U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
04/11/2003 - 04/14/2003
** EVENT NUMBERS **
39749 39750 39751 39752 39753 39754
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39749 |
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| FACILITY: CLINTON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/11/2003|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:23[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 04/11/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:45[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PAT RYAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/11/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: ARLON COSTA +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |MICHAEL PARKER R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 M/R Y 30 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO VIBRATIONS ON THE MAIN TURBINE |
| |
| "A manual scram was initiated at 0145 on April 11, 2003, due to vibrations |
| on the Main Turbine trending up to the trip setpoint. A scheduled plant |
| shutdown was in progress for a maintenance outage [of the 'B' recirculation |
| flow control valve sensor]. All plant systems operated normally on the |
| scram. The plant is shutdown at 0% power in Mode 3. The turbine vibrations |
| returned to normal values after the turbine tripped." |
| |
| All rods inserted normally. All safety and electrical systems operated as |
| designed during and after the reactor trip. The plant is stable and using |
| normal feedwater. There was nothing unusual or not understood. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39750 |
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| FACILITY: DAVIS BESSE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/11/2003|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:17[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-R-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/11/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: LARRY MYERS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/11/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: MIKE RIPLEY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |MICHAEL PARKER R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |GENE IMBRO NRR |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) UNANALYZED CONDITION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| UNANALYZED CONDITION COULD CAUSE HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION PUMP DAMAGE |
| |
| "As a result of an in-depth design and performance capability review, a |
| non-conforming condition was identified whereby, utilizing only safety grade |
| equipment, long term cyclic repressurizations of the reactor coolant system |
| (RCS) may occur following a subset of postulated very small Loss of Coolant |
| Accidents (LOCAs) with effective break sizes in a range between 0.0021 ft2 |
| to 0.0045 ft2. The repressurization cycles were not previously analyzed, |
| but are predicted by a new application of the license basis 10 CFR 50.46 |
| Evaluation Model. Although non-safety grade equipment would be available to |
| prevent repressurizatons, if only safety grade LOCA mitigating equipment is |
| credited, these repressurizazion cycles could be postulated to damage both |
| High Pressure Injection (HPI) pumps. This could occur due to pump |
| deadheading after HPI recirculation flow back to the borated water storage |
| tank is procedurally isolated upon tank low level and pump suction has been |
| manually transferred to the containment emergency sump at minimum of |
| approximately 20 hours into the postulated event. Minimum recirculation |
| flow back to the borated water storage tank initially provided protection |
| against deadheading the pump and previously assumed reactor coolant system |
| pressures would have allowed continued HPI pump flow. During part of the |
| newly predicted repressurization cycle, RCS pressure would exceed the |
| shutoff head of the HPI pumps. Without minimum flow, the pumps would be |
| damaged. |
| |
| "This issue is currently evaluated by Condition Report 02-06702. |
| Davis-Besse has determined this condition is reportable under ยง |
| 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) 'Any event or condition that results in ..'The nuclear |
| power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades |
| plant safety.' Although the plant is currently in cold shutdown and the HPI |
| pumps are not required to be operable per the Technical Specifications, this |
| issue represents a historical condition that existed within the last three |
| years." |
| |
| The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 39751 |
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| FACILITY: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/12/2003|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:02[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2) |EVENT DATE: 04/11/2003|
| COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL |EVENT TIME: 18:30[EDT]|
| |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/12/2003|
| CITY: COLUMBIA REGION: 2 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: RICHLAND STATE: SC |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: SNM-1107 AGREEMENT: Y |BRIAN BONSER R2 |
| DOCKET: 07001151 |JANET SCHLUETER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CARL SNYDER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| LOSS OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PROTECTION |
| |
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION |
| |
| Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, |
| Columbia SC, low enriched (less than or equal to 5.0 wt. % U-235) PWR fuel |
| fabricator for commercial light water reactors. License: SNM-1107. |
| |
| Time and Date of Event: 18:30 hours, April 11, 2003. |
| |
| Reason for Notification: |
| |
| On March 19, 2003, six UF6 cylinders were placed on hold because |
| Westinghouse questioned if the cylinders were properly tested following |
| repair. The ANSI N14.1 nameplate had been removed from supporting "feet" |
| and-welded directly onto the pressure vessel dome. The "U" Stamp had been |
| replaced with an "R" Stamp and documentation from the shipper indicated that |
| the fillet weld on the dome had undergone dye-penetrant testing. The UF6 |
| cylinder pressure vessel, however, had not undergone hydrostatic testing. |
| |
| The "hold" consisted of a flag in the UF6 cylinder tracking computer |
| database, which was inserted as a manual edit. The hold flag should have |
| prevented the cylinders from being transferred into work in process (WIP) to |
| allow processing. On March 31, 2003 one of the six cylinders was allowed |
| by the tracking database to be processed. A second cylinder with the hold |
| flag was allowed to be processed on April 1, 2003. |
| |
| Unaware of the failure of the hold flags, the safety analysis proceeded. On |
| April 10, 2003 NCS and process engineering completed the safety review begun |
| on March 19, 2003 of the nameplate welding using applicable pressure vessel |
| standards including an on-site interview with a certified boiler code |
| inspector. The conclusion of the safety review was that the "R" Stamp |
| cylinders met the ANSI N 14.1 requirements and were acceptable for |
| processing. |
| |
| On April 11, 2003, NCS began a review of the sequence of events leading to |
| the processing of the two hold tagged cylinders. At approximately 18:30 |
| hours April 11, 2003 NCS completed its final interview. Shortly thereafter, |
| it was determined that there had been a loss of previously documented |
| double contingency protection. NCS immediately informed the EH&S manager of |
