U 5. Depart men! 
of Transportation 
Research and 
Administration 
--- Special Programs 
400 Sevenlh SI S W 
Washington DC 20590 
NOV 1 8 2604 
Mr. David L. Young 
Senior Vice President 
MarkWest Hydrocarbon, Inc. 
155 Inverness Drive West 
Suite 200 
Englewood, CO 801 12-5000 
Re: CPF No. 2-2004-5017H 
Dear Mr. Young: 
Enclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued by the Associate Administrator for Pipeline 
Safety in the above-referenced case. It requires you to take certain corrective actions, including a 
pressure reduction, with respect to the Maytown Station to Ranger Junction segment of your 
Appalachian Liquid Pipeline System. Service is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Your 
receipt ofthis Corrective Action Order constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. 5 190.5. 
The terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt. 
d- 
SinAerely, 
Jmkd Reynolds 
Pipeline Compliance Registry 
Office of Pipeline Safety 
Enclosure 
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL lRETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED) AND TELECOPY 

--- 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION 
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY 
WASHINGTON, DC 20590 
In the Matter of 1 
1 
MarkWest Hydrocarbon, Inc., 1 
1 
Respondent. 1 
CPF NO. 2-2004-5017H 
CORRECTTVE ACTION ORDER 
Purpose and Backmound 
This Corrective Action Order is being issued under authority of 49 U.S.C. 5 60112 to require 
MarkWest Hydrocarbon, Inc. (Respondent) to take the necessary corrective action to protect the 
public, property, and the environment from potential hazards associated with a failure involving the 
four- and five-inch Maytown Station to Ranger Junction segment (：the affected segment；) of 
Respondent・s Appalachian Liquid Pipeline System running from near Langley, Kentucky to near 
South Shore, Kentucky. - - = 
On November 8, 2004, a failure occurred on the affected segment in Floyd County, Kentucky 
resulting in the release of natural gas liquids (NGLs). The cause of the failure has not yet been 
determined. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 5 601 17, the Southern Region, Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) 
initiated an investigation of the incident. 
Preliminary Findings 
At approximately 8:30 a.m. EST on November 8, 2004, a Kentucky State Trooper spotted a 
vapor cloud and ensuing explosion around the failure site. The Trooper began evacuating 
residents from the housing division adjacent to the failure site. 
The failure occurred at or around Mile Post (MP) 86.7 of the affected segment in Ivel, Floyd 
County, Kentucky, resulting in the release of an undetennined quantity of NGL. 
Respondent reported the incident to the National Response Center at 1:50 p.m. EST. 
The incident resulted in fires, explosions, nine injuries that included three or more 
hospitalizations, and the destruction of five homes in the Ivel, Kentucky subdivision. 

2 
-4 Respondent・s Appalachian Liquid Pipeline System is approximately 140 miles long and 
transports NGL products from the Maytown Station near Langley, Kentucky through the Ranger 
Junction in Ranger, West Virginia, and terminates at the Siloam Fractionation Plant near South 
Shore, Kentucky. The affected segment extends from the Maytown Station (M-P 96.1) northeast 
to the Ranger Junction (MP 35.9). 
Portions of the affected segment cross or are adjacent to highways, drinking water sources, and 
populated areas. The failure site is located in a residential subdivision. Residents along the 
affected segment right-of-way have expressed concern that, prior to the incident, they may have 
lacked knowledge of the pipeline location or the ability to identify and notify proper parties of 
the pipeline emergency. 
FolIowing the failure, Respondent・s personnel shut down the pump station upstream from the 
failure site. An employee of the owner of the pipeline system then closed valves upstream and 
downstream of the failure site. 
The cause of the failure has not yet been determined. Preliminary visual inspection indicated 
the presence of localized external corrosion around the failure site. Inspectors identified a small 
hole in the pipeline at the 6 o・clock position .when examining the failure site. 
Respondent removed the failed portion of pipe on November 10,2004 and has sent the failed 
portion to a metallurgist for analysis. 
Respondent has replaced the failed portion of pipe with a flanged portion of pipe. The pipeline 
remains out of service. Respondent stated that it plans to purge the pipeline in the area of the 
failure site with nitrogen and preliminarily replace 650 feet of pipe in that area. 
--I 
The affected segment contains 65 miles of pipe constructed between 1956 and 1957,39 miles 
of which are bare steel pipe and 26 miles that are coated with a variety of coatings. Impressed 
current cathodic protection is not in use. The affected segment is constructed of 4- and 5-inch 
nominal diameter, grade B, 0.3 12-inch wall thickness, seamless pipe manufactured by National 
Tube. 
The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the affected segment is 2340 pounds per square 
inch gauge (psig). At the time of the failure, the pressure at the Maytown Station was 1260 psig 
and the pressure at the failure site is yet to be determined. 
. The affected segment was hydrostatically tested in 1957 to a pressure of 2925 psig, according 
to Respondent. Records supporting the 1957 test could not be located. 
The pipeline has not been subject to internal inspection. However, Respondent has indicated 
its intent to perform internal inspections on the pipeline. 

