## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,	§	
	§	
Plaintiff,	§	Civil Action No.:
	§	
VS.	8	
	8	<b>COMPLAINT</b>
JIM BOB BROWN,	§	
	§	
Defendant.	§	
	§	
	§	

## **COMPLAINT**

The United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") files this suit against Defendant Jim Bob Brown ("Brown" or "Defendant") and would respectfully show the Court as follows:

## **SUMMARY**

- 1. This action arises from multiple violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") and other federal securities laws by Brown, a former employee of a subsidiary of Willbros Group, Inc. ("Willbros Group"). Brown, a United States citizen and employee of Willbros affiliates for more than 20 years, worked extensively in the company's Nigerian and Latin American operations, rising to the level of Managing Director.
- 2. During the course of his employment, Brown participated in multiple bribery schemes, both in Nigeria and in Ecuador. In early 2005, Brown, along with other employees of Willbros Group subsidiaries, helped deliver \$1.5 million in cash to Nigerian officials to settle in part previously-made "commitments" designed to help the company obtain one or more projects,

including one project that has generated revenues in excess of \$240 million for Wilbros Group

and its business partners. In addition, Brown participated in a long-running scheme to

fraudulently use the company's petty cash accounts in Nigeria to make a variety of corrupt

payments to Nigerian tax and court officials. Finally, in 2004, Brown participated in a scheme

that paid over \$300,000 to officials of PetroEcuador, an oil and gas company wholly-owned by

the government of Ecuador, and its subsidiary, PetroComerical, in connection with a contract

that ultimately generated total revenues of \$3.4 million.

3. The Commission, in the interest of protecting the public from any further illegal

activity, brings this action against the Defendant seeking permanent injunctive relief to prevent

future violations of the federal securities laws and a civil monetary penalty.

**JURISDICTION AND VENUE** 

This court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Exchange Act Sections

21(d)(3) and 27 [15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(3) and 78aa]. Defendant, directly and indirectly, made use

of the mails and of the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce in connection with the

acts, practices and courses of business described in this Complaint. Venue is proper because

many of the transactions, acts, practices and courses of business described below occurred within

the jurisdiction of the Southern District of Texas.

**DEFENDANT** 

5. Jim Bob Brown, age 45, is a United States citizen and former employee of

Willbros International, Inc. ("Willbros International"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Willbros

Group, Inc. Brown worked for Willbros affiliates from 1984 through his termination in April

2005. He was assigned to Nigeria from 1991 through August 2000, rising to the level of

Division Manager of Willbros (Nigeria) Limited, a Willbros subsidiary in Nigeria. In August

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2000, he became the Managing Director of the company's subsidiary in Venezuela, where he

also supervised business development efforts in Ecuador. In late 2004, Brown transferred back

to Nigeria, as Managing Director. His employment was terminated in April 2005.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

6. Willbros Group, Inc., is an international oil and gas pipeline company

incorporated in Panama since 1975 (its predecessor companies date back to 1908). From 1975

until 2000, its principal place of business was Tulsa, Oklahoma, until it relocated to Houston in

2000. Willbros Group provides construction, engineering and other services in the oil and gas

industries. Willbros Group, which became a public company in 1996, has a class of securities

registered under Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act and its shares are traded on the New York

Stock Exchange. Willbros Group conducts all of its operations outside of North America

through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Willbros International, Inc. Like Willbros Group, Willbros

International is incorporated in Panama and maintained its principal place of business in Tulsa

until 2000, when it moved its headquarters to Houston. In turn, it has conducted business in

Nigeria for over 40 years - primarily through three affiliates: Willbros West Africa, Inc., a

wholly-owned subsidiary of Willbros International; Willbros Nigeria, Ltd., a majority-owned

subsidiary of Willbros West Africa; and Willbros Offshore Nigeria, Inc., a majority-owned

subsidiary of Willbros West Africa.

