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> November 10
Event Notification Report for November 10, 2004
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
11/09/2004 - 11/10/2004
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 41172 |
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA, INC.
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JERRY EAKINS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
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Notification Date: 11/02/2004
Notification Time: 17:35 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2004
Event Time: 16:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/04/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
DAVID SILK (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
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Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING IMPROPER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENT
On 11/02/04 the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control was notified by U.S. Customs at the Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport of the arrival of an aircraft from the Bahamas " . . . Carrying [a] RAM holder 650L (depleted uranium) with a depleted Ir-192 source [approximately 10 curies]. [The] pilot initially said that he had nothing to declare. Customs investigator's dosimeters alarmed when they examined the plane and they subsequently found the holder. The pilot then claimed that Bahamas Oil Refining Co. paid him to fly the holder to Ft. Lauderdale and send it to owner via FedEx. He then made a false statement that the holder was empty. The pilot was not hazmat qualified, was not licensed to handle RAM, and did not have proper shipping papers. The holder was impounded. [The] owner [AEA Technology, Inc.] provided proper shipping papers and had the item shipped back to them. This office [Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] will take no further action on this incident."
Incident Number: FL04-150
A conference call was established between the NMSS EO (Tom Essig) and the FL BRC Representative (Jerry Eakins) to discuss the situation. During followup on 11/4/04, it was determined that the initial notification constituted an Agreement State Report.
Notified RDO (David Silk), NMSS EO (Sandra Wastler) and TAS Duty Officer (Aaron Danis). |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 41183 |
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICKEY STOCKTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
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Notification Date: 11/09/2004
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2004
Event Time: 09:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
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Person (Organization):
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT VENT ISOLATION VALVE
"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the WBN [Watts Bar Nuclear] Train A Containment Vent Isolation signal. NUREG1022 Revision 2 identifies the Information that needs to be reported as discussed below.
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.
"On September 15, 2004, at 0914 EDT, a Train A Containment Vent Isolation (CVI) signal was received when the A Train Containment Purge Radiation Monitor momentarily spiked above the High Radiation Trip set-point. The B Train Containment Purge system was in operation at the time of the CVI signal and automatically shutdown as designed.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
"The actuation was considered complete. The CVI signal for Train A automatically isolated the containment ventilation system as designed. The A Train Containment Purge Radiation Monitor was removed from service and considered inoperable due to no supporting indication of actual radiation by redundant radiation monitors or recorded trend data.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
"Train A Containment Vent Isolation signal automatically actuated and functioned successfully. The CVI signal was not in response to an actual plant condition. Maintenance on the Train A Containment Purge Radiation Monitor, revealed a loose connection in the detector cable. The radiation monitor was repaired and returned to service and the containment ventilation air cleanup unit was also returned to service."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this by the licensee. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 41184 |
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: A. J. HALLIDAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
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Notification Date: 11/09/2004
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2004
Event Time: 02:44 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
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Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Refueling |
0 |
Refueling |
Event Text
INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
"The purpose of this report is to provide a telephone notification under 10 CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for invalid actuation of emergency AC electrical power systems. As allowed by 10 CFR50.73(a)(1), this telephone is being made in lieu of submitting a written LER.
"On October 7, 2004, James A. FitzPatrick was in a refueling outage with the reactor cavity flooded and the spent fuel pool gates removed. At approximately 0244, Surveillance testing was in progress on the LOCA initiation logic for the 'A' and 'B' RHR Pumps. Technicians had aligned the initiation circuit for testing in accordance with Surveillance Test ST-2F. When the test signal was applied to the circuit the 'A' and 'B' RHR pumps started as expected. The 'A' and 'C' Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) unexpectedly auto started but did not load onto the emergency bus. There was no loss of power to the emergency busses and thus no need for the EDGs to load and power the emergency busses. Operations personnel verified plant conditions and secured the EDGs.
