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ROP Action Matrix Deviations

Brief Description

The NRC determines its regulatory response in accordance with an Action Matrix that provides for a range of actions commensurate with the significance of the performance indicator (PI) and inspection results as described in IMC 0305, "Operating Reactor Assessment Program." The NRC recognizes that there may be rare instances in which the regulatory actions dictated by the Action Matrix may not be appropriate. In these instances, the Agency may deviate from the Action Matrix to either increase or decrease Agency action when approved by the Executive Director for Operations.

As requested by the Commission and incorporated into the self-assessment program, the staff reviews the causes of all Action Matrix deviations and evaluates them for potential improvements to the program. The evaluations are included in the annual ROP self-assessment, are discussed with senior NRC management at the Agency Action Review Meeting, and are presented to the Commission in the resultant briefing.

Summary of Deviations

Since the beginning of the Reactor Oversight Process in calendar year (CY) 2000, there have been a total of fifteen (15) deviations from the Action Matrix. Several programmatic changes have been or will be incorporated into the program as a result of the evaluations of these deviations as discussed below.

December 2007 (Indian Point) - On October 28, 2005, and renewed on December 11, 2006 and December 19, 2007, the EDO approved the deviation memorandum to continue to deviate from the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Action Matrix for the Indian Point Energy Center to provide heightened NRC oversight throughout calendar year 2008 (ROP 9). This action is necessary because the exit criteria for the existing deviation have not been met. The staff intends to continue to closely monitor the licensees actions to address issues associated with on-site groundwater contamination characterization and mitigation, and the Alert and Notification System (ANS), including implementation and testing of the replacement ANS that Entergy is installing in response to the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The actions proposed in the deviation request for the Indian Point Energy Center represent a customized approach that considers factors beyond each units Action Matrix categorization. This approach is consistent with underlying concepts of Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Operating Reactor Assessment Program.

November 2007 (Peach Bottom) - The NRC issued a deviation memorandum in November, 2007 to Exelon for Peach Bottom to address concerns related to the security program at the two-reactor plant to address concerns related to the security program. The deviation memorandum emphasizes the companys agreement to take certain actions in response to inattentiveness on the part of some security officers at Peach Bottom. The companys actions include detailed briefings to security force personnel on acceptable behavior; round-the-clock supervisory oversight of security activities, and keeping the NRC informed of the status of the Peach Bottom transition from a contractor security force to one that is run by Exelon. The commitments in the letter will remain in effect until the NRC has reviewed Exelons root cause analysis of the security program issues, the companys corrective actions and implementation schedule, and the companys method for assessing the effectiveness of the corrective actions.

August 2007 (Davis Besse) - The NRC issued a deviation for Davis-Besse in August 2006 in order to continue heightened NRC oversight for the time period of August 2006 through July 2007. The Davis-Besse deviation was an extension of the previous deviation in CY 2005. Davis-Besse was placed under the IMC 0350 process for about 3 years. While the plant transitioned from the IMC 0350 process, the NRC authorized a deviation from the ROP on May 16, 2005, for the period of July 2005 through June 2006. The extension is necessary for continued monitoring of the licensees efforts to sustain improved plant performance following resolution of the long-standing underlying problems that culminated in a Red finding associated with the severe wastage that was discovered on the reactor vessel head. As noted in last years self-assessment, the staff revised IMC 0305 to allow the regional offices to use additional followup actions for plants that are exiting the IMC 0350 process. The programmatic changes made as a result of this deviation will prevent the need for similar deviations in the future.

December 2006 (Indian Point) - The NRC issued a deviation for the Indian Point plants in December 2006 to allow for an increased level of oversight for two issues: groundwater contamination from cracks in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool and problems with the alert and notification system. The Indian Point deviation was an extension of the previous deviation in October 2005.

July 2006 (Waterford) - The NRC issued a deviation for the Waterford 3 plant in July 2006 to conduct actions specified in the Licensee Response Column rather than the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column for a Red safety system unavailability (SSU) performance indicator (PI) for high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) and a Yellow PI for residual heat removal (RHR). The deviation was necessary because the actions outlined in the Licensee Response Column were more appropriate for the situation at Waterford 3 than those of the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column. Specifically, the risk was more appropriately characterized at a Green level and the low risk evaluation result did not warrant the significant resources and expanded focus of a 95003 supplemental inspection.

July 2006 (Davis-Besse) - This NRC issued a deviation for the Davis Besse plant in July 2006 in order to continue heightened oversight for the time period of August 2006 through July 2007. This action was necessary to continue to monitor the licensee's efforts, in response to the NRC Orders, to sustain improved plant performance following resolution of the long-standing underlying problems that culminated in a Red finding associated with the severe wastage that was discovered on the reactor vessel head.

December 2005 (Point Beach) - The NRC issued a deviation for the Point Beach plant in December 2005 to waive the requirement for a separate supplemental inspection for a finding of white significance in the emergency preparedness cornerstone. The NRC previously inspected the performance deficiency associated with this finding in accordance with IP 95003 and its attachment 95003.01, "Additional Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone Inspection." Ongoing investigations by the Office of Investigations and the Department of Justice delayed the formal NRC technical resolution for this finding. In addition, the finding related to an old inspection item did not reflect current licensee performance; therefore, this deviation represented a unique situation. The NRC does not anticipate any programmatic changes as a result of this deviation.

