March/April 2006
Essential to the National Interest
by Richard F. Weingroff
The first decade of the greatest public works project in
history began a transportation system yet unrivaled in the world—along with
problems to match.
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The Bureau of Public Roads developed an exhibit in 1957-one of many over the years-to let the
public know about the "controlled access Interstate System being built under the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1956." Left to right, Robert M. Monahan, special assistant for public affairs;
Federal Highway Administrator Bertram D. Tallamy; Harold C. Wood, Sr., of the Motion Picture and
Exhibits Section; and Assistant Commissioner for Research E. H. "Ted" Holmes.
The Bureau of Public Roads developed an exhibit in 1957-one of many over the years-to let the
public know about the "controlled access Interstate System being built under the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1956." Left to right, Robert M. Monahan, special assistant for public affairs;
Federal Highway Administrator Bertram D. Tallamy; Harold C. Wood, Sr., of the Motion Picture and
Exhibits Section; and Assistant Commissioner for Research E. H. "Ted" Holmes. |
President Dwight D. Eisenhower understood
the value of roads. In 1919 he was aboard the U.S. Army's first transcontinental
convoy, a 2-month journey from Washington, DC, to San Francisco, CA, to assess
the readiness of military vehicles to make such a long trip and to promote good
roads. The trip convinced the participants, which included military personnel,
road advocates, and members of the press, of the country's need for better
roads. During and after World War II, he traveled on Germany's Reichautobahnen
network of rural superhighways, which were studied and envied by American
engineers during the prewar 1930s. Eisenhower would say, "The old convoy had
started me thinking about good, two-lane highways, but Germany had made me see
the wisdom of broader ribbons across the land."
In 2006 the transportation
community celebrates the 50th anniversary of the Eisenhower Interstate System. The
second in a three-part series, this article examines the birth of the
Interstate System, from the grand ideas to the day-to-day challenges of
executing the country's largest public works project.
The Interstate Idea
The concept of the Interstate System was born in two reports
to the U.S. Congress, Toll Roads and Free
Roads (1939) and Interregional
Highways (1944). The reports recommended construction of what the 1939
study called a "system of direct interregional highways, with all necessary
connections through and around cities, designed to meet the requirements of the
national defense in time of war and the needs of a growing peacetime traffic of
longer range."
The Map That Started the Interstate System
In February 1938, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to discuss one of his pet ideas with Thomas H.
MacDonald, head of BPR. At the White House, the President drew lines on a map
of the United States where he thought a system of east-west and north-south
transcontinental toll highways should be built. He asked MacDonald for a report
on the idea.
Two months later MacDonald submitted Proposed Direct Route
Highways to the White House. BPR found that "a national system of direct
route highways designed for continuous flow of motor traffic, with all cross
traffic on separated grades, is seriously needed and should be undertaken." BPR
concluded that most sections would not carry enough traffic for toll revenue to
liquidate bonds used to finance construction, but the report emphasized that
"any expenditure actually required for the accommodation of the traffic on
these highways will be more than repaid by the normal road-user taxes generated
by their use."
Having heard about the internal study, Congress decided to
seek a public report. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1938, which President
Roosevelt approved in June 1938, asked BPR to submit a report on a toll network
of no more than three east-west and three north-south "superhighways." Toll
Roads and Free Roads would be an extensive study based on data from traffic
surveys around the country. Again, the report rejected a toll network but
proposed "a special, tentatively defined system of direct interregional
highways, with all necessary connections through and around cities, designed to
meet the requirements of the national defense in time of war and the needs of a
growing peacetime traffic of longer range." President Roosevelt submitted the
report to Congress in April 1939.
With enactment of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, what
began as a few red lines drawn by President Roosevelt on a map almost 20 years
earlier would become a system of direct interregional highways known as the
Interstate System.
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Congress agreed. The Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1944 directed designation of a 65,000-kilometer (40,000-mile)
"National System of Interstate Highways" by joint action of State highway
agencies, subject to approval by the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads (BPR). In
August 1947, Major General Philip B. Fleming, the Federal Works Administrator,
and Commissioner of Public Roads Thomas H. MacDonald announced designation of
60,642 kilometers (37,681 miles) of principal highways, including 4,638
kilometers (2,882 miles) of urban thoroughfares carrying the main line through cities.
