Supreme Court - Sliplists, 546 U. S., Part 1

546 U. S., Part 1

Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U. S. 1 (2005) (per curiam)

R001; No. 04-8384; 10/11/05. Petitioner's federal prosecutorial misconduct claim was properly raised in state court for purposes of federal habeas, and his federal habeas petition presented that claim with more than sufficient particularity.

Schriro v. Smith, 546 U. S. ___ (2005) (per curiam)

R002; No. 04-1475; 10/17/05. In commanding the Arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve respondent's claim that his mental retardation made him ineligible for the death penalty, the Ninth Circuit exceeded its habeas authority because the State had not had a chance to apply its chosen procedures for adjudicating such mental retardation claims.

Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U. S. ___ (2005) (per curiam)

R003; No. 04-1538; 10/31/05. Because Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806, which establishes a Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, does not imply a pro se defendant's right to access a law library, the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that violation of a library access right is a basis for federal habeas relief.

Eberhart v. United States, 546 U. S. ___ (2005) (per curiam)

R004; No. 04-9949; 10/31/05. Because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 33 is a claim-processing, rather than jurisdictional, rule, the Government forfeited its defense that petitioner's untimely memorandum could not support his new trial motion when it did not raise the defense until after the District Court had reached the merits of petitioner's claim.

IBP, Inc., v. Alvarez, 546 U. S. ___ (2005)

R005; No. 03-1238; 11/8/05. In these cases, the time employees spend walking between changing and production areas and the time they spend waiting to doff their protective gear is compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, but �a)(2) of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 excludes from the FLSA's scope the time they spend waiting to don the first piece of gear.

United States v. Olson, 546 U. S. ___ (2005)

R006; No. 04-759; 11/8/05. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States waives sovereign immunity only where local law would make a "private person" liable in tort, 28 U. S. C. �46(b)(1), not where local law would make "a state or municipal entity" liable.

Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U. S. ___ (2005)

R007; No. 04-698; 11/14/05. In an administrative hearing under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act challenging a school district's "individualized education program" for a disabled child, the burden of persuasion is properly placed upon the party seeking relief, whether that is the child or the school district.

Maryland v. Blake, 546 U. S. ___ (2005) (per curiam)

R008; No. 04-373; 11/14/05. Certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted.

Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U. S. ___ (2005) (per curiam)

R009; No. 05-101; 11/28/05. The Sixth Circuit erred in holding that respondent was entitled to habeas relief on the alternative grounds (1) that transferred intent was not a permissible theory for aggravated felony murder under Ohio law and (2) that respondent's trial counsel's performance had been constitutionally deficient under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668.

Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, 546 U. S. ___ (2005)

R010; No. 04-712; 11/29/05. Defendants may remove an action from state to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship if there is complete diversity between all named plaintiffs and all named defendants, and no defendant is a citizen of the forum State. It is not incumbent on the named defendants to negate the existence of a potential defendant whose presence in the action would destroy diversity.

Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U. S. ___ (2005)

R011; No. 04-631; 12/6/05. Because Kansas' motor fuel tax is a nondiscriminatory tax imposed on off-reservation receipt of fuel by non-Indian distributors, the tax is valid and poses no affront to respondent Nation's sovereignty, even though those distributors subsequently deliver the fuel to the Nation's gas station on the reservation. The interest-balancing test set forth in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, does not apply to a tax that results from an off-reservation transaction between non-Indians.

Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U. S. ___ (2005)

R012; No. 04-1140; 12/7/05. Absent unusual circumstances, attorney's fees should not be awarded in an order remanding a case to state court under 28 U. S. C. �47(c) when the party who previously removed the case to federal court had an objectively reasonable basis for doing so.

Lockhart v. United States, 546 U. S. ___ (2005)

R013; No. 04-881; 12/7/05. The United States may offset Social Security benefits to collect a student loan debt that has been outstanding for over 10 years.

United States v. Georgia, 546 U. S. ___ (2006)

R014; No. 04-1203; 1/10/06. Insofar as Title II of the Americans with Disability Act of 1990 creates a private cause of action for damages against States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.

Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U. S. ___ (2006)

R015; No. 04-905; 1/10/06. A manufacturer may not be held liable for secondary-line price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act in the absence of a showing that the manufacturer discriminated between dealers competing to resell its product to the same retail customer. The Act centrally addresses price discrimination in cases involving competition between different purchasers for resale of the purchased product. Such competition ordinarily is not involved when a product subject to special order is sold through a customer-specific competitive bidding process.

Evans v. Chavis, 546 U. S. ___ (2006)

R016; No. 04-721; 1/10/06. The Ninth Circuit departed from this Court's interpretation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's 1-year limitations period as applied to California's collateral review system when it found respondent's petition timely despite a 3-year, 1-month, delay in appealing denial of his state collateral review petition.

Brown v. Sanders,, 546 U. S. ___ (2006)

R017; No. 04-980; 1/11/06. An invalidated sentencing factor (whether an eligibility factor or not) will render a first-degree murder sentence unconstitutional by reason of its adding an improper element to the aggravation scale in the weighing process unless one of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances; the jury's consideration of invalid special circumstances in Sanders' case gave rise to no constitutional violation.

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Last Updated: January 11, 2006
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