CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF NWS PERFORMANCE |
FINDING 2-1: As is generally the case with a
synoptic pattern with little or no forcing and weak steering
currents, the National Meteorological Center and National
Hurricane Center models in general did not perform well
with regard to the track of the remnants of Tropical Storm
Alberto. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-1: The
National Weather Service (NWS) should continue to strive
for improvements in tracking tropical systems once they
make landfall. It is especially important that improvements
be made in the forecasts at the surface and not just in
the mid and upper levels of the atmosphere. Interactions
with the research community within
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
(such as the Office of Atmospheric Research) and other Federal
agencies, as well as the academic research community, are
especially encouraged. |
FINDING 2-2: The quantitative precipitation
forecast (QPF) guidance generated by the National Meteorological
Center models was poor (as is common for convective situations
during the warm season) and therefore of limited help to
the forecasters. The national QPF guidance frequently underestimated
excessive rainfall amounts and sometimes did not accurately
highlight the area of maximum rainfall. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-2: The NWS should continue
to strive for improvements in QPFs for tropical and convective
systems.
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FINDING 2-3: The Weather Surveillance Radar-1988
Doppler (WSR-88D) Stage I Precipitation Processing, which
runs in the Radar Products Generator, does not currently
use rain gage data to provide potentially better quantitative
estimates of the precipitation. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-3: Rain gage data must be included
in the WSR-88D Stage I Precipitation Processing as soon
as possible, so that the radar-rainfall can be adjusted
to avoid underestimation of rainfall associated with warm
tropical events. |
FINDING 2-4: The number of automated rain gages
under the umbrellas of many of the WSR-88Ds in the area
affected by Alberto was inadequate to effectively incorporate
rain gage data into the Stage I Precipitation Processing.
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RECOMMENDATION 2-4: The rain gage data network
must be expanded and the reporting characteristics of existing
sites modified to provide more timely data to produce a
higher quality WSR-88D precipitation estimate. |
FINDING 2-5: Even though the Southeast River
Forecast Center (SERFC) area of responsibility has almost
complete WSR-88D coverage, the SERFC was not able to quantitatively
use the WSR-88D information in its forecasts. The capability
to process WSR-88D digital precipitation estimates would
have added value to the hydrologic forecasts. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-5: Pre-AWIPS workstations must
be deployed immediately to the SERFC and other River Forecast
Centers (RFC) so the Stages II and III Precipitation Processing
can be performed and utilized in the forecasts. |
FINDING 2-6: The Atlanta WSR-88D was not able
to retrieve data from the archive for a precipitation event
that set historical records. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-6: The potential for losing
data, for all time, that could be used for storm analysis,
training, and calibration of hydrometeorologic models and
calibration of the WSR-88D dictates a requirement that there
be a prompt resolution of the problems with the archive
media. |
FINDING 2-7: The WSR-88D was unable to provide
all the products in the time required when there was a large-scale
precipitation event. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-7: Develop methods to increase
the number of products that can be obtained by associated
principle user processors, especially for offices with warning
responsibilities. |
FINDING 2-8: A limitation in the number of phone
lines caused problems for at least one office and a cooperative
observer from a critical area who was not able to provide
data to the NWS because of busy phone lines. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-8: Ensure that data are not
lost due to inadequate phone lines into NWS offices and
have adequate automated collection systems to acquire data
so that the capacity of voice lines is not a constraint.
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FINDING 2-9: The remote job entry (RJE) dial
backup did not function because the dedicated phone line
had not been connected to the system. The RJE dial backup
had not been tested since the office moved. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-9: RFC staffs must routinely
test the RJE dial backup. |
FINDING 2-10: The SERFC did not declare a Critical
Flood Situation during the Alberto event, because job processing
times were adequate. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-10: The declaration of a Critical
Flood Situation and use of the crisis job priority are powerful
tools that should be utilized by the RFCs during any critical
flood event. |
FINDING 2-11: The Sheriff/Emergency Management
Agency (EMA) Director for Sumter County, Georgia, receives
weather watches and warnings from the public broadcast media.
The county does not receive the National Attack Warning
System (NAWAS) transmissions and is on the outside fringe
of NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) reception (Americus is 68 miles
from the nearest NWR transmitter). The NWR tone alert does
not work reliably in the county because of this distance.
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RECOMMENDATION 2-11: NWS should work with Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to ensure that every
county emergency management agency/emergency operation center
in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia has a communication link
to NAWAS. Additionally, the Gore Initiative should be implemented
as soon as possible to expand the NWR network of transmitters
to reach 95 percent of the population. |
FINDING 2-12: The Sheriff of Sumter County,
Georgia, as with many other emergency management officials
in the impacted area, expressed a high degree of frustration
in making residents aware of the danger from the floodwaters
and of the need to evacuate. Some of the deaths that occurred
were people who had been warned (more than once) to evacuate
but failed to act until it was no longer safe to do so.
No flash flood/flood anywhere near the magnitude of this
event had ever occurred in this area; and residents were,
for the large part, unable to realize the dangers they faced
until it was too late. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-12: More emphasis should be
placed on public awareness and preparedness training for
flood and flash flood events. The continued high number
of vehicle-related deaths during floods and flash floods
indicates the need to educate the public of the risks involved
with vehicles in flood situations. The "Hidden Danger" video
currently being developed by the NWS should be used to inform
the public of the dangers of low-water crossings. |
FINDING 2-13: The Sheriff of Sumter County,
Georgia, had high praise for NWS products and service during
this event and did not think there was anything the NWS
could have done to reduce the loss of life during this event.
