Since September 11, 2001, the men and women of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have worked tirelessly to reinforce our intelligence capabilities and improve our ability to protect the American people from national security threats. We have built on our established capacity to collect information and enhanced our ability to analyze and disseminate intelligence. Development of the National Security Branch (NSB) has been another step in enhancing the FBI’s mission as a dual law enforcement and intelligence agency.

The National Security Branch

On June 28, 2005, the President directed the FBI to create a “National Security Service” within the FBI. The Attorney General implemented this directive through the standing up of a new organization—the National Security Branch—on September 12, 2005. On June 5, 2006, the FBI received notification that Congress had officially approved the new structure as part of the larger reorganization of the FBI. The NSB consists of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, the Counterintelligence Division, the Directorate of Intelligence, and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Directorate.

The NSB integrates the FBI’s primary national security programs under the leadership of an Executive Assistant Director for the National Security Branch and through policies and initiatives designed to enhance the Bureau’s capability to support national security duties. The mission of the NSB is to optimally position the FBI to protect the United States against WMD, terrorist attacks, foreign intelligence operations, and espionage by:

· Integrating investigative and intelligence activities against current and emerging national security threats;

· Providing useful and timely information and analysis to the intelligence and law enforcement communities; and

· Effectively developing enabling capabilities, processes, and infrastructure, consistent with applicable laws, Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence guidance, and civil liberties.

The NSB’s initiatives are all aimed at our goal of integrating intelligence and operations to protect our national security. Since 9/11, the FBI has implemented significant changes to enhance our ability to counter today’s most critical threats. The NSB will build on the FBI’s strengths, ensure integration of national security intelligence and investigations, promote the development of a national security workforce, and facilitate a new level of coordination with the U.S. Intelligence Community. With the continued commitment and dedication of the men and women of the FBI, these reforms will improve the Bureau’s ability to accomplish our national security investigative and intelligence missions and, ultimately, to protect the American people.

The National Security Branch

Introduction

Since September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has implemented a comprehensive plan that fundamentally transforms the organization to enhance our ability to predict and prevent terrorism and other national security threats. We overhauled our counterterrorism operations, expanded our intelligence capabilities, modernized our business practices and technology, and improved coordination with our federal, state, local, and tribal partners. Development of the National Security Branch (NSB) has been another step in enhancing the FBI’s mission as a dual law enforcement and intelligence agency.

The NSB structure took effect on September 12, 2005, in response to a directive from the President to the Attorney General. This directive mandated that the FBI establish a “National Security Service” that combines the missions, capabilities, and resources of the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and intelligence elements of the FBI under the leadership of a senior FBI official. On June 5, 2006, the FBI received notification that Congress had officially approved the new structure as part of the larger reorganization of the FBI.

Combining our national security workforce and mission under one leadership umbrella enhances our contribution to the national intelligence effort and provides us with the opportunity to leverage resources from our U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) partners, as well as our federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners.

The mission of the NSB is to optimally position the FBI to protect the United States against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorist attacks, foreign intelligence operations, and espionage by:

· Integrating investigative and intelligence activities against current and emerging national security threats;

· Providing useful and timely information and analysis to the intelligence and law enforcement communities; and

· Effectively developing enabling capabilities, processes, and infrastructure, consistent with applicable laws, Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) guidance, and civil liberties.

The vision of the NSB—to the extent authorized under the law—is to build a national awareness that permits recognition of a national security threat sufficiently early to permit its disruption. This approach will promote the collection of relevant information and minimize the gathering of extraneous data that distract from the analytical process.

Background

The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission) examined the FBI’s intelligence program and concluded in March 2005 that it had been significantly improved since 9/11. The commission rejected calling for the creation of a separate agency devoted to internal security without any law enforcement powers. It recognized that the FBI’s hybrid intelligence and investigative nature is one of our greatest strengths and emphasized the importance of the ongoing effort to integrate intelligence and investigative operations. At the same time, the commission noted the FBI’s structure did not sufficiently ensure that our intelligence activities were coordinated with the rest of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Accordingly, the commission issued the following recommendation:

To ensure that the FBI’s intelligence elements are responsive to the Director of National Intelligence, and to capitalize on the FBI’s progress, we recommend the creation of a new National Security Service within the FBI under a single Executive Assistant Director. This service would include the Bureau’s Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions and the Directorate of Intelligence. The service would be subject to the coordination and budget authorities of the Director of National Intelligence as well as to the same Attorney General authorities that apply to other Bureau divisions.

(WMD Commission Report at 465.)

The commission’s recommendation promoted the integration of the FBI’s intelligence activities within the U.S. Intelligence Community by ensuring the DNI has the ability to coordinate the FBI’s intelligence activities. At the same time, this proposal ensured that the FBI retains the ability to integrate national security investigative and intelligence activities while continuing to take advantage of our extensive network of partnerships, including our 800,000 state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners.

On June 28, 2005, the President issued a memorandum acknowledging the substantial efforts the FBI has made in strengthening our national security capabilities and coordinating effectively with other elements of the government. The President also determined that additional action was required to meet evolving challenges to the security of the United States and, therefore, directed the FBI to create a “National Security Service” consistent with the WMD Commission’s recommendation. In establishing this new service, the President instructed the FBI to combine the missions, capabilities, and resources of the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and intelligence elements of the FBI under the leadership of a senior FBI official.

The Attorney General implemented this directive through the standing up of a new organization—the National Security Branch—on September 12, 2005. On June 5, 2006, the FBI received notification that Congress had officially approved the new structure as part of the larger reorganization of the FBI. The NSB integrates the FBI’s primary national security programs under the leadership of a single FBI official and through policies and initiatives designed to enhance the entire Bureau’s capability to support our national security missions.

Organization

The NSB consists of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division (CTD), the Counterintelligence Division (CD), the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), and the WMD Directorate (WMDD). It integrates our counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigative and operational capabilities with our intelligence capabilities. Effective September 12, 2005, the day the NSB structure took effect, these divisions and the programs they administer were unified under the authority of a single official who reports to the Deputy Director.

F B I National Security Branch

The CTD and CD retain both their basic structure and their responsibility for management of investigative operations related to counterterrorism and counterintelligence, intelligence collection related to national security, and evidence exploitation.

The DI also retains its basic structure, including its embedded intelligence elements in each field division and in the CTD, CD, Criminal Investigation Division (CID), and Cyber Division (CyD) at FBI Headquarters. The DI will continue to supervise FBI-wide intelligence activities, including field intelligence operations, from collection to dissemination.

While the CTD, CD, and DI will currently retain their basic structure, the FBI will look for opportunities to incorporate structural changes across the NSB that will create efficiencies and promote integration. One such recent change occurred on July 26, 2006, when the FBI established the WMDD within the NSB to support and consolidate the FBI’s WMD components.

Executive Assistant Director for National Security

The Executive Assistant Director for the National Security Branch (EAD-NSB) leads the NSB. An Associate EAD and the Assistant Directors of the CTD, CD, DI, and WMDD, who bring specialized expertise to the day-to-day management of each component, assist the EAD-NSB.

Personnel Authority

As the head of the NSB, the EAD has substantial personnel authority. He can transfer personnel from one division to another within the NSB, consistent with FBI and applicable government policies and DNI guidance and priorities. He is responsible for rating the performance of the heads of the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, intelligence, and WMD programs and is the reviewing official for the immediate subordinates of those officials. This creates a clear chain of command between the EAD-NSB and the heads of the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, intelligence, and WMD programs.

The EAD-NSB participates in the decision-making process for the selection of all Special Agents in Charge (SACs) and Assistant Directors in Charge (ADICs) in FBI field offices by serving as a voting member of the FBI Senior Executive Service (SES) Board. The EAD-NSB also has input into the evaluation of all SACs and ADICs.

Operational Authority

The EAD-NSB has the authority to initiate, direct, terminate, or reallocate any of the investigations or other activities within the NSB. To facilitate exercise of this authority, the EAD-NSB has full access to information from all counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and intelligence operations, as well as information about all of the Bureau’s sources of information.

Budget Authority

The EAD-NSB exercises direct budget authority over the NSB’s components and related programs, including the investigative resources in CTD and CD, Intelligence Career Service (ICS) personnel, human source management resources, and national technical intelligence collection resources.

In addition, because the NSB-controlled budget includes a pro rata share of FBI resources supporting overall FBI operations, the EAD-NSB can influence components outside the NSB that support our national security programs, such as training, human resources, facilities, and information technology. In this way, the EAD-NSB can prioritize all FBI national security investments.

Enforcement Mechanisms

The EAD-NSB has full management authority over all FBI Headquarters and field national security programs through his control of both operations and the national security budget. Specifically:

· The NSB, through its DI, ensures that FBI raw and strategic intelligence production is consistent with national security priorities.

· The NSB exercises its authority over national security activities at FBI Headquarters and in the field through its budget authority, including management of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) budget.

· The NSB relies on a regular inspection process and program-specific reviews to ensure our national security activities are consistent with the direction of the Attorney General and DNI. The EAD-NSB is implementing management strategies over field activities and operations, which provide direction, accountability, and measurable expectations. The EAD-NSB is also establishing policies and procedures to hold personnel accountable for performance results through such mechanisms as evaluation of individual performance, the regular inspection process, and program-specific reviews.