The remaining 3,732 kilometers (2,319 miles) of the authorized mileage were
reserved for circumferential and distributing routes. This process was
completed when BPR released the publication General Location of National
System of Interstate Highways Including All Additional Routes at Urban Areas
Designated in September 1955 (known as the "Yellow Book" because of the
cover's color).
What was missing was a program to
fund and build the Interstate System.
The "Grand Plan"
President Eisenhower's Grand Plan is sometimes misunderstood
as simply recommending construction of the Interstate System. His vision was
far grander than that.
The President intended to present
the plan to the Governors' Conference meeting in upstate New York in July 1954.
However, following the death of his sister-in-law, Eisenhower was unable to
attend. Instead, he provided notes to Vice President Richard M. Nixon for
delivery to the Governors.
The Grand Plan, Nixon explained,
was that each level of Government—Federal, State, county, and municipal—would
contribute to upgrading the Nation's entire road network over a 10-year period.
The goal was "a properly articulated system that solves the problems of speedy,
safe, transcontinental travel." The benefits would be improved safety, reduced
traffic jams, less traffic-related litigation, increased economic efficiency,
and elimination of "the appalling inadequacies to meet the demands of
catastrophe or defense should an atomic war come."
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President Dwight D. Eisenhower (seated) received the report A Ten-Year National Highway Program from his
Advisory Committee on a National Highway Program (the Clay Committee). The report would provide the basis
for the President's proposal to Congress on financing construction of the Interstate System. Left to right, General
Lucius D. Clay (U.S. Army, retired), committee chairman; Francis C. "Frank" Turner of BPR, committee executive
secretary; and members Steve Bechtel of Bechtel Corp.; Sloan Colt of Bankers' Trust Co.; Bill Roberts of Allis-
Chalmers Manufacturing Co.; and Dave Beck of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. |
Finally, the Grand Plan included "very probably, a program initiated by the Federal Government, with State cooperation, for the planning and construction of a modern State highway system . . . to construct new, or modernize existing, highways." That was as close as Eisenhower came to mentioning the Interstate System in his Grand Plan speech.
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956
The President asked his friend and adviser General Lucius D. Clay to head a committee to develop a Federal response to the challenge. The resulting Clay Committee believed the Interstate System would cost $27 billion, with $23 billion of that for rural segments. In February 1955, Eisenhower submitted the committee's report to Congress along with legislative proposals. The Clay plan—which entailed $25 billion in bonds and redirection of the gas tax—was a flop.
As Congress searched for an alternative financing plan in 1955, the highway-related interests that supported the Interstate System agreed on only one thing—they did not want to pay for it. Why, they asked, should only users pay for a highway network that would benefit the entire country? In July 1955, the Congress adjourned without completing action, mainly because of disagreement over financing.
Supporters realized they would have to compromise to get the highways they wanted. With tax compromises in place, the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 moved through Congress with little controversy. It included a financing mechanism drafted by Representative Hale Boggs (D-LA) of the House Ways and Means Committee. At the suggestion of Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, Boggs used the Social Security Trust Fund as a model for the Highway Trust Fund. Revenue from taxes on highway user products would be credited to the highway fund for use exclusively on the Interstate System and other Federal-aid highway and bridge projects. The revised bill sailed through the Congress, which approved the bill on June 26.
Having fought for this bill,
President Eisenhower would be denied a signing ceremony. He was at Walter Reed
Army Medical Center following emergency surgery for an intestinal ailment. On
June 29 he was given a stack of bills, including the highway act. Without
fanfare, a photograph, or statement, he signed the legislation and was,
according to Press Secretary James C. Hagerty, "highly pleased."
The legislation changed the name
of the Interstate System to reflect its importance to national defense: The
National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. It expanded the system by
1,609 kilometers (1,000 miles) to 65,983 kilometers (41,000 miles) and
authorized $25 billion to be made available in fiscal years (FY) 1957 through
1969 for construction to accommodate traffic demand in 1975. The Federal share
of costs would be 90 percent.
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Missouri claimed the first project on which actual construction began
under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. A sign to that effect, shown
here, was erected beside U.S. 40 (the future I-70) in St. Charles County. |
The Firsts
The first project to go to construction under the new law
was the Mark Twain Expressway portion of U.S. 40 (future I-70) in St. Charles
County, MO. Construction on the $1.87 million project, which included 5
kilometers (3.1 miles) of bridging, grading, and concrete paving leading to a
new bridge over the Missouri River, began on August 13. The Missouri State
Highway Commission placed a sign on the project declaring it to be the first on
which "actual construction" was begun under the 1956 act.
