

National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D. C. 20594 Safety Recommendation

> Date: September 19, 1988 In reply refer to: A-88-110

Honorable T. Allan McArtor Administrator Federal Aviation Administration Washington, D.C. 20591

On July 20, 1987, a student pilot was climbing to cruise altitude approximately 10 minutes after takeoff from Reid-Hillview Airport in San Jose, California. The airplane was a Piper PA 28-161, N91338, powered by an Avco Lycoming 0-320 engine. At the time, the pilot heard a loud noise, followed by "violent vibrations" coming from the engine area. The pilot reduced the throttle, and the noise and vibrations became less severe. However, when he advanced the throttle, the noise and vibrations returned to their previous level. The pilot chose to land in a newly excavated construction site. The airplane was substantially damaged and the pilot suffered minor injuries.¹

Examination of the engine revealed deformation of the No. 4 cylinder valve cover. The valve cover was removed and the No. 4 exhaust valve rocker arm (P/N 18790) was found broken. The broken rocker arm was submitted to the National Transportation Safety Board Materials Laboratory for analysis. The rocker arm was determined to have fractured due to high-cycle fatigue emanating from the outside surface of the sharp-edged corner of the oil drip hole.

Presently, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) addresses the inspection of P/N 18790 rocker arms in airworthiness directive (AD) 87-10-06. This AD, which incorporates Avco Lycoming Service Bulletin 477A, specifically addresses P/N 18790 rocker arms that have been installed in Avco Lycoming engines manufactured, remanufactured, or overhauled between July 1, 1985, and October 8, 1986, or rocker arms that were purchased from Avco Lycoming during that same time period.

The AD requires that the bushing bore wall thickness of the rocker arm be measured and that rocker arms with a wall thickness less than 0.075 inch minimum be replaced with new or serviceable P/N 17F19353 rocker arms. If the rocker arm meets the thickness requirement, the AD further requires that the oil drip hole be "burred" to achieve an approximate 0.030-inch radius. All subject rocker arms that

¹For more detailed information, read Field Accident Brief No. 1584 (attached).

are found in compliance with the AD are to have a letter "B" inscribed on the outside surface.

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Review of the aircraft maintenance records for the subject airplane revealed that AD 87-10-06 was complied with 78.7 service hours prior to the accident. The separated rocker arm on airplane N91338 had an inscribed letter "B" opposite the part number indicating compliance with the AD. However, when the wall thickness of the separated rocker arm was gauged using a measuring microscope (an instrument not normally found in a maintenance facility), the wall thickness measured 0.055 inch, well below the required 0.075-inch minimum. Due to the barrel-shaped profile of the bearing bore, obtaining an accurate wall thickness measurement with common tools is extremely difficult. When the wall thickness of the separated rocker arm was gauged using calipers or a rounded anvil micrometer (ordinary tools that a maintenance facility would typically have), erroneously high wall thickness measurements were obtained which, taken alone, would indicate an acceptable minimum thickness.

Metallurgical examination also disclosed what appeared to be improper "burring" of the edge of the oil drip hole. Apparently, attempts had been made to round the outside edge using a drill bit or other sharp tool. The effective radius was judged to be nonuniform and generally sharper than the 0.030-inch radius specified in the AD. The diameter of the oil drip hole is extremely small (approximately 0.090 inch) and, therefore, specialized tooling may be required to accomplish a uniform 0.030-inch edge radius.

A review of Service Difficulty Reports revealed that six other cases of inflight loss of power caused by breakage of P/N 18790 rocker arms were reported after Service Bulletin 477A was issued on February 16, 1987. In two of these cases, the incidents had occurred after complying with Service Bulletin 477A.

The Safety Board is concerned that further incidents involving the subject rocker arms will occur. Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

Revise airworthiness directive 87-10-06 to include accurate measurement technique(s) so that the subject rocker arms are inspected properly and include instructions for recontouring the edge of the oil drip hole to obtain the specified 0.030-inch radius. If the two corrections are impractical, require replacement of the subject rocker arms with new or serviceable P/N 17F19353 rocker arms. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-88-110)

KOLSTAD, Acting Chairman, and BURNETT, LAUBER, NALL, and DICKINSON, Members, concurred in this recommendation.

