TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6

The United States Army Functional Concept for

Move

2015-2024

Version 1.0

30 April 2007

Foreword

From the Director
United States Army Capabilities Integration Center

This concept provides amplification to the Army's capstone and operating concepts within the move functional area. It focuses on how the Army will move the future Modular Force. This concept also defines the functional capabilities required to move the future Modular Force across the full spectrum of operations, which will serve as the foundation for follow-on concept capability plans development and additional exploration through studies, experiments, and wargames.

As this concept demonstrates, the Army has a well-developed body of ideas regarding how we can better support joint force commanders to conduct successful campaigns in the future. However, it is equally clear that the Army cannot achieve its conceptual goals for improvement without an array of capabilities that must be developed by other Services and the larger joint community, particularly in the areas of strategic responsiveness and operational agility. Thus, I strongly encourage the use of the *Move* concept in our interactions with other Services and joint organizations, in the spirit of joint interdependence.

This concept is the outcome of a collaborative effort involving subject matter experts from throughout the Army, and the product of a detailed study of strategic guidance, current doctrine, and lessons learned. It assumes a future that includes complex situational environments; thinking, adaptive, and highly-capable enemies; and Army operations that must be fully integrated into a joint, interagency, and multi-national framework. From these efforts, the concept offers new ideas for further examination so that the future Modular Force will be able to defeat any adversary or control any situation across the full range of military operations.

As with all concepts, the *Move* concept is in continuous evolution. It will be refined and updated as new learning emerges from research, operational experience, joint and Army wargaming, experimentation, and combat development.

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Executive Summary

Introduction

The *Move* concept for the future Modular Force is intended to describe the *best* means to improve the strategic responsiveness and operational agility of the Army to meet the expected requirements of the future operational environment during the 2015-2024 timeframe, in consonance with the Army's approved capstone and operating concepts.

Operational Problem

a. The future joint operational environment (JOE) projects an international security environment in which United States (U.S.) forces are committed more frequently to intervene in regional crises and conflicts, both planned and unplanned, which may range from short duration, smaller scale contingencies to major combat operations in theater war.

b. In addition, future adversaries will actively seek to deny, delay, or disrupt the U.S. access to conflict areas through anti-access capabilities. This environment will require the Army future Modular Force to respond rapidly from a strategic expeditionary posture for immediate employment in theater and move throughout the depth of the joint area of operations in order to swiftly defeat the efforts of an aggressor or to win decisively in an extended campaign.

Solution Synopsis

a. The Future Modular Force conducts *operational maneuver from strategic distances* to secure positions of advantage for prompt engagement of the enemy in operations that may often be of uncertain scope and duration. The Army approaches the overall requirements for strategic responsiveness through a *prompt and sustained framework* in concert with its Title 10 mission. Organized into lighter, smaller, but more capable modular formations, the future Modular Force exploits all available air and sea lift, both military and commercial. Fielding of advanced lift platforms not dependent on improved air and sea ports will enable future Army formations to deploy in combat ready unit configurations with integrated sustainment, in a matter of days rather than weeks, with units prepared for immediate employment in accordance with a *Deploy=Employ* paradigm that minimizes requirements for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI).

b. Exploiting multiple entry points and simultaneous force flows by air and sea, the future Modular Force will be able to achieve a level of *deployment momentum* that helps overcome enemy anti-access efforts, increases the opportunity for operational surprise, and closes the gap that exists today between early entry and campaign forces. In addition, improvements within the force deployment process, including reliable visibility of forces and sustainment in transit, coupled with continuously updated situational awareness, enable commanders to *adjust force projection plans in stream* and adapt to changing battlefield conditions.

c. The achievement of deployment momentum by air, sea, and ground, coupled with capability for intratheater operational maneuver, permits commanders to seize the initiative more rapidly, confront the enemy with multiple dilemmas, generate dislocating and disintegrative

effects, and accelerate the enemy's defeat. As the theater matures and the active area of operations expands, force elements deploy from outside the theater directly into forward objective areas rather than through forward operations bases (FOB) or lodgment areas. The commander employs combinations of strategic and intratheater lift throughout the campaign to project forces and sustainment within the JOA. Blending strategic force projection with operational employment in this manner generates the *operational agility* that will be essential to the concept of simultaneous, distributed operations and the achievement of rapid decision inherent within new joint warfighting concepts.

d. At the tactical level, improvements in speed, mobility, and protection, when coupled with other enablers, can be expected to enable commanders to decisively conclude tactical actions and engagements more rapidly than what is possible today. Agile, adjustable, theater to tactical distribution to the point of need ensures continuous operations and the desired level of tempo.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6

30 April 2007

Military Operations

THE UNITED STATES ARMY FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT FOR MOVE 2015-2024

History. This publication is a new United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet developed as part of the Army Concept Strategy for the future Modular Force.

Summary. TRADOC Pamphlet (Pam) 525-3-6, *The United States Army Functional Concept for Move 2015 – 2024* is the overarching visualization of how the Army's future Modular Force will move in the future. It is intended to describe the *best* means to improve the strategic responsiveness and operational agility of the Army to meet the expected requirements of the future operational environment during the 2015-2024 timeframe. The ideas presented here are fully integrated within the evolving context of joint and Army strategic guidance and the joint framework.

Applicability. This concept applies to all Department of Defense (DOD) services, agencies, and activities involved in the future Modular Force. It functions as the conceptual basis for developing required solution sets related to the future Modular Force within the domains of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF).

Proponent and exception authority. The proponent of this pamphlet is the TRADOC Headquarters, Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate (ATFC-ED), Fort Monroe, VA 23651-1046. The proponent has the authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this pamphlet that are consistent with controlling law and regulations.

Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggestions on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, TRADOC (ATFC-ED), Fort Monroe, VA 23651-1046. Suggested improvements may also be submitted using DA Form 1045 (Army Ideas for Excellence Program Proposal).

Distribution. This publication is only available on the TRADOC Homepage at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pamndx.htm.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

1-1. Purpose

a. The future operational environment will often require the Army future Modular Force to respond rapidly from a strategic expeditionary posture for immediate employment in theater and movement throughout the depth of the joint operations area (JOA) in order to swiftly defeat the efforts of an aggressor or to win decisively in an extended campaign.

b. This concept is intended to describe the *best* means to improve the strategic responsiveness and operational agility of the transforming Army during the 2015-2024 timeframe, in consonance with the Army capstone, *Operational Maneuver* and *Tactical Maneuver* concepts.

1-2. Scope

a. This concept is focused on strategic force projection and operational agility of Army ground forces in support of joint operations abroad. It also includes fundamental considerations of tactical movement, which is most fully described in the *Tactical Maneuver Concept*, TRADOC Pam 525-3-2. It covers all phases of a future campaign, retains a focus on major combat operations (MCO), and is relevant to all other parts of the range of military operations (ROMO) that require either prompt or sustained force projection. Future contingency operations or military activities that do *not* require both prompt or sustained force projection and operationally agile forces generally fall outside the scope of this concept.

b. It draws guidance, where appropriate, from relevant joint concepts including the *Joint Forcible Entry Operations*, *Integrated Air and Missile Defense*, *Seabasing*, and *Joint Logistics (Distribution)* joint integrating concepts (JIC). Simultaneously, the ideas presented within this concept influenced the content of those JICs during their development and coordination.

c. This concept clearly recognizes the continued significance of forward stationing, forward presence, force readiness, and Active Army/Reserve Component (RC) integration to effective force projection, but does not extend to specific recommendations for policy change in those areas, considering those subject areas beyond its purview and scope.

1-3. Strategic Guidance

a. The concept directly addresses transformational requirements presented in seminal defense policy documents. For example, the 2003 Strategic Planning Guidance placed strong emphasis on the need to protect and sustain U.S. forces in distant anti-access environments, themes which are central to this concept. In addition, the concept deliberately seeks to describe the ways and means by which the Army future Modular Force can meet the Department of Defense (DOD) policy 10-30-30 joint swiftness goals for intervention and conflict termination (see sec 4-1).

b. The Army mission is a critical underpinning to this concept. The central responsibility of the U.S. Army under Title 10, U.S. Code, is to conduct prompt and sustained operations on land as a component of America's joint military forces in support of joint force commanders (JFCs). The term, prompt and sustained, reflects the inescapable reality that the U.S. cannot reliably predict the occasion, scale, or duration of contingencies to which its military forces might be committed. Hence, prompt and sustained also defines the essential and to some extent competing requirements that current *and* future force projection must satisfy.

c. The Move concept is one of six functional concepts that describe how the future Modular Force will achieve the tenets outlined in the Army capstone, *Operational Maneuver* and *Tactical Maneuver* concepts. The functional concepts are *See, Battle Command, Protect, Sustain* and *Strike*. They, along with *Move*, are inexorably interrelated. This interrelationship is described in the following chapters.

Chapter 2
The Joint Operational Environment

2-1. General Overview

a. Emerging cultural, religious, ethnic, political, technological, and economic factors will complicate the future geopolitical environment (fig 2-1). The resulting mix of global strategic, operational, and tactical issues transcends borders and involves opponents with worldwide connections that present a demanding combination of challenges and dilemmas for the U.S. Security challenges will be more varied and unpredictable and the range of operational settings within the spectrum of conflict considerably more complex, driving expectation that U.S. military assistance in civil support operations and stability operations will continue to rise. The future Modular Force will encounter unprecedented complexities in physical terrain (especially urban areas), demographics, and informational environments. U.S. resources could be extended beyond the historic bounds of the task, and the range of military operations in those settings will be much wider than in the recent past.



Figure 2-1. The Joint Operational Environment

b. The National Defense Strategy and the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* postulate four primary security challenges for the future: traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive. *Traditional* (conventional) operations conducted within a state-on-state framework will continue to be relevant in the future environment. Regional aggressors will continue to modernize conventional forces and invest in capabilities that will enable them to dominate their neighbors. *Irregular* (unconventional) warfare may be conducted as the principle choice of adversaries who are overmatched in size or military technologies, or these kinds of operations may be combined with conventional capabilities to present an even more complex threat. *Catastrophic* challenges involve the acquisition, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction. Adversaries seek such capabilities to dominate their regions, deter external intervention, or both. *Disruptive* challenges may occur through the employment of breakthrough technologies to negate existing U.S. advantages in key operational domains.

c. The most dangerous future adversary would be one that combines capabilities in all four challenges in creative ways, adapting them before and during the course of a conflict to frustrate U.S. military action. Opponents will attempt to use these capabilities to exploit perceived vulnerabilities, especially our dependence on networked command and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Opponents will also attack America's relationships with host and supporting nations, the media, commercial interests, and multi-national or interagency partners. U.S. development of the intellectual capital that will power a culture of innovation and adaptation potentially represents the most effective response to combinations of threats that cannot be predicted.

d. The future Modular Force will face increasing complexity in its own operations. Given the expectations outlined above, strategic and joint guidance unequivocally establishes full spectrum dominance, the defeat of any adversary or control of any situation across the full ROMO, as the overarching goal of joint transformation and JF development. Thus, it is imperative that the future JF and the Army are fully prepared to be effective across the SC and in the conduct of FSO throughout the course of a future campaign. The future Modular Force will fight as a part of a networked JF, integrated at every level, and interdependent in the joint areas of battle command, force projection, air and missile defense, sustainment, and fires.

e. Exploiting the full potential of future technical capabilities will require an unprecedented breadth and depth of technical and tactical skill, individual and organizational flexibility, and personal initiative and creativity pitted against thinking, adapting adversaries. Speed, simultaneity, distribution, and the ability to conduct multidimensional, continuous operations over extended distances will be mandatory to gain the initiative and allow for ultimate success. As future adversaries gain additional capabilities to directly threaten U.S. territory, U.S. military forces will become increasingly involved in homeland security in addition to executing challenging missions abroad. The future Modular Force must also fully integrate its operations with its interagency and multi-national partners, exploiting the strengths that those partners provide while minimizing any limitations and vulnerabilities.

