~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

8 August 1960

OCI No. 3860/60
Copy No. 159

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

MAO TSE-TUNG ON STRATEGY, 1926-1957
(The Background of the Sino-Soviet Dispute of 1957-1960)

(Reference Title: ESAU IX-60)

[redacted]

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

MAO TSE-TUNG ON STRATEGY, 1926-1957
(The Background of the Sino-Soviet Dispute of 1957-1960)

This is a working paper, the first portion of a long study of the dispute between Mao and Khrushchev--about the strategy of the world Communist movement in the struggle with the West--which began in or about autumn 1957 and persists to this day. The second portion, now in draft, will treat the developing dispute, the period of autumn 1957 to autumn 1959. The third, also in draft, will treat the dispute in full flower, the period of autumn 1959 to the abortive "summit" of May 1960. There may be a fourth paper in this series, treating Soviet and Chinese positions since that time.

Although the various portions of the study hang together and, if possible, should be read together, the study is being published in the form of relatively modest papers, rather than as one enormous paper, in the interest of encouraging the reader not to sigh and lay the paper aside for a free day. For some readers the free day never comes, but a free hour may, and we are now aiming our papers at that hour.

The summary and conclusions of this paper appear as pages i-v.

Various analysts of the Agency, in particular those of the Radio Propaganda Branch of FBID and [redacted] of OCI, have offered useful comments on this paper. None is responsible, however, for the conclusions, and perhaps none would entirely agree with them. The Sino-Soviet Studies Group would welcome further comments, addressed to the acting coordinator of the group [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

MAO TSE-TUNG ON STRATEGY, 1926-1957

MAO TSE-TUNG ON STRATEGY
(The Background of the Sino-Soviet Dispute of 1957-60)

Summary and Conclusions

Very early in his career, in the 1920s, Mao Tse-tung took to himself the Leninist-Stalinist world view of two irreconcilable camps engaged in a prolonged and mortal struggle, and he believed that the Chinese revolution was and must remain a part of this world revolution. In the struggle, the Communist camp was to be prepared for "imperialist" attacks and its strategy was to be that of encouraging and supporting those conflicts which were weakening and would increasingly weaken the imperialist camp--i.e., anti-imperialist struggles in the colonies and semi-colonies (imperialist-dominated countries), conflicts among the imperialist powers, and internal opposition in imperialist countries. Mao believed further with Lenin and Stalin that the Communist camp would inevitably win a global victory, but that it must nevertheless pursue this victory as aggressively as possible, retreating temporarily only when compelled. His concept of the imperialist "paper tiger"--added much later--was an expression of all facets of this belief. In all this, Mao was not simply subscribing to the views of his Soviet mentors in order to assist himself to power; that he genuinely believed in these concepts has been demonstrated by his writings and policies ever since.

Mao's thinking on strategy in a semi-colonial country, of which China was the largest, also began in the 1920s. Mao took from Lenin and Stalin the beliefs that the revolution must necessarily be violent and that the bulk of the population (most importantly the peasantry) could be brought into the struggle. He agreed further with Lenin and Stalin that the Communist party, whatever the degree of its cooperation or compromise at various times with other groups, must keep its eye fixed on acquiring total power as soon as practicable. Mao came to the same view that Stalin finally did, although Mao may have reached this view independently, that the Communists in such a country as China would win power primarily through the operations of peasant armies which would establish and expand rural base areas. In all this, Mao's beliefs

were not merely nominal--they were propositions which in his view were vindicated by everything in his experience.

Mao's military thinking, developing mainly in the 1930s, reflected both his views on global strategy and the circumstances in which he was forced to operate in China. His thought was centered on the concept of "protracted war"--in which his forces would have assistance from the USSR in the final stages of the struggle. His strategy called for various types of warfare against both domestic and foreign enemies, expanding Communist bases as opportunity permitted, retreating when necessary in the hope that the enemy would overextend himself. In offensive operations, the most important principles were careful planning, concentration of superior forces, and achievement of surprise. In both defensive and offensive operations, the party was to fight decisive engagements only when confident of victory, and it was to avoid absolutely a decisive engagement on which the fate of the nation would be at stake.

In the earliest years of his career--from 1926 to 1935--Mao was associated only with some parts of the complex and often confused program that Stalin was exhorting and backing in China, and Stalin's favor was given primarily to other leaders than Mao. The generally close cooperation between Stalin and Mao in the subsequent period--the years 1935-1947--probably began with the Soviet acceptance of an accomplished fact, i.e., Mao's dislodgement of the then dominant leaders in 1935. The record does not support the view, however, that Mao at any time in the period 1926-1947 was acting in opposition to Soviet party policies, as he has been in recent years.

In 1948, with victory in China in sight, Mao began to turn his attention increasingly to the question of Communist strategy for the Far East as a whole. He continued to believe all of the propositions, with respect to world view, global strategy, and strategy for colonial and semi-colonial areas, set forth in the first two paragraphs above, and he agreed with Stalin on the need for combating the concept of a third path between the bloc and the West. Believing all this, Mao was happy to work closely with the Soviet party from 1948 to 1951 in a Far Eastern program which emphasized "armed struggle" by Communist-led "liberation" movements. When the emphasis in this program began in 1951 to change,

the Chinese party, reluctant to abandon its own road to power as the strategic prescription for Asian Communist movements, lagged in endorsing this change.

In the Korean war, the most ambitious bloc venture of the "armed struggle" period of 1948-1951, the Chinese intervention in late 1950 seemed to derive primarily from Mao's devotion to the world Communist cause, although there were also factors of Chinese self-interest. The intervention well illustrated Mao's doctrinal emphasis on careful planning, the massing of forces, and the importance of surprise. At the same time, in intervening, Mao compromised the most important of his conservative military principles--that of avoiding an engagement which staked the fate of the nation. Although Moscow and Peiping guessed right--Western military power was not brought to bear against mainland China--the fact remains that Mao (as well as Moscow) took a great risk. Mao thus demonstrated that his actual decisions as to the employment of his armed forces could not be deduced simply from his declared military principles.

By mid-1952, while adhering to the Marxist-Leninist world view, Mao had come to agree with Stalin on the need for new tactics in the global struggle, tactics entailing what amounted to a change in strategy for the struggle in the Far East. Globally, the new line called for a more conciliatory pose--favoring "peaceful coexistence" and the settlement of existing military conflicts--while attempting to aggravate differences among Western countries and between the West and the remainder of the non-Communist world, primarily by political and economic means.

With respect to general war, Mao in the 1952-55 period agreed with Stalin's 1952 position that such a war was not inevitable and if possible should be avoided. Mao took a cheerful view that half the world would survive a general war if it came, but it is uncertain whether he genuinely believed, as he asserted, that the bloc could win a meaningful victory.

The change in strategy for the Asian Communist movement in the 1952-55 period had the aim of influencing and eventually seducing rather than discrediting and soon overthrowing non-Communist governments in the area, and it emphasized political forms of action rather than "armed struggle." Although

the Chinese lagged until mid-1952 in endorsing this latter shift of emphasis, it is not possible to conclude that their endorsement, when it finally came, was insincere. (Mao of course reserved the right to return to his earlier views.) The Chinese party cooperated fully in "peaceful settlement" of the Korean war in 1953 and of the Indochina conflict in 1954, and its representative took a very conciliatory line at the Asian-African conference at Bandung in 1955.

The Chinese Communists in the 1952-55 period did not alter their insistence on their right to use force if necessary to "liberate" Taiwan--the Far Eastern issue that understandably vexed them most--and their hard line on Taiwan may have given Moscow some concern. With respect to the actual employment of his armed forces, however, Mao returned to conservative principles, taking only undefended and isolated offshore islands and postponing any more ambitious effort.

In the period 1956-57, Mao retained the Leninist-Stalinist world view of the two camps and of the conflicts working in the imperialist camp, and he seemed to agree with Khrushchev on a strategy of developing a broad anti-imperialist front, eventually isolating the United States. This was to be done by steadily expanding the "peace zone" of Communist and non-Communist states.

Mao continued in this period to agree with the Soviet position that a general war was not inevitable, but he apparently disliked the emphasis of Khrushchev's concurrent modification of doctrine to allow for the peaceful accession to power of Communist parties in some non-Communist countries. With respect to general war, Mao continued to agree with the Soviet view that general war should be avoided if possible, and he believed that Soviet military strength constituted a solid deterrent. Mao went a bit beyond Soviet positions, however, in asserting that the bloc should not fear a general war, and he may have moved some distance further toward a belief that China specifically could emerge from such a war with a meaningful victory.

With regard to Far Eastern strategy, Mao appeared to remain satisfied with the results of a generally conciliatory bloc policy in the area, although he was clearly aware that the results had been small in the bloc's relations with

several Far Eastern countries, and he may have been getting more restive about Taiwan. Peiping continued to follow conservative military principles with respect to the use of armed force against Taiwan.

The most important development of the 1956-57 period, in terms of Sino-Soviet relations, was the increasing Chinese willingness to differ publicly with the Soviet party on important matters--the handling of the reassessment of Stalin, the scope and terms of the reassessment, the revision of Stalinist positions, the conduct of intrabloc relations, and the rationale of Chinese domestic policies. The strong Chinese challenge to Soviet authority, yet to develop, was delayed by evidence of Soviet successes in military technology during 1957, but even by mid-1957 it was clear that Khrushchev had something to worry about.

