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Contents of Main Volume | Contents of Supplement
DISCLAIMER: The Longshore Benchbook was created solely to assist the Office of Administrative Law Judges as a first reference in researching cases arising under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and extension acts, as amended. This Benchbook does not constitute the official opinion of the Department of Labor, the Office of Administrative Law Judges, or any individual judge on any subject. This Benchbook does not necessarily contain an exhaustive or current treatment of case holdings, and should, under no circumstances, substitute for a party's own research into the statutory, regulatory, and case law authorities on any given subject referred to therein. It is intended to be used as a research tool, not as final legal authority and should not be cited or relied upon as such.
PDF Version: Volume I (Topics 1-21) | Volume II (Topics 22-90)
Description |
Topic |
Conflicts Between Applicable Sections |
8.4 |
|
8.4.4 |
TOPIC 8.4
Topic 8.4.1 Conflicts Between Applicable Sections—Unscheduled Injuries and Total Disability
Keenan v. Director, OWCP, ___ F.3d ___ (No 03-70442)(9th
Cir. Dec. 21, 2004).
While the main focus of this case is on de minimis awards, the court, in
a two to one decision, also decided to adopt Board and other circuit court
precedent that a shoulder injury is unscheduled. As to the de minimis
issue, the court opined, “if there is a chance of future changed circumstances
which, together with the continuing effects of the claimant’s injury, create a
‘significant potential’ of future depressed earning capacity, then the claimant
is entitled to the possibility of a future modified award under Rambo II.”
See Metropolitan Stevedore Co v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121 (1997)(“Rambo
II”).
Here the claimant had remained at work for several years in a clerical position
rather than his prior longshoring position and was making more than he had at
the time of injury. The ALJ had found that the passage of time had
outweighed the need for a de minimis award. The court stated that
unless the passage of time has directly removed one of the relevant factors—for
example, if some of the claimant’s work restrictions were removed, or if market
conditions changed for the better—the logic of the Rambo II test
dictates that the mere fact that the claimant is earning above pre-injury
levels cannot obviate the basis of the de minimis award. The court
found, “the absence of economic loss thus far does not reflect an underlying
absence of loss in physical function. The significance of the injury is a
substantial factor in the ‘significant potential of diminished capacity’ test
articulated by Rambo II.” Judge Tallman dissented on the de
minimis portion of this opinion.
The Ninth Circuit also took the opportunity to note it’s recently explicit
opinion in Sestich v. Long Beach Container Terminal, 289 F.3d 1157, at
1160 (9th Cir. 2002), ratifying the rule expressed previously
in Board decisions that the statutory formula for wages contemplates wages at
the time of injury, rather than projected present wages as the relevant
baseline for comparison to actual present earning capacity. Claimant had
argued that he should collect benefits according to a hypothetical damages
formula, under which the employer must compensate him for the difference
between his actual economic position and his hypothetical economic position,
which he would have enjoyed but for the injury.
Topic 8.4.4 Conflict Between Applicable Sections--Multiple Scheduled Injuries/Successive Injuries
ERRATA
The reference to “Section 22” should be corrected to read “Section 8©(22).”
Topic 8.4.4 Conflict Between Applicable Sections--Multiple Scheduled Injuries/Successive Injuries
Matson Terminals, Inc. v. Berg, 279 F.3d 694 (9th
Cir. 2002).
When both of a claimant's knees are injured in one accident, Section 8(c)(22)
indicates that there should be two liability periods. Since the claimant's two
knees were discrete injuries under Section 8(f), the Ninth Circuit found
that the Board and ALJ were correct in imposing two 104-week liability periods
on the employer. "It is irrelevant that the injuries arose from the same
working conditions or that they arose from a single cause or trauma. What is
relevant is that the working conditions caused two injuries, each separately
compensable under Section 8(f)."
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