

## Chapter 6. Energy Extraction and Conversion

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### KEY FINDINGS

- In recent years, the extraction of primary energy sources and their conversion into energy commodities in North America released on the order of 2700 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> per year to the atmosphere, approximately 40% of total North American emissions in 2003 and 10% of total global emissions. Electricity generation is responsible for a very large share of North America's energy extraction and conversion emissions.
- Carbon dioxide emissions from energy supply systems in North America are currently rising.
- The principal drivers behind carbon emissions from energy supply systems are (1) the growing appetite for energy services, closely related to economic and social progress, and (2) the market competitiveness of fossil energy compared with alternatives.
- Emissions from energy supply systems in North America are projected to increase in the future. Projections vary among the countries, but increases approaching 50% or more in coming decades appear likely. Projections for the United States., for example, indicate that CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from electricity generation alone will rise to above 3300 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> by 2030, an increase of about 45% over emissions in 2004, with three-quarters of the increase associated with greater coal use in electric power plants.
- The prospects for major reductions in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from energy supply systems in North America appear dependent upon (a) the extent, direction, and pace of technological innovation and (b) whether policy conditions favoring carbon emissions reduction that do not now exist will emerge (Fig. 6-1). In these regards, the prospects are brighter in the long term (e.g., more than several decades in the future) than in the near term.
- Research and development priorities for managing carbon emissions from energy supply systems include, on the technology side, clarifying and realizing potentials for carbon capture and sequestration, and, on the policy side, understanding the public acceptability of policy incentives for reducing dependence on carbon-intensive energy sources.

1           **Figure 6-1. Prospects for carbon emissions from energy extraction and conversion in North**  
2           **America, assuming substantial improvement in energy efficiency.**

## 4   **INTRODUCTION**

5           The energy supply system in North America is a significant part of the North American carbon cycle,  
6           because so many of its primary energy resources are fossil fuels, associated with extraction and  
7           conversion activities that emit greenhouse gases. This chapter summarizes the knowledge bases related to  
8           emissions from energy extraction, energy conversion, and other energy supply activities such as energy  
9           movement and energy storage, along with options and measures for managing emissions.

10          Clearly, this topic overlaps the subject matter of other chapters. For instance, the dividing line  
11          between energy conversion and other types of industry is sometimes indistinct. One prominent case is  
12          emissions associated with electricity and process heat supply for petroleum refining and other fossil fuel  
13          processing – a large share of their total emissions, included in industrial sector emission totals; another  
14          example is industrial co-generation as an energy-efficiency strategy. Also, biomass energy  
15          extraction/conversion is directly related to agriculture and forestry. Moreover, emission-related policy  
16          alternatives for energy supply systems are often directed at both supply and demand responses, involving  
17          not only emission reductions but also potential payoffs from efficiency improvements in buildings,  
18          industry, and transportation, especially where they reduce the consumption of fossil fuels.

## 20   **CARBON EMISSIONS INVENTORY**

### 21   **Carbon Emissions from Energy Extraction and Conversion**

22          Carbon emissions from energy resource extraction, conversion into energy commodities, and  
23          transmission are one of the “big three” sectors accounting for most of the total emissions from human  
24          systems in North America, along with industry and transportation. The largest share of total emissions  
25          from energy supply (not including energy end use) is from coal and other fossil fuel use in producing  
26          electricity; fossil fuel conversion activities such as oil refining and natural gas transmission and  
27          distribution also contribute to this total, but in much smaller amounts. Other emission sources are less  
28          well-defined but generally small, such as emissions from oil production and methane from reservoirs  
29          established partly to support hydropower production (Tremblay *et al.*, 2004), or from materials production  
30          (e.g., metals production) associated with other renewable or nuclear energy technologies. Generally, data  
31          on emissions have a relatively low level of uncertainty, although the source materials do not include  
32          quantitative estimates of uncertainty.

33          Data on emissions from energy supply systems are unevenly available for the countries of North  
34          America. Most emission data sets are organized by fuel consumed rather than by consuming sector, and

1 countries differ in sectors identified and the units of measurement. As a result, inventories are reported in  
2 this chapter by country in whatever forms are available rather than constructing a North American  
3 inventory that could not be consistent across all three major countries. It is worth noting that Canada and  
4 Mexico export energy supplies to the United States; therefore, some emissions from energy *supply*  
5 systems in these countries are associated with energy *uses* in the United States.