Information Sharing and Coordination

The head of the NSB serves as the FBI’s lead intelligence official and communicates with the Attorney General and the DNI to ensure responsiveness to their guidance and to facilitate coordination with other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community. On October 5, 2005, the FBI Director designated the EAD-NSB as the principal FBI official for information and intelligence sharing policy. In this capacity, the EAD-NSB serves as the principal advisor to the Director for these policies and provides policy direction to other FBI components with respect to information and intelligence sharing policy.

Responsibility for Intelligence Activities

Consistent with the President’s direction, the EAD-NSB’s principal responsibility is the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence to further enhance the security of the nation. The integration of national security components in the NSB strengthens the continuous cycle of intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination.

The integration of investigative and intelligence activities will be discussed in-depth in the following section, as we take a closer look at the components that compose the NSB’s mission.

Integrating Intelligence and Investigations

The mission of the National Security Branch is to optimally position the FBI to protect the United States against weapons of mass destruction, terrorist attacks, foreign intelligence operations, and espionage by:

· Integrating investigative and intelligence activities against current and emerging national security threats;

· Providing useful and timely information and analysis to the intelligence and law enforcement communities; and

· Effectively developing enabling capabilities, processes, and infrastructure, consistent with applicable laws, Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence guidance, and civil liberties.

Introduction

The structure of the National Security Branch is designed to strengthen the integration of the FBI’s intelligence and investigative missions. This structure will enable us to capitalize on our established ability to collect information and extend that strength to the analysis and production of intelligence.

Integration also ensures that intelligence can drive investigative operations. Information collected through FBI investigations is analyzed not just to build a case for prosecution, but to give us a greater awareness of threats. Intelligence, in turn, drives investigative strategies to ensure that our resources are targeting the most pressing threats and that we collect the information decision makers need most.

Criminal and national security threats are often intertwined. Our greatest opportunity to prevent terrorist attacks is to combine intelligence gathered through both criminal investigations and national security investigations. The NSB will coordinate support from other FBI divisions, whether it is exploitation of documents and electronic media from a terrorist safe-house or outreach efforts to enlist the private sector to track acquisition of weapons materials or defend Critical National Assets.

Training, finances, recruiting, logistical support, pre-attack planning, and preparation are all required components of terrorist operations. These different facets of terrorist operations create vulnerabilities, particularly when the terrorists engage in criminal activities to achieve their ends. At each stage, terrorists may trigger a response that exposes their activities to FBI investigators, law enforcement officers, and other federal partners. The NSB will help strengthen our national security investigative and intelligence web.

Although the FBI’s CTD, CD and the DI have had many national security accomplishments prior to the standing up of the National Security Branch, the NSB will help to further integrate the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, WMD, and intelligence functions through uniform processes and procedures. To promote the integration of NSB components, we will continue to identify the basic business and operational processes the NSB will employ to carry out and support its programs. In addition, we have made changes to our management structure, hiring processes, and training programs. We have modernized our work environment and infrastructure and strengthened our partnerships. These steps, which have impacted every component of the FBI, provide the foundation for development of the National Security Branch.

National Security Branch Components

To support our centralized, integrated approach, we put in place a new management structure and reorganized and expanded both the CTD and CD and established a new WMDD. These new structures help us coordinate operations and intelligence production domestically and overseas, concentrate WMD essential capabilities into key functional sections, and establish clear lines of accountability for the overall development and success of our missions.

In the intelligence arena, we moved the FBI beyond case-focused intelligence gathering and analysis and enhanced our capacity to fuse intelligence from across the Bureau. The FBI now uses intelligence not just to pursue investigations but to have greater awareness of the threats we face.

Counterterrorism

The prevention of further terrorist attacks is the FBI’s overriding priority. We have reallocated resources and personnel and updated investigative strategies, policies, and procedures to support the counterterrorism mission, which is managed from FBI Headquarters. This broader approach helps us identify crucial gaps in intelligence and supports proactive investigative and analytic efforts to combat immediate threats, identify plots before they develop, and disrupt and dismantle terrorist organizations.

The counterterrorism mission has been assisted by the USA PATRIOT Act, which has dismantled the wall that separated law enforcement from intelligence. Previously, the ability of law enforcement and intelligence officers to share information and connect the dots in terrorism and espionage investigations was limited. The USA PATRIOT Act’s provisions have reduced the statutory and cultural barriers to information sharing, and it is this information sharing, as the 9/11 and WMD Commissions made clear, that will make the difference in our ongoing efforts to prevent terrorism.

We also established new operational components dedicated to the counterterrorism mission. These include the 24-hour Counterterrorism Watch (CT Watch) and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) to manage and share threat information; the Terrorism Financing Operation Section (TFOS) to centralize efforts to stop terrorist financing; evidence exploitation squads to exploit material found overseas for intelligence value; deployable “Fly Teams” to lend counterterrorism expertise wherever it is needed; and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) to help identify terrorists and keep them out of the United States.

Counterintelligence

Counterintelligence is the FBI’s second priority, and, here, too, we have added resources, improved our organization, and implemented strategies to address new and changing threats. We consolidated all counterespionage activity under a single command, to provide a more systematic national effort against espionage, including economic espionage, and other threats. In the field, we increased the number of field offices with counterintelligence squads from 23 to 56.

The foreign intelligence threat currently facing the United States from foreign nation-state and non-state actors is increasingly complex and asymmetrical. U.S. national security is gravely threatened by foreign intelligence services and their assets, who are dedicated to using all means at their disposal to obtain information that enhances the strategic position of their country while disadvantaging the United States. Our adversaries are especially active in areas where they perceive counterintelligence vulnerabilities.

As the lead agency for counterintelligence in the United States, and the primary investigative component of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI has the responsibility to oversee the integration of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence efforts to ensure that all available means are brought to bear to mitigate this ongoing and daunting threat, consistent with our laws and policy.

In counterintelligence, as in counterterrorism, we centralized management and adopted a proactive strategy where we collect and disseminate intelligence, disrupt threats, and prosecute offenders as warranted. Our National Strategy for Counterintelligence expands our focus beyond the traditional state-controlled agents and threats of the Cold War era to the asymmetrical threats we face today. Our new strategy addresses both state and non-state actors and focuses all field divisions on the three most pressing modern threats: acquisition of information about WMD; penetration of the U.S. Intelligence Community and other government agencies/contractors; and the compromise of Critical National Assets.

Intelligence

To support the broader intelligence mission, we established the Directorate of Intelligence at FBI Headquarters to coordinate and manage intelligence functions throughout the Bureau. The DI oversees field intelligence operations through embedded intelligence elements called Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) in each of our 56 field offices. The FIGs perform intelligence functions through integrated teams of Special Agents (SAs), Intelligence Analysts (IAs), Language Analysts (LAs), and Surveillance Specialists. The DI also has embedded elements focused on intelligence in each of the operational divisions at FBI Headquarters—CTD, CD, and the WMDD, as well as the Criminal Investigative and Cyber Divisions. Through this integrated management structure, the DI ensures that the FBI’s raw intelligence production and strategic intelligence production are consistent with national intelligence priorities.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

To integrate WMD components currently spread throughout the FBI and concentrate WMD essential capabilities into key functional sections, the NSB established the WMD Directorate on July 26, 2006. The WMDD integrates and links the FBI's necessary counterterrorism, intelligence, counterintelligence, and scientific and technological components to accomplish the Bureau's overall WMD mission.

WMDD’s vision is to eliminate the illicit use of weapons of mass destruction, and its mission is to prevent WMD attacks, identify and respond to WMD threats, and fully coordinate the investigative response. This involves integrating intelligence and leading law enforcement operations to identify, detect, and disrupt WMD operations.

The newest NSB component, the WMDD is expected to provide flexibility for growth and development; its structure will also allow for optimal coordination with interagency partners. The directorate will assign specific program responsibilities and will provide a mechanism to perform the following essential capabilities: intelligence; countermeasures; preparedness; assessment and response; investigative; science and technology support; and policy and planning.

Accomplishments

These and other changes—some occurring prior to the standing up of the National Security Branch—have enabled the FBI to participate in operations disrupting a wide variety of domestic and international terrorist undertakings. Since 9/11, we have substantially increased development of human sources, and our ability to integrate intelligence into our operations has allowed us to take an increasingly sophisticated and targeted approach to disrupt attacks during periods of heightened threat.

Counterterrorism Operations

The NSB’s Counterterrorism Division’s priorities are:

· Detecting, disrupting, and dismantling terrorist sleeper cells in the United States before they act;

· Identifying and preventing acts of terrorism by individuals with a terrorist agenda acting alone;

· Detecting, disrupting, and dismantling terrorist support networks, including financial support networks;

· Enhancing our capability to quickly ascertain the reliability, implications, and details of terrorist threats and improving our capacity to disseminate threat-related information to local, state, and federal agencies, and to the private sector as needed; and

· Enhancing our overall contribution to the U.S. Intelligence Community and to senior policy makers in government by providing timely and accurate in-depth analysis of the terrorist threat and other information of value on an on-going basis.

