Berlin, January 9, 1961, 5 p.m.

395. Paris for Embassy, USRO, CINCEUR Thurston and Finn. Following is our assessment current East German situation and Sov/East German policy re Berlin at year's end--with particular reference to recently concluded IZT and FedRep-Sov trade negotiations. It appears clear that Sov/East Germans did not expect from West such strong reaction to East German harassments as IZT cancellation. Presumably when Ulbricht sold Khrushchev on his Berlin program at Sochi last Aug they counted on no such Western reaction. It now evident that FedRep cancellation of IZT raised spectre of such serious economic difficulties for USSR/GDR that they felt obliged defer program for time being. Alternative was undoubtedly new Berlin crisis which most inopportune from Kremlin's point of view at this time.

Cessation of IZT would have seriously endangered GDR production plans, slowed rate of economic growth, and forced revision of East German contribution to CEMA plans. GDR would have had to forego long heralded goal of overtaking FedRep in per capita consumption of certain consumer goods by end of 1961. These economic costs were avoidable only if Sov Union could assure adequate substitutes for products normally obtained in West Germany.

Despite Khrushchev's announced willingness fill gaps if IZT agreement not renewed, all circumstances and available evidence suggest Sovs unable to assume economic burdens resulting from rupture IZT and unwilling to assume political burdens resulting from creation new Berlin crisis. Detailed Sov-East German examination of requirements must have revealed impracticability at this time for Sov bloc to fill them in event of breakdown FedRep-GDR trade because of continued East German utilization of 1) West German engineering standards (DIN, Deutsche Ingenieur Normen) and 2) certain Western raw materials not obtainable from bloc sources. Recent statements by Ulbricht and other East German leaders have stressed need to adjust East German production machinery to bloc standards and raw materials in order reduce dependence on West. Intelligence reports confirm planning activities in GDR economic apparatus directed toward this end.

Sov and East German IZT policies and propaganda since Sept 30 and Behrendt's conduct of negotiations have been consistent with over-all Kremlin policy to avoid precipitating Berlin crisis until another effort made to negotiate Berlin settlement with new U.S. administration. Timing IZT abrogation of course was not of Sov-GDR choosing. Acceptance of challenge which abrogation represented, particularly in form of interference with West Berlin traffic allegedly based on IZT Annexes, would have precipitated major Berlin crisis.

Main trends SED policies are following lines noted ourtel 277 Dept, 257 to Department./2/ Here is increasing evidence that creation of Staatsrat in Sept after Pieck's death has given Ulbricht further instrument for increasing his direct personal power. Under Stoph, who is emerging quietly as Ulbricht's chief deputy, GDR ministries are being transformed into unified administrative structure directly controlled from a single party-government office. We take for granted that in final top-level SED discussions on IZT negotiations, Ulbricht and Stoph threw their support to GDR Trade Minister Rau against those who were opposing any GDR "concessions".

We continue be impressed by fact that SED, while carrying out major administrative changes, is avoiding policies against own population which would dissipate SED energies. Reasons for this are both economic and political. Absence overt farmer resistance to collectivization has not resolved regime's agricultural problems, particularly in light of growing shortages of milk and pork. Possibility also exists that during late winter and early spring agricultural situation will further deteriorate due to inadequate fodder supplies. Industrial production below expectations during last half of 1960 and SED now carrying on major propaganda campaign calling for increased industrial production, perhaps as prelude to introduction higher work norms.

Refugee flow, which currently has reached proportions surpassed only in "crisis years" of 1953 and 1956, poses perhaps most important socio-economic problem. Regime has sought ineffectively to reduce flow primarily by concessions to professional groups where loss particularly damaging. Consideration of drastic control measures is presumably being held in abeyance, pending negotiations on Berlin.

Soviet/East Berlin decision reach "compromises" with FedRep on IZT and FedRep/Soviet trade agreement does not, of course, indicate any change in basic Soviet/East German policy regarding Berlin. Both "compromises" were worked out with relatively little loss face from Communist standpoint. Gain from Western standpoint, however, has been demonstration to Soviets/East Germans that West can and will react strongly even to minor encroachments on Berlin status.

Next following message sets forth views West Berlin leadership on current situation in light of conclusion IZT agreement./3/

Lightner

Washington, January 28, 1961.

Dear Mr. President: I am enclosing a brief chronology/2/ of the principal events relating to Berlin which have occurred since the ending of the first Berlin blockade in 1949.

The period covered falls logically into two parts: that from the end of the blockade until November 1958, when the current "Berlin crisis" began; and the period of the crisis itself since that time.

The first period was characterized by the readjustment of relation-ships between the Western Allies and West Germany, between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, and between the USSR and East Germany. The last of these in particular set the stage for the Soviet efforts to dislodge the Allies from West Berlin which began in 1958.

Soviet tactics to force Western abandonment of Berlin which, with the measures taken by the West to counter them, dominate the second period, have gone through two general phases. The first was a direct threat to Allied access rights to West Berlin. This threat took the form of the stated intention of the USSR to sign a peace treaty with East Germany and turn over to the latter the control over Allied access to the city. In the second phase, which has developed since the abortive Summit meeting of May 1960, the Soviets have substituted a gradual de facto transfer to the East Germans of control over Berlin, and in this framework harassment has centered on West German-Berlin relations. A return to the earlier tactic may be expected and may in fact be heralded by Khrushchev's reiteration on January 6 in Moscow of his threat to sign a separate peace treaty./3/

Meanwhile, relative quiescence has prevailed since Western, particularly West German, countermeasures brought an easing of East German harassment of Berlin access late in 1960.

There are indications that Mr. Khrushchev will be returning to the Berlin question in due course, perhaps soon. The chronology will give you a brief outline of the past pending a full briefing./4/

Faithfully yours,
Dean Rusk/5/

Washington, February 2, 1961.

SUBJECT
Berlin

PARTICIPANTS
German Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe
Dr. Swidbert Schnippenkoetter, Counselor, German Embassy

The Under Secretary
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, GER

The Under Secretary said he wanted to point out that he personally had on several occasions taken a strong position in conversations with Ambassador Menshikov on Berlin. He had described Berlin as a symbol of the present situation in Central Europe. This symbol had to remain as long as the situation remained unchanged. He had asked Menshikov how the Soviets would view an increase in the Allied garrison of Berlin by 5,000. When Menshikov had indicated this would be unwelcome, the Under Secretary had made the point that a diminution of 5,000 in the strength of the West Berlin garrison would likewise have the same symbolic importance for the Berliners. The present level of the garrison, as an expression of this symbol, could not simply be changed. It would be a mistake to look for less strength on the part of the new Administration, the Under Secretary continued. If anything it would react with greater strength to prove its seriousness. This was not a good area for venturesome diplomacy. The new Administration was prepared to take the risks involved. Our new President was both intelligent and tough, and would not be pushed around. He had both convictions and courage. However, he was anxious to find the beginnings of solutions. Ambassador Grewe commented that this was precisely his impression and constituted the burden of his own reports to Bonn. He believed his Government felt the same way about the new Administration. This was why he had actually received no instructions to query the Department as to why the President's State of the Union address/2/ did not contain any reference to Berlin, despite certain murmurings in the German press on this score. The Under Secretary said he was in a position, based on personal knowledge of how the speech was prepared, to assure the Ambassador that there need be no cause for worry on this point. A reference to Berlin had actually been in the first draft, but this was eliminated in the process of revision in the White House in order to avoid highlighting this issue. The Under Secretary said we should take the lid off our imagination and examine these problems together confidently. After all the Germans had achieved what was described as "a miracle". Ambassador Grewe said he did not like this term "miracle" applied too frequently to Germany. It raised expectations about German performance too high.

Moscow, February 4, 1961, 1 p.m.

1839. Following views on German and Berlin problems naturally reflect only situation as seen from Moscow. I believe Soviet interests as such lie rather in German problem as whole than Berlin. Soviet Union interested in stabilization their western frontier and Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, particularly East Germany which probably most vulnerable. Soviets also deeply concerned with German military potential and fear West Germany will eventually take action which will face them with choice between world war or retreat from East Germany. Even if Berlin question were settled to Soviet satisfaction, problem of Germany would remain major issue between East and West. Berlin question nevertheless of great current importance because:

1) It is convenient and forceful means of leverage for Soviets;

2) Khrushchev's prestige personally involved;

3) Soviets under some pressure from Ulbricht regime;

4) Present situation in Berlin threatens stability of East German regime because of its use as escape route, base for espionage and propaganda activities, etc.

Soviet proposals on Berlin designed enable East German regime eventually to acquire it or as minimum completely neutralize it, while to some extent saving face for West.

Impossible to assess with any degree accuracy Khrushchev's present intentions. He obviously trying build up case for settlement favorable to him this year. Extent to which he will have to push this problem will be affected by developments in other fields, both of general nature such as trade and disarmament as well as progress on other specific political problems. I believe that if there were some activity on German problem indicating that real progress could be made after German elections, he would be disposed not bring matters to head before that event. This might mean, for example, a meeting of Foreign Ministers having a first session in September in preparation for summit conference after elections. If there is no progress on this specific question and little progress in general situation, Khrushchev will almost certainly proceed with separate peace treaty. Extent to which he would then allow East Germans attempt gradual strangulation of Berlin would depend upon other developments, but separate treaty would in my view bring about highly dangerous situation and one which could get out of control.

Looking ahead there appears to be no prospect of reunification Germany on basis satisfactory to us for many years. I therefore believe best approach to settlement of German problem would be modification of package proposal we put forward at Geneva/2/ but with period before they would have to face free elections increased. I think Khrushchev might accept 10 year period but 7 years or even less might be negotiable. Some of military clauses could be modified and we would of course have to insist upon maintaining our position in Berlin and having better guarantees for access especially for West Germans. We could of course not be sure Soviets would carry out such solution even if agreed upon but it would have advantage of gaining time for both sides and would be solution under which we could keep our principle of self-determination intact. This appears to me of great importance as it is one of best cards we have with which to oppose Soviet policies./3/

Thompson

Washington, February 17, 1961, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
US-German Relations

PARTICIPANTS

US
The President
The Secretary of State
Walter C. Dowling, Ambassador
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
Pierre Salinger, Press Secy
Mrs. Nora Lejins, Interpreter

Germany
Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Foreign Minister
Dr. Hilger van Scherpenberg, State Secretary
Dr. Hasso von Etzdorf, Ministerial Director
Mr. Heinz Weber, Interpreter

In his preliminary remarks the President stated that he was very much interested in arranging a meeting with Chancellor Adenauer. He hoped that von Brentano would convey to the Chancellor the appreciation of the US Government for the cooperation and friendship of the German government during the past years. The new Administration hoped that this cooperation would continue also in the future and that all mutual problems would be worked out satisfactorily.

The Foreign Minister in turn thanked the President for his recent communication to the Chancellon./2/ Lack of time had prevented the Chancellor from replying so far. He wanted the President to know, however, that the President's letter was of great assistance to Chancellor Adenauer, coming as it did, the day before his departure for the Paris talks.

President Kennedy then briefly mentioned some of the points he wished to discuss with von Brentano. First among them, of course, was the Berlin question. He was anxious to have the Germans understand the reason why his Administration had so far been silent on the Berlin question except for a comment made in answer to one question during a press conference. This did not by any means signify a lessening of United States interest in the Berlin question. As long as there was a lull, however, he had not wanted to provoke either action or comment in the matter. But the President expected renewed pressure by the Soviets in the coming months. He asked the Foreign Minister for his comment and suggestions concerning possible effective means with which to counter the subtle pressures which the Soviets were expected to exert.

Von Brentano assured the President that Germany fully understood the stand taken by the US and was in complete agreement with the President's procedure in the matter. Moreover he, too, felt sure that there was no need to raise the question now. We would have to deal with it sooner or later. Von Brentano expressed his belief that Soviet pressure would again be exerted, if only in response to pressure by the Soviet Zone of Germany. The leaders of the Soviet Zone cannot tolerate the symbol of a free Berlin in the midst of their Red zone. This is completely unacceptable to them, and therefore they will do all in their power to stimulate the Soviet Union to action with regard to Berlin. Von Brentano feels that such pressure will be dangerous only if it should result in a blockading of Berlin. For instance, this might be the result if the Soviet Union were to sign a separate peace treaty with Eastern Germany. The Foreign Minister himself is of the opinion that the Soviets will hesitate to take any drastic steps with regard to Berlin as long as they know that the Western Allies will not tolerate any such steps. Under such circumstances the Soviet Union may continue to threaten but will not take any actual steps for some time to come.

The President further probed to get the Foreign Minister's thinking as to the possibility of the Soviet Union signing a separate peace treaty in spite of the fact that it is clear that the West will not tolerate any infringement of Western rights in Berlin, and then using this as an indirect means for increasing pressures on Berlin. Von Brentano agreed that this, no doubt, would be the intention of the Soviets, but he doubts that the Soviet Union will take the final step in this direction as long as the West remains firm. The President came back to this point several times, indicating the gradual development of Soviet action, that is, first signing a separate peace treaty--while continuing the status quo in Berlin for a certain length of time--and then resorting to further and more drastic action. The Foreign Minister agreed that this danger definitely existed and that the signing of a separate peace treaty would result in a step by step development, eventually leading to drastic action with reference to Berlin. The first step would be the signing of the treaty. Secondly, the Soviet Union would give instructions to the East Zone to continue Berlin traffic and other arrangements very much as at present, if anything according the Allies even better treatment than now. This, however, would be followed by a change and definite action. While the Foreign Minister considered this a possibility, he appeared to feel very strongly that there would be no action on the part of the Soviets as long as they knew that the Allies would not stand for any disruption of the present Berlin arrangement. He admitted, of course, that the danger existed and was latent.

The President then asked whether Brentano thought that United States difficulties in the Congo, Laos, and in Latin America would increase the chances of trouble in Berlin. The Foreign Minister thought so. He then indicated that the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, who had been recalled to Moscow and had not been expected to return to Bonn before the end of March, had just returned. He was to see Chancellor Adenauer this evening at 6 p.m. for the purpose of delivering a message from Khrushchev./3/ While von Brentano did not know the content of the message, he felt that it was most likely an answer to the Chancellor's letter concerning the repatriation issue. The Foreign Minister would not be surprised, however, if Khrushchev's message were to contain a proposal for bilateral German-Soviet talks. The Foreign Minister wanted it understood that Germany had no intention of engaging in such talks.

The President then inquired into the prospects of future German-Polish relations. The Foreign Minister replied by calling attention to the primary problems complicating German-Polish relations:

1. The Oder/Neisse frontier question. Millions of former residents of the area east of this line, now living in West Germany, bitterly oppose the acceptance of this frontier.

2. A much more difficult problem to solve is the following: Germany has maintained the principle of not entering into or maintaining diplomatic relations with any country recognizing the Eastern Zone of Germany and thereby accepting the Soviet concept of two German states. Germany has no intention of giving up this principle and proved this in its action vis-a-vis Yugoslavia. The Foreign Minister feels that Germany acted correctly, for if nothing had been done when Yugoslavia recognized the East Zone of Germany, other countries might have followed suit.

Within these limits, it is Germany's intention to do everything possible to improve German-Polish relations. As a beginning--if Poland agrees--Germany wishes to establish a trade mission in Poland, which would maintain constant contact between the two countries. Since Poland is the freest and most accessible of the Iron Curtain countries, Germany also wishes to intensify its cultural contact with this country in the hope of eventually influencing political thinking thereby. The Foreign Minister has some doubt as to the success of this venture since preliminary talks, carried on in Copenhagen between the Polish and German Ambassadors stationed there, were not very promising. The Polish Ambassador was most negative in his reaction.

The President asked whether the initiative for the Beitz talks had come from the Chancellor or the Foreign Minister, or whether it had been that of Beitz himself. The Foreign Minister indicated that the initiative had been Beitz's, but that he had kept in touch with the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister both before and after the talks. The President inquired whether additional similar talks were scheduled. He stated that the United States, too, is very much interested in more cordial relations with Poland. In view of the uncertainty of success in this respect, the President was very much interested in knowing how Germany fared in this area. The Foreign Minister stated that Germany was definitely desirous of continuing the efforts to establish closer relations with Poland by continuing further talks in Copenhagen. He pointed out that there are at present fairly substantial trade relations between Germany and Poland and that some effort will be made to utilize these relations, which moreover are to be further expanded and improved, to increase German political influence as well. (Dr. van Scherpenberg interjected at this point that the German-Polish trade talks were, of course, perfectly normal procedure on a governmental level. Moreover, Germany was presently envisaging a long-term trade agreement with Poland.)

Secretary Rusk asked at this point whether many Polish students were presently studying in Germany. The Foreign Minister replied that there were a small number of Polish students in Germany and a small number of German students in Poland.

[Here follow five pages of discussion of the U.S. balance of payments, disarmament, and the communiqué. For final text of the communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, March 13, 1961, pages 369-370.]

Washington, February 23, 1961.

SUBJECT
East-West Relations, Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Ambassador Gavin
Mr. McGhee, S/P
Mr. Davis, EUR
Mr. McBride, WE
Mr. Beigel, WE

Ambassador Alphand
M. Lebel
M. Winckler
M. Manet
M. Pelen

Ambassador Alphand said that the French Government was perfectly satisfied that there should be US-Soviet bilateral discussions on outstanding problems but thought that there should be prior agreement among the three Western Powers and accordingly that there should be tripartite discussions on this range of matters. He expressed appreciation to the Secretary for the US views which had been conveyed to him and to Ambassador Caccia on February 22./2/ He added that the French Government had the same view as ours with regard to a Summit Meeting and felt strongly that there should not be a second Summit failure and that such a meeting should not be scheduled unless at least some small progress could be envisaged.

Ambassador Alphand continued, saying that while there were critical problems in Cuba, Laos, Congo, and throughout Africa, nevertheless in the French view Berlin remained the number one problem even though the Soviets have been silent on this issue recently. Ambassador Alphand referred to Khrushchev's recent letter to Adenauer which the French thought was important./3/ He noted that although the tone had been polite, the substance of the letter had been very tough. The French had an extensive summary of the letter and it appeared to reiterate the two-Germanies concept and the free city of Berlin idea. Also the French were under the impression that the letter underlined the necessity and urgency of an agreement on Berlin and Germany. He thought that the Soviets, in effect, had asked for talks on this subject with the Western Powers. He said that Gromyko had recently indicated the need for reaching a German settlement in 18 to 24 months.

