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> January 26
Event Notification Report for January 26, 2004
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
01/23/2004 - 01/26/2004
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 40460 |
Rep Org: KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: BOWLING GREEN MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: BOWLING GREEN State: KY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
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Notification Date: 01/21/2004
Notification Time: 16:20 [ET]
Event Date: 01/19/2004
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
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Event Text
KENTUCKY AGREEMENT STATE REPORT ON A MEDICAL EVENT
A medical event occurred on 1/19/04 at the Bowling Green Medical Center located in Bowling Green, Kentucky. Specifically, an inner vascular Brachytherapy treatment was planned. The catheter ran outside the body through an external valve which was inadvertently partially shut resulting in no dose to the target area. As a result, the doctor administering the treatment received .736 gray at his fingertips. Also, the patient received .736 gray to the thigh area. The source involved was 43.14 curies of strontium-90. There was no significant adverse health effects from this event. A review was initiated by the licensee to determine the cause and to initiate corrective actions. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 40461 |
Rep Org: KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: INDUSTRIAL SERVICES OF AMERICA
Region: 1
City: LOUISVILLE State: KY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
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Notification Date: 01/21/2004
Notification Time: 16:28 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2004
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
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Event Text
KENTUCKY AGREEMENT STATE REPORT ON LOSS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOUND AT SCRAP YARD
On 1/16/04, the radiation detectors alarmed at the North American Stainless scrap yard, located in Ghent, Kentucky, when a truck entered the scrap yard. The scrap yard radiation detectors indicated 42 microrem per hour. The truck was not accepted and sent back to its origin. The scrap material in the truck came from Industrial Services of America. Investigation determined that a piece of a fixed gauge caused the radiation alarms to set off. Apparently, the gauge went through a shredder. On-contact radiation readings were 35 millirem/hour with the shutter closed and 58 millirem/hour with the shutter open. This was considered a loss of radioactive material and further review will be performed to try to determine the owner of the gauge. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40462 |
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: E. HENSON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
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Notification Date: 01/21/2004
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2004
Event Time: 12:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
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Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SIREN TEMPERATURE SENSITIVITY
"On 1/14/04 a problem with emergency notification sirens was identified and traced to a manufacturing defect in components supplied by Federal Signal Corporation.
"Investigations were initiated to determine if this situation was applicable to Callaway. At 1230, 1/21/04, Federal Signal Corporation notified Callaway Plant that there was a potential for siren inoperability due to a temperature sensitive piece of equipment. It was determined that 19 out of 29 emergency sirens were subject to this potential failure if ambient temperatures fall below approximately 20 degrees F. The model number of the questionable sirens is EOWS612. Callaway conducted a "quiet test" of the questionable sirens and 4 of the sirens indicated a problem. At present the ambient temperature is above 32 degree F and it is believed that the four questionable sirens are not experiencing the temperature related failure. A field test of the four sirens is being conducted this evening to determine their operability. Alternate methods of public notification have been established.
"The failure mechanism has been identified by the vendor and temporary repairs will begin by 1/22/04."
The licensee notified State and local agencies, FEMA, and the NRC Resident Inspector.
****Update on 01/23/04 at 1455 EST by E. Henson taken by MacKinnon****
"This event is an update to EN# 40462 in which Callaway reported that 19 of 29 emergency sirens were potentially susceptible to temperature sensitivity. A field test of four suspect sirens was completed by 1900, 01/21/04, and it was established that all four sirens were operable. All 19 of the emergency sirens using electronic circuits that were potentially susceptible to temperature sensitivity, had temporary heating elements installed on 01/23/04, thus eliminating the temperature sensitivity problem. Federal Signal Corporation expects to have a permanent solution identified and permanent repairs completed within 3 weeks." R4DO (Linda Howell) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee. |
| Transportation Event |
Event Number: 40467 |
Rep Org: BEST MEDICAL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Licensee: BEST MEDICAL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 1
City: SPRINGFIELD State: VA
County:
License #: 25-19757-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KRISHNAN SUTHANTHIRAN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
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Notification Date: 01/23/2004
Notification Time: 09:45 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/2004
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
INFORMATION ONLY
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Person (Organization):
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
LINDA PSYK (NMSS)
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Event Text
MISPLACED SHIPMENT OF I-125 SEEDS
The licensee was notified by the Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center that a package containing 85 I-125 brachytherapy seeds (total activity 40 millicuries) had not arrived as of 1/22/04. The licensee contacted Airborne Express who initiated an investigation.
