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> May 19
Event Notification Report for May 19, 2006
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/18/2006 - 05/19/2006
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 42581 |
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: LICON ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: EL PASO State: TX
County:
License #: L05530
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
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Notification Date: 05/16/2006
Notification Time: 22:49 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2006
Event Time: 16:15 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2006
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
ILTAB (via email) ()
MEXICO (via fax) ()
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Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A LOST MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The licensee while transporting a Campbell Moisture Density Gauge S/N MC1391 from one jobsite to another in El Paso, TX, discovered upon arrival that the tailgate of the truck was down and the transport case with gauge were missing. The loss occurred within a sixteen (16) mile radius of the intersection of Hawkins Blvd. and Montana Ave. The licensee acknowledged to the TX Department of Health representative that the instrument had not been properly secured prior to transport. The gauge contains two (2) sources, i.e., 50 millicuries Am-241/Be and 10 millicuries Cs-137.
The licensee informed local law enforcement and the TX Department of Health.
TX Incident No. I-8338
**** UPDATE ON 5/17/06 AT 2250 EDT VIA E-MAIL FROM LATISCHA HANSON TO SANDIN ****
Incident # correction: It should be I-8337.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility |
Event Number: 42585 |
Facility: FRAMATOME ANP RICHLAND
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County: BENTON
License #: SNM-1227
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001257
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LINK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
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Notification Date: 05/18/2006
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2006
Event Time: 12:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2006
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
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Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
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Event Text
POSTULATED CRITICALITY DUE TO BACKFLOW TO AN UNFAVORABLE GEOMETRY VESSEL
"During a regularly scheduled review of the ISA for a process system in the ELO building, the ISA team postulated where fissile solution could backflow into an unfavorable geometry vessel (55-gallon drum). This system configuration did not have sufficient IROFS designated to ensure that the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61 were met. The process system was immediately shut down, the potential for back flow to the unfavorable geometry vessel was removed, and the potential for similar accident sequences in this and related process systems was evaluated. This evaluation found one additional system configuration in the same process system where fissile solution could backflow into an unfavorable geometry vessel. The details of this condition are still undergoing internal investigation. This configuration does not have sufficient IROFS designated to ensure that the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61 are met. The process equipment associated with this scenario is also shut down and will remain shut down pending establishment of sufficient IROFS to meet the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61
"The material in the identified system sources that is normally in the tanks that could back flow to the unfavorable geometry vessel is uranyl nitrate solution with a range of [deleted] g U/liter. However on certain rare occasions, there is the potential for uranyl nitrate solution with up to [deleted] U/liter to be present in these tanks. This is the highest concentration observed by veteran system operators.
"The 95/95 upper limit of keff for a single 55 gallon drum containing uranyl nitrate solution with [deleted] U/liter, sitting on a 30 cm thick concrete slab and with [deleted] cm of water tight fitted water reflector is approximately [deleted]. At [deleted] U/liter the 95/95 upper limit of keff is approximately [deleted]. The allowed 95/95 upper limit on keff for normal conditions is [deleted] and [deleted] for abnormal conditions.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
"Safety significance is low. The potential of accidental nuclear criticality in the as found condition remained unlikely.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED:
"The potential criticality pathway involves having more than [deleted] U/liter uranyl nitrate solution in the system tanks, an improper valve line up and then pumping the solution back through an air powered double diaphragm pump into the 55-gallon drum.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (Mass, Moderation, Geometry Concentration etc.):
"The controlled parameter on the 55 gallon drum of feed material was concentration. The maximum allowed concentration is [deleted] U/1 UNH solution.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (Include process limit and % worst case critical mass:
"The facility is limited by NRC license to an enrichment of [deleted] wt.% U-235. The maximum amount of material that could potentially back flow into the 55-gallon drum is approximately [deleted] liters and the maximum expected concentration would be [deleted] U
"The normally expected concentration is less than [deleted] U/liter. According to ARH-600 page III.B6-3, the minimum critical spherical mass of UN solution is in excess of [deleted] kg.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"The back flow potential was eliminated and the system tagged out of service pending a complete re-analysis of the process system and the establishment of sufficient IROFS to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.
"Related process systems that might have a similar potential were also shut down pending completion of an evaluation to ensure that the same potential does not exist in these areas." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 42588 |
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KYLE GARNISH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
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Notification Date: 05/18/2006
Notification Time: 19:40 [ET]
Event Date: 05/18/2006
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2006
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
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Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
UNEVALUATED FAILURE OF CHARGING PUMP IN FIRE SCENARIO
"On May 18, 2006, it was determined that a previously unevaluated failure mode of charging pumps during a certain 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire scenarios existed. Charging pumps are credited for specific fire scenarios to be available to make up inventory and provide reactivity control in the reactor coolant system. The engineering evaluation determined that an Appendix R fire scenario could potentially result in the failure of a circuit which would cause the credited charging pump to be tripped and held tripped by the undervoltage protection circuitry. The postulated failure would require diagnosis and manual actions to operate the charging pump.
"A preliminary analysis of the core damage risk associated with this condition was performed, taking into account the frequency of fires in all of the affected areas, the potential failure of fixed and/or manual fire suppression systems, and the required manual operator actions (with assumed failure likelihoods). The results indicate that the additional core damage frequency (CDF) associated with this condition is approximately 1.2E-07/yr.
"Procedures changes to address this issue are being developed."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 42589 |
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: SCOTT CIESLEWICZ
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
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Notification Date: 05/18/2006
Notification Time: 21:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/18/2006
Event Time: 13:23 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2006
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
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Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Hot Shutdown |
0 |
Hot Shutdown |
Event Text
POSTULATED FLOODING THAT COULD IMPACT BOTH TRAINS OF THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM
"At 1323 the Shift Manger was notified of a flooding concern that could impact both trains of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. At this time both trains of RHR were declared inoperable and actions were taken to isolate the lines that could flood the RHR Pump Pits, The lines in question were from the Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup system specifically associated with the Spent Fuel Pool Dernineralizers and the Pre-filters and Post-filters. These lines were Isolated at 1345. Spent Fuel Pool cooling remained in service following isolation of the Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup system. Both RHR trains were returned to service at 1345.
"Initial piping analysis determined that these lines would have remained intact during and following a seismic event. The final evaluation s expected to be completed within two weeks."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
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