On August 31, the Kansas State
Highway Commission awarded a contract for concrete paving of a 12.9-kilometer
(8-mile) section of U.S. 40 (I-70) outside Topeka. Construction had begun
before enactment of the 1956 law, but under the new contract, paving began on
September 26 with funds provided under the new program. Joined by BPR
officials, First District State Highway Commissioner Ivan Wassberg marked the
historic occasion by scratching "9-26-56" in the fresh concrete. On November
14, 1956, highway officials held a ribbon-cutting ceremony and posted a sign
proclaiming the project to be the first completed under the 1956 act.
Off to a Flying Start
In July 1956, BPR and the American Association of State
Highway Officials (AASHO), as it was called at the time, agreed on design
standards for the Interstate System. Access would be controlled, with
crossroads carried over or under the routes. The system would consist of
divided highways with four or more 3.7-meter (12-foot) lanes. In sparsely
settled rural areas where traffic volumes were low, the standards would be
relaxed, with at-grade crossings permitted in some cases; two-lane sections
with one lane in each direction would be built to one side of the right-of-way
so additional lanes could be added when traffic warranted.
The highways would be designed for
speeds of 80.5 kilometers per hour, km/h (50 miles per hour, mi/h) in mountain
terrain, 96.6 km/h (60 mi/h) in rolling terrain, and 112.7 km/h (70 mi/h) in
flat terrain. Bridges and overpasses would be built without overhead
obstructions, but all structures would allow at least 4.3 meters (14 feet) of
vertical clearance over the roadways and shoulders.
To maintain the program's quick
start, President Eisenhower believed that BPR would need a leader with the
prestige of Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation as he worked with
State highway leaders appointed by Governors. With the support of Senator Al
Gore, Sr. (D-TN), Senator Prescott Bush (R-CT), and others, the
Administration's proposal for a position of Federal Highway Administrator
became law in August 1956. The Administrator would be a top adviser on highway
policy and take charge of the Interstate program, while the Commissioner of
Public Roads, Charles D. "Cap" Curtiss, would oversee day-to-day operations of
BPR and its other programs.
President Eisenhower's choice was
Bertram D. Tallamy, who had held several positions with the New York Public
Works Department and helped create the New York State Thruway. But because
Tallamy was unable to sever his New York connections until February 1957, the
President appointed John A. Volpe, who had recently resigned as Massachusetts
Commissioner of Public Works to return to the private sector, to serve as
interim Administrator. Like Tallamy, Volpe was a seasoned veteran within the
highway community, having started his own construction company with initial
capital of $300 and built it into a multimillion dollar contracting firm.
Thus, on October 22, 1956, Volpe
became the first Federal Highway Administrator (although not confirmed by the
Senate). At the White House ceremony, President Eisenhower said he wanted to
make certain that the highway program got off to a "flying start." He held the
Bible while Frank K. Sanderson, White House administrative officer,
administered the oath of office to Volpe, the only Administrator whose
swearing-in ceremony was attended by a President.
Volpe coordinated important
decisions with Tallamy, and in his brief tenure, he reorganized BPR and
delegated authority to field offices to handle the increased workload more
efficiently. The States, he reported to the President on February 1, were
moving forward aggressively; only five had not obligated any of their FY 1957
Federal funds. In submitting his resignation, Volpe said, "My 100 days in
Washington have been exciting, challenging, busy, action-packed, and, I trust,
productive."
On February 5, 1957, U.S.
Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks administered the oath of office to
Tallamy, who was unanimously confirmed by the Senate. Tallamy understood the
task he would oversee. As he told the Economic Club of Detroit in May, the 1956
act provided the highway community with "the greatest challenge that has ever
been given to any peacetime public works agency." It was bigger, he said, "than
the St. Lawrence Seaway, the Panama Canal, the Grand Coulee Dam, the Egyptian
Pyramids, and a lot of other big projects . . . all rolled into one." Despite
the scale of the project, he said, the highway community had only 13 to 16
years to complete the job.
