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Home > Electronic Reading Room > Document Collections > Fact Sheets > Design Basis Threat Rulemaking
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Design Basis Threat Rulemaking
The revised Design Basis Threat (DBT) rule was issued in March 2007. The rule describes general adversary characteristics that nuclear power plants must defend against. All existing nuclear power plants and Category I Fuel Cycle Facilities – and any built in the future – must adhere to this rule. The new rule also reflects insights gained by the NRC since 9/11, the latest threat information and a strengthened cyber threat component, as suggested by Congress and the public. In all, the NRC received and considered over 900 public comments on the rule.
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Chairman Dale Klein:
"This rule is an important piece, but only one piece, of a broader effort to enhance nuclear power plant security. Overall we are taking a multifaceted approach to security enhancements in this post 9/11 threat environment, and looking at how best to secure existing nuclear power plants and how to incorporate security enhancements into design features of new reactors that may be built in coming years."
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“Overall we
are taking a
multifaceted
approach to security
enhance-
ments...”
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Energy Policy Act of 2005
In this legislation, Congress outlined 12 factors that the NRC considered when developing the new DBT rule. Among those factors were:
- An assessment of physical, cyber, biochemical, and other terrorist threats;
- The potential for attack on facilities by multiple coordinated teams of a large number of individuals and several insiders;
- The potential for suicide attacks;
- The potential for water-based and air-based threats;
- The potential use of explosive devices of considerable size and other modern weaponry;
- The potential for attacks by persons with a sophisticated knowledge of facility operations;
- The potential for possibly long-lived fires.
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