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Significance:
Mar 30, 2008
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XI for Failure To Establish Adequate Test Control Measures For TS SR 3.7.5.2
Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for failure to consider the effects of instrument uncertainty, water temperature, or system orifice resistance during auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump technical specification required surveillance testing. This finding was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as condition reports CR 2007105436, CR 2007105713, CR 2007105870, and CR 2007105895. Planned corrective actions included revision of the AFW pump test procedures to correct the non-conservative acceptance criteria.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and operability of the AFW pumps to perform the intended safety function during a design basis event and the cornerstone attribute of Procedure Quality, i.e. maintenance and testing procedures. The inspectors assessed the finding using the SDP and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency did not result in any AFW pumps being inoperable based upon a recent review of AFW surveillance testing results. (Section 4OA5)
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2008
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Capability of Auxiliary Feedwater System to Meet Design and Licensing Requirements
The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to include the cumulative effects of the replacement of the 1A motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump rotating element, accuracy of AFW system resistance values, safety relief valve setpoint tolerances, and turbine driven AFW pump speed settings on evaluation of the performance of the AFW system. This finding was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as condition report CR 2007105979. Planned corrective actions included revision of the AFW system flow calculations to incorporate the most limiting design inputs.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and operability of the AFW system to perform the intended safety function during a design basis event and the cornerstone attribute of Design Control, i.e. initial design. The inspectors assessed the finding using the SDP and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiencies did not result in the AFW system being inoperable based upon additional analysis that showed that the AFW system had sufficient flow performance margin to accommodate pump performance and the increased system flow resistance when applying appropriate resistance values and steam generator backpressures.
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2008
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Inadequate Procedures Associated with Degraded Ability to Detect Boric Acid Leakage
A NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, was identified for lack of procedures to address compensatory measures for containment conditions which would mask indications of boric acid leakage. A combination of condensation and leaking containment cooler coils produced a white, crystalline film in large portions of the lower levels of containment that would reduce the adequacy of visuals inspections performed to detect boric acid leakage on susceptible components. The licensee entered the deficiency into their corrective action program for resolution.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone in that there were no additional measures taken to discriminate between boric acid leakage and the white residue present in containment which masked actual boric acid leakage. The finding is of very low safety significance because no degradation discovered called into question the operability of an affected component.
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Last modified : August 29, 2008