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Contents of Main Volume | Contents of Supplement
DISCLAIMER: The Longshore Benchbook was created solely to assist the Office of Administrative Law Judges as a first reference in researching cases arising under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and extension acts, as amended. This Benchbook does not constitute the official opinion of the Department of Labor, the Office of Administrative Law Judges, or any individual judge on any subject. This Benchbook does not necessarily contain an exhaustive or current treatment of case holdings, and should, under no circumstances, substitute for a party's own research into the statutory, regulatory, and case law authorities on any given subject referred to therein. It is intended to be used as a research tool, not as final legal authority and should not be cited or relied upon as such.
PDF Version: Volume I (Topics 1-21) | Volume II (Topics 22-90)
TOPIC 8.3
Topic 8.3.1 Permanent Partial
Disability—Scheduled Awards—Some General Concepts
Keenan v. Director, OWCP, ___ F.3d ___ (No 03-70442)(9th
Cir. Dec. 21, 2004).
While the main focus of this case is on de minimis awards, the court, in
a two to one decision, also decided to adopt Board and other circuit court
precedent that a shoulder injury is unscheduled. As to the de minimis
issue, the court opined, “if there is a chance of future changed circumstances
which, together with the continuing effects of the claimant’s injury, create a
‘significant potential’ of future depressed earning capacity, then the claimant
is entitled to the possibility of a future modified award under Rambo II.”
See Metropolitan Stevedore Co v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121 (1997)(“Rambo
II”).
Here the claimant had remained at work for several years in a clerical position
rather than his prior longshoring position and was making more than he had at
the time of injury. The ALJ had found that the passage of time had
outweighed the need for a de minimis award. The court stated that
unless the passage of time has directly removed one of the relevant factors—for
example, if some of the claimant’s work restrictions were removed, or if market
conditions changed for the better—the logic of the Rambo II test
dictates that the mere fact that the claimant is earning above pre-injury levels
cannot obviate the basis of the de minimis award. The court found, “the
absence of economic loss thus far does not reflect an underlying absence of
loss in physical function. The significance of the injury is a
substantial factor in the ‘significant potential of diminished capacity’ test
articulated by Rambo II.” Judge Tallman dissented on the de
minimis portion of this opinion.
The Ninth Circuit also took the opportunity to note it’s recently
explicit opinion in Sestich v. Long Beach Container Terminal, 289 F.3d
1157, at 1160 (9th Cir. 2002), ratifying the rule expressed
previously in Board decisions that the statutory formula for wages contemplates
wages at the time of injury, rather than projected present wages as the
relevant baseline for comparison to actual present earning capacity.
Claimant had argued that he should collect benefits according to a hypothetical
damages formula, under which the employer must compensate him for the
difference between his actual economic position and his hypothetical economic
position, which he would have enjoyed but for the injury.
Topic 8.3.1 Permanent
Partial Disability--Scheduled Awards--Some General
Concepts
Carpenter v. California United Terminals, 37 BRBS 149
(2003).
In a case involving concurrent awards for permanent partial and permanent total
disability, the Board found that the Section 6(b)(1) statutory maximum
compensation rate was applicable to concurrent awards rather than accepting the
Director's position that Section 6(b)(1) should be considered in terms of each
separate award of benefits. The Board found that the term
"disability" must be construed in section 6(b)(1) such that, in instances
of concurrent awards, it means the overall disability resulting from both
injuries.
The Board noted that the Director's position, i.e., that the Section 6(b) limit
is applicable only on a single award basis would allow for a twice-injured
worker to receive compensation in excess of the single injury person, despite
the fact that their overall loss in wage-earning capacities are the same.
"In contrast, the Board's approach, based on the plain language of Section
6(b) limiting compensation for ‘disability,' precludes this would-be inequity
since both workers are subject to the same limit. The statute should not be
interpreted in a way that results in claimant's receiving from two employers
more than he could receive from one employer, pursuant to an explicit statutory
provision."
As to how offsets may be taken, the Board once more cites Hastings v. Earth
Satellite Corp., 628 F.2d 85, 14 BRBS 345 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980) as outlining a flexible scheme for
compensating loss of wage-earning capacity in cases of multiple injuries based
on the facts in a specific case, rather than setting forth a mechanical rule.
Topic 8.3.1 Permanent Partial
DEisability--Scheduled Awards–Some General
Concepts
[ED. NOTE: The following June 2003 decision
is included in this digest news letter because it was received in July.]
Gillus v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Company, 37 BRBS 93 (2003).