7. In order to pursue certain projects in Nigeria, Willbros West Africa formed a joint

venture consortium with a Nigerian subsidiary of a German engineering and construction

company ("the consortium"). In December 2004, the consortium submitted a commercial

proposal seeking to be awarded some or all of the Eastern Gas Gathering Systems ("EGGS")

project, a natural gas pipeline system. The project contemplated multiple components, which

will be generally referred to here as EGGS Phase 1 and EGGS Phase 2.

8. Although EGGS Phase 2 was a separate component of the project, it was

understood by the joint venture consortium that the entity that performed EGGS Phase 1 would

in also perform EGGS Phase 2. The commercial proposal was submitted to the operator of a

joint venture ("the Nigerian joint venture") that is controlled by the Nigerian National Petroleum

Corporation ("NNPC"), an arm of the Nigerian government, and its subsidiary, the National

Petroleum Investment Management Services ("NAPIMS")(employees, agents, and officials of

the operator, the Nigerian joint venture, NNPC, and NAPIMS will be referred to here as

"Nigerian officials.") The consortium was ultimately awarded the project, and, to date, that

project has generated revenue of over \$240 million.

9. Prior to and during the bidding process, the former President of Willbros

International and certain employees of Willbros West Africa's joint venture partner, plotted to

make more than \$6 million in payments to various Nigerian officials. To implement this

scheme, an outside consultant based in the United Kingdom ("the UK Consultant") invoiced the

company for purported "consulting" services, when in fact some or all of that money was

intended for corrupt payments. The money disbursed to the UK Consultant was improperly

recorded in Willbros Group's books and records as consulting expenses or other business

expenses. Through this scheme, a portion of these so-called "commitments" had been paid by

late 2004.

In November 2004, Brown transferred from his position in South America to

become Managing Director within the company's Nigerian operations. During this time, Brown

worked closely with the then-President of Willbros International. In December 2004, a Bolivian

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newspaper reported that a Willbros Group subsidiary in Bolivia had been accused of

implementing a scheme, which included possible payments to Bolivian tax officials, to illegally

minimize certain of the subsidiary's tax obligations. On January 6, 2005, Willbros Group

announced that the President of Willbros International had resigned and that the company was

investigating that issue.

11. Shortly thereafter, Brown (and other employees of Willbros affiliates in Nigeria

and elsewhere) learned that the company was conducting an internal investigation into the

circumstances that had led to the former President's resignation. As part of that process, the

company's general counsel e-mailed Brown and others, prohibiting any further payments to,

among other persons and entities, the UK Consultant.

12. During this same time period, unidentified persons began telephoning Brown and

other Willbros employees to complain that the "commitments" were not being met. As a result,

Brown and other employees of Willbros Group's affiliates, in concert with their counterparts at

their consortium partner, determined to resume the payments to avoid jeopardizing the

consortium's existing operations and the re-opening for additional bids the EGGS Phase 2 work.

13. In February 2005, Brown, along with another Willbros-affiliate employee, several

employees of Willbros's consortium partner, and a Nigerian consultant, participated in a meeting

to devise a way to continue the payments. At that meeting, it was agreed that Willbros-affiliate

employees would raise \$1,550,000 to pay a portion of the outstanding commitments.

14. Because the UK Consultant was no longer available as a source of funding,

Brown and the others sought alternative sources. Ultimately, Brown procured \$1 million by

executing a loan agreement on behalf of Willbros West Africa with the company's consortium

partner. Brown then delivered this cash to a third party with the understanding that the third

party would deliver it to Nigerian officials.

15. In addition, Brown's co-worker (who had attended the February 2005 meeting)

borrowed, in Nigerian currency, the equivalent of roughly \$550,000 from another source. With

Brown's knowledge and approval this money was delivered to third parties with the

understanding that the third parties would deliver the money to the Nigerian officials.

16. Brown further worked towards procuring a source to continue making the illicit

payments. He sent an e-mail to Willbros personnel in the company's administrative headquarters

in Houston asking that the company enter a new consultancy contract with a new "consultant."

Ultimately, after receiving what he perceived as authorization, Brown entered the contract.