## 7 **Canada**

8 Canada is the world's fifth-largest energy producing country, a significant exporter of both natural  
9 gas and electricity to the United States. In Alberta, which produces nearly two-thirds of Canada's energy,  
10 energy accounts for about one-quarter of the province's economic activity; its oil sands are estimated to  
11 have more potential energy value than the remaining oil reserves of Saudi Arabia (DOE, 2004). Although  
12 Canada has steadily reduced its energy and carbon intensities since the early 1970s, its overall energy  
13 intensity remains high—in part due to its prominence as an energy producer—and total greenhouse gas  
14 emissions have grown by 9% since 1990. As of 2003, greenhouse gas emissions in Mt CO<sub>2</sub> equivalents  
15 were 134 for electricity and heat generation and 71 for petroleum refining and upgrading and other fossil  
16 fuel production (Environment Canada, 2003). Although the mix of CO<sub>2</sub> and CH<sub>4</sub> in these figures is  
17 unclear, the carbon emission equivalent is probably in a 60-80 Mt C range.

## 19 **Mexico**

20 Mexico is one of the largest sources of energy-related greenhouse gas emissions in Latin America,  
21 although its per capita emissions are well below the per capita average of industrialized countries. The  
22 first large oil-producing nation to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, it has promoted shifts to natural gas use to  
23 reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The most recent emission figures are from the country's Second  
24 National Communication to the UN United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2001,  
25 which included relatively comprehensive data from 1996 and some data from 1998. In 1998, total CO<sub>2</sub>  
26 emissions from "energy industries" were 47.3 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> (13 Mt C); from electricity generation they totaled  
27 101.3 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> (27.6 Mt C), and "fugitive" emissions from oil and gas production and distribution were  
28 between 1.9 and 2.6 Mt of CH<sub>4</sub> (1.4 – 2 Mt C), depending on the estimated "emission factor"  
29 (Government of Mexico, 2001).

## 31 **United States**

32 The United States is the largest national emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions  
33 associated with electricity generation in 2004 account for 2299 Mt of CO<sub>2</sub> (627 Mt C), or 39% of a  
34 national total of 5890 (EIA, 2006a). Greenhouse gases are also emitted from oil refining, natural gas

1 transmission, and other fossil energy supply activities, but apart from energy consumption figures  
2 included in industry sector calculations these emissions are relatively small compared with electric power  
3 plant emissions. For instance, emissions from petroleum consumed in refining processes in the U.S. are  
4 about 40 Mt C per year (EIA, 2004: Ch. 2), while fugitive emissions from gas transmission and  
5 distribution pipelines in the U.S. are about 2.2 Mt C yr<sup>-1</sup> (ORNL estimate). On the other hand, a study of  
6 greenhouse gas emissions from a six-county area in southwestern Kansas found that compressor stations  
7 for natural gas pipeline systems are a significant source of emissions at that local scale (AAG, 2003).

## 9 **Carbon Sinks Associated with Energy Extraction and Conversion**

10 Generally, energy supply in North America is based heavily on mining hydrocarbons from carbon  
11 sinks accumulated over millions of years; but current carbon sequestration occurs in plant growth,  
12 including the cultivation of feedstocks for bioenergy production. Limited strictly to energy sector  
13 applications, the total contribution of these *sinks* to the North American carbon cycle is relatively small,  
14 while other aspects of bioenergy development are associated with carbon *emissions*.

## 17 **TRENDS AND DRIVERS**

18 Three principal drivers are behind carbon emissions from energy extraction and conversion.

19 (1) *The growing global and national appetite for energy services such as comfort, convenience,*  
20 *mobility, and labor productivity, so closely related to progress with economic and social development*  
21 *and the quality of life* (Wilbanks, 1992). Globally, the challenge is to increase total energy *services* (not  
22 necessarily *supplies*) over the next half-century by a factor of at least three or four—more rapidly than  
23 overall economic growth—while reducing environmental impacts from the associated supply systems  
24 (NAS, 1999). Mexico shares this need, while increases in Canada and the United States are likely to be  
25 more or less proportional to rates of economic growth.