October 2005 (Indian Point 2) - The NRC issued a deviation for the Indian Point 2 plant in October 2005 to closely monitor the utility's performance in addressing issues associated with the spent fuel pool, including onsite tritium contamination, and improving the reliability and availability of thealert and notification system, including implementation of the backup power requirements in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. This deviation addressed a variety of performance issues unique to the site and represented a customized approach as envisioned in IMC 0305. The staff does not anticipate any programmatic changes to the assessment program as a result of this deviation, although on-site tritium issues may be a generic concern that could result in safety issue inspections in the future.

July 2005 (Salem/Hope Creek) - The NRC issued a deviation for the Salem/Hope Creek plants in July 2005 to renew the August 2004 deviation to provide heightened NRC oversight to closely monitor the licensee's actions to address significant SCWE issues. The actions taken at Salem/Hope Creek were considered in the NRC's safety culture initiative. Programmatic changes will be made as a result of the safety culture initiative that are expected to prevent the need for similar deviations in the future.

May 2005 (Davis-Besse) - The NRC issued a deviation for the Davis-Besse plant in May 2005 to allow for an increased level of oversight as Davis-Besse transitioned out of the process outlined in IMC 0350, "Oversight of Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance and/or Operational Concerns," to the normal ROP assessment process on July 1, 2005. Based on a review of this deviation, the staff revised IMC 0305 to allow the regional offices to use additional followup actions for plants that are exiting the IMC 0350 process. This revision allows the regional offices to use some of the actions that are consistent with the multiple/repetitive degraded cornerstone or degraded cornerstone columns of the Action Matrix for a period of 1 year after the original findings have been resolved. These actions, which now do not constitute a deviation from the Action Matrix, include: (1) senior management participation at periodic meetings and site visits that are focused on reviewing the results of licensee improvement initiatives, such as efforts to reduce corrective action backlogs and progress in completing the Performance Improvement Plan; (2) limited Inspection Procedure (IP) 95003, "Supplemental Inspection for Repetitive Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Yellow Inputs, or One Red Input,"; activities and confirmatory action letter follow-up inspections beyond the baseline inspection program; (3) senior management attendance at the annual public meetings; and (4) signature authority for the subsequent assessment letters. These actions were previously made available for plants exiting the multiple/repetitive degraded cornerstone of the Action Matrix. The programmatic changes made as a result of this deviation will prevent the need for similar deviations in the future.

August 2004 (Salem/Hope Creek) - The NRC issued a deviation for the Salem/Hope Creek plants in August 2004 to provide heightened NRC oversight to closely monitor the licensee’s actions to address significant issues associated with its safety conscious work environment (SCWE). This deviation was renewed in July 2005 as discussed above and may result in programmatic changes as a result of the NRC’s safety culture initiative.

April 2004 (Cooper) - The NRC issued a deviation for the Cooper plant in April 2004 to provide heightened NRC oversight to monitor the actions confirmed by the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) dated January 30, 2003. Upon review of this deviation and others described below, the staff identified a need to clarify follow-up activities for plants that are exiting the multiple/repetitive degraded cornerstone column of the Action Matrix, and revised the guidance in IMC 0305 to provide for greater transparency and standardization of staff actions as plants transition out of increased oversight columns of the Action Matrix. This revision allows the regional offices to utilize some of the actions that are consistent with the multiple/repetitive degraded cornerstone or degraded cornerstone columns of the Action Matrix for a period of one year after the original findings have been closed out. These actions, which do not constitute a deviation from the Action Matrix, include senior management participation at periodic meetings and site visits that are focused on reviewing the results of licensee improvement initiatives such as efforts to reduce corrective action backlogs and progress in completing the Performance Improvement Plan, limited IP 95003 and CAL follow-up inspections beyond the baseline inspection program, senior management attendance at the annual public meetings, and signature authority for the subsequent assessment letters. The programmatic changes made as a result of this deviation will prevent the need for similar deviations in the future.

April 2004 (Indian Point 2) - The NRC issued a deviation for the Indian Point 2 plant in April 2004 to renew the March 2003 deviation to closely monitor the utility's performance following the station's recovery from longstanding problems. This deviation contributed to the staff's revision to program guidance described above to allow for limited heightened oversight as plants transition out of increased oversight columns of the Action Matrix.

March 2003 (Indian Point 2) - The NRC issued a deviation for the Indian Point 2 plant in March 2003 to provide for heightened oversight of the facility to closely monitor the utility's performance following the station's recovery from longstanding problems. This deviation was renewed in April 2004 as discussed above and contributed to the staff's revision to program guidance to allow for limited heightened oversight as plants transition out of increased oversight columns of the Action Matrix.

August 2002 (Oconee) - The NRC issued a deviation for the Oconee plant in August 2002 to permit for agency actions consistent with the degraded cornerstone column of the Action Matrix, including the performance of an IP 95002 vice IP 95003 supplemental inspection. The deviation, however, is not publicly available due to privacy information.