Ambassador Alphand continued saying that the French view was that the two-Germanies concept and the free city of Berlin idea remained basic to Soviet thinking and that they were anxious to achieve these ends. The French thought that there might be an interim arrangement to be followed by a more definitive settlement. If this did not happen the French feared that the Soviets would conclude a separate peace treaty with the East Germans and then arm this Communist regime to greater extent than at present.

Ambassador Alphand continued, saying that Berlin was our first worry and that the French feared some major Soviet move before the German elections. Khrushchev needs to demonstrate some progress on Berlin. He then asked what the US view was with regard to talking with the Soviets on Berlin and whether we thought it would be necessary to enter into such discussions before next fall. He then asked what was our appreciation of the possibility of a unilateral Soviet action to sign a peace treaty with East Germany and also whether we believed we should oppose by force interference with access from West Germany to Berlin. He wondered if the views of the new Administration on these questions were different from those of the previous Administration.

The Secretary, in replying, agreed with the overriding importance of the Berlin question, especially to the Federal Republic. He said that while the new Administration has not thus far had to comment in detail on the Berlin question this did not mean that we did not attach a tremendous measure of importance to this problem. At the present time we were in a period of civility with the Soviets even on the Congo. In fact it was a wait and see period. However, he agreed with Ambassador Alphand that the Soviets would probably not leave the Berlin issue alone for long. He noted that Ambassador Menshikov, prior to President Kennedy's inauguration, had been seeing a number of political figures and indeed had been extremely active. On the whole in these contacts Ambassador Menshikov had made rather gruff and blunt statements regarding Berlin and had stressed the urgency of the problem. However, since the inauguration the Soviets have not mentioned Berlin to us here nor have they mentioned it to Ambassador Thompson in Moscow. He reiterated that while Ambassador Menshikov has not raised this problem with us, we did not expect this situation to last. Berlin as a subject was tabula rasa since January 20. We did not think it particularly wise to challenge the Soviets on this issue when they were not pressing.

Ambassador Alphand inquired if we were also acquainted with the Khrushchev letter to Adenauer. The Secretary replied in the affirmative. Mr. Davis noted that we had a brief summary of this and expected to receive the text soon.

Ambassador Alphand said that in fact we could really consider that the Berlin question was again on the table because the Soviets had raised it with the Germans. He said the French were not entirely clear whether the Soviets would make any more formal requests for talks with the Germans or with the three Western Powers. In any case he thought there would be some move before the German elections and he repeated that Gromyko had stated that the Soviets would conclude a separate peace treaty unless there were an agreement within the period of 18 to 24 months.

The Secretary asked if the French believed that the Germans had any different appreciation of the Berlin question from that of the three Western Powers. Ambassador Alphand replied in the negative. The Secretary asked if the recent Franco-German talks/4/ had led the French to believe that there could be any further development of de facto talks between the East Germans and the West Germans. Ambassador Alphand said that they had held some discussions and that more might develop but that it would probably be insufficient to bring about any Berlin settlement. He said the West Germans had told the French that they were prepared to continue de facto talks. The Secretary said that if the Soviets could not obtain any concessions it was of course possible that they would conclude a separate peace treaty. He wondered if the talks between the East Germans and the West Germans threw any light on the degree of danger of such a treaty. Mr. Davis said that such a treaty would be dangerous both because it would enhance the status of East Germany and because it would lead East Germany to have certain greater freedom of action on the access question.

Ambassador Alphand said the French felt that the Soviets and East Germans would attempt progressively to sever access to West Berlin after the signature of a separate peace treaty. He said that this whole problem had been discussed extensively both here and in Bonn and that contingency planning had been in progress to cover the actions we should take in the event of progressive steps against the access routes. He said this planning was not completed in the countermeasures field. He thought we should discuss further the moves which might be taken in the trade field, navigation, etc., against the East Germans in the event of a separate peace treaty in order to prove that we are serious on these problems. However, our experts need new instructions. He said that the US and French positions were somewhat more in favor of a positive line on countermeasures than were the British. He said he considered this an urgent problem. Mr. Winckler said that there had also been planning for a probe on the Autobahn if necessary but said that this was of course a dangerous operation. However, this was being considered in the event that the Soviets did sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany and then move against the Berlin access routes. Mr. Winckler also thought it was important to take clear and coordinated actions around the world in this event in order to show our firmness before Khrushchev's prestige was engaged and to give him an opportunity to back down. He thought it was important to take measures of this type before any military showdown. In response to Mr. McGhee's question, Mr. Winckler said he thought these could be in the travel field, in shipping, and in control of aircraft. He said it was very important that these measures should be coordinated to show our seriousness and perhaps lead to the Soviets backing down. The Secretary inquired if the French thought that the Soviets attach more importance to preventing the reunification of Germany or to the liquidation of the Berlin situation. Are they more interested in establishing East Germany firmly than in a Berlin settlement on their terms which would lead to a crisis? Ambassador Alphand referred to Khrushchev's talk with de Gaulle in which the Soviet Premier had stressed that the division of Germany must continue./5/ Ambassador Alphand said he personally could not really give priority to one of these problems over another in the Soviet view but that certainly the reunification of Germany under conditions of freedom was unacceptable to the Soviets because it would wreck their position in the Satellites. However, he did not think that the Soviets could continue to stand the Berlin situation indefinitely either but stressed the importance of Western firmness.

The Secretary agreed that we must continue our planning work here. He said the US Administration was studying this problem and then would want to have tripartite talks. He said we were not planning any initiative with the Soviets on Berlin. Ambassador Alphand said the French were not planning any initiatives either since we did not want anything from the Soviets but merely wish to retain our rights. The Secretary said we were in Berlin rightfully and legally. However, the Soviets could make difficulties and we did not want to dramatize these to the point which would require military action. He wondered if even more important than the military problem was the question of maintaining the life of the city of Berlin. He thought that if the Soviets moved against Berlin they would take almost imperceptible steps to tighten the noose around Berlin. A sophisticated approach of this type would of course be hard to react to. We thought this was much more likely than any blunt action.

The Secretary noted that Ambassador Menshikov in his talks around town had stressed the urgency of some action because of Khru-shchev's personal situation. He wondered as to the meaning of this. Ambassador Alphand thought that perhaps Khrushchev wished to prove to the Chinese Communists and to the Satellites that his policy paid. Therefore he needed some success. Furthermore he thought that Khrushchev was under pressure from East Germany to get rid of the Berlin showcase. The Secretary said Ambassador Menshikov had given some impression that there were pressures on Khrushchev to achieve a settlement. In any event, he concluded that the Berlin problem would not sleep for long. Ambassador Alphand said that perhaps there was a Chinese problem although he believed that the leaks on Soviet-Chinese differences had been well organized.

The Secretary concluded that the Berlin problem was a most serious one and that we should pick up our contingency planning and consult urgently together. He thought it was important to tell Khrushchev soon that we were serious about Berlin even if the situation remained fairly quiet. He said it would appear that there was no division of policy between the United States and France on this issue. Ambassador Alphand agreed but said that the British position was slightly different. The Secretary said we would discuss this problem with Macmillan here soon and that Berlin unfortunately fundamentally would remain a pressure point on which the Soviets could exert pressure on us because of the difficult situation on the ground.

Washington, February 28, 1961, 9:43 p.m.

1402. You should not take initiative in raising subject of Germany and Berlin, but if Khrushchev does so within established pattern Soviet position, suggest you respond along following lines:

New Administration has been giving careful consideration to problem of Germany and Berlin. It is recognized that entire situation in Germany and also that in Berlin is unsatisfactory both to Western Powers, Germans themselves, and Soviet Union. Central difficulty is of course continued division of Germany. United States continues to believe that there will be no real settlement of this problem or any real tranquillity in Central Europe until Germans are permitted to unite themselves. This will remain our constant aim and we would not be disposed to take any legal or other definitive steps which would appear to perpetuate or legalize this division. However as a practical matter we recognize that chance of its achievement in immediate future is remote. It is therefore necessary to endeavor to deal with this abnormal situation and we would like to emphasize that abnormality stems from situation in Germany as a whole and cannot be applied exclusively to one element thereof such as West Berlin. It would seem realistic common sense therefore to endeavor to find some means which would, without prejudicing the future unification of that country, to try, insofar as possible, to reduce its potentiality for serious friction which could lead to grave international dangers. It would seem to us that to change existing status in Western Berlin alone in direction of a free city of some other scheme of like nature would merely be to increase the abnormality of an already abnormal situation resulting from division of city and of country.

One possibility would be to leave city as it is, since however unsatisfactory, it has been nonetheless since 1948 at least tolerable for both sides. Soviets however maintain that some form of peace treaty with East German regime is essential and say they cannot wait much longer before proceeding to sign such peace treaty. We cannot physically stop them from doing this, although we could not approve or underwrite treaty confirming the division of Germany and would have to oppose it publicly. On other hand, a major practical interest to us would be effect which such peace treaty would have on our position in Berlin. Provided arrangements similar to those under the Bolz-Zorin exchange of letters/2/ were still continued in effect, we could try to make necessary adjustments.

Mr. Khrushchev maintains that since Soviets have put forward their proposals on Berlin, it is now turn of West to make counter-proposals. West has made proposals in past which proved unacceptable to Soviets. We shall consult with our Allies and in due course put forward our ideas. Mr. Khrushchev must surely understand however that it would not be possible for US to contemplate a change in city in regard to our rights and position in Berlin which would represent material change for worse in Western position in that city or access thereto.

Comment: If Ambassador feels there is any possibility of misunderstanding, it should be made clear that discussion does not constitute reply to recent Soviet memorandum to FedRep.

Rusk

Moscow, March 10, 1961, 5 p.m.

2147. Germany-Berlin. After I had completed presentation of our views,/2/ Khrushchev noted I had not mentioned question of Germany which he wished to discuss. He said USSR had put forth its position in aide-mémoire to Adenauer,/3/ that it did not want to change anything in Germany, but to fix juridically what had happened after the war. He said to leave situation as is would cause instability and encourage German revanchists. Khrushchev mentioned that memo to Adenauer was published at German request.

He said he had explained Soviet position in great detail to Pres Eisenhower who, he said, had understood him, but Pentagon and others had deliberately exploded relations between us and sent U-2--a matter, he said, which is now in past.

He said he would like very much that Pres Kennedy would regard with understanding Soviet position on German question.

USSR would like to sign treaty with Adenauer, Ulbricht, and US. He said he knew US desired unified Germany; USSR also desired unified Germany; but to conceive of unified Germany under either Adenauer or Ulbricht would be unrealistic. Therefore, he said, let us conclude a treaty with two Germanies; we are ready to stipulate with US a provision of whatever is necessary for people of West Berlin to have political system of their own choice. He said borders now exist between FRG and GDR and between Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia and these borders have legal force but need legal foundation. He said Socialist camp does not want to expand toward West and, if US were ready to proceed on peace treaty, they would be prepared state this when working out treaty. If our wartime Allies do not agree, he said, SU and all Socialist countries will sign treaty with GDR. He said West Berlin is bone in throat of Sov-American relations. If Adenauer wants to fight, he said, West Berlin would be good place to begin conflict.

Khrushchev said his frank desire, and he wanted us to understand him, is not to worsen but to better relations with US. He said he had expressed similar desire to Adenauer but did not know yet his reaction. If Adenauer understands me correctly, he said, this would render it impossible for aggressive forces to use present situation for preparation of aggression, and everyone understands what this would mean with nuclear weapons.

I said President was reviewing our German policy and would wish discuss it with Adenauer and other Allies before reaching conclusions but was difficult to see how there could be much change in our basic policy. I inquired whether if free city of Berlin were created there would be special clause in peace treaty referring to this setup. When he replied in affirmative I inquired why then separate treaty could not make provision for continuance present situation in Berlin. Khrushchev asked what attracted West so much in Berlin. I answered we had given our commitment to people there and our prestige now committed. Khrushchev asserted Western powers are in Berlin because of Germany's capitulation. He said no one is encroaching upon West Berlin. Let us work out together a status for West Berlin: we can register it with UN; let us have joint police force on basis of peace treaty which can be guaranteed by four powers, or symbolic force of four powers could be stationed West Berlin. He made clear this would not include East Berlin which was capital of GDR.

He said USSR would join whatever guarantees necessary to keep West Berlin the way it is and added that no threat from any side would be allowed which would assure us that its prestige would not suffer. He said West Berlin had little meaning for USSR.

I said I agreed USSR had no interest in West Berlin, but pointed out Ulbricht was very much interested. Khrushchev replied Ulbricht would also sign commitment on West Berlin.

In line with Deptel 1402,/4/ I said situation abnormal in Berlin because situation in Germany is abnormal; we were not disposed to legalize permanent division of Germany; we were re-examining whole problem of Germany and Berlin; problem of Berlin unsatisfactory to both of us as is entire situation in Germany. I said I thought much could be done to reduce tensions and expressed opinion President would be disposed do something to help relaxation. I added I did not want to attempt to reflect President's views until he had chance to consider problem and discuss it with our Allies.

Khrushchev replied he would like President to understand correctly Soviet desire to solve German question. If agreement could be reached, he said, it would be big success. He said he did not know how Germans thought, and said Adenauer was very aggressive now. He said he wanted US and USSR to be together on this question--this would be understood correctly by our peoples--just as during war we shed blood together against Germany. He said peace treaty does not involve any factual change in situation. I interjected, "except Berlin". He replied they were not striving for West Berlin. He said USSR even ready to keep such a capitalist island as West Berlin within GDR because USSR in 1965 will surpass West Germany in per capita production. He added USSR would surpass US in per capita production in 1970.

He reiterated that if Pres Kennedy and they could sign treaty it would mark great progress in American-Sov relations. If treaty were not signed, American and Sov troops would continue to confront each other, and situation would not be one of peace but one of armistice. If treaty were signed, it could be implemented by installments including gradual withdrawal of American-Sov troops from Germany, and atmosphere of trust would be established to help disarmament negotiations./5/

Thompson

Washington, March 10, 1961.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Wilhelm G. Grewe, German Ambassador
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

The President opened the conversation by inquiring with respect to Ambassador Grewe's plans. The latter said he would leave on Saturday and make four speeches in Boston before leaving for Europe on Tuesday. He expected to return about March 25 or well before the Chancellor's visit. Some discussion ensued as to the nature of the speeches the Ambassador would be making and the audiences he would address relating particularly to the speech scheduled to be made at Ford Hall in Boston.

Referring to the Adenauer visit the President said that the Vice President was anxious to have the Chancellor come to Texas during his visit./2/ The Vice President had suggested that the Chancellor visit a new medical school, then come out to his ranch for a reception. The President said we would of course make the arrangements and provide the transportation. The Chancellor could fly out in the morning by jet and return either late that evening or the next morning. The President thought that if the Chancellor had the time he would find this trip interesting. The Ambassador took note of the suggestion and said he would be glad to take it up with the Chancellor.

Ambassador Grewe then referred to his discussion with Mr. Ball with respect to the US statement on the recent revaluation of the German mark./3/ He observed that the use of the phrase, "useful but modest step," in the US statement had created difficulties in Germany since it led to speculation that the revaluation would be followed by further appreciations of the value of the mark. The President expressed appreciation for this problem, which he was sure had not been intended by the Treasury. The statement had not been brought to his attention before issuance and he personally felt that it would have been better simply to say that this was a "helpful" action. The President said the Ambassador could certainly assure the German Government that the United States did regard this action as "helpful". He added, however, he felt that the Dutch action following upon the German revaluation had confused the issue and added to speculation. He agreed that efforts must now be made to convince people generally that this was a finished operation.

The Ambassador then commented on the statement of Ambassador Harriman during his visit to Germany to the effect that the United States Government did not consider itself bound by the previous negotiations with the Soviets with respect to Germany and Berlin./4/ He himself understood exactly what this meant, that it referred to compromise proposals which had been put forward, and that sort of thing. However there had been some speculative interpretation in Germany to the effect that the statement meant that the new Administration was reviewing and might change fundamental positions on Germany. He suggested that perhaps the Brandt visit would offer the occasion for the issuance of a communiqué which would clarify the US stand. The President and Mr. Kohler both commented in this connection on Secretary of State Rusk's press conference the previous day/5/ and the Ambassador agreed that this had gone far toward putting Mr. Harriman's statement in context both as regards US policies toward Germany and Berlin and as regards our specific intention to maintain Allied rights in Berlin.

The President said we would consider the question of what we would say to the press on the occasion of the Brandt visit. However he reminded the Ambassador that his government had been anxious, while remaining firm and determined with respect to Germany and Berlin, not to seem to be throwing out a challenge to the Soviet Government. He felt that it was better to let the challenge or threat come from Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev.

Ambassador Grewe then gave the President a brief report on the Khrushchev letter to Chancellor Adenauer of February 17 and attached memorandum setting forth in adamant terms the Soviet intention to move ahead on Germany and Berlin along the lines of their established position of a peace treaty and "free city." In this connection he referred to the consultation which had taken place by the quadripartite ambassadorial group in the Department with respect to this memorandum./6/

The President expressed his interest and was assured that the Khrushchev memorandum to Adenauer had been sent to him by the Secretary of State for his information together with the Western analysis agreed by the ambassadorial group. He requested that he also be provided with some of the Soviet press commentaries on this subject which Mr. Kohler undertook to do.

The President then brought up the subject of the conversations which had taken place with respect to the US balance of payments and German surplus positions. He commented that the appreciation of the mark in fact would increase the cost of support of our troops in Germany which at the rate of $350 million plus per annum was one of the major factors in our balance of payments accounts. He said that during the past couple of weeks our gold losses had been stemmed but that we had lost a lot during January and that the problem remained with us. He very much hoped that the Germans would move forward toward helping to alleviate this problem referring in particular to possible reductions in costs in Germany and German procurements in this country. He repeated that the fact that the Dutch had followed suit in appreciating the value of the guilder had removed some of the good done by the mark appreciation but again repeated that this had been "helpful" and that it was now necessary to make it clear that there would be no more changes. The President again referred to the importance of a continuing German aid program to the lesser developed countries and Ambassador Grewe hastened to assure him that while the amounts involved were subject to Parliamentary action he was authorized to confirm Foreign Minister Brentano's commitment to a continuing aid program.