To meet these priorities, we have made improvements to the core functions of CTD. The most telling measure of our progress is the way we have conducted individual operations consistent with our prevention mission. The extent of our transformation is most clearly seen in the approach we take when confronting specific terrorist threats. Our operations demonstrate that coordination and prevention through the development of actionable intelligence have become our guiding operational principles. The following sampling of our investigative activities shows the dimensions of our counterterrorism capabilities.

Terrorist Screening Center Encounters

The FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center was created by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 to consolidate the government’s approach to terrorist screening and to create a single comprehensive watch list—the Terrorist Screening Data Base (TSDB)—of known or suspected terrorists. The consolidation of the various government watch lists into the TSDB occurred on March 12, 2004.

The TSC shares access to its TSDB with many federal government agencies, including the DOJ, Department of State (DOS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and Department of Defense (DOD). The TSC also disseminates its Daily Summary Report to each of those agencies.

As detailed below, recent TSC successes include: (1) a traffic stop resulting in the arrest of a suspect connected to Hamas, which is denoted as a Specially Designated Terrorist Organization (SDTO) by the DOS, and (2) a customs in-flight check with the FBI prompting an arrest at the Chicago Airport.

1. In 2004, Maryland authorities stopped a person who was filming the Chesapeake Bay Bridge. A routine check by the police officers provided information that the person who was filming might have been of interest to the FBI. A police officer called the TSC from his location, and TSC personnel advised the officer that the individual was, in fact, an unindicted co-conspirator with three others who were members of Hamas. Within minutes, the individual was arrested on an outstanding material witness warrant.

2. In another recent incident, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)’s National Tracking Center (NTC) notified the TSC of a possible match with a name of a passenger who was, at the time, on a flight from Amman, Jordan, to Chicago, Illinois. TSC personnel checked databases and verified a positive match. FBI TSC personnel in Washington, D.C., contacted FBI personnel on the Chicago FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). The Chicago JTTF was advised that the subject on the plane should be arrested immediately upon landing. When his flight landed, the subject was arrested and taken into custody at the airport in Chicago.

Iyman Faris

The investigation of Iyman Faris is a good example of how the FBI works cooperatively with our partners to investigate and neutralize a specific threat. The investigation was initiated and developed as a result of close coordination with our international, federal, state, and municipal partners. Faris initially came to our attention when information from a foreign source linked Faris to terrorists who had plotted attacks to coincide with Millennium celebrations. With help from FBI Headquarters, agents, and other JTTF members in our Cincinnati field office, we conducted an extensive investigation of Faris and ultimately interviewed Faris in March 2003. During the interview, Faris admitted that he had personal contact with several individuals tied to terrorism.

At about the same time, another foreign source indicated that an Ohio‑based truck driver had been tasked to attack U.S. bridges, particularly the Brooklyn Bridge. Once that information came together, we quickly composed a targeted plan for the Faris interview team, assigned operational leads to field offices and JTTFs around the country, and teamed up with New York Police Department investigators and analysts. As a result of these activities, Faris was arrested, and he ultimately pled guilty to the charge of providing material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization. On October 28, 2003, Faris was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Investigation of Criminal Enterprises Supporting Hizballah

Hizballah criminal enterprises, primarily based in the Detroit area, were engaged in a wide range of offenses, including credit card fraud, bank fraud, mail fraud, mortgage fraud, wire fraud, bankruptcy fraud, money laundering, contraband cigarette trafficking, trafficking in counterfeit cigarette tax stamps, transportation of stolen property, and trafficking in counterfeit goods. A team of investigators from several FBI JTTFs, Legal Attachés, and our partner agencies used an integrated strategy of intelligence collection and criminal investigative techniques to identify, disrupt, and defeat Hizballah support networks. To date, the investigation has resulted in 18 complaints, 37 indictments, 19 arrests, and 10 convictions.

Counterintelligence Operations

The FBI’s counterintelligence (CI) strategy has established national counterintelligence priorities and proactively focused operations against the United States’ most aggressive adversaries. The program has made great strides in rebuilding the FBI’s professional cadre of counterintelligence Special Agents, deploying critical CI resources in all 56 field offices, and establishing evaluation criteria by which field offices can manage their programs and gauge their progress. In the future, these improvements will provide a foundation from which enhanced and expanded CI efforts can be launched.

These successes can be clearly linked to a variety of FBI Headquarters initiatives:

1. Country-specific program directives issued by FBI Headquarters and the coordination and participation of FBI Headquarters program managers in critical field operations.

2. Aggressive training schedules for executives, supervisors, Special Agents, and professional support staff.

3. The use of clearly defined performance standards linked to strategy elements, by which field office implementation activities can be assessed.

4. The use of CI professionals to conduct field office program reviews and provide recommendations for CI program improvements.

5. Outreach to U.S. Intelligence Community and government contractors to assist them in better protecting themselves against Foreign Intelligence Service attacks.

CI program executives are committed to reducing the hostile intelligence activities of the United States’ major adversaries over the next five years. This requires continuous progress toward full implementation of all aspects of the CI strategy. The CI program will work to significantly enhance program and operational capabilities across the board, with emphasis on counterproliferation and the non-traditional threat, to produce a substantial reduction in the current level of threat to vital U.S. interests. At the same time, the integrity and level of our efforts against the more traditional threat must not be diminished, as this threat continues to exist at higher levels and on a broader spectrum than during the Cold War.

As part of our CI mission, the FBI has taken steps to establish closer working relationships with the private sector and academia through business and academic alliances.

Business Alliance

The FBI is building executive-level relationships between high-tech, cutting edge technology companies and the FBI. The purpose of this Business Alliance is to make those companies the nation’s “first line of CI defense” against the foreign intelligence threat. The FBI is raising the awareness of Corporate America about the covert interests of foreign intelligence services in their proprietary information and intellectual property, as well as the methodologies hostile services are currently using to gain access. The Business Alliance also fosters CI information sharing between the FBI and industry.

Academic Alliance

On September 15, 2003, the creation of a National Security Higher Education Advisory Board was announced. The board consists of the presidents and chancellors of several prominent U.S. universities and is designed to foster outreach and promote understanding between higher education and the FBI. The Board provides advice on the culture of higher education, including the traditions of openness, academic freedom, and international collaboration; along with seeking to establish lines of communication on national priorities pertaining to terrorism, counterintelligence, and homeland security. The Board also assists in the development of research, degree programs, course work, internships, opportunities for graduates, and consulting opportunities for faculty relating to national security.

Counterintelligence Successes

Lawrence Franklin Investigation—A major FBI counterintelligence investigation conducted recently involved Lawrence Franklin, a former Iran desk officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon. Franklin, from Kearneysville, West Virginia, was sentenced on January 20, 2006, by U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis III on three felony counts: conspiracy to communicate national defense information to persons not entitled to receive it; conspiracy to communicate classified information to an agent of a foreign government; and the unlawful retention of national defense information. Franklin was sentenced to a total of 151 months in prison and ordered to pay a fine of $10,000.

Other Counterintelligence Arrests— On December 15, 2005, a federal jury convicted Kenneth Wayne Ford, Jr., of Waldorf, Maryland, of unlawfully possessing classified information related to the national defense and making a false statement to a U.S. government agency. Ford was employed by the National Security Agency (NSA) between June 2001 and late 2003. On January 11, 2004, FBI agents executed a search warrant at Ford’s residence and discovered sensitive classified information throughout his home, including numerous Top Secret documents in two boxes in Ford’s kitchen. Ford was arrested on January 12, 2004. Ford had taken home the classified information on the last day of his employment at NSA in December 2003, when Ford was to start working in the private sector on a classified contract for a defense contractor. On March 30, 2006, Ford was sentenced to 72 months in prison.

On March 23, 2006, Howard Hsy, of Bellevue, Washington, was sentenced by U.S. District Judge Thomas S. Zilly to two years of probation and a $15,000 fine in the U.S. District Court in Seattle for conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control Act. Hsy conspired with others to export night vision goggles and camera lenses to a contact in Taiwan. Exporting those items required a license and written approval from the DOS, which Hsy did not have. The military equipment is later shipped to the People’s Republic of China. Hsy conspired with others in the Seattle area and Taiwan to purchase the military gear for export. The military equipment was primarily used by military pilots to fly and navigate at night. In October 2005, a Seattle-area co-conspirator, Donald Shull, pled guilty to conspiracy to violate the Export Administration Act and was sentenced in February 2006 to two years of probation and a $10,000 fine.

On January 25, 2006, the U.S. Southern District Court of Indiana convicted Shaaban Hafiz Ahmad Ali Shaaban of six counts: conspiracy; acting as a foreign agent without notification; one violation of the Iraqi Sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; unlawful procurement of an identification document; and unlawful procurement of naturalization. Shaaban never registered as an agent of Iraq, yet, in 2002 and 2003 when he lived in Indianapolis and Greenfield, Indiana, Shaaban committed the following acts:

· Traveled to Baghdad in late 2002 where he offered to sell names of U.S. intelligence agents and operatives to Iraq for $3 million.

· Sought to gain Iraqi support to establish an Arabic television station in the United States that would broadcast news and discussions that would be pro-Iraqi.

· Sought to enter into a “cooperation agreement” where he would be paid a fee by Iraq to organize volunteers to act as human shields to protect Iraqi infrastructure during the war.