26 (2) *The market competitiveness of fossil energy sources compared with supply- and demand-side*  
27 *alternatives*. Production costs of electricity from coal, oil, or natural gas at relatively large scales are  
28 currently lower than other sources besides large-scale hydropower, and production costs of liquid and gas  
29 fuels are currently far lower than other sources, though rising. This is mainly due to the fact that the  
30 energy density and portability of fossil fuels is as yet unmatched by other energy sources, and in some  
31 cases policy conditions reinforce fossil fuel use. These conditions appear likely to continue for some  
32 years. In many cases, the most cost-competitive alternative to fossil fuel production and use is not  
33 alternative supply sources but efficiency improvement.

1       (3) *Enhanced future markets for alternative energy supply sources.* In the longer run, however,  
2 emissions from energy supply systems may—and in fact are likely to—begin to decline as alternative  
3 technology options are developed and/or improved. Other possible driving forces for attention to  
4 alternatives to fossil fuels, at least in the mid to longer term, include the possibility of shrinking oil and/or  
5 gas reserves and changes in attitudes toward energy policy interventions.

6       Given the power of the first two of these drivers, total carbon emissions from energy extraction and  
7 conversion in North America are currently rising (e.g., Fig. 6-2). National trends and drivers are as  
8 follows. As is always the case, projections of the future involve higher levels of uncertainty than  
9 measurements of the present, but source materials do not include quantitative estimates of uncertainties  
10 associated with projections of future emissions.

11  
12           **Figure 6-2. U.S. carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation, 1990–2004.**

13  
14       **Canada**

15       Canada has ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and it is seeking to meet the Kyoto target of CO<sub>2</sub> emission  
16 reduction to 6% below 1990 levels. Of these reductions, 25% are to be through domestic actions and 75%  
17 through market mechanisms such as purchases of carbon credits (Government of Canada, 2005).  
18 Domestic actions will include a significant reduction in coal consumption. Available projections,  
19 however, indicate a total national increase of emissions in CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent of 36.1% by 2020 from 1990  
20 levels (Environment Canada, 2005). Emissions from electricity generation could increase 2000–2020 by  
21 as much as two-thirds, while emissions from fossil fuel production would remain relatively stable  
22 (although substantial expansion of oil sands production could be a factor).

23  
24       **Mexico**

25       It has been estimated that total Mexican CO<sub>2</sub> emissions will grow 69% by 2010, although mitigation  
26 measures could reduce this rate of growth by nearly half (Pew Center, 2002). Generally, energy sector  
27 emissions in Mexico vary in proportion to economic growth (e.g., declining somewhat with a recession in  
28 2001), but such factors as a pressing need for additional electricity supplies, calling for more than  
29 doubling production capacity between 1999 and 2008, could increase net emissions while a national  
30 strategy to promote greater use of natural gas (along with other policies related in part to concerns about  
31 emissions associated with urban air pollution) could reduce emissions compared with a reference case  
32 (EIA, 2005).

## 1 **United States**

2 The Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2006a) projects that CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from electricity  
3 generation in the United States will rise between 2004 and 2030 from about 2299 (627 Mt C) to more  
4 than 3300 Mt (900 Mt C), an increase of about 45%, with three-quarters of the increase associated with  
5 greater coal use in electric power plants. EIA projects that technology advances could lower emissions by  
6 as much as 9%. Projections of other emissions from energy supply systems appear to be unavailable, but  
7 emissions could be expected to rise at a rate just below the rate of change in product consumption in the  
8 U.S. economy.

## 10 **OPTIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF EMISSIONS FROM ENERGY EXTRACTION AND** 11 **CONVERSION**

12 Few aspects of the carbon cycle have received more attention in the past several decades than  
13 emissions from fossil energy extraction and conversion. As a result, there is a wide array of technology  
14 and policy options, many of which have been examined in considerable detail, although there is not a  
15 strong consensus on courses of action.

### 17 **Technology Options**

18 Technology options for reducing energy-supply-related emissions (other than reduced requirements  
19 due to end-use efficiency improvements) consist of

- 21 • reducing emissions from fossil energy extraction, production, and movement (e.g., for electricity  
22 generation, improving the efficiency of existing power plants or moving toward the use of lower-  
23 emission technologies such as coal gasification–combined cycle generation facilities) and
- 24 • shifting from fossil energy sources to other energy sources [e.g., energy from the sun (renewable  
25 energy) or from the atom (nuclear energy)].

