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13 March 2008
Amb. Rocca Discusses U.S. Expectations for Conference on Disarmament
Ask America webchat transcript, March 12
Ambassador Christina B. Rocca, U.S. representative to the Conference on Disarmament, answers questions in a March 12 webchat on the U.S. goals and expectations for the 2008 Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland.
Following is the transcript:
(begin transcript)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Bureau of International Information Programs
Ask America Webchat Transcript
Ambassador Christina Rocca: 2008 Conference on Disarmament
Guest: Christina Rocca
Date: March 12, 2008
Time 11:00 a.m. EDT (1500 GMT, 1600 Geneva)
Moderator: Welcome to our webchat on the 2008 Conference on Disarmament (CD). The webchat will take place on March 12. We welcome your questions now or during the live event.
Welcome to today's discussion with Ambassador Christina Rocca. You may begin sending in your questions now. We ask that you submit each question separately. We do see your questions coming in. Thank you!
Members of the press are kindly asked to identify their affiliation when submitting questions.
Ambassador Christina Rocca: Welcome to today’s web chat.
The United States has been and remains a supporter of the CD. It is the sole international forum to negotiate multilateral arms control treaties, and as such has a special place in the international community.
In 2008 our goal is for the CD to get to work. We have stated this before and we state it again. We want this body to be a leader in negotiating arms control agreements that strengthen international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.
We have seen considerable progress in the CD over the past two years in terms of advancing an agenda and nearing approval of a program of work. We are not there yet, but almost.
The United States has shown considerable flexibility in the last two years to advance this effort, and we remain fully committed to the proposal, officially known as L.1, that has almost complete support in the CD. In fact, only three countries opposed it last year.
In short, L.1 proposes that the CD begin negotiations, without preconditions, on an FMCT. It also proposes beginning substantive discussions on three other issues that the CD has identified as meriting closer scrutiny. We support this. We support beginning open discussions on an FMCT in which any issue can be negotiated. This is the best basis for negotiations, i.e. without mandating any specific results ahead of time.
An FMCT is a non-proliferation and disarmament measure that enhances international security. It is time to begin negotiations now.
As the United States continues to push hard to advance the CD, we have not been idle in advancing the disarmament agenda. As is well known, in 2004, President Bush announced that the U.S would dramatically reduce its stockpile of nuclear weapons: in 2012, the U.S. planned to have only one-half as many weapons as it had in 2001 – reaching the lowest level since the Eisenhower Administration in the 1950s.
Just last December, the President announced that we reached that goal by the end of 2007 – five years ahead of schedule – and he directed an additional 15 percent cut in our overall stockpile.
I will be happy to take your questions.
Question [colin1999]: What does the U.S. seek to accomplish in the conference on disarmament?
Answer [Ambassador Christina Rocca]: The United States would like to see the CD get back to work. The role of the Conference is to negotiate multilateral arms control treaties, and the United States will continue to seek a mandate for the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). That has been the issue the most ripe for negotiations for years and continues to enjoy the support of almost all members of the CD. The United States seeks consensus to negotiate such a treaty as soon as possible. We would like to make the Conference as substantive and productive as possible, and keep it relevant.
We have the honor this year of being one of the 6 Presidents of the CD (P6). We have good working relations with the other 5 Presidents and hope to build on this cooperation, on the momentum and good work of the P6 Presidencies in 2006 and 2007, to get over the final hurdles that are preventing the CD from getting to work.
Q [colin1999]: Why does the U.S. oppose a treaty to prevent weapons in space?
A [Ambassador Christina Rocca]: The issue of space has been and remains of the utmost importance to the United States. We not only take our treaty obligations seriously, but make every effort to be as transparent as possible in our space actions. We have consistently stated and we continue to believe that in addition to the existing treaty regime covering outer space activities it is transparency of actions by space-faring nations that can make the single most important contribution to strengthening security and cooperation in outer space.
U.S. national security space policy is best characterized by continuity across many years and Presidential administrations. Continuity includes the U.S. commitment to basic principles first advanced by the United States at the outset of the Space Age, including our support for the Outer Space Treaty and other elements of international law, which we believe provide the legal authority to respond to the emerging challenges of the Twenty-First Century.
Another area where the U.S. is continuing on an established course is our opposition to new binding space arms control agreements. It is our persistent position that the existing space-related legal regime is sufficient to guarantee the right of all nations for access to, and operations in, space. This international legal regime includes the four “core” space treaties: the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1968 Rescue Agreement, the 1972 Liability Convention and the 1974 Registration Convention.
In contrast, the United States is considering initiatives based on our long-standing support for voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures, commonly referred to as TCBMs. We have repeatedly noted in multilateral forums that some new TCBMs, implemented on a voluntary basis, have the potential to enhance satellite safety and reduce uncertainty in an evolving space security environment. We therefore continue to welcome opportunities with all spacefaring nations for TCBMs. However, the United States approach is not to tie pragmatic TCBMs to proposals for space arms control treaties.