Ambassador Grewe then brought up the recent story in the Star based on Secretary Rusk's letter to Secretary McNamara hinting a possible change in US approach to military strategy. He expressed appreciation for the clarifying statement which the Secretary had issued the following day but emphasized the great interest of the FRG in this question./7/

The President said that he hoped to send a statement to Congress within a matter of days on the strengthening of American military programs and posture./8/ He continued to say that he had been examining the state of our contingency planning with respect to Berlin and that this was a subject which he would want to discuss with Chancellor Adenauer. He said he also wanted to discuss this with Prime Minister Macmillan and with the French to be sure that we are all firmly agreed as to what we would do in case we have a Berlin crisis again this year.

The President then went on to say that he had read an article in the Washington Post this morning which purported to find anti-German sentiment on the increase in the United States. He said that while he recognized that there was some anti-German sentiment here he was sure that there was much less than in most other countries notably the UK. He said that in fact he had been impressed by the fact that the US press had for the most part taken the side of the Germans in the controversy that arose on the occasion of the visit to Bonn of former Treasury Secretary Anderson. He said also that it was generally overlooked how many Americans there are of German origin who have good will toward Germany. Ambassador Grewe observed that he thought the President's role with respect to this matter was decisive. He felt that American sentiment very closely reflected the views expressed by the leadership of the country. The President said he thought that if we continued to seek agreements on the problems under discussion and announced the results from time to time that this in itself would help to improve the feeling in the United States toward Germany. He himself wanted to see the most harmonious relations prevail between the two countries. In this connection he said that he had been surprised to find that there are many Germans in the Vice President's section of Texas. Chancellor Adenauer was greatly admired in the United States and was regarded as the symbol of a new Germany. He thought that the Chancellor's travel to Texas might be a very useful demonstration and he hoped that it would be possible for the Chancellor to do this. Ambassador Grewe agreed and repeated that he would certainly discuss this with the Chancellor probably toward the latter part of next week.

The Ambassador asked if the President could then summarize the subjects which he would like to discuss with the Chancellor. The President then itemized: (1) Germany and Berlin; (2) Contingency planning; (3) Economic and financial problems; (4) Aid to the underdeveloped countries and (5) Western strategy. He added that the Secretary of State might have others to suggest.

At the end of the talk Ambassador Grewe reverted to the question of a statement to be made on the general views of the new Administration toward Germany and Berlin, either on the occasion of the Brandt visit or on another appropriate occasion. He said he would put forward a personal suggestion that this statement might refer to and confirm the Administration's support of the Paris treaties of 1954. This would in fact cover all the main points without making it necessary to go into detail in a public statement. Moreover since these treaties were the results of discussions which had gone far forward under the Truman Administration such a reference would have the effect of leaving the impression that the US policy on the problems of Germany and Berlin was really bipartisan in nature.

The President indicated that he would consider this suggestion and would wish to review the Paris treaties in this connection.

Washington, March 13, 1961, 3-3:40 p.m.

SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The President
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

Germany
Willy Brandt, Governing Mayor of Berlin
Franz Krapf, Charge of the German Embassy
Egon Bahr, Press Chief of West Berlin Senate

After the initial greetings, the President opened the conversation by asking Mayor Brandt about the forthcoming elections in Germany. The Mayor replied that he expected some campaign activity in May and June but the real political campaign would only get underway intensively in August.

The President then asked how the Mayor saw developments with respect to Berlin's status. The Mayor said that he thought the critical date to keep one's eye on was the October Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. He believed that Khrushchev might feel the need of some kind of action favorable from his point of view prior to that meeting. In reply to the President's question as to what the nature of such action might be the Mayor expressed the opinion that it would probably not be in the form of a serious military confrontation. However, Khrushchev might decide to go ahead with his program to conclude a separate peace treaty with the "GDR".

The President then turned to the subject of the current situation with respect to access to Berlin and movements within the city. The Mayor referred to the recent incidents of harassment by the East Germans of movements between West and East Berlin and expressed the opinion that the outcome of this in the form of the December arrangements between the East and West Germans had been satisfactory from the West's point of view. On the general subject, he acknowledged that it was always possible to have movements into West Berlin from West Germany harassed and made difficult in which case conditions of life in West Berlin would worsen. However, he pointed out that considerable stockpiles of fuel and food had been built up in the city which he thought would be sufficient for the population to carry on for about six months. This would give time to find a way out of an impasse.

The President then commented that of all the legacies of World War II which the West had inherited Berlin was the most difficult; he expressed the opinion that we would just have to live with the situation. He then asked the Mayor's opinion as to whether, if Khrushchev concluded a separate peace treaty, the East German regime would act independently of Moscow. The Mayor replied in the negative. He added that the "GDR" had tried to act independently some times in the past but again expressed the opinion that the December experience had exercised a restraining influence. Fundamentally he could not believe that the "GDR" would be permitted to go very far on its own. In reply to the President's further inquiry as to whether he thought Berlin constituted a real point of weakness for the "GDR" Mayor Brandt replied in the affirmative. He said he thought that the existence of West Berlin made it hard for Ulbricht to stabilize the East German regime. The comparison between West and East Berlin was very visible and was unfavorable to the East. Moreover West Berlin provided an escape hatch for the Eastern population. He said that he had to admit that the existence of West Berlin was a serious problem for the Ulbricht regime which had absolutely no mass basis of support, unlike, for example, Poland.

The President then referred to the problem of the Oder-Neisse border with Poland and asked the Mayor what he thought the Federal Government could do about this. The Mayor replied that it would be difficult for any West German Government to go beyond the Allied position that frontier questions could only be finally settled at a peace conference. It was his personal view that if ways could be found to bring the peoples together the question of the boundary would become a less important one. He felt that particularly if some small modifications could be made in a frontier it would be possible to find a solution satisfactory to both Germans and Poles. The President questioned whether since reunification of Germany was not foreseeable perhaps for a period of many years, this question might not increasingly exacerbate relations between Poland and the FRG and all the West. The Mayor said that this could be the case but pointed out that in any event it was for the time being the East German regime and not the FRG which bordered on Poland. Some further discussion ensued on this problem and its relationship to the German desire for reunification, the importance of which relationship the President recognized. The Mayor confirmed that this was a basic consideration, then went on to say that he thought it might be possible to have some new discussions with the Russians. Possibly they could be brought to agree to some kind of self-determination for Germany after a period of perhaps 10 years with some interim arrangement during that period. The President questioned whether there would be any Russian interest in such a proposal as the Mayor described it. He said he did not see how it would serve their purposes to agree to any self-determination formula. The Mayor said he had no specific idea as to the acceptability of such a formula to Moscow unless perhaps it could be accomplished as a result of broader agreements between the East and West in such fields as arms control. In this connection the President asked the Mayor's views as to whether proposals for Central European neutral zones or arms zones such as had been propounded by Mr. Kennan some years ago might be useful./2/ To this the Mayor replied with a firm negative.

The President commented that it was very hard to find grounds for agreement with the Soviets on anything beyond perhaps removing restrictions on crabmeat and this was really unilateral. He then went on to ask the Mayor's estimate as to whether economically the "GDR" was a net help or burden to Moscow. The Mayor replied that on balance he felt that Moscow still regarded the "GDR" as an economic asset. He repeated, however, that the regime was politically weak and said it was possible that some day the Soviets might find a reunified non-Communist Germany better and easier to deal with from their point of view than a corrupt Eastern regime. In reply to a further question from the President about the reliability of the "GDR" armed forces the Mayor expressed the opinion that the "GDR" Army might fight effectively elsewhere but that in the case of a really significant move on Berlin they were likely to revolt and go over to the other side.

The President then asked how the people in Eastern Germany regarded West Berlin. The Mayor said that West Berlin provided a window to the West for the East German population and kept alive their hopes for an eventual change. Without West Berlin this hope would die. As to the relations between the governments of the two parts of the city the Mayor referred to East Berlin Mayor Ebert as "the least known" Mayor in the world. He said that he had never met Ebert and that the relationship between the two parts of the city was limited to technical contacts. Expressing his appreciation for the Mayor's explanations, the President said he had not been in Berlin himself since 1949.

The President then turned to the question of the balance of payments situation, referring to his recent talks with FRG Foreign Minister von Brentano./3/ He said that in addition to his concern about our own situation he is now worried about the British who are having considerable trouble in the wake of the revaluation of the German mark. The Secretary of the Treasury had informed him that the British had lost nearly 10% of their gold reserves during the last 7 days. He felt that the West needed some mechanism which would prevent the development of these imbalances and the strain which gold surpluses put on the international payments situation. He said that the cost of maintaining the United States troops in the Federal Republic, which ran to about $340 million in gold every year, was a major factor in the U.S. situation. The problem here was not one of relief for the U.S. budget or the U.S. taxpayer but of the outflow of gold. The United States is committed to keep the U.S. divisions on the continent and he personally believed our conventional forces should be strengthened so that we would not be faced with the question of using nuclear weapons in the middle of Germany. The President feared that some mistaken impressions had resulted from the Anderson visit to Germany last December. He wanted to make it clear that the United States was not asking for budgetary relief but was concerned about its gold position and also that of the British. If the FRG should undertake a program of aid to the underdeveloped countries this might ease the strain. Also and more directly it would be helpful if the costs of maintenance of our troops could be reduced and if the FRG should procure additional military equipment in the United States. He felt that there had been considerable misunderstanding of U.S. purposes. Mayor Brandt agreed that some misunderstanding had developed in connection with this problem. He was personally convinced that we needed not only military strength but cooperation in political strategy, in the conduct of a peace offensive and in the economic field. He was very pleased with the establishment of the OECD. The importance of these questions was understood and agreed to in Germany by both major parties. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) would not oppose agreements reached by the present Government to help in the balance of payments situation and to undertake a program of aid to the lesser developed countries. Indeed on aid they would be inclined to go even farther than the present Government. He thought that these questions would play no real role in the electoral campaign. The only questions on the part of the SPD would be as to how the Government planned to work these matters out, particularly from a budgetary point of view.

The President commented that we had some differences of opinion in the United States as respects economic aid programs but he thought there were no important differences as to the need for military preparedness. He referred in this connection to the "grandiose" requirements which had been put forward by General Norstad as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Concluding, he remarked that maybe when the elections were over we could get down to details on these questions.

The President then explained to the Mayor that his administration had not said much about Berlin since the new administration took office. It was too bad that Ambassador Harriman had recently had to make a statement in Berlin which had necessitated further statements by Secretary Rusk and then further clarifications. He had felt that it was better on this subject to leave the launching of any challenges to Khrushchev. Mayor Brandt said that he entirely agreed to this position and the West Berliners fully understood it. He said that if the Soviets do raise the Berlin question again he felt the West should seek to broaden the agenda. The President commented that he had thought Mayor Brandt's point in his television interview as to the inadequacy of the UN as a guarantee for Berlin following the Congo experience was well made. He also commented in this connection that Senator Mansfield had been active in promoting this idea. However, the President said he recognized that the UN would not provide a satisfactory guarantee for West Berlin. The Mayor said he believed that the presence of United States troops was not only the essential guarantee for Berlin but also important for the United States itself. He felt that if the Russians were told clearly that the U.S. position there must not be challenged then they would have to respect this position.

The President asked the Mayor's views as to the build-up of the FRG military forces. The Mayor replied that he thought the situation was satisfactory in this respect. Perhaps it could be improved some-what though he did not believe that the FRG should build its forces up to the point where it would create fears among its neighbors in Western Europe and arouse apprehensions in Eastern Europe. It was necessary to find the right level.

The President then referred to the political campaign and asked what the issues would be. When the Mayor replied health, schools, public roads and the like, the President commented that this sounded very familiar to him. The Mayor then went on to say that there would be no serious foreign policy issues in the campaign. Originally there had been major differences between the SPD and the CDU in the foreign policy field, particularly as relates to the approach to Moscow and the East; however, both parties had had to face up to the realities over the last 10 years, during which the Soviets had given no reason for hope. Both parties were convinced that West Germany could only go with the West. The President commented that when he had met Chairman Ollenhauer of the SPD in 1956 this had been a period when the SPD had been more optimistic as regards negotiations with the Soviets. Mayor Brandt replied that that time had gone by. The SPD was now firmly committed to the West.

The meeting concluded with discussion of and agreement on the statement which would be made to the press by Mayor Brandt regarding his talk with the President.

Moscow, March 16, 1961, 7 p.m.

2209. Eyes only Secretary. Department repeat as desired. All my diplomatic colleagues who have discussed matter appear to consider that in absence negotiations Khrushchev will sign separate treaty with East Germany and precipitate Berlin crisis this year. My own view is that while he would in these circumstances almost certainly conclude separate treaty, he would likely attempt avoid immediate crisis on Berlin by some method such as instructing East Germans not to interfere with Allied access for given period time. Important factor in Khrushchev decision will be status overall Soviet relations with West at time decision made. Present outlook is not favorable. While I anticipate possible settlement Laos question, conflict between East and West in Africa and South America will continue if not increase; test ban agreement extremely doubtful; continuation general disarmament discussions even if arranged will be prolonged and at least in beginning unpromising. Moreover in judging intentions new administration Soviet judgment will be influenced by number of steps we have taken indicating greater militancy on our part. Among these are increased arms budget including preparations for guerrilla warfare, adverse decision on licenses for machine tools to Soviet Union, President's public appeal for support RFE/2/ which Soviets consider dedicated to overthrow Communism in Eastern Europe, and President's request for modification MDA Control Act/3/ in context of hopes for freedom of Eastern European peoples. Latter two actions particularly likely support Chinese arguments accommodation between East and West impossible. Apart from fact I think it unfortunate President became personally involved in RFE appeal I do not question wisdom or necessity these actions, and Soviets by declaration 81 Commie Parties/4/ and Khrushchev's Jan 6 speech have given us ample justification. Nevertheless believe we must appraise realistically possibility Soviet conclusion US determined on what they label "positions of strength" policy.

Von Brentano's statement re desirability Four-Power negotiations/5/ on peace treaty would appear indicate he has endorsed Kroll's idea of such negotiations as means of stalling until after German elections. This appears to me highly questionable tactic. So far as I have been informed Brentano did not raise this question in discussions Washington.

At such time as President might meet Khrushchev, discussion German problem will be main point exercise so far as he concerned and he will probably make decision on his German policy at that time or shortly thereafter. Therefore seems to me important that President have something to say to Khrushchev on this problem which will at least give us possibility of avoiding separate treaty and subsequent Berlin crisis. It goes without saying that one aspect would be convince Khrushchev we would fight rather than abandon people of West Berlin. If this is all that is done, highly probable Khrushchev will force issue, provided his colleagues cannot or do not prevent him, before October Party Congress. Regardless outcome this particular issue, and it could involve real possibility of world war, we would almost certainly be led back to intensified Cold War relationship.

Alternative would seem to be that President should be able hold out prospect of negotiations which would as minimum enable Khrushchev save face somewhat and maintain his position. Although I continue believe Khrushchev is probably better from our point of view than anyone likely to succeed him, I do not advocate this course of action in order keep Khrushchev in power as I do not believe that in first place we know enough about workings this regime to calculate accurately effects our actions on leadership and in any event do not believe this should be basis of US policy. I do believe we should attempt avoid actions which likely lead to dangerous situation if this possible. Among possible actions I consider most advantageous would be modification Western package peace plan proposal which in effect would defer showdown on German reunification for say seven years combined with British and US declaration reassuring Soviets on frontier problem and an interim Berlin solution which would reduce temperature this trouble spot and give West Germans better basis for access. Even if Soviets should refuse discuss it, our having put forward such proposal would weaken ability Khrushchev to take drastic action on German and Berlin problems. As absolute minimum I suggest President could discuss with Khrushchev possibility of both sides defusing Berlin problem by unilateral actions on both sides without formal agreement. On our side this might mean giving up RIAS and reducing covert activities based on Berlin.

If we expect Soviets to leave Berlin problem as is, then we must at least expect East Germans to seal off sector boundary in order stop what they must consider intolerable continuation refugee flow through Berlin. Wish point out that recent Western actions in Berlin have shown that, unless we change our policy, price we would exact for such action is virtual boycott East Germany. Seven year plan, which I advocate, should in itself ease Berlin problem by reducing refugee flow which disadvantageous to West in many respects.

I note von Brentano in discussion with President evaded being pinned down on facing consequences of separate treaty as Adenauer has always done. Suggest it would be advisable that Adenauer know before he visits US that President expects him present some clear ideas or proposals on handling German and Berlin problems and that at present stage simply putting off decisions is not good enough, as we will in effect by inaction be choosing between alternatives. One of these is conclusion separate peace treaty and he should be prepared give President answers to such questions as following: if policy is not to take positive steps to prevent separate treaty

1) How do Germans suggest we handle situation in which following separate treaty, East Germans begin slow harassment and strangulation Berlin economy without disturbing Allied access;

2) What action does he propose we take if East Germans close sector boundary and what would West Germans do;

3) How would West Germans handle refusal East Germans deal with them on such matters as trade and incidents except on formal governmental basis.

In this connection I do not believe West Germans can effectively desire of East Germans to continue trade as in these circumstances I believe Soviets would furnish East Germany requisite economic support although reluctantly.

Thompson

Washington, undated.

THE PROBLEM OF BERLIN

1. However impelling the urge to find some new approach to the Berlin problem, the facts of the situation strictly limit the practical courses of action open to the West. The history of the Berlin crisis since November 1958 gives little reason for thinking that a lasting settlement can be devised which, under current circumstances, will prove acceptable to both East and West.

2. A vital component of the Western position is the maintenance of a credible deterrent against unilateral Soviet action. Without this the full geographic weaknesses of the Western position in Berlin will have decisive weight in any negotiation. Thought should be given to the possibility of developing and strengthening deterrents other than the pure threat of ultimate thermonuclear war.

3. While we should give further thought to the possibility of providing some all-German "sweetening" for continuing discussion of the Berlin question with the Soviets, this should be done in awareness of the unlikelihood that any real step towards German reunification can be achieved within the calculable future under circumstances acceptable to the West. It also seems questionable that any all-German approach acceptable to the West will alone suffice to provide the basis for even a temporary solution to the Berlin problem.

4. In planning, therefore, for further negotiations with the Soviets, the Western Powers must prudently expect that they will once again be forced to discuss the question of Berlin in isolation. While a number of possible proposals for an arrangement on Berlin should be further studied to see if they contain the basis for an acceptable settlement, it seems unlikely that any of them will be negotiable with the Soviets or, if negotiable, acceptable to the West.

5. Under certain circumstances, however, the Western Powers might find it desirable to aim at a limited arrangement involving stabilization of existing access procedures, allowing for a certain East German role but preserving the essentials of the Western position. Alternatively they might find it necessary to contemplate the execution of their contingency plans.