· Broadcasted messages of support for the Iraqi government on Iraqi media stations that advocated support for Iraq and encouraged others to forcibly resist the United States and others who opposed Iraq.

Former National Security Advisor Samuel Berger pled guilty in April 2005 in Washington, D.C., to one count of US Title 18, Section 1924 (unauthorized removal and retention of classified documents or material) to avoid a jail sentence. In September 2005 Berger was sentenced and required to perform 100 hours of community service and pay a $50,000 fine for the removal of classified documents from the National Archives and intentional destruction of some of them, as well as $6,905 for the administrative costs of his two-year probation.

Intelligence Operations

The purpose of the FBI’s intelligence program is to leverage our investigative and information gathering capability to detect and disrupt threats before they manifest themselves in a terrorist or criminal act.

The DI is responsible for building an intelligence program throughout the FBI. We must collect and disseminate information in a manner consistent with the civil liberties and civil rights of all we serve.

The DI will leverage the FBI’s strong history of partnerships by uniting FBI intelligence professionals with the private sector and state, local, and tribal law enforcement. We will engage in joint operations in a shared information space, where we can create a common view of the threat and a clear understanding of our respective roles in countering that threat.

Each of our 56 field offices has a FIG made up of Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts, and depending on the size of the office Surveillance Specialists and Language Analysts. Officers and analysts from other intelligence and law enforcement agencies are often included as well. FIGs are central to the integration of the intelligence cycle—the six-step process of developing unrefined data into polished intelligence for the use of policymakers—into field operations.

The FIG provides regional integration of the larger FBI intelligence program. It provides a flow of national requirements and information needs into the field office, and it informs local collection and direction. The FIG also integrates field office insight into the national picture.

Development of Human Sources

The FBI has long recognized that human source information is one of the most important ways to investigate criminal activity. We have long‑standing expertise in recruiting and working with human sources, and we have used those skills to great effect across a wide range of investigative programs, including organized crime, drugs, public corruption, and white collar crime. The Bureau has placed a priority on developing human intelligence source reporting on international and domestic terrorists. We have revised our training program, personnel evaluation criteria, and operational priorities to focus on source development, and are enhancing the guidance, oversight, and training provided to agents to ensure proper management of human sources.

In the President’s Memorandum to the Attorney General dated November 18, 2004, the FBI was directed to provide a comprehensive plan for source validation. In addition, the Office of the DNI (ODNI) drafted U.S. Intelligence Community-wide validation standards for sources. The FBI, in compliance with ODNI standards, and in response to the President’s memorandum, has drafted a Confidential Validation Standards Manual that was approved by Deputy Director John S. Pistole on May 23, 2006. The FBI has implemented a phased in validation process that allows us to validate all of our sources on a continuous basis. Our validation process has been coordinated closely with ODNI, DIA and elements of DOD. As a result of its implementation, each division at FBI Headquarters has established entities specifically dedicated to the validation of sources reporting on their specific programs.

Photograph of Intelligence analyst at work

Intelligence Career Service

A primary accomplishment of the FBI’s Intelligence Program in 2005 was the creation of an Intelligence Career Service, whose members work at FBI Headquarters and in all 56 field offices. As just one example of the Directorate of Intelligence’s progress in building up the ICS, the FBI focused on and increased the Intelligence Analyst staffing level in the field, thereby supporting the strategic emphasis of putting analysts “where the intelligence is.” The number of analysts in the field grew from 617 in January 2004 to 1,105 as of July 2006. The DI also increased the Language Analyst Funded Staffing Level (FSL), from 494 in FY 2005 to 773 in FY 2006.

Finally, the DI certified the first FBI Intelligence Officers in December 2005 as part of the pilot implementation of the FBI Intelligence Officer Certification (FIOC) Program. FIOC is a credential that recognizes achievement in and long-term commitment to the intelligence profession as demonstrated through experience, education, and training. Eight FBI executives were certified, on the basis of prior training and activities, after review by a board of U.S. Intelligence Community executives and approval by the FBI Director. An additional three FBI executives were named Certified FBI Intelligence Officers in July 2006, bringing the total number of Certified Intelligence Officers to 11.

NSB employees work together to accomplish the second component of the NSB’s mission statement—providing useful and timely information and analysis to the intelligence and law enforcement communities—which will be discussed in-depth in the following section.

Providing Useful and Timely Information and Analysis

· Integrating investigative and intelligence activities against current and emerging national security threats;

· Providing useful and timely information and analysis to the intelligence and law enforcement communities; and

Introduction

Intelligence has always been a core competency of the FBI and intrinsic to our investigative mission. Post-September 11, 2001, this competency has assumed a new importance. New national needs have created new opportunities and responsibilities to evolve the FBI’s intelligence capabilities beyond case-oriented prosecution.

The FBI has moved beyond solely case-focused intelligence to building a Bureau-wide intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination program that has enhanced our capacity to fuse intelligence from across the Bureau. The FBI now uses intelligence not just to pursue investigations but to have greater awareness of the national security threats we face and an enhanced understanding of the total threat environment. We look at information for its predictive value and share that information with our partners in law enforcement and the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Information about threats comes from many diverse sources and must be broadly shared among all who need to take action to eliminate the threat. For that reason, the FBI is committed to sharing information—save that which we are legally proscribed from releasing—with our law enforcement and U.S. Intelligence Community partners, while at the same time always protecting sources, methods, and other operationally sensitive details. We share by rule and withhold by exception.

The FBI agrees with the recommendations and observations of the 9/11 Commission and recognizes that the intelligence we collect has greater value when combined with information from our partners. We work side by side with personnel from the ODNI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Defense (DOD), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at the new National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and with state, local, and tribal partners in taskforces around the country. The FBI shares intelligence gathered at home and overseas to provide a coordinated strategic and tactical response to threats.

NSB Information Sharing Initiatives

The FBI’s Information Sharing Policy Board (ISPB) is chaired by the EAD-NSB. The ISPB brings together the Bureau entities that generate and disseminate law enforcement information and intelligence to implement the FBI’s goal of sharing by rule and withholding by exception. The ISPB initiates, develops, enacts, monitors, and maintains the primary policies, decisions, and relevant procedures concerning substantive criminal and intelligence information sharing internally within the FBI and externally with entities outside of the FBI.

Within the U.S. Intelligence Community, the FBI has a two-level approach. For those agencies that operate at the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI)-level, we are expanding our secure facilities for the FBI network (SCI On-Line, or SCION) that is linked to the DOD-based Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) network used by the CIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), and other national agencies. For those agencies that operate at the Secret level, we have connected the FBI’s internal electronic communications system to the DOD-based SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) that serves military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement users. As a result, FBI agents or analysts who need to communicate at the Secret-level with other agencies can do so from their desktops.

The FBI’s National Information Sharing Strategy (NISS) ensures that we share information as fully and appropriately as possible with our federal, state, local, and tribal partners in the intelligence and law enforcement communities. NISS is based on the principle that FBI information and information technology (IT) systems must be designed to ensure that those protecting the public have the information they need to take action. It also ensures that information is shared within the bounds of the Constitution.

NISS includes three components: Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx); Law Enforcement Regional Data Exchange (R-DEx); and the Law Enforcement Online (LEO) network. N-DEx will provide a nationwide capability to exchange data derived from incident and event reports. R-DEx enables the FBI to join participating federal, state, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies in regional full-text information sharing systems under standard technical procedures and policy agreements. LEO provides Web-based communications to the law enforcement community to exchange information, conduct online education programs, and participate in professional special interest groups and topically focused dialog.

Each FBI field office now has a FIG. The FIGs are the FBI’s primary component for receiving and disseminating information. The FIGs play a major role in ensuring that we share what we know with others in the U.S. Intelligence Community and our federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners, in part by assigning personnel to state and regional Intelligence Fusion Centers and other regional multi-agency intelligence centers, where appropriate and practical, or through liaison and/or technical connectivity.

Federal Information Sharing Efforts

The Terrorist Screening Center leverages the FBI Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) backbone to provide real-time actionable intelligence to state and local law enforcement. The TSC was developed to screen for known and suspected terrorists as well as provide for appropriate and lawful use of terrorist information. Multiple federal agencies participate, including the FBI, DOJ, DHS, Department of State, and Department of Treasury.

In the National Counterterrorism Center, analysts from the FBI, CIA, DHS, and DOD work side by side to piece together the big picture of threats to the United States and our interests. NCTC analysts produce the National Threat Bulletin (NTB) for the President, the Threat Matrix, and other analytic products. FBI personnel at NCTC are part of the NSB’s Directorate of Intelligence.

The FBI currently has agents and analysts detailed to other federal entities, including the CIA, NSA, National Security Council, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, DOD’s Regional Commands, Department of Energy, and other federal and state agencies.

Joint Efforts with Other Partners

Recognizing the importance of partnerships to the success of our national security mission, the FBI increased the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces from 35 on September 11, 2001, to 101 today. JTTFs partner FBI personnel with hundreds of investigators from various federal, state, and local agencies.