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Kansas claimed the first project
completed under the 1956 highway
law for a 12.9-kilometer (8-mile)
section of U.S. 40 (I-70) west of
Topeka. Here, four representatives
of the engineering contractor and
State highway commission mark
the occasion on a windy day. |
As the first year ended, BPR
General Counsel Clifford W. Enfield said, "Perhaps the greatest advancement to
be enjoyed by Americans during the 20th century may
not come about because of nuclear energy, startling medical advances, or
interplanetary communications, but by enactment of the Federal-Aid Highway Act
of 1956." He added, "This legislation calls for environmental changes for the
United States on a scale so staggering as to dwarf any prior peacetime
endeavors of mankind."
Enfield called it "America's New Design for Living."
AASHO Road Test
The design of pavements and bridges on the Interstate
System largely followed the results of a road test by the American Association
of State Highway Officials (AASHO).
The test site in Ottawa, IL, was financed by the State
highway agencies, BPR, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Automobile
Manufacturers Association, American Petroleum Institute, American Institute of
Steel Construction, foreign countries, and U.S. materials and transportation
associations. The Highway Research Board administered the project.
In August 1956 workers began constructing 11.3 kilometers (7
miles) of two-lane pavements in the form of six loops and a tangent (straight),
half concrete and half asphalt. The 836 test sections employed a range of
surface, base, and subbase thicknesses, and included 16 short-span bridges.
Test traffic was inaugurated on October 15, 1958, with DoD providing drivers
and heavy vehicles. The road test ended November 30, 1960.
The test data established the relationships for pavement
structural designs based on expected loadings over the life of a pavement.
Although the bridge findings were consistent with predictions, the road test
provided the foundation for the analytical evaluation of stresses and
deflections from moving vehicles.
The AASHO road test is a landmark in highway and bridge
design. The straight portion of the track is now part of I-80 in Illinois.
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Pivotal Year: 1957
The highway engineers who launched the Interstate System
may, perhaps, be forgiven for thinking they would be part of one of the most
popular programs in American history. Today, with the automobile long since a
key part of the American way of life, traffic volumes increasing every year,
congestion in cities sapping urban energy, suburban life spreading into exurban
sprawl, and continuing concern about highway safety, the system's popularity
may have decreased a bit. But in the 1950s, support for Interstates was
widespread and bipartisan. During the debates in Congress in 1955 and 1956, no
opposition was expressed whatsoever.
As the first fiscal year of the
Interstate program ended in June 1957, Tallamy reported that based on
engineering and economic studies, BPR had approved 80 percent of the locations
within the original 65,000-kilometer (40,000-mile) limit. Further, State
highway agencies completed improvements on 1,190 kilometers (737 miles) of the
Interstate System at a total cost of $173.3 million (Federal share: $117.8
million). BPR added that planning and construction were "going on at a furious
pace throughout the Nation."
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On October 22, 1956, President Eisenhower holds the Bible as John A.
Volpe (left) takes the oath of office as the first Federal Highway
Administrator. White House Administrative Officer Frank Sanderson
administers the oath. The President said he participated in the ceremony
because he wanted to be sure the Interstate program got off to a
"flying start." |
But Tallamy acknowledged that
problems had been encountered. For example, he noted that engineers and steel
were in short supply. Indeed, throughout 1957, highway engineers would be
buffeted by surprises, even shocks.
One of the problems was a
requirement in the 1956 act that the States hold public hearings to consider
the economic effects of the location if a Federal-aid highway project involved
bypassing or going through a city, town, or village. Based on early experience,
AASHO Executive Secretary A. E. "Alf" Johnson warned highway officials that the
hearings required "the finest in public relations" and must present "factual data
and logical reasons."
Right-of-way acquisition was
another concern because so much of the Interstate System would be built on new
locations. State highway agencies had rarely needed to acquire land or to do so
by eminent domain. The States needed new legislation, standards,
appraisers—and they needed them quickly. The first problems arose in Indiana,
where speculators were buying land in the Interstate corridors to resell to the
State at "preposterous profits," as The Washington Post and Times-Herald
reported.
Perhaps the greatest shock of 1957
involved the urban routes, which—contrary to the estimate of requiring just $4
billion of the total $27 billion—would take about half the Interstate funds.