6. While the Western contingency plans as now developed constitute a highly articulated system of related stages, we must realistically expect the intrusion of unpredictable factors as well as possible efforts by our Allies to reopen, under crisis conditions, certain aspects of contingency planning.

[Here follow sections on political and military aspects of the Berlin crisis (pages 2-3), the problems of deterrents (pages 4-5), a position for possible four-power negotiations (pages 6-7), discussion of Berlin in isolation (pages 7-9), and contingency plans (pages 9-10).]

Washington, April 5, 1961.

SUBJECT
A Possible Visit to Berlin

One of the difficulties is how we can bring home to the Soviets our determination to maintain our rights in Berlin. Words may not be enough. Representatives may be ignored such as was Ambassador Thompson's warning with respect to Laos. Thus it may be worthwhile to consider whether it may not be wise to stake the President's prestige deliberately to the freedom of Berlin. The forthcoming visit with President de Gaulle may provide such an opportunity. I would recommend that consideration be given to a brief stop in Berlin either just before or just after the visit to Paris. The advantages seem obvious: (1) It would signify as nothing else our commitment to the freedom of Berlin. (2) It would be a tremendous boost for the morale of the population of Berlin. (3) It would make a profound impact in public opinion in the Federal Republic.

The disadvantages (together with some counter arguments) seem to be:

(1) The concern such a trip might cause to the Secret Service. Still I cannot imagine a Communist attack on the person of the President.

(2) There will be a delicate political problem because of the German electoral campaign. If Brandt receives the President, Adenauer must be there too. Or else, a stop in Bonn has to be added and this might open the floodgates.

(3) The Soviets may construe such an action as a provocation and it might focus unnecessary attention on Berlin. This seems to me excessively timid. The Soviets will not drop the Berlin issue through an oversight. They have raised it at every opportunity since the inauguration.

Henry A. Kissinger

Washington, April 5, 1961, 3:10 p.m.

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH
PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN
WASHINGTON, APRIL, 1961

SUBJECT
East-West Issues: Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
The President
Secretary of State
Secretary of the Treasury
Secretary of Defense
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Dean Acheson
Ambassador Stevenson
Ambassador Harriman
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Foy D. Kohler
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen
Mr. G. Mennen Williams
Mr. Walt Rostow
Mr. George McGhee
Mr. John M. Steeves
Mr. Harlan Cleveland
Mr. William C. Burdett
Mr. James W. Swihart

U.K.
The Prime Minister
Lord Home
Ambassador Caccia
Sir Norman Brook
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
Honorable Peter E. Ramsbotham
Sir Patrick Dean
Mr. John Russell
Mr. Philip de Zulueta
Mr. John Thomson

The President observed that Mr. Acheson was leaving tomorrow for a meeting of the World Court. He said he would like to have Mr. Acheson present his views on Berlin and the subject could be followed up tomorrow./2/

Mr. Acheson said that the President had drafted him to get some studies started. He had not reached any conclusions. The studies would be ready when he returned. However, some rough conclusions came to mind which might lead the Prime Minister to associate him with the late-lamented administration. In his thinking he approached the problem of Berlin with certain semi-premises. 1) There was no satisfactory solution to the Berlin problem aside from a resolution of the German problem. It did not look as though the German problem were in train for immediate solution. 2) It looked as though the Soviets would press the Berlin issue this year. 3) There was no solution that would not weaken the Western position. The same issues would confront the West under less favorable circumstances. He could see no proposals on the whole of Germany which would be better or put the West in a more favorable position.

Thus, Mr. Acheson continued, we must face the issue and prepare now for eventualities. Berlin is of the greatest importance. This is why the Soviets press the issue. If the West funks Germany will become unhooked from the Alliance.

Political and economic preparations are not adequate. There has got to be some sort of military response. When we would come to a military response is a difficult question. We would not do so on purely formal matters such as who stamps a pass. The important test is substantial interference with the traffic to Berlin, civilian or military. There are three ways of responding; on the air, on the ground or by threat of a nuclear response. The last is not wise, but reckless and would not be believed. This brings us to a ground or air operation. He would hope we could go further than before with Live Oak, etc.

Since the last airlift, Mr. Acheson went on, developments have caught up with the use of aircraft as a test of will. He did not think the West had the capability of forcing access versus determined Russian opposition. What is needed is a test of will. He hoped the test would make it clear to the Russians that Western interest in access was more important than Russian interest in stopping access. Berlin is vital to us but not to them. Ground-to-air missiles have been brought to a point where aircraft cannot survive. Thus there could be no test of the will in the air. The Russians would just shoot down the planes with their rockets. On the ground it would be really possible to raise some ugly questions for the Russians and to show the Russians that it was not worthwhile to stop a really stout Western effort. A small battalion or a brigade is not enough. A division with a division in support is required. Then we would have a very formidable weapon. If the Russians were to throw some twenty divisions at it our division could get back. If East German divisions were used maybe we could take care of them. There would be no resort to nuclear weapons. We would have tested and seen whether Russia was really firm on Berlin. If Russia threw back the attempt all would rally and realize the need to increase their efforts as happened after Korea. Concluding, Mr. Acheson said that these were only his ideas for study. They had not been considered by the President.

The President said that he had not come to a conclusion over what to do, but he had concluded that the state of planning was not adequate. The plans he had seen were not serious enough. The tests proposed did not escalate the matter to a sufficient height. The President asked for the Prime Minister's views.

Lord Home inquired whether in saying that the tests did not escalate high, the President was referring to a land probe. The Russians would have made a choice if they shot down a plane. Mr. Acheson replied that the air probe would face only East Germany with a choice. All sorts of hindrances could be placed in the way of air transport. They could shoot down one or two. What do we do? Bomb the ground?

The Prime Minister said that Mr. Acheson had made a most important point when he stated that he would regard the test as stoppage of military or civilian supplies. He had never thought the British people would go to war over who stamped a document. What counts is what happens to Berlin. Will supplies move? Mr. Acheson's statement is a tremendous advance in the U.S. position. Just saving face with the East Germans was not important. It was a great change. Mr. Acheson interjected that it might become so if after every change the East Germans made another.

The Prime Minister expressed the view that a division would be a very vulnerable body if moving on a narrow front. It would have to spread out if trouble started. Secretary McNamara said he thought of it as something to test intentions. More definite plans were required and he hoped these could be worked out.

The President asked the Prime Minister if it was his view that we should begin with an air lift. The Prime Minister replied that he was told what was done in 1949 could not be done now.

Lord Home maintained that a certain amount of planning was being done. There was plan B calling for action on the ground, which General Norstad favored. Then there was a plan for a garrison air lift and another for a civilian air lift. Quite a bit was being developed. Mr. Acheson commented that the plans are limited by what the planners are authorized to do. Secretary McNamara said we were ill-prepared to carry out a probe. Secretary Rusk recalled that back in 1948 and 1949 the plans were on such a scale that the tests could be stopped by small boys. Now we should make such a serious commitment that the Government's responsibilities would be engaged.

The Prime Minister pointed out that one difficulty has been the forum. Originally the planning was tripartite. Then the Germans were brought in. Now there is talk of NATO. Secretary McNamara said that the planning had been largely tripartite but even the tripartite planning was not very effective. There were two questions. A. To what extent should the planning be broadened? B. What training should there be for the plans? Lord Home asserted he was not convinced by the idea of sending in a division. Bridges could be blown and the division isolated. Mr. Acheson said this would not happen until the Elbe was reached. The President asked about the likelihood of use by the Russians of East German divisions. Mr. Acheson replied that it was the unofficial view in State that this would be very hazardous for the Russians. If the East Germans deserted the Russians would be in great difficulty.

The President commented that it had been said the plans were being developed without commitment. In addition to planning we must make some commitments. It would be helpful to us to know if Britain thought the land probe was too hazardous. If a peace treaty is signed should we go to the air lift. We should come to conclusions. The Prime Minister commented that signature of a peace treaty was not an act of war. The question would arise if the people of Berlin were deprived of what to live on. The West used to take the line that because they had occupied Berlin they had a duty to feed the populace. The Russians accepted the thesis. It was doubtful that they would do so now. Mr. Acheson warned that it was dangerous to be too legalistic. All rests on the spirit of the people of Berlin. For effective purposes there is no difference whether the supplies are for troops or civilians.

Lord Home pointed out that British doubts have been about the ground probe. The garrison air lift, civilian air lift, and diplomatic action seemed sensible. The British should have another look. The Prime Minister agreed.

Ambassador Stevenson recalled that Gromyko had recently said to him that he was disturbed to see that the United States underestimated the seriousness of the Berlin situation.

The President requested Secretary McNamara to obtain more detailed information regarding an air lift, especially on such matters as radio communication, supplies and so forth. He added that we should then reach conclusions on the effects of various forms of blockade. We should make up our own minds. Both of us would be talking to Adenauer and we must be in agreement on what to say. Secretary Rusk suggested following up the matter with the Foreign Office to see if new instructions could be sent to the planning group. The Prime Minister said the discussions should be on a bilateral basis first. The Prime Minister said he was suggesting bilateral discussions on what to do if access were blocked. The President agreed to the proposal.

Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar pointed out that the East Germans already control all civilian supplies. If this control were extended to control over supplies to our troops it would affect morale in Berlin. The result would be the same as a blockade.

Secretary Rusk said that additional bilateral planning would be helpful but we should get into tripartite planning rapidly and then talk with the Germans. Time was an important factor. Lord Home pointed out that German security was not good.

Lord Home expressed the view that on the political side our position was very negative. If Khrushchev says he wants a conference and that he wants to make a change we have no alternative to propose. Khrushchev will then say he is going to sign a treaty with the East Germans. Is it necessarily true that our presence in Berlin based on right of conquest, which is wearing thinner year by year, is on stronger grounds than if based on a treaty? Khrushchev has made only one public commitment--end the occupation status. He could get off this hook if we signed a treaty for a period of 10 years or such. Mr. Acheson replied that Khrushchev was not on a hook and thus does not have to be taken off one. He is not legalistic. Khrushchev is pushing to divide the Allies. He is not going to make any treaty that would help us. Our position is good as it is and we should stick by it. The real problem is reunifying Germany. If we start talking of signing of a treaty we will undermine the German spirit.

Lord Home asked is it not possible that Khrushchev does not wish to pass control to the GDR? Secretary Rusk stated that we would not want to agree that we are in Berlin by the grace of Khrushchev. We are there as the result of war. We are great powers and do not wish to be driven out. This is a fresh fact every day. If we transfer over to a treaty we are starting down a slippery slope. Lord Home admitted that perhaps this was right but added the right of conquest was wearing thin. Mr. Acheson suggested that perhaps it was our power which was wearing thin. Lord Home said he did not like going into a conference knowing we had nothing to offer./3/

Secretary Rusk commented that the dilemma we have faced all along is that we have never made our case in public opinion. The Soviets have violated most post-war agreements. They have collected all that was promised to them and are trying to cut down on what we thought was our part of the settlement.

April 6, 1961, 3:45 p.m.

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH
PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN
WASHINGTON, APRIL, 1961

SUBJECT
East-West Issues: Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The President
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Bruce
Ambassador Bohlen
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Foy D. Kohler
Mr. John M. Steeves
Mr. William C. Burdett

United Kingdom
The Prime Minister
Lord Home
Sir Norman Brook
Sir Frederick Hoyer Miller
Ambassador Caccia
The Honorable P. E. Ramsbotham
Mr. John Russell
Mr. Philip de Zulueta

The President asked why Khrushchev had not moved on Berlin. Was it the danger of the Western response? What made him hold off? Lord Home thought Khrushchev was not going to lay off much longer. Ambassador Bohlen commented that the Soviets were subjected to strong importunities from the East Germans. They had large stakes in the East German regime but it would not work so long as Berlin was there. He recalled the Khrushchev offer in 1958 of a Free City. Probably, Khrushchev really thought he was offering quite a thing. He underestimated the Western reaction, which was quite sound. The Soviets then realized that they had raised a tremendously dangerous issue. Insofar as Soviet interests are concerned, Ambassador Bohlen said, he did not consider that Berlin was worth the risk. But, the Soviets also had to think of their Eastern empire. It would be imprudent to believe that the Soviets would exercise restraint forever. In addition, the China thing was forcing Khrushchev to be more militant. He was being outflanked from the left. The Secretary observed that a good deal depended on what position Khrushchev felt he must be in before the next Party Congress. Ambassador Bohlen thought he could not stand a political defeat. The question was to what degree are the Russian rulers prepared to use and risk the power of the Soviet state in Laos, etc. They are supporting "wars of national liberation"!

The President expressed the view that if Khrushchev were held off by the threat of a direct encounter with the West we should consider how to build up this threat. On Berlin we have no bargaining position. Thus we ought to consider, as Mr. Acheson suggested yesterday, how to put the issue to Khrushchev as bluntly as possible.

The Prime Minister recalled that we did have a long, drawn-out negotiation with the Soviets on Berlin and at one time it looked as if we were going to succeed. It was something like a play. We maintained that at the end of the play we should be in just the same position we occupied at the beginning. The Russians insisted that at the end there should be a change. Mr. Kohler thought that there was never any real prospect of an agreement acceptable to us. All the Russians were willing to offer was to allow the status quo to continue for a year or so. Lord Home remarked that he was never happy going into a negotiation with no position at all. We might go in with the idea of getting a continuation of the present situation for say three years. During this period, the East Germans and the West Germans could come to some agreement.

The Prime Minister noted that Khrushchev never offered a Free City including both sections of Berlin. Mr. Kohler pointed out that we once did but the offer was immediately dismissed. Lord Home thought we ought to offer something like that again. Mr. Kohler advised doing everything possible not to have to negotiate on Berlin. Lord Home asked whether international opinion would permit our not having any negotiation at all. The Prime Minister thought that if Khrushchev puts up an ultimatum he will then say, let's have a conference. The Soviets, Lord Home said, would put up a proposal which looked reasonable.

The Prime Minister inquired whether we thought Khrushchev would act on Berlin before or after the German elections. Ambassador Bohlen said the West Germans were trying to induce him to wait. The Secretary referred to a speech by Khrushchev saying he would not wait.

Ambassador Bohlen stressed that it was important to broaden the basis of our stance. It tended to be overly legalistic. We could take the position that we have an obligation to the people of Berlin. Our difficulties stem not from our position, but from the nature of the problem. He did not see the Russians accepting an interim arrangement unless there was a clear implication that we would accept a Free City afterwards. Lord Home maintained that there could be a temporary period during which the East Germans and the West Germans could work out their own arrangements. Ambassador Bohlen countered that they could do so under the present situation.

The Prime Minister observed that we had made a peace treaty with West Germany without asking the Russians. If they did the same with East Germany it should not matter to us. Mr. Kohler pointed out that the Russians now have exactly the same arrangement with East Germany as we do with West Germany. Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar added that they now wish to go further. The Prime Minister said that if the Russians and ourselves have similar arrangements then we might propose a joint guarantee for the freedom of Berlin. Although our rights based on conquest are strong juridically, as the years pass, they become slightly tarnished. Ambassador Bohlen said that we should rest on the fact that we took certain obligations to the people of Berlin. This would give us a broader basic stance.

The Prime Minister referred to the importance of the public presentation. We should maintain that we are preserving the right of the people of Berlin to have a Free City. He asked whether the United States would mind going for a treaty instead of the occupation status as the basis for our position. Ambassador Bruce explained that the Soviets were occupying so strong a position on Berlin that we could not afford to give away what little we possessed. We would be giving from so little to start with that to give a little would be to give all. We cannot disregard the consequences that would flow in Central Europe and in West Germany from weakening on Berlin. We find that the West Germans are less willing to fight for Berlin than we are. We--the United States, the United Kingdom and France--are protecting the honor of the West. There is no question whatever that more yielding will set off an exodus from Berlin that will be really shocking. We must maintain our forces there. We should be prepared to discuss Berlin but not to negotiate on Berlin. If the Russians cannot better their own position except to our disadvantage, it is best for us to keep things as they are. Seeking an alternative is not feasible. Reducing the Berlin garrison would have little military effect; it is just a police force. The question is one of prestige. If anyone is lacking in imagination it is the West Germans. A real consideration which would influence the Soviets materially would be the de facto recognition by West Germany of East Germany. This would be a matter of great consequence which would affect all of Central Europe.

Lord Home asked again whether it was really impossible to negotiate. We could come forward with a plausible plan, for example, for a Free City. We must have a negotiating position. Ambassador Bruce said that there is a plan which would be sustainable but which we have not advanced. This would involve two points: (1) Berlin should be treated as a whole because of the circumstances under which it was constituted; (2) there should be no difficulties in access. The original sin was in not defining a land corridor, although it was clearly understood at the time that there was to be a land corridor. This would be a reasonable position.

The President remarked that we ought to pursue the matter of what our negotiating position should be if we do enter negotiations. We should also consider the suggestions of Mr. Acheson about what we should do if it is necessary to act. If we are going to be talking to the French, we should determine what our position will be. The Prime Minister suggested adding to point 9 of the agreed paper/2/ a study of our position in any negotiation. Mr. Kohler pointed out that we have a working group on Berlin and that we have staffed out every conceivable plan. Developing a negotiating position is not the problem. The fact is that there is no satisfactory solution.

The Prime Minister said we should study whether to propose a Free City. What, in fact, happens if the Russians sign a treaty and do nothing further? What happens if they sign a treaty and do something? The difficulty lies in the area between the two questions. The Russians would probably move gradually. We should study at what point we would break.

The President said obviously the deterrent effect of our response keeps the Communists from engaging us in a major struggle on Berlin. It was necessary to keep the fact of the deterrent well forward.

The Prime Minister asked, what happens when Adenauer dies. Sooner or later, say in five or ten years, the Russians might try to offer the West Germans unity in return for neutrality. Is it so dangerous for the Russians to make this offer? It would be a great temptation for the West Germans. Ambassador Bruce maintained that the great objective of Soviet policy in Europe was somehow to obtain governmental possession of West Germany. Then the German question would cease to exist. Unless the German population was exterminated in the process, the Soviets may misapprehend what is likely to happen in West Germany after Adenauer dies, believing that this event will accrue to their advantage. The extraordinary character of the immigration to West Germany is revealing. The immigration is weakening all that goes to make up the normal life of a state. Last year there were 200,000 immigrants, 70 per cent from vital age groups. The East Germans are pressing the Soviets to stop the flow. Ambassador Bohlen expressed doubt that the Soviets could offer the bait of neutrality. They could not afford to sell the "wave of the future" down the drain.