I. CHINA STRATEGY: The Long War, 1926-1947

In his writings in the years 1926-1947, when he was concerned primarily with strategy for gaining power in China rather than with Far Eastern or global strategy, Mao Tse-Tung set forth a number of the concepts that dominate his strategic thinking today.

Relations With the Kuomintang

Mao was almost certainly familiar, by 1926, with Lenin's report to the Comintern in July 1920 on National and colonial questions--a report which the Chinese Communist party (CCP) official history (1951) particularly cited in crediting Lenin with having charted the "fundamental revolutionary course for the oppressed nations and for the people of colonial and semi-colonial countries." Lenin in that report proceeded from the proposition that as a result of "imperialism" the world was divided into a small number of oppressing nations and a large number of oppressed nations. He argued that the Comintern and Communist parties should support "bourgeois liberation movements" in backward countries if such movements were really revolutionary; i.e. if Communists attached to these movements could exploit them to train and organize "the peasants and the broad masses...in a /Communist/ revolutionary spirit." Further, Lenin in this report asserted the feasibility of establishing peasants' soviets in backward countries without a significant industrial proletariat, and he said that it was the "duty" of Communist parties in backward countries to promote such soviets. He concluded with the proposition that the backward "colonial and semicolonial" countries, with the assistance of "Soviet governments" could bypass the stage of capitalism.

The CCP, through the Comintern, took Lenin's advice and worked to attach itself to the Kuomintang (Nationalist party), then leading a "bourgeois-democratic" revolution in China. Mao in fact belonged to both the CCP and the Kuomintang at one time. The CCP described its own "special task" in the alliance as that of propaganda and organizational work among the workers and peasants. The party declared grandly that its abiding mission was to "liberate the oppressed Chinese nation...and to advance to the world revolution, liberating the oppressed peoples and oppressed classes of the whole world." The Kuomintang shared only the first objective.

Under Stalin's instruction, the CCP managed to cooperate with the Kuomintang from 1924 until April 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek, recognizing that the CCP was working to capture the

the revolution, violently broke off the relationship. For most of this period Mao Tse-tung was apart from the central leadership, occupied with the peasant movement in his native Hunan and elsewhere.

Mao's first recorded article, a Leninist-Stalinist analysis of classes in Chinese society, appeared in 1926. His central proposition was that the CCP belonged to one of only two camps in the world--the camp of militant revolution led by the Third International, engaged in a "final struggle" with the camp of militant counterrevolution. It is essential to realize that this orthodox concept of the long war against "imperialism" was the central concept of his world view from his earliest days as a systematic thinker.

Mao in this article took the view that the great bulk of the Chinese people could be brought to support the Communist cause. The industrial proletariat was described as the "leading force" in the revolution, the semi-proletariat (which included the bulk of the peasantry) and petty bourgeoisie as the party's "closest friends," the middle class as "vacillating," and only the rich and their vassals as being "in league with imperialism."

By March 1927, writing of his work with the Chinese peasantry, Mao had concluded--similarly to Stalin--that the peasantry was an irresistible force, a force which revolutionary leaders (presumably both Kuomintang and Communist) must make every effort to capture and direct. He described the poor peasants as the core of the peasants' associations, the "revolutionary vanguard" which was overthrowing feudal forces. He also wrote--a statement omitted from later editions--that 70 percent of the accomplishments of the revolution to date were made by the peasants. In line with Stalin's wish not to antagonize the Kuomintang, Mao did not call for the establishment of peasant soviets or for a radical program of land redistribution.

Similarly, Mao in that article of early 1927 first endorsed the Leninist-Stalinist view that a revolution must be violent, hailed the violence of the peasants against the landlords and other elements hostile to the revolution, and applauded the peasants' action in taking over the landlords' militia and building up their own militia. He did not, however, call for the formation of regular armed forces--presumably because the CCP then hoped to achieve its objectives through the regular armed forces of the Kuomintang, which it had been instructed to penetrate.

Speaking to Chinese students in May 1927, Stalin said that the time had not come to try to establish a Red Army in China, but that the party should lay the "foundations" by creating corps within the left-wing Kuomintang forces which would eventually develop into a Red Army. On 1 August 1927, after the CCP's failure to retain its connection even with the Left Kuomintang (a connection Stalin favored), Stalin asserted that the Comintern in May had secretly instructed the CCP to "organize your own reliable army before it is too late." This may be true, as knowledge of some such instruction apparently played a part in the Left Kuomintang's decision to break, like Chiang, with the CCP.

Armed Struggle

After its expulsion from the Kuomintang, the Communist party apparently acted under a Comintern directive in leading a military revolt at Nanchang on 1 August. After this failed, the CCP in August held an emergency conference to adapt to its real if not yet nominal status as an insurrectionary party. The program adopted called for the party to take as its basic task the effort to lead the labor movement, including the arming of workers for coordinated uprisings with the peasantry, and to take as "one of its main tasks" the organization of planned and systematic peasant insurrections. The program called for the first time for the confiscation and redistribution of land, but not for the formation of peasants' Soviets --and in so doing followed the Comintern's line in both respects. The program also called for the scattered armed units of peasants and workers to be rebuilt on a uniform plan into a "well-organized, solid force"--apparently in response to Stalin's call, on 1 August if not back in May, for the formation of a Red Army.

In consonance with this program, Mao Tse-tung in the autumn of 1927 went back to Hunan to organize peasant uprisings.* He succeeded in assembling a rudimentary army designated the First Division of the Chinese workers' and Peasants' Red Army. This force incited and took part in uprisings over much of Honan during autumn 1927, but the effort ended in failure and Mao's force was obliged to retreat. Mao was rebuked for this failure by the CCP leadership in November 1927, reportedly on the grounds that the peasantry had not been enlisted sufficiently to support the military effort.

*One of his slogans was said to be the "organization of Soviets," but it is not clear what kind he had in mind.

The CCP in November 1927 finally called for the establishment of both urban and rural soviets, following a decision by the Comintern (Stalin) in September that the time had become ripe. This was followed in December by an unsuccessful attempt to establish, by armed force, an urban soviet in Canton; the leaders of the venture (Mao was not one) were later hailed for their intentions but criticized for poor judgment.

While Mao Tse-tung and his remnant forces were attempting to preserve themselves in a mountainous area in South China and reportedly were proclaiming "soviets" almost wherever they made camp, the CCP in the summer of 1928 held its sixth congress in Moscow under the supervision of the Comintern. The party's resolution, reaffirming that the Chinese revolution was still in the "bourgeois-democratic" stage, described the principal tasks of the revolution as the overthrow of imperialism and the carrying out of the agrarian revolution, asserted that a "new revolutionary rising tide is inevitable," conjectured that such a tide might rise in one or more provinces if not nationally, and called on the party to prepare for eventual armed insurrection on a national scale. In this light, the party's tasks (in the order stated) were to rebuild itself, win the support of the working class, organize guerrilla warfare among the peasants and coordinate it with urban uprisings, organize revolutionary armies of workers and peasants in the present guerrilla areas (described as the "central issue in the peasant movement"), expand the soviet base areas, develop in those areas a regular Red Army, complete the land program in those areas, set up Soviet governments in those areas, fight for the leadership of anti-imperialist and antimilitarist struggles, prepare for the overthrow of the Kuomintang, and so on and so on. In short, the feeble and confused Chinese party was given a set of heroic tasks which, as a set, it had no hope of achieving.

The proceedings of the sixth congress reflected Stalin's and the CCP leadership's continuing approval of Mao's effort in South China--but only as one line of action among others. Mao himself apparently took the same view at the time, although later CCP histories accuse the Comintern and the then CCP leadership of having undervalued Mao's effort.

Mao in a report later in 1928 described his "border area" as engaged in a prolonged struggle in which it was building its power as opportunity permitted, pursuing an aggressive

policy of military expansion of the base area under favorable conditions and a conservative policy in areas where the power of anti-Communist forces seemed stable. The tactical principles which followed from this strategy were later expressed as: "Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue."

In June 1929 the CCP central leadership under Li Li-san reaffirmed the positions taken in Moscow in the summer of 1928, despite the fact that the program was not prospering. In late 1929 and early 1930 Li was under Comintern pressure to recognize and act on the prophesied new "tide," and by mid-1930 the Comintern had proclaimed the arrival of the tide and was even advising the employment of Chinese Communist forces to attack urban centers. In July 1930, Communist forces attacked and occupied Changsha but could not hold it and suffered great losses; some of Mao's forces tried to retake Changsha later in 1930, but they too failed. Li Li-san was made the scapegoat for a succession of failures and was succeeded in the central leadership by a group of young Chinese Communists recently returned from study in the USSR.

In January 1931 the new leadership, following the Comintern's line, published a resolution showing a much greater appreciation--or more precisely, making a virtue of necessity --of the rural base areas, which were to be expanded primarily by guerrilla warfare. The central leadership remained in Shanghai, however, to carry out the tasks apparently still regarded as requiring the efforts of the top leaders--to rebuild the party and acquire a strong following in the urban proletariat.