The following information was received earlier at 0245 EST on 1/23/04 from the National Response Center :
Airborne Express reported to the National Response Center (Incident # 711334) that a package containing 2.48 GBq I-125 (solid metal form) shipped on 1/20/04 by Best Medical International, Inc located in Springfield, VA had not been received at the Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center located in Pomona, CA. The Airborne Express Tracking Number 20270858952 shows an arrival scan on 1/21 at their Ontario, CA station. Information provided by their driver shows delivery to the US Post Office in Temecula, CA although Post Office officials assert that the package is not there. Airborne is continuing their investigation and will interview the driver involved.
* * * * UPDATE FROM BEST MEDICAL (KRISHNAN SUTHANTHIRAN) TO M. RIPLEY 1238 ET 01/23/04 * * * *
The licensee was notified by Post Office officials that the package was found in a post office in City of Industry, CA at approximately 1200 ET 01/23/04. There was no apparent tampering or damage to the package. The package will be retrieved by Airborne Express and either returned to Best Medical International or delivered to Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center.
Notified R1 DO (C. Anderson), R4 DO (L. Howell), and NMSS EO (L. Psyk)
* * * UPDATE FROM BEST MEDICAL (KRISHNAN SUTHANTHIRAN) TO M. RIPLEY 1515 ET 01/23/04 * * * *
The licensee was notified by Airborne Express that the package was retrieved by them at the post office and was found intact. The package will be delivered to Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center this afternoon, 1/23/04.
Notified R1 DO (C. Anderson), R4 DO (L. Howell), and NMSS EO (L. Psyk) |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40468 |
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GLEN MORROW
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
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Notification Date: 01/23/2004
Notification Time: 13:53 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2004
Event Time: 12:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
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Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
95 |
Power Operation |
95 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
"Dresden Unit 2 is performing a Technical Specification required shutdown due to the loss of the [120 VAC] Essential Service Bus normal electrical feed. This is reportable per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), SAF 1.2 "Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specification". The loss of the feed occurred at 02:10 [CST] on 01/23/04 and power swapped to the backup feed. Technical Specification 3.8.7. A. was entered and repairs began on the uninterruptible power supply. Repairs were unsuccessful and Unit 2 shut down began at 12:20 [CST] with unit required to be hot shutdown by 22:10 [CST] 01/23/04 and cold shutdown by 22:10 [CST] 01/24/04. Repairs will continue in parallel will unit shutdown."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
***UPDATE on 01/23/04 at 1742 EST by G. Morrow taken by John MacKinnon****
Unit 2 ESS BUS normal feed was restored to OPERABLE, unit shutdown was secured and preparations for load increase are in progress. Preliminary troubleshooting data taken on the ESS UPS show the most likely cause of the UPS power supply transfer was a static switch component that caused the UPS to swap to the emergency supply. The troubleshooting shows the malfunction that caused the initial power supply transfer to the ESS Emergency supply via the ABT at 0210 this morning originated in the static switch circuitry. The static switch is bypassed in the current configuration and therefore the power supply to the ESS bus is assured. The voltage sensing relays investigated during the troubleshooting on the output of the inverter show no indication that an inverter failure initiated the bus transfer. Operations will continue to monitor the output of the inverter. Troubleshooting of the UPS static switch will continue to determine the cause of the malfunction. R3DO (Roger Lanksbury) notified
NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40469 |
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: Ken Russell
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
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Notification Date: 01/23/2004
Notification Time: 14:05 [ET]
Event Date: 11/29/2003
Event Time: 15:26 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
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Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
On November 29, 2003, at 1526 hours, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant experienced an actuation of several Division 2 Balance-of-Plant (BOP) inboard isolation valves as a result of the loss of the normal power supply to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) B. At the time of the event, the plant was in mode 1(Power Operations) at about 100% power. The isolation closed one or more valves in each of the following Division 2 subsystems: Main Steam line drains, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup, Liquid Radwaste Sumps, Containment Vessel Chilled WATER, Reactor Water Sampling, Drywell and Containment Radiation Monitoring, and Control Room Ventilation. Instrumentation that receives electrical power from RPS B also lost power. Division 1 components and valves were not affected.
