| |
Search Options | |||
| Index | Site Map | FAQ | Facility Info | Reading Rm | New | Help | Glossary | Contact Us | |
|||
|
UNITED STATES
NRC REGULATORY ISSUE SUMMARY 2004-xx
All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensees, applicants for licenses, holders of certificates of compliance, and their contractors. INTENT Although not required by regulation, licensees and other employers subject to NRC authority are expected to establish and maintain a safety conscious work environment (SCWE, pronounced “squee”). The NRC is issuing this regulatory issue summary (RIS) to supplement guidance for fulfilling this expectation. The guidance describes a number of practices that may facilitate the efforts of licensees and others in developing and maintaining a SCWE. The NRC recognizes that some of the practices described in this document may not be practical for every licensee, depending on the existing work environment and/or the size, complexity, and hazards of the licensed activities. Although this RIS requires no action or written response, all NRC addressees are encouraged to review and consider the contents of this RIS when evaluating whether a SCWE exists at their facility. BACKGROUND INFORMATION In April 2000, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Executive Director of Operations chartered the Discrimination Task Group (DTG) to evaluate issues associated with matters covered by the NRC’s employee protection standards, including SCWE. The DTG recommendations were provided to the Commission in September 2002 in SECY-02-0166. In a March 26, 2003, staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-02-0166, the Commission directed the staff to take certain actions in the area of SCWE and safety culture, including providing the guidance herein. Regarding these two terms, SCWE and safety culture, there has been some confusion historically. Many use the terms interchangeably. They are, in fact, distinct, but related concepts. In the Commission’s January 24, 1989 “Policy Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear Power Operations,” safety culture is described as “the necessary full attention to safety matters” and “the personal dedication and accountability of all individuals engaged in any activity which has a bearing on the safety of nuclear power plants.” A strong safety culture is also often described as having a “safety-first focus.” Attributes include the principles of safety-over-production, procedural adherence, and conservative decisionmaking. The willingness of employees to identify safety concerns, i.e., SCWE, is also an important attribute of a strong safety culture. In July 1993, the agency reassessed the NRC’s program for protecting
allegers against retaliation. Retaliation is prohibited by NRC regulations
in Parts 19, 30, 40, 50, 60, 61, 63,
70, 72, 76, and 150. It was recommended that an agency policy be developed
to emphasize that licensees and their contractors are responsible for
achieving and maintaining a work environment which is conducive to the
reporting of concerns without fear of retaliation. In SRM-SECY-02-0166 the Commission directed the staff to develop further guidance, in consultation with stakeholders, that would identify “best practices” for encouraging a SCWE. The Commission indicated that the proposed guidance should emphasize training of managers on their obligations under the employee protection regulations and should make recommendations about the content of the training in this important area. In the 1996 policy statement, the NRC acknowledged that although the statement and principles, described therein, apply to all licensees and other employers subject to NRC authority, some of the suggestions, programs, or steps that might be taken to improve the quality of the work environment (e.g., establishment of a method to raise concerns outside of the normal management structure such as an employee concerns program) may not be practical for every licensee or other employer, depending on factors such as the number of employees, complexity of operations, potential hazards, and the history of allegations made to the NRC. Similar to the suggestions and principles in the 1996 policy statement, the practices described in this document may not be practical for every licensee, depending on the existing work environment and/or the size and complexity and hazards of the licensed activities. For example, some of the practices in this guidance document may not be applicable for very small licensees or other affected employers that have only a few employees and a very simple management structure. SUMMARY OF ISSUE An environment where employees feel free to raise safety concerns may
contribute to a reduced risk associated with licensed activities and
the use of radioactive materials. Attachment 1, “Establishing & Maintaining
a Safety Conscious Work Environment,” is provided as guidance to
licensees, applicants, and contractors on developing and maintaining
a SCWE in response to the Commission’s March 2003 directive. Current
industry guidance, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 97-05, “Nuclear
Power Plant Personnel - Employee Concerns Program - Process Tools In
a Safety Conscious Work Environment” (www.nei.org/documents/Nuclear_Employee_Concerns_Tools.pdf)
The NRC recognizes that some of the practices outlined in this guidance
may not be practicable or appropriate for every NRC licensee or contractor,
depending on the existing work environment, and/or the size or complexity
and the hazards of the licensed activities. In addition, practices not
included in this guidance may be equally effective in establishing and
maintaining a SCWE. The NRC staff emphasizes that licensees are responsible
for establishing and maintaining a SCWE and that implementation of the
guidance may not improve a SCWE without additional BACKFIT DISCUSSION This RIS requires no action or written response and is, therefore, not a backfit under 10 CFR 50.109, 70.76, 72.62, or 76.76. Consequently, the staff did not perform a backfit analysis. FEDERAL REGISTER NOTIFICATION A notice of opportunity for public comment on this RIS was published in the Federal Register (xx FR xxxxx) on {date}. Comments were received from {indicate the number of commentors by type}. The staff considered all comments that were received. The staff’s evaluation of the comments is publicly available through the NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) under Accession No. ML042800027. SMALL BUSINESS REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT FAIRNESS ACT OF 1996 The NRC has determined that this action is not subject to the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT This RIS does not request information collections and, therefore, is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). CONTACT Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate project manager or regional office.