The Chinese Soviet Republic--Mao's Kiangsi base, which during 1931 was recognized by the Comintern as the "most important" (the only thriving) development in China--was proclaimed in November 1931. During 1931 and 1932 the central leadership of the CCP, increasingly endangered in Shanghai, transferred to Kiangsi. Mao remained chairman of the Kiangsi Soviet, which drew heavily on Soviet Russian "experience," but the "returned students" remained the dominant figures in the CCP.

In 1934, after having withstood a number of "extermination" campaigns by the strong Nationalists, The CCP was forced to evacuate the Kiangsi Soviet. In January 1935, during the

Long March, Mao staged a successful showdown with the then-dominant CCP leaders (Mao's historians later wrote that Mao charged others with disregarding correct military principles and thus losing the Kiangsi base); and Mao himself became the dominant figure. After establishing the party's new base in Shensi, Mao restated his thinking in 1936 in "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War."

The unfavorable factors for the CCP, as Mao saw them, were these: the Nationalist enemy was strong and had international counterrevolutionary support; whereas Communist forces were weak and isolated. Other factors, however, were favorable and of greater importance; China was unevenly developed, its rulers were disunited, the country was vast, and the CCP would be supported by the peasantry.

Mao went on to argue in this article that the party must prepare for a prolonged war of alternating defensive and offensive actions until there was a "fundamental change" in the balance of forces. When on the defensive, the party would be preparing the conditions (especially that of gaining popular support) which would permit a counteroffensive. The counteroffensive would finally be followed by an annihilating offensive.

In Communist offensive operations, Mao wrote, the party must emphasize mobile warfare, the concentration of much superior forces, battles of quick decision (the "short attack"), and battles of annihilation. The most important of these principles was concentration of forces. While the strategic directive was to defeat the many with the few, the tactical directive was to defeat the few with the many.

The "Protracted War"

In both 1935 and 1937, in accordance with Comintern policy, Mao wrote on the need for forming a national united front against the Japanese, with the aim of overthrowing the Nationalists as well as the Japanese. In the latter article he stated his willingness to subordinate the struggle with the Nationalists to the struggle with Japan, on the grounds that China must be first be saved if the CCP were later to win it. He made clear, however, that he meant to pursue the two struggles concurrently, shifting his emphasis as necessary.

In 1938, with the united front achieved, Mao adapted his thinking to problems in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, which he knew must necessarily be the principal form of the Communist contribution for some years. Mao called for Communist guerrilla forces to preserve their independence from the Nationalists, to establish base areas in the enemy's rear, and to harass the enemy's flanks. The principles for guerrilla offensive operations were: concentration of forces, swift and secret preparations, surprise attack, and quick decision. Guerrilla warfare was to be developed, as possible, into mobile warfare. Eventually, as a result of many offensives in both conventional warfare (primarily Nationalist) and guerrilla warfare (primarily Communist), Chinese forces (both Nationalist and Communist), in coordination with "international" forces and Japanese popular forces, could encircle and annihilate the Japanese imperialists.

In the same period (spring 1938), Mao gave a series of lectures in Yenan, "On Protracted War." The manifest aim of the lectures was to heighten the morale of Communist forces, which were engaging two much stronger forces. His central assertion was that China would certainly win the war with Japan, although it would be a long war. Conceding that Japan was strong, Mao argued that Japan could not win, because of its "retrogressive" and "barbarous" character, its lack of sufficient resources for a protracted war, and its lack of international support. Conversely, admitting that China was weak, he argued that China would win because its cause was "progressive" and just, because of its great territory and huge population to support a prolonged war, and because of abundant international support--which would eventually find some practical expression. Mao observed parenthetically that the war in China would result not only in the repulsion of Japan but in the purging of "our own filth" (i.e., enemies of the Communists).

Mao contended that, as the war went on, factors unfavoralbe to Japan and favorable to China would develop. He projected three stages: the enemy's strategic offensive and China's strategic defensive, conducted primarily by mobile warfare, during which period the Japanese would become greatly overextended; a second long stage of "strategic stalemate," in which guerrilla warfare would be the principal form of Chinese action; and the third stage, the Chinese counteroffensive, which would be supported by "international forces" and forces within Japan.

Mao presumably recognized that without the support of "international forces," the prospects of both China and the CCP were bleak indeed. He put his argument, however, primarily in terms of China and Japan. Mao called for a strategy of employing the main Chinese forces in mobile warfare over an extended, indefinite, and shifting front. These forces would be supplemented by great numbers of guerrilla detachments formed from the peasantry. It would become increasingly feasible to engage the Japanese in positional warfare. Eventually, Japan's economy would crack and the morale of the Japanese armed forces would break, whereas China would continue to pour millions of men into the war.

Mao emphasized the value, in the first two stages of the war, of offensive operations aimed at quick decisions, concentrating heavily superior forces against Japanese forces on the move. An important factor in gaining the initiative, Mao held, was surprise; indeed, with the benefit of surprise an inferior force could often defeat a superior force. As for any moral question that might arise in the employment of surprise:

> We are not Duke Hsiang of Sung and have no use for his stupid scruples about benevolence, righteousness, and morality in war.

With regard to "decisive engagements," Mao took a conventional, common-sense position: that Chinese policy throughout the course of the war should be "to fight resolutely a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle when victory is certain; to avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle when victory is uncertain; and to avoid absolutely a strategic decisive engagement which stakes the destiny of the nation." In extension of this latter point,

> Even a gambler needs money to gamble with, and if he stakes all he has on a single throw of the dice and loses it through bad luck, he will not be able to gamble again...

This policy was to apply even in the final stage, the "strategic counteroffensive," when the enemy would be in an inferior position, because

> We are advocates of the theories of a protracted war and a final victory, and...do not advocate the theory of staking everything on a single throw of the dice.

The Global Struggle

Mao contended again in these lectures, in accordance with Leninist-Stalinist doctrine, that the Sino-Japanese protracted war must be regarded as a part of a larger protracted war. The war in China, he held, would be followed by a world war, and "owing to the existence of the Soviet Union" and the enlightenment of other peoples, the world war would be succeeded by "great revolutionary wars" which would result in the elimination of capitalism and consequently in "permanent peace." In this connection, Communists everywhere must oppose "unjust wars" but take part actively in "just" wars.

Mao returned to this concept of a protracted global war in a 1939 article apologizing for the Soviet-German nonaggression pact. Following Soviet spokesmen, he praised the Soviet example in refraining from entering "any unjust, predatory, and imperialist war" while "actively helping" peoples engaged in "just" wars. Citing Soviet assistance (which actually was very small) to China and other countries, Mao assured his audience that the USSR "will surely help in the people's wars of liberation or national independence that may break out in the future...."

Mao took up this concept again in his long 1940 article, "On New Democracy." Before the Russian October Revolution in 1917, Mao wrote, the Chinese "bourgeois-democratic revolution" (which was under way) was part of the world bourgeois-democratic revolution. Since 1917, however, the Chinese revolution belonged to that type of revolution which aimed at establishing a "new democratic" society--one not quite identical with Soviet society, but in which the "revolutionary front" was a part of the new "proletarian socialist" (Communist) world revolution.

In explanation of this, Mao set forth a Leninist assessment of the stage of the struggle. Capitalism had been overthrown in one sixth of the world (the USSR), and had shown that it could not survive without increasing reliance on the colonies and semi-colonies (i.e., exploitation of countries it dominated). The USSR had shown itself willing to support /In theory, but not yet with arms/ the "liberation movement" in all colonies and semi-colonies. And the proletariat in capitalist countries was freeing itself from the mere reformists

and was also supporting /verbally/ the liberation movement of the colonies and semi-colonies. All this being so, "any revolution that takes place in a colony or semi-colony against imperialism" is a part of the new "proletarian-socialist world revolution."

Mao noted in this article that his view was "based on" Stalin's view. Mao cited Stalin's writings since 1918 on the theme that the principal global significance of the October Revolution lay in opening up possibilities for the emancipation of the colonies and semi-colonies from imperialism, thereby drawing together the oppressed peoples of West and East and creating " a new front of revolutions" against imperialism.*

Victory in China

By 1940, Mao felt able to declare that the Japanese were unable to launch any further large-scale offensives in China, and consequently that the war had reached the second of its three projected stages; i.e., the stage of "strategic stalemate." Several times in 1940 and 1941 Mao reminded his comrades that the party must build its military, political, and economic power in China by all possible means, not only against the Japanese but against the "anti-Communist diehards of the Kuomintang." There had in fact already been a number of battles with the Nationalists since 1939.

Although he had minimized Japanese capabilities in 1940, Mao in 1944, reviewing the party's history, described the years 1941 and 1942 as having been very difficult. The Japanese had dealt the party "heavy blows," with the result that the Communist base areas shrank in size and population and Communist forces were reduced to 300,000 men. However, Mao wrote, things got much better in 1943 and early 1944, so that

*Lenin had foreseen the world revolution as combining civil wars in advanced countries with "a whole series of democratic and revolutionary movements--including movements of national liberation--in underdeveloped, backward and oppressed nations."

by April 1944 the party could claim an expansion of its base areas, a population in those areas of 80 million, and an army of 470,000. A year later, Mao was claiming for the "liberated" areas a population of 95 million and an army of 910,000.