We also created a National JTTF, consisting of representatives from 38 agencies, that manages the activities of the JTTFs, coordinates national intelligence collection strategies, and facilitates information sharing with JTTF partner agencies’ headquarters. We work with our partners at the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, the NCTC, and most military operations commands.

The FBI operates six highly specialized Regional Computer Forensic Laboratories designed to provide forensic examinations of digital evidence. In each one, law enforcement agencies from all levels of government train, work, and share information.

In addition to liaison through Intelligence Fusion Centers and the multi-agency intelligence centers, the FBI is also working more closely with other U.S. Intelligence Community agencies to advance the counterintelligence mission through national, regional, and local counterintelligence working groups and FBI-DOD technology taskforces around the country. The FBI has also taken steps to establish closer working relationships with the private sector through business, academic, and laboratory alliances.

Finally, the FBI is working with international partners in new ways. We offer whatever assistance we can to other governments to support their counterterrorism efforts, whether it is training or investigative support. In some countries, we are working together on task forces and conducting joint operations. To support this new approach, we expanded the number of Legal Attaché offices from 23 on September 11, 2001, to more than 60 today. We now routinely deploy integrated teams of personnel, including agents, analysts, and crime scene experts, to assist in the investigation of terrorist attacks.

JTTF Facts

History: Task forces started in 1979 as an effort to address bank robberies, and JTTFs imported the concept. The first JTTF was implemented in 1980 in the FBI’s New York Office. The FBI subsequently applied the task force concept to its counterterrorism effort in other field offices.

Function: Operational Unit that conducts field investigations of actual or potential terrorism threats.

Size: 35 JTTFs before September 11, 2001; 101 as of September 2006.

Management Structure: Each JTTF is housed in the FBI’s field office and select resident agencies; the members are assigned taskings, and investigative process and strategy are overseen by FBI management.

Information Technology Initiative

The National Security Branch has launched initiatives in several areas, including information technology and training, to support our information sharing mission.

The NSB is working with the FBI’s Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) to implement new tools—and upgrade existing ones—that will make it easier for analysts and agents to access, analyze, and share information throughout the FBI and with our U.S. Intelligence Community and law enforcement partners.

Alert Capability in Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW)

Investigative Data Warehouse is a centralized, Web-enabled repository for relevant intelligence and investigative data that allows users to query the information utilizing advanced software tools. At the NSB’s request, the Office of the Chief Technology Officer (OCTO) has implemented an “alert capability” that allows users of IDW to create queries of the system and be automatically notified when a new document is uploaded to the database that meets their search criteria.

As of July 2006, over 1,000 Intelligence Analysts have received this capability, which allows users to build profiles on targets of interest, including names, phrases, addresses, e-mail accounts, phone numbers, and bank account/credit card numbers. We expect that all IDW users will be provided with this capability by the end of 2006.

External Training Highlights

Training and orientation materials provided to our federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners enable us to educate these partners on what the FBI is doing, enhance our information sharing efforts, and build trust among all parties.

Orientation Training

Orientation training is designed to inform those not working regularly on national security matters about the FBI’s national security mission. This includes FBI, other DOJ and federal agencies, as well as state, local, and tribal agencies.

The orientation training that has been developed includes:

· A package of training materials about the NSB for use in outreach to state and local law enforcement.

· A 15-minute video about the NSB and how it relates to local law enforcement that is designed to be shown at police department roll calls. The video is scheduled to be rolled out via DVD and LEO in fall 2006.

· A 12-minute video about the Terrorist Screening Center instructing state and local police officers how to proceed if they encounter someone who is identified in a National Crime Information Center (NCIC) check as a suspected terrorist.

· A two-part series on national and international perspectives on suicide bombing trends. This series was “multicast” to state and local law enforcement partners via LEO and to FBI and DOJ employees via the FBI’s Virtual Academy, Justice Television Network, and FBI secure satellite television in March 2006.

Photograph: An F B I Joint Terrorism Task Force These successes in information sharing can only be realized when the NSB develops enabling capabilities, processes, and infrastructure that are consistent with applicable laws, Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence guidance, and civil liberties. This final mission of the NSB will be discussed in-depth in the next section.

Developing Effective Capabilities

· Integrating investigative and intelligence activities against current and emerging national security threats;

· Providing useful and timely information and analysis to the intelligence and law enforcement communities; and

· Effectively developing enabling capabilities, processes, and infrastructure, consistent with applicable laws, Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence guidance, and civil liberties.

Introduction

In addition to operational matters, the National Security Branch is also responsible for the continued development of a specialized national security workforce and ensuring that NSB components have the tools, resources, and infrastructure they need to carry out the FBI's national security mission. This is why the EAD-NSB has full operational and management authority over all FBI Headquarters and field national security programs, including the authority to initiate, terminate, or reallocate any of the investigations or other activities of the FBI. This allows the NSB to focus resources where they are needed most. As detailed earlier in this paper, the NSB is committed to providing its workforce with the technology tools and other resources it needs to do its work. But none of these capabilities can be achieved without an underlying infrastructure that provides the budget resources and, most importantly, the human resources needed to carry out our mission.

Legal and Policy Initiatives

The NSB is coordinating with the FBI’s Office of General Counsel to address policy and legal issues for intelligence and information sharing both within and outside the FBI. Collaborating with our partners in the Department of Justice and the U.S. Intelligence Community, the NSB is ensuring FBI representation and participation in U.S. Intelligence Community working groups and policy-related activities regarding information sharing, classification, confidential human sources, and information technology. The NSB is also working with the DNI to create standard policies and procedures for the U.S. Intelligence Community.

The NSB’s policy and legal accomplishments include the following:

· Developed the FBI Intelligence Policy Manual, which includes dissemination policy, classification, declassification, dissemination caveats, sanitization, and tearlines. The manual implements the policies on intelligence and information sharing set forth by the President, by Congress in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), and by the DNI in the soon-to-be-released U.S. Intelligence Community Directive 500. One of the key areas of focus for the manual is how to strike the proper balance between the need to share information versus the need to protect intelligence sources and methods. It also provides policy specifying the categories of intelligence that can be disseminated to different groups of customers.

· Coordinated the FBI’s role in implementing new U.S. Intelligence Community information sharing policies, including the Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 8/1 on information sharing. This directive establishes policy to maximize intelligence information sharing, identifies key policy elements that will govern implementation of the policy, and assigns responsibilities for ensuring that the policy is effectively carried out within the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Budget and Performance Measures

The NSB is working with its components and the FBI’s Finance Division to develop procedures for formulating and executing the FBI’s budget for programs and projects funded by the National Intelligence Program. The DNI requires that programs funded by the NIP must have performance-based measurements, including a description of how the money will be spent, how progress will be measured, and what was accomplished with the money.

The NSB’s accomplishments in budget and metrics include:

· 2008 Performance Plan: Developing an FY 2008 performance plan that ties spending on NIP-funded FBI programs to performance measures based on the DNI’s National Intelligence Strategy.

· 2007 Performance Measures: Completed FY 2007 performance measures that align with the expenditure of NIP funding and assist NSB managers in the evaluation of FBI's national security performance.

· Congressional Budget Justification Booklet: Added key performance goals to 23 funding categories in the Congressional Budget Justification Booklet (CBJB), which is the NIP’s request to Congress.

· Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Supplemental: Submitted a supplemental request to Congress for FBI activities associated with the GWOT.

· Money-saving opportunities: Coordinated within the NSB and other FBI divisions to consolidate various contracts and vendor purchases to promote cost-saving measures.

The NSB is also reviewing its various programs to ensure consistency throughout its divisions. For example, the NSB worked with the Inspection Division to revise Inspection Interrogatories and workpapers to ensure they measure relevant national security accomplishments. These new interrogatories were implemented in April 2006 and have allowed inspections to more closely mirror the goals and objectives of the FBI’s National Security Programs.

Human Resources

The FBI’s most valuable resource is our people, and it is our employees who will enable us to successfully complete our national security missions. The NSB is developing and supporting a specialized, integrated FBI intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists with deep investigative and intelligence expertise in national security and criminal tools. To build this intelligence cadre, the NSB is creating a workforce environment that will attract and retain intelligence personnel with critical skills and competencies needed to protect the nation against current and emerging threats. Among the human resource initiatives the NSB is undertaking are:

· Defining core national security competencies—a cluster of interrelated knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform a specific job—and revising recruiting practices to target those competencies.

· Determining the critical skills hiring goals for Special Agents for the Counterterrorism Division, Counterintelligence Division, the DI, and the WMD Directorate and coordinating with the Human Resources Division (HRD) to develop Special Agent hiring goals and recruitment strategies. Critical skills are: intelligence experience; language proficiency; computer science/information technology; science; engineering; accounting/finance; law enforcement; and military experience.

Implementing a national security career path for everyone in the intelligence workforce, allowing analysts, agents, linguists and surveillance specialists to develop specialized skills and experience in priority areas. These career paths will reward and develop technical expertise in intelligence operations and enhance our ability to retain a cadre of intelligence professionals.