Chancellor Adenauer visited the United States April 12-13, 1961, at the invitation of President Kennedy. On April 12 he met with the President at 10 a.m. to discuss NATO; a memorandum of this conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XIII, Document 98. At 4 p.m. Adenauer and Brentano met with Rusk to continue the discussion on NATO and to talk about Berlin. Memoranda of these conversations are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. At 10:30 a.m. on April 13 Adenauer and the President met again to discuss disarmament, aid to underdeveloped countries, and European integration. Memoranda of the first two conversations are ibid.; a memorandum of the conversation on European integration is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XIII, Document 4. At noon they met to discuss Berlin, the balance of payments, and NATO; the memorandum of the conversation on Berlin is printed as Document 17; memoranda of the conversation on the other two topics are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. At 4:30 p.m. Adenauer and Kennedy met again briefly to discuss NATO and the final communiqué. Memoranda of these conversations are ibid. For the Chancellor's account of the visit, see Erinnerungen, 1959-1963, pages 91-97; for Grewe's account of the visit, see Rückblenden, pages 461-464, which also includes a description of meetings not recorded in the formal memoranda of conversation.

Washington, April 13, 1961, noon.

ADENAUER VISIT
Washington, April 12-13, 1961

SUBJECT
Berlin Contingency Planning and Related Matters

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The President
Secretary Rusk
Ambassador Dowling
Assistant Secretary Kohler
Mrs. Lejins (Interpreter)

Federal Republic
Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister von Brentano
Ambassador Grewe
Dr. Karl Carstens
Mr. Weber (Interpreter)

In the discussion in his private office the President raised the question of contingency planning for Berlin. He stated that Mr. Acheson agreed to take this task upon himself, and he understood that Mr. Acheson had discussed the problem to some extent with the Chancellor./2/ The President indicated that he had discussed contingency planning with Mr. Macmillan during the latter's recent sojourn in Washington/3/ and intended to discuss it also during his pending talks with General de Gaulle. The important thing which the President wished to point out was that he had noticed that there was a considerable gap between the planning done in such instances and the commitments which the various nations understood they had taken upon themselves. This was true of such organizations as SEATO as well as of other international bodies. The President wanted to have an absolutely clear understanding on the part of the United Kingdom, France and Germany as to what each country, including the United States, understands its duty to be in concerted action, so that it will be possible to know exactly how each country is going to respond to the pressures which may arise. Again, the President reiterated that there was a tremendous gap between the plans that had been worked out and what the various nations were willing to do in the case of need. The President had discussed this problem with the British and he felt that the end of these talks had by no means been reached so far. He was seriously concerned with finding out what the response of the various nations would be under certain conditions. The United States, for instance, wanted to strengthen the military probes in the event that a formal blockade of Berlin might be undertaken by either the Soviets or the East Zone. He indicated that he could hardly say that any final conclusions in this matter had been reached with the British and he felt that discussions would probably have to continue for some time. Moreover, he had no idea at all of what General de Gaulle might be prepared to do. For this reason he was very anxious to get the Chancellor's ideas on how best to strengthen the Allied position with reference to Berlin and how best to demonstrate that the United States was firm in its stand on Berlin. He wanted to hear what the Chancellor envisaged the role of Germany to be in the case of an emergency, especially as regards the commitment of German troops.

The Chancellor replied that the last time he had had a chance to discuss this matter was with Mr. Dulles./4/ It had been at a time when Mr. Dulles was in Bonn. At that time he gained the impression that there was no firm agreement on this matter between the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Mr. Dulles had told him that the planning had reference only to a case in which United States forces might be cut off from access to Berlin, regardless of who it was who cut them off. Mr. Dulles had indicated that in such a case the United States would be prepared to resort to the use of troops, if necessary tanks, and would not hesitate to use atomic weapons if this appeared warranted. At that time there had been no talk whatsoever of German forces being used beyond the Iron Curtain, since, according to Mr. Dulles, this entire situation was regarded by the United States as the direct outgrowth of the 4-power agreement on Berlin.

The Chancellor made reference to his discussions of yesterday with the Secretary./5/ He had not gone into any detail because it had not been the right time to do so. He agreed, however, that this entire matter was a very complicated one, which needed to be discussed quietly and calmly. This morning, then, the Foreign Minister had told him of his talk with the Secretary,/6/ and he fully agreed with the conclusion reached on that occasion that, first of all, the problems of international law which were involved in the Berlin situation should be carefully studied and only after that should the matter be taken up again for consideration. The Chancellor indicated that he had wanted to inquire what agreement there existed among the United States, France and United Kingdom and that he had hoped this matter could be discussed to some degree. He realized, of course, that agreements among the three countries were affected, and the situation changed, by the NATO guarantee with reference to Berlin./7/ In any event, the Chancellor wished to assure the President that Germany was prepared to do everything that appeared necessary in the interest of this joint cause.

The President returned to the matter of the gap between the military planning and the commitments and policy decisions by governments in this respect. He stated that the Secretary could testify that such a gap had been found to exist with reference to SEATO in regard to the Laos situation. He presumed that there might well be no clear idea on the part of the various countries as to exactly what the commitment of each nation was with reference to Berlin under the guarantee made by NATO. It was most necessary, however, to find out exactly where everyone stood and how far each government was prepared to go, and the President was going to make every effort to try to clarify this situation.

The Chancellor agreed that a gap of this kind definitely existed, that it had to be closed, and that it was necessary to find out how far each government felt committed.

The President then asked the Chancellor what he thought might happen in Berlin this summer, for example. The Chancellor smilingly replied that he was no prophet. Anything or nothing could happen. When Khrushchev made his threats in November 1958, no one would have expected that he would wait as long as he did.

At this point Foreign Minister von Brentano made reference to his statement during the conference at the State Department the afternoon of the previous day (April 12, 4:00 p.m.)./8/ At that time he had said that there existed two possibilities with reference to Berlin: (1) Some kind of direct action by the Soviets similar, perhaps, to the blockade of some years ago. The Foreign Minister hardly thought that any such action would be forthcoming. (2) The Foreign Minister felt that the Soviet Union might enter into a separate peace treaty with the Soviet Zone, as it had previously announced, and transfer the obligations for the control of access to Berlin to the GDR, accompanied, of course, by carefully prepared instructions as to how to proceed. The GDR would then assume control of access to Berlin and quite possibly start various harassing actions against the traffic seeking access. This might initially be directed against German traffic alone and might or might not be expanded to include the Western Allies. Consequently, the Foreign Minister felt that it was necessary to decide what action should be taken in case the Soviet Union chooses the second alternative. The Foreign Minister felt that it had been pointed out correctly that the responsibilities of the various nations concerned were no longer clearly defined, especially since the issuance of the NATO guarantee on Berlin of December 1958, which had been reconfirmed several times, the last time in the very recent past. These guarantees did affect to some extent the responsibility of the three occupying powers. Germany, too, entered into the picture, of course. In order to be able to carry out the various guarantees, it was necessary for the three powers to get together, with Germany also included, and carefully to work out a program which would indicate exactly what action should be taken in a number of specifically designated eventualities, as well as at what point such action should be taken. Once such a program had been worked out, the Foreign Minister felt, it would be time to inform NATO and discuss the whole matter there, since the NATO guarantee was, of course, involved in this entire picture. This was the reason that the Foreign Minister had suggested yesterday that the matter of contingency planning for Berlin be discussed on a high level in order to clarify and confirm the obligations and commitments of the various parties concerned. The Foreign Minister wished to reconfirm what the Chancellor had said, namely, that the German Government had no intention of not living up to its obligations. After all, the question involved the capital of Germany and beyond that even the very future of Germany itself. If Berlin fell, the Foreign Minister said, it would mean the death sentence for Europe and the Western World.

The Chancellor indicated that the questions of international law pertaining to the Berlin question were very involved and complicated. This matter did not concern only the rights of the three or the four occupying powers. The three Western Allies, as occupying powers, had the right to demand unobstructed access to Berlin. As regards Germany, the legal situation was much more difficult. Germany has no title to Berlin at present from the standpoint of international law. However, it had the hope of becoming re-united and, when this was accomplished, of having Berlin re-instated as the capital of the nation. Germany's approach, therefore, had to be based on the fact that Berlin was not part of Western Germany and that the East Zone was not part of Western Germany at the present time. Therefore, the legal situation was a most confused one and the Chancellor felt that it was highly desirable, in fact absolutely necessary, to study this situation very carefully before engaging in any further talks on the subject.

At this point the President directly inquired what rights, if any, Germany claimed to have on West Berlin under international law, and what rights Germany felt she should have in Berlin. The Chancellor and the rest of the German party vigorously agreed that Germany had no rights in Berlin under international law. Ambassador Grewe spent a few minutes outlining the various agreements and statutes from which the rights of the various parties derived. Some, including the rights of the four powers, went back to 1945. The Soviet rights, of course, went back to that time. Then there were the rights of the Berliners themselves, as the inhabitants of the locality. The German constitution claimed Berlin as the capital of Germany, but this was a de jure situation only and was actually suspended by the occupation statute of 1949./9/ The right of access of the Federal Republic to Berlin was based on various de facto arrangements growing out of its trade relations with Berlin. In all, the legal situation was a most confused one.

The President then asked whether our occupational rights in Berlin gave us the right to provide adequate supplies for the local population. Both Ambassador Grewe and Foreign Minister von Brentano answered in the affirmative, stating that this was naturally implied in the rights and obligations of an occupying power.

The Secretary of State said that all of us understood that there were various gradations of rights, duties and responsibilities. The three Western Allies were, of course, the three powers principally and most critically involved in the Berlin situation. Over and above this, however, NATO had assumed a guarantee for Berlin. However, the Secretary felt that as the representative of the German people and the German state, especially in terms of future reunification, the German Federal Republic had claims on Berlin. The United States understood these gradations, but as the need for action arose a practical situation would confront all parties concerned which would obliterate by necessity the gradations of responsibility and rights. For this reason the Secretary felt that very close and careful scrutiny of the problem was required in order that all might know what everybody's role was to be and how each of the parties concerned would meet its responsibilities. The Secretary thought that this would require much consultation. The Chancellor stated that he was in full agreement.

The President then asked the Chancellor what, in his judgment, the United States response should be if the Soviet Union entered into a separate peace treaty with East Germany, thereby giving control of access to the GDR, but the latter, while assuming such control, did not interfere with traffic to Berlin.

The Chancellor stated that he was not sure whether the President realized that at present there still had been no peace treaty by the four powers with Germany. He was making reference to this matter for the purpose of indicating once again how complicated the overall legal situation was. A peace treaty was supposed to be signed with all four powers. Again, the Chancellor did not know whether the President was aware of a little-known fact that the Soviet Union still maintained military missions in the area of Western Germany. The three Western Allies had asked Germany not to cause difficulties with reference to these Soviet missions, because the three Western Allies had military missions stationed in East Germany which enabled them to get all sorts of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] information which they otherwise might not be able to obtain. Thus, the Chancellor again indicated that the legal situation was an extremely complicated one; at the same time the national aspects could not be kept out entirely. The Chancellor then continued to say that if an attack were made on American soldiers who were trying to get unhampered access to Berlin, to which they were entitled, then, under its NATO commitments, Western Germany would have to bring its troops into play. Again, however, the Chancellor reiterated that this whole thing was so complicated that he greatly welcomed the Secretary's suggestion that the legal situation be studied carefully before any further steps were taken.

The Chancellor then turned to answer the President's question regarding the action recommended in case of a separate peace treaty with the GDR, without the GDR harassing traffic. If he remembered correctly, he said, a similar question had arisen once before, when the Soviet Union had asked the GDR to take over control of the access routes in the name of the USSR, thereby having the GDR act in the capacity of Soviet agent. At that time the three Western Allies and Germany had rejected the idea of agency very firmly. Thus, in any consideration of the Berlin situation, it was really necessary to have at hand the tremendous bulk of material covering all the various legal involvements and past history.

The Secretary indicated that he hoped the question would be examined both on a tripartite and quadripartite basis and agreed that the legal situation was indeed a most confused one. He said that the situation reminded him of one of the Soviet Ambassadors to Washington, who was quoted as stating that the law is like the tongue of a wagon; it goes in the direction in which it is pointed.

Washington, April 15, 1961, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Berlin Contingency Planning

PARTICIPANTS
German Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe
The Secretary
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, GER

Ambassador Grewe began by saying that the Chancellor had sent him to see the Secretary expressly to straighten out a point about which he felt there might still exist a certain obscurity and misunderstanding. The Chancellor, Foreign Minister von Brentano and the Ambassador had reviewed the course of the formal talks as well as the Chancellor's dinner conversation with the Secretary on the subject of Berlin contingency planning. In addition, Ambassador Grewe noted, he (Grewe) had just had a talk with a reliable American journalist who had said that from his conversations with important people in the State Department he had obtained the impression that there was some uncertainty on the American side as to the ultimate German determination to participate in the case of a real emergency over Berlin. Moreover, according to this same journalist, the Germans were supposed to have shown a certain reluctance to participate in Berlin contingency planning. There was absolutely no basis for the last point, Ambassador Grewe commented. The Secretary observed that he had never heard anyone say that; the first point had a little more background.

After the question had been discussed with him, Ambassador Grewe continued, the Chancellor agreed that the German position might not be clear enough and might require additional explanation. Discussion of the subject with the Germans had started with the visit of Secretary Dulles to Bonn in February of 1959. The Secretary had explained his view as to how the West should react to Soviet harassments and had indicated that the United States was determined to keep the routes to Berlin open, if necessary by force and ultimately by the use of nuclear weapons. At the time the Chancellor had felt a little bit that this proposed course of action did not exhaust all possibilities of averting the ultimate catastrophe and did not allow sufficiently for negotiations in between. Perhaps there was a certain reluctance in the Chancellor's statements to Secretary Dulles which might have led to the impression that the Germans were hesitant about cooperating. In 1960 Mr. Kohler had expressed to the Ambassador certain American anxieties on this score, and had noted that the Federal Republic had not yet even passed the emergency legislation required to deal effectively with a crisis situation.

It was a fact, Ambassador Grewe went on, that the Germans had been excluded from Western contingency planning because of French and British opposition based on the argument that the Three Occupying Powers could not afford to dilute their exclusive legal competency for Berlin. The Germans had only been given information and papers after the planning had been completed, but were reluctant to press too much because of the legal situation of basic Three-Power responsibility. This thought was behind the Chancellor's statement during the recent talks that German forces could not be expected to participate in initial steps. He believed it sufficient to say that, if the three Allies were involved in hostilities, then Germany was involved too along with the rest of the Alliance. He still felt this was the best formula but did not want any misunderstanding to arise over its implications.

The Secretary said he wanted to make the following points:

1. We are under no doubt whatsoever that the US, France, and the UK have the primary and, if necessary, sole responsibility for Berlin as Occupying Powers.

2. We fully understand that the Federal Republic does not have a legal or other basis for asserting its unilateral or special responsibility for West Berlin. We would, therefore, not expect it to participate in the initial steps to be taken. In fact, we would be deeply concerned by any steps the Federal Republic might take in advance of the Three Powers.

3. We feel the situation to be somewhat affected by the change in the de facto situation with respect to the armed forces in Western Europe. The ready divisions are primarily US, Canadian and German. The British and French are not in a state of readiness. The French forces have been very severely depleted. The fact is, of course, that if any serious fighting occurred we would all be involved. We have tried to start from this and work backwards. We believe there ought to be careful tripartite and quadripartite consultation on the contingencies which might arise. There is not now full tripartite or quadripartite agreement on alternative situations which might arise with respect to Berlin. These must be reviewed and discussed in a consultative process in which the Federal Republic must be considerably more involved than in the past.

4. The governments involved should consider these matters at the highest policy level, not just at the planning level, as if plans had nothing to do with policy. Although all decisions could not be made in advance, there must be agreement on the policies which should govern. In an actual crisis governments could not start from the beginning with their discussion of policies and plans. There is now a gap between our plans and our policies.

The Secretary indicated that he now understood the Chancellor's position better with respect to participation of German forces. After all, the kind of action in question would be across the border, he observed. If we should decide on a military probe on the ground, this will involve movement across the border. The problem would be a difficult one to handle if the border could determine NATO strategy in this context. We will have to look carefully at the quadripartite and NATO role to see if there are any legal obstacles affecting military contingency planning. Except perhaps during the initial phase, the Secretary noted, it would be surprising if these legal obstacles proved formidable. This was a point, however, which required clarification in quadripartite discussions. The situation was a little confused at the tripartite level. If the Federal Republic were also confused, it might be difficult to determine who felt responsible for what.

We are agreed, the Secretary continued, that it would be politically difficult for the United States to seem more concerned about Berlin than the Federal Republic. We thought the Chancellor understood this. The subject was one which obviously could be developed only so far bilaterally. Tripartite discussions must be held, moving rapidly into quadripartite discussions. We would begin tripartitely, not to achieve fixed positions before bringing in the Federal Republic, but because of the basic legal responsibility of the Three Powers.

Ambassador Grewe said that in his exposition the Chancellor had begun with the tripartite responsibility to which the Secretary had referred and then moved on to the question of what the Federal Republic could do. He (Adenauer) had also wanted to show that as far as German civilian traffic was concerned there was a vacuum and that this also raised certain problems which had to be considered.

After his conversation with the Chancellor during dinner on April 12, the Secretary commented, he had been a little concerned that if the matter came up the next day with the President, Dr. Adenauer's somewhat compressed response might cause puzzlement with respect to the German attitude. As a result he had spoken to Foreign Minister von Brentano to alert him that some clarification was needed. We could understand that the German Government did not want to see any diminution in the basic Three-Power responsibility or to get involved in decisions taken without German participation. Our view is that the four governments should straighten the matter out. Perhaps certain other NATO countries would also have to be brought into the picture. After all, NATO as an organization could be involved by tripartite action. The Secretary said he would take the occasion at the airport on Sunday to thank the Chancellor for having sent in Ambassador Grewe and to tell him that we did not think there was any misunderstanding but that we would be in further touch on the subject.