In order to vindicate, without giving credit to the West, his earlier formulation that the final stage of the Sino-Japanese war--the Chinese counteroffensive--would be supported by international forces, Mao called for the nationwide counteroffensive on 9 August 1945, the day after the Soviet declaration of war on Japan. These Russian and Chinese Communist actions--not the Western military effort--were later said to have brought about Japan's surrender on 14 August.

In August 1945 the Chinese Communist party was in a good position for its long-foreseen struggle with the Nationalists for sole control of China. It had a large base in North China and strong military forces in many other parts of China as well, and it quickly moved strong forces into Manchuria, assisted in so doing by Soviet forces there. Although Nationalist and Communist representatives concluded a cease-fire agreement and an interim political agreement in January 1946, there was no agreement on implementation, and the civil war resumed in earnest in Manchuria in the spring of 1946.*

Mao in 1946 was much concerned with preventing the United States from increasing its aid to the Nationalists, and especially with preventing the large-scale employment of American forces in China. In August 1946, in an interview with an American Communist journalist, Mao contended that a peaceful settlement in China depended on American nonintervention. Mao stated his agreement with the long-standing Soviet proposition that American "imperialism" was preparing for an eventual war against the Soviet Union. He went on to argue,

*Two Yugoslav leaders have said that Stalin told them he had advised the CCP after World War II to try to enter a coalition with the Kuomintang rather than to engage in civil war, and that the CCP had been "right" in "ignoring" his advice. The CCP did in fact try to enter a coalition, however, and resumed the civil war when this hope failed. Stalin presumably approved this course--resumption of the war--as the only one then open.

as he does today, that the United States, while its preparations were incomplete, was using the talk of a Soviet-American war as a "smoke screen" to conceal the conflicts between American rulers and the American people, between the United States and other "capitalist" powers, and between the United States and the colonial and "semi-colonial" (imperialist-dominated) countries.

It was also in this interview that Mao first stated his concept that "all reactionaries" are "paper tigers." "In appearance they are frightening; in reality, their strength is not so great." Mao specified in this interview, however, as he has not always done since, that this assessment was from "the long-term point of view."

In the latter half of 1946 and the early part of 1947 the Nationalists enjoyed a number of apparent successes against the Communists but did not succeed in appreciably reducing Communist forces, whereas the Communists, emphasizing mobile warfare, were repeatedly able to concentrate their forces to destroy isolated Nationalist forces. During 1947 the strategic initiative passed to the Communists, and in December 1947, with the outcome hardly in doubt, Mao reviewed the situation in a report to the party.

Celebrating the "turning point" in the war, Mao described it as also a "turning point in history," one which would bring "jubilation and encouragment" to the oppressed nations of the East and would also be "a form of aid" to oppressed peoples struggling in Europe and the Americas.

Mao stated that the military principles which were bringing victory were principally those of: first striking isolated groups, then concentrated groups; first taking the countryside and small towns, then taking the cities, aiming primarily to annihilate the enemy, not to take particular places; concentrating "absolutely superior forces" in every battle (up to six times the strength of the enemy); and fighting "no unprepared engagements" and "no engagements in which there is no assurance of victory."

As for the world scene, Mao affirmed several positions taken by Andrei Zhdanov in his speech of September 1947. American efforts to organize an "imperialist antidemocratic front against all democratic forces headed by the Soviet Union,"

Mao said, represented a plan to initiate a third world war "at some remote day in the future." This plan could be frustrated, he said, because the "strength of the world anti-imperialist camp exceeds that of the imperialist camp." These anti-imperialist forces already included the USSR, the Eastern European states, "liberation" movements throughout Asia, and other forces in Western Europe and Latin America. Mao endorsed the Cominform's "summons to battle" against imperialism.

Summary

Mao's pronouncements on strategy in the years 1926-1947 show that he subscribed entirely to the Leninist-Stalinist world view that there are two irreconcilable camps engaged in a prolonged and mortal struggle.* In this struggle, the Communist camp must be prepared for "imperialist" attacks on it and must encourage and aggressively support anti-imperialist struggles in the colonies and semi-colonies, conflicts among the imperialist powers, and internal opposition in imperialist countries. Mao believed that the Chinese revolution was and must remain a part of the world revolution. Further, he believed with Lenin and Stalin that a Communist global victory was inevitable but must nevertheless be pursued as vigorously as possible, retreating temporarily when compelled; Mao expressed this in his concept of imperialism as a "paper tiger."

As for strategy in a semi-colonial country, of which China was the largest, Mao took from Lenin and Stalin the beliefs that the revolution must necessarily be violent, that the bulk of the population could be brought to support the struggle

*The best known statement is Lenin's: "We live not only in a state but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end either one or the other will conquer. And until that end comes, a series of the most terrible collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable."

against imperialism and domestic "counterrevolution," and (consequently) that peasant discontent offered the greatest potential for exploitation. He agreed further that in the struggle, whatever the degree of its cooperation or compromise at various times with other groups, the party must keep its eye fixed on acquiring total power as soon as practicable. Finally, Mao came to the same view that Stalin finally did, although Mao may have reached this view independently: that the Communists in such a country as China would win power primarily through the operations of peasant armies which would establish and expand rural base areas.

In his military thinking, Mao learned from classic Chinese military writers, from Soviet experience in the Russian revolution, and from Western theorists; and he added some propositions of his own on guerrilla warfare. His strategy called for Chinese Communist power to be built in a protracted war in which his forces would engage in both guerrilla and mobile warfare and expand their base areas as circumstances permitted. In defensive operations the Communists could retreat deeply, hoping that the enemy would overextend himself. In offensive operations the most important principles were careful planning, the concentration of superior forces, and the achievement of surprise. In both defensive and offensive operations, the party would fight decisive engagements only when confident of victory and would avoid absolutely a decisive engagement risking the fate of the nation. In the final stages of the struggle, Chinese Communist forces would be assisted by the USSR.

In the earliest years of his career--the years 1926-1935 --Mao was associated only with some parts of the complex and often confused program that Stalin was exhorting and backing in China, and Stalin's favor was given primarily to other leaders than Mao. It is probably true, as other observers have contended, that the generally close cooperation between Stalin and Mao in the subsequent period--the years 1935-1947 --began at least with the Soviet acceptance of an accomplished fact, i.e., Mao's dislodgement of the then dominant leaders in 1935.

It is important to realize, however, that the record does not support the view that Mao at any time in the period 1926-1947 was acting in opposition to Soviet party policies. Mao worked consistently in that period within policy lines

formulated, at least in general terms, in Moscow. This included his work among the peasants and on peasant affairs in 1924-26, his organization of peasant uprisings in the autumn of 1927, his formation of an army at that time, his struggle to establish a base area after 1927, his proclamation of the Kiangsi Soviet in 1931 and his subsequent shaping of its program, his relocation of the party's base in North China in 1934-35, his call for a united front from 1935, his struggle against both the Japanese and the Nationalists from 1937, his formulation of "new democracy" in 1940, his effort to get a political agreement with the Nationalists in 1945, and (probably) his decision to resume the civil war in 1946. It is necessary to recognize Mao's long record of fidelity to Moscow in order to understand how sharply Mao in recent years has been departing from that record.

II. FAR EASTERN STRATEGY: Armed Struggle, 1948-1951

In 1948, with the conquest of the China mainland in sight, Mao Tse-tung and his lieutenants began to turn their attention increasingly to the question of Communist strategy for the Far East as a whole.

At the end of the World War II, the Soviet party had not appeared to have worked out a coherent program for the Far East, as distinct from a policy of general support for "liberation" movements. In the period 1945-47, Communist movements in the Far East had at least two common objectives --to induce the withdrawal of Western military forces and to gain control of existing or emerging governments--but Moscow evidently had not decided on any one line to emphasize. In Indochina and the Philippines the Communist movements, like the Communists in China, had simultaneously negotiated and engaged in limited fighting; in North Korea and Malaya they had built up their military capabilities; and in Burma, Indonesian, and India they had collaborated with nationalist parties.

Zhdanov's Signal for the Offensive

In September 1947, in his speech at the founding conference of the Cominform, Andrei Zhdanov gave the signal for the Communist camp to go on the offensive in the global struggle. Emphasizing the concept of two camps and positing a change in the balance of forces, Zhdanov noted inter alia the "aggravated crisis of the colonial system," the "powerful movement for national liberation" in the colonies and dependencies (or semi-colonial areas) which was jeopardizing the "rear of the capitalist system." Zhdanov expressly praised the "armed resistance" in Indonesia and Indochina. Going on to emphasize the need for Communist leadership in the struggle against American plans for the "enslavement of Europe" (the most important arena), Zhdanov concluded that the principal danger to the Communist camp lay in "underrating its own strength and overrating the strength of the enemy."

As noted in Part I, Mao Tse-tung in his December 1947 report endorsed the line taken by Zhdanov and the Cominform's

"summons to battle." As for the struggle in Asia, Mao spoke in general terms, calling on "all anti-imperialist forces" of Asia to unite to oppose "the oppression of imperialism and the reactionaries within each country"--aiming at nothing less than the "liberation" of all Asia.