2-2. The Assured Access Challenge

a. Creating and maintaining assured access to the theater in conflict is a complex endeavor involving all components of the JF and will present major challenges to U.S. interventions in the future. Adversaries of the U.S. are expected to adopt anti-access strategies to deny, delay, and degrade U.S. intervention in regional crises. Those strategies will have political, diplomatic, and physical components, synchronized wherever possible to strengthen their effects.

b. From the political and diplomatic perspective, adversaries will likely act and seek allies within a variety of international bodies and to attempt to legitimize aggression while simultaneously undermining grounds for U.S. intervention. They will further take action to influence neighboring states, through threats, coercion, and positive incitements to deny support to U.S. action in terms of over flight, basing privileges, logistical support (such as, refueling), port access, transit of territorial waters, and other forms of support. Information campaigns will be mounted to affect U.S. and coalition political and public will. Any of these activities may be further bolstered by overt and covert physical acts, such as focused terrorism and sabotage against potential U.S. partners.

c. Iraqi efforts to draw Israel into the Gulf War in 1990-91 constitute an excellent example of how the combination of political, diplomatic, informational, and physical action could weaken and potentially fracture a U.S. led coalition. A current day example also exists, more comprehensive action by Al Qaeda (or supporting terrorist groups) or states to destabilize Pakistan could have made its ongoing support to U.S. operations in Afghanistan untenable. Thus, particularly vulnerable coalition partners will increase the assured access challenge for U.S. forces by introducing additional requirements for the U.S. to take action to ensure their security and continued participation, through means such as the deployment of U.S. air and missile defense forces prior to use of friendly foreign territory for basing or transit.

d. Physical methods and capabilities to deny access will range from high- to low-tech and be applied, potentially, at any point in the U.S. land, air, and sea force projection chain of operation from home base to tactical assembly areas. At the high end, the most capable enemies will employ theater ballistic missiles, air and ground launched cruise missiles, advanced integrated air defense systems, sea mines, submarines, space denial, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities. Farther down the scale, anti-access measures could include intentional industrial contamination, widespread employment of landmines and complex obstacles (given sufficient time), direct action by special operations forces (SOF), terror strikes, use of human shields to deter attack of key anti-access capabilities, and information warfare to degrade automated elements of the U.S. and coalition deployment command and control (C2) and planning process. The enemy will further apply all sources available to obtain visibility on U.S. and coalition deployment to identify vulnerabilities and opportunities for denial.

e. Overall, the enemy's target set could include any component of the U.S. force projection structure, although focused efforts are expected in particular against maritime and land chokepoints, improved aerial ports of debarkation (APOD) and sea ports of debarkation (SPOD), staging bases, node transit points with long dwell time, assembly areas, lift capabilities, and fuel supplies upon which those lift platforms depend. Once U.S. force buildup is underway in the theater, anti-access strategy may shift to an emphasis on denying sustainment of deployed forces.

f. Future adversaries are further expected to continue to employ all of these methods and capabilities during the actual campaign. In addition, the prudent aggressor will seek to accomplish his initial objectives as quickly as possible, leaving ample time to deny or prepare for external intervention. Significant enemy success along any of these lines of operation could work to retain the enemy's advantage in time, raise the costs of intervention to challenging levels, and hinder rapid decision, thereby heightening the enemy's chance to succeed by means of either established fact or stalemate.

g. Finally, geography (terrain, remoteness) and level of economic development (infrastructure), may present significant barriers to force projection in many regions of the world. The 2002 Army Transformation Wargame scenario, which featured contingency operations in Sumatra, offers a case in point. Despite a large population, Sumatra has insufficient deep water ports to permit large, medium speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) vessel operations, zero airfields capable of supporting the C-5 aircraft, and only one C17 aircraft capable airfield. U.S. Army forces deployed into the area during game play had to rely on transshipment from nearby staging bases on C-130 aircraft and theater support vessels to complete deployment and be sustained.[1] In short, the terrain severely restricted access, even without an enemy effort to deny U.S. entry. In 2001-02, the remote location and austere infrastructure within Afghanistan presented similar obstacles to Operation Enduring Freedom.

2-3. Implications of the Global War on Terrorism

a. Concomitant with the changes in the geo-strategic environment described above, the global war on terrorism (GWOT) has further increased the complexity of the force projection challenge and placed an unforeseen burden on existing force projection capabilities. In addition,

[1] The theater support vessel is now known as the joint high speed vessel (JHSV) in the joint requirements process.

the GWOT requires the commitment of low density and reserve force structure and the establishment of unique infrastructure, such as forward operating bases that may not be useable, politically, for wider purposes.

b. Furthermore, long-term deterrence in the GWOT requires the retention of a highly responsive, multidimensional strike capability to further act as a constraint on the numbers and types of capabilities for strategic responsiveness available to other contingencies. These kinds of burdens will no doubt continue at some level, through the coming decade and rise and fall in unpredictable measure while competing with other projection requirements.

2-4. Joint Operational Framework

a. Campaign Phases. The joint construct of the overlapping campaign phases presents Army future Modular Force commanders at all levels a clear analytical framework for both planning and execution. This section describes how future JFCs will likely desire to project forces to effectively execute a campaign. These phases *shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority,* will enable commanders to consider the end state and structure plans aimed at achieving this end state.

b. Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, specifies six phases: shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, *The Army in Joint Operations*, which predates this new joint phase titling, uses the following four phases: prepare and posture, shape and enter, conduct decisive operations, and transition. For concept purposes, the *prepare and posture* phase encompasses the two distinct joint phases of *shape* and *deter*. Similarly, the Army *shape and enter* phase includes elements of the joint *shape* and *seize the initiative* phases. The Army *conduct decisive operations* phase includes the joint *seize the initiative* phase and parts of *dominate, stabilize,* and *enable civil authority*. *Transition,* as used in the Army capstone concept, overlaps the joint phases of *dominate, stabilize,* and *enable civil authority.*

c. The discussion of joint phasing does not imply that those phases are sequential in planning or in execution. In fact, many phases will be concurrent while some phases may actually be omitted from a particular campaign or major operation. For example, though Joint Pub 3-0 labels *shape* as phase 0, it is actually a continuous effort that only begins in phase 0. In some instances, phase I, *deter,* may not occur at all; the JFC may go directly from s*hape* to s*eize the initiative*.

(1) During the *shape and deter* phases, the Modular Force conducts operations to dissuade and deter potential adversaries and to solidify relationships with allies. The best outcome is to discourage the enemy from acting against our national interests, thereby preventing the need for armed conflict. This is accomplished through a proactive set of measures, applying all the instruments of national power, to further our interests, while encouraging an enduring, prosperous peace for the community of peaceful nations. However, should our best efforts fail to deter serious detrimental actions by a determined enemy; the next step is to prepare for deployment of forces necessary to effectively address the threat. Prior to actual commitment of forces, the JF and its constituent components will transition through an initial phase of varying duration to prepare and posture for intervention, depending on the degree of warning that exists.

(2) In the case of short notice contingency operations, such actions might be quite limited. In contrast, commitments to ongoing stability operations through scheduled rotation of forces will provide extended time for the *prepare and posture* phases. Prepare and posture activities will normally include the actual "formation of the joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ) and its components;" the establishment of coalition organizations, if required; reinforcement of the initial knowledge building required to refine planning and execution; the development of force flow; the pre-deployment positioning of forces and sustainment; the activation and incorporation of critical RC elements; initial agreements with host and supporting nations; confirmation and arrangement of over flight, transit, and basing rights to support operations; and other activities necessary to respond rapidly and effectively to the conflict environment.

(3) This concept is not intended to investigate the details of the joint deployment process or to examine current organizational relationships and responsibilities. The approved *Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept*, already initiates substantive change in the joint deployment process including the development of a joint deployment and distribution enterprise (JDDE), which is intended to rationalize and integrate diverse processes and organizations towards the goal of operating across the strategic, operational, and tactical continuum with a set of integrated, robust, and responsive physical, information, communications, and financial distribution networks. The *Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept* recognizes that current joint deployment processes have consistently failed to meet the full expectations of JFCs with respect to speed, agility, adaptability, and visibility of the movement of forces and stocks. As the JDDE, is implemented in the future, it must include substantive change in C2, automated planning, ease of data entry within the future defense transportation system, interoperability across components, and full visibility of forces and stocks in motion and in theater, to be fully responsive to future commanders.

(4) *Seize the initiative (Shape and Enter).* Once the decision is taken to initiate operations, the JFC projects forces and conducts shaping and entry operations to rapidly create and preserve conditions for the success of decisive operations. The adversary seeks to set conditions that deter, deny, delay, and degrade U.S. intervention and effective force employment. The U.S. combatant commander, in turn, seeks to alter military conditions that favor the adversary, preclude his achievement of initial objectives, obtain operational positional advantage, secure key terrain, and establish conditions that permit rapid transition to decisive operations. Key joint shaping actions to alter military conditions will largely focus on achieving assured access and immediate employment of deploying forces to seize the initiative.

(5) *Projecting Forces*. The JF will employ all available military and commercial lift capabilities within the strategic triad of airlift, sealift, and pre-positioned stocks to project forces and sustainment and increase throughput along multiple, parallel paths.

(a) When feasible, deployment will combine strategic maneuver from the continental U.S. (CONUS) with operational maneuver of forward deployed forces employing theater lift assets, the latter directly into objective areas. Advanced lift platforms with improved speeds and payloads will enable forces to deploy in unit configurations (to include all the equipment, personnel, and integrated sustainment [fuel and ammunition]) through multiple improved and

unimproved air and sea entry points. Where possible, commanders will seek to maximize deployment directly to the JOA, thereby reducing the number of mode transfers and node transits, therefore avoiding chokepoints and reducing vulnerability to enemy counters. While strategic surprise will almost certainly be out of reach, the JFC will endeavor to achieve operational surprise through higher levels of simultaneous movement that disguises timing, location, and immediate action upon arrival. Forcible entry by sea and air delivered land forces will further support operational surprise, expand the ways and means of building combat power rapidly, and multiply challenges to which the enemy must respond.

(b) Joint seabasing provides another option to JFCs to mitigate the effects of an anti-access environment by conducting initial operations primarily from the joint seabase. Comprised of a variable set of maritime assets, the joint seabase is projected to be able to deploy early and be prepared for operations within 10-14 days. In smaller scale, shorter duration contingencies, it is possible to foresee conducting the joint operations exclusively from the sea, if necessary. However, when the JF is engaged in MCO, the fundamental role of the seabase will likely focus on neutralizing enemy anti-access capabilities and ensuring access to the JOA from the sea for the larger formations needed to operate in the land domain. Capabilities resident within the seabase for forcible entry over the shore and via the air, in combination with Sea Shield capabilities, are vital to secure the multiple air and sea entry points needed to achieve deployment momentum.

(6) *Achieving Assured Access*. Preparations and measures needed to achieve assured access will often begin well before an actual contingency occurs and then intensify as crisis breaks into conflict and U.S. intervention is undertaken.

(a) Peacetime Preparations. The basis for assured access is a vigilant global posture of high peacetime readiness. This includes maintaining forward deployed forces, pre-positioned stocks, established access to regional bases, and standing agreements with foreign states. Any policy decisions to significantly circumscribe this posture will almost certainly introduce greater difficulty and more risk to JF projection. Theater security cooperation programs, for which the Army carries the greatest share of the burden worldwide, further strengthen levels of regional cooperation that could prove important for joint and combined power projection in time of crises. Peacetime preparation for assured access is also supported by pre-conflict standing assessments within each regional combatant command of the nature and scope of anti-access challenges within respective areas of responsibility.
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(b) Actions in Crisis and Emerging Conflict. Combatant commanders, in conjunction with other federal agencies and national authorities, must take additional prompt actions to strengthen capability for assured access, including-

- Confirmation of existing and new agreements with foreign states for flight rights, territorial water transit, port access, and basing privileges needed to support deployment.
- Establishment of agreements necessary to ensure foreign logistical support to U.S. and coalition deployments at transit points, intermediate staging bases (ISBs), FOBs, and within the threatened country itself.

- Strengthening of contacts and sources within the region in conflict to achieve the level of situational understanding necessary for effective force projection.
- Diplomatic action to build a coalition, if necessary, and to counter activities by the adversary to undermine the same.

(c) Flexible Deterrent Options. At this point in crisis development, flexible deterrent options (FDO) comprise the next major element to assure access. The most common FDOs under consideration include-

- Early establishment of the land, air, sea, and space components of a theater air and missile defense system sufficient to warn and protect deploying forces and threatened regional partners.
- Deployment or augmentation of SOF in strategic reconnaissance and indigenous stability roles.
- Movement of seabased pre-positioning and forward presence forces to posture for future operations.
- Repositioning of space information systems, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) constellations, and defensive measures to ensure continued access to space-based capabilities.
- Activation of key RC unit based access capabilities (port operations, theater opening force modules).
- Increased readiness posture for forces earmarked for response.
- Establishment of elements of the combined joint task force (CJTF) information systems, ISR, and logistical infrastructure necessary to support contingency operations.