The participation of German forces in any probing action, Ambassador Grewe stated, would mean a change in the basic situation because the East German population would take this as a sign for a general uprising which would presumably have the effect of extending the conflict. We could understand this German view, the Secretary commented, as it related to the initial Western action to reopen access, but if counter-military action by the other side were taken, then this point would be passed. One of the factors in such a situation might be that, if the Soviets attempted to strangle Berlin, the East Germans would be concerned about these implications. Ambassador Grewe agreed they would. As to the question of a civil blockade of Berlin, the Ambassador continued, there seemed to be no concrete planning for this at all. It would be difficult to find a definite line which, if breached by the East, would elicit specific Western measures. Here was the old problem of Communist so-called "salami tactics". The Secretary said we found it difficult to draw a distinction between the lines of communication of the few thousand Allied troops in Berlin and those of the civilian population. It would not do much good for the troops to be in the city if it were in disorder. This question had to be studied.

In response to Ambassador Grewe's query as to what level the Secretary had had in mind when he had referred to the need for high-level considerations, the Secretary said that, since the issue was so basic and serious, we must have further talks as the opportunity arose. President Kennedy and President de Gaulle would certainly discuss the subject. Perhaps it should also be dealt with in side talks between those directly concerned at the time of the forthcoming NATO Ministerial meeting. Apart from Ministerial consideration, much careful work at a lower level was also required. One thing that must be avoided among the four is a misunderstanding on these points which would have a divisive effect. We must be somewhat careful so that the points emphasized are fully understood by all of the Four Powers. It was a little difficult to comment further on this in the absence of fuller talks, but there appeared to have been an absence of intimate discussions of these matters among the four. As the new American Administration comes in, the Secretary observed, some of the nuances of the past may not be present and the approach may at first seem a little over-simplified. The Chancellor could be assured, however, that the question which had been in the Secretary's mind from the Wednesday dinner conversation had been cleared up.

19. Editorial Note

On April 23 the Federal Republic of Germany's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Hans Kroll, flew to the Crimea for a 3-day visit with Khrushchev. During their discussion on Berlin Khrushchev told Kroll that he would sign a treaty with the German Democratic Republic, but not until after the West German elections in September or perhaps until after the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October. For Kroll's account of the visit, see Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters, pages 483-489. On his return to Moscow Kroll briefed the three Western Ambassadors on his talks with Khrushchev (telegram 2693 from Moscow, May 2; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-261) and on May 2 Ambassador Grewe briefed the Four-Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin. (Memorandum of conversation, May 2; ibid., 762.0221/5-261)

NIE 11-7-61

Washington, April 25, 1961.

SOVIET SHORT-TERM INTENTIONS
REGARDING BERLIN AND GERMANY

The Problem

To estimate probable Soviet intentions with respect to Berlin and Germany over the next six months or so.

Conclusions

1. We believe that in the relatively near future the USSR will present a formal demand for a renewal of negotiations on the question of a peace treaty for "the two Germanies" and a new status for Berlin. Almost certainly, Khrushchev still prefers to negotiate on this matter rather than to provoke a crisis by unilateral action, chiefly because he desires to avoid the risks of a showdown in this dangerous area of East-West confrontation. He apparently still hopes that, if he keeps in reserve the threat of a unilateral move, Western fears of a showdown will induce the Allies to make concessions at the bargaining table. (Paras. 5, 9, 11)

2. In raising this issue once again the USSR's chief concern will be to strengthen the East German regime by eroding and eventually eliminating the Western position in Berlin, and by bringing the West to recognize the permanence and legitimacy of that regime. The Soviets also hope that success in this will undermine West Germany's confidence in its present policy of participation in NATO's military effort, since it remains a primary Soviet purpose to check the buildup of significant military power in the Federal Republic. (Paras. 6-8)

3. In any negotiations which take place in the next few months, the Soviets would almost certainly not hold fast to their maximum demand for a peace treaty with "the two Germanies" and the immediate conversion of West Berlin into a "demilitarized free city." Instead they will concentrate on getting an "interim agreement," of the kind outlined at Geneva in 1959, which would constitute a first step toward eliminating Allied occupation rights in West Berlin. The USSR might in the course of negotiations reduce some of its previous demands concerning such an interim settlement if it could obtain an agreement, which, at least by implication, put a time limit on these occupation rights. This outcome would be intended to lay the groundwork for later advances and would be, in the Soviet view, a major gain. (Paras. 12-15)

4. If higher level negotiations do not take place, or if they break down, the USSR might agree to refer the problem to lower level talks. More likely, however, it would move to summon a Bloc-sponsored peace conference and would eventually sign its long-threatened separate peace treaty with the GDR. Subsequently, the Soviets could transfer to the GDR control over Allied access and, sooner or later, permit that regime gradually to apply a policy of harassments. As another way of exerting pressure, they might choose to exploit the vulnerabilities of German civilian access, a course which would not directly threaten the Allied position but could seriously undermine the integrity of West Berlin. Under this or any other policy, however, the USSR is likely to continue to offer negotiations, always hopeful that the Allies can be induced to accede peacefully to the eventual loss of the Western position in Berlin. (Paras. 19-21)

[Here follow four pages of the "Discussion" section.]

Washington, April 25, 1961.

SUBJECT
Review of Berlin Contingency Planning

There seems little doubt that the British emerged from the recent Macmillan talks with some fairly important misconceptions about the direction of American thinking on Berlin. This was perhaps inevitable, given the very general terms in which Mr. Acheson made his presentation combined with the basic British willingness, which has existed from the outset of the Berlin crisis, to move towards recognition of the GDR in return for an arrangement on Berlin. In any event, we now seem to be in the position where Prime Minister Macmillan regards the supposedly "new" American approach to the earlier phases of contingency planning as linked to the process of reviewing and perhaps toughening the later phases.

At his request, John Thomson came in yesterday afternoon/2/ and showed us the British record of the pertinent discussion between the President and Prime Minister Macmillan during which Mr. Acheson made his presentation. There are some material differences of emphasis compared with the American record of this conversation. Based on their record, the British drew much more far-reaching conclusions about the implications of Mr. Acheson's statement, particularly his willingness to go down the road towards acceptance of the GDR and a corollary of his unwillingness to have any procedural stage made a sticking point.

As far as I am aware of his thinking, it is fair to say that Mr. Acheson does not consider the presently-agreed "peel-off" procedure to be a suitable method for making the basic test of whether there is actually physical interference with access to Berlin. He seems inclined to believe that continuation by GDR officials of the same procedures now applied by the Soviets would be a more clear-cut point at which to draw the line and one more likely to obtain both the understanding and support of public opinion.

Given the situation revealed by your conversation with Lord Hood,/3/ we need now to give consideration to whether we want to reopen the documentation procedures in our contingency plans. These now provide for the use of a new type of movement orders to identify Allied movements to East German border personnel, who will, in effect, not be permitted to process Allied official travelers but merely to take cognizance of their identity and to receive a copy each at the incoming and outgoing check-point of a form on which the date and time of entry will be indicated.

As you know, upon his return from Europe at the beginning of May, Mr. Acheson intends to resume his study of the Berlin question which he undertook at the request of the President. He has asked that the Defense Department undertake on an urgent basis certain studies relating to the terminal phases of contingency planning. He will also expect that we come up with some thoughts on how his criterion of interference with physical access can be translated into concrete terms.

I have been giving some thought to this, and I am coming reluctantly to the conclusion that, since the "peel-off" procedure does not seem to make sense to many people as a definitive sticking point, we will probably have to seriously consider reopening the agreed documentation procedures, especially now that the British will be pressing hard for a change in something which they initially accepted with great reluctance. Apart from the sheer force of inertia, there is a natural tendency to oppose reopening something which was attained only after much discussion, which has now been embodied in agreed texts of public statements to be made and of notes to be sent to the Soviets, which has been sent to the field in the form of instructions to those who must carry them out, and which has actually led to the preparation and distribution in the field of the "peel-off" forms to be used. On the other hand, the agreed contingency planning already contains a provision permitting GDR personnel, expressly authorized as such, to function as Soviet agents in performing existing procedures with relation to the access of the Three Powers to Berlin. This could possibly provide a basis for return to "imputed agency".

In attempting to assess where reopening of the present agreed planning might take us, the history of the revision of contingency plans which took place early in 1959 is not without relevance. When the Berlin crisis broke in November 1958, the agreed tripartite plans involved acceptance of processing by GDR officials providing the same procedures as those carried out by the Soviets were preserved. This was to be justified on the basis of an imputed agency concept. Late in 1958, there was a considerable feeling, especially on the part of Ambassador Bruce, that such an imputed agency concept made little sense in the face of an explicit Soviet denial that any agency relationship could exist after the signature of a peace treaty. Secretary Dulles, who was absent from the Department during the first weeks of December 1958 because of illness, and who returned to work only in time to go to the NATO Ministerial Meeting about the middle of the month, was apparently never fully acquainted with the details of the existing contingency planning. It will be recalled, however, that he caused quite a furor by endorsing the agency concept in a press conference which he gave in late November just before going off to Walter Reed. In February he made his last trip abroad--to London, Paris, and Bonn--during which he discussed the first draft of a paper which, in a subsequent form, was eventually to become the basic April 4, 1959 tripartitely-agreed paper,/4/ which has since provided the framework for contingency planning. As far as I am aware, Mr. Dulles never really gave up the idea, which obviously appealed to him, of imputing agency status to GDR officials. Without attempting to spell out what this meant in practice, the basic April 4 planning paper merely stipulated that if Soviet personnel are withdrawn from the check-points there would be no objection to providing mere identification of the vehicles of the Three Powers for the information of GDR personnel at the check-points. The "peel-off" was intended to translate this into a specific procedure.

The British interpretation of the statements made to Prime Minister Macmillan during his visit obviously raises fundamental policy questions. Although we indicated our willingness to continue discussions with the British by the middle of this week, I do not think we should rush into any conclusions. The Secretary presumably will be too preoccupied with other matters really to focus on this question. Mr. Acheson will be returning early in May and taking a further look. British eagerness obviously derives from a desire to nail down what they believe to be a significant shift in US policy. Hence, I would suggest that during your next meeting with the British we should hold up the "go slow" sign, possibly making the following points:

1. As Mr. Acheson indicated, the President had asked him to get some studies started. He had not, however, reached any conclusions.

2. Examination of our record of the conversations with Mr. Macmillan plus what we believe we know of Mr. Acheson's thinking does not lead us to the conclusion that he was taking a position which he thought might lead to de facto recognition of the GDR.

3. Mr. Acheson merely stipulated the criterion of physical interference with access to Berlin as the point at which the West would have to make its show of determination. He did not attempt to translate this criterion into concrete terms.

4. Obviously such a criterion does have to be given some concrete embodiment, if it is to have operational meaning. Otherwise, we would seem to be in the impossible position of being willing to meet every and any GDR demand provided only that the traffic keeps moving.

5. We need to give further careful thought to this. Mr. Acheson will be returning early in May and may wish to give some precise definition to his thoughts.

6. We do not see how we can accept, under cover of contingency planning, an approach which involves really a fundamental change of policy towards the GDR. As the British know, anything of this sort would be anathema to the Federal Republic.

7. We will want to think about this further, but perhaps the place to draw the line might be at the point of acceptance of present procedures. This is already provided for in the contingency plans if the Soviets expressly acknowledge an agency relationship, and in a sense is the essence of the old Solution C, which had been thought of as a possible fallback position during the course of negotiations with the Soviets. It is difficult, however, to see how we could let ourselves get in a position where we must actually negotiate with the GDR on procedures, or in the position of completely renouncing all Soviet responsibility, for that would strike at the basis of the Western legal position.

Washington, May 5, 1961.

SUBJECT
Military Planning for a Possible Berlin Crisis

This memorandum is submitted in response to your request (National Security Action Memorandum No. 41, April 25, 1961)/2/ for a prompt report on the current military planning for a possible crisis over Berlin.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recently reviewed Berlin Contingency Planning to determine deficiencies. In their report to me of 13 April,/3/ the Joint Chiefs reaffirmed their view that a solution to a Soviet attempt to deny the Free World access to Berlin must include U.S. and Free World military, diplomatic, and economic countermeasures, on a worldwide basis, in addition to local military actions. They stated that "within existing capabilities and national policy guidance" there are no deficiencies in U.S. Unilateral Berlin Contingency Plans. They reported, however, certain important deficiencies in Tripartite Berlin Contingency Plans. Examples of the tasks to be completed are:

a. Tripartite approval of appropriate training for the tripartite battalion combat force.

b. Development of a plan for use of a tripartite reinforced division to assist in restoring access to Berlin.

c. Tripartite agreement for German participation in Berlin Contingency Planning.

Defense representatives on the U.S. Coordinating Group will take action at the earliest possible time to obtain approval for the correction of these deficiencies.

Although, as the Joint Chiefs report, the unilateral military planning "within existing capabilities and national policy guidance" is satisfactory, the national policy guidance is not. NSC 5803, dated February 7, 1958,/4/ on which Berlin Contingency Planning is based, does not reflect new developments in U.S. strategic thinking. Specifically, NSC 5803 implies the U.S. "will be prepared to go immediately to general war after using only limited military force to attempt to reopen access to Berlin." This is inconsistent with current thinking which proposes the use of substantial conventional force before considering resort to nuclear weapons and other general war measures. An early restatement of our national policy with regard to Berlin Contingency Planning is desirable.

Concurrent with our review of military plans, Mr. Acheson's memorandum to you of April 3, 1961, subject: "Berlin",/5/ was being considered. The Joint Chiefs, on April 28, 1961, in response to a memorandum of April 17, subject: "Berlin",/6/ signed by Mr. McGeorge Bundy, completed three studies directed at resolving certain questions presented in Mr. Acheson's memorandum. Copies of the Joint Chiefs' conclusions and their studies have been furnished to Mr. Bundy.

The Chiefs' studies indicate that we must plan on employing a ground force of two divisions or more if we are to be effective in reopening access to Berlin without the use of nuclear weapons. This course of action may subsequently require reinforcement of our forces in Europe, shifts in deployments and partial mobilization by ourselves and our allies. Based on the studies, I conclude that:

a. Substantial (in contrast to limited) non-nuclear military action to reopen ground access must be planned.

b. Non-nuclear military actions to reopen air access would not be successful without an expansion of the conflict, and even then would not succeed in reopening and maintaining air access in the face of determined Soviet opposition.

c. There is a wide range of action available to us, worldwide, which can be employed for timely and effective pressure on the Soviet Union in event of another Berlin crisis.

These studies have further reinforced my opinion that both unilateral and tripartite planning are deficient in failing to include the possibility of exploiting the military potential of the Federal Republic of Germany. With German interest in and de facto responsibility for Berlin, I believe we should be prepared to accept German participation in Berlin military action.

Not clearly spelled out in the summary conclusions in the Joint Chiefs memorandum, but adequately covered in Appendix A to their report, is the fact that with but a one or two division force, allied or U.S. attempts to reopen access to Berlin could be stopped by East German forces alone. I do not believe that a great power such as the United States should select a course of action which could lead to defeat by a Soviet puppet regime. Agreeing that the main purpose behind this conventional military operation is political and an extension of the test of will between the USSR and ourselves, I consider it mandatory that, in any military operation larger than a probe, we have at least the level of forces required to defeat any solely Satellite force, without employing our nuclear response. In fact, our planning for action by substantial non-nuclear ground forces must assure that active USSR participation is required to deny us access to Berlin.

In conjunction with the above, we should not overlook the likelihood of an uprising in East Germany and other satellite countries should a sizable and active allied military movement in East Germany take place. There is a need for an immediate assessment of our capability to use and support special forces and guerrilla-type operations and to coordinate them properly with normal military action.

In summary, I believe that:

a. The Chiefs' studies will help resolve three of the questions raised by Mr. Acheson in his memorandum.

b. We must urgently re-examine the national policy guidance on which our unilateral U.S. planning is based, and translate this U.S. policy guidance into agreed tripartite policy.

c. We must arrange for participation by the Federal Republic of Germany in Berlin Contingency Planning.

d. The full potential for U.S. and non-U.S. "special operations" should be developed and coordinated with our planned military actions.

We shall initiate recommendations to the NSC to permit the accomplishment of items b, c, and d.

Robert S. McNamara

Oslo, May 9, 1961.

Secto 27. Bonn pass USBER Berlin info 4. Following based on uncleared memorandum of conversation:/2/

Lengthy quadripartite discussion of Berlin last night revolved around three points noted Secto 13./3/

On timing of German reply to Soviet memorandum February 17, von Brentano agreed this could wait until after President's visit to de Gaulle. Pointed out, however, that too much delay in reply might give German political opposition basis for charging that Government deliberately stalling. Meanwhile quadripartite consultations on text should proceed.

Ministers generally agreed that there was no basis for Western initiative to open negotiations with Soviets on Berlin. Von Brentano stressed that any change in status of Berlin likely to be deterioration and that peace treaty between Soviets and GDR could have no legal effect but might serve as instrument to achieve greater recognition of GDR among noncommitted countries. In response to Lord Home's query whether there were any price Germans prepared to pay to prevent peace treaty, such as interim arrangement for 18-24 months while West and East Germans tried to settle question, von Brentano strongly opposed any idea of all-German talks. Apart from problem of sitting down with GDR regime which lacked meaningful mandate, such talks could only lead to anything if FedRep prepared to make concessions which would jeopardize freedom of West Germans and threaten entire Western Alliance. However, von Brentano did not exclude possibility of eventual Four-Power negotiations in response to Home's conclusion that implication of discussion was that even if Soviets offered negotiations and put forward seemingly attractive proposal, West would have no negotiating position and could do no more than simply say to Soviets they should go ahead and sign their peace treaty and face consequences.

Couve made point that German fear of initial interference with civilian rather than Allied military access did not correspond to likely development of situation. Civilian access already controlled by GDR, and arrangements could be worked out by East and West Germans as before. Direct threat following signing of peace treaty was to Allied military traffic which thereafter would presumably no longer be processed by Soviets. He reiterated his belief that Soviets were completely serious about Berlin as of vital interest to them and West must accordingly expect them to proceed with announced intention of signing peace treaty and turning over responsibility to GDR. Couve saw no reason why West could not negotiate with Soviets on Berlin as in 1959 at Geneva. Essential basis preservation freedom of West Berlin was continuation Western military presence, but this need not be at present force levels.

Ministers agreed that possible misconception on part of Khrushchev re Allied firmness of intentions on Berlin, as indicated his recent conversation with German Ambassador Kroll,/4/ could be highly dangerous and that means of correcting this should be given serious consideration.