The Board found that when a claimant in temporary partial disability status
filed a motion for modification seeking de minimis benefits, it was not,
per se, invalid as an “anticipatory” claim. Specifically, here the claimant filed
the motion after her doctor noted her increasing difficulty in performing her
job and that she had progressive arthritis and probably would need knee
replacement surgery in the future. Thus the claim was not “anticipatory”
according to the Board.
Further more, the Board found that simply because the claimant’s injury was to
her leg, a body part covered by the schedule, does not mean that the claimant
cannot receive a de minimis award. The board noted that the claimant had
not claimed or been compensated for any permanent disability to her leg, nor
has her condition been termed “permanent” by her physician. Thus, her
modification claim for de minimis benefits was appropriately viewed as
based upon an award for temporary partial disability benefits pursuant to
Section 8(e). A Section 8(e) award is not precluded to a claimant who sustains
an injury to a member listed in the Schedule at Section 8(c), but whose injury
has not yet been found permanent. A claimant is limited to the schedule only where
the claimant is permanently partially disabled.
Topic 8.3.3 Permanent Partial
Disability—Section 8(c)(1) Loss of Use of Arm
Keenan v. Director, OWCP, ___ F.3d ___ (No 03-70442)(9th
Cir. Dec. 21, 2004).
While the main focus of this case is on de minimis awards, the court, in
a two to one decision, also decided to adopt Board and other circuit court
precedent that a shoulder injury is unscheduled. As to the de minimis
issue, the court opined, “if there is a chance of future changed circumstances
which, together with the continuing effects of the claimant’s injury, create a
‘significant potential’ of future depressed earning capacity, then the claimant
is entitled to the possibility of a future modified award under Rambo II.”
See Metropolitan Stevedore Co v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121 (1997)(“Rambo
II”).
Here the claimant had remained at work for several years in a clerical position
rather than his prior longshoring position and was making more than he had at
the time of injury. The ALJ had found that the passage of time had
outweighed the need for a de minimis award. The court stated that
unless the passage of time has directly removed one of the relevant factors—for
example, if some of the claimant’s work restrictions were removed, or if market
conditions changed for the better—the logic of the Rambo II test
dictates that the mere fact that the claimant is earning above pre-injury
levels cannot obviate the basis of the de minimis award. The court
found, “the absence of economic loss thus far does not reflect an underlying
absence of loss in physical function. The significance of the injury is a
substantial factor in the ‘significant potential of diminished capacity’ test
articulated by Rambo II.” Judge Tallman dissented on the de
minimis portion of this opinion.
The Ninth Circuit also took the opportunity to note it’s recently
explicit opinion in Sestich v. Long Beach Container Terminal, 289 F.3d
1157, at 1160 (9th Cir. 2002), ratifying the rule expressed
previously in Board decisions that the statutory formula for wages contemplates
wages at the time of injury, rather than projected present wages as the
relevant baseline for comparison to actual present earning capacity.
Claimant had argued that he should collect benefits according to a hypothetical
damages formula, under which the employer must compensate him for the
difference between his actual economic position and his hypothetical economic
position, which he would have enjoyed but for the injury.
Topic 8.3.4 Permanent Partial Disability--Sections 8(c)(1) and 8.4 Conflicts Between Applicable Sections
Carpenter v. California United Terminals, 37 BRBS 149
(2003).
In a case involving concurrent awards for permanent partial and permanent total
disability, the Board found that the Section 6(b)(1) statutory maximum
compensation rate was applicable to concurrent awards rather than accepting the
Director's position that Section 6(b)(1) should be considered in terms of each
separate award of benefits. The Board found that the term
"disability" must be construed in section 6(b)(1) such that, in
instances of concurrent awards, it means the overall disability resulting from
both injuries.
The Board noted that the Director's position, i.e., that the Section 6(b) limit
is applicable only on a single award basis would allow for a twice-injured
worker to receive compensation in excess of the single injury person, despite
the fact that their overall loss in wage-earning capacities are the same.
"In contrast, the Board's approach, based on the plain language of Section
6(b) limiting compensation for ‘disability,' precludes this would-be inequity
since both workers are subject to the same limit. The statute should not be
interpreted in a way that results in claimant's receiving from two employers
more than he could receive from one employer, pursuant to an explicit statutory
provision."
As to how offsets may be taken, the Board once more cites Hastings v. Earth
Satellite Corp., 628 F.2d 85, 14 BRBS 345 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980) as outlining a flexible scheme for
compensating loss of wage-earning capacity in cases of multiple injuries based
on the facts in a specific case, rather than setting forth a mechanical rule.
Topic 8.3.26 Section 8(c)(22) Multiple
Scheduled Injuries
ERRATA
The reference to “Section 22” should be corrected to read “Section 8(c)(22).”
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