Mao in that report echoed Zhdanov's exhortation not to overestimate the enemy or underrate Communist strength. He enlarged on this point and on his "paper tiger" concept of 1946 in the following month, reaffirming his 1946 position that the enemy is to be despised--but only from a long-term point of view. Mao wrote in January 1948 that the proper attitude is

> to despise the enemy in the general sense as well as strategically, while at the same time to attach importance to the art of the struggle and to take the enemy seriously in every particular situation and every specific struggle.

Possibly as early as the autumn of 1947, clearly by early 1948, the Soviet party, perhaps in consultation with the Chinese party, decided to emphasize "armed struggle" wherever possible in the Far East. During 1948 the Communists in the Philippines, Burma, and Malaya went into open rebellion, the Indonesian Communists launched a revolt, and the Indian Communists adopted tactics of violence.

Mao's Agreement With Stalin

Observing the progress of the struggle, Mao by November 1948, writing in the Cominform journal, was again putting his emphasis (as in December 1947) on the need not to overestimate the strength of the enemy. Conceding that the enemy--"American imperialism and its stooges"--was "still powerful," Mao argued that the enemy's foundation nevertheless was weak and that the enemy was vulnerable to an "anti-imperialist united front headed by the Soviet Union."

Liu Shao-chi in the same month reflected Mao's thinking on Far Eastern strategy--i.e., his continuing agreement with Stalin--in a long article, "Internationalism and Nationalism," designed primarily as an endorsement of the Cominform's condemnation of Yugoslavia. Describing the Communist-led

"anti-imperialist national united front" in China as an integral part of the world Communist movement, Liu went on to assert that the latter had supported and must continue to support all "national liberation movements" in the colonies and semi-colonies; he specified, in Asia, the existing Communist-led insurgents in Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines, and India. These liberation movements, Liu wrote, "sap, weaken, and undermine" the foundations of imperialism, and their success was a necessary condition for the overthrow of the imperialists at home. Further, Liu wrote, Mao's elaboration of Stalin's theories in "new Democracy" (1940) was "absolutely correct," and oppressed nations could be liberated "only" on the basis of these theories. For example, Communists in the Far East should adopt the (Soviet-approved) Chinese tactic of taking a hard position against the reactionary bourgeoisie but entering into an alliance with all forces (including the nonreactionary bourgeoisie) opposing imperialism.

In July 1949, three months before the Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed at Peiping, Mao Tse-tung published his article, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," setting forth the party's intentions. Mao was at pains to assert the relevance of the "universal truth of Marxism-Leninism" for a backward country such as China. In a passage directed to other Asian countries as well as to his domestic audience, Mao wrote:

> To sit on the fence is impossible. A third road does not exist.... Not only in China but also in the world, without exception, one leans either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is a camouflage, and a third road does not exist.

In August, Mao had occasion to comment again on the nature of imperialism--i.e., to express his continuing agreement on this point with Lenin and Stalin. Its nature, he said, was "unchangeable"; it was compelled to aggress, fail, aggress again, fail again, "until its doom." It was foolish to hope that imperialists could be persuaded to "repent"; they could only be exposed, attacked, defeated, and punished. Those who did not know this, Mao said, must be helped "to cast off their illusions and prepare for struggle."

The "Higher Stage" of Struggle

In October 1949, a Soviet party spokesman expressed the Soviet party's satisfaction--as had Mao and Liu for the Chinese party in the preceding year--with the progress of the struggle in the Far East. Writing in Problems of Economics, he hailed the "armed struggle for the formation of independent repbulics in Indonesia and Indochina, the armed struggle in Malaya and Burma, and the peasant uprisings in India," as well as the "victorious liberation war of the Chinese people"--all of which proved that "the national-liberation movement has entered a new, higher stage" in its development since World War II. He denounced the "rotten little idea" of the possibility of some kind of "middle path between Communism and capitalism," the notion pursued by "national reformists" in colonial and semi-colonial countries. He went on to observe that the national liberation movement could "easily" develop throughout Asia in the form of a "people's democratic" revolution on the Chinese model. He was careful, however, to note in this connection that the Chinese model did not differ radically from the Soviet model--that the "general patterns of social development are identical for both Eastern and Western countries."

The concept of a "new, higher stage" in the struggle in Asia appeared again in the following month in the speech by Georgi Malenkov on the 32nd anniversary of the October Revolution. Malenkov devoted several paragraphs to the significance of the Communist victory in China and asserted that as a result of this victory, "the national struggle for liberation of the peoples of Asia, the Pacific basin, and the whole colonial world has risen to a new, considerably higher stage." Although Malenkov did not say so, earlier Soviet and Chinese statements had suggested that the Chinese Communist success was to be presented as an inspiration to other Asian Communist movements; the CCP's emphasis on armed force was apparently to be followed wherever possible; the Chinese Communist regime (proclaimed a month earlier) was to be the Soviet-approved model; and the Peiping regime was to provide advisory and material aid to Far Eastern "liberation" movements within its reach.

Ten days later the CCP played the leading role in the WFTU's trade union conference in Peiping of Asian and Australasian countries. In his opening speech on 16 November, Liu

Shao-chi hailed the anti-imperialist movement in the Far East, now "more intensified and better organized." Describing the Chinese revolution as already victorious, Liu praised the armed struggles (in order of their estimated success) in Indochina, Burma, and Indonesia; in Malaya and the Phillippines; and in India. Further, he asserted that the "national liberation movement" in the Far East would struggle to complete victory, with China having set the "best example."

Liu in this address described the strategy of the Communist victory in China, "the path of Mao Tse-tung," as follows: (1) the formation of a Communist-led national united front against imperialism; (2) the organization of Communist-led armed forces; (3) the establishment of bases for these armed forces; and (4) the coordination of military operations in the countryside with legal and illegal activities in enemy-held cities and other areas. Liu declared and reiterated that "armed struggle" must be the "main form" of struggle in "many" colonial and semi-colonial countries.

The conference set forth a Far Eastern strategy centering on "armed struggle," on the Chinese model, by the various "liberation" movements. In this effort, Communist China and North Korea were to be regarded as "base areas" in the same sense that the USSR was (and remains) a "base area" for the world revolution. The "base areas" were to assist the Far Eastern "liberation movements"--placed in two categories: those countries in which "liberation" was in sight and those in which victory was distant--with all means at their disposal.

The Cominform in January 1950 underlined the WFTU's statement of strategy by sharply criticizing the Japanese Communist party for its concept of "peaceful revolution." At the same time, the Cominform reprimanded Indian Communist leaders who regarded Mao's road to power as heretical and therefore as inadmissible for other Asian parties. The Cominform journal declared forthrightly: "The path taken by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism...is the path which should be taken by the people of many colonial and semi-colonial countries...."

The North Korean "base area" invaded South Korea in June 1950. In the autumn of 1950 when the United Nations counter-offensive threatened to unliberate North Korea and perhaps part of Communist China too, the Chinese "base area" was

called upon, with the Soviet base area standing behind China. While Chinese intervention began as a trickle in October 1950, the massive intervention in late November 1950 well illustrated Mao's doctrinal emphasis on careful planning, the massing of forces, and the importance of surprise. About 180,000 elite Chinese Communist troops suddenly struck advance elements of the UN command south of the Yalu and changed the course of the war. Throughout the Korean war, the preferred Chinese form of offensive action was that of forces massed by stealth to undertake assaults with maximum surprise.

Dissatisfaction With Results

By mid-1951 it was apparent that Communist forces in Korea could not attain their objectives without Soviet intervention, a course which Moscow was unwilling to risk. Moreover, although the Viet Minh since 1946 had been doing well in their "armed struggle," none of the "liberation" movements which had embarked on this course in 1948 had been able to establish a territorial base, and none was a position to improve its fortunes greatly without Chinese intervention--a course which Peiping, heavily committed in Korea, was unwilling to risk (and was unable to pursue in noncontiguous areas in any case). The Burmese Communists had been unable to consolidate their areas in the countryside, the Huks in the Philippines had been much weakened by government action, the Indonesian Communists had again failed in a military operation, the Malayan Communists could not expand beyond guerrilla operations, and the Indian Communists' militant program had generally been a failure.

In apparent recognition of the general failure outside China and Indochina, every Far Eastern "liberation" movement except the prospering Viet Minh began in 1951 to change its tactics to emphasize political forms of action. The first practical step was the Communist bid in June 1951--by a Soviet spokesman, seconded the next day by Peiping--for truce talks in Korea. Shortly thereafter, the Indian Communists adopted united front tactics. In late 1951 the Indonesian Communists also shifted to united front tactics, the Malayan Communists ordered a curtailment of guerrilla operations, and the Philippine Communists decided to concentrate on "legal activity" to gain a popular following.

Although the Chinese probably did wish to see the Korean war concluded, they did not seem prepared as to mid-1951 to see "Mao's path" abandoned, or even temporarily withdrawn, as the strategic prescription for Asian liberation movements. In a July article in People's Daily to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, Lu Ting-i, a long-time spokesman for Mao, wrote on the "World Significance of the Chinese Revolution." The Chinese revolution was again presented in this article as the "classic type" of, and "example" for, the revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial countries--especially Asia. Mao was invoked for the contention that the essentials of the Chinese "experience" were a Leninist party, the armed forces led by the party, and the united front led by the party. Lu went on to hail the "national liberation wars" in Indochina, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines and the increasing strength of the national liberation "movements" in India and Japan. He stated that their "fighting will" had been strengthened by the Chinese example and that "these rear bases" of imperialism had turned or were turning into a "revolutionary storm" against imperialism. Lu concluded with a call for Communist parties everywhere to study Mao Tse-tung's "theory of the Chinese revolution."