(d) In rare instances, it may be possible to pre-deploy combat forces to staging bases within operational striking distance of the objective area or directly next to critical objective areas to preempt the enemy. In addition to their deterrent value, FDOs like these posture the combined JF for more rapid shaping of the battlespace, seizure of the initiative, and denial of enemy options, should deterrence fail.

(e) When FDOs are not undertaken due to time or policy, prior to conflict, the same kinds of actions must be executed immediately once the U.S. decides to intervene. Simultaneously, any number of additional actions enhancing strategic responsiveness, such as, updates to contingency plans, activation and pre-positioning of lift capabilities, review of civil reserve fleet and voluntary intermodal sealift agreements, increased force protection posture, pre-deployments of force projection control elements to ISBs, and pre-configuring sustainment packages can also be taken.

(7) *Seize the Initiative*. Once intervention begins in earnest, the U.S. combatant commander and combined JFC apply all means available to destroy adversary capabilities to physically thwart U.S. force projection. Initially, air and maritime forces are likely to carry the burden of these operations, with land forces assuming major shaping tasks, as they are deployed to include -

(a) Establishment of air, maritime, land, and space access to the theater, leading to dominance in each domain with only marginal interruptions to continuous access.

(b) Comprehensive establishment of required information systems ISR and logistical infrastructures, enabling effective battle command, information superiority, comprehensive situational awareness, and a common operational picture throughout the JF.

(c) Immediate, sustained attacks against key enemy capabilities to constrain their ability to act and react, to include restrain freedom of action, extend U.S. operational influence, and begin the process of paralysis and disintegration. These attacks would include destruction, in particular, of enemy knowledge and command networks, the integrated air defense system, sustainment capabilities, and components of the precision engagement system, such as long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, long-range artillery, rockets, sensors and target acquisition, and unmanned aircraft systems.

(d) Uninterrupted, continuous flow of combat power into the area of operations, achieving a *deployment momentum* with immediate employment of forces that allows the aggressor little time to adjust plans, reconfigure forces, and reposition.

(e) Rapid expansion of early entry lodgments locally, then more broadly, to seize the initiative and force the enemy to the defensive.

(f) Improve theater infrastructure required to support continuous force flow beyond entry points and continuous operations at high tempo.

(g) Reconfiguration of deployment throughput and infrastructure to respond to changes within battlespace conditions or campaign execution.

(h) Extension of the combined JF theater protection umbrella to regional partners and nodes within the deployment infrastructure.

(8) *Dominate (Conduct Decisive Operations).* Military history consistently demonstrates the earlier decisive operations begin, the shorter and less costly the campaign is likely to be. This dictum reinforces the highly significant role of rapid JF projection to enable seizure of the initiative and rapid transition to decisive operations.

(a) Strategic Sustainment. As the campaign continues, the combined JF will continue to shape the operating environment to ensure assured access is maintained with no more than marginal interruptions through the decisive phase of operations. In pursuit of this goal, strategic sustainment in unit configured loads must be delivered directly to deployed units in accordance with the emerging principles and capabilities envisioned within focused logistics and joint operational concepts of simultaneous, non-contiguous distributed operations in-depth.

(b) Synergistic Employment of Forces. The achievement of deployment momentum, with no significant gaps between the deployment of early entry and campaign forces, directly supports this aim. In addition, the continuous integration of sustaining capabilities into the force

flow further enables the force to avoid operational pauses and maintain continuous pressure against the enemy, particularly through the delivery sustainment directly to forward operating areas. Thus, the force projection system must simultaneously meet requirements for strategic deployment, operational employment of forces, and continuous sustainment throughout the JOA in support of decisive operations. The ways and means of generating this synergy are discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

(9) *Stabilize, Enable Civil Authority and Transition*

(a) As the campaign proceeds, the enemy's ability to control terrain and act throughout the battlespace is diminished and the complexion of the battlespace changes. The JFC will often find it necessary to conduct stability operations, enabling civil authorities, while simultaneously conducting combat operations. In the course of this transition, the missions assigned to the JF may change significantly, introducing a more desirable makeup of JF composition.

(b) In the case of multiple simultaneous conflicts in different regions, transitions may occur as forces are moved between theaters, creating new challenges with respect to allocation and employment of strategic lift.

(10) Summary of critical requirements for improved JF protection. Joint and Service transformation must be synchronized to establish and maintain assured access and enable rapid transition to decisive operations. This requires-

(a) The capability to rapidly execute flexible deterrent options to deter, preclude, and posture forces for intervention.

(b) Increased multi-modal throughput and more rapid build up of combat power by means of simultaneous and sequential force flows to achieve deployment momentum.

(c) Synchronization of deployment with immediate employment of arriving forces in a deploy to employ paradigm, within any operational environment.

(d) Capability development to increase the possibility of achieving operational surprise.

(e) Presentation of multiple dilemmas for the enemy to resolve.

(f) Reduction in predictability and vulnerability to enemy counters through use of multiple improved and austere APODs and SPODs.

(g) Improved capability to deploy from or through the joint sea base.

(h) Improved capability to defend and secure improved APODS and SPODs (such as, improved missile defense) and to rapidly improve degraded or unimproved entry points.

(i) Versatility and adaptability for both developed and austere theaters; capability to adjust deployment throughput in support of evolving campaign requirements.

(j) Better integration of force projection planning and execution to support campaign timelines and improved capability to synchronize strategic and intratheater lift to deploy forces to forward objective areas.

(k) Integration and synchronization of force projection requirements to support coalition.

Chapter 3
The Central Idea

3-1. Operational Problem

a. The future JOE projects an international security environment in which U.S. forces are committed more frequently to intervene in regional crises and conflicts, both planned and unplanned, which may range from short duration, smaller scale contingencies to major combat operations in theater war. In addition, future adversaries will actively seek to deny, delay, or disrupt U.S. access to conflict areas through anti-access capabilities.

b. This environment will require the Army future Modular Force to respond rapidly from a strategic expeditionary posture for immediate employment in theater and move throughout the depth of the joint area of operations in order to swiftly defeat the efforts of an aggressor or to win decisively in an extended campaign.

3-2. Solution Synopsis

a. The future Modular Force conducts operational maneuver from strategic distances to secure positions of advantage for prompt engagement of the enemy in operations that may often be of uncertain scope and duration. The Army approaches the overall requirements for strategic responsiveness through a "prompt and sustained framework" in concert with the Title 10 mission.

b. Organized into lighter, smaller, but more capable formations, the future Modular Force exploits all available air and sea lift, both military and commercial. Fielding of advanced lift platforms not dependent on improved air and sea ports will enable formations to deploy in combat ready unit configurations with integrated sustainment, in a matter of days rather than weeks, with units prepared for immediate employment in accordance with a *Deploy=Employ* paradigm that minimizes requirements for RSOI (fig 3-1).



Figure 3-1. Move Key Ideas

c. Exploiting multiple entry points and simultaneous force flows by air and sea, the future Modular Force will be able to achieve a level of deployment momentum that helps overcome enemy anti-access efforts, increases the opportunity for operational surprise, and closes the gap that exists today between early entry and campaign forces. In addition, improvements within the force deployment process, including reliable visibility of forces and sustainment in transit, coupled with continuously updated situational awareness, enable commanders to adjust force projection plans in stream and adapt to changing battlefield conditions.

d. The achievement of deployment momentum by air, sea, and ground, coupled with capability for intratheater operational maneuver, permits commanders to seize the initiative more rapidly, confront the enemy with multiple dilemmas, generate dislocating and disintegrative effects, and accelerate the enemy's defeat. As the theater matures and the active area of operations expands, force elements deploy from outside the theater directly into forward objective areas rather than through forward operating bases or lodgment areas. The commander employs combinations of strategic and intratheater lift throughout the campaign to project forces and sustainment throughout the JOA. Blending strategic force projection with operational employment in this manner is essential to the concept of simultaneous, distributed operations and the achievement of rapid decision inherent within new joint warfighting concepts. At the tactical level, improvements in speed, mobility, and protection, when coupled with other enablers, can be expected to enable commanders to decisively conclude tactical actions and engagements more

rapidly than what is possible today. Agile, adjustable, theater to tactical distribution to the point of need ensures continuous operations and the desired level of tempo.

Chapter 4
Future Combat Force Move Concept in the Joint Campaign

4-1. Introduction
Given the joint framework and operational requirements described above and the Army's Title 10 mission, this concept strongly advocates the utility of analyzing joint and Army force projection through a prompt and sustained framework. This section provides the analysis and identifies areas needing improvement to operate effectively in the future JOE.

4-2. The Prompt and Sustained Framework

a. Requirements for prompt and sustained. Future contingency operations will not always require prompt response or necessarily lead to sustained combat operations, but those two operational conditions present the most demanding requirements and comprise the primary parameters for analysis. As stated in Chapter 1, the terms *prompt and sustained* reflect the inescapable reality that the U.S. cannot reliably predict the occasion, scale, or duration of contingencies to which its military forces might be committed. Hence, prompt and sustained also define the essential and to some extent competing requirements that current and future force projection must satisfy. This framework also corresponds directly with the primary metrics for strategic responsiveness established by DOD 10-30-30 joint swiftness goals for future contingencies.

b. Prompt Force Projection

(1) Prompt force projection has both strategic and operational importance. From a strategic perspective, the capability for prompt force projection known to friend and enemy alike contributes to the deterrence of adversaries and reassurance of allies. It also is essential to cope with politically sensitive short warning missions, such as evacuation of endangered U.S. and allied citizens, support to friendly but militarily weak governments threatened by internally or externally generated threats, humanitarian crises, and low level conflicts that threaten to expand quickly if not stabilized. Prompt response has become more important as such requirements have become less predictable, and as forward stationing has become a less practical means of assuring early engagement of capable, survivable military forces in a remote crisis.

(2) From an operational perspective, prompt force projection can help diminish both the vulnerability of early deploying U.S. forces to deliberate access denial and the ability of an aggressor to achieve a protected posture before confronting them. In effect, it permits early recapture of the initiative inherently enjoyed by any adversary that strikes first. At best, it may arrest such aggression outright. At worst, it can prevent unimpeded seizure by the aggressor of strategically important objectives whose subsequent recovery would be costly in lives and treasure. In a major conflict, prompt force projection may be necessary simply to secure the geography essential to the uninterrupted deployment of follow–on forces. Successful prompt

response presumes both accurate diagnosis of the threat and the selection and preparation of the force capability packages needed to operate and sustain themselves effectively in the contingency area. Moreover, these forces must be projected directly to positions of advantage which can be immediately exploited to support subsequent operations.

(3) Naturally, the scale of such a prompt deployment is dependent on each contingency. Operational experience and wargaming suggest that the scale of immediate response required will range from to 5-7 brigade equivalents, not all of which necessarily will be combat formations. A non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), for example, may require only a brigade level prompt response, while responding to major regional instability or aggression could require several brigades and divisions level prompt response to arrest the aggression or establish conditions for sustained operations. Conversely, a humanitarian crisis will normally demand other than maneuver forces for effective response. Whatever its scale, however, prompt force projection implies the minimum feasible delay between a political decision to commit U.S. forces and their arrival in the theater of operations.

(4) Thus, the central measure of effective prompt power projection is the arrival at the right place of a survivable, self–sufficient, immediately employable combined arms force package appropriate to the mission and threat, and sufficiently timely to arrest further deterioration of the conflict or crisis, in concert with the actions of the entire JF.

c. Sustained Force Projection

(1) Sustained force projection is required when large forces must be committed to operations abroad. It may be required by the very nature of the prompting contingency or result from escalation of a limited conflict into a major one. Among the lesser contingencies that nevertheless could require a major force commitment and the sustained force projection it implies are the conduct of large and prolonged stability operations, counterinsurgency or counterterrorist operations, and maintaining order in the context of a major humanitarian crisis.

(2) The most demanding requirements for sustained force projection, however, are associated with conducting decisive operations in a major theater or multi–theater war requiring the liberation of friendly territory, the occupation of enemy territory, the possible imposition of régime change, and the conduct of stability operations concurrent with and subsequent to MCO. In virtually every such case, prolonged ground operations are likely to be required on a scale precluding the achievement of strategic objectives by prompt force projection alone. Indeed, to a determined potential adversary, America's perceived ability and willingness to sustain force projection for as long as required to achieve a decisive result may be an even more convincing deterrent than our ability to respond promptly. Should deterrence fail, the only likely alternative to such a capability is temporary or permanent abandonment of the strategic objective.