From the earliest description of the Interstate System, in BPR's 1939 report to
Congress Toll Roads and Free Roads, the goal was to use the new highways
to invigorate blighted urban areas, reverse suburbanization, and restore city
tax bases. To achieve these goals, BPR had used sampling techniques developed with
the U.S. Census Bureau to conduct extensive urban origin-and-destination
surveys and worked with State and local officials before designating the urban
Interstates in 1955. BPR urged the States to concentrate on projects in urban
areas because that was where the need for traffic relief was the greatest.
The highway community would find
out how hard providing that traffic relief would be at a September 1957
conference in Hartford, CT, on the effect of highways on metropolitan areas.
Tallamy, reinforcing statements by Administrator Albert M. Cole of the Housing
and Home Financing Agency, told conference attendees that "we have the chance
of a century to make our cities sparkle brightly among our Nation's brilliant
collection of really wonderful cities." The Interstate System, he added, was
"probably the greatest single tool" in reversing urban problems.
Tallamy recognized, however, that
as soon as "a fine new highway project" is developed, "there will develop
forces opposed to it." He was confident that those who criticized the program
the most at the start would "probably be pushing the real supporters of the
program in the background at the finish so they can cut the ribbons and take
the credit they do not deserve."
The final speaker at the
conference, nationally known author and social scientist Lewis Mumford, was
skeptical, however. "We have good reason to be anxious," he said, since it was
obvious "that neither of these Administrators had the slightest notion of what
they were doing."
Signs of Progress
Although 1957 held serious controversy for the Interstate System, the year included considerable progress. AASHO and BPR, for example, applied the route numbers to the Interstate highways in September. They adapted the U.S. numbering plan for the system, but in mirror image. Where the lowest, odd-numbered, north-south U.S. route was on the East Coast (U.S. 1), the lowest, odd-numbered Interstate route would be on the West Coast (I-5). Similarly, the lowest, even-numbered east-west U.S. route ran along the Canadian border (U.S. 2), while the corresponding Interstate route was in the South (I-10).
The Interstate sign was unveiled at the same time. The States had submitted designs that AASHO then narrowed to four. Full-size versions of the signs were erected on a road near the AASHO road test site while a special meeting of the organization was underway in August 1957. State highway officials were able to observe the signs in daylight, dark, rain, and shine. They decided on a combination of designs submitted by Missouri and Texas—the now familiar red, white, and blue shield.
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The real blame fell on Congress,
Mumford said, which approved the 1956 act based on a study of highways, "not a
study of the real problems." It had been "jammed through Congress so blithely
and lightly," Mumford said, "on a dubious pretext," namely America's love of
the automobile and the idea that it was "a necessary part of our defense
program." He dismissed the latter claim as "nonsense" because "there is no
defense against total extermination in nuclear warfare, no defense except
peace."
The conference made national news,
painting the highway experts as the "bad guys." The consensus among critics was
that the urban Interstates should be suspended until comprehensive land use
plans could be drawn to incorporate them.
The initial reaction of State
highway officials is reflected in a speech by AASHO President William A. Bugge
to a regional AASHO branch. He rejected the suggestion that highway officials
needed "some expert assistance from outsiders." The idea of a 2-year moratorium
for urban Interstates, as some had called for, "is a bit ridiculous," because
the "economic penalties for delaying already vitally needed facilities for
another 2 years would be tremendous," he said.
Despite the warning signs, the
highway community had much to celebrate as 1957 ended. The States broke the
record in dollars invested in all highway development by spending nearly $4.6
billion. Through December 1, more than $1 billion in Federal and State funds
had been committed to Interstate projects, and projects totaling $247 million
were completed.
Funding Problems
Secretary Weeks released the first Interstate Cost Estimate
(ICE) in January 1958. It covered 62,037 kilometers (38,548 miles) of the
Interstate System (excluding mileage added in 1957) and pegged costs at $37.6
billion (Federal share: $33.9 billion). However, the Secretary did not see a
need for additional authorizations. As techniques for estimating costs were
refined, he said, future estimates would more accurately reflect trends "either
upward or downward." Until then, an increase in funding "would be premature."
The Secretary's caution was soon
confronted by economic reality. By August 1957 the country had slipped into a
recession that would increase unemployment to 7 percent and reduce corporate
profits by 25 percent by April 1958. One of the reasons the President had
promoted the Interstate System was to counteract just such a situation—so that
he would have a public works program that could be expanded or contracted to
influence the economy.