On the same occasion Chen Po-ta, another of Mao's writers, observed that Mao Tse-tung more than 20 years earlier had arrived

> at the unequivocal conclusions of staging a protracted revolutionary war in the rural areas and then trying to seize the cities...; and the establishment and maintenance of revolutionary state power in numerous small bases, and then to seize the state power of the country through the gradual extension of our power by means of protracted struggle. This is the new Marxist conclusion arrived at in colonial and semi-colonial countries.

Finally, on same occasion, yet another to Mao's writers, Hu Chiao-nu, writing in Study, described the strategy of waging a protracted armed struggle in rural areas as a "law" discovered by Mao. Hu quoted Mao to the effect that armed struggle is "the highest as well as the necessary form which peasant struggles in a semi-colony must adopt."

There were similar statements in official Chinese party journals throughout 1951. In October, for example, the Chinese revolution was again cited as "the classic example of revolution in colonial and semi-colonial areas...." In November, China's revolution was again put forward as the "model" to be imitated, and "Mao's road" as the road to be followed. This editorial concluded that

> China's today then is the tomorrow of Vietnam, Burma, Ceylon, India, and various other Asian colonial and semi-colonial nations.

There are various possible reasons for the Chinese lag (which persisted until mid-1952) in endorsing a change in tactics by the Far Eastern "liberation" movements. One was simple Chinese obtuseness: i.e., Stalin could see, but Mao could not, that "armed struggle" was not prospering in most Far Eastern countries. A more plausible reason was Mao's continuing high regard for his own road to power, a feeling that, however dark the immediate scene, a "tiny spark can kindle a great fire," and the spark must not be allowed to go out; in that connection, Mao may well have believed that if Communist party leaders in other Far Eastern countries were not able to follow Mao's road in keeping the armed struggle alive, then Moscow and Peiping should try to develop some local leaders who could. Another plausible reason, which might be added to the foregoing, was Chinese self-interest: armed struggles in several Far Eastern countries were tying down considerable Western forces which might otherwise be thrown into the Korean war.

Summary

The statements of Mao and his spokesman in the period 1948-51 indicate that he held firmly to the Leninist-Stalinist world view, global strategy, and strategy for colonial and semi-colonial areas; and he agreed with Stalin on the need for combating the concept of a third path between the bloc and the West. This being so, the Chinese party was happy to work closely with the Soviet party in encouraging and supporting Far Eastern "liberation" movements in a program emphasizing "armed struggle" wherever possible. Mao continued to think highly of his own road to power as the model for Asian

"liberation" movements, and he lagged in endorsing a change in tactics by Far Eastern Communist movements in 1951.

In the Korean war, the most ambitious bloc venture of the "armed struggle" period of 1948-1951, the Chinese intervention in late 1950 seemed to derive both from Mao's devotion to the world Communist cause and from Chinese self-interest. The principal reason was probably the common Sino-Soviet determination not to permit the destruction of a bloc regime. Other factors were the long-standing Chinese wish for a Korean buffer, the Soviet promise of massive aid to the Chinese military establishment (which continued through and after the Korean war), and Mao's desire for prestige.

The intervention well illustrated Mao's doctrinal emphasis on careful planning, the massing of forces, and the importance of surprise. At the same time, Mao in intervening compromised the most important of his conservative military principles--that of avoiding an engagement which staked the fate of the nation. Although Moscow and Peiping guessed right, in that Western military power was not brought to bear against mainland China, the fact remains that Mao (as well as Moscow) took a great risk. Mao thus demonstrated that his actual decisions as to the employment of his armed forces could not be deduced simply from his declared military principles.

III. FAR EASTERN STRATEGY: A New Emphasis, 1952-1955

A theoretical rationale for changes in the tactics of Far Eastern Communist movements was supplied by Moscow--not Peiping--in November 1951. Just as the public statement of Far Eastern strategy emphasizing "armed struggle" had been made in Peiping some months after most of the Far Eastern Communist parties had in fact embarked on this course, so the public authorization for the change of tactics to emphasize political forms of action came from Moscow after most of the parties had already switched.

The New Soviet Line

The occasion was a conference of Soviet theorists, sponsored jointly by the Soviet party and Oriental Studies Institute. The key speaker, known to represent the party's position on such occasions, emphasized that it would be a mistake to regard the Chinese revolution as "some kind of stereotype" for revolutions elsewhere in Asia, particularly in those countries in which the Communist party was not assured of an opportunity to build a "revolutionary army" of the Chinese type. This speaker was immediately supported by another who contended that Mao's most valuable contribution, upon re-examination, proved to be his successful exploitation of anti-Western and antigovernment sentiment to create a "national united front." This speaker observed that the Communist parties of Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines were already working along these lines.

There was some opposition at this conference to the shift in emphasis, but the opposition fared poorly. One theorist, observing that conditions in China had made necessary the development of the revolution "in the form of a revolutionary war," and contending that the same conditions called for the same program in Korea, Indochina, Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines, was promptly rebuked for regarding the Chinese revolution as an "obligatory model." The key speaker reprimanded the opposition for minimizing the strength of pan-Asian sentiment, and the conference concluded that conditions were favorable for political forms of action to unite the great bulk of Asian peoples in opposition to the West.

Following this conference, those Asian Communist parties which had not changed their tactics took steps to do so. The Korean Communists, according to prisoners, adopted a new plan to overthrow South Korea by subversion rather than military action. The Burmese Communists early in 1952 began to make overtures for a cease-fire looking toward a "peace" coalition government. The Malayan Communists specified July 1952 as the beginning of a primarily political phase. The Japanese Communist party, again the last to get the word, was publicly rebuked by its fugitive secretary general (in Peiping) in July for having overemphasized violence and having paid "insufficient attention" to political action.

Delayed Chinese Endorsement

As noted in Party II, the Chinese party lagged in endorsing the new line. During the first six months of 1952 there was a considerable difference between Soviet and Chinese statements on the "liberation" struggle in the Far East. For example, Chou En-lai and People's Daily on the Sino-Soviet treaty anniversary had much praise for the progress of the struggle, especially for the efforts of Communist-led armed forces, while on the same occasion the Soviet ambassador, the Cominform journal, and Pravda failed even to take note of the struggle.

Similarly, People's Daily in its May Day editorial endorsed the position on a world war that Stalin had taken in an interview in March--that a world war had not come closer and that "peaceful coexistence" between the two camps was possible if there were mutual desire to cooperate, willingness to fulfill commitments, and observance of equality and noninterference. The same editorial, however, as well as other Peiping comment, discussed the "liberation" movements in the Far East in the same terms that the Chinese (and the Russians, then) had used in 1948-49: the "new stage" of the struggle, the Chinese example, the successes of "open armed struggle," the role of the struggle in undermining imperialism, the need to persist to "complete victory," and so on.

By July 1952, Chinese Communist comment began to follow the lead of the World Peace Council in emphasizing the need for peaceful settlement of all armed conflicts, including

those in Asia. This line continued through August and September. Then in October 1952 more than 400 delegates and observers from about 40 countries met in Peiping for an Asian-Pacific Peace Conference. The Chinese delegates joined the conference as a whole in calling, inter alia, for a conclusion to the conflicts in Korea, Indochina, and Malaya and for "settlement of all issues by peaceful negotiations."

Soviet Global Strategy

Just prior to the Soviet party's 19th congress in October 1952, Stalin wrote an article, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," which served as an outline for the congress. In that part of the article dealing with foreign affairs, Stalin expressly rejected his prewar thesis of the stabilization of capitalism and returned to the thesis that wars among capitalist states are inevitable. Conceding the "theoretical" truth of the proposition that "contradictions" between the bloc and the West were greater than those among "capitalist" countries, Stalin pointed out that World War II nevertheless had begun among the capitalist countries; he observed that war with the USSR was and remained more dangerous for the West, as it raised the question of the "existence of capitalism itself." Malenkov, in making the central committee report to the congress, enlarged on this point, reiterating his 1949 contention that the USSR was not afraid of a new war, as World War I had resulted in the formation of the USSR and World War II in the formation of the bloc, and any World War III would lead to the "collapse of the world capitalist system."

Malenkov in his report hailed the "new surge of the national liberation struggle in the colonial and dependent countries." He did not distinguish, however, between Communist-led movements and those not so led, and he did not mention armed struggle. Malenkov praised "liberation" movements in Indochina, Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and movements of "national resistance" in India, Iran, and Egypt.

The purport of the 19th congress was to direct the world Communist movement to aggravate the differences in the Western camp and between the West and the rest of the world, primarily by political and economic means. People's Daily immediately endorsed this directive. It commented that the world camp of "imperialism" headed by the United States was greatly

weakened, "disunited," with sharpening contradictions, a contracting world market, and an inevitable economic crisis. In these conditions, "war between the imperialist states is also inevitable." The editorial avoided the question of "liberation" movements in the Far East, as did Peiping's comment in early November on the October Revolution anniversary.