| the event. |
| |
| Double Contingency Protection: |
| |
| The parameters that directly affect neutron multiplication for the |
| vaporizers are mass (density) and geometry (level control). A criticality |
| could be possible in a vaporizer under the following conditions: |
| |
| Sufficient material is discharged from the cylinder into the vaporizer in |
| order to form a critical UO2F2 H2O density (optimum moderation), and water |
| slab height increases to a critical height. |
| |
| Cylinder integrity maintains mass control. The U235 mass control depends |
| upon maintaining the structural integrity of the cylinder to ensure that no |
| material is released due to a sudden uncontrollable rupture. |
| |
| The geometry control consists of ensuring that condensate drains properly |
| from the vaporizer, and detecting water accumulation should it occur. |
| |
| It has been determined that less than previously documented double |
| contingency protection remained for the system and that greater than a safe |
| mass was involved. Double Contingency protection was restored within 4 |
| hours. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), |
| paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criterion for a 24-hour |
| notification. |
| |
| As Found Condition: |
| |
| See "Reason for Notification." As detailed above, the Investigation found |
| that the cylinders were safe to process. In fact, there never was an actual |
| safety issue. The event did point out a weakness in our control of UF6 |
| cylinders that will be addressed. |
| |
| Summary of Activity: |
| |
| 1) The four remaining cylinders were physically tagged out. |
| 2) A complete inventory and inspection of all cylinders on-site was |
| performed. |
| 3) It was verified that no movement of UF6 cylinders onto the site or into |
| processing will occur for the next week. |
| |
| Conclusions: |
| |
| 1) Loss of double contingency protection occurred. Greater than a safe mass |
| was involved. |
| 2) At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the |
| public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. |
| 3)The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety |
| significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. |
| 4) Notification was the result of an event, not a deficient NCS analysis. |
| 5) A causal analysis will be performed. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39752 |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/12/2003|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:55[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/12/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:47[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVEN SULLIVAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/12/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JAMES TRAPP R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM- ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED |
| |
| At 1847 hours on 04/12/03 the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2 |
| experienced an automatic reactor scram and shutdown following an air line |
| failure which resulted in the closure of the "D" outboard main steam line |
| isolation valve. The closure of this valve resulted in a Reactor High |
| Pressure Automatic Scram Signal. This caused a actuation of the Alternate |
| Rod Insertion system on reactor high pressure of 1106 psi. All rods fully |
| inserted. Additionally reactor vessel water level lowered to approximately |
| negative 10 inches which resulted in a RPS and PCIS Group 2 & 3 |
| isolations. All systems activated as required. The outage control center is |
| currently staffed and repair/planning and restart preparation activities are |
| in progress. Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2 plant conditions are |
| currently stable. |
| |
| A copper air line going to the solenoid valve which operated the "D" |
| outboard main steam isolation valve failed. Cause of the line failure is |
| unknown at this time. The offsite electrical grid is stable and all |
| emergency core cooling systems are fully operable if needed. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39753 |
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| FACILITY: SEQUOYAH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/12/2003|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: TN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:50[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/12/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:21[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MITCHEL TAGGART |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/13/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: RICH LAURA +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |BRIAN BONSER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| TURBINE TRIP CAUSES REACTOR TRIP AT SEQOUYAH UNIT 2 |
| |
| "While resetting a turbine trip supervisory module, the unit 2 turbine |
| tripped from "Turbine High Vibration Turbine Trip" at 22:21. The reactor |
| tripped as a result of the turbine trip. Investigation is pending concerning |
| the turbine vibration equipment. |
| |
| "Auxiliary feed water system initiated as designed. All secondary plant |
| equipment performed as expected. |
| |
| "The plant is being maintained in Mode 3 at NOT/NOP, 547 degrees F and 2235 |
| psig, with auxiliary feed water supplying the Steam Generators and steam |
| dumps removing the decay heat." |
| |
| All control rods inserted into the core with no problems. The NRC Resident |
| Inspector was notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39754 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/13/2003|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:06[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/13/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:56[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RON GIBBS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/13/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |DAVID LOVELESS R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) DEGRADED CONDITION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR VESSEL BOTTOM HEAD DEGRADED CONDITION |
| |
| "On 4/12/2003, during the Unit 1 11th (1RE11) refueling outage, an |
| inspection was performed of the vessel bottom head. This bare metal |
| inspection identified a potential leak indication at the head to penetration |
| interface for Bottom Mounted Instrumentation (BMI) penetrations 1 and 46. |
| There was a small amount of residue around the outer circumference of the |
| BMI penetrations. No wastage was observed. Samples of the residue were taken |
| and the area was cleaned with demineralized water. Chemical sample results |
| available as of 1300 on 4/13/2003 are not conclusive; however, they have |
| confirmed that the residue found at the Penetration 46 contains boron, |
| indicating that this could be an RCS leak. The residue removed from |
| Penetration 1 was characterized as 'gummy' and its composition is still |
| under investigation. Additional exams are planned to confirm the likely |
| origin of the residue and to determine the scope of any repairs. There has |
| been no indication of RCS leakage observed at the BMI penetrations during |
| previous operational cycles. This notification is being made in accordance |
| with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)." |
| |
| Unit 1 will remain in mode 5 until appropriate corrective actions are |
| identified. The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. |
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