The event is considered an invalid system actuation, and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The isolation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters, and was not a manual initiation. It meets the criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) as a general containment isolation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. Therefore, notification is being provided via 60-day optional phone call in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). All systems functioned as expected for an inboard isolation. Repositioning of the valves did not present operational concerns; and the valves were re-opened per restoration procedures. The BOP isolation was attributed to the loss of power to RPS B as a result of a blown fuse. The blown fuse was the result of the failure of a GE CR105 contactor due to age related degradation (insulating varnish degradation resulting in a winding to winding short circuit). This event was documented in the corrective action program. Remedial actions included replacement of the failed fuse and the RPS A and B normal power supply contactors and the RPS A alternate power supply contactor. The RPS B alternate power supply contactor will also be replaced.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40472 |
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID FRYE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
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Notification Date: 01/23/2004
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2004
Event Time: 15:29 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
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Person (Organization):
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
HERB BERKOW (NRR)
RICHARD WESSMAN (DIRO)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
M/R |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Standby |
Event Text
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP WITH SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION SIGNALS
"At 1529 ET the reactor was manually tripped due to low steam generator level as a result of the loss of the 22 SGFP (Steam Generator Feed Pump). When the reactor was tripped, the turbine bypass and atmospheric dump valves went full open and did not shut. This lead to a SIAS (Safety Injection Actuation Signal) and SGIS (Steam Generator Isolation Signal). At 1718 ET, a second SIAS actuation occurred while reestablishing pressurizer level. The cause of the SGFP trip is unknown. The cause of the over steaming on turbine bypass valves and atmospheric dump valves is unknown."
All control rods fully inserted. Auxiliary Feedwater initiated normally. The licensee stated that there was no actual ECCS injection to the RCS. The plant electrical system responded normally and all emergency diesel generators remain operable. All ECCS systems remain operable. There are no primary to secondary leaks. Decay heat is currently being removed via the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and the atmospheric steam dumps. As of 1830 ET, primary pressure is approximately 2103 psi and pressurizer level is at 242 inches. Plant conditions are being stabilized at normal hot standby values . The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector who responded to the Control Room. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40473 |
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE SCHAEFER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
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Notification Date: 01/23/2004
Notification Time: 19:42 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2004
Event Time: 16:16 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
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Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
A/R |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Standby |
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO HIGH-HIGH STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL
"We make the following report per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). At 16:16 CST Unit 1 Reactor automatically tripped from full power due to [actual] high-high level in 1B Steam Generator. Prior to the trip, vital distribution panel 1201 lost power when it's normal power supply inverter failed. Steam Generators 1A and 1B levels were selected to instruments from this power supply [and therefore generating a false low level output]. Operators were in the process of taking manual control of 1A and 1B Main Feed regulating valves when the Main Turbine trip was actuated due to the high level in 1B Steam Generator. A reactor trip occurred due to the Turbine Trip above 50% power. The unit is stable at 567 degrees and 2235 pslg.
"We also make the following report per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Following the reactor trip the Auxiliary Feed Water System automatically actuated on [actual] low steam generator level. This is normal for a trip in the Unit 1 from full power.
"The following information is also provided: All control rods fully inserted. No primary reliefs lifted. Technical Specification 3.8.3.1 action b was entered due to the vital distribution panel not being energized from its normal source. (inverter). It is currently power from it's voltage regulator."