He did think it is a mistake for the NWS and the media to
emphasize tropical storms only up until landfall; and then,
in some cases, the public perceives that there is no danger
because of a relatively weak wind-producing storm. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-13: The NWS should work with
the media to educate the public on the fact that heavy rains
and widespread flooding from tropical storms and hurricanes
may have as much, and in some cases even more, detrimental
impact as winds at landfall. |
FINDING 2-14: The disaster survey team found
that the Flash Flood Warnings issued in this event were
generally accurate and timely. However, many lacked a strong
enough indication of the life- threatening nature of the
flash flooding. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-14: NWS offices should strive
to better recognize truly extreme rainfall events and, in
those events, use the strongest possible wording in the
warnings and statements issued to make the public more cognizant
of the life-threatening nature of the event. |
FINDING 2-15: The disaster survey team found
a high degree of satisfaction from emergency managers, the
media, and the public with the river forecast services they
received during this event. In particular, the impact statements
and relationship to recent and historical flood levels were
judged valuable information. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-15: NWS Hydrologic Service
Area offices should make every effort to include up-to-date
and informative impact statements in all Flood Warnings
and Flood Statements. |
FINDING 2-16: There were several suggestions
from emergency managers and the media that the public river
forecasts be updated more frequently. The normal procedure
presently is to issue the Flood Statements once per day
in late morning or early afternoon. In particular, an early
morning update was suggested to provide current information
so the public can make more informed decisions on commute,
daily activities, or evacuation activities. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-16: NWS offices should make
every attempt to update Flood Warnings and Flood Statements
more than once per day. |
FINDING 2-17: Several users suggested that changes
in crest forecast values be highlighted at the beginning
of Flood Statements. An analysis by the disaster survey
team of the Flood Statements issued during this event where
the crest forecast was revised from the previous forecast
showed that they, in general, did not call attention to
the fact that a crest forecast had been revised. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-17: Any significant change
in the crest forecast from a previous crest forecast should
be highlighted at the beginning of the Flood Warning or
Flood Statement. |
FINDING 2-18: The forecast for the Flint River
at Bainbridge received considerable media and public attention
when the river crested well below the forecasted level.
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RECOMMENDATION 2-18: The SERFC must investigate
the causes for the Bainbridge forecast error and make the
appropriate changes to the hydrologic forecast model as
soon as possible. When the appropriate modifications to
the hydrologic model are completed, NWS personnel, RFC and/or
NEXRAD Weather Service Forecast Office (NWSFO), should make
the necessary effort to brief the Bainbridge public officials
(and media) on their findings. |
FINDING 2-19: Some communities, and perhaps
emergency managers, were not as prepared for the disastrous
floods as they could have been if there were greater personal
contact and education on floods by NWS Warning Coordination
Meteorologists (WCM) and Service Hydrologists (SH). |
RECOMMENDATION 2-19: NWS policy should require
periodic (annual if possible) personal visits by the WCMs
and/or SHs to emergency management and other action agencies
from the state to the local level. These contacts should
include a review of the flood threat to the local community
(emphasizing the threat to vehicular passengers) and a review
of the hydrologic services that the NWS provides. This educational
process should specify what products are available, how
they can be used, and where they can most efficiently be
obtained. |
FINDING 2-20: The public's perceived threat
from Alberto appeared to lessen once it made landfall. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-20: The NWS and NOAA should
take maximum advantage of the recommendations from the 1995
Interdepartmental Hurricane and the NOAA Hurricane Conferences,
which focused on the inland effects of tropical cyclones,
in order to enhance the public's perception of the dangers
associated with landfalling tropical cyclones. In addition,
the WCMs in all areas which might be affected by the aftermath
of decaying tropical cyclones should reenforce the potential
for severe flooding from such storms with the user community.
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FINDING 2-21: The disaster team believes another
possible contributing factor to the high death count could
be that the public was not adequately educated regarding
the locations of flood-prone areas (particularly roads),
safe evacuation routes, and the potential impact of their
actions. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-21: If funding permits, the
NWS, in conjunction with FEMA and appropriate state and
local agencies, should embark upon a campaign to educate
the public as to their local flood-prone areas. This should
include a widely distributed array of visual representations
of flood-prone areas depicting roads and bridges as well
as portions of communities that may be potentially inundated
by floods. Additionally, the NWS should plan to issue graphical
flood forecasts as well as the traditional text products.
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FINDING 2-22: The disaster team felt it was
inappropriate for a single NWS office to be expected to
respond to an event that covered multiple offices and to
FEMA's national-level press and Federal coordination briefings.
In addition, there was an imbalance in the media contacts
and interest with the National Hurricane Center prior to
landfall and Weather Forecast Branch once the tropical cyclone
had made landfall. |
RECOMMENDATION 2-22: The NWS should establish
a national media unit to provide beginning-to-end coverage
of storm events that have national impact or interest. This
unit would provide a consistent posture in front of the
national media, which could emphasize the dangers associated
with each phase of the storm. The unit would be headed by
a public affairs specialist and supported by an ad hoc team
of meteorologists and hydrologists, as appropriate for the
event. Teleconferencing should be utilized to maximize participation
of personnel from a variety of NWS offices. |