To stimulate the economy and avoid
losing momentum, Congress passed the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958. It
increased Interstate funding by $800 million for FYs 1959-1961 and included an
emergency increase of $400 million for the Federal-aid systems in FY 1959.
Because these increases occurred
without a change in taxation to boost revenue, the 1958 act also suspended the
1956 law's "Byrd Amendment"—for deficit hawk Senator Harry Flood Byrd
(D-VA)—which required the Commerce Secretary to hold apportionments below the
point of creating red ink in the Highway Trust Fund. President Eisenhower
approved the legislation in April 1958, just as the recession was ending.
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Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks, whose
department included BPR, was a businessman from
Massachusetts and chairman of the Republican Party's
Finance Committee. President Eisenhower said of him,
"This great highway system will stand in part as a
monument to the man in my Cabinet who headed the
department responsible for it, and who himself spent
long hours mapping out the program and battling it
through the Congress-Secretary of Commerce Sinclair
Weeks." |
By the end of the year, Interstate
construction expenditures exceeded trust fund receipts. Additional income would
be needed to avoid reduced apportionments in FY 1961 under the restored Byrd
Amendment. The looming crisis led many in the highway community to fear what
the American Road Builders Association (ARBA) described as "a complete collapse
of work on the Interstate System."
Critics attributed the funding
imbalance to "gold-plating," especially in urban areas. They created the term
"90-itis" to describe the attitude of State highway officials who, they said,
had no reason to be economical because the Federal Government was picking up 90
percent of the cost. As Representative John A. Blatnik (D-MN) of the House
Committee on Public Works would say, "Congressman after congressman got up on
the floor of the House and made wild speeches, frightening speeches . . .
saying we had a shortage of funds because the States were playing fancy-free
and foot-loose with the taxpayers' dollars."
To maintain the construction
schedule, President Eisenhower recommended a temporary 1.5-cent increase in the
gas tax, but the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1959 added only a penny (increasing
the tax to 4 cents a gallon) through June 1961. The legislation, which the
President approved on September 21, also reduced FY 1961 Interstate
authorizations to $2 billion, but because of the Byrd Amendment, BPR could apportion
only $1.8 billion.
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The National Highway Users Conference used this chart to illustrate the
problems affecting the Highway Trust Fund in the late 1950s. The group
explained: "The ascending solid black line represents cash receipts
coming in each year to the Fund; the broken black line, annual cash
expenditures. The shaded green areas show the cumulative surplus in
the Trust Fund, and the shaded red areas the cumulative deficit." |
While signing the 1959 act,
President Eisenhower disclosed that he had asked a member of his staff, Major
General John Bragdon (U.S. Army, retired), to study the Interstate program with
attention to delineating Federal versus State and local responsibilities in
financing, planning, and supervising the highway program. Bragdon also would be
responsible for determining ways to improve coordination between planning for
Federal-aid highways and State and local planning, especially for urban areas.
At the same time, Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D-TX) appointed
Representative Blatnik in September 1959 to head the Special Subcommittee on
the Federal-Aid Highway Program investigating corruption allegations.
The Urban Problem
Shocked by the intensity of objections to the Interstate
System from Mumford and others, the highway community tried to regain its
footing by holding a summit at Syracuse University in October 1958. Committees
of the American Municipal Association, AASHO, and Highway Research Board joined
the university in what was billed as the first National Conference on Highways
and Urban Development. Funded by the Automotive Safety Foundation, the
conference featured highway officials and elected officials, primarily mayors,
who supported the goal of making the Interstate System work for the orderly
development of urban communities. The critics were not invited.
The goal was a "grand accounting"
in which the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative for highway users
and the community were to be evaluated. As E. H. "Ted" Holmes, BPR's assistant
commissioner for research at the time, would recall many years later, "Probably
no one present, however, had any notion of the difficulty of measuring the
community costs and benefits."
The Urban Revolt Begins
If the highway community left the Syracuse conference with
renewed optimism, it soon had a reminder of how difficult a challenge it faced
in urban areas.
Several cities were seeing
resistance to Interstates, particularly from those whose homes or businesses
would be acquired for rights-of-way. In San Francisco, for example, opposition
focused on the Embarcadero Freeway (I-480) that was to link the San
Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge (I-80) with the Golden Gate Bridge (U.S. 101).