Establishing 24 senior-level critical pay positions, or Senior Intelligence Officers. These experts will perform significant work, such as interacting and coordinating with intelligence consumers; producing efficient and responsive intelligence; communicating with outside experts to tap their knowledge and insights; consulting with the DNI and the U.S. Intelligence Community on the capabilities and needs of FBI-analytic procedures; and developing substantive priorities to guide intelligence collection and evaluation. These experts will be the capstone for the ICS and its career path. We are currently seeking final approval for the senior-level positions. The Attorney General approved the request in March 2006, the Office of Personnel Management approved it in May 2006, and the Office of Management and Budget is currently reviewing it for approval.

· Collaborating with the ODNI on various directives, including:

o Aligning the FBI’s Human Capital Plan and priorities with the ODNI’s Strategic Human Capital Plan;

o Crafting a common compensation structure for the U.S. Intelligence Community workforce; and

o Participating in and establishing Bureau policy for ODNI Joint U.S. Intelligence Community Duty Assignments.

The Intelligence Career Service

To enhance our intelligence workforce, the NSB’s DI has created an Intelligence Career Service, which is composed of Intelligence Analysts, Language Analysts, Surveillance Specialists, and a dedicated number of Special Agents.

Membership in the ICS begins with a new hiring process that screens candidates based on competencies specific to each position. Personnel hired to the ICS then have a clear career path with opportunities for training, development, specialization, and, ultimately, promotion to upper-management ranks.

The FBI has also reformed the way we recruit, hire, train, assign, and promote Special Agents. These reforms have led to a highly trained and specialized corps of agents dedicated to national security missions, and they include a program for career-long development that builds specialized expertise in counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and intelligence, while providing a solid foundation in law enforcement and Constitutional protections.

Recruiting

For the ICS, we shifted from a local recruiting model to a centralized, nationwide recruiting strategy, much like that used for FBI Special Agents. Each new hire must sign a mobility agreement (similar to that which exists for Special Agents) so that Intelligence Analysts, Language Analysts, and Surveillance Specialists can be redeployed consistent with the needs of the enterprise.

We refined our recruitment strategy to target and provide incentives to applicants with critical skills in intelligence, foreign languages, technology, area studies, and other specialties.

We also use the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program, which offers $25,000 scholarships to current FBI Intelligence Analysts to help fund their past, current, or future studies in a specialized critical skill or area of specialty. The purpose of this program is to enhance the FBI’s retention of ICS personnel with specialized critical skills. So far in 2006, we have awarded 23 scholarships.

For Special Agents, the FBI revised the hiring process by changing the list of critical skills we are looking for in candidates, including skills or a background in intelligence, languages helpful to our counterterrorism and/or counterintelligence missions, information technology and computer science, engineering, physical sciences, accounting, or international business. The result has been a significant increase in the number of new Special Agents with expertise in these areas.

Selection and Hiring Action Plan

We have more than doubled the number of Intelligence Analysts onboard, from approximately 1,000 pre-9/11 to more than 2,100 today, through improvements in our selection and hiring processes and technology tools.

Career Paths

The FBI is committed to creating advancement opportunities that build on initiatives already underway in the DI. To that end, we are developing career paths for Intelligence Analysts, Language Analysts, and Surveillance Specialists to allow these ICS members to pursue technical, as well as management, paths in their chosen jobs.

Career paths that reward and develop technical experts in intelligence operations are essential to our ability to retain a top-notch national intelligence workforce. To date, the FBI achieved a key milestone in extending the Intelligence Analyst career path to the GS-14 level in field offices. Previously, analysts serving in the field could advance only to the GS-12 level. Representatives from the DI and other FBI Headquarters divisions are developing proposals to extend the career ladder for other ICS personnel.

The Special Agent Career Path Program is designed to increase specialization and develop national security expertise in the agent workforce. Specifically, the agent career paths will fall into two overall programs (national security and criminal) and five subprograms (intelligence, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, criminal, and cyber) positions.

Pay for Performance

The FBI submitted our first required report to Congress at the end of Calendar Year 2005 by providing a Concept of Operations for a Pay for Performance system for the FBI Intelligence Community. Our Concept of Operations was developed in consultation with the OPM, the ODNI, the National Academy for Public Administration (NAPA), and the DOJ. In addition, the FBI is working with the ODNI and other elements of the USIC on overarching architecture for pay reform across the U.S. Intelligence Community.

A main component of the FBI’s ICS pay for performance system will be a performance management system (PMS) that makes meaningful distinctions among employees’ individual and organizational contributions as a basis for pay. The FBI fielded a new five-level PMS in March 2006, replacing our pass-fail system. The new PMS will be the cornerstone for the new pay for performance system.

Training Initiatives for the ICS

New Analyst Training—Cohort Program

The FBI is committed to providing our personnel with the best training available in the U.S. Intelligence Community. For example, the ICS Cohort Program, launched in October 2005, is a training program designed for new Intelligence Analysts, Language Analysts, and Surveillance Specialists. For the first time at the FBI, these ICS members enter on duty to the FBI together as a Cohort class for five weeks of training at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. The Cohort Program equips ICS members with basic intelligence tradecraft, an appreciation for how each role contributes to the intelligence cycle, and a nationwide network from which to draw as they embark on their FBI careers. Additionally, new Analysts and Special Agents participate together in joint training exercises as part of the Cohort Program. The regular Cohort schedule of classes began in January 2006, and we have trained 392 ICS personnel through Cohort as of July 2006.

After completing the five-week ICS Cohort Program, the career tracks receive additional specialized training: four weeks for Intelligence Analysts, two weeks for Language Analysts, and three to six weeks for Surveillance Specialists depending on their job role.

Special Agent Basics

The basic curriculum for Special Agents now includes these topics:

FBI intelligence mandates and authorities;

Overview of the intelligence cycle;

Introduction to the U.S. Intelligence Community;

Intelligence reporting and dissemination;

FBI intelligence requirements and collection management process;

Role of Intelligence Analysts; and

Validating human sources.

New Agent Training

All new agents participate in an 18-week basic training course of instruction at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. This program introduces agents to the full range of intelligence and law enforcement tools and emphasizes how intelligence and criminal investigative techniques are used in tandem as part of the FBI’s strategic mission. We also emphasize the development of an intelligence base through the operation of human sources and liaison with other agencies.

Basic Training

Basic training will be provided to all NSB employees, to ensure they have a baseline understanding of all of the FBI’s national security missions. NSB employees must complete four core courses online through the FBI Virtual Academy: National Security Branch Introduction; Introduction to Counterintelligence; International Terrorism; and Domestic Terrorism.

Intermediate Training

We are developing intermediate intelligence training using U.S. Intelligence Community curricula as a basis for our curriculum development. The format will be requirements-driven with a practicum based on real world problems. The following training courses are being implemented:

· On August 7-10, 2006, the Managers of Analysts Workshop was piloted with 50 managers, including Supervisory Special Agents and Supervisory Intelligence Analysts in attendance.

· In September 2006, we will pilot the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Source, Targeting & Development Course. This class will have active participation from the CIA.

· In early FY 2007, we plan to implement Reports Officer (RO) training and Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) courses. The RO training will focus on the roles and responsibilities associated with the RO position, identifying intelligence, legal issues, and IIR exercises. The IIR course will allow ICS personnel to gain more in-depth knowledge of the IIR process and will include several exercises.

Advanced Training

In addition to basic and intermediate training, advanced training continues to be developed for the intelligence workforce with the goal of providing a catalog specializing in national security. This catalog of training, in conjunction with the DNI, will be broken down into core and elective instruction tailored to each employee’s role and responsibilities. Once implemented, it is anticipated that employees will be expected to complete training obligations as a condition of promotion. Courses will be available in a variety of formats, including the FBI Virtual Academy; local, regional, and national instruction; and Web casts.

All NSB Special Agents receive advanced training as part of an ongoing career development program. Some of this training is provided to agents through the FBI’s intranet, and other specialized training is brought directly to the field offices. Special Agents also attend specialized training in their region of the country or return to the Washington, D.C., area for advanced training. This training delves into dozens of individualized topics such as counterproliferation and source recruitment, development, and handling.

Several opportunities for joint training with members of the U.S. Intelligence Community exist as FBI personnel attend other agencies’ classes and personnel from other Community agencies attend FBI classes. In addition, the FBI routinely details Special Agents to other U.S. Intelligence Community agencies. Finally, the FBI continues to coordinate all advanced and specialized training with the ODNI, as its requirements are outlined and refined.

Professional Development Opportunities

The FBI has also developed multiple joint-training opportunities with the U.S. Intelligence Community and higher-education institutions. The training partnerships and activities we are pursuing with other government agencies, academia, and the private sector include the following:

· Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC): We continue to offer FBI employees the opportunity to participate in JMIC. JMIC is a center of excellence for the education of intelligence professionals; the two degrees granted by JMIC are the only accredited degrees in strategic intelligence in the United States. JMIC programs include core and elective courses in analytic methods, intelligence collection, national security policy, intelligence community organization, regional assessments, and transnational issues.

· Kellogg School of Management: We have implemented joint-training seminars with Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts, Language Analysts, and Surveillance Specialists. The major theme for the seminars is accelerating the Bureau’s transformation process and, more specifically, integrating the intelligence process into Bureau operations. Topics discussed include strategic leadership, change implementation, and the role of intelligence in criminal as well as counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases. More than 1,500 Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts, Language Analysts, and Surveillance Specialists have completed the 2.5 day “Navigating Strategic Change” course, and more than 40 senior and mid-level executives have completed the five-day “Leading Strategic Change” course.