Decay heat is currently being removed via the steam dumps. The plant electrical system responded normally and all emergency diesel generators remain in standby. All ECCS systems remain operable. There are no primary to secondary leaks. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40474 |
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAN DALY
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
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Notification Date: 01/24/2004
Notification Time: 03:22 [ET]
Event Date: 01/24/2004
Event Time: 00:37 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/24/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
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Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 3 |
A/R |
Y |
96 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Shutdown |
Event Text
AUTO REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO AUTO MAIN TURBINE TRIP
At 0322 EST on 01/24/03, Licensee reported that at 0037 CST on 01/24/03, the Unit 3 reactor auto scrammed from 96% power due to an auto main turbine trip while performing weekly main turbine testing. All control rods inserted completely. Steam is being dumped to the main condenser. PCIS Group 2 (Containment Ventilation System) and Group 3 (Shutdown Cooling System) isolated as expected due to reactor vessel level decrease following the scram. Reactor vessel level is being maintained at normal level (30 inches) with the reactor feedwater system. Reactor pressure is 900 psig and moderator temperature is 530 degrees F. All systems functioned as expected. Unit 3 is in Condition 3 (Hot Shutdown). The cause of the main turbine trip is under investigation. This event had no effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40475 |
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HERBERT EADES
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
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Notification Date: 01/25/2004
Notification Time: 10:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2004
Event Time: 03:16 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
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Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
0 |
Startup |
0 |
Startup |
Event Text
UNPLANNED AUTO START OF TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP
"At 0316, EST, on 25 January 2004, the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP) was automatically started upon receipt of a valid start signal. The start of the pump was unplanned. At the time, the Unit 2 reactor was critical at [approximately] 0.001 % power as indicated on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Instruments (Unit 2 is emerging from a forced outage following main generator repairs). The steam generators were being supplied water by the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps.
"Shift operators were in the process of aligning the Unit 2 condensate system for cleanup and closed both (out of service) main feedwater pumps' suction isolation valves, as required by the procedure. Closure of a main feedwater pump's suction valve generates a main feedwater pump trip signal. Trip of both main feedwater pumps generates an automatic auxiliary feedwater system start signal.
"The start of the TDAFWP had no adverse effect on the unit. Operators reset one of the main feedwater pumps and secured the TDAFWP."
The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40476 |
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN REYMER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
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Notification Date: 01/25/2004
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2004
Event Time: 11:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
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Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Refueling |
0 |
Refueling |
Event Text
INOPERABLE REFUELING INTERLOCK
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Maintain Safe Shutdown and Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. During Unit 1 refueling operations, it was discovered at 1110 hours 1/25/04 CST that the Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock was inoperable. Because this interlock is credited for mitigating the "Control Rod Removal Error During Refueling" event evaluated in the UFSAR, this is reportable as an 8 hour ENS notification.
"With the Unit 1 Mode Switch in REFUEL, the one-rod-out interlock function was tested per LaSalle Operating Surveillance LOS-RD-SR4. Since the acceptance criterion of this surveillance was not met, the interlock was declared inoperable and the required actions of Technical Specification 3.9.2 entered. Currently all control rod withdrawals are suspended and all control rods are fully inserted in core cells containing fuel assemblies. The Unit 1 Mode Switch is in Shutdown. Actions are in progress to restore the One-Rod-Out Interlock to an operable status."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40477 |
Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CURTIS CASTELL
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
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Notification Date: 01/26/2004
Notification Time: 03:50 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2004
Event Time: 22:36 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/26/2004
|
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
|
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
|
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE COMMUNICATIONS DUE TO FAILED UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY
"At approximately 22:36 hours EST, on January 25, 2004, the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2, Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) computer system became inoperable due to a loss of the uninterruptible power supply (UPS). The ERFIS computer system provides monitoring and communications capability for plant data systems including the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Meteorological Data link system, FAX modems for Emergency Preparedness functions, and the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM). The loss of ERFIS requires alternate methods as described in plant procedures to be used for these functions, as necessary. Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still have been made as necessary, if required, during the time that the ERFIS was inoperable. The ERFIS computer system was restored at approximately 01:47 hours EST on January 26, 2004, using a back-up power supply. The cause of the loss of the ERFIS UPS has not yet been determined. Plant personnel are continuing to investigate the loss of the power supply and are in the process of repairing the UPS. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. As previously stated, alternate means remained available to assess plant conditions, make notifications, and accomplish required communications, as necessary."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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