27 The most comprehensive description of emission-reducing and fuel switching technologies and their  
28 potentials is the U.S. Climate Change Technology Program (CCTP) draft *Strategic Plan* (CCTP, 2005),  
29 especially Chapters 5 (energy supply) and 6 (capturing and sequestering CO<sub>2</sub>)—see also National  
30 Laboratory Directors (1997). The CCTP report focuses on five energy supply technology areas: low-  
31 emission fossil-based fuels and power, hydrogen as an energy carrier, renewable energy and fuels, nuclear  
32 fission, and fusion energy.

33 There is a widespread consensus that no one of these options, nor one family of options, is a good  
34 prospect to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions from energy supply systems, nationally or globally,

1 because each faces daunting constraints (Hoffert *et al.*, 2002). An example is possible physical and/or  
2 technological limits to effective global “decarbonization” (i.e., reducing the use of carbon-based energy  
3 sources as a proportion of total energy supplies), including renewable or other non-fossil sources of  
4 energy use at scales that would dramatically change the global carbon balance between now and 2050.  
5 One conclusion is that “the disparity between what is needed and what can be done without great  
6 compromise may become more acute.”

7 Instead, progress with technologies likely to be available in the coming decades may depend on  
8 adding together smaller “wedges” of contributions by a variety of resource/technology combinations  
9 (Pacala and Socolow, 2004), each of which may be feasible if the demands upon it are moderate. If many  
10 such contributions can be combined, the total effect could approach requirements for even relatively  
11 ambitious carbon stabilization goals, at least in the first half of the century, although each contribution  
12 would need to be economically competitive with current types of fossil energy sources.

13 A fundamental question is whether prospects for significant decarbonization depend on the  
14 emergence of new technologies, in many cases requiring advances in science. For instance, efforts are  
15 being made to develop economically affordable and socially acceptable options for large-scale capture of  
16 carbon from fossil fuel streams—with the remaining hydrogen offering a clean energy source—and  
17 sequestration of the carbon in the ground or the oceans. This approach is known to be technologically  
18 feasible (and is being practiced commercially in the North Sea), and recent assessments suggest that it  
19 may have considerable promise (e.g., IPCC, 2006). If so, there is at least some chance that fossil energy  
20 sources may be used to provide energy services in North America and the world in large quantities in the  
21 mid to longer terms without contributing to a carbon cycle imbalance.

22 What can be expected from technology options over the next quarter to half a century is a matter of  
23 debate, partly because the pace of technology development and use depends heavily on policy conditions.  
24 Chapter 3 in the CCTP draft *Strategic Plan* (2005) shows three advanced technology scenarios drawn  
25 from work by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, varying according to carbon constraints.  
26 Potential contributions to global emission reduction by energy supply technology initiatives between  
27 2000 and 2100 range from about 25 Gt C equivalent to nearly 350 Gt, which illustrates uncertainties  
28 related to both science and policy issues. Carbon capture and storage, along with terrestrial sequestration,  
29 could add reductions between about 100 and 325 Gt C. It has been suggested, however, that significantly  
30 decarbonizing energy systems by 2050 could require massive efforts on a par with the Manhattan project  
31 or the Apollo space program (Hoffert *et al.*, 2002).

32 Estimated costs of potential technology alternatives for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from  
33 energy supply systems are summarized after the following discussion of policy options, because cost  
34 estimates are generally based on assumptions about policy interventions.

1

## 2 **Policy Options**

3 Policy options for carbon emission reduction from energy supply systems revolve around either  
4 *incentives* or regulatory *requirements* for such reductions. Generally, interventions may be aimed at  
5 (a) shaping technology choice and use or (b) shaping technology development and supply. Many of the  
6 policy options are aimed at encouraging end-use efficiency improvement as well as supply-side emission  
7 reduction.