Technical Contact: Lisamarie Jarriel, OE Attachment 1
BACKGROUND In July 1993, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Executive Director for Operations directed that a team reassess the NRC’s program for protecting allegers against retaliation. The team evaluated the process that was in place in 1993 and sought comments from other NRC offices, other Federal agencies, licensees, former allegers and the public. One recommendation from the 1993 effort was the development of an agency policy to emphasize that licensees and their contractors are expected to achieve and maintain a work environment which is conducive to the reporting of concerns without fear of retaliation.1 On May 14, 1996, the NRC issued a policy statement 2 to express the Commission’s expectation that licensees and other employers subject to NRC authority will establish and maintain safety-conscious environments in which employees feel free to raise safety concerns, both to their management and to the NRC, without fear of retaliation. Licensees, contractors, subcontractors, and other employers in the nuclear industry are responsible for maintaining a safety conscious work environment (SCWE). This policy statement is applicable to the NRC-regulated activities of all NRC licensees, certificate holders, and their contractors and subcontractors. In April 2000, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Executive Director for Operations chartered the Discrimination Task Group (DTG) to evaluate issues associated with matters covered by the NRC’s employee protection standards, including SCWE and SCWE training for managers - the subject of a petition for rulemaking, PRM-30-62, submitted on August 13, 1999. The DTG recommendations 3 were provided to the Commission in September 2002. In a March 26, 2003, staff requirements memorandum,4 the Commission directed the staff, in consultation with stakeholders, to develop further guidance that identifies best practices for encouraging a SCWE. On February 19, 2004, the staff met with stakeholders to discuss an expanded outline of best practices prepared by the staff based on the guidance contained in the 1996 policy statement. Comments on the outline were also solicited in a February 12, 2004 Federal Register notice. The comments that were received during the meeting and in response to the Federal Register notice were considered in preparing this guide. INTRODUCTION The guidance in this document is intended to supplement existing information that was communicated in the 1996 policy statement. The supplemental elements of a SCWE summarized in this document were developed using information obtained from reactive inspections of problematic licensee programs, reviews of successful progressive SCWE programs, and insights obtained during discussions with nuclear industry professionals, including individuals who provide training to the industry on the subject and attorneys who have represented licensees and whistleblowers in proceedings. The NRC recognizes that some of the practices outlined in this guidance may not be practicable or appropriate for every NRC licensee or contractor, depending on the existing work environment and/or the size, complexity and the hazards of the licensed activities. In addition, practices not included in this guidance may be effective in establishing and maintaining a SCWE. The NRC staff emphasizes that licensees are responsible for establishing and maintaining a SCWE and that implementation of this guidance may not improve a SCWE without additional efforts by site management. However, the NRC believes that the elements in this guidance could be helpful to NRC licensees and their contractors when developing or enhancing existing SCWE programs, or when attempting to identify and correct potential problems in a program. ELEMENTS OF A SAFETY CONSCIOUS WORK ENVIRONMENT Effective Processes for Problem Identification and Resolution Effective processes for problem identification and resolution are essential to ensuring the safe use of nuclear materials and operation of facilities. The following guidance discusses attributes of the work environment that encourage individuals to look for and articulate safety concerns and effectively and efficiently address and resolve the concerns. The approach taken to develop the SCWE and to implement the appropriate processes described below will depend on several factors, including the size of the licensee, applicant, or contractor. A. Employees are Encouraged to Raise Safety Concerns
B. Management Is Promptly Notified of Concerns
C. Concerns Are Promptly Prioritized and Reviewed Safety should be a primary factor in the concern prioritization scheme and in For significant conditions adverse to quality, the evaluation should be sufficient to identify the root and contributing causes of the issue. In addition, the root cause analysis should address both the extent of the condition and the cause of the issue. D. Concerns Are Appropriately Resolved Timeliness of the corrective actions should be commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. Processes should be in place to ensure that appropriate actions are taken in response to all conditions adverse to quality. For significant conditions adverse to quality, corrective actions should be taken to address the root causes, contributing causes, and the extent of the condition caused by the identified concern. E. Timely Feedback Is Provided To The Concerned Individual Timely feedback should be provided at appropriate points during the concern resolution process. The individual receiving the