(3) Prolonged operations nearly always will involve change over time in the character and geographical focus of operations. The nature and operational behavior of the threat will often change and with it the scale and intensity of combat operations. Above all, the political context of the commitment may change, including involvement by allies of one or both sides.

Due to this variability, sustained force projection implies the ability to smoothly adapt both the geographic focus and the operational character of deployed forces as operations progress.

(4) Logistical self–sufficiency, which is very important for prompt response, becomes less important for sustained projection (table 4-1). Instead, sustainment continuity, force balance, and the consistency of the deployed force mix with the shifting character and requirements of the mission rise in significance. Higher levels of RSOI can be tolerated for sustained force projection, although reduction in requirements for RSOI presents an operational benefit wherever and whenever it can be obtained.

Table 4-1. Contrasting Requirements between Prompt and Sustained Force Projection

Prompt Force Projection: Speed and Effectiveness	Sustained Force Projection: Momentum and Continuity
▪ Standardized, modular, pre-configured deployment packages ▪ Rapid force alert, assembly, and load out ▪ Deployment in a ready-to-fight configuration ▪ Minimum intermediate staging and transshipping [ideal movement would be fort to tactical assembly area] ▪ Minimum RSOI on arrival ▪ Integrated sustainment to enable initial self-sufficiency in short term operations Central measure of effectiveness: *Arrival at the right place of a survivable self–sufficient, immediately employable, and effective combined arms force package appropriate to the mission and threat and sufficiently timely to arrest further deterioration of the conflict or crisis*.	▪ Easy force flow re-configurability ▪ Low vulnerability to flow interruption ▪ Multiple secure theater entry points ▪ High throughput, including directly to forward operating areas ▪ Use of offset port and airfield facilities ▪ Network enabled logistics Central measure of effectiveness: *Maintaining a rate of deployment that achieves and retains force dominance sufficient to prevent a major tactical reverse or operational pause and that directly enables campaign execution*

(5) Whatever the prompting contingency, sustained force projection imposes requirements different in kind, as well as, duration from those of prompt response. Whereas the defining objective of prompt force projection is speed, that of sustained force projection is momentum. Thus, in contrast to prompt force projection, the central measure of effective sustained force projection is a rate of deployment that retains initiative and achieves force dominance sufficient to prevent a major tactical reverse or operational pause and that directly enables campaign execution.

(6) The 10-30-30 joint swiftness goals established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2003 with respect to operations to swiftly defeat the efforts of a regional aggressor actually reinforce the central elements of the Army's concept of prompt and sustained response. The 10 day goal to seize the initiative represents the requirement for prompt response, while the initial 30 day goal to defeat the enemy and be prepared for redeployment to a near-simultaneous conflict (within the second 30 days) represents the requirement for sustained response. In concert with this overarching joint metric, the Army established corresponding framework in the

Army Campaign Plan for Transformation which is-

(a) Four to 7 days to deploy a brigade combat team (BCT),

(b) 10 days to deploy a 3 BCT division,

(c) 20 days to deploy 9 BCTs (roughly, a 3 division force equivalent), and

(d) 30 days to deploy up to 15 BCTs (roughly, a 5 division equivalent).

(7) The first two metrics apply to prompt response, while the second two encompass goals for the deployment of forces required to conduct sustained operations in MCO.

4-3. Prompt Response Strategic Responsiveness

a. As the Army transforms, regionally focused future Modular Force theater armies and corps will maintain the readiness posture required to meet the Army deployment goals. Force deployment will be orchestrated and synchronized in the context of the entire JF. If the theater army or corps echelon is acting as the JTF HQ, it must be able, in concert with the combatant commander, to plan and execute the overall deployment process for the entire JF, as well as, synchronize parallel deployment of coalition partners.

b. Thus, the theater army or corps must be capable of directing and controlling the deployment of both CONUS based and forward deployed forces, as well as, Army pre-positioned stocks (APS) of supplies and equipment where available. Forward stationed forces and APS will continue to act as a springboard for Army strategic responsiveness well into the future.

c. Prepare and Posture

(1) Future Modular Force deployment will always be preceded by the *prepare and posture* phase described in Chapter 2. In addition to those actions cited earlier, Army prepare and posture activities will include home station readiness activities and preparation for deployment; campaign force tailoring from force pools; and augmentation, if required, of corps or division C2 echelons to perform roles as CJTF or coalition joint forces land component command.

(2) Other prepare and posture activities include initial deployment and campaign planning, accomplished collaboratively with joint C2 echelons; configuration of the strategic to JOA sustainment linkages required to support the campaign; establishment of information systems linkages within the CJTF structure (and with forward deployed elements, such as SOF); and initial efforts to posture the information systems ISR network of networks necessary to support operations.

d. Deterrence and Preclusion

(1) During the early stages of a crisis the immediate deployment of JFs may deter aggression outright or constrain the adversary's ability to achieve his initial and subsequent objectives (preclusion). In this sense, rapidly deployed Army elements strengthen JTF abilities to deter conflict outright, limit escalation, preclude early enemy success, and posture the force for rapid transition into conflict, if deterrence fails.

(2) Ground components of the theater air missile defense system (Patriot, terminal high altitude air defense, medium extended air defense system) will degrade enemy long-range air and missile anti-access capabilities and protect the introduction of early entry and follow-on forces into the theater. Information systems ISR organizations, fully integrated within the joint contingency force structure for entry operations, will strengthen capabilities of the JF to establish the required level of situational understanding for effective operations.

(3) Ground based capabilities for deep, precision fires and long-range, manned and unmanned armed reconnaissance will complement air and sea joint *counter precision* and *counter anti-access* capabilities. Deployment of ground forces directly into objective areas will help deny initial enemy objectives, occupy or protect key terrain and facilities, and assume positions from which enemy aggression can be denied or threatened. If entry into actual objective areas is precluded (for example, for political considerations), deployment of Army formations into nearby operating bases from which they can rapidly intervene by means of theater or Army lift capabilities will have a similar deterrent effect.

(4) Army special operations forces and other specialized elements may deploy early to provide force protection, security, direct action, strategic reconnaissance, and counter SOF capabilities. When possible, psychological operations and civil affairs elements deploy pre-conflict to support joint information operations and create conditions favorable for U.S. intervention, as well as to strengthen the framework for effective coalition operations.

e. Operational Maneuver from Strategic Distances

(1) When deterrence fails, the future Modular Force will conduct operational maneuver from strategic distances for rapid commitment on short notice. Maneuver from strategic distances begins at home station. It is envisioned that the Army future force generation process will earmark specific forces within force pools as prompt responders. Under ideal conditions, prompt responding units will be located near or adjacent to port of embarkations (POEs) and deploy with modularized, prepackaged unit sets of equipment and pre-configured, sustainment stocks for very rapid load out. These forces will also need to conduct periodic deployment readiness training with joint lift providers to exercise the deployment process from end-to-end.

(2) Similarly, theater Army, corps, and division HQs will organize early entry command post packages within a similar prompt response posture. Home station nodes will be manned and trained to support force projection from alert through redeployment, maintaining continuous communications with higher echelon and joint C2 elements and assuming any functions that can be performed effectively outside the theater. Host installations will continue to improve

capabilities for force projection to process forces, support movement to POEs, and exploit early activation of Active Reserve capabilities to accelerate deployment activities. Improvements at POEs are required to reduce loading times for Army forces and leverage civilian port operating capability.

(3) *Deploy=Employ Paradigm (see fig 4-1).* The fielding of advanced air and sea lift platforms will enable prompt responding Army formations to deploy in combat ready unit configurations, with integrated sustainment, in a matter of days, with units prepared to begin operations immediately after arrival. Joint austere access, high speed sealift (AAHSS), theater watercraft such as the joint high speed vessel (JHSV), super short take off and landing (SSTOL), and heavy lift vertical take off and landing (HLVTOL) aircraft, and advanced joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) will permit the JF and ground force commander to push substantial, ready to fight land power ashore through *multiple, unimproved entry points*.[2] Embedded enroute mission planning and rehearsal system (EMPRS) packages will permit deploying forces to build situational understanding while in transit and refine plans for immediate operations upon arrival. This approach will further accelerate simultaneous force flow, sharply enhance strategic and operational agility, help deceive the enemy, and reduce his ability to deny access.



Figure 4-1: Deploy=Employ Paradigm

[2] In 2006, the Army concept for AAHSS is in the process of merging with the Navy/USMC concept for rapid strategic sealift into a joint program currently known as joint high speed sealift (JHSS). At present, the JHSS is envisioned as having the capability to deliver a combat configured battalion task force (+) through degraded or unimproved ports. In comparison, the JHSV is sized to company/team level. In each case, the lift capability is intended, through simultaneous disembarkation, to deliver intact battalion and brigade level formations in proximity to each other.

(4) *Deployment Momentum*. The speed and versatility of these platforms will permit Army commanders to *close the gap* between entry forces most often arriving by air and immediate follow-on forces deploying by air and sea. When these gaps are closed, deployment momentum is achieved, improving the capability of the force to expand initial entry operations, seize the initiative earlier in concert with other JFs, and build combat power sufficiently to assume the offensive, without a significant operational pause. Development of fort to fight or ISB to fight air lifters capable of take off and landing on unprepared runways will help reduce the number of nodes that must be transited during deployment, saving significant time, expanding available entry points for both prompt and sustained force projection, and delivering ground formations within striking distance of objective areas.

(5) *Intermediate Staging Bases and Self-Deployment from Operational Distances*. Deploying forces may or may not use ISBs for initial and subsequent deployment and sustainment, depending on the conditions in each contingency and enemy capability to interdict or deny their use. However, the future Modular Force will possess inherent (but limited) self-deployment capability, preferably of both mounted and dismounted forces, from ISBs or forward presence locations outside but proximate to the conflict JOA. They will also employ advanced intratheater airlift (SSTOL, HLVTOL) and sealift such as the JHSV allocated to the JTF to move forces simultaneously on multiple routes from ISB/FOB to specified objective areas within the JOA.

(6) *Army Pre-positioned Stocks and Forces*. Conceptually, pre-positioning will continue to provide many advantages with respect to reducing burden on strategic lift and reducing the time required to deploy selected forces and sustainment to theaters. However, the delivery of APS Afloat directly to the JOA will require access to improved, deep water ports with substantial, on site throughput capabilities and infrastructure. Thus, the same actions or conditions that may deny use of improved ports in theater to strategic sealift also deny their use for APS Afloat. When APS Afloat cannot be delivered directly, but must be transfer loaded through an additional node, such operations impose a burden on intratheater lift and consume considerable time. Operational experience and analysis further demonstrate that the use of pre-positioning mitigates, but falls well short by itself of accelerating force flow to a sufficient extent to avoid operational pauses.

(7) With respect to APS Ashore, there are no guarantees that these stocks will actually be used where they are positioned. In fact, wargaming across defense planning scenarios often demonstrates that APS Ashore must be delivered by either strategic air or sealift to the JOA for employment, imposing a burden on lift and reducing its near to midterm availability. Naturally, if those forces are moved by large sealift, they must be delivered through improved ports. Using smaller vessels able to employ unimproved ports may not be possible due to range considerations. Moreover, RSOI will still be required at the SPOD, introducing further delay. Finally, while sustainment stocks contained in APS will often be relevant to any future contingency, pre-positioned forces may not necessarily represent the most desirable force options for the JFC.

(8) Challenges to lift can be mitigated by several factors. First, pre-conflict activation of APS ashore and movement of assets afloat to the conflict region as FDOs will increase their

responsiveness for early employment. More importantly, the introduction of JHSV into the future JF mix will mitigate these challenges, if it is procured in sufficient numbers. The JHSV and the AAHSS, if used for intratheater movement, will have the capability to move APS ashore, as well as afloat assets downloaded in ISBs or advance bases (because of non-availability of LMSR capable ports), in combat figuration for immediate employment through a range of SPODs. Absent these capabilities, pre-positioned forces will normally be constrained by their inherent limitations to introduction as part of the sustained response force.

f. Entry Operations

(1) As noted earlier, successful entry operations in all environments (permissive, semi-, and non-permissive) set conditions for transition to decisive operations. Multi-modal entry operations by the future Modular Force are conducted under the protection of the rapidly established joint theater air and missile defense network, shielded further from denial or interdiction by air and maritime superiority that may be local, wide area, or theater wide in scope. Entry points are carefully selected as springboards for early attack of key enemy capabilities, with a view toward rapid expansion of lodgments. Entry operations are supported by deception, supporting information operation, joint fires and intelligence, ground based precision fires, security operations, integrated sustainment, and other shaping actions to assure continuous operations. In most situations, entry forces will initially conduct an active defense, but seek to seize the initiative as soon as possible and transition to offensive action. Very rapid deployment of early entry command post(s) insure effective C2 capability is emplaced to control these complex operations. The volume and simultaneity of entry operations will be improved by the synchronized combination of advanced lift capabilities graphically displayed in fig 4-2.