In response Secretary's query, von Brentano vigorously denied that determination of West Berliners had softened with increasing prosperity or that interest of West Germans in Berlin not passionate. Loss of Berlin would have disastrous effect in FedRep, he mentioned, and hence on entire Western Alliance. At several points von Brentano made strong plea for full German participation in Western contingency planning to which he felt FedRep had important contribution to make. This would not derogate from basic tripartite responsibility for Berlin. Secretary noted would be helpful to have from Germans exposition of what they felt to be responsibility of FedRep for Berlin including legal respects. Noting NATO interest this subject at Ministerial Council meeting in afternoon,/5/ he also made point that Western Powers should move ahead on contingency planning so report could be made to NATO.

Rusk

Moscow, May 24, 1961, noon.

2887. In order repeat interested missions this message not highly classified but trust will be handled with great discretion. I shall give abbreviated account British, French and German colleagues.

Yesterday AM Kuznetsov phoned to say K would be attending American ice revue and hoped I would be present. On arrival my wife and I were taken directly to his box. He was accompanied by Furtseva, Kuznetsov, Troyanovsky, and his son and daughter-in-law. At intermission we sat down to supper in adjoining room and did not return to revue.

K said frankly he had seen enough ice shows and invitation was excuse for discussion forthcoming meeting with President. He said he expected leave Sat or Sun by rail stopping in Kiev for some relaxation as well as Lvov and Bratislava where he would spend 30 hours. He expects arrive Vienna about noon June 2. He will be accompanied by wife and daughter-in-law.

Conversation ranged over wide field and as I could take no notes sequence following report may not be exact but essentials were as follows:

He revealed plainly he was troubled by problem how deal with President on question Berlin. He would not make same approach to President as he was now making to me although he knew I would report our current conversation. This was different matter however than for him and President to have discussion on this delicate problem in front of their assistants. In general he took same line with me as he had with Kroll stating if no agreement reached on Berlin they would sign separate peace treaty in fall or winter after German elections and probably after Party Congress. This would end our occupation rights and East Germans would control communications. He realized this would bring period of great tension but he was convinced would not lead to war. German reunification was impossible and in fact no one really wanted it including de Gaulle, Macmillan and Adenauer. He said de Gaulle had told him not only should Germany remain divided but would be even better if it were divided in three parts.

I told him with utmost seriousness it was my duty as Ambassador to see that he was under no misunderstanding of our position and that if he signed separate treaty and force was used to interfere with our communications it would be met with force. He replied if we wanted war we would get it but he was convinced only madman would want war and Western leaders not mad though Hitler had been. I said our prestige was deeply engaged in our pledge to people of Berlin and we would carry out our commitment. When he plugged their free city proposal I said frankly we were bound to be suspicious of emphasis they put upon changing basis of our rights there and reduction of our troops. When he said nothing would really be changed I asked about our access and he replied frankly this would be prevented except by agreement with East Germans. When he denigrated importance of Berlin I inquired why then should he take such risks over it and observed while he might not want Berlin, Ulbricht clearly did. I pointed out he had himself observed our troops had no military value. He repeated many times throughout conversation it was 16 years after war and necessary put end to occupation. Under my pressing he said one reason for action was that so long as question remained in present status Adenauer would aspire to make Berlin capital of West Germany. In this connection he referred to talk of Bundestag meeting in Berlin. I probed further to find out what elements of problem were of greatest importance to him and mentioned refugees. He brushed this aside and said Berlin was running sore which had to be eliminated. I said although problem had existed for 16 years we had survived that period without too great difficulty. We could not stop him from signing peace treaty but important question was whether our rights were interfered with. He repeated categorically our access would be prevented. He said they would not touch our troops in Berlin but they might have to tighten their belts.

He said however they would not impose blockade. When he reverted to question of frontiers and said this was of great importance to Poles and Czechs and was disturbing factor I expressed personal opinion that if this were heart of problem it would not be too difficult to handle. He expressed great interest in this but I refused to be drawn further. At one time when he was again talking of horrors of war but his determination to face it if necessary he said he could not believe we would bring on such catastrophe. I pointed out it was he who would be taking action to change present situation. To this he replied we would be ones who would have to cross frontier. To emphasize seriousness our position I said I thought in West we looked at matter in following way. If we gave in to his pressure we would lose West Berlin and this would probably lead to loss of West Germany and Europe. When he challenged this position I said psychological effect would be disastrous to our position. He said their proposal had been designed to save our prestige. I said it would not do so. He referred to proposals they had made to Adenauer and said they were prepared to accept temporary Berlin solution to allow two German sides negotiate but said clearly if they did not agree at end of given period peace treaty would be concluded with two Germanies. He knew we would not agree and he would sign separate treaty.

Perhaps one of his most revealing remarks was when I suggested situation might be left as it is. He declared with some heat that we apparently wished to damage their prestige and said matter could not go beyond fall or winter this year. He reminded me his original plan had been to act within 6 months. Thirty months have now passed. He threw out possibility of our each reducing our troops in Germany by say one-third. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

He seemed to be groping for some possible way out of impasse and I therefore put forward in guarded terms as purely personal suggestion my thought that we might agree to put matter off for number of years on basis of our Geneva package proposal. He repeated matter could not wait and that this was problem which was spoiling all our relations. He was convinced if this problem could be solved we could make much progress on our many other problems. These other problems were serious but none of them was vital as was German problem. When I said our Geneva proposals had not been bad he said in any event Western Ministers had withdrawn them. I thought it best not to deny this but also not to confirm it. In presenting my suggestion I said this would give us time to approach disarmament question calmly and success in this would facilitate solution of German problem. He said frankly disarmament impossible as long as Berlin problem existed. He ignored my question how long Ulbricht needed to consolidate his regime to point where he could face free choice of people, making remark it was question of different social systems. In this part conversation he referred to fact we had prevented Soviet Union from collecting reparations from Germany but we agreed no point raking over past history.

Early in conversation K stated he had read President's remarks to Soviet journalists/2/ and said he approved of them. He expressed admiration for President but said with obvious pleasure that President had made error in Cuban affair. When I observed Cuban affair put President in even more difficult position in tackling German problem he said he fully understood this. He also referred several times to his talk with Eisenhower and said he had strong impression Eisenhower understood Berlin question could not be left unresolved and had it not been for U-2 agreement might have been reached at summit meeting. He referred frequently to items in our press commenting on what he would and wouldn't do about Germany and said he was convinced Allen Dulles' agents were heating up Berlin problem deliberately. I of course denied this categorically.

In discussing his Berlin proposal he said they asked only addition of symbolic Soviet forces in West Berlin. He categorically rejected my mention of possibility an all-Berlin solution.

Other subjects and comment in septels./3/

Thompson

Moscow, May 24, 1961, 2 p.m.

2889. I note in conversation with Kohler Grewe said Kroll had indicated I favored our proposing negotiations on German problem./2/ This inexact. All four Western Ambassadors here in agreement however that matters should not simply be allowed to drift. When Kroll told me he thought negative German reply to Soviet memorandum might precipitate Soviet action on Berlin I disagreed. While I do not think Khrushchev is in any real danger from his colleagues, the one issue which might cause them to attempt unseat him would be belief he taking action which might lead to war. I do not believe he will take such risk before Party Congress. Presumably after Congress which will doubtless add more of his supporters to Central Committee he will probably be in position to carry out any policy he desires.

There are four reasons why I believe we should attempt develop better position on German problem. First is that we should endeavor achieve better position before world opinion both in order to attain greater unity with our Allies and to make more difficult dangerous Soviet action. Despite basic soundness our Geneva proposals Soviets have succeeded in creating impression in world opinion that we are saying no to proposal that would avoid war. I believe it essential that we get in position where it is Soviets who are saying no. There are number of possibilities that fall in this category and I believe we should not delay in working out plans with our Allies. Among possibilities of largely propaganda content are such steps as internationally supervised referendum in West Berlin on question whether they want free city or continuance present situation pending reunification. Do not believe our argument that this was decided in last Berlin elections is convincing to world opinion. Another possibility is an all-Berlin proposal which I believe Soviets would refuse but this is not absolutely certain and many of objections to free city West Berlin would apply to all-Berlin free city plan.

Second reason is that we owe it to ourselves and to world make every possible effort to see if some way around present impasse can be achieved. I continue to believe that in showdown Khrushchev might be tempted by my idea of something along lines of our Geneva proposals spread out in time provided this were coupled with some action on frontiers such as unilateral British and American statements similar to that already made by de Gaulle. We might state that in eventual peace conference we would not support any change in frontiers. I realize of course this could not be advanced until after German elections. Suggest package could also include better assurance of West German access to Berlin.

Third reason is that until we in West can agree on some positive position it is difficult for us to handle tactical problems which are constantly arising. President's meeting with Khrushchev is case in point.

Fourth reason is that no question but what Soviet prestige as well as our own is deeply involved in Berlin question. Therefore if we hope arrive at peaceful solution some formula must be found which would enable both sides save face. This difficult but not impossible. This is area it seems to me President might most usefully explore with K in private stating frankly what his purpose is.

There is some difference of opinion among my colleagues and I gather in our capitals about effect of separate peace treaty. I personally feel this will lead to really major crisis and that war will hang in balance although this is the one area in which K has some possibility of backing down. I am inclined to disagree with statement by French Foreign Minister at Oslo /3/ that problem would be Allied access rather than German. This may be true in beginning stages but German access seems to me our greater weakness and more likely possibility of radical action from Communist side.

Thompson

PMK-B/1

Washington, May 25, 1961.

BERLIN AND GERMANY
(Khrushchev will undoubtedly raise; if not, President should.)

Khrushchev will perhaps begin by saying--as he did to Ambassador Thompson/2/--that he would like very much for the President to understand the Soviet position. He may again add that he had obtained such understanding from President Eisenhower only to have the resultant improving relations deliberately exploded by the Pentagon and others.

He will probably say that the Soviet aim, as presented formally, most recently in his February 17 memorandum to the Chancellor, is not to change anything in Germany, but merely to fix juridically what has happened since World War II. Leaving the situation as it is would cause instability and encourage German revanchists.

The USSR would like to sign a treaty with the East Germans, the West Germans, and the US. The USSR, like the US, desires a unified Germany, but to conceive of a unified Germany under either Adenauer or Ulbricht would be unrealistic. Therefore, let us conclude a treaty with two Germanys.

The USSR and the GDR will join in whatever guarantees are necessary to keep West Berlin the way it is, and no threat from any side will be permitted. US prestige will not suffer. The West Berlin status could be registered with the UN, guaranteed by the Four Powers, and protected by a joint police force or symbolic military forces of the Four Powers stationed in West Berlin.

The existing borders between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic and between Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have legal force but need legal foundation. The Socialist Camp does not want to expand westward and would be prepared to so state in working out a treaty with us. If their wartime allies do not agree, the Socialist countries will sign a treaty with the GDR.

West Berlin is a bone in the throat of US-USSR relations. If Adenauer wants to fight, West Berlin would be a good place to start. The problem of West Berlin must be solved. The USSR desires a negotiated agreement. At this point Khrushchev might indicate a willingness to negotiate an interim agreement. If agreement cannot be reached, the USSR would see no alternative to a treaty with the East Germans, under which control over access to Berlin would become their responsibility.

Khrushchev may conclude by saying that he very much wants the President to understand that his frank desire is not to worsen--but to improve--US-USSR relations as well as USSR-FRG relations. This would make it impossible for aggressive forces to use the present situation to prepare aggression, the significance of which, with nuclear weapons, everyone understands.

If the US and the USSR could reach agreement on Berlin and Germany, it would be a great success, creating an atmosphere of trust in which US and USSR troops could be gradually withdrawn, and which would help disarmament negotiations. If not, Soviet and American troops will continue to confront each other, and the situation will not be one of peace, but one of armistice.

The President might wish to say that the new Administration has been giving careful consideration to US policy on Berlin and Germany, but it is difficult to see how there can be much basic change.

The situation in all of Berlin--not West Berlin alone--is abnormal because the situation in all of Germany is abnormal. The central difficulty is, of course, the continued division of Germany. We continue to believe there will be no real solution of the German problem or any real tranquillity in Central Europe until the Germans are reunified. This remains our ultimate aim, and we are not disposed to take any legal or other definitive steps which would appear to perpetuate or legalize the division.

In order that the possibilities of a disastrous miscalculation be reduced, it is absolutely vital for the USSR to understand the following. Berlin is of paramount importance to the US. The US is in Berlin by unimpeachable right of conquest. More importantly, it is there with the overwhelming approval of the people of West Berlin, which has been demonstrated many times in the past and can be easily demonstrated at any time in the future. It is there to protect the freedom of West Berlin, and, under existing circumstances, it is wholly convinced that there is no other way to protect that freedom. We have no intention whatsoever of being forced out of Berlin and will use all means to see that we are not. US concern with strengthening conventional forces should under no circumstances be interpreted as affecting our decision to use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend all the NATO area, including Berlin.

We would consider the proposed "separate peace treaty" between the USSR and East Germany and the abandonment by the USSR of its responsibilities to us to be a grave violation of the legal situation in Berlin. Such a unilateral act cannot affect our rights in Berlin, and we are determined to continue to exercise those rights, including specifically the right of access.

In all of this we have the full support of our allies. The West is convinced that its fate is intimately associated with the fate of West Berlin.

But now let us consider why we should avoid a showdown and how we can.

[Here follow sections on Stalin's policy toward Western Europe and the Federal Republic of Germany's efforts to integrate into Western Europe.]

There are aspects of the present situation in Germany and Berlin unsatisfactory to the USSR just as there are aspects unsatisfactory to the US. There is, however, nothing in the present situation in Germany and Berlin really intolerable to either. The Soviet Union cannot really believe that the continued existence of West Berlin offers any threat to Soviet security--or indeed to the continued existence of the East German regime. There is, of course, the type of competition foreseen and approved by the Soviet Union as "peaceful coexistence" but a mutual willingness to accept this competition is a fair test of the real meaning of the "peaceful coexistence" concept. For a decade after the Berlin blockade ended until the Soviet initiative of November 1958, the situation in Berlin and Germany was relatively quiet.

Looked at from the historical view, it would clearly seem to be the part of wisdom for the Soviet Union and the Western powers to avoid a sharp confrontation and a crisis situation in Germany and Berlin. As Khrushchev himself has frequently pointed out, the major and overriding international problem of the day is disarmament. To jeopardize progress in this all-important field by forcefully striving for political pains of minor significance compared to disarmament must surely be shortsighted. The problems of Germany, Berlin and European security can be approached in a much more promising context when we have begun to progress toward disarmament. The settlement of these problems would then become immeasurably easier.

Under conditions of increased international tension not only would forward movement on disarmament become most difficult, but there would arise the strong probability of an acceleration of the armaments race.

Khrushchev may well ask whether the West is ready to negotiate about West Berlin. If so, the President might wish to say that he would have to consult with his allies, but that they--with the US--undoubtedly "remain unshaken in their conviction that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the use or threat of force, but by peaceful means through negotiation" and "remain ready to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future." (This is from the statement of the Three in Paris after the abortive summit of May 1960,/3/ and there has been no change in this position.) If Khrushchev brings up the question of level of negotiations, the President might wish to say that, speaking personally, the foreign minister level would seem appropriate for a meeting after the necessary preparatory work has been done through diplomatic channels.

Khrushchev would be less than human if Laos, Cuba, and Yuriy Gagarin have not reinforced his normal self-confidence to the point where over-boldness and possible miscalculation could constitute a grave potential menace to the whole world. In such a mood, Berlin must offer a temptation that may very well be too strong to resist. Although Khrushchev is undoubtedly reluctant to risk a major war, the real danger is that he might risk just such a war without realizing he is doing so. He must, therefore, be warned in the firmest and most solemn manner that the US has no intention whatsoever of being forced out of Berlin and that in any attempt to do so he would be taking the gravest possible risk.

In his initial talk with Ambassador Thompson, Khrushchev's treatment of the problems of Germany and Berlin was cast in a semi-philosophical vein, as much a sort of chalk talk to get President Kennedy's "understanding" of the Soviet position as a discussion of the issues. It might be to our advantage to take this cue and do what has often been suggested but not yet done in any rounded way--set out fully our own views on the course of the postwar development of West Germany.

We would envisage a kind of historical account, designed to lay particular emphasis on two themes: 1) the state of the Federal Republic's armament and the attitude of the Federal Republic toward the Soviet Union and the bloc are to a considerable extent a reaction to Soviet policy and actions; and 2) under Adenauer, the Federal Republic has taken significant steps to merge its policies, and even some institutions, with its neighbors, and this development is decidedly in the Soviet interest. Our objective would be to suggest to Khrushchev that, while the situation in Germany and Berlin cannot be considered satisfactory from the point of view of either of us, it has been, and is, tolerable with no great strain and should be left alone until some significant measure of progress toward disarmament has been made. Conversely, we would be suggesting that an aggressive Soviet policy in Germany may well act to encourage exactly the developments in Germany and Europe which Khrushchev seeks to avoid. A reduction of armaments, on the other hand, would change the entire context within which we approach the problems of Germany and European security with greatly improved prospect for a mutually agreeable settlement.

It is, of course, extremely unlikely that Khrushchev would agree to leave the Berlin situation alone, but this approach might exert some influence toward reducing the terms on which he would agree, either explicitly or implicitly.

Berlin, May 25, 1961, 7 p.m.

572. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Stoessel, CINCEUR for Finn. On assumption Berlin will be among major issues discussed Vienna, I should like to emphasize several aspects Berlin problem that appear important from vantage point of Berlin itself.

Basic Sov aim toward Berlin unchanged though tactics apparently have become more reasonable as result of Western resistance. West Berlin has remained free because Sovs have realized that precipitate action to absorb it into GDR would entail grave risk of war.

Playing on West's strong desire avoid war, Sovs trying push us into making new arrangements that will appear reasonable but actually will start erosion process ending in Berlin's absorption into GDR.

Sovs and GDR in major propaganda campaign since abortive summit have been trying soften up West by convincing us (1) Khrushchev really means he cannot wait any longer and intends soon to force issue through conclusion separate peace treaty; (2) Sovs certain West will not fight for Berlin; (3) We should therefore agree on interim arrangements ala Geneva 1959) or face consequences.

Although continuing flow of refugees may constitute serious long-range social-economic problem for GDR and is certainly an acute irritant, pressures on Khrushchev from GDR to solve Berlin situation are probably no greater today than in recent past. Certain compulsion for a Berlin "solution" exists as a result of Khrushchev's own artificially stimulated propaganda campaign, which creates a face-saving problem. However, frequently mentioned pressure to report progress on Berlin to CPSU Congress in October should have declined in light Sov space success and advance of Communism in Laos and Cuba. In short Sovs could live with Berlin status quo for some time.