Q [Abraham_Lincoln]: I tend to think that, for the purpose of achieving long term international disarmament, it is important for each nation to make defense budget more transparent and to facilitate more democratic civilian control over the military because transparency and democratic accountability would in turn contribute to mutual trust among nations. However, in some countries, defense budgets are not transparent at all. In some countries, national legislatures do not have effective oversight power over the defense budgets or defense policies.
Thus, I am wondering whether it is possible for Geneva Conference on Disarmament or any international disarmament conferences to endorse proposals or recommendations that each nation should make defense budget more transparent and facilitate more democratic civilian control over the military. Have any such proposals or recommendations ever already been made? How would be the prospects and effectiveness of such proposals or recommendations? I would appreciate it if you would kindly provide your advice.
A [Ambassador Christina Rocca]: The United States is one of the most, if not the most, transparent countries in the world in terms of transparency in its budget, including its military budget. The United States Government has a constitutional responsibility and requirement to report its expenditures to its elected representatives and to the American people. That is the nature of our democracy. We strongly support transparency and urge all countries to seek to enhance the transparency of their budgets. Transparency not only strengthens a country’s democratic institutions, it enhances mutual understanding among countries and builds confidence among nations, thus generating greater stability. What we're trying to achieve when we talk about transparency is greater mutual understanding of strategic intent, greater mutual understanding of how specific capabilities are tied to strategic objectives.
Moderator: You can read several articles on Arms Control and International Security in our eJournal, found at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0207/ijpe/ijpe0207.htm.
Q [GlobalPeace]: Good Afternoon Ambassador, how do you respond to the call by some former American Secretaries of State to discard any existing operational plans for massive attacks that still remain from Cold war days?
A [Ambassador Christina Rocca]: We are indeed moving away from the Cold War days. From the first days of this administration, President Bush has directed that we move away from Mutual Assured Destruction as the basis of our deterrence policy, recognizing that deterrence based on the threat of retaliation alone is inadequate to address today’s threats.
Q [Elena Hushbeck]: In your welcoming remarks, you mention the progress in US disarmament efforts--Some have suggested that the NWS must do a better job of imparting this information to other governments and civil society. To that end, it appears that many are appreciative of the recent efforts by some NWS to increase transparency regarding their disarmament accomplishments (Mr. D'Agostino's presentation being the most recent example) However, could you shed some light on why the US or other NWS do not seem willing to provide this same information in any sort of structured or ritualized way?
A [Ambassador Christina Rocca]: We cannot speak for the other nuclear-weapons states, but we certainly encourage greater transparency from those who have not shown the same degree of openness. If you go to our web site you can see Mr. D'Agostino's full presentation. The link is: http://geneva.usmission.gov/CD/.
Q [Wade Boese]: Dear Ambassador Rocca, as part of the U.S.-Indian civil nuclear cooperation proposal, India pledged to support fissile material cutoff treaty negotiations. Could you please clarify whether India currently supports the U.S. proposed fissile material cutoff treaty draft?
A [Ambassador Christina Rocca]: Wade, thanks for the question. We work very closely with the Indian delegation here in Geneva and I would refer you to the Indian delegation itself for full details on its current positions at the CD. As you can understand, it would not be appropriate for one government to speak for another.
Moderator: For more information on the National Nuclear Security Administration, visit http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/.
Q [Wade Boese]: Dear Ambassador Rocca, A key goal of a proposed fissile material cutoff treaty has been to cap the accumulation of fissile material in South Asia. India and Pakistan, as well as most other countries, support negotiations on an “effectively verifiable” fissile material cutoff treaty, but the United States opposes such a formulation. While the United States argues negotiating verification measures would prolong negotiations, isn’t it the case that the current U.S. position is postponing the start of those negotiations and, thereby, permitting the additional accumulation of bomb-making material in India and Pakistan?
A [Ambassador Christina Rocca]: On the contrary, our views on "an effectively verifiable" FMCT are well-known. That said, we are prepared for negotiations on an FMCT without any preconditions. This flexibility facilitates the start of negotiations. It is our view that others are hiding behind certain issues to postpone negotiations. The U.S. has made it clear that we want the CD to move forward.
Q [Abu Morgan]: How will the US-India nuclear deal affect the CD? Aren't you just contributing to greater proliferation by pursuing this cooperative program?
A [Ambassador Christina Rocca]: On balance, we believe this is a good agreement for non-proliferation. It brings India formally into the international non-proliferation effort and it adds to the overall non-proliferation effort in the world as well.
Moderator: The State Department has produced an eJournal titled "Today’s Nuclear Equation," which can be found at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0305/ijpe/ijpe0305.htm.
Q [Naomi.w]: Why is an FMCT important? What is an FMCT?
A [Ambassador Christina Rocca]: Naomi, thank you for this question. The United States supports the achievement of a normative fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) that would prohibit production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
An FMCT is a disarmament measure as well as a nonproliferation measure. Many countries have called for states possessing nuclear weapons to make concessions to take steps to promote the security of non-nuclear weapons states. FMCT is just such a measure. An FMCT would create a new obligation for states that possess nuclear weapons.