· Intelligence Community Assignment Program (ICAP): We are currently participating in the ICAP, a structured rotational program within the U.S. Intelligence Community. ICAP is designed to provide intelligence professionals with the opportunity to gain U.S. Intelligence Community experience through rotational assignments to intelligence or intelligence-related positions in sister agencies.

· CIA University: The Mission Academy, which is one of CIA University’s schools, offers substantive training to CIA personnel and across the U.S. Intelligence Community. So far in 2006, more than 200 FBI employees have attended course offerings.

· Joint Intelligence Virtual University (JIVU): We are currently participating in the JIVU, which offers access to training from other agencies and components. Registered users can take courses from their desktop at any time. JIVU’s catalog includes in-demand course topics such as analytic tradecraft, foreign denial and deception, national intelligence, and counterterrorism, as well as a robust foreign language catalog with more than 700 modules and nine languages.

· Mercyhurst College’s Graduate Program in Applied Intelligence: We have partnered with Mercyhurst College to establish a national intelligence studies sabbatical for our cadre of analytical personnel. The masters of science degree in applied intelligence is a 33-credit program designed to provide a theoretical and practical framework for the study of intelligence and its application.

· Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC): JMITC recently invited the FBI to participate in the U.S. Military Familiarization Course for the Civilian Intelligence Analyst (MILFAM). MILFAM is a two-week interactive field course designed for new Intelligence Analysts who have no previous military background. The analysts gain real-life experiences with all five of the uniformed services with a focus on military intelligence.

· Summer Hard Problem Program (SHARP): SHARP is a four-week program sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis. This study program investigates the intelligence implications of the factors that cause individuals and communities of interest to coalesce into pro-social, anti-social, terrorist, or extra-legal movements.

Intelligence Officer Certification

The creation of the NSB’s DI acknowledges the importance of our intelligence mission and elevates the stature of our intelligence professionals. Our intelligence professionals will not simply be granted that elevated stature but will earn it through a rigorous certification process based on competency models. With the implementation of the FBI Intelligence Officer Certification (FIOC) Program, some FBI intelligence professionals will be eligible to become Certified FBI Intelligence Officers.

A Certified FBI Intelligence Officer is a recognized organizational authority whose demonstrated in-depth knowledge and understanding of the national threat environment and intelligence issues drives organizational and strategic decision-making through the effective integration of FBI operational and intelligence capabilities. Intelligence Officer Certification is a credential that recognizes achievement in and long-term commitment to the intelligence profession as demonstrated through experience, education, and training.

All Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts, Language Analysts, and Surveillance Specialists are eligible to participate in certification. Not all personnel occupying these positions are required to obtain certification. However, certification will eventually be required for certain management positions, including DI executive management, all Assistant Special Agents in Charge (ASACs), and certain section chiefs serving in an operational or intelligence capacity.

Eight FBI executives were certified in December 2005, on the basis of prior training and activities, as FBI Intelligence Officers, after review by a board of U.S. Intelligence Community executives and approval by the FBI Director. Three FBI executives were named certified FBI Intelligence Officers in July 2006 after review by the Certification Approval Board, bringing the total number of Certified Intelligence Officers to 11. An incremental rollout for ASACs and additional FBI executives began in spring 2006, and we will begin registering eligible onboard FBI employees in October 2006.

Respect for Civil Liberties

In addition to the guidance and initiatives cited above, the National Security Branch is committed to the FBI’s unwavering respect for civil liberties. The FBI’s job is both to protect Americans from crime and terrorism and to preserve their constitutional and statutory rights. Our long history of protecting civil rights and uncovering public corruption gives us a unique perspective that helps us maintain a proper balance between protection and privacy.

Thanks to the professionalism of our personnel and the respect for civil liberties institutionalized within the Bureau, the FBI has carried out our expanded post-9/11 mission with full adherence to the Constitution and the principles of personal liberty and privacy. We believe that, while we cannot afford to miss information about terrorist threats, we also cannot afford to lose the support of the American people. Protecting a territory the size of the United States can only occur when citizens act as partners who trust us and are willing to talk to and share information with us. We value this essential support and will not jeopardize it.

Our strict adherence to civil liberties is also aided by the regime of oversight, legal guidance, and self-regulation that governs our investigative activities within the United States. This regime is comprehensive and has many facets, including the following.

Statutory Limitations

These examples of statutes, which are implemented by DOJ and FBI policies, serve to guide the Bureau’s operations so that our activities always remain clearly within the bounds of the Constitution and of propriety:

· The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as amended)—This law established a process for obtaining judicial approval of electronic surveillance and physical searches for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information.

· The Whistleblower Protection Acts of 1989 and 1998—These laws protect whistleblowers from retaliation.

· The Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (as amended)—This law provides the public with effective access to all FBI documents not covered by a specific statutory exemption.

· The Privacy Act of 1974 (as amended)—This law forbids the FBI and other federal agencies from collecting information about how individuals exercise their First Amendment rights, unless that collection is expressly authorized by statute or by the individual, or is pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.

Oversight Mechanisms

· Attorney General’s Crimes Guidelines—The Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (General Crimes Guidelines) have been in effect, in one form or another, since the mid-1970s. These guidelines govern all investigations by the FBI of crimes and crime-related activities. They set forth the standards and requirements under which an investigation may be initiated, and they define the permissible scope, duration, subject matters, and objectives of an FBI criminal investigation. They are designed to provide Special Agents with a framework that maintains the proper balance between the public’s need for effective law enforcement and terrorism prevention, on the one hand, and the preservation of individual rights and liberties, on the other.

Among the provisions that specifically serve to protect individual rights are the following: (1) the prohibition against initiating investigations directed solely at the exercise of First Amendment rights or other constitutionally protected activity; and (2) the requirement that agents consider using the least intrusive method necessary to achieve their investigative goals. In short, the guidelines translate the DOJ’s respect for individual rights and liberties into practical policy and thereby prevent investigative abuses.

· Attorney General’s National Security/Foreign Intelligence Guidelines—The Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG) were first issued in 1976 and recently updated in October 2003. (The guidelines are reviewed and updated whenever necessary due to changes in the law or to accommodate changing social needs.) These classified guidelines govern the manner in which the FBI conducts national security investigations—those investigations that focus on protecting the United States from threats to the national security.

The National Security Guidelines, like the domestic General Crimes Guidelines, were designed to maintain the proper balance between the public’s need for effective protection of our national security interests and the imperative to respect and protect individual rights. Like the General Crimes Guidelines, the NSIG are designed to ensure that individual rights and liberties will be protected. First Amendment activities are fully protected, investigative techniques are carefully managed, both by predication and by higher authority, and a U.S. person may be the subject of a national security investigation only if circumstances indicate that he or she might be acting for or on behalf of a foreign power.

· Congressional Oversight—Committees of the U.S. Congress, primarily the House and Senate Committees Overseeing Judiciary, Intelligence, Appropriations, Government Reform/Governmental Affairs, and Homeland Security, have broad oversight authority over the FBI. These committees—along with others—exercise regular, vigorous oversight into all aspects of the FBI’s operations. This oversight has significantly increased in breadth and intensity since the 1970s, and it provides the public with additional assurance that the FBI conducts investigations in accordance with the law and the Constitution.

· Department of Justice Oversight—The FBI’s national security investigations are subject to significant outside oversight beyond that conducted by Congress. The DOJ’s Office of Intelligence Policy and Review was established in 1981, in part as an oversight body for FBI intelligence activities. It monitors national security investigations conducted by U.S. intelligence agencies and provides Congress a series of semi-annual reports on various aspects of the FBI’s counterintelligence operations.

· Intelligence Oversight Board—The FBI is also subject to oversight by the Intelligence Oversight Board, formerly the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board. Established in 1981, the board is composed of four members appointed from the membership of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Among its other responsibilities, the Intelligence Oversight Board reviews all violations of national security law, Executive Orders, or Presidential Decision Directives by the FBI and the other intelligence agencies, and issues reports thereon to the President and the Attorney General.

· Office of the Inspector General (OIG)—OIG receives copies of all reports that are sent to the FBI’s Office of Inspections, and OIG has the option of investigating any issue itself.

Self-Regulation, Enforcement, and Inspection

· Inspections—The FBI’s Office of Inspections is responsible for inspecting FBI investigative, financial, and administrative programs to ensure their economic value and effective compliance with objectives, governing laws, rules, regulations, and policies. These inspections also ensure that FBI personnel conduct the organization’s activities in a proper and professional manner. The inspection process is a continual one, with the goal of inspecting every FBI entity, field office, FBI Headquarters division, and Legal Attaché Office at least every three years.

· Internal Enforcement—The FBI’s Office of Office of Inspections and the DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General investigate allegations of misconduct.

· Internal Safeguards—Internal safeguards include the Privacy Council, which reviews the plans of any record system that is proposed within the FBI for compliance with the Privacy Act and related privacy policies, and the Criminal Undercover Operations Review Committee, which is composed of senior DOJ and FBI officials and reviews all proposed undercover operations that involve sensitive circumstances. There is also a Criminal Informant Review Committee, composed of senior FBI and DOJ officials, which provides oversight over several categories of human sources, such as high-level criminal informants and long-term sources.