City officials had proposed the freeway in 1943 as a way of using a needed
transportation artery to revitalize a blighted area near the Ferry Building and
a former farmer's market. State highway officials used a double-deck design
that they considered "an ultramodern highway facility." After the initial
section opened in February 1959, it came to symbolize what the San Francisco
Chronicle called "a crime which cannot be prettied up."
In January 1959, the Board of
Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco met to discuss the proposed
Western Freeway (I-80) through the Sunset District. With more than 160 freeway
opponents cheering, the board adopted a resolution opposing construction of all
freeways in the San Francisco Master Plan. The resolution cited "the demolition
of homes, the destruction of residential areas, the forced uprooting and
relocation of individuals, families and business enterprises" as well as the
loss of property from the tax rolls.
Concerns about the impact of the
Interstate System on urban areas would be summarized in the April 14, 1960,
issue of The Reporter magazine. "New Roads and Urban Chaos" was written
by Daniel P. Moynihan, a professor who had served on the staff of New York
Governor Averill Harriman. Moynihan began by quoting The Wall Street Journal's
description of the Interstate program as "a vast program thrown together,
imperfectly conceived and grossly mismanaged, and in due course becoming a
veritable playground for extravagance, waste, and corruption."
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One of the earliest Interstate battles took place in San Francisco, CA,
where the double-decked Embarcadero Freeway (I-480) became a focal
point for objections. Although additional construction was blocked, the
freeway remained in place until it was damaged by the Loma Prieta
Earthquake in October 1989. |
Moynihan declared that "the crisis
has come. In one metropolis after another, the plans have been thrown together
and the bulldozers set to work." At this late stage, metropolitan planning
would be difficult, especially given the shortage of planners. Still, he said,
"almost any effort to think a bit about what we are doing would help." He
advocated funding flexibility because he was convinced that city officials
would use at least 50 percent of the Interstate funding for mass transit and
commuter facilities if they could.
Moynihan was sure the pending
congressional investigations would turn up thieving, mischief, and blunder. "If
not," he said, "it will be necessary to investigate the investigators," but he
hoped for a more serious reappraisal in the next Administration. "We may yet
impart some sanity and public purpose to this vast enterprise." He closed,
"Roads can make or break a Nation."
As Ike Leaves Office
Meanwhile, the highway community awaited two reports, namely
Bragdon's report to the President and the new ICE, both of which were expected
to provoke additional concerns. Rumors about the Bragdon report were
circulating for months, particularly that it would call for abandoning the
urban Interstates, downsizing the program, and converting it to toll facilities.
Bragdon and his staff had peppered BPR with questions and requests for a year
before issuing a 12-page report embodying these concepts just 3 days before the
end of the Eisenhower Administration. It was quickly forgotten.
Although Bragdon's untimely report
was ignored, Congress could not ignore the 1961 ICE. This estimate, submitted
to Congress on January 11, put the total cost of the Interstate System,
including past expenditures, at $41 billion (Federal share: $37 billion). Based
on work underway and previous authorizations of $25.4 billion, Congress would
have to authorize an additional $11.5 billion to complete the Interstate
construction program on schedule—or scale it back.
As the Eisenhower Administration
ended on January 20, 1961, 16,802 kilometers (10,440 miles), or 25 percent, of
the Interstate System was opened to traffic. More than $10 billion was spent.
Lingering concerns would need to be addressed by incoming President John F.
Kennedy and his appointed officials. General L. W. Prentiss, executive vice
president of ARBA, put the situation facing the Interstate System in stark
terms: "The highway program is in for the battle of its life."
To be continued in the May/June 2006 issue of Public Roads magazine.
Richard F. Weingroff is the information liaison
officer in the FHWA Office of Infrastructure.
For more information on
the early days of the Interstate System, visit
www.fhwa.dot.gov/interstate/homepage.cfm or
www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/history.htm.
Other Articles in this issue:
The Straight Scoop on SAFETEA-LU
Mileage-Based Road User Charges
Preservation Act
Helping Roadway Contractors Fulfill Public Expectations
Geospatial Technologies Improve Transportation Decisionmaking
The Return of Private Toll Roads
Essential to the National Interest
Multipedestrian Tracking