information may need to discuss the concern with the employee raising the concern in order to understand the issue and its safety significance. Additional feedback may be necessary during the evaluation when it is apparent that resolution may take longer than anticipated. When the evaluation is complete, it is important to followup with the concerned employee to share proposed actions to address the issue, if appropriate. The most effective feedback process is one which is sufficiently flexible to permit a concerned employee who wants anonymity to obtain feedback. F. Appeal Process For Concerns An appeal process to ensure that issues were thoroughly addressed (e.g., differing professional opinion or alternative dispute resolution processes) can provide added assurance that concerns are appropriately resolved. G. Self-Assessments Of Problem Identification & Resolution (PI&R) Processes It is a good practice to periodically evaluate the adequacy and timeliness of responses, as well as the satisfaction of the concerned individual with the response and process. In addition, a self-assessment should address whether employees feel free to raise issues using the various processes employed by the licensee and whether these processes are viewed as effective, and why or why not. An assessment should include an appraisal of the effectiveness of the root cause analyses for significant issues and the effectiveness of associated corrective actions. Management should have a plan to promptly review the findings of such self-assessments and implement appropriate corrective actions. H. An Alternative Process To Line Management To address the situation where an individual wishes to raise a concern to someone other than their management or through the corrective action program, an alternative process, such as an employee concerns program, can be useful. Given the nature of many of the issues one may wish to raise outside of line management, such a process should ensure identity protection and/or anonymity to the extent appropriate. Such an alternative process should be accessible in multiple ways (e.g., walk-ins, hot lines, drop boxes) to the extent practical, given the size of the organization. In considering the physical location of the personnel operating the alternative process, one should consider both their accessability to the workforce and their visibility. An overly visible office may not allow discreet visits. Personnel training programs, advertising posters, and facility news articles help provide notification of the process. Like concerns brought to the corrective action program, concerns brought to the alternative program must receive appropriate operability and reportability reviews and be properly prioritized using safety as a primary factor for determining the breadth, depth, and timeliness of the evaluation. While independent from line organizations involved in the concerns, the process is most effective if the personnel doing the evaluations are directly accountable to senior management. Senior management provides appropriate support and resources, including staffing and access to necessary documents and materials to conduct inspections. The process should provide timely feedback on the status and resolution of concerns and status reports to senior management with analyses of program data and observations. Tools To Assess the SCWE Information gathered from the following tools should be considered for program enhancements, training enhancements, coaching and counseling opportunities, organizational changes, and survey topic suggestions. As with the processes for problem identification and resolution, discussed above, the choice of tools and their usefulness will depend on several factors, including the size of the licensee, applicant, or contractor, and the complexity and hazards of the licensed activities. A. Lessons Learned Evaluations It may be useful to periodically evaluate information from pertinent organizations and processes which may contribute to or negatively affect the SCWE to identify enhancements or adjustments to the organizations and processes. The organizations and processes with pertinent information may include the primary process for raising concerns (e.g., correction action program), an alternative process for raising concerns (e.g., employee concerns program, or ombudsman), human resources (regarding work environment concerns, etc.), legal counsel (regarding Department of Labor files, etc.), and/or regulatory affairs (regarding NRC findings or observations). Discussions about specific documentation or events should take into consideration privacy and attorney- client restrictions. Lessons learned from external organizations can also be useful. B. Benchmarking Participation in applicable industry forums or peer-group assessments of other SCWE programs where ideas and practices are exchanged and various SCWE elements compared can also provide valuable insights.C. Performance Indicators Parameters that help indicate the effectiveness of the SCWE training and problem identification and resolution processes should be identified and monitored. For example, the number and trend of NRC allegations (available only for large licensees) compared to the number and trend of internally raised concerns may be an indication of employee willingness to raise concerns internally. Similarly, the percent of anonymous concerns raised may indicate employee willingness to raise concerns without fear of retaliation. Licensee effectiveness in preventing retaliation claims may be indicated by the number and trend of NRC retaliation