Shortly thereafter Willbros Group's general counsel instructed Brown and others that no

payments were to be made under the agreement until it had been more fully reviewed pursuant to

heightened FCPA procedures the company was implementing. Ultimately, the contract did not

survive that scrutiny.

17. From at least the early 1990's through 2005, employees of Willbros Group or its

affiliates in Nigeria used petty cash accounts to, among other things, make repeated bribes to

Nigerian tax and court officials.

18. For example, Willbros, in order to maintain its operations in Nigeria, must pay

taxes administered by various Nigerian states, including a Pay-As-You-Earn ("PAYE") tax,

which is based on employee earnings and which Willbros deducts from its workers' salaries. In

order to reduce this tax obligation, employees of Willbros affiliates bribed auditors responsible

for determining the amount of tax owed.

19. During this same time period, Willbros employees payed clerks and other officials

within the Nigerian judicial system in exchange for favorable treatment in pending cases. These

payments to court and tax officials were disguised within the company's petty cash processes.

Certain employees of Willbros Group's subsidiaries created excess petty cash funds by

submitting fictitious invoices from non-existent vendors. These fabricated invoices were used to

obtain cash (ultimately over \$7 million) from the company's administrative headquarters in the

United States. At least \$300,000 of this money was used to make the payments to Nigerian tax

and court officials discussed above. Brown knowingly participated in this scheme. As a

supervisor in Nigeria, Brown knew about this conduct and did nothing to intervene. In addition,

on occasion, he instructed others to procure the fabricated invoices necessary to obtain the excess

cash.

20. In addition, Willbros Group conducted business in Ecuador through Willbros

Servicios Obras y Sistemas ("Willbros Ecuador"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Willbros

International. In 2000, Brown was transferred to South America, where he served as Managing

Director of a Willbros affiliate in Venezuela. Brown was further asked to help supervise the

company's efforts to obtain business in Ecuador.

21. In late 2003, Brown's supervisor instructed another, Ecuador-based, individual to

pursue business prospects in Ecuador ("the Ecuador employee"). The Ecuador employee

telephoned Brown and informed him that the company could obtain a \$3 million contract to

modify a pipeline running from Santo Domingo to El Beaterio, Ecuador ("the Santa Domingo

Project"), if the company would agree to pay \$300,000 (10% of the contract value) to certain

officials of PetroEcuador, an oil-and-gas company wholly-owned by the government of Ecuador,

and its subsidiary, PetroComercial (collectively, these entities will be referred to here as

"PetroEcuador"). The scheme called for \$150,000 to be paid up front, with the remaining

\$150,000 to be paid at completion of the project. Ultimately, Brown and the Ecuador employee

agreed to make the payments, and in March 2004, the company announced that it had received a

letter of intent for the Santo Domingo Project.

22. Throughout the January – June 2004 time period, Brown communicated by e-mail

and telephone with his supervisor to arrange the transfer of \$150,000 to employees of Willbros

Ecuador so that they could deliver the money to PetroEcuador officials. One or more of these e-

mail communications were sent from Brown in Venezuela through Willbros Group's server

located in Houston, Texas.

23. In June 2004, Brown's supervisor directed an outside consultant to wire \$150,000

to the bank account of a second Willbros Ecuador employee, so that the money could be then be

used to make the payments to the PetroEcuador officials. The Ecaudor employee confirmed to

Brown that the money had been received and would be delivered.

24. While the Santo Domingo Project was underway, the PetroEcuador officials

involved in the scheme were replaced. The former officials, however, continued to insist on

receiving the second installment, while the newly installed officials also insisted on receiving

payments. To resolve this problem, Brown attended a meeting at which the Ecuador employee

met with both former and current officials. Brown attended this meeting to ensure that the

PetroEcuador officials understood that the Ecuador employee had the full backing of the

company. Brown authorized the Ecuador employee to resolve the situation. Ultimately, acting

on that authorization, the Ecuador employee brokered a deal to pay the former officials an

additional \$90,000 and the new officials \$165,000. In return for this agreement, Willbros would

retain the Santo Domingo project and would be awarded a second project. The money for these

payments was transferred to the private bank accounts of Ecuadorian employees of Willbros and

their family members. These disbursements were falsely recorded in the company's books and

records as "consulting" expenses, "platform expenses," or as "prepaid expenses."