In December 1952, in consonance with his March 1952 position that "peaceful coexistence" was possible, Stalin remarked that "war between the United States and the Soviet Union cannot be considered inevitable." People's Daily quickly endorsed this statement too, reaffirming Peiping's interest in peaceful settlements. At the same time, the Vienna Peace Congress took the line that there was no international question which could not be settled peacefully.

After Stalin's death in March 1953, Malenkov in his first speech as chairman of the Council of Ministers declared,

> At the present time there is no disputed or unresolved question that cannot be settled peacefully by mutual agreement of the interested countries.

This line was again promptly endorsed by Peiping.

The Chinese Contribution

In late March, shortly after Chou En-lai's return from Moscow, Peiping moved to break the deadlock in the Korean truce talks by agreeing to the UN Command's offer to exchange sick and wounded prisoners and by proposing a resumption of the talks. A Korean truce agreement was concluded in July, and its implementation seemed to absorb most of the CCP's energies (in foreign affairs) for the rest of 1953. Along the way, however, Peiping took occasion to endorse various Soviet initiatives for "peace."

One of these was Malenkov's conciliatory review of foreign policies in August 1953, in which he (and the Chinese, in their comment) avoided the themes of the conflict between the two camps, the crisis in the West, and the colonial struggle. In November, Mao himself went on record, in a message to Malenkov, in support of the Soviet "stand...in favor of

settling all international disputes by peaceful means." By December Peiping professed to see "a little relaxation of tension" in the world, and during December Peiping became much more vocal in urging a settlement in Indochina.

In February 1954, People's Daily expressed "full support" for the agreement of the Big Four to meet in Geneva in late April, with Chinese representation, to discuss Korea and Indochina. In the next two months Indochina displaced Korea as the principal topic of Peiping's comment on foreign affairs, with emphasis on the theme of an American intention to prevent a settlement in Indochina and to increase the scale of American intervention there. This line was given heavy play before and during the Geneva conference.

Chou En-lai was the principal Communist spokesman at Geneva. Chou left the conference for a time in June to journey to India and Burma; while in India he issued a joint statement with Nehru emphasizing five principles which were to be applicable to their relations with each other and with all other countries that so desired: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

Returning to Geneva, Chou took part in the talks on Indochina, and a truce was concluded on 21 July. Chou publicly hailed the truce as testimony to the increasing attractiveness of "peaceful coexistence" and to the general Asian wish for "peace and cooperation" on the basis of the five principles enunciated with Nehru.

Just three days later, lest anyone conclude that Taiwan was an Asian country rather than a piece of China wrongfully "occupied" by the United States, Peiping began a propaganda campaign for the "liberation" of Taiwan. People's Daily concluded a long and fierce editorial with the assertion that the Chinese people would "never stop" until their aim was achieved. Chinese Communist spokesman soon began to speak of the "liberation" of Taiwan as a necessary part of the "fight for peace."

Peiping was still carrying on about Taiwan when a Soviet delegation headed by Khrushchev arrived for the celebration of National Day, 1 October. Khrushchev emphasized in his

speech the theme of peaceful coexistence and expressed the sympathy and support of the Soviet "peoples"--rather than the support of the Soviet Government--for Peiping's wish to acquire Taiwan. The joint declaration of the international situation, issued on 12 October at the end of Khrushchev's visit, affirmed an intention to consult on all questions touching common interests and observed mildly that American policy in supporting the Chinese Nationalists was "incompatible with the task of maintaining peace in the Far East." Khrushchev's visit could not be seen as deterring the Chinese Communists from an assault on Taiwan, as top-level Chinese spokesmen had themselves said that Peiping was not yet prepared, but the visit did underline the Soviet desire to be consulted before any such venture was launched.

Nehru visited Peiping in mid-October 1954, just after Khrushchev left. Hailing his arrival, People's Daily declared that the Nehru-Chou joint statement of June 1954 on the "five principles" had laid out a "clear path to collective peace in Asia and the world." However, the visit was apparently not much of a success. Mao received Nehru only once, issued no joint statement with him, and made no public remarks. The principal item of interest was Mao's reported reply to Nehru's observation that a new war would destroy half the world. Mao is said to have remarked cheerfully that in that case, half the world would survive.

Continuing Sino-Soviet Agreement

As of autumn 1954, Moscow and Peiping appeared to remain in general agreement on a Far Eastern program consonant with Soviet global strategy. The program appeared to call for developing relations with non-Communist Asian states on the basis of the Sino-Indian "five principles," with an increase in conciliatory gestures from both Moscow and Peiping. The conciliatory part of the program was to include Communist support for Asian governments in matters disputed with the West, invitations to Asian leaders to visit Communist capitals, Soviet and Chinese acceptance of invitations, further "cultural" exchanges, an intensified campaign for the promotion of trade, better treatment of Asian diplomats, efforts to allay fears of border encroachment by the Chinese, and a softer policy as regards the ten million Overseas Chinese

in Southeast Asia. At the same time, there were to be selective threats directed toward Asian governments cooperating closely with the United States, and there was to be continued support of subversive activity--especially of local Communist parties--in both "friendly" and "unfriendly" countries. Finally, there was to be a very hard line toward Taiwan, including limited military activity. The Chinese Communists continued through the remainder of 1954 to give greater attention to the status of Taiwan--which concluded a mutual security pact with the United States in this period--than to any other issue.

In the first week of 1955, People's Daily warmly welcomed the agreement by Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan to sponsor an Asian-African conference in April, with Communist China and 24 other countries to be invited. The newspaper observed that Peiping wished to continue to "enlarge the area of peace" on the basis of the Sino-Indian five principles, and it pointed out that the USSR was committed to the same view, as witness the Sino-Soviet declaration of 12 October 1954. In the same month, Chou En-lai rejected any "so-called cease-fire" with the Chinese Nationalists and reaffirmed that the liberation of Taiwan was an "internal" affair. Lacking the capabilities to attack Taiwan itself in the face of the US commitment to its defense, Chinese Communist forces in January and February "liberated" Ichang and the Tachens, the most isolated and vulnerable of Nationalist-occupied offshore islands at the time.

In mid-February, speaking at a celebration of the Sino-Soviet treaty anniversary, Mao Tse-tung stated for the first time his agreement with the Soviet thesis--tentatively advanced by Stalin in 1952, affirmed by Khrushchev in spring 1954, and reaffirmed by Soviet spokesmen in February 1955--that a new war would mean the end of the capitalist system. Mao's formulation of the point was even stronger--that the imperialists would be "wiped clean from the face of the globe."

Peiping appeared to be marking time in March and April 1955, at which time Moscow was exploring prospects for negotiations with the West. Chinese Communist representatives did take part, however, in a Communist-dominated "Asian countries' conference" in New Delhi in April. The conference adopted a number of resolutions hailed by People's Daily as

advancing the "five principles," opposing war, and easing tension in the Far East.

Chou En-lai headed the Chinese Communist delegation to the Asian-African conference which met in Indonesia for 10 days in April 1955, with more than 300 delegates from 29 countries (the USSR was not invited). As Chou said, he came "to seek unity and not to quarrel," and his speeches at the conference were models of sweetly reasonable exposition of the "five principles." Chou also gave an impressive performance in private discussions, and in the opinion of most observers he stole the show.

In the course of the conference, Chou declared that Peiping was willing to "enter into negotiations with the United States Government to discuss the question of relaxing tensions in the Far East, and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area." Later he added that Peiping was willing to negotiate with the "responsible local authorities" of Taiwan. In other words, Chou wished to negotiate a withdrawal of American forces from the Taiwan area, then a peaceful turnover by the Nationalists.

The Chinese cooperated with the Soviets along a number of lines in advancing the Sino-Soviet version of "peaceful coexistence" in the latter half of 1955. They repeatedly endorsed the "five principles" and vowed that they and the Russians would continue to uphold them.* They hailed the results of the heads of government meeting of the Big Four in Geneva in the summer, and in the autumn they expressed sorrow over the "failure" of the followup meeting of foreign ministers. They began ambassadorial-level talks with the United States in August at Geneva, and in the first phase of the talks--regarding detained nationals--were fairly conciliatory, while pressing for higher-level negotiations. They also concluded a number of political and economic agreements with non-Communist Asian states (as well as some Near Eastern states) and praised those that the Soviet

*As a small gain from this line, Nepal recognized Peiping in August--the first government to do so since 1950.

Union concluded. Further, there was a substantial increase in "people's diplomacy," the reception of Asian delegations to Peiping, and the dispatch of Chinese delegations abroad.

During 1955, Communist parties in non-Communist countries of the Far East played or attempted to play supporting roles in the Sino-Soviet performance--emphasizing political forms of action, working for the formation of broad "united fronts," advancing Sino-Soviet efforts to establish or improve relations, and avoiding actions which would compromise bloc diplomacy. The only notable success, however, was in Indonesia, where the legal Communist party polled some 20 percent of the vote in the first national election. The other legal Communist parties, in India and Japan, did not manage to gain much of a popular following. The Burmese Communists were trying to negotiate a truce and affiliate with a legal non-Communist party, and the Malayan Communists similarly were trying to get a cease-fire and to resume activities as a legal party. The Communists in Laos (retaining their armed forces) were seeking a "coalition" government, and those in Cambodia were working through a Communist-dominated party. The Communists in the Philippines sporadically conducted small-scale terrorist actions for lack of other capabilities, and, similarly, those in South Vietnam, South Korea and Taiwan were perforce obliged to emphasize subversive action.