"Condition Report CR-JAF-2004-04426 was initiated and an investigation into the unexpected start of the EDGs was conducted. It was determined that a relay malfunction in the test circuitry resulted in the failure to 'block' the EDG auto start signal. The EDGs started as designed based on the response to the unblocked test signal in the start logic. Since there was no actual need for the EDGs to start and the start was the result of a test signal that should have been blocked by the failed relay it was determined that the EDG start was based on an invalid signal. This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1)." The state of New York will be notified of this event by the licensee.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| Other Nuclear Material |
Event Number: 41185 |
Rep Org: POTLATCH CORPORATION
Licensee: POTLATCH CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: LEWISTOWN State: ID
County:
License #: 11-27075-01
Agreement: N
Docket: 30-32229
NRC Notified By: PAUL BRIDGES - RSO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
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Notification Date: 11/10/2004
Notification Time: 00:33 [ET]
Event Date: 11/09/2004
Event Time: 07:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
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Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS)
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Event Text
ACCIDENTAL EXPOSURE FROM PAPER MILL RADIOACTIVE GAUGE
The radiation safety officer (RSO) for the licensee reported that he discovered a mass thickness measuring gauge (NDC Model # 1107 containing an 80 milliCurie Am-241 sealed source) removed from its normal location with its shutter open and people working in the vicinity. The gauge is normally mounted on machinery and used to measure paper thickness for the licensee's pulp mill operations. The mill operation was apparently shut down at approximately 0730 a.m. on 11/09/04 for maintenance. Evidently, the radioactive gauge shutter was not closed when the operation was shut down. Furthermore, the gauge was then moved from its mounted location an placed near a walkway as part of the maintenance activities.
The licensee's RSO discovered the condition at approximately 3:30 pm on 11/09/04 and immediately closed the shutter on the gauge. The RSO stated that the shutter on the gauge is opened and closed procedurally without any automatic safety closure when not in operation. The RSO also stated that there are numerous signs and postings that alert personnel to inform and involve the RSO when any activities take place that are in the vicinity of the gauge.
The RSO stated that investigation is just beginning and that details or estimates on potential exposures have not yet been determined. The RSO noted that the maintenance crew in the area consisted of 10 (or less) people. Based on preliminary discussions, it is estimated that the maximum exposure to the gauge was less than 0.5 hours at a distance of 6 to 12 inches. None of the maintenance personnel were wearing dosimetry so all exposures will have to be estimated.
The RSO reported this event without a specific CFR report category. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 41187 |
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: T.R. JONES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
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Notification Date: 11/10/2004
Notification Time: 04:05 [ET]
Event Date: 11/09/2004
Event Time: 23:39 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
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Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
N |
0 |
Refueling |
0 |
Refueling |
Event Text
ACTUATION OF THE EMERGENCY AC ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM
"On November 9, 2004 at 2339 hours, an actuation of the emergency AC electrical power system occurred. While in a refueling outage a planned evolution was in progress to tie 480V Bus 3A to 480V Bus 6A using the tie breaker. A Bus under-voltage condition occurred when the Normal supply breaker was opened to bus 6A. When the normal supply breaker was opened, the tie breaker also opened causing a loss of power to bus 6A. With bus 6A deenergized an under-voltage signal was generated. 21 and 22 Emergency Diesel Generators automatically started and supplied bus sections 5A, 2A, and 3A. 480V Bus 6A remained deenergized because 23 Emergency Diesel Generator was out of service for planned maintenance. As a result, Residual Heat Removal cooling was lost for 5 minutes until power was restored and 21 Residual Heat Removal Pump was started. In addition, normal Spent Fuel Pool Cooling was lost for 39 minutes until 21 Spent Fuel Pool Pump was started. An activity is in progress to determine why the tie breaker opened when the normal supply breaker to Bus 6A was opened.
"On November 10, 2004 at 0058 hours unit 2 was returned to its normal 480V lineup.
"At the time of the event, refueling outage 16 was in progress on Unit 2 with all fuel assemblies installed in the core after refueling with the Reactor Vessel Head and Upper Internals removed.
"This results in a condition that resulted in a valid actuation of the emergency AC electrical power systems which is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
The loss of the 21 spent fuel pool cooling pump resulted in a 3 degree rise in spent fuel pit temperature. The loss of the 21 RHR pump resulted in no appreciable increase in reactor coolant temperature.
The licensee will be notifying the New York Public Service Commission of this incident and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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