I doubt if Khrushchev has firm policy decision or timetable on Berlin at this moment; fact no real Berlin showdown during past two and one-half years indicates inter alia Sovs not sure unpredictable West will not fight for Berlin. In this situation with both sides heavily committed to retain positions and neither anxious to force matters to showdown that could precipitate war, Vienna meeting provides opportunity, perhaps one of last opportunities, to convince Khrushchev of U.S. determination make good on Berlin pledges regardless of consequences.

Fact that Khrushchev will attempt convince President of his own determination solve Berlin along familiar Soviet-GDR lines only serves to emphasize importance this psychological duel at Vienna. I believe Soviet toughness re their Berlin intentions reflects serious desire change Berlin status, but also includes large element of bluff. I doubt Sov resolve is sufficient to risk thermo-nuclear war. Therefore, at this stage, U.S. must be even tougher if Khrushchev is to go away from Vienna convinced his threats are too risky to warrant carrying them out.

I realize President in first meeting with Khrushchev will not wish appear unreasonable; however, any indication President willing discuss "interim solutions," compromises, or modus vivendi if Sovs sign separate peace treaty, would reduce impact of warning Khrushchev of dire consequences his miscalculating our resolve.

Fact that in this meeting things can be said which cannot be spelled out in quadripartite conference may give President opportunity tell Khrushchev in blunt language that we consider USSR solely to blame for division of Germany and denial right of self-determination to German people; Sovs should keep hands off Berlin where U.S. committed to stay; there really nothing further to discuss on Berlin itself.

In sum, Vienna will be psychological testing ground and U.S. position on Berlin in my view should be molded carefully to create strongest possible impression on Khrushchev of U.S. firmness of intention on Berlin in effort to deter him further from course of action he has been threatening since Nov 1958./2/

Lightner

Moscow, May 27, 1961, 1 p.m.

2939. Re Berlin tel to Dept 572 and Bonn tel 1971./2/ While I agree in main with analysis contained Berlin reftel I do not believe this is whole story. I not only do not believe Khrushchev has necessity of reporting progress on Berlin to Party Congress but believe he will deliberately wish to put off crisis until after he has further consolidated his position at Congress. However I consider K has so deeply committed his personal prestige and that of Soviet Union to some action on Berlin and German problems that if we take completely negative stand suggested by Berlin, this would probably lead to developments in which chances of war or ignominious Western retreat are close to 50-50. Situation is not changed by fact it is of K's own making. However, I believe there is real suspicion here that we and/or West Germans hope to develop position in which we can use force or threat of force to bring down Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. Both sides consider other would not risk war over Berlin. Danger arises from fact that if K carries out his declared intentions and we carry out ours, situation likely get out of control and military as well as political prestige would become involved making retreat for either side even more difficult. Soviets have strong nerves and far greater cohesion with their allies. Geography and local balance of forces are in their favor. Assuming we are prepared carry our policy through to end and K found he had misjudged us, would probably be too late for retreat. In these circumstances it seems to me we should make every effort avoid allowing such situation to develop.

I agree we should not allow gradual erosion our position by embarking on slippery path of tempting compromises. In my view President has difficult task of convincing K on one hand that we will fulfill our commitment to people of Berlin and on other that it is not our intention to saw off limb on which he has crawled. I believe best approach would be to tell him frankly that neither of our two great powers can suffer humiliating defeat over this issue and that we would be prepared to endeavor work out some kind of solution which would save face on both sides but essentially leave problem on ice while we attempt tackle other problems.

General background from which I view this problem is that it would not be to our advantage to revert to all-out cold war or have Soviet Union swing over to Chinese policy. Given President's programs I believe that despite recent Soviet successes time is on our side. I consider this the more true in view of real possibility eventual split between Soviet Union and Red China. Therefore consider our policy should be directed toward gaining time and reducing possibility of direct confrontation Soviet-US power. As I have frequently reported, additional reason for not simply taking uncompromising position is that lengths to which Soviets will go and extent to which we can maintain unity in Western camp will depend upon image this problem held by world opinion. At present time do not believe this satisfactory from our point of view. Since Geneva we have virtually dropped discussion our peace plan, whereas Soviets have constantly focused attention on their proposal. We have thus been maneuvered into position of saying no to proposal that would avoid warlike situation. Strongly believe we must put Soviets in position of saying no.

In view his conversation with me, quite possible K will attempt slide over Berlin problem in sweetness and light atmosphere. In this event believe President should force issue./3/

Thompson

Washington, undated.

BERLIN AND GERMANY
(The President might wish to raise)

We agree with de Gaulle that Berlin is of paramount importance. It is the symbol of our determination and ability to prevent further Communist expansion in Europe. The US is determined, in cooperation with its allies, to preserve the freedom of the people of West Berlin and to defend the Allied position in the city, upon which the preservation of that freedom to such a large extent depends.

US concern with strengthening conventional forces should, under no circumstances, be interpreted as affecting our decision to use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend all the NATO area, including Berlin. As we have recently informed NATO, "deterrence requires that NATO shield forces continue to have an effective nuclear capability, and the Soviets must never be allowed to doubt NATO's readiness to use this capability, if necessary, together with the nuclear forces outside the European theater, to counter Soviet attack on Europe."/2/

We believe the Soviet Union is likely to heighten tension over Berlin this year most probably by a renewed threat to sign a "separate peace treaty" with the "GDR", possibly with an indication of willingness first to have another round of negotiations. Depending on how the issue is raised, it may become desirable again to enter into negotiations on Berlin and Germany. France, the US, the UK, and the Germans should, therefore, review the position they should take in such negotiations.

We should attempt to negotiate on Berlin only within the context of the entire German question. However, we must realistically be prepared to negotiate separately on Berlin. Furthermore, it seems questionable that any all-German approach acceptable to the West would provide the basis for even a temporary solution to the Berlin problem, or indeed that any real step toward German reunification can be taken within the foreseeable future under circumstances acceptable to the West.

If the Soviets sign a "separate peace treaty", our position should be that this unilateral act cannot affect our rights in Berlin, and that we are determined to continue to exercise those rights, including specifically the right of access.

The US is urgently and thoroughly reviewing certain aspects of Berlin contingency planning with a view to the development of more precise governmentally-agreed courses of action. When our review is concluded, in the very near future, we wish to discuss this matter with the French, the British, and the Germans--through the established Washington machinery--as well as with our other NATO allies.

US/MC/1

Paris, May 31, 1961, 12:30 p.m./2/

PRESIDENT'S VISIT
Paris, May 31-June 2, 1961

SUBJECT
Wednesday Morning Talks

PARTICIPANTS

United States
President Kennedy
Mr. Glenn (Interpreter)

France
General de Gaulle
Mr. Andronikoff (Interpreter)

The President opened by saying that the range of problems common to the two countries extends all over the world from Laos through Africa and Latin America. There is, however, the problem of Berlin which is particularly important at this moment as it may come up during the week end talks with Mr. Khrushchev. What is General de Gaulle's point of view on this question?

The President then reported the conversations between Mr. Khrushchev and Ambassador Thompson/3/ in which Mr. Khrushchev said that he had waited long enough, that he has commitments in this area and that his prestige is engaged. He said therefore that after the elections, it is time for him (Khrushchev) to carry out his commitments. Ambassador Thompson spoke of the Western commitments in the area and particularly of the presence of Western troops. Mr. Khrushchev said that those troops should prepare themselves to tighten their belts.

The President again asked the General for his thoughts about the manner in which this question should be discussed with Mr. Khrushchev. Backing down on Berlin would clearly represent a defeat for the Western Alliance and result in a very serious weakening thereof. What is General de Gaulle's opinion on this question, not only for the immediate future but also for the longer range point of view?

There seemed to be two possibilities. One is to say that neither the status of Berlin nor the right of the Western Powers to free access to and from Berlin are subjects for negotiation. The other one is that the right of free access to Berlin is not a subject of negotiation but that the future status of Berlin can be a subject of discussion. If the second position is taken, it might lead to some talks about Berlin such as the ones which took place in Geneva at an earlier date./4/ Such talks will be fruitless but will give the appearance of a negotiation.

General de Gaulle replied that for two and a half years, Mr. Khrushchev has been saying and repeating that his prestige is engaged in the Berlin question and that he will have to have a solution of it in six months, and then again in six months and then still in six months. This seems to indicate that Mr. Khrushchev does not want war. If he had wanted war about Berlin he would have acted already. This is a psychological question. General de Gaulle had already said to Mr. Khrushchev: "It is annoying to both sides that Berlin should be located where it is; however, it is there." There is no reason why the Western Allies should withdraw. Under the circumstances, why is it that Mr. Khrushchev keeps on raising the question of Berlin. "You pretend," said General de Gaulle to him, "that you seek a detente. If such is the case, proceed with a detente. If you want peace, start with general disarmament negotiations. Under the circumstances, the entire world situation may change little by little and then we will solve the question of Berlin and the entire German question. However, if you insist on raising the question of Berlin within the context of the cold war, then no solution is possible. What do you want? Do you want war?" Mr. Khrushchev had replied that he didn't want it. In that case, de Gaulle told him, do nothing that can bring it about./5/

The President said that the question was how to make the Western position believed by Mr. Khrushchev. There is a danger that he might not believe in our firmness. The General himself had asked whether we would be ready to trade New York for Paris. If the General himself, who has worked together with the United States for so long, could question American firmness, Mr. Khrushchev can question it also. The problem then is how to convince him.

General de Gaulle said it is a situation with which we are faced. It is important to show that we do not intend to let this situation change. If we were to retreat, if we were to accept a change in the status of Berlin, if we were to accept a withdrawal of the Western troops from Berlin, or if we were to accept that obstacles be put to our communications with Berlin, this would be the defeat. It would result in an almost complete loss of Germany and in very serious losses within France, Italy and elsewhere. We must not retreat before Soviet dictation. Now, in speaking with Mr. Khrushchev, we must make it clear that we are not asking for anything. It is he who seeks a change. That change we reject. If he uses the GDR to stop us, then we will push through the GDR because it is obvious that we are stronger than the GDR. If he wants war, we must make it clear to him that he will have it. But the General does not think that Mr. Khrushchev wants war.

The President asked what would happen if Mr. Khrushchev signs a peace treaty with the GDR--for such a possibility clearly exists--and if he transfers the inspection rights to the GDR, if furthermore the GDR begins by stamping all travel documents and then possibly step by step renders communications more difficult, what would be our position in such a case? Should we act immediately as soon as a treaty is signed and as soon as the GDR assuming the rights of inspection begins to stamp documents, or should we wait to act until such time as restrictions are imposed on our communications?

General de Gaulle said that we cannot prevent Mr. Khrushchev from signing anything he wishes with the GDR. This is his own Communist business and none of ours. We must, however, make it clear that no matter what he does with the GDR it will not be recognized by us in any way. Our position remains that there can be no peace treaty except as signed by all four powers. We must also make it clear to Mr. Khrushchev that no internal Communist document between him and the GDR changes in any way the position that the responsibility concerning Berlin is a Russian responsibility (as well as, of course, a responsibility of the Western Allies) and that it can change only if all four powers agree to a change. It must be made clear to Mr. Khrushchev that we do not recognize any duality between him and the GDR. To us, both are one and the same thing. We do not accept any stamping of papers by the GDR. What they sign between themselves is their business, but we might make it immediately clear that we do not accept any consequences of their action. Should we wait, we could be drawn into serious difficulties. In particular, we could even be brought to a state of affairs where we would have lost without seeming to have lost but in a way which would be understood by the entire world. In particular, the population of Berlin is not made up exclusively of heroes. In the face of something which they would interpret as our weakness, they might begin to leave Berlin and make it into an empty shell to be picked up by the East.

It is the firm opinion of the General that the course of action which he outlined is a necessary one. If Mr. Khrushchev had wanted to go to war, he would have done it already.

However, this is the question of the general Soviet intentions which the two Presidents will be discussing later.

Another point is that the thing which may be discussed is not the particular situation of Berlin but rather the general situation of Germany. If Mr. Khrushchev wishes to talk about it, we can talk about it once more. But we should not talk about Berlin in isolation and we should ask Mr. Khrushchev outright if he wants to humiliate us--in which case he will not succeed--or does he want war?

The President asked in what manner this could be handled in detail. If Mr. Khrushchev signs a treaty with the GDR, this in itself is no reason for a military retaliation on our part. If the GDR starts stamping travel documents, this is not, per se, a cause for military action either. In what way, therefore, at what moment, shall we bring our pressure to bear? Right now Mr. Khrushchev can sign a peace treaty, the GDR can start stamping documents and then little by little, it can make the situation more difficult, causing the economic ruin of Berlin. How do we answer that?

General de Gaulle answered that the criterion is the use of force either by the Soviets directly or by the GDR. If either he or his lackeys use force to cut our communications with Berlin, then we must use force. We must see clearly that no GDR exists other than the Soviets themselves and that no matter what documents Mr. Khrushchev signs, the responsibility in regard to Berlin remains his.

The President said that he agreed. If we should weaken, then we should have suffered a severe blow in both Western Germany and in all of Europe, a blow which would not be mortal but would be serious. The point is how to convince Mr. Khrushchev of our firmness. Let us again look at the situation which might follow a signature of a treaty between the Soviet Union and eastern Germany and the stamping of documents by the GDR and the stoppage of our access to Berlin. Is the General satisfied with the Allied plans as they exist right now and which in such a case we call for a demonstration in approximately company strength and in case of failure, possibly in brigade strength? Are these good plans?

General de Gaulle replied that there is no possibility of a military victory for us in the area of Berlin. What we must make clear is that if there is any fighting around Berlin, this means general war.

Prior to adjourning for lunch, the President asked General de Gaulle about the manner in which the fourth estate should be handled.

General de Gaulle replied that the French do not intend to say anything at all for the present.

US/MC/2

Paris, May 31, 1961, 2:50 p.m.

PRESIDENT'S VISIT
Paris, May 31-June 2, 1961

SUBJECT
Wednesday Afternoon Talks

PARTICIPANTS

United States
President Kennedy
Mr. Glenn (Interpreter)

General de Gaulle
Mr. Lebel (Interpreter)

The President opened with a summation of the morning talks on Berlin./2/ The positions of the two countries are fully in agreement. If Mr. Khrushchev signs a treaty with the G.D.R. in spite of warnings from the West, the two countries should advise immediately as to a common response. Secondly, the military of the two countries should study the contingency plans so as to translate into such plans the best thinking of both governments. This should be coordinated with the British. The President does not know what the British position is. He hopes, however, that the British share the one of the French and Americans.

General de Gaulle said he had already discussed this question with the British./3/ Mr. Macmillan's position is not clear and he is somewhat hesitant. He cannot, however, take any other position than the one agreed upon by the two Presidents and he does not really wish to take any other position. As for a tactical approach to Mr. Khrushchev, it should be a direct one and not one based on legalistic argumentation. We should ask Mr. Khrushchev what is it that he wants. If what he wants is for us to retreat, this is something that we do not want. If he uses force, we will use force. He represents a great power and so do we. Great powers, and this means the U.S. and also the U.K. and France, cannot be treated as if they were insignificant entities. Mr. Khrushchev says that he is sensitive to his prestige and so are we. This is a type of language which fits in with Mr. Khrushchev's view of the world and which he appreciates.

The President asked whether there wasn't something which would go beyond mere words which we should do in order to convince Mr. Khrushchev of our firmness. The danger is that Mr. Khrushchev might not believe that we would resort to war and that in consequence he might try to undertake the strangulation of Berlin step by step, thus bringing about a situation without issue. The President does not believe that the present military plans are satisfactory. They speak only of a first probing action so weak that it could be stopped by a couple of companies. No decision has been taken about probing in brigade, division or several division strength. It is necessary that Mr. Khrushchev be made to understand that we are decided, if necessary, to wage nuclear warfare. At the present moment he may believe that the position of the U.K., for example, is hesitant and that he can gain everything by undertaking actions none of which taken individually would be enough of a provocation, but all of which taken together would destroy our position. In order to keep him from taking such a risk, we must make our position clear by actions. The United States is proceeding with strengthening the material capabilities of its armed forces; additional common planning might be useful. In 1949, we had nuclear superiority and we resorted to the air lift in Berlin. At the present moment, the Soviet Union has great nuclear capabilities and Mr. Khrushchev may think that we would not dare to go equally far.

President de Gaulle replied that it is true that Mr. Khrushchev must be made to understand that we will stand firm. It would be good indeed if some strengthening of the Berlin garrisons were undertaken. If the United States does it, France and the U.K could proceed in parallel. (Note: It seems that there was a slight misunderstanding between the two Presidents. President Kennedy seems to have spoken about the strengthening of the material of the U.S. forces in general; President de Gaulle seems to have understood this as strengthening in material of the Berlin garrisons.) President de Gaulle then said that in 1949 the air lift proved relatively easy as the West had nuclear superiority. At the present moment, the situation is not the same. Nevertheless, a useful action in the direction suggested by the President would be the public strengthening of the Air Force units having the capability of carrying out an air lift. This would clarify the situation, because the only thing which can be done against air lift is to shoot a plane down. This is an act of war and a clear act of war. It is possible to quibble about when force is actually used to stop some trucks or to stop a train, but it is impossible to deny that force is being used when a plane is shot down. The U.S. is right in strengthening the Berlin garrisons but a clearer action would be to strengthen air lift capabilities.

The President said that at the present moment the question of supplying the Berlin garrisons does not create a problem as there exists a capability of four sorties a day which is sufficient. The problem is more difficult in regard to supplying the civilian population. Nevertheless, the West still has time to study that question, which is unlikely to create any complications before the end of the summer.

President de Gaulle said that there is another aspect of a possible Berlin Blockade which is worth mentioning and that is that of the economic situation in Russia. Russia is no longer economically self-sufficient. She seeks trade relations with the West. Likewise, the G.D.R. needs trade relations with West Germany, on which it depends for its very life. This is something which has changed since `49 and which Mr. Khrushchev must take into account. There is, therefore, a possibility of economic retaliation in addition to the military action and this economic retaliation is something which Mr. Khrushchev must take into account because he needs trade with the West. For example, Russia has recently bought sixty thousand tons of meat from France. As for Berlin, it has supplies for its civilian population for six months which would give the West time. Generally speaking, the West is not as weak as people think in regard to the Berlin question and Mr. Khrushchev must be made to understand this.

[Here follows discussion of Laos and Africa.]