3 
=-= In 2002, Respondent conducted an electrical survey on the pipeline at five-foot intervals using 
a cell-to-cell process with the pipe connected. . Respondent has informed OPS inspectors of 13 previous leaks that were identified on the 
pipeline. Eleven of these leaks were confirmed to be caused by corrosion. 
Determination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and-Wht to Hearing 
Section 601 12 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action 
Order, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action, which 
may include the suspended or restricted use of apipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, 
replacement, or other action as appropriate. The basis for making the determination that a pipeline 
facility is hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set forth both in the above-referenced statute and 
49 C.F.R. 9 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed. 
Section 601 12 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a Corrective 
Action Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing upon a finding that failure to issue the 
Order expeditiously will likely result in serious harm to life, property or the environment. In such 
cases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable after the issuance of the 
Order. 
After evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that the continued operation of the 
affected segment without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property and the 
environment. Additionally, after considering the age of the pipe, the proximity of the pipeline to 
highways, drinking water sources, and populated areas, the combustible nature of the products the 
pipeline transports, the pressure required for transporting the material, the history of leaks・attributed 
to corrosion on the pipeline, and the ongoing investigation to determine the cause of the failure, I 
find that a failure to expeditiously issue this Order requiring immediate corrective action would 
likely result in serious harm to life, property, or the environment. 
_ _ - 
Accordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued without 
prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions ofthis Order are effective upon 
receipt . 
Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as 
practicable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, delivered 
personally, by mail or by telecopy at (202) 366-4566. The hearing will be held in Atlanta, Georgia 
or Washington, DC on a date that is mutually convenient to OPS and Respondent. 
After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, OPS may identify 
other corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be notified of any 
additional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered. To the extent 
consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to 
the imposition of any additional corrective measures. - 

-J Rewired Corrective Action 
4 
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 4 601 12, I hereby order MarkWest Hydrocarbon, Inc. to immediately take the 
following corrective actions with respect to the Maytown Station to Ranger Junction segment of 
Respondent・s Appalachian Liquid Pipeline System: 
1. Conduct metallurgical testing of the failed pipe sections. 
A. Provide to the Director, Southern Region, OPS for approval the protocol to be employed 
to test the failed pipe sections. 
B. Ensure that the laboratory distributes all resulting metallurgical reports, whether draft or 
final, to OPS at the same time as they are made available to Respondent. 
2. As soon as practicable, but not later than 30 days after receipt of this Order, establish an 
immediate action plan and submit the plan to the Director, Southern Region, OPS for approval. 
The plan must include: 
A. Procedures for completion, within 120 days of receipt of this Order, of hydrostatic 
pressure testing of the affected segment to 125 percent (125%) of the existing MOP, in 
accordance with the pressure testing requirements of Part 195. 
-- B. A written return-to-service plan. The plan must provide for an incremental start-up and 
must include sufficient pressure monitoring, leak patrolling, and surveillance to ensure 
that no leaks are present when operation of the line is resumed. 
C, Procedures for leak detection. Respondent must utilize a tracer chemical during any 
hydrostatic pressure testing or conduct an instrumented leak survey as part of the returnto-
service plan. 
D, A plan for conducting a close-interval electrical survey on the affected segment to be 
completed within 180 days of receipt of this Order. 
E. Public education program and liaison procedures. 
i. Review the existing public education program to ensure compliance with the 
requirements of 49 C.F.R. 6 195.440. If revisions to the public education program are 
warranted, submit brochures, articles, or other materials to be used in conjunction with 
the public education program to the Director, Southem Region, OPS along with the 
revisions to the public education program. 
ii. Identify any action or series of actions to be undertaken that may require rapid 
decision-making by the responsible authorities at the community level to protect the 
pubIic safety such as through evacuations, road closings, or notifications of police, 