25. The company ultimately performed the Santa Domingo project, which generated

revenues of roughly \$3.4 million. When the bribes pertaining to the second project were

discovered in 2005, the company relinquished the project.

**CLAIMS** 

FIRST CLAIM

**Violations of Exchange Act Section 30A** 

26. Paragraphs 1 through 25 are re-alleged and incorporated by reference.

27. As described above, Defendant, acting on behalf of Willbros Group and its

subsidiaries, made use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce

corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of

any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value, to

foreign officials for the purposes of influencing their acts or decisions, securing an improper

advantage, or inducing them to use their influence, to assist Willbros Group in obtaining or

retaining business.

28. In addition, Defendant was a United States person as that term is defined in

Section 32A(g)(2) of the Exchange Act, was an officer, director, employee or agent of Willbros

Group acting on behalf of Willbros Group, and corruptly committed acts outside the United

States in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any

money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value, to

foreign officials for the purposes of influencing their acts or decisions, securing an improper

advantage, or inducing them to use their influence, to assist Willbros Group in obtaining or

retaining business.

29. By reason of the foregoing, Defendant Brown violated, and unless restrained and

enjoined will continue to violate, Section 30A of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1].

SECOND CLAIM

Violations of Exchange Act Section 13(b)(5) and Rule 13b2-1

30. Paragraphs 1 through 25 are re-alleged and incorporated by reference.

31. As described above, Defendant knowingly circumvented Willbros Group's

internal accounting controls and, directly or indirectly, falsified or caused to be falsified books,

records, or accounts of Willbros Group subject to Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2) [15 U.S.C. §

78m(b)(2)].

32. By reason of the foregoing, Defendant Brown violated, and unless restrained and

enjoined will continue to violate, Section 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act Rule 13b2-1 thereunder

[15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1].

THIRD CLAIM

Aiding and Abetting Violations of Exchange Act Section 30A

33. Paragraphs 1 through 25 are re-alleged and incorporated by reference.

34. As described above, Defendant knowingly provided substantial efforts to others

who, acting on behalf of Willbros Group and its subsidiaries, made use of the mails or any means

or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise

to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or

authorization of the giving of anything of value, to foreign officials for the purposes of

influencing their acts or decisions, securing an improper advantage, or inducing them to use their

influence, to assist Willbros Group in obtaining or retaining business.

35. By reason of the foregoing, Defendant Brown aided and abetted, and unless restrained and enjoined will continue to aid and abet, violations of Section 30A of the Exchange

Act [15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1].

**FOURTH CLAIM** 

Aiding and Abetting Violations of Exchange Act Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and (B)

36. Paragraphs 1 through 25 are re-alleged and incorporated by reference.

37. Willbros Group inaccurately recorded bribery payments and other cash

expenditures as legitimate consulting fees and other business expenses in its consolidated books

and records in violation of Exchange Act Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) [15 U.S.C. §§

78m(b)(2)(A) and 78m(b)(2)(B)]. Defendant knowingly provided substantial assistance to the

inaccurate recording of these payments in Willbros Group's books and records.

41. By reason of the foregoing, Defendant Brown aided and abetted, and unless

restrained and enjoined will continue to aid and abet, violations of Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and

13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A) and 78m(b)(2)(B)].

RELIEF REQUESTED

The Commission respectfully requests that this Court:

(1) enter an order permanently enjoining Defendant from violating Sections 30A and

13(b)(5) [15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 and 78m(b)(5)] of the Exchange Act and Rule 13b2-1 thereunder

[17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1] and from aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(b)(2)(A),

13(b)(2)(B), and 30A of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(2)(B), and

78dd-11.

(2) order Defendant Brown to pay civil penalties pursuant to Sections 21(d)(3) and

32(c) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(3) and 78ff(c)]; and

(3) grant the Commission such other and further relief as is just and appropriate.

DATED: September 14, 2006

Respectfully submitted,

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