U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/05/2003 - 06/06/2003
** EVENT NUMBERS **
39894 39903 39905 39907
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39894 |
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| FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/30/2003|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:54[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/30/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEN ROBINSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/05/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: GERRY WAIG +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|DDDD 73.71(b)(1) SAFEGUARDS REPORTS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 99 Power Operation |99 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| SECURITY GUARD POSTED WITHOUT PROPER EQUIPMENT |
| |
| A plant security officer was stationed at a security post without all |
| equipment required to properly man that post. Immediate compensatory |
| measures were taken upon discovery. The licensee notified the NRC Resident |
| Inspector. Refer to the Headquarters Operations Officer Log for additional |
| details. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1220EDT ON 6/5/03 FROM ANDREW WISNIEWSKI TO S. SANDIN |
| |
| The licensee upon further review concluded that the incident was logable and |
| is, therefore, retracting this report. The licensee informed the NRC |
| Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Linville). Contact the Headquarters |
| Operations Officer for details. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39903 |
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| FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/04/2003|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:03[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE: 06/04/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RANDY TODD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/05/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) UNANALYZED CONDITION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|3 N N 0 |0 |
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EVENT TEXT
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| APPENDIX R ISSUE |
| |
| During an Appendix R design basis review, an Engineer noted that cables |
| associated with normal operation of components used for one train (Primary |
| Isolation Valves) of Appendix R mitigation were routed through an adjacent |
| fire zone associated with the other train of Appendix R mitigation. During |
| an Appendix R event, control of the affected components is transferred to |
| the Standby Shutdown Facility, which electrically isolates the subject |
| cables. |
| |
| However, the area containing the subject cables does not have fire detection |
| equipment. The Engineer noted that if a fire occurred and damaged the |
| cables, it would be theoretically possible for a "smart short" to result in |
| damage to equipment before action could be taken to transfer control to the |
| Standby Shutdown Facility. |
| |
| Initial Safety Significance: |
| |
| This condition is similar to an example given in NUREG 1022, Section 3.2.4 |
| (fire barrier missing such that the required degree of separation for |
| redundant safe shutdown trains is lacking). |
| |
| In order to result in a loss of safety function, the postulated fire would |
| have to damage the cable, result in a smart spurious actuation of a |
| component, damage that component such that it became inoperable (such as by |
| burning out the motor of a valve), then also spread within the fire zone to |
| damage the redundant component (for example by burning the power cable or |
| motor control center). |
| |
| The Oconee license basis is no spurious circuit operations for 10 minutes. |
| Cable testing sponsored by the NRC, NEI, and EPRI for fire exposure has |
| demonstrated that armored type cable construction used in this application |
| is more rugged than other designs and that internal cable failure times |
| usually extend beyond 30 minutes. |
| |
| The area containing the cables is a high traffic area for both personnel and |
| material - including low quantities of transient combustibles, but has no |
| appreciable fixed fire loads. Thus the probability of a fire of sufficient |
| energy to damage the cable is low. Pending a PRA analysis, it appears |
| reasonable to credit prompt discovery of a fire and initiation of action to |
| suppress the fire and/or transfer of control to the Standby Shutdown |
| Facility prior to cable damage. Therefore the overall risk impact of this |
| event is currently considered low. |
| |
| Corrective Action: |
| |
| The SSF has been declared inoperable pending establishment of a fire watch. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39905 |
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| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/05/2003|
| UNIT: [2] [3] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:44[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/05/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:45[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BOB HURON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/05/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: GERRY WAIG +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JAMES LINVILLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |DAVID MATTHEWS NRR |
|ACOM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| LOSS OF 2 OFFSITE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SIRENS AT INDIAN POINT |
| |
| On 06/05/03 at 1644 EDT the licensee reported that 2 of 16 emergency |
| notification sirens located in Orange County failed on 06/05/03 at 1545 EDT |
| due to a loss of power. An investigation is underway to determine the cause |
| and restore power to the affected sirens. |
| |
| The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39907 |
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| FACILITY: MAINE YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/05/2003|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: ME |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:25[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 06/05/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:47[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TERRY VOGEL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/05/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JAMES LINVILLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Decommissioned |0 Decommissioned |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO STATE AGENCIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED RELEASE |
| |
| The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: |
| |
| "Notified Maine Emergency Management Agency of unscheduled release that |
| occurred on Monday June 2, 2003. Notified Department of Human Services of |
| same. |
| |
| "Maine Yankee released 3E-8 curies of liquid. 3E-8 curies of this release |
| exceeded the value projected for this period and is, therefore, classified |
| as unscheduled. The total liquid release resulted in an exposure value of |
| 1E-8 millirem. |
| |
| "This unscheduled release resulted from low levels of Cs-137 exiting the |
| restricted area via a storm drain, and occurred throughout the 24-hr time |
| period from 6-2-3." |
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