5 
fire, or other emergency responders (such actions would include, but are not limited 
to, line restarts, pressure testing, purging, and significant excavation activities). 
Document your procedures for communicating timely notice of such actions to 
federal, state, and local officials and for maintaining liaison to coordinate pre-planned 
and actual response activities with the appropriate officials. 
3. Once the pipeline is restarted in accordance with Item 2.B, the operating pressure on the 
affected segment is not to exceed 80 percent (80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect at 
the failure site just prior to the November 8,2004 failure. This pressure restriction will remain 
in effect until written approval to increase the pressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure 
operating pressure is obtained from the Director, Southern Region, OPS. If the results of any 
action undertaken pursuant to this Order dictate a reduction in the allowable operating pressure 
below that imposed by this Order, Respondent must fbrther reduce the operating pressure 
accordingly. 
4. Within 60 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit a written plan with corrective 
measures for prior approval by the Director, Southern Region, OPS. The plan must fully 
address all known or suspected factors that caused or contributed to the November 8, 2004 
failure and must include: 
A. The integration of the information developed from the actions required by Items 1 and 2, 
along with any relevant information from previous failure investigations, leak history, 
repair records, corrosion control records, in-line inspections, hydrostatic testing, changes 
in pressure cycling, and other relevant operating data for the purpose of performing a 
comprehensive analysis of all factors that caused or contributed to the failure; 
B. The performance of appropriate field testing, inspections, and evaluations to determine 
whether and to what extent the condition(s) associated with the failure, or other integrity 
threatening trends, are present along the remainder of the affected segment or elsewhere 
on any portion of the Appalachian Liquid Pipeline System constructed with similar 
methods and material as the affected segment. Include a description of the tools and 
methods to be used in any field evaluations and the criteria to be used for the prioritization 
of any integrity threats that are identified. Make the results of any field evaluations 
available to OPS or its representative; 
C. The performance of appropriate repairs, pipe replacement, or other corrective measures fully 
remediating the integrity threatening condition(s) associated with the failure everywhere along 
the pipeline where such conditions are identified by the evaluation process. Include a 
description of the repair method(s) to be used in undertaking any repairs or other remedial 
actions; and 
D. A proposed schedule for completion of the testing, repairs, and/or pipe replacement. 

1 
6 
-2 5. Submit the plan to: Director, Southern Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, 233 Peachtree Street, 
Suite 600, Atlanta, Georgia 30303. The plan must be revised as necessary to incorporate new 
information obtained during the failure investigation and remedial activities undertaken 
pursuant to this Order. Submit any such plan revisions to the Director for prior approval. The 
Director may approve plan elements incrementally. 
6. Implement the plan as it is approved, including any revisions to the plan. 
7. The Director, Southern Region, OPS may allow the removal or modification of the pressure 
restriction set forth in Item 3 upon a written request from Respondent demonstrating that the 
hazard has been abated and that restoring the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is 
justified based on a reliable engineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is safe 
considering a11 known defects, anomalies and operating parameters of the pipeline. 
8. The Director, Southern Region, OPS may grant an extension of time for compliance with any 
of the terms of this Order for good cause. A request for an extension must be in writing. 
The corrective actions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive 
any requirements that apply to the pipeline under 49 C.F.R. Part 195, including the integrity 
management program regulations. 
Respondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline 
Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final. ./ 
Failure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties of not more than 
$100,000 per day and in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States 
District Court. 
NOV 1 8 ?GO4 
Date Issued 
for Pipeline Safety