Figure 4-2. Force Projection Options

(2) The future Modular Force will conduct CONUS based forcible entry operations (mounted and dismounted) using strategic and theater assets (air and sea lift, remote precision fires, joint information systems ISR, and other enablers) during any phase of the joint campaign. Forces may also conduct forcible entry from ISBs or forward operating bases over operational distances using organic force projection capabilities (HLVTOL), supplemented by joint lift and enablers. Once entry is assured, the JFC orchestrates the flow to build mobile, lethal capability quickly and evenly to prevent gaps between early arriving forces and decisive operations forces.

(3) The situational understanding required to support operational maneuver from strategic distances in its various manifestations begins building at home stations and continues throughout deployment, including during the operations required to establish assured access. The goal is to establish entry conditions and a sufficient knowledge base to ensure strategic maneuver is not executed as a strategic meeting engagement, but as a deliberate introduction of force packages tailored and ready for immediate operations. Thus, enroute knowledge building and continuous connectivity from fort to foxhole with forces enroute to or already in place in theater are essential. Home station nodes and EMPRS capabilities embedded within lift platforms are critical enablers.

(4) *Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB), Forcible Entry and Strike from the Sea*. The Army is engaged in an extended effort to investigate a supporting concept that would enable it to conduct vertical maneuver of dismounted and mounted forces from specially configured sea-based platforms. Described within the *Joint Seabasing JIC*, the AFSB is scaled to the level of the brigade combat team. It is intended to operate in concert with the joint seabase and provide reinforcing and complementary effects to current and projected USMC capabilities for ship-to-objective maneuver. In its most mature form, the AFSB would employ HLVTOL capability to conduct and sustain mounted vertical maneuver against critical objectives well beyond tactical depth. It would require considerable support from seabase assets, including ISR, fires, and protection. Investigations to this point in time suggests comprehensive utility of such a capability across the range of military operations, as well as a viable concept of employment, but more definitive analysis is required to confirm its significance relative to other potential approaches.

g. Strategic to Theater Distribution

(1) Distribution from CONUS or from another theater to the supported theater will be managed by the aforementioned JDDE, with U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) as the deployment process owner acting to synchronize actions of the JDDE partners. This task requires both the vertical and horizontal integration of all joint distribution activities to ensure that all joint, Service, and commercial resources are effectively employed. The desired end state of this activity is a joint, integrated approach from point of origin to point of need, supported by an effective two-way distribution network that employs simultaneous, adaptable distribution flows by air, sea, and ground through multiple pathways and entry points.

(2) The key to strategic distribution is visibility of requirements, priorities, and resources and integration of effort across the JDDE, a virtual unified distribution network. The distribution network will comprise multi-directional and flexible combination of nodes and links between the

nodes and further enabled with assured communications, effective distribution management, and modernized distribution processes and technologies.

4-4. Sustained Response, Operational Agility and Related Issues

a. Sustained Response

(1) Sustained, uninterrupted deployment of Army forces will continue to rely primarily on current air and sealift capabilities the C-5, C-17, and civil reserve air fleet strategic airlift, LMSRs, fast sealift ship, and other sealift assets available through voluntary intermodal sealift agreements. As these legacy capabilities largely depend on the availability of improved ports of debarkation (POD), ground infrastructure, and extensive post arrival RSOI, forces delivered by these means will require more time to close within the theater and rarely be available for immediate employment.

(2) Pre-positioned assets include theater opening capabilities and theater sustainment stocks to improve responsiveness to some degree and directly address the sustainment gap that has often delayed initiation of large scale operations in the past. Although the requirement to meet the parameters of the Deploy=Employ paradigm is reduced somewhat at this point in the future campaign, excessive sequentiality and delay is likely to extend the gap, between the early arrival of initial entry forces and the subsequent arrival of campaign forces, inducing the need for an operational pause, which is clearly undesirable and should be avoided.

(3) Future force projection and intratheater movement capabilities are as critical to the conduct of decisive operations as they are to entry operations. Strategic force projection must evolve to more effectively support campaign execution throughout the decisive phase, while capabilities for operational maneuver permit the JF and ground commander to act throughout the entire JOA. In fact, execution of the Deploy=Employ paradigm and the need to avoid operational pauses demand combinations of strategic and intratheater lift to simultaneously meet requirements for strategic power projection, as well as for operational employment and continuous sustainment throughout the JOA, to achieve decision. The old boundaries between the communications zone, rear areas, and combat zones and between the force and function hand -offs that occured at those boundaries are largely disappearing. Key factors driving this development include joint and Army operational, sustainment, and assured access concepts that identify capabilities required to-

(a) Act decisively with speed, power, and momentum throughout the enemy's dispositions to shatter and disintegrate his defensive coherence.

(b) Conduct simultaneous and sequential, non-contiguous operations.

(c) Conduct direct attack by joint strike and maneuver against enemy key capabilities, decisive points, and elements of enemy centers of gravity, exposing the entire enemy force.

(d) Maintain high operational tempo and continuous pressure to overwhelm and paralyze the enemy.

(e) Utilize distribution based, strategic to JOA sustainment with unit configured loads.

(f) Provide continuous sustainment from strategic providers to forward elements across discontinuous air and ground lines of communication.

(g) Avoid operational pauses to reconsolidate or resynchronize.

(h) Increase reliance on air-based sustainment.

(i) Apply fort to fight and ISB to fight projection goals equally to deployment and sustainment.

(j) Employ multiple force projection routes and multiple entry points that extend from shorelines to forward objective areas.

(k) Increase necessity to project forces through brownwater access points, dirt airstrips, and landing areas for advanced vertical lift.

b. Operational Agility

(1) Blending strategic force projection with operational employment is essential to the achievement of rapid decision inherent within new joint warfighting concepts. The absence of capability in the current and programmed force to extend strategic force projection beyond improved APODs and SPODs, and link it with intratheater assets to campaign execution will inhibit the overall ability of the JF to act throughout the enemy's dispositions via operational maneuver and long-range strike to achieve dislocating and disintegrative effects. The capability is also essential to the transitions likely to occur in future joint operations, as formations are shifted from one part of the JOA to another, or even between separate JOAs and separate theaters, when simultaneous conflicts are ongoing.

(2) However, it is clear the current and planned suite of strategic and intratheater air and sealift platforms cannot adequately support these essential elements of future warfighting. They are neither supportive of assured access, nor of the operational and sustainment agility required during the course of the joint campaign.

(3) With respect to sealift, LMSRs, the primary workhorse of sustained seabased power projection are as long as aircraft carriers and require deep water ports to berth and off-load. Similar constraints afflict other sealift platforms and restrict their use in brownwater or over-the-shore operations, constraining the ability to deliver forces closer to the fight. The chart below, based on an initial global port analysis carried out by the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Transportation Engineering Agency in 2005-06, provides a rough order of magnitude comparison of existing LMSRs and Cape D[3] class vessels with several different advanced concept, high speed concept vessels with austere access features. Preliminary analysis indicates an important increase in access that could be achieved through fielding of JHSV and other larger vessels designed simultaneously for austere access and delivery of combat configured units.

[3] The Cape D ship is a class of roll on/roll off ships configured as wheeled and tracked carriers with some container stowage capability.

Simply doubling access, for example, would have a significant impact on increasing force flow, improving simultaneity, reducing predictability, enabling littoral maneuver and building employable combat power more rapidly.[4]

(4) There are 2077 seaports in the global database below the numbers and percentages accessible by listed watercraft:

(a) 242 seaports are LMSR accessible (12%);

(b) 660 seaports are Cape D accessible (32%);

(c) 1363 seaports are JHSV accessible (66%);

(d) 555 seaports are Catamaran-concept accessible (26%);

(e) 322 seaports are accessible by 1,000', 24' draft Monohull-concept (15%); and

(f) 714 seaports not accessible by current or concept sealift (34%).

(5) In terms of airlift, C-5 Galaxies can carry enormous loads (two M1 Abrams tanks) up to 8,000 nautical miles, but they require a world-class airport at both POE and POD. The C-17 Globemaster III and C-130 Hercules aircraft provide the only capability today of bypassing these major choke points from appreciable distances while maximizing load capacities. Even so, they are still constrained to at least a 3,000 foot runway and in many cases (weather, terrain, environment dependent) may require 5,000 - 6,000 feet with sizeable loads.

(6) The venerable C-130 aircraft is further hampered by significant payload, altitude, and range limitations and cannot be refueled in-air. These capability limitations not only severely constrain U.S. ability to execute assured access strategies, they demand a nearby intermediate staging base to transload equipment, personnel, and sustainment from inter to intratheater lift platforms. None of the airlift platforms are suitable for routine aerial delivery in proximity to objective areas, nor can they support *rapid* shift of maneuver forces and sustainment across the breadth and depth of the battlespace, without time consuming, highly visible repositioning of ground forces into assembly areas near improved airports. The required capabilities to satisfy critical operational requirements for future lift platforms are listed in table 4-2. At this time they are not fully met by the current suite of legacy lift.

[4] The port analysis represented above is an ongoing project in constant evolution as additional data surfaces on ports worldwide. In addition, ongoing research and development is exploring on board enablers to further increase access. The analysis will become more useful as it is disaggregated to regions and sub-regions of particular interest.

Table 4-2. Required Capabilities for Theater Operational Agility and Transitions

Required Capabilities for Theater Operational Agility and Transitions
▪ HLVTOL and SSTOL capability to lift and move mounted and dismounted forces for vertical maneuver to tactical and operational depth- o Extended range, payload, and speed. o Movement of crews, fighting platforms, and munitions in a single aircraft. o Broad variety of landing areas. o Reduced up/offload, time on ground. o Internal loading. o Capability thru manning for 24 hour operations. o Operations from dispersed bases. o Air refueling; simplified on-ground refueling.
▪ Sustainment of forces via HLVTOL and SSTOL along discontinuous (air limes of communication) ALOCs- o Re-supply operations by air with unit configured supplies. o Refueling of like aircraft and ground vehicles. o MEDEVAC and back-haul after offload. o Rapid shift of sustaining operations across multiple locations.
▪ Survivability against an array of air and ground based threats.
▪ Seabased platforms for operational agility within littoral regions.

(7) To overcome the limitations of these legacy systems, larger capacity SSTOL and heavy lift VTOL are required in substantial quantities for air movement and AAHSS and JHSV for austere seaport access. Whether the goals encompass operational maneuver from strategic distances, use of multiple simultaneous austere points of entry, vertical maneuver and envelopment, precision engagement or distribution based logistics, these air and sealift technology solutions are needed sooner rather than later. These kinds of platforms further provide a quality of versatility and adaptability necessary to enable Army and JFCs to adjust movement of forces and sustainment in stride in response to the evolution of the campaign and the enemy's own actions.

(8) Similarly, advanced sealift platforms will enable Army forces of significant size to exploit maritime maneuver along the littoral and increase opportunities for operational surprise. Both JHSV and AAHSS can be employed for these purposes, even though the latter is intended as an intertheater lift asset.

c. Maneuver Enhancement

(1) Achieving deployment momentum, operational agility, and increased maneuverability throughout of ground formations, requires a suite of capabilities to enable and extend theater access. To enable theater access, maneuver enhancement support brigades and commands protect and improve theater entry points, including multiple APODs and SPODs, intermediate staging and forward operating bases, joint support areas, and theater LOCs.

(2) As forces continue to build during the deployment process, maneuver enhancement forces assess and expand theater infrastructure through means such as joint rapid airfield construction and rapid port enhancement, support the receipt, integration, and onward movement

of forces projected by legacy capabilities, detect and eliminate hazards that may impede force movement, and help provide the situational awareness to the deploying force needed to maintain force flow and sustainment.

