| |
Search Options | |||
| Index | Site Map | FAQ | Facility Info | Reading Rm | New | Help | Glossary | Contact Us | |
|||
Significance:
Jun 30, 2008
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to manage the increase in plant risk by failing to implement risk-management actions prior to performing switchyard maintenance activities
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the failure to protect the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) and Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps during maintenance activities involving the operation of bucket trucks in the switchyard. The licensee determined that this activity would increase the Loss of Offsite Power event initiator and resulted in Yellow risk condition. As a result of failing to protect the EDGs and AFW pumps, the licensee failed to implement the appropriate risk-management actions prior to performing maintenance.
The finding is more-than-minor because it is related to a risk-management issue where the licensee failed to implement the risk-management action, which the licensee determined to be a significant compensatory measure. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance because the licensee did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety is supported, in that supervisory oversight of work activities did not verify that risk-management actions were completed prior to conducting maintenance activities which increased nuclear risk.
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2007
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to Determine the Cause of a Failure of the Steam-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump to Start
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI for the licensee’s failure in 2005 to determine the cause of a failure of the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump to start, thereby allowing a subsequent similar failure in 2007.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Specifically, the performance deficiency decreased the reliability of the SDAFW pump by increasing the probability that the pump’s governor air supply solenoid valve would fail to open on demand. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency and did not represent the loss of a system safety function. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance because the licensee did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety, in that the licensee did not ensure that resources were available and adequate to produce a complete investigation for a significant condition adverse to quality.
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance: Aug 17, 2007
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: FIN Finding
Failure to install Thermal Overload (TOL) protection on the ‘D’ deep well pump
The team identified a finding having very low safety significance (Green) involving the failure of the licensee to meet a self imposed standard. The licensee committed in modification package EC 59037, “Install ‘D’ Deep Well Pump,” to meet or exceed the requirements in the Electrical Power Distribution System Design Basis Document (DBD), DBD/R87038/SD16. DBD sections 4.3.1.c and 4.5.1.20 specified that overload protection be provided. The vendor technical manual for the ‘D’ deep well pump motor, which is included in the facility technical manual 762-209-103 for the ‘D’ deep well pump, specified that Thermal Overload (TOL) protection be provided. The vendor technical manual for the ‘D’ deep well pump motor was referenced in modification package, EC 59037. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to install TOL protection for the “D” deep well pump.
This finding was more than minor based on the fact that it is associated with the reactor safety mitigation cornerstone aspect of design control. It impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, “Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations,” the team conducted a Phase 1 SDP screening and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). Since the ‘D’ deep well pump is not safety related equipment per Chapter 15 of the UFSAR, this finding does not represent a violation of any NRC requirements. The team did not identify any cross cutting aspects associated with this finding. This issue is documented in the corrective action program as nuclear condition report (NCR) 239915. (Section 1R21.2.9.)
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2008
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to barricade and conspicuously post a High Radiation Area during refueling outage 24
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1 for the failure to barricade and conspicuously post a High Radiation Area (HRA) during refueling outage 24.
The finding is more-than-minor because the area radiation levels within the boundaries exceeded the levels (greater than 100 mr/hr) such that the area was required to be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a HRA. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, in that the root cause investigations had failed to thoroughly evaluate the recurring nature of these issues and had failed to establish effective corrective actions that addressed the root cause and failed to prevent recurrence of these issues.
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Significance: Mar 31, 2008
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure of the licensee to assess the increased risk resulting from removing a boric acid injection path from service
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the failure of the licensee to perform a risk assessment on March 10, 2008, before establishing maintenance boundaries which removed a boric acid injection flow path from service. This finding was more than minor because it is related to a risk assessment and management issue where the licensee failed to consider risk significant systems, structures, or components and support systems that were unavailable during maintenance. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance (H.3(a)) because the operations staff did not appropriately plan the work activity of establishing maintenance boundaries by incorporating risk insights of the site’s risk model.
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Last modified : August 29, 2008