Yes We Are Safer

Last week, the nation marked the seventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks in solemn fashion, focusing on memorials and reflection, rather than on point scoring. Too bad Richard Clarke couldn’t manage to do the same.

Clarke, the official in charge of antiterrorism efforts before 9/11, commemorated the anniversary of the attacks by publishing a finger-pointing screed in U.S. News and World Report.

Clarke’s argument went something like the following: Here we are, seven years after 9/11. We haven’t been attacked. But we could be. Al Qaeda still exists, Bin Laden remains at large, and terrorists still commit terrorism. We’re backsliding, and no safer now then we were then. On the home front, our borders are still porous, we’re still not screening people, and security grants are too much about pork and not enough about real risk.

Clarke is mostly wrong.

In fact, we are safer today than we were seven years ago. We haven’t been attacked since 9/11 in part because we have destroyed al Qaeda’s headquarters, enhanced our intelligence assets across the globe, captured and killed terrorists on nearly every continent, and partnered with our allies on information sharing and other security-related efforts.

Today, al Qaeda no longer has a state sponsor. Contrary to Clarke’s claims, most of its original leadership has been captured or killed. It is losing in Iraq -- thanks to the surge and to the Awakening movement among the Sunni tribes--and its savage attacks on innocents have reduced its popularity there and across the Muslim world. Muslim scholars and clerics are increasingly condemning its beliefs and behavior as a desecration of Islam.

This progress has come because we abandoned the practice of treating terrorism solely as a criminal matter – exactly the kind of September 10 policy that Clarke celebrates in his article.

Closer to home, the Department of Homeland Security has made clear progress that belies Clarke’s claims.

At the border that Clarke thinks is so porous, DHS has built hundreds of miles of fence and will double the size of the Border Patrol. We’ve also deployed fingerprint-based screening and radiation portal monitors at all of our border entry points.

To protect against a repeat attack, DHS has built nearly two dozen layers of security into our aviation system, and it has developed comprehensive security plans for other critical infrastructure.

Clarke claims that the executive branch has proved incapable of managing new terrorism programs to success. Tell that to US-VISIT – a massive government IT project that compares fingerprints of travelers to a database of millions and does it in 30 seconds for officials all across the country and the world. We got it up and running from scratch, despite the doubters. And it’s so successful that we’re expanding it to collect all ten prints and to compare them to prints found in terrorist safe houses around the world. We’ve done all that since Dick Clarke left government – and without a word of support from him.

Despite his claims of backsliding, it’s DHS that has been battling complacency, and Clarke who seems to have been sitting on the sidelines.

We’re the ones who’ve been fighting for the carefully targeted, risk-based homeland security grants he favors. It’s Congress that has added billions and made them less risk-based. Has Clarke criticized Congress or praised DHS for our risk based approach? If so, I missed it.

On our southern border, DHS’s fence-building and increased border enforcement have been hampered by local NIMBY (“not-in-my-backyard”) forces and advocates for illegal immigration. Did Dick Clarke speak out against them? Not so I’ve noticed.

To secure our northern border, we’re implementing tougher document standards, and we were ready to require all travelers to produce a passport or passport-equivalent by the end of this year. Where was Dick Clarke when Congress decided to push back that deadline to mid-2009? I don’t remember an op-ed then complaining about how porous this would make our Canadian border.

Clarke says that terrorists who look European have been trained by al Qaeda and may have European Union passports and clean identities unknown to intelligence agencies. He thinks such people could enter the United States almost as easily as did the 9/11 hijackers. It’s indeed true that during Dick Clarke’s tenure, Europeans could come to the US without any opportunity to screen them before they were in the air. As of this January, though, no foreign travelers other than Canadians will be able to come to the US without supplying -- in advance -- the information we need to screen them. At last, we’ll have the time and information we need to investigate risky travelers (and to prepare a rude surprise for terrorists who try this route). That’s all happened since Dick Clarke left government, and without any support from him.

There’s no question that Dick Clarke contributed to strengthening our national security, but his recent assertions are not only incorrect, they disrespect the work of many national security professionals he once called colleagues. That is indeed unfortunate.