· Training—The Bureau’s training program emphasizes respect for the Constitutional rights and dignity of individuals. Agents receive extensive instruction on Constitutional law and criminal procedure, and all new agents visit the Holocaust Museum to learn the consequences of government oppression and persecution. Then, throughout their careers, agents receive quarterly training from the Chief Division Counsel in each field office to keep them up to speed on the latest guidelines, changes to laws and regulations, and judicial decisions related to Constitutional rights and liberties.

This comprehensive infrastructure of legal limitations, oversight, and self-regulation effectively ensures that the Bureau’s operations are carried out within constitutional and statutory parameters, and they comport with the expectations of the public.

Conclusion

The NSB consolidates the FBI’s counterterrorism, counterintelligence, intelligence, and WMD missions into a single national security mission. The FBI has always answered the call to combat threats to our national security. From gangsters in the 1930s, to intelligence threats during the Cold War era, to organized crime in the 1970s, to drug trafficking in the 1980s, the Bureau has accepted the nation’s most pressing challenges and risen to the occasion. In our dual role as both a law enforcement and intelligence agency, we are uniquely positioned to respond to a changing world with evolving threats and adversaries.

We have a mandate from the President, Congress, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence to protect national security by producing intelligence in support of our investigative mission, national intelligence priorities, and the needs of other customers. The FBI has always used intelligence to solve cases; however, today, we count on our agents and analysts working hand-in-hand with colleagues around the country and around the world to collectively piece together information about multiple, interrelated issues.

The NSB’s initiatives are all aimed at our goal of integrating intelligence and operations to protect our national security. Since September 11, 2001, the FBI has implemented significant changes to enhance our ability to counter today’s most critical threats. The NSB builds on the FBI’s strengths to ensure integration of national security intelligence and investigations, promote the development of a national security workforce, and facilitate enhanced coordination with the U.S. Intelligence Community. With the continued commitment and dedication of the men and women of the FBI, these reforms will improve the Bureau’s ability to accomplish our national security investigative and intelligence missions and, ultimately, to protect the American people.

Photograph of F B I Swat Team in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina (A P Photograph)

Appendix A

Background: DNI Authorities and Relationship to the FBI

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is the head of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) and the principal advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Homeland Security Council on intelligence matters. [Note: The Director of the FBI reports to the Attorney General, not the DNI. Nothing in the relationship with the DNI weakens the FBI’s accountability to the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General in the Department of Justice (DOJ) chain of command to ensure the ability to support the DOJ and FBI missions.]

The DNI has specified authority to concur in the appointment of the Executive Assistant Director of the National Security Branch (EAD-NSB), who serves as the FBI’s lead intelligence official. The Director of the FBI forwards his recommendation to the Attorney General for the appointment of the EAD-NSB. The Attorney General then seeks the concurrence of the DNI before making the appointment, consistent with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). The EAD-NSB communicates with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to ensure responsiveness to DNI guidance and to facilitate coordination with other elements of the USIC.

The NSB National Security Issues Group oversees and coordinates the implementation of new DNI policy guidance and FBI representation on USIC policy bodies. The group represents the FBI on the USIC Information Sharing Working Group and the Community Interoperability and Information Sharing Office Group.

The National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF)

The National Intelligence Priorities Framework is the DNI’s guidance to the USIC on the national intelligence priorities approved by the President. The NIPF’s purpose is to provide a comprehensive prioritization methodology and mechanism to serve as basic guidance for the operation, planning, and programming of U.S. intelligence analysis and collection. The NIPF, updated semiannually, is managed by the Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for the NIPF.

The FBI and other members of the USIC support the DNI’s efforts to establish national intelligence priorities within the NIPF. The FBI has adopted the NIPF as a method of prioritizing intelligence collection and production for the FBI. As such, the FBI is expected to collect against NIPF requirements and to integrate efforts with the DNI Mission Managers and the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Collection (DDNI/C). All FBI intelligence requirements for collection (both Standing and Ad Hoc requirements; FBI Headquarters and field) are and must be based on and traceable to the NIPF.

The National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, both as amended, designated the FBI as a member of the USIC and authorized us to collect, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence. Therefore, the priorities that are the output of the NIPF are applicable to the execution of the FBI’s intelligence process (requirements, planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination) as well as to acquisition decisions and resource management. The priorities allow managers to determine the order in which requirements will be addressed and the level of resource commitment appropriate to the effort.

The National Intelligence Program (NIP)

The NIP [formerly the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP)] is the funding stream for national intelligence activities. The IRTPA redesignated the NFIP as the NIP to illustrate the DNI’s responsibility for foreign and domestic intelligence.

The DNI develops, determines, and presents to the President for approval the annual consolidated NIP budget, which includes the FBI’s National Security Program budget. In addition to the information to which the DNI has access as “national intelligence” and “intelligence related to the national security,” the FBI Director must provide the DNI other requested information needed to determine the NIP budget. The DNI also is authorized to provide guidance for developing the annual budget for intelligence elements not part of the NIP.

The EAD-NSB is responsible for building and submitting the FBI national security budget request. The EAD-NSB has budget oversight authority over the FBI’s Intelligence and Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Decision Units, which includes funding for all FBI national security programs and the FBI’s NIP resources.

All efforts to create and manage the FBI intelligence budget are directed at ensuring the DNI is able to exercise oversight for all national intelligence spending. The FBI’s intelligence requirements and collection management process is fully aligned with the DNI’s NIP.

Under the IRTPA, the DNI has authority over the national intelligence budget, known as the NIP, including that portion of the NIP allocated to the FBI. The DNI has the authority to develop and determine the NIP and to reprogram NIP resources, subject to certain limitations. The DNI also monitors the implementation of the NIP budget and ensures that it is effectively executed. In addition, the DNI is authorized to provide guidance on the development and execution of the remainder of the budget under the management of the EAD-NSB, pursuant to the authority granted by the IRTPA.

This allocation of budget authority between the Attorney General and the DNI is appropriate because it will give the DNI significant authority over the FBI’s national security budget while maintaining the authority of the Attorney General and the FBI Director over the FBI’s investigative, intelligence, and law enforcement resources. Preserving this chain of command ensures that the Attorney General can meet his statutory responsibilities to enforce federal law.

The National Intelligence Strategy (NIS)

In October 2005 the DNI’s office released the National Intelligence Strategy, which establishes the strategic objectives for the USIC. The document sets forth the framework for a more unified, coordinated, and effective USIC and will guide USIC policy, planning, collection, analysis, operations, programming, acquisition, budgeting, and execution. The strategy outlines 15 strategic objectives that are referred to as either mission or enterprise objectives, and the DNI is leading an effort within the USIC to develop strategic implementation plans for all 15 objectives.

Communication between the DNI and FBI

The creation of a unified management structure to oversee the primary national security components of the FBI makes our principal intelligence gathering units—including the counterterrorism and counterintelligence programs—subject to the DNI’s oversight. This operational structure ensures that these resources can be directed appropriately in coordination with other U.S. Intelligence Community agencies under the DNI’s leadership.

The FBI, through the National Security Branch, is actively communicating with and responding to taskings from the ODNI. Among the ODNI products to which the FBI has contributed are the DNI 2005 Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community, Coordination of USIC Human Capital Policies, and 15 National Intelligence Strategy Implementation Plans.

The FBI has detailed personnel with specialized expertise to the ODNI and its entities.

The FBI has also participated actively in many U.S. Intelligence Community interagency policy groups under the authority of the ODNI, including the Intelligence Community Leadership Council, Intelligence Community Program Managers, National Counterintelligence Policy Board, Intelligence Policy Advisory Council, Chief Information Officer’s Principals Council, Chief Human Capital Officer’s Executive Council, and Information Sharing Council.

Finally, NSB executives and staff are in daily contact with their ODNI counterparts, and the FBI continues to work with the ODNI and the Department of Justice to re-examine existing authorities governing the FBI’s criminal and intelligence missions and budget and mission-management structures.

FBI Priorities

In executing the following priorities, we will produce and use intelligence to protect the nation from threats and to bring to justice those who violate the law.

1. Protect the United States from terrorist attack.

2. Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage.

3. Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes.

4. Combat public corruption at all levels.

5. Protect civil rights.

6. Combat transnational/national criminal organizations and enterprises.

7. Combat major white-collar crime.

8. Combat significant violent crime.

9. Support federal, state, local, and international partners.

10. Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI’s mission.

National Security Branch | FBI Home

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

The National Security Branch

Introduction

Background

Organization

Executive Assistant Director for National Security

Introduction

National Security Branch Components

Accomplishments

Counterterrorism Operations

Counterintelligence Operations

Intelligence Operations

Providing Useful and Timely Information and Analysis

Introduction

NSB Information Sharing Initiatives

Federal Information Sharing Efforts

Joint Efforts with Other Partners

External Training Highlights

Introduction

Legal and Policy Initiatives

Budget and Performance Measures

Human Resources

The Intelligence Career Service

Training Initiatives for the ICS

Special Agent Basics

Intelligence Officer Certification

Respect for Civil Liberties

Conclusion

Appendix A

FBI Priorities