Put simply, the first step toward disarmament is for everyone to stop doing what they are doing. Some states have. The United States, as well as some others, have long since stopped producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. In view of the existing stated support for FMCT, we believe that all states should adhere to such a moratorium, pending conclusion of a treaty.
An FMCT adds a valuable element to the existing arms control regime by codifying the voluntary moratoria on production of fissile material being observed by four nuclear weapons states, and would create a new norm for other states possessing nuclear weapons.
FMCT would not, however, make any new demands on NPT non-nuclear states. Those states are already obliged not to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes.
Pending the commencement of such negotiations, the United States calls on all states which have not done so to join us in observing a moratorium on production of such material and maintain it pending entry into force of an FMCT.
Moderator: While waiting for our next response, you may wish to visit the Peace and Security webpage on America.gov, available at http://fpolicy.america.gov/fpolicy/security/index.html.
Q [GlobalPeace]: Why will the US not ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)?
A [Ambassador Christina Rocca]: The United States continues to observe its nuclear testing moratorium and encourages other states not to test. We have no plans to conduct a nuclear explosive test. The Stockpile Stewardship program continues to ensure the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons.
The U.S. Senate did not give its consent to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) because of concerns with the ability to verify other nations’ compliance with the terms of the treaty. The Bush Administration continues to oppose this treaty for these and other concerns and will not pursue ratification of the Treaty.
The United States continues to support, as appropriate, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission working groups and the Provisional Technical Secretariat on International Monitoring System (IMS) and IMS-related activities.
Q [Naimat Ullah Khan: LC Karachi]: Ms. Rocca, Can you please tell us what role the United States is playing in Arm control & disarmament? & what has been done by the US in this regard upto this moment?
A [Ambassador Christina Rocca]: President Bush has always made international security one of his top priorities, and arms control and non-proliferation are fundamental to that effort. The United States firmly believes that the Conference on Disarmament is important because it is the sole international body for the negotiation of multilateral arms control treaties, it operates by consensus, and it has a vital role to play in advancing the cause of arms control and non-proliferation.
There are critically important issues directly relating to disarmament and nonproliferation at the CD. The one the US thinks holds the most likelihood to negotiate (this is after all a negotiating forum) is the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).
Other important topics are discussed as well and disarmament is one of them. The US has made enormous strides in this area. President Bush has taken unprecedented steps not only to reduce our nuclear arsenal, but also to work with other countries, especially Russia, to help them reduce theirs. The President recently announced that the United States has not only reached its ambitious goal of reducing our nuclear arsenal by 50 per cent, but we did it several years ahead of schedule. Moreover, the President announced that we will not stop there and will move further by reducing our nuclear arsenal by another 15 per cent by 2012.
As for helping other countries, let me give you one small example. The United States has given billions of dollars in assistance to Russia not only to help it dismantle its nuclear weapons safely, but also to provide meaningful employment to thousands of employees in its nuclear complex.
In other areas, the United States is a leader in destroying land mines and excess small arms and light weapons and is working to achieve consensus on multilateral agreements to restrict weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. We have the world’s most stringent and transparent laws governing the trade in arms and ammunition and are prepared to help interested countries implement similar effective laws, the single most important way to keep arms out of the hands of terrorists.
These are just a few of the many ways the United States is a leader in this field.
Q [Kuba]: What about China? Does China join this conference? Will China help with N Korea?
A [Ambassador Christina Rocca]: Yes, China is a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Moderator: To learn more about the Proliferation Security Initiative, visit http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/proliferation/
Q [Victoria Samson]: Ambassador Rocca, how do you think last month's interception of USA-193 with an adapted interceptor from the U.S. sea-based missile defense system will affect international discussion of appropriate "rules of the road" by space-faring nations? How did you address the incident in the Conference on Disarmament?
A [Ambassador Christina Rocca]: The interception last month of the out-of-control U.S. satellite was a unique case, which succeeded in avoiding a potential humanitarian incident that could have resulted from the re-entry of the satellite with an intact and full tank of highly corrosive rocket fuel. In the Conference on Disarmament, I provided a steady stream of timely and accurate information on our intentions and actions, throughout the operation and afterwards.
Q [Bemmer: What is your view on the how to manage the risks of the nuclear fuel cycle?
A [Ambassador Christina Rocca]: The United States, together with a number of other states, are working together to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology, which poses a serious challenge to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
In order to allow the world to safely enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy without adding to the danger of nuclear proliferation, the United States and others are working with the IAEA to establish a mechanism to provide even more reliable access to the market for nuclear fuel as an alternative to sensitive fuel cycle activities.
The United States is also already processing 17 tons of highly enriched uranium excess to our defense needs into low enriched uranium for reactor fuel to support fuel supply assurances.
Moderator: Unfortunately, that is all the questions we have time for today, and the webchat is now closed. We wish to thank Ambassador Rocca for joining us today.
A full transcript of today's webchat will be available on our Ask America homepage usually within one business day.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