Stewart Baker
Assistant Secretary for Policy

A National Fusion Center Network

The Department and states have made a lot of progress in making the State and Local Fusion Center Program -- a key provision of the 9/11 Commission Implementation Act -- a success in the last three years. Now we are committed to building on that success by supporting the implementation of a National Fusion Center Network.

What do I mean by that? Working with our colleagues in the Department of Justice, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment, the National Fusion Center Network strategy will connect more than 50 state and major city fusion centers and the federal government in a partnership to protect America.

I envision a community of state, local and federal intelligence and law enforcement professionals working together – supported by appropriate tools – to achieve a common goal: protection of the nation.

These men and women would leverage federal as well as state and local networks; move relevant information and intelligence quickly; and enable rapid analytic and operational judgments. That is what this National Fusion Center Network is all about.

Our ability to move, analyze and act on information is our greatest strength. We must use the network and the information in that network to push our defensive perimeter outward. That’s what the National Fusion Center Network will do for us.

We in the federal government recognize that state and local authorities have been working at this for years. We, particularly those of us in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the rest of the National Intelligence Community, must aggressively support the states in this endeavor and become a committed partner in creating the National Fusion Center Network.

That is exactly what we are doing.

Intelligence officers equipped with exiting capabilities are helping local authorities as needed and appropriate. In addition, information once only available in cities and states can be shared with the federal government and used to protect the nation as a whole.

This is all very new and different for the Intelligence Community. We are working hard to educate ourselves on the information needs of our state, local and tribal partners, as well as increase our ability to provide them information.

And we all must do this while paying the utmost respect to the civil liberties and privacy of our citizens.

Creating this National Fusion Center Network is a challenging but achievable task. We are doing many things for the first time, and will likely make mistakes. But we will learn from those mistakes, do better, and create what the country should have had before 9/11.

Charlie Allen

Under Secretary for Intelligence & Analysis

In Case You Missed It

While the media dwell on celebrity peccadilloes and microscopic analysis of political comments, sometimes really important news gets overlooked. Right now, buried in the pages of a number of U.S. newspapers is a very significant story that tells us a lot about why we need some of the moderately inconvenient security measures with which we live.

If you fly commercially, you will remember that about 18 months ago new restrictions on hand-carried liquids were imposed at airports here and overseas. As we explained at the time, these actions were the result of a major disrupted plot to detonate liquid explosives on airliners flying from Britain to North America. Because we couldn’t say more without violating British legal rules, some of you may have wondered whether the plot was all that serious.

The trial of a number of the plotters is now underway in a London courtroom. The details being unfolded are riveting – and chilling. Unfortunately, the trial is not getting much play in our domestic news outlets, but the evidence should be required reading for those who travel by air.

As the prosecutor has explained, the plotters intended to smuggle liquid explosives on airplanes in plastic bottles of popular soft drinks. To conceal the liquid explosives, the terrorists injected them into the bottles with a syringe and used food coloring to approximate the appearance of a drink. Blueprints showed in court demonstrated how the explosives could be combined with detonators in mid-air.

The targets: at least half a dozen flights, including aircraft headed for Washington, D.C., New York, Chicago, and San Francisco.

Particularly disturbing, the terrorists intended to detonate these bombs only when the aircraft were all midway over the Atlantic Ocean and packed with summer travelers. The sinister idea was that after the first plane exploded, the others would be too far from land to reach safety before the next detonation.

Not much imagination is required to conceive of the horror that would have been experienced when word of the first explosion reached crews and even passengers of other transatlantic flights.

Was the plot real? The courtroom was told that the plot was “almost ready.”

I recommend following this story in the newspapers over the next few weeks (if you can find it). The evidence is powerful proof of the reason that we work 24/7 to avert terrorist plots by devoting time, money, and energy to security.