8 Options for intervening to change the relative attractiveness of available energy supply technology  
9 alternatives include appealing to voluntary action (e.g., improved consumer information, “green power”),  
10 a variety of regulatory actions (e.g., mandated purchase policies such as energy portfolio standards),  
11 carbon emission rights trading (where emission reduction would have market value), technology/product  
12 standards, production tax credits for non-fossil energy production, tax credits for alternative energy use,  
13 and carbon emission taxation or ceilings. Options for changing the relative attractiveness of investing in  
14 carbon-emission-reducing technology development and dissemination include tax credits for certain kinds  
15 of energy R&D, public-private sector R&D cost sharing, and electric utility restructuring. For a more  
16 comprehensive listing and discussion, see Chapter 6 in IPCC (2002, Chapter 6).

17 In some cases, perceptions that policies and market conditions of the future will be more favorable to  
18 emission reduction than at present are motivating private industry to consider investments in technologies  
19 whose market competitiveness would grow in such a future. Examples include the CO<sub>2</sub> Capture Project  
20 and industry-supported projects at MIT, Princeton, and Stanford.

21 Most estimates of the impacts of energy policy options on greenhouse gas emissions do not  
22 differentiate the contributions from energy supply systems from the rest of the energy economy [e.g.,  
23 Interlaboratory Working Group (IWG), 1997; IWG, 2000; IPCC, 2001; National Commission on Energy  
24 Policy, 2004; also see OTA, 1991, and NAS, 1992]. For instance the IWG (1997) considered effects of  
25 \$25 and \$50 per ton carbon emission permits on both energy supply and use, while IWG considered fifty  
26 policy/technology options (IWG, 2000; also see IPCC, 2001), most of which would affect both energy  
27 supply and energy use decisions.

28

## 29 **Estimated Costs of Implementation**

30 Estimating the costs of emission reduction associated with the implementation of various technology  
31 and policy options for energy supply and conversion systems is complicated by several realities. First,  
32 many estimates are aggregated for the United States or the world as a whole, without separate estimates  
33 for the energy extraction and conversion sector. Second, estimates differ in the scenarios considered, the  
34 modeling approaches adopted, and the units of measure that are used.



1 More specifically, estimates of costs of emission reduction vary widely according to assumptions  
2 about such issues as how welfare is measured, ancillary benefits, and effects in stimulating technological  
3 innovation; and therefore any particular set of cost estimate includes considerable uncertainty. According  
4 to IWG (2000), benefits of emission reduction would be comparable to costs, and the National  
5 Commission on Energy Policy (2004) estimates that their recommended policy initiatives would be, on  
6 the whole, revenue-neutral with respect to the federal budget. Other participants in energy policymaking,  
7 however, are convinced that truly significant carbon emission reductions would have substantial  
8 economic impacts (GAO, 2004).

9 Globally, IPCC (2001) projected that total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from energy supply and conversion could  
10 be reduced in 2020 by 350 to 700 Mt C equivalents per year, based on options that could be adopted  
11 through the use of generally accepted policies, generally at a positive direct cost of less than U.S.\$100 per  
12 t C equivalents. Based on DOE/EIA analyses in 2000, this study includes estimates of the cost of a range  
13 of specific emission-reducing technologies for power generation, compared with coal-fired power,  
14 although the degree of uncertainty is not clear. Within the United States, the report estimated that the cost  
15 of emission reduction per metric ton of carbon emissions reduced would range from -\$170 to +\$880,  
16 depending on the technology used. Marginal abatement costs for the total United States economy, in 1990  
17 U.S. dollars per metric ton carbon, were estimated by a variety of models compared by the Energy  
18 Modeling Forum at \$76 to \$410 with no emission trading, \$14 to \$224 with Annex I trading, and \$5 to  
19 \$123 with global trading.

20 Similarly, the National Commission on Energy Policy (2004) considered costs associated with a  
21 tradable emission permit system that would reduce United States national greenhouse gas emission  
22 growth from 44% to 33% from 2002 to 2025, a reduction of 760 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> (207 Mt C) in 2025 compared  
23 with a reference case. The cost would be a roughly 5% increase in total end-use expenditures compared  
24 with the reference case. Electricity prices would rise by 5.4% for residential users, 6.2% for commercial  
25 users, and 7.6% for industrial users.

26 The IWG (2000) estimated that a domestic carbon trading system with a \$25/t C permit price would  
27 reduce emissions by 13% compared with a reference case, or 230 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> (63 Mt C), while a \$50 price  
28 would reduce emissions by 17 to 19%, or 306 to 332 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> (83-91 Mt C). Both cases assume a doubling  
29 of United States government appropriations for cost-shared clean energy research, design, and  
30 development.

