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Transforming the Navy's Surface Combatant Force |
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March 2003 |
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Notes
Unless otherwise indicated, the years referred to in this study are
fiscal years and the dollar amounts are in 2003 dollars.
Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because of rounding.
The cover shows the Preble, an Arleigh Burke class (DDG-51) guided-missile destroyer (top), and an artist's rendering of the DD(X) future destroyer (bottom). (Pictures are courtesy of the Navy and Northrop Grumman, respectively.)
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Today, the U.S. Navy numbers about 300 ships, including a force of 115 surface combatants (cruisers, destroyers, and frigates). For the past
six years, the official force goal for surface combatants was 116. But
recently, senior Navy officials have argued that the nation needs a larger
Navy: 375 ships, including a surface combatant force of 160 ships. That
force would comprise 104 large cruisers and destroyers as well as 56 new,
much smaller vessels called littoral combat ships--which are expected to
be an important element of the Bush Administration's plans for transforming
the Navy. Those ships are intended to counter potential threats in the
world's coastal regions that, if left unchecked, could inhibit the Navy's
freedom of action. At the same time that it hopes to expand the fleet,
however, the Navy plans to retire many existing surface combatants early.
Reaching the Navy's new force goal by building more surface combatants
would require a substantial investment, which would compete with other
demands, including different transformation efforts and ship programs.
Are there ways to transform the surface combatant force within today's
funding level? This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study--prepared at
the request of the Subcommittee on Seapower of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services--examines that question. It looks at the Navy's modernization
plans for the surface combatant force and their budgetary implications.
The analysis also evaluates three options that would modernize and transform
that force at the current funding level. In keeping with CBO's mandate
to provide objective, impartial analysis, this study makes no recommendations.
Eric J. Labs of CBO's National Security Division wrote the study under
the general supervision of J. Michael Gilmore. Raymond Hall of CBO's Budget
Analysis Division prepared the cost estimates and wrote the appendix under
the general supervision of Jo Ann Vines. Ian MacLeod of the National Security
Division helped review the manuscript for factual accuracy. Lyle Nelson,
Arlene Holen, David Moore, Dennis Zimmerman, Tracy Foertsch, and R. William
Thomas of CBO provided thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of the study,
as did several officials of the Department of the Navy. In addition, numerous
Navy officials and analysts answered many requests for information. The
author is especially grateful to Robert Work of the Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, whose insights and comments were extremely valuable.
(The assistance of such external participants implies no responsibility
for the final product, which rests solely with CBO.)
Joseph Foote and Christian Spoor edited the study, and Leah Mazade proofread
it. Kathryn Winstead prepared the study for publication. Lenny Skutnik
printed the initial copies, and Annette Kalicki prepared the electronic
versions for CBO's Web site.
Douglas Holtz-Eakin
Director
March 2003
Tables |
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S-1. |
Average Annual Spending for Ship Construction, by Category, 1990-2020 |
S-2. |
The Surface Combatant Force in 2010 and 2025 Under Alternative
Force Structures |
1. |
Characteristics of Current and Proposed Surface Combatants |
2. |
Annual Operating Costs for Present and Future Classes of Navy Ships |
3. |
Average Annual Construction Spending and Procurement for Navy Ships,
by Category, 1990-2020 |
4. |
Summary of Program Changes and Assumptions Under Alternative Force
Structures Through 2025 |
5. |
Average Annual Spending for Procurement and Operation and Support,
2003-2025 |
6. |
Estimated Operating Costs for Future Classes of Navy Ships Using
Single Crews or Multiple Crews |
7. |
The Surface Combatant Force in 2025 Under Alternative Force Structures |
A-1. |
Estimated Production Schedule for New Surface Combatants, 2005-2025 |
A-2. |
CBO's Cost Estimate for the First DD(X) Destroyer |
A-3. |
CBO's Cost Estimate for the First CG(X) Cruiser |
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Figures |
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S-1. |
Inventory of Surface Combatants Under CBO's Estimate of the Navy's
160-Ship Plan, 2001-2025 |
S-2. |
Inventory of Surface Combatants Under Option I, 2001-2025 |
S-3. |
Inventory of Surface Combatants Under Option II, 2001-2025 |
S-4. |
Inventory of Surface Combatants Under Option III, 2001-2025 |
1. |
Composition of the Surface Combatant Force, 2002 |
2. |
The Number of Surface Combatants the Navy Needs, According to Various
Sources |
3. |
Inventory of Surface Combatants Under CBO's Estimate of the Navy's
160-Ship Plan, 2001-2025 |
4. |
Annual Purchases of Surface Combatants Under CBO's Estimate of the
Navy's 160-Ship Plan |
5. |
Inventory of Surface Combatants Under Option I, 2001-2025 |
6. |
Annual Purchases of Surface Combatants Under Option I, 2001-2025 |
7. |
Inventory of Surface Combatants Under Option II, 2001-2025 |
8. |
Annual Purchases of Surface Combatants Under Option II, 2001-2025 |
9. |
Inventory of Surface Combatants Under Option III, 2001-2025 |
10. |
Annual Purchases of Surface Combatants Under Option III, 2001-2025 |
11. |
Notional Multiple-Crew Deployment Cycle for Future Surface Combatants |
12. |
Number of Surface Combatants On-Station in Peacetime Under Alternative
Force Structures, 2001-2025 |
13. |
Number of Surface Combatants That Could Be Surged to Northeast Asia
and the Persian Gulf in Wartime Under Alternative Force Structures, 2010-2025 |
14. |
Number of Ships Capable of Long-Range Air and Missile Defense On-Station
in Peacetime Under Alternative Force Structures, 2001-2025 |
15. |
Number of Ships Capable of Long-Range Air and Missile Defense That
Could Be Surged to Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf in Wartime Under
Alternative Force Structures, 2010-2025 |
16. |
Number of Helicopter Hangars On-Station in Peacetime Under Alternative
Force Structures, 2001-2025 |
17. |
Number of Helicopter Hangars That Could Be Surged to Northeast Asia
and the Persian Gulf in Wartime Under Alternative Force Structures, 2010-2025 |
18. |
Number of VLS Cells on Surface Combatants On-Station in Peacetime
Under Alternative Force Structures, 2001-2025 |
19. |
Number of VLS Cells on Surface Combatants That Could Be Surged to
Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf in Wartime Under Alternative Force
Structures, 2010-2025 |
20. |
Number of Ships with Penetrating Littoral ASW Suites On-Station
in Peacetime Under Alternative Force Structures, 2010-2025 |
21. |
Number of Ships with Penetrating Littoral ASW Suites That Could
Be Surged to Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf in Wartime Under Alternative
Force Structures, 2010-2025 |
22. |
Amount of Gunfire Support On-Station in Peacetime Under Alternative
Force Structures, 2015 and 2025 |
23. |
Amount of Gunfire Support That Could Be Surged to Northeast Asia
and the Persian Gulf in Wartime Under Alternative Force Structures, 2015
and 2025 |
24. |
Total Number of Next-Generation Ships Under Alternative Force Structures,
2010-2025 |
25. |
Total Crew Size of the Surface Combatant Force Under Alternative
Force Structures, 2001-2025 |
26. |
Average Age of the Surface Combatant Force Under Alternative Force
Structures, 2001-2025 |
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Boxes |
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1. |
Force Structure Under the Navy's New Operational Concept |
2. |
The Role of Helicopters in Countering Area-Denial Threats |
3. |
Providing Logistics Support to a Navy That Has Littoral Combat Ships |
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