(3) Combat support forces further enable operational agility through engagement and control of local populations, a function that is particularly important in conflicts that generate large numbers of refugees and displaced persons. In addition, future enemies may employ local populations in deliberate efforts to interfere with force mobility and freedom of movement. The ability of combat support forces to leverage local resources helps to reduce the strain on the deployed force and enables commanders to limit the volume of capabilities that must be applied in these areas.

d. Operational Distribution

(1) The future JFC will often choose to appoint a joint or joint capable logistics HQs to coordinate theater logistics, including theater distribution functions. For the Army, the theater Army will normally be the C2 echelon responsible for linking the strategic logistical base with tactical sustainment of corps, divisions, and subordinate organizations. For smaller scale contingencies, the division may assume broader logistical and sustainment functions. As such, it must integrate seamlessly within the joint theater logistics structure and balance requirements to support the theater with orchestration of sustaining operations to support committed forces. Future theater support commands play a critical role in this framework and provide capability to function as a joint functional command, when appropriate.

(2) Modular in construct, the future theater support commands will C2 Army theater distribution. It will establish a distribution network that optimizes all available distribution capabilities to provide a robust, adaptive, and dynamic network of logistic nodes, linked by multi-modal transportation capabilities, including the advanced air and sea lift capabilities discussed above. The other Services will contribute and manage specific capabilities in support of their efforts using the theater base as required. Distribution will be coordinated centrally at the operational level, but executed regionally, in close proximity to the user, by logistic formations, weighted to priority of maneuver in support of critical campaign objectives. Subordinate logistics formations will provide both area support and formation specific support as directed.

(3) Loads will be configured as far to the rear as practical, but configured such that they will be appropriate to user needs when delivered. This feature suggests there may be configuration points at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, with the operational tempo and distribution and build times determining the exact location of the configuration point.

(4) Key principles informing the organization and execution of operational distribution in the future Modular Force include-

(a) Unity of C2 of distribution forces and capabilities.

(b) Fully networked forces within the joint theater logistics and distribution structure.

(c) Collaborative planning between logistic staffs, distribution managers, and operational staffs.

(d) Reduction in the size of the nodal infrastructure and stockpiles supporting distribution enabled by in transit visibility and highly synchronized movements of stocks that maintain inventories in motion within distribution pipelines.

(e) Distribution management that is agile and highly adaptable to changing battle conditions.

4-5. Tactical Movement and Mobility

a. Ultimately, decisive operations are based on tactical success in close combat. Three changes in particular will distinguish future Modular Force tactical movement and maneuver from traditional practice. The first is exploiting the ability to develop and effectively act on information. The second is the capacity to execute actions in contact with significantly higher levels of tempo, lethality, survivability, and endurance. The third is an increase in speed, accompanied by better off-road agility, improved fuel consumption for longer sustained movement, and greater exploitation of the vertical dimension.

b. The first requirement confronting any tactical formation seeking to engage the enemy is finding them and determining their strength, composition, and disposition. The classic means of doing so, is through reconnaissance or a movement to contact, in which friendly forces advance on their objective until the enemy is detected, maneuver to further define their dispositions and fix the forces, then finish their destruction through assault. At best, this process forfeits surprise, exposes friendly forces to fire, and gives the enemy time to react. At worst, it can subject the friendly force to enemy counterattack when it is least prepared to deal with it.

c. To the extent they enjoy situational awareness, future Modular Force formations can avoid this procedure and the penalties it incurs. Direct access by small tactical units to real-time, all source information will furnish early warning of the approach of moving enemy formations and increasingly permit detection and diagnosis of static forces in prepared positions. Tactical units will supplement this information using organic robotic platforms that are inherently smaller and less detectable than manned systems.

d. In the best of circumstances, these capabilities will allow the friendly force to identify enemy dispositions while remaining undetected, and thus begin the engagement from a position of advantage, without warning the enemy. In the worst of circumstances, they will allow it to develop the tactical situation more rapidly and with less friendly exposure. Both outcomes will be determined by the ability to achieve a decisive tactical overmatch in massing effects rather than forces.

e. Tactical maneuver by future Modular Force formations will replace the characteristic movement of contiguous columns or lines of units, with dispersed movement by smaller

elements maneuvering autonomously without loss of synchronization and by taking full advantage of the terrain. Traditionally, major obstacles to dispersed and autonomous maneuver have been loss of tactical control and mutual support, risk of fratricide, difficulty in synchronizing both organic and supporting fires, and the danger of enemy infiltration of the empty space among moving elements. All these obstacles are aggravated in complex terrain, at night, and in other conditions of reduced visibility.

f. Massing to overcome these obstacles also incurs penalties. Movement by contiguous formations increases the risk of early detection and attack. Mass formations are less able to exploit the terrain, and their very concentration increases both their exposure to fire and its lethality. Movement by massed formations invariably sacrifices tactical agility and flexibility for control. And perhaps most important, in urban and other very complex terrain, it is painfully slow and physically infeasible at times.

g. In the future, tactical maneuver seeks to achieve the effects of concentration without its liabilities. Shared understanding achieved by means of collaboration through intertwined systems will allow independent yet integrated maneuver supported by continuous real–time knowledge of friendly and enemy locations and movement. The latter protects against both fratricide and infiltration, while the ability to electronically synchronize their own and supporting sensors, and attack systems will allow units to concentrate effects simultaneously from widely separated locations. Dispersed, autonomous tactical movements of this nature increase the physical and psychological demands on Soldiers and small unit leaders, a condition which will be mitigated by the degree of confidence they have in their situational understanding of both friendly and enemy forces.

h. Improvements in speed and terrain negotiation will introduce other significant advantages to tactical movement over a less tactically mobile enemy. Certainly, they will constitute a distinct advantage in meeting engagements and enable U.S. forces to more easily seize positional advantage, achieve surprise, and win the race to occupy contested key terrain. Greater use of vertical movement, maneuver and improvement in the ability to identify and operate along the seams between enemy forces will compel the enemy to secure themselves from a 360^{o} degree perspective and limit their ability to concentrate.

i. Superior speed and dispersed movement constitute an inherent form or protection which complicates the enemy's ability to acquire, pattern, and effectively target U.S. tactical units. When coupled with other enablers, improved speed and agility will lead to tactical actions and engagements that are decisively concluded more rapidly than possible in the past. Overall, the paralyzing psychological effect that fast moving forces, operating with high situational awareness, impose on slower forces may be its most important operational benefit, an effect certainly observed in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

j. Future commanders must be prepared to compensate for the differences in speed and mobility that often exist within forces which have been mission tailored from unequally modernized components of the (hybrid) future combat force. The differentials may be acute when comparing the speed and mobility of maneuver forces against the sustaining organizations charged with ensuring timely replenishment in distributed operations.

k. Maneuver Enhancement. The maneuver enhancement functions described earlier in support of operational agility apply equally at the tactical level. In addition, maneuver enhancement forces will improve force protection and security during movement through early warning, standoff detection and neutralization of hazards and obstacles, and defeat of improvised threats to mobility. The ability of combat support forces to enhance mobility in urban and other complex terrain will be highly important in future conflict, when the frequency of operations in large urban areas is expected to rise significantly.

l. Tactical Distribution

(1) The fast pace and extended distances characterizing future tactical maneuver will place high demands on the ground distribution capabilities and logistical C2 organizations required to sustain the force. These conditions impose demands for improved protection, mobility, and ground lift capabilities within the tactical logistics structures that support the maneuver. Some of the improvement required will be manifested in the realization of existing future tactical wheeled vehicles programs in the coming years, but increasing reliance on ALOCs even at the tactical level, will also require improvement in Army aviation to provide timely, easily handled stocks to forward units.

(2) Tactical distribution will focus on delivering timely, accurate, and consistent support to the point of need. Logistics formations will be integrated into division and brigade planning processes in habitual, routine collaboration, to ensure their sub-units deliver commodities at a time and place best suited to the operational tempo. As described in other concepts, these activities normally take the form of combat replenishment and mission staging operations within a pulsed rhythm tied directly to battle rhythm.

(3) Fully synchronizing sustaining operations with tactical maneuver will be critical to maintaining the high tempo anticipated in future, distributed operations within the non-contiguous battlefield framework. Naturally, the tactical agility and versatility required in this dynamically changing environment will demand equally adaptable distribution management processes. Conducting distribution over discontinuous LOCs will further require sustaining formations to possess substantial capability for self-protection, with leaders trained to exploit both Army and joint enablers for improved situational awareness, assured mobility, and fire support. Failing that, commanders will be compelled to commit substantial combat forces for LOC security, which is an operational paradigm to be avoided whenever possible.

4-6. Relevance Across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO)

a. This concept is relevant to all other parts of the ROMO that require either prompt or sustained force projection (para 1-2). For example, it is self-evident that U.S. military response to humanitarian crises or major disasters will be far more effective if the U.S. is able to respond *promptly* in the manner described above with forces that do not require extended RSOI and are immediately employable. In addition, operations involving maneuver forces such as strikes, raids, NEO, counterterrorism, and the like, will benefit from the improvement of prompt response capability described in this concept. Similarly, sustained force projection will be essential for small contingency operations whose conditions change significantly over time and

require substantial increase in committed forces in semi-permissive or hostile environments. In all these examples, the improvements in operational and tactical agility described in this concept must be recognized as operationally beneficial and highly desirable.

b. However, exceptions do exist. Future contingency operations or military activities that do *not* require both prompt or sustained force projection and operationally agile forces generally fall outside the scope of this concept. Exceptions include the planned rotation of forces engaged in long-term stability operations, deployment of forces for peacetime training events abroad, or deployments connected to demonstrating forward presence, support to multi-national partners or exercise of pre-positioned unit sets and stocks.

c. Civil Support. There can be little doubt, most of the conceptual ideas described above will, if implemented in the future, have a favorable impact on the ability of the future Modular Force to respond promptly and effectively to support civil authorities in the areas of crisis response, consequence management, reinforcement in civil disturbances, domestic relief, and the like. Army and joint response to Hurricane Katrina is the most recent example of how the versatility of the future Army, coupled with advanced force projection and mobility enablers can save lives and restore order.

Chapter 5
Required Capabilities

5-1. Introduction

a. The following capabilities encompass those most needed to achieving desired improvements in joint and future Modular Force strategic responsiveness and operational agility. The capabilities are described within a framework of the traditional four segments or legs that comprise the chain of force projection which extends from fort to foxhole. Within each segment, capabilities are identified with respect to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel and facilities.

b. Overall, advances in materiel capabilities will have the greatest impact on force responsiveness and agility, although the discussion below will demonstrate that infrastructure and process improvements can significantly reduce the time required to move Army forces from home stations to the fight.

c. Requirements to fix known shortfalls of the current force include-

(1) Sufficient numbers and types of lift platforms to meet contingency requirements in as timely a manner as desired.

(2) Improved APODs, SPODs.

(3) Increased payload and range limitations for most fixed and rotary-wing aircraft types.

(4) Reduced limitations on aerial refueling across the air bridge.

(5) Increased speed to decrease time consuming loading and off-loading of sealift.

(6) Reduced time to position, off-load, and organize pre-positioned assets.

(7) Reduced time and action required to integrate personnel, equipment, and sustainment arriving in different modes (RSOI).

(8) Increase fort to fight projection capability. (Strategic bombers, airborne forces, and tactical level amphibious forces largely comprise this capability at this time.)

(9) Increase existing intratheater air and sea connectors to provide operational agility.

(10) Reduced limitations on forcible entry and other capabilities to address assured access challenges.

(11) Provide multiple, layered, deployment C2 organizations.

(12) Change the cultural state to view deployment as an operation link to employment, instead of a logistics function.

(13) Increase force projection planning and execution expertise at tactical level.

(14) Increase automated deployment planning and management tools.

d. Operational consequences of shortfalls include-

(1) Delayed arrival of forces, with breaks in the flow that inhibit combat power build up.

(2) Sequential and predictable force flow through small numbers of improved PODs.

(3) High vulnerability to interdiction.

(4) Difficulty in achieving deployment momentum.

(5) More time for the enemy to prepare and resist intervention.

(6) Delay in transition to decisive operations.

5-2. Fort to Port

The fort to port segment extends from home stations to air or sea port of embarkation (SPOE) by means of surface (road, railroad) or airlift.

a. Facilities

(1) The future Modular Force requires the capability to improve home stations for both force protection and force projection (with special emphasis to those bases identified as key power projection platforms) in the context of a JOE, to provide sustained response and operational agility in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to establish home

station operations centers fully trained to support deployments in the context of a JOE, to provide sustained response and operational agility in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to improve routes from and to air ports of embarkation (APOEs), SPOEs, rail hubs, and local marshalling areas in the context of a JOE, to provide sustained response and operational agility in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to re-evaluate CONUS stationing plans so units earmarked as prompt responders will be located near sea and airports in the context of a JOE, to provide strategic responsive in FSO.