allegations (available only for large licensees) compared to the number and trend of internally raised retaliation concerns. The percent of employees with a questioning attitude and a willingness and ability to raise safety concerns may be indicated by comparing the number of risk-significant concerns that are self-revealed, self-identified, or externally identified by INPO, NRC, OSHA, etc., to the total number of concerns. Finally, the backlog and age of concerns may indicate the effectiveness of processes for resolving concerns. No single indicator is sufficient in itself to identify weaknesses in the SCWE, nor are there absolute measurements that indicate an unhealthy environment. Nonetheless, monitoring the trends in various characteristics of the SCWE with performance indicators like those mentioned above may provide insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the SCWE at a site. D. Survey and Interview Tools Survey instruments and interview questionnaires implemented by organizations independent of the groups being surveyed or interviewed can be useful tools and complement other tools used to assess the SCWE. Space should be provided on surveys for written comments. Survey or interview followup action plans should be developed to address findings that are specific to work groups or generic to the facility. In addition, management should commit to share the results with the workforce and share action plans to address findings. The results of a surveys or interviews may indicate employee beliefs, attitudes, and satisfaction with key SCWE attributes, as well as ways to improve the SCWE. E. Direct Observations Direct observations of individuals’ behavior provides information regarding the effectiveness of any SCWE training. Management behaviors observed may indicate whether a supervisor is receptive to concerns and supports and rewards employees for raising concerns. Direct observation of employees in the work environment can provide valuable insights into the employees’ questioning attitude and willingness to challenge perceived unsafe behavior. F. Exit Interviews And Surveys Exit interviews and surveys, conducted to facilitate the identification of safety issues from exiting employees, provide an opportunity to capture concerns an individual may not have been comfortable raising while working at the facility. These activities should include followup mechanisms for exiting employees who want to be informed of the resolution of their concerns. Employees’ identities should be protected. G. 360-Degree Appraisals Consideration should be given to the implementation of a “360-degree” appraisal Improving Licensee Contractor Awareness Of SCWE Principles The Commission’s longstanding policy is to hold its licensees
responsible for compliance with A. Communicating Licensee SCWE Expectations To Contractors Licensee SCWE expectations of contractor responsibilities as they relate to creating and maintaining a SCWE should be communicated to contractors providing components, equipment, materials, or other goods and services related to NRC-regulated activities. It should be the licensee’s expectation that the contractors and their subcontractors are aware of applicable regulations. Furthermore, a licensee may want to communicate to its contractors and subcontractors that the licensee expects them to demonstrate that either an effective program exists that prohibits discrimination against contractor employees for engaging in protected activity and fosters a SCWE, or they adopt and comply with the licensee’s SCWE program for their employees. B. Licensee Oversight Of Contractor SCWE Activities Aside from communicating its SCWE-related expectations to their contractors, licensees may wish to oversee contractor SCWE-related activities. Such oversight may include:
C. Licensee Management Involvement In Contractor Cases Of Alleged Discrimination Given that the SCWE is most challenged when changes are made to the employment conditions of the workforce, it can be very beneficial to licensees to monitor such changes when proposed or executed by the contractor. Licensee oversight in this area might include evaluating contractor processes for making changes to employment conditions, such as disciplinary policies or reduction-in-force plans, to ensure the processes are well-defined, defensible, and communicated to the workforce in advance of their implementation. Finally, contractor changes to employment conditions that are alleged to be or are likely to be perceived as retaliatory should be reviewed to ensure the changes are not retaliatory or would otherwise effect the SCWE adversely. D. Contractor SCWE Training Contractor SCWE training can be provided by the contractor or licensee. As with the training given to licensee employees, the contractor training should cover the laws, regulations, and policies underlying the licensee’s SCWE expectations; the licensee’s governing SCWE policy; the avenues available to contractor staff to raise concerns; and the licensee’s expectations for contractor management and employee behavior regarding raising safety concerns. The contractor training should also include an explanation of licensee contractual rights to oversee the contractor’s SCWE. Training should be conducted during business hours. Involvement of Senior Management In Employment Actions Management should ensure that programs and processes involving changes to employment conditions, such as disciplinary policies or reductions-in-force plans, are well-defined, defensible, and communicated to the workforce prior to their implementation. An effective way for senior licensee management to prevent retaliatory actions by their supervisory staff is to review proposed employment actions, such as those above an oral reprimand, before the actions are taken to determine whether any of the factors of retaliation are present. The factors of retaliation are as follows:
Senior management review of such employment actions should ensure that programs or processes are being followed to ensure actions are well-founded and nonretaliatory. In addition, the review should ensure that the proposed action comports with normal practice within the limits allowed by the defined process and is consistent with actions taken previously. The review should assess whether the supervisor requesting the action exhibits any sign of unnecessary urgency. The employee’s prior performance assessments and the proposed action should be consistent or inconsistencies should be justified and documented. Finally, an assessment should be done to determine what, if any, effect the employment action may have on the SCWE. If management determines that the action, despite its legitimacy, could be perceived as retaliatory by the workforce, mitigating actions should be considered to minimize potential chilling effects on raising safety issues. Such mitigating actions may include (1) the use of holding periods during which the proposed employment action is held in abeyance while further evaluations are completed; (2) communicating with the workforce about the action being taken, with appropriate consideration of privacy rights; (3) reiterating the SCWE policy; and (4) explaining the action to the affected employee(s) and clearly articulating the nonretaliatory basis for the action. After an employment action is taken, management should initiate a review of the facts and, if warranted, reconsider the action that was taken. If retaliation is alleged, the licensee should assure that the appropriate level of senior management is involved in efforts to minimize a potential chilling effect that the employment action may have on raising safety issues. Definitions Adverse action - An action initiated by the employer that detrimentally affects the employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Such actions include but are not limited to termination, demotion, denial of a promotion, lower performance appraisal, transfer to a less desirable job, and denial of access.Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) - Refers to a number of processes, such as mediation and facilitated dialogues, that can be used to assist parties in resolving disputes. Corrective action program (CAP) - A formal system for issues that may require remedial action that are raised by employees that tracks issues from their identification through evaluation and resolution. The issues are usually prioritized according to the relative safety significance. Differing professional opinion (DPO) - A formal alternative process which provides an avenue of appeal for an employee to disagree with a position taken by management. Employee concerns program (ECP) - An alternative process to line management
and the CAP for employees to seek an impartial review of safety concerns.
Many ECPs handle a variety of concerns and may act as brokers seeking
resolution on behalf of the employees. Hostile work environment - An intentional discriminatory work environment that is either pervasive and regular or acute but severe and detrimentally affects the employee because of protected activity. Memorandum of understanding (MOU) - A written agreement which describes how organizations, offices, or agencies will cooperate on matters of mutual interest and responsibility. Performance indicators (PI) - A series of predetermined measured items which usually provide managers with insight into what may be occurring within an organization and give an early sign of problems that, if acted upon, could relieve stress within an organization. Protected activity - Includes initiating or testifying in an NRC or DOL proceeding regarding issues under the NRC’s jurisdiction, documenting nuclear safety concerns, the internal or external expression of nuclear safety concerns, and refusing to engage in any practice made illegal under the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy Reorganization Act if the employee has identified the alleged illegality to the employer. Safety conscious work environment (SCWE) - An environment in which employees are encouraged to raise safety concerns both to their own management and to the NRC without fear of retaliation. 1. Reassessessment of the NRC's Program for Protecting Allegers Against Retaliation," NUREG 1499, January 1994. 2. Policy Statement for Nuclear Employees Raising Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation," Federal Register Notice May 14, 1996, (Volume 61, Number 94). 3. SECY-02-0166, "Policy Options and Recommendations for Revising the NRC's Process for Handling Discrimination Issues," September 12, 2002. 4. Staff Requirements - SECY-02-0166 - "Policy Options and Recommendations for Revising The NRC's Process for Handling Discrimination Issues", March 26, 2003. |
|
Privacy Policy |
Site Disclaimer |
contains
elements that are important to establishing and maintaining a SCWE as
well, and complements the guidance provided by this RIS. However, NEI
97-05 primarily focuses on establishing an effective employee concerns
program (ECP), an alternative process for reporting safety concerns.
Attachment 1 addresses SCWE more broadly as it applies to all problem
identification and resolution processes.