

## Biometric Credentialing for Biometrically Challenged Users

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Why use biometric credentials?



- Provides mechanism for limiting credential holders to a single identity within a credentialing system
  - n 1:N search ties applicant's biometric(s) to an identity
  - n Can<u>not</u> verify the identity against any objective reality
- Increase certainty that the credential can be used only by the person to whom it is issued
  - n Biometrics are only useful if the credential's biometric features are used
    - No increased security in flash-pass systems
    - No increased security in card + PIN systems
- Applicable to Physical & Logical Access Control Systems


Who can take full advantage of biometric credentials?



- Various estimates exist
  - Industry conventional wisdom says that biometric products have a 1% to 5% Failure To Enroll rate; this rate varies by product and by biometric type
  - n NISTIR 7271, "The Myth of Goats: How many people have fingerprints that are hard to match?", reports on a population in which less than 0.05% had fingers that were usually hard to match
- Everyone appears to agree that there is some group of people that cannot be served by any given biometric technology



- There are a variety of reasons a given biometric technology will not provide satisfactory results for a given individual.
  - n Lack of the physical feature from which biometric samples are derived
  - Injuries to the physical feature from which biometric samples are derived
  - n Physical characteristics that make biometric samples from the individual unusable
  - n Physical handicaps that make the usual biometric sample devices difficult or impossible for the individual to use
  - <sup>n</sup> Use of cosmetic devices that interfere with sample capture
- Some issues can be mitigated to provide for successful use
  - n Dry fingers can often be overcome with oil
  - n Patterned contact lens wearers can forego their use





- HSPD-12 requires that all executive branch employees and contractors be issued PIV II credentials that contain fingerprint and facial biometric templates
  - n If only 1% are unable to use biometrics, this translates to 10,000 of every 1,000,000 credential holders
- TSA intends, by some estimates, to issue TWICs to over 6,000,000 transportation workers
  - n If 2% are unable to use biometrics then 120,000 workers would be affected
- If we don't plan to serve this population, implementation of large-scale biometric access control systems will founder due to legal and social sensibility considerations



- Increased security is primary motivation for use of biometrics
  - Credential-only systems allow access to anyone possessing a genuine credential, even if they're not the owner
  - n PIN-based systems are only slightly better since PINs can easily be compromised
  - n Biometric credential can, in theory, only be used by its owner

But... the overall security of a biometric system is compromised if some credential holders don't use biometrics Operational options for biometric access control systems



- Alternate provisions must be made for those who cannot use the primary biometric (fingerprints)
  - n Alternative biometric access (face, iris, etc)
    - Facial biometric devices could operate on PIV II facial templates
    - Other biometrics will require use of a server-based matching subsystem
  - n Non-biometric access
    - Credential + PIN
    - Opens the door to misuse of credentials by unauthorized persons
  - n Pseudo-biometric access
    - Credential contains identifier in biometric template indicating cardholder status
    - No more secure than non-biometric access, but helps to conceal the identity of those holding non-biometric cards
    - Only useful for persons possessing the biometric feature



## Summary

- Biometric credentials enable implementation of more secure access control systems
- Such systems are only as secure as their weakest link
- There is no generally accepted approach for serving people with no or unusable biometric features
- Systems implemented without considering this population will encounter resistance and possibly prevent implementation of biometric access controls
- System operators *will* adopt a solution; if no guidance is provided these solutions may weaken security
- Without consistent, cost-effective solutions we may be issuing the world's most expensive flash passes and proximity cards

## **Contact Information**



Ron Sutton

## BearingPoint, LLC

ron.sutton@bearingpoint.com