James D. Kols bal James L. Kolstad

Acting Chairman

National Transport . on Safety Board Washington, D.C. 20394

Rrief of Accident

File No 1584 ; 7/20/87 MILFITAS,CA	A/C Res	14. No. N91339	Tine	(Lc1) - 1230 FUT	
Basic Information Type Operating Certificate-NONE (GENERAL AVIAT	ION) Aircraft Dan SUBSTANTIAL	, Dumase XTIAL	Fatal S	Injuries Serious Miror	None
Type of OperationINSTRUCTIONAL Flight Conducted Under -14 CFR 91 Accident Occurred During -LANDING	F 1 T C N ON E		1	0 0	0
mation - FIFER PA-28-161 - TRICYCLE-FIXED - 2150 - 4	Ens Muke/Mudel - LYC Number Ensines - 1 Ensine Type Rated Power	LYCOMING 0-320-D3G 1 RECIFROCATING-CARBURETOR 160 HF	ELT Stal	Installed/Activated 1 Warning System - 1	1 - YES/NO YES
<pre>Environment/Operations Information Weather Data It Wx Briefind - FSS Wx Briefind - TELEPHONE Completeness - FULL Basic Weather - VMC</pre>	tinerary Last Beparture Foint SAN JOSE,CA Destination CONCORD,CA		AirPort Froximity OFF AIRPORT/STRIP AirPort Data REID HILLVIEW	tч тятр	
Wind Dir/Speed- 270/008 KTS Visibility - 50.0 SM AT Lowest Sky/Clouds - 20000 FT SCATTERED Lowest Ceiling - NONE Dbstructions to Vision- NONE Precipitation - NONE Condition of Light - DAYLIGHT	C/Airspace Type of Flight Plan Type of Clearance Type Apch/Lnda	- VFR - NUNE - Forced Landing		Ident - NVA Lth/Wid - N/A Surface - DIRT Status - DRY	
	Age - 50 Blennial Flisht Review Current - N/A Months Since - N/A Alrcraft Type - N/A	Medicel Certificate Flight Total - Make/Model- Instrument-	101 101 00	VALID HEDICAL-WAIVERS/LIMIT me (Hours) Last 24 Hrs - Last 30 Days- Last 90 Days- Last 90 Days-	117 33 49
Instrument Rating(s) - MONE					
<pre>Narrative</pre>	COLLOWED OVER AN OVER AN OVER AN OF. OTO BE OF. OTO BE SED. TO T SED. TO T S	OLLOWED BY "VIOLENT VIBRATIONS" & A LOSS OF FOWER. OVER AN EMBANKMENT. INVES REVEALED DEFORMATION OF ID TO BE BROKEN. REVIEW OF ACFT MAINTENANCE RECORDS TIN (SP) 477A WAS ACCOMP 78,7 HRS FRIOR TO THE AC OF.075 BE REPLACED. IF THE ROCKER ARM FASSES THE 7 (ED" TO THE APFROX .030 RADIUS FRIOR TO REASSEMBLY IREMENT MET THE MIN DIMENSION OF .075. AFTER THE AC & OVERSTRESS. THE ORIGIN OF THE FATIGUE WAS TRACE & MALL THICKNESS MFASURED .055 USING A MEASURING MI	TIONS 3 A LOSS OF F REVEALED DEFORMATIO ACFT MAINTENANCE KE 78.7 HKS FRIOR TO TH 2 ROCKER ARM PASSES DIUS FRIOR TO REASSE DIUS FRIOR TO REASSE THE FATIGUE WAS T 055 USING A MEASURI	T VIBRATIONS' & A LOSS OF FOWER. PLT MADE A INVES REVEALED DEFORMATION OF THE #4 VIEW OF ACFT MAINTENANCE RECORDS REVEALED ACCOMP 78.7 HRS PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT. THE . IF THE ROCKER ARM PASSES THE THICKNESS .030 RADIUS FRIOR TO REASSEMBLY. THE ROCKER DIMENSION OF .075. AFTER THE ACCIDENT. MET ORIGIN OF THE FATIGUE WAS TRACED TO THE ASURED .055 USING A MEASURING MICROSCOPE.	

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	Brief of Acc	Brief of Accident (Continued)	
File No 1584		A/C Res. No. N91338	Time (Lc1) - 1230 PUT
Phase of Operation CLIM	LOSS OF ENGINE POWER(PARTIAL) - MECH FNILURE/MALF CLIMB - TO CRUISE	LURE/MALF	
Finding(s) 1. ENGINE ASSEMBLY,ROCKE 2. MAINTENANCE,COMPLIA 3. MAINTENANCE,SERVICE B	nding(s) 1. ENGINE ASSEMBLY,ROCKER ARM/TAPPET - FRACTURED 2. MAINTENANCE,COMPLIANCE WITH AD - IMPROPER - OTHER MAINTENANCE PSNL 3. MAINTENANCE,SERVICE BULLETINS - INADEDUATE - MANUFACTURER		
tion	FORCED LANDING Descent - Ehergency		
Phase of Operation LAND	OUND COLLISI NG - ROLL		
Finding(s) 4. TERRAIN CONDITION - ROUGH/UNEVEN	DUGH/UNEVEN		\$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$
Probable Cause			
The National Transportatio	The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the Probable Cause(s) of	robable Cause(s) of this accident	*

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Factor(s) relating to this accident is/are finding(s) 4

is/are finding(s) 1,2,3

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