(2) The future Modular Force requires the capability to evaluate POEs to identify infrastructure improvements in the context of a JOE, to provide distributed support and sustainment in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to pre-position ready to deploy unit sets or stocks at POEs in the context of a JOE, to provide prompt, strategic response in FSO.

b. Organization. The future Modular Force requires the capability to provide Army, corps, and division HQs with improved capabilities to organize, direct, and synchronize ground force and sustainment flows with JF deployment in the context of a JOE, to provide strategic responsiveness in FSO.

c. Training and Leader Development

(1) The future Modular Force requires the capability to develop and implement enhanced deployment training opportunities in the context of a JOE, to provide prompt and sustained responsiveness in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to develop a force projection training strategy that includes PME, collective, and functional training programs in the context of a JOE, to provide operational maneuver from strategic distances in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to reinforce training through a comprehensive exercise plan that uses a building block approach in the context of a JOE, to provide strategic responsiveness in FSO.

(2) The future Modular Force requires the capability to create force projection futures labs networked to all installation power projection platforms in the context of a JOE, to provide operational maneuver from strategic distances in FSO.

d. Doctrine. The future Modular Force requires the ability evolve joint and Army deployment doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures in concert with the introduction of new capabilities for movement of forces from fort to port in the context of a JOE, to provide strategic responsiveness in FSO.

5-3. Port to ISB or Port to Port

This segment of the deployment chain moves forces and stocks from POEs to either intermediate staging bases of PODs located within the JOA. It includes POD capabilities in theater to receive, process, and support onward movement of arriving forces and stocks.

a. Materiel. The future Modular Force requires the capability for AAHSS in the context of a JOE, to provide prompt and sustained force projection in FSO. The future Modular Force

requires the capability of JHSV in the context of a JOE, to provide prompt and sustained force projection in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to reconfiguration LMSRs in the context of a JOE, to provide prompt and sustained force projection in FSO.

b. The future Modular Force requires the capabilities for rapid port enhancement and a light modular causeway system in the context of a JOE, to provide prompt and sustained force protection in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to develop theater airlift capable of self-deployment and refueling by air in the context of a JOE, to provide strategic responsiveness in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to perform at sea transfers and movement of forces and sustainment ashore in the context of the JOE, to provide sustained force projection and distributed support and sustainment in FSO.

5-4. Port/ISB to Staging Area or Forward Operating Base (FOB)

a. Under current practices for most forces, once unit sets, personnel, and supplies are delivered to ports or ISBs, they must be moved forward to staging areas or FOBs for full integration, prior to forward movement and employment. Today, from SPODs, that process relies very heavily on organic transportation downloaded in port and other surface means that may be obtained from local sources.

b. As personnel are most often deployed by strategic airlift (there are few options to move personnel on sealift), the availability and proximity of secured airfields to SPODs and the requirement to link those personnel with equipment and stocks arriving by sea requires considerable time and complex synchronization. Egress from overseas port facilities may be hampered due to immature infrastructure.

c. Materiel

(1) The future Modular Force requires the capability to move forces and stocks that are already fully integrated when they reach entry points in the context of the JOA, to provide prompt, strategic response in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability for intratheater lift with the ability to land and stop on unimproved surfaces and refuel in flight within the contest of the JOA, to provide prompt and sustained readiness and strategic responsiveness in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability for HLVTOL aircraft in the context of a JOE, to provide strategic responsiveness in FSO.

(2) The future Modular Force requires the capability to develop joint rapid airfield construction in the context of a JOA, to provide intratheater maneuver and strategic responsiveness.

d. Organization. The future Modular Force requires the capability to develop unit configured loads in the contest of a JOA, to provide distributed support and sustainment to the tactical level in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to collaborate with Army, joint, and defense agencies to generate the organizational structures, processes, and materiel needed to develop unit configured loads in the context of a JOE, to provide distributed support and sustainment to the tactical level in FSO.

e. Facilities. The future Modular Force requires the capability to evaluate locations to employ as intermediate staging bases (air and sea ports) within the context of a JOE, to provide distributed support and sustainment and strategic responsiveness in FSO.

5-5. Staging Areas to Objective Areas

a. This segment of the chain of projection completes the movement of forces and stocks to the areas of their actual employment or consumption. In the past, the Army has largely depended on surface distribution to close these distances to the tactical units. One continuing challenge that must be overcome in the future is ensuring that non-combat elements possess sufficient mobility enablers and situational awareness to keep pace with combat forces.

b. While it is reasonable to expect continuing reliance on surface transport as the primary means of distribution and maneuver, Army concepts forecast increasing reliance on airlift capabilities in the future, in order to provide expanded agility, versatility, and adaptability.

c. Materiel. The future Modular Force requires the capability to develop SSTOL or HLVTOL in the context of the JOE, to provide sustained and strategic responsiveness in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to conduct airdrop operations to deliver equipment directly to units in the context of the JOE, to provide sustained and strategic responsiveness in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to utilize the joint cargo aircraft for the delivery of small forces and sustainment packages in the context of a JOE, to provide sustained support and strategic responsiveness in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability for improved light and medium surface distribution transport with capabilities to maintain speed and operational tempo in the context of a JOE, to provide high-tempo, simultaneous, distributed operations in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to develop composite armors in the context of a JOE to provide force protection in FSO.

d. *Doctrine*. The future Modular Force requires the capability to evolve doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to capture new operational methods for sustaining the force in the context of a JOE, to provide distributed support and sustainment, and strategic responsiveness in FSO.

5-6. Capabilities Common to All Projection Segments

a. Materiel

(1) The future Modular Force requires the capability for enroute mission planning and rehearsal system to receive updates on the developing situation, interoperate with organic battle command systems, conduct mission planning and rehearsal, and maintain a common operating picture with forces already in theater in the context of a JOE, to provide strategic responsiveness in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to develop automated decision aids, planning tools, advanced modeling and simulation, and in-transit visibility in the context of a JOE, to provide strategic responsiveness and distributed support and sustainment in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability for a deployment system designed to minimize the

amount of data required to be transmitted in the context of a JOA, to provided prompt and sustained deployment and strategic responsiveness in FSO.

(2) The future Modular Force requires the capability to develop an APS program that incorporates future lift assets in the context of a JOE, to provide strategic responsiveness in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to reconfigure ships to meet pre-positioning afloat future requirements in the context of a JOE, to provide strategic responsiveness in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to adjust pre-positioning strategy, to include a review of what is contained within each APS, as new operational concepts and lift assets are incorporated in the context of a JOE, to provide strategic responsiveness in FSO.

b. Organization

(1) The future Modular Force requires the capability to organize, equip, and train home station operations centers in the context of a JOE, and back to provide force projection in FSO. Home station readiness activities and posture should become a standardized unit readiness metric. The ability of the home station (power projection platform) to support deployment is as critical as the readiness of the unit and should be reportable within the readiness reporting system.

(2) The future Modular Force requires the capability to redesign unit identification codes and the tables of organization and equipment to support capability packaged deployments and associated supply coding in the context of a JOE, to provide strategic responsiveness in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to rapidly pass information within the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System in the context of a JOE, to provide rapid force projection and strategic response in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to redesign Department of Defense Activity Address Codes to support multiple modular elements from the same unit at different locations in the context of a JOA, to provide strategic response and decisive operations in FSO.

(3) The future Modular Force requires the capability to develop deployment experts (movement officers and non-commissioned officers) in the context of a JOA, to provide strategic response in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to develop and utilize small teams with the ability to leverage space-based communication systems to react to changing priorities and maintain deployment momentum in the context of a JOE, to provide strategic response in FSO.

c. Organization and Materiel

(1) Mobility Support. Enabling theater access, providing assured mobility, and denying the enemy the ability to interfere with movement, are critical functions performed by combat support forces now and in the future. Required capabilities in these areas have been previously described in the Army's operating concepts.

(2) The future Modular Force requires the capability to improve immature mobility infrastructure in the context of a JOE, to provide assured mobility in FSO. The future Modular

force requires the capability to enhance mobility within urban and complex terrain in the context of a JOA, to provide theater access in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to eliminate hazards and obstacles, including those that hinder air operations in the context of a JOE, to provide assured mobility in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to prevent the adversary from impeding mobility and adversely shaping the terrain to create advantages in a JOE, to provide assured access and mobility in FSO.

(3) The future Modular Force requires the capability for highly responsive counter mobility support to fix, canalize, constrain, and block enemy forces and protect engaged units in a JOE, to provide assured access and mobility in FSO. The future Modular Force requires to capability to control displaced persons, refugees, and enemy prisoners of war in the context of the JOE, to provide force protection in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to bridge and breach obstacles in the context of a JOA, to enable theater access and provide assured mobility in FSO.

(4) The future Modular Force requires the capability to reduce weight and cube measurements across all classes of supply in the context of the JOE, to provide distributed support and sustainment and operational agility in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to simplify packaging and materiel handling, and increasing commonality in equipment and platform characteristics in a JOE, to provide distributed support and sustainment and operational agility in FSO.

(5) The future Modular Force requires the capability to link force projection research and development efforts and requirements more effectively with maneuver research and development in the context of a JOE, to provide force projection, force protection and strategic responsiveness in FSO. The future Modular Force requires the capability to improve the process for calling up and utilizing reservists in the context of a JOE, to provide strategic responsiveness in FSO.

Chapter 6
Conclusion

a. The operational consequences of future Modular Force concepts for adaptive power projection and operational maneuver from strategic distances, when enabled by the new capabilities cited above for theater operational agility, will have profound effects on the course and outcome of the joint campaign. The most important of the expected benefits include-

(1) More rapid introduction of forces in the prompt timeframe.

(2) Increased capability to achieve assured access.

(3) Reduced vulnerability to enemy counters; higher levels of active and passive force protection.

(4) Increased possibility of achieving operational surprise.

(5) Improvement in the level of simultaneous throughput enabling achievement of balanced force deployment and deployment momentum, that in turn closes the gap between entry and campaign forces and reduces the need for unplanned operational pauses.

(6) Immediate employment of deployed forces.

(7) More rapid seizure of the initiative with preclusive effects.

(8) Capability to act throughout the enemy's dispositions with strike and maneuver achieve disintegrative and dislocating effects.

(9) Increased capability to conduct and sustain simultaneous operations distributed within a non-linear battlespace.

(10) Presentation of a multidimensional threat to the enemy.

(11) Significantly higher versatility and adaptability to respond to opportunity or uncertainty.

(12) More rapid transition to decisive operations.

(13) Expanded capability to maintain overwhelming tempo.

b. The future operational environment will require the Army future Modular Force to respond rapidly from a strategic expeditionary posture for immediate employment in theater and movement throughout the depth of the JOA, in order to swiftly defeat the enemy. These desired move capabilities are necessary to insure that the future Modular Force remains ready and relevant to effectively meet future challenges.

Appendix A
References

Section I
Required Publications

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations.

JP 3-0
Joint Operations.

Joint Logistics (Distribution), Joint Integrating Concept.

The Joint Operational Environment, The World Through 2030 and Beyond.

Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-0
The Army in Joint Operations: The Army's Future Force Capstone Concept 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-1
The Army Operating Concept for Operating Maneuver 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pam525-3-2
The Army Operating Concept for Tactical Maneuver 2015-2024.

Section II
Related Publications

Distribution Operations for the Future Modular Force Concept Capability Plan.

Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept.

Force Application Joint Functional Concept.

Joint Forcible Entry Operations Joint Integrating Concept.

Major Combat Operations Joint Operations Concept.

Sea Base: Operational Independence for a New Century, Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore Jr., U.S. Navy and LTG Edward Hanlon JR., U.S. Marine Corps, January 2003.

TRADOC Pam 525-2-1
The United States Army Functional Concept for See 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-4
The United States Army Functional Concept for Strike 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-5
The United States Army Functional Concept for Protect 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pam 525-4-0
Maneuver Sustainment Operations for the Future Force.

TRADOC Pam 525-4-1
The United States Army Functional Concept for Sustain 2015-2024.

TRADOC White Paper on Joint Seabasing, the Army Perspective.

Appendix B
Assumptions

The preceding discussion of the *Move* concept is predicated on the following major assumptions. Should any of these assumptions be altered or not be in effect for some reason, the *Move* concept would require alteration.