31 For carbon capture and sequestration, IPCC (2006) concluded that this option could contribute 15 to  
32 55% to global mitigation between now and 2100 if technologies develop as projected in relatively  
33 optimistic scenarios and very large-scale geological carbon sequestration is publicly acceptable. Under

1 these assumptions, the cost is projected at \$30 to \$70/t CO<sub>2</sub>. With less optimistic assumptions, the cost  
2 could rise to above \$200/t.

3 Net costs to the consumer, however, are balanced in some analyses by benefits from advanced  
4 technologies which are developed and deployed on an accelerated schedule due to policy interventions  
5 and changing public preferences. The U.S. Climate Change Technology Program (2005: pp. 3–19)  
6 illustrates how costs of achieving different stabilization levels can conceivably be reduced substantially  
7 by the use of advanced technologies, and IWG (2000) estimates that net end-user costs of energy can  
8 actually be reduced by a domestic carbon trading system if it accelerates the market penetration of more  
9 energy-efficient technologies.

10 In many cases, however, discussions of the promise of technology options are not associated with cost  
11 estimates. Economic costs of energy are not one of the drivers of the IPCC SRES scenarios, and such  
12 references as Hoffert *et al.* (2002) and Pacala and Socolow (2004) are concerned with technological  
13 potentials and constraints as a limiting condition on market behavior rather than with comparative costs  
14 and benefits of particular technology options at the margin.

## 16 **Summary**

17 In terms of prospects for major emission reductions from energy extraction and conversion in North  
18 America, the key issues appear to be the extent, direction, and pace of technological innovation and the  
19 likelihood that policy conditions favoring carbon emissions reduction that do not now exist will emerge if  
20 concerns about carbon cycle imbalances grow. In these regards, the prospects are brighter in the long term  
21 (e.g., more than several decades in the future) than in the near term. History suggests that technology  
22 solutions are usually easier to implement than policy solutions, but it is possible that observed impacts of  
23 carbon cycle imbalances might change the political calculus for policy interventions in the future.

## 25 **RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS**

26 If it is possible that truly effective management of carbon emissions from energy supply and  
27 conversion systems cannot be realized with the current portfolio of technology alternatives under current  
28 policy conditions, then research and development needs and opportunities deserve expanded attention and  
29 support (e.g., National Commission on Energy Policy, 2004). If so, the priorities include:

31 **Technology.** Several objectives seem to be especially relevant to carbon management potentials:

- 32 • clarifying and realizing potentials for carbon capture and sequestration;
- 33 • clarifying and realizing potentials of affordable renewable energy systems at a relatively large scale;

- 1 • addressing social concerns about the nuclear energy fuel cycle, especially in an era of concern about
- 2 terrorism;
- 3 • improving estimates of economic costs and emission reduction benefits of a range of energy;
- 4 technologies across a range of economic, technological, and policy scenarios; and
- 5 • “Blue Sky” research to develop new technology options and families, such as innovative approaches
- 6 for energy from the sun and from biomass, including possible applications of nanoscience (Caldeira *et*
- 7 *al.*, 2005; Lewis, 2005).

8

9 **Policy.** Research and development can also be applied to policy options in order to enlarge their

10 knowledge bases and explore their implications. For instance, research priorities might include learning

11 more about:

- 12 • the public acceptability of policy incentives for reducing dependence on energy sources associated
- 13 with carbon emissions,
- 14 • possible effects of incentives for the energy industry to increase its support for pathways not limited
- 15 to fossil fuels,
- 16 • approaches toward a more distributed electric power supply enterprise in which certain renewable
- 17 (and hydrogen) energy options might be more attractive, and
- 18 • transitions from one energy system/infrastructure to another.

19

20 In these ways, technology and policy advances might be combined with multiple technologies to

21 transform the capacity to manage carbon emissions from energy supply systems, if that is a high priority

22 for North America.

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


Fig. 6-1. Prospects for carbon emissions from energy extraction and conversion in North America, assuming substantial improvements in energy efficiency.

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


Fig. 6-2. U.S. carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation, 1990–2004.

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