A much-feared World War III never came to pass in the 20th century. In fact, the Cold War ended in 1989 with the thud of the falling Berlin Wall and the colossal statues of Lenin rather than with nuclear bombs. Instead, many regional wars broke out both during and after the Cold War, caused by centuries of ethnic and religious conflict that had been held in check by colonization and occupation. There were military operations overseen by supranational organizations, such as the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which enforced treaties or helped with humanitarian activities. The world looked to the United States, as one of the two superpowers, to lead the way in these conflicts, a position that did not always make it happy.

 

Following its defeat in Vietnam, it seemed to many that the United States was increasingly reluctant to become involved in foreign conflicts. Called the "Vietnam Syndrome," American leaders would not commit forces to foreign confrontations unless they could send overwhelming numbers, with full congressional and public support and an assurance of a quick victory. In the public eye, each time foreign military involvement was considered, the question loomed, "Could this be another Vietnam?"

 

However, when national security was threatened, the United States rarely hesitated to use its might. Public outrage over such events was so clear that the government knew swift military action was the course to take.

 

The best example of this was the 1986 American attack on Libya, called Operation Eldorado Canyon, in response to evidence that Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi, was sponsoring international terrorism, including a bombing at a Berlin disco that had killed American servicemen. On the night of April 14, F-111 Aardvarks took off from England on a 6,300-mile (10,139-kilometer), 14-hour trip around the coasts of Europe. Requiring eight refuelings, the lengthy trip was necessary because countries closer to Libya--Spain, Italy, and Greece--had refused American planes permission to fly from bases in their countries and France had denied overflight rights because of the potential of revenge terrorism.

 

The Aardvarks were met by an escort group from aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean and arrived in Libya early on the morning of the 15th. For 13 minutes, bombs rained down on various Libyan government buildings and three of the 30 Libyan terrorist training camps. The rules of engagement, designed to avoid civilian casualties, prevented six aircraft from launching their missiles and another eight had equipment problems. The other four F-111s, using the AN/AVQ-26 Pave Tack infrared and laser targeting system, destroyed their targets, including a fleet of transport aircraft. Other bombs fell on Qaddafi’s compound, barely missing his home. Then the planes left Libya and returned to base, as quickly as they had arrived.

 

President Ronald Reagan had sent Libya a message. And although Qaddafi continued to support terrorism, his influence in the Arab and terrorist worlds had been reduced. It was a fast action; there was no time for questioning the tactics or worrying about a quagmire.

 

Other threats to America’s national security yielded similar actions. After truck bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya were linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist network in 1998, President Bill Clinton ordered Tomahawk cruise missile attacks on targets in Afghanistan and Sudan that were linked to the terrorists. In Panama, military installations were bombed by F-117As in December 1989 for dictator Manuel Noriega’s part in supporting the drug trade,. With the Panamanian military stunned by the attacks from the new fighter-bombers, Lockheed C-114s with the 82nd Airborne Division landed at an air base, accompanied by a planeload of reporters chartered by NBC News, to occupy the city and arrest Noriega. In less than two weeks, the operation was over. The message was clear: threaten the United States and your cities will be bombed.

 

The largest of these operations was launched after the Al Qaeda attacks on New York City and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Since the Al Qaeda was an organization, not a nation, Operation Enduring Freedom was targeted at supposed Al Qaeda strongholds and the governments that assisted them. Beginning in the skies over Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, cruise missiles and aircraft, including B-52s and F-117s, began to bomb, preparing strategic locations for the arrival of ground troops on October 19. After the troops arrived, the bombings continued, targeted mainly at strongly held locations such as mountain ridges and caves. By December, the Afghani ruling party, the Taliban, had fled the country but military activity continued the attempt to find any remaining Al Qaeda members in the country. Because of Al Qaeda’s global reach, the U.S. government began to plan operations in other countries in its effort to curtail the terrorist organization’s power.

 

In comparison to these "hyper-wars," there were situations where the United States was more hesitant because the conflict could not be solved with a few bombing runs. These often involved humanitarian issues, where much of the world community felt there was something wrong but where a military solution was unclear.

 

One such case the Americans became involved in was Somalia, where famine was caused by warlords disrupting humanitarian aide. Operation Restore Hope in 1992 was supposed to be quick--U.S. troops would secure the country, then U.N. troops would arrive to oversee food distribution and nation-building. But the plan changed and the Americans stayed in the country, using air power to strike targets identified with the warlords. A special operations action, Task Force Ranger, intended to capture the leading warlord, became a disaster as a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter supporting the operation was downed. By the end of the day, 18 American soldiers were dead, two helicopters were lost and the bodies of two helicopter crewmen had been dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. The remaining American troops were quickly pulled out.

 

The role of the United States in the former Yugoslavia was even more undefined, mirroring the uncertainties of the war between the region’s ethnicities. The conflict raged for more than a decade, but the world community tried to remain neutral, even when there was evidence of genocide. Beginning in December 1992, NATO instituted Operation Provide Hope to bring humanitarian relief to Bosnia, one of the newly formed nations. Operating much like the Berlin Airlift, 21 nations became involved in the three-and-a-half year operation; landing cargo planes at the Sarajevo airport when it was safe or airdropping pallets of supplies if the airfield was covered with ground fire. NATO planes brought 160,536 tons of materials to the region over this period, helping to save it from disaster.

 

In 1993, the NATO mission was expanded to fighter patrols and airborne monitoring over the region to deter Serbian air attacks. The Serbians backed down after four of their airplanes were shot down by two F-16 Fighting Falcons.

 

While the Dayton Peace Accord of 1995 ended fighting in Bosnia, evidence of ethnic cleansing by the Serbians against the Albanians in Kosovo became too blatant to ignore. In March 1999 NATO ordered Operation Allied Force, the largest military action in Europe since World War II. For 10 weeks and 35,000 missions, the NATO nations bombed military targets in Kosovo and the Serbian capital, Belgrade. The missions were the first for the new Northrop B2A Spirit bomber, but the old reliable Boeing B-52s were also used. Extreme care was taken to avoid civilian casualties, but there were some mistakes, including the bombing of the Chinese Embassy and a column of fleeing refugees. On the 79th day of bombing, negotiations ended the air strikes and the Serbians withdrew from Kosovo.

 

In the years since Vietnam, the U.S. military has placed much faith in bombing, both as a quick attack tactic and as a pre-invasion one. Bombers send a clear message to a country, and expose American troops to the least risk. But in the new century, wars between nations are being replaced by wars against terrorist groups or other factions of society. Bombing a city to the ground is no longer the most feasible option. What the future of air war will bring is anyone’s guess, but the U.S. military has not retired its B-52s yet.

 

--Pamela Feltus

 

References:

Boyne, Walter. Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the U.S. Air Force 1947-1997. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.

Gunston, Bill. History of Military Aviation. London: Hamlyn, 2000.

Hallion, Richard P. Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992.

Knaul, Jonathan. "Memories of Kosovo." Air & Space, December 2000-January 2001.

Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996.

 

CNN Bosnia: http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/index.html

Frontline: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/

Military.com on Black Hawk Down: http://www.military.com/ContentFiles/BHDbackgroundM

Ranger History: Task Force Range http://www.ranger.org/usara/s3/Ops/history/somalia.htm

 

Educational Organization	Standard Designation  (where applicable)	Content of Standard
International Technology Education Association	Standard 4	Students will develop an understanding of the cultural, social, economic, and political effects of technology.
National Center for History in the Schools	World History Era 9 Standard 3	Major global trends since World War II