- The current Army force development process and transformation campaign objectives will largely be achieved and will constitute a reasonable guide with respect to basic force structure in 2015.
- The Army will remain a hybrid force of light, medium, heavy, and special purpose forces in 2015 and beyond.
- Joint transformation will succeed in achieving its fundamental objectives.
- Advances in information systems ISR capabilities will enable higher levels of situational understanding in operations and more effective battle command.
- Modularization of Army forces will provide projected benefits with respect to force agility, tailorability, and mobility.
- Adversaries will not employ large scale use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear.
- Global stationing policy for U.S. Armed Forces will include a combination of CONUS, forward deployed, and forward presence forces.
- The U.S. will maintain capability to achieve air and maritime superiority in any theater.
- The war on terrorism will continue to impose operational requirements on the force to 2015 and beyond, with effects on both force availability and strategic lift requirements.
- The future OE will require frequent intervention by U.S. military forces.
- The U.S. will continue to be disadvantaged by compressed warning time.
- National policy on preemption will mature, not diminish, maintaining emphasis on prompt, joint expeditionary response.
- Access to areas of conflict will be widely challenged from theater to tactical level.
- U.S. intervention will be challenged by the low probability that the U.S. will ever have sufficient lift to satisfy all requirements.

Glossary

Section I
Abbreviations

AAHSS	austere access high speed airlift
AETF	air expeditionary task force
AFSB	afloat forward staging base
AIEP	Army Ideas for Excellence Program
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
APOE	air posts of embarkation
APS	Army pre-positioned stock
BCT	brigade combat team
C2	command and control
CJTF	combined joint task force
CONUS	continental United States
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities
EMPRS	en route mission planning and rehearsal system
FCS	future combat system
FDO	flexible deterrent options
FOB	forward operations base
GWOT	global war on terror
HLVTOL	heavy lift vertical take off and landing
HQ	headquarters
ISB	intermediate staging base
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
JDDE	joint deployment and distribution enterprise
JF	joint force
JFC	joint force commander
JFHQ	joint force headquarters
JHSV	joint high speed vessel
JIC	joint integrating concept
JLOTS	joint logistics over the shore
JOA	joint operations area
JOE	joint operational environment
JTF	joint task force
LMSR	large, medium speed roll-on/roll-off
MCO	major combat operations
NEO	non-combatant evacuation operation
POD	port of debarkation
POE	port of embarkation
RC	reserve component
ROMO	range of military operations

RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integrations
SOF	special operations forces
SPOD	sea port of debarkation
SPOE	sea port of embarkation
SSTOL	super short take off and landing
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRANSCOM	Transportation Command
U.S.	United States

Section II
Terms

10-30-30
The 2004 *Army Transformation Roadmap* defines 10-30-30 as a swiftness goal for strategic responsiveness of the Joint Force as a whole within the 1-4-2-1 framework. A Congressional Budget Office Study, *Options for Restructuring the Army*, May 2005, describes the swiftness goals. The "1-4-2-1 strategy," as discussed in the March 2005 *National Defense Strategy of the United States*, is defined as: 1-Defend the U.S. Homeland; 4-Operate in and from four forward regions to assure allies and friends, dissuade competitors, and deter and counter aggression and coercion; 2-Swiftly defeat adversaries in overlapping military campaigns while preserving for the President the option to call for a more decisive and enduring result in a single operation; and 1-Conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies.

aerial port
An airfield that has been designated for the sustained air movement of personnel and materiel as well as an authorized port for entrance into or departure from the country where located. (JP 1-02).

adversary
A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 3-0).

afloat pre-positioning operations
Pre-positioning of ships, preloaded with equipment and supplies (including ammunition and petroleum) that provides for an alternative to land-based programs. This concept provides for ships and onboard force support equipment and supplies positioned near potential crisis areas that can be delivered rapidly to joint airlifted forces in the operational area. Afloat pre-positioning in forward areas enhances a force's capability to respond to a crisis, resulting in faster reaction time. (JP 4-01.6).

afloat pre-positioning ships
Forward deployed merchant ships loaded with tactical equipment and supplies to support the initial deployment of military forces. (JP 4-01.2).

airdrop
The unloading of personnel or materiel from aircraft in flight. (JP 1-02).

airdrop platform
A base upon which vehicles, cargo, or equipment are loaded for airdrop. (JP 1-02).

antiterrorism
Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. (JP 3-07.2).

area of operations (AO)
An operational area defined by the JFC for land and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 3-0).

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive hazards
Those chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive elements that pose or could pose a hazard to individuals. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive hazards include those created from accidental releases, toxic industrial materials (especially air and water poisons), biological pathogens, radioactive matter, and high-yield explosives. Also included are any hazards resulting from the deliberate employment of weapons of mass destruction during military operations. (JP 3-07.2).

command and control
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission; also called C2. (DOD).

civil reserve air fleet
A program in which the DOD contracts for the services of specific aircraft, owned by a U.S. entity or citizen, during national emergencies and defense-oriented situations when expanded civil augmentation of military airlift activity is required. These aircraft are allocated, in accordance with Department of Defense requirements, to segments, according to their capabilities, such as international long-range and short range cargo and passenger sections, national (domestic and Alaskan sections) and aero-medical evacuation and other segments as may be mutually agreed upon by the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation. (JP 3-17).

combatant command
A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities**.** (JP 5-0).

commander's intent
A concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state. It may also include the commander's assessment of the adversary commander's intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. (JP 3-0).

common operational picture (COP)
A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. (JP 3-0).

counter precision and counter anti-access capabilities
Counter precision refers to U.S. capabilities that are employed to destroy or neutralize enemy capabilities to detect and engage friendly forces at will with precision fires. Counter anti-access refers to U.S. capabilities that are employed to destroy or neutralize enemy capabilities to deny access by air, land, or sea, such as the emplacement of sea mines, capability to contaminate entry points, and the like.

debarkation
The unloading of troops, equipment, or supplies from a ship or aircraft. (JP 1-02).

***Deploy=Employ* paradigm**
Force projection linked directly to campaign execution, delivering forces configured for immediate employment, and extending beyond the shoreline to forward areas to enable operational agility, which in turn supports the primary defeat mechanisms of destruction, dislocation, and disintegration.

deployment
1) In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach or contact disposition to a disposition for battle. 2) The movement of forces within operational areas. 3) The positioning of forces into a formation for battle. 4) The relocation of forces and materiel to desired operational areas. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental U.S., intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. (JP 4-0).

distribution
The operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistics system to deliver the ’right things‘ to the ’right place‘ at the ’right time,‘ to support the geographic combatant commander. Further to this definition, distribution employs a partnership of Army, joint, multi-national, interagency, (JMI), and commercial capabilities, to provide personnel, equipment and materiel from a source of supply to a point of use or consumption, which includes the last tactical mile, redistribution, redirection, and retrograde activities. Distribution is fully synchronized with the force deployment process and the battle plan, and includes the multidirectional flow of personnel, equipment and materiel, mode and node operations, container and materiel handling, and protective packaging. (JP 4-0).

embarkation
The process of putting personnel and/or vehicles and their associated stores and equipment into ships and/or aircraft. (JP 1-02).

employment
The strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces. (JP 5-0).

end state
The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (DOD).

footprint
The amount of personnel, spares, resources, and capabilities physically present and occupying space at a deployed location. (JP 1-02).

force projection
The ability to project the military element of national power from CONUS or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. Force projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment of forces to redeployment to CONUS or home theater. (DOD).

force protection
Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (JP 3-0).

forward operations base (FOB)
In special operations, a base usually located in friendly territory or afloat that is established to extend command and control or communications or to provide support for training and tactical operations. Facilities may be established for temporary or longer duration operations and may include an airfield or an unimproved airstrip, an anchorage, or a pier. A forward operations base may be the location of special operations component headquarters or a smaller unit that is controlled and/or supported by a main operations base. (JP 3-05.1).

home station
The permanent location of active duty units and Active Reserve units (for example, location of armory or reserve center**.** (JP 4-05).

intermediate staging base (ISB)
A temporary location used to stage forces prior to inserting the forces into the host nation. (JP 3-07.5).

intermodal
Type of international freight system that permits transshipping among sea, highway, rail, and air modes of transportation through use of American National Standards Institute and International Organization for Standardization containers, line-haul assets, and handling equipment. (JP 4-01.7).

intertheater
Between theaters or between the continental United States and theaters. (JP 1-02).

intertheater airlift
The common-user airlift linking theaters to CONUS and to other theaters as well as the airlift within the continental United States. The majority of these air mobility assets are assigned to the Commander, USTRANSCOM. Because of the intertheater ranges usually involved, intertheater airlift is normally conducted by the heavy, longer range, intercontinental airlift assets but may be augmented with shorter range aircraft when required. (JP 3-17).

in-transit visibility
The ability to track the identity, status, and location of DOD units, and non-unit cargo (excluding bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants) and passengers; patients; and personal property from origin to consignee or destination across the range of military operations. (JP 4-01.2).

intratheater
Within a theater. (JP 1-02).

intratheater airlift
Airlift conducted within a theater. Assets assigned to a geographic combatant commander or attached to a subordinate JFC normally conduct intratheater airlift operations. Intratheater airlift provides air movement and delivery of personnel and equipment directly into objective areas through air landing, airdrop, extraction, or other delivery techniques as well as the air logistic support of all theater forces, including those engaged in combat operations, to meet specific theater objectives and requirements. During large scale operations, USTRANSCOM assets may be tasked to augment intratheater airlift operations, and may be temporarily attached to a JFC. (JP 3-17).

joint
(DOD) Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more military departments participate.

joint force (JF)
A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more military departments operating under a single JFC. (DOD).

joint logistics over-the-shore operations (JLOTS)
Operations in which Navy and Army logistics over-the-shore forces conduct logistics over-the-shore operations together under a JFC. (JP 4-01.2).

joint operations
A general term to describe military actions conducted by JFs or by Service forces in relationships (for example, support, coordinating authority) which, of themselves, do not create JFs. (DOD).

joint operations area
An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. (JP 3-0).

liaison
That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (JP 3-08).

line of communications
A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move; also called LOC. (DOD).

maneuver
1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 3-0).

move
For the purposes of this concept move is defined as movement capabilities and processes that support strategic to tactical distribution and maneuver in the JOE.

nodes
Nodes are the points along the distribution network connected by lines of communication, and generally are of four different types: aerial ports and sea ports, which are in-transit nodes; maintenance, rebuild and assembly facilities, which are in-process nodes; storage and pre-positioning sites, which are in-storage nodes; and, use or consumption point, which is the customer node.

Non-governmental organizations
Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multi-national businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). (DOD).

operational environment
A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are as follows. (a) Permissive environment--Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. (b) Uncertain environment--Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. (c) Hostile environment--Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (DOD).

operational level of war
The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (DOD).

port of debarkation (POD)
The geographic point at which cargo or personnel are discharged. This may be a seaport or aerial port of debarkation; for unit requirements; it may or may not coincide with the destination. (JP 4-01.2).

port of embarkation (POE)
The geographic point in a routing scheme from which cargo or personnel depart. This may be a seaport or aerial port from which personnel and equipment flow to a port of debarkation; for unit and non-unit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the origin. (JP 4-01.2).

reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI)
A phase of force projection occurring in the operational area. This phase comprises the essential processes required to transition arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into forces capable of meeting operational requirements. (JP 4-01.8).

seabasing
Seabasing is the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary JFs without reliance on land bases within the JOA. These capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea. (Joint).

seaport
A land facility designated for reception of personnel or materiel moved by sea, and that serves as an authorized port of entrance into or departure from the country in which located. (JP 4-01.2).

Sea Shield
A Navy initiative that exploits global sea control to defeat area denial threats, extends precise and persistent naval defensive capabilities deep overland to protect joint forces and allies ashore, protects our nation at home, assure allies, deter adversaries, and generate operational freedom of action for the projection of naval and joint power.

situational understanding
The product of applying analysis and judgment to the common operational picture to determine the relationships among the factors of METT-TC.

strategic level of war
The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multi-national (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multi-national military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (DOD).

synchronization
1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operation plan. (JP 2-0).

tactical level of war
The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (DOD).

terrorism
The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (DOD).

theater distribution
The flow of personnel, equipment, and materiel within theater to meet the geographic combatant commander's missions. (JP 4-01.4).

theater distribution management
The function of optimizing the distribution networks to achieve the effective and efficient flow of personnel, equipment, and materiel to meet the combatant commander's requirements. (JP 4-01.4).

weapons of mass destruction
Weapons capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Weapons of mass effects are often used to include weapons, such as chemical and biological types, that may cause mass casualties without destruction of human life. (DOD).

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