Michael Chertoff

Preventing IED Attacks

Earlier today I gave a speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies on the Department’s efforts to prevent the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against our country. All of us have seen the horrible images of our soldiers being attacked overseas by roadside bombs and other forms of IEDs. Over the past two decades, IEDs have been used by terrorists in attacks ranging from the U.S.S. Cole to the London and Madrid bombings to the Oklahoma City attack in 1995. IEDs remain a terrorist weapon of choice: they are easy to make, difficult to defend against, and cause untold death and destruction.

Our Department is 100 percent committed to protecting the people of the United States from IEDs. All of our counterterrorism efforts focus directly or indirectly on bombing prevention--whether that involves screening passengers for explosives at airports, checking cargo for radiological materials that can be used to make “dirty bombs,” protecting dangerous chemicals from theft, hardening critical infrastructure, advancing research and technology to defeat IEDs, or sharing information and intelligence with state and local partners.

These efforts are not scattershot or uncoordinated. Within the Department, we established an Office for Bombing Prevention specifically to work with other federal, state, and local agencies, as well as members of the private sector, to implement a national strategy to address IED threats. This office also sponsors TRIPWire, an information sharing portal that brings together bomb squad technicians, intelligence analysts, and state and local law enforcement to share expertise on the latest terrorist IED tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Our Science and Technology Directorate is also leveraging the vast knowledge and expertise of our nation’s science and research community to develop next generation IED screening tools and countermeasures. This includes technology to identify and alert authorities to suspicious behaviors that precede an IED attack, and developing bomb-resistant materials and barriers to minimize damage after an explosion.

At our airports, we’ve deployed a full complement of screening tools and procedures, from bomb-sniffing “puffer” machines to explosives detection canine teams to Bomb Appraisal Officers trained to look at a person’s behavior for signs of malicious intent. We’re also stepping up security requirements for chemical sites and facilities, small planes, and small boats operating in U.S. waters.

In all of this, we are making it harder for terrorists to acquire materials to make IEDs. We are educating state and local partners on the latest IED threats and techniques. We are working with the private sector to elevate security in and around critical infrastructure. And we are providing substantial resources, including $1.7 billion to date in grants for IED prevention, detection, protection, and response.

There is no guarantee against an IED attack, but we are raising our barrier against the use of this deadly terrorist weapon. Of course, an alert and informed public is a key part of our nation’s defense. We appreciate your continued vigilance and your support.

Michael Chertoff

Exercising the Team

This week we’ll conduct a major counterterrorism exercise, so I want to take an opportunity to fill you in on just what it will entail, the benefits it will produce, and why we conduct exercises in the first place.

The Top Officials 4 exercise (or TOPOFF 4 as it’s commonly called) is a week-long endeavor that starts today and focuses on simulated terrorist incidents occurring in Arizona, Oregon, and the U.S. territory of Guam. It’s the fourth of a series of congressionally-mandated exercises that involves participants at all levels of government, the private sector, as well as some of our international partners. In fact, TOPOFF 4 will be the largest and most comprehensive national-level exercise to date, and will include more than 15,000 participants.

It will not only test our ability to respond effectively to multiple attacks, but also provide a realistic environment in which to assess our preparedness efforts and enhance coordination among federal, state, local and international partners.

A full-scale exercise like TOPOFF 4 is incredibly valuable. Responding to and effectively managing a terrorist attack or natural disaster requires close coordination with a variety of people and organizations. Problems with logistics, personnel, and information flow can cost lives and must be worked out before a disaster strikes, rather than in the middle of a crisis. Exercises are a welcome opportunity to address these issues.

Similar to the way football teams practice for game day, we prepare for real world disasters by constantly conducting small exercises throughout the year, and applying what we learn to larger and more complex events like TOPOFF. Our goal is to push our systems to the breaking point--and beyond--to help us better understand what things perform well and what areas need work.

After we complete an exercise, we review the results, address any problems that arose, and share the lessons learned with our homeland security partners throughout the government and private sector. While not released to the general public, we do circulate these results promptly to our state and local partners to reduce vulnerabilities identified within the exercise. Most importantly, we apply these lessons learned to real-world situations.

Thanks for reading, and I look forward to hearing from you.

Michael Chertoff