People's Daily at the end of 1955 expressed approval of the results of the bloc's Far Eastern as well as global strategy in that year. In an editorial entitled "The Great Victory of the Idea of Peaceful Coexistence," the party organ described 1955 as a year "marked by steady success for the policy of peaceful coexistence and international cooperation; by an unprecedented growth of the struggle against colonialism in Asian and African countries; and by the rising demand of an increasing number of nations for an independent policy, which has dealt a heavy blow to the 'policy of strength' so vigorously pursued by international aggressive forces." It hailed as "landmarks" the Asian-African conference with its "Bandung spirit," and the Geneva conference with its "Geneva spirit."

As Peiping had already made clear, however, the "Bandung spirit" and "Geneva spirit" envisaged an American withdrawal from the Taiwan area, not a Chinese Communist renunciation of force in regard to Nationalist-held territory. In mid-January 1956, after three months of discussion with the US at Geneva on the concept of renunciation of force, the Chinese Communists

publicly announced that they "absolutely cannot accept" any formula permitting the United States to defend Taiwan against attack. At the same time, following a Soviet bid for a peace pact with the United States, Chou En-lai called for a "collective peace pact" of all Pacific powers, including the United States.

Summary

By mid-1952, while adhering to the Marxist-Leninist world view, Mao had come to agree with Stalin on the need for new tactics in the global struggle--tactics which would entail what amounted to a change in strategy for the struggle in the Far East. Globally, the new line called for a more conciliatory pose--favoring "peaceful coexistence" and the settlement of existing military conflicts--while attempting to aggravate differences among Western countries and between the West and the remainder of the non-Communist world.

With respect to general war, Mao in the 1952-55 period endorsed Stalin's 1952 view that war was not inevitable and if possible should be avoided. It is uncertain whether Mao genuinely believed in this period that, if a world war were to come, the bloc could win a meaningful victory, although he seems genuinely to have believed that half the world would survive such a war.

The change in strategy for the Asian Communist movement in the 1952-55 period had the aim of influencing and eventually seducing rather than discrediting and soon overthrowing non-Communist governments in the area, and it emphasized political forms of action rather than "armed struggle." Although the Chinese lagged until mid-1952 in endorsing this shift of emphasis, it is not possible to conclude that their endorsement, when it finally came, was insincere. (Mao of course reserved the right to return to his earlier views). The Chinese party cooperated fully in "peaceful settlement" of the Korean war in 1953 and the Indochina conflict in 1954, and its representative took a very conciliatory line at the Asian-African conference at Bandung in 1955.

The Chinese Communists in the 1952-55 period did not alter their insistence on their right to use force if necessary to "liberate" Taiwan--the Far Eastern issue that understandably vexed them most--and their hard line on Taiwan may have given Moscow some concern. With respect to the actual employment of his armed forces, however, Mao returned to conservative principles, taking only undefended and isolated offshore islands and postponing any more ambitious effort.

IV. THE STATURE OF STALIN: Some Divergences, 1956-57

The period from February 1956 to July 1957--from the time of Khrushchev's spectacular attack on the dead Stalin to his purge of the live Molotov and others--is of interest in terms of Soviet and Chinese views on strategy, but perhaps of greater interest in terms of a changing Chinese attitude toward the Soviet party. Whereas Mao Tse-tung in the years 1926-1955 had never publicly challenged any important proposition put forward by the Soviet party, in the period 1956-57 the Chinese party responded to a number of Khrushchev's initiatives by offering only qualified support, or by withholding support, or even by public criticism.

Reassessment of Stalin

In February 1956, at the Soviet 20th party congress, Khrushchev made the central committee report, which was published, and delivered his long reassessment of Stalin, which was not. The terms of his attack on Stalin--later published by the West and not denied to be authentic--are well known and will not be reviewed here. It may be noted, however, that the Chinese party apparently had no knowledge of the imminent attack on Stalin, and was very displeased with it.

In the central committee report, Khrushchev surveyed the international situation and reaffirmed the bloc's policy of steadily developing a broad anti-imperialist front. He observed a "definite relaxation" in tension, a deepening crisis of capitalism, and a "steady strengthening of the national liberation movement." Communist forces, he continued, had been augmented by the emergence of a group of European and Asian states which did not participate in blocs, with the result that there had been formed a vast "peace zone" of Communist and non-Communist states comprising the larger part of the population of the world.

Like Malenkov in 1952, Khrushchev treated the "liberation struggle" in terms of former colonial areas gaining independence, rather than simply in terms of Communist-led "liberation"

movements. He specified the great (Communist) triumph in China and the (non-Communist) triumphs of India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and the Sudan. He went on to cite the "upsurge" of the peoples of Southeast Asia and the "Arab East," the "awakening" of Africa, and gains in Latin America. And again not distinguishing between Communist-led and non - Communist-led struggles for independence, Stalin invoked the "outcome of the wars in Korea, Indochina, and Indonesia" as testimony that the imperialists "are unable...to cope with peoples who are resolutely fighting for a life of freedom and independence."

Apparently in view of the existence of the "peace zone" and the successes of "independence" movements of all kinds, Khrushchev felt able to revise Communist doctrine in two important respects. In the first of these--actually a formalization of a position taken by Stalin in 1952--Khrushchev conceded that the economic causes of wars would remain as long as imperialism exists, but he contended that nevertheless "war is not a fatalistic inevitability."* This was so, he said, because there were "mighty social and political forces /both Communist and non-Communist/ possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war" or to give them a "smashing rebuff" if they attempted to start a war. In his other and more genuine revision, Khrushchev went on to say that Communists in some countries--countries where capitalism was not "strong"--might come to power without "violence and civil war"; i.e., by parliamentary means. In making these revisions, Khrushchev did not say that general war between the bloc and the West was impossible, that wars would not arise among the imperialists themselves, that there would be no more wars in colonial and semicolonial areas, or that civil wars were not to be expected in the principal capitalist states. His emphasis differed, however, from that of Molotov, who observed in a later speech that there would be the danger, so long as "imperialism" existed, of a "new world war, not to mention other military conflicts."

The Chinese party's official People's Daily immediately endorsed Khrushchev's central committee report, describing it as of "profound historical significance." Twice in February the paper expressly endorsed Khrushchev's assertion that a

---

*The context makes clear, as did other speakers, that Khrushchev was referring to world war.

world war was not inevitable, as well as his declaration that the USSR stood for "peaceful coexistence." The paper made no comment, however, on his thesis that Communists might come to power by parliamentary means. Only one Chinese endorsement of this latter thesis was subsequently discovered--a brief and passing comment appearing several months later in a nonparty journal.

There was no further CCP comment on the Soviet 20th party congress until April, although People's Daily on 28 March reprinted the Pravda editorial justifying Khrushchev's attack on Stalin in the secret speech. In April there appeared the first of two long Chinese statements on the question of the stature of Stalin--a statement which marked the beginning of a new and higher stage (as the Communists would say) in the CCP's willingness to criticize Soviet actions and to dispense counsel to all members of the bloc.

The matter for the Chinese was not simply one of Mao's personal regard for Stalin, although this was no doubt a factor; Mao had indeed admired him, as was evident in his March 1953 eulogy, "The Greatest Friendship." The more important thing, as the Chinese clearly saw, was that the extreme denigration of Stalin called into question the fundamental propositions of "socialism" and Communism.

Conceding that Stalin had made "several gross errors," the CCP's April statement described him nevertheless as an "outstanding champion of Marxism-Leninism." It observed further that Stalin's works "will still be studied seriously...especially much of his writing in defense of Leninism and in correctly summarizing Soviet experience in construction...."

Although Stalin's writings in "defense of Leninism" presumably made him a generally correct leader in the struggle against imperialism, the CCP's statement noted one Stalinist formula on the "direction of the main blow" (the defined task of strategy) which was not to be accepted uncritically. Whereas Stalin had held that the main blow should generally be directed toward isolating "middle-of-the-road social and political forces," the Chinese had found in their revolution that the main blow should be directed at the "principal enemy and his isolation." Although the Chinese statement did not discuss this, the Bloc's global strategy at the time (the spring of 1956) had corrected this very mistake of Stalin's; rather than lumping the neutral countries with the enemy, Moscow and Peiping envisaged precisely the ultimate isolation of the principal enemy--the United States--by expansion of the "vast peace zone" of Communist and non-Communist states.

General Agreement on Foreign Policies

As of April 1956, Peiping was continuing to make some small gains with a conciliatory line toward countries outside the bloc. The Chinese Communists by April had established diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, Nepal, and Yugoslavia; they had somewhat improved their relations with Britain, Norway, Denmark, and Switzerland; and they had published with Cambodia a statement subscribing to the "five principles."

In mid-April 1956, celebrating the anniversary of the Bandung conference, People's Daily again surveyed Peiping's generally conciliatory foreign policy and again found it good. The editorial specified Communist China's "increasingly good relations" with India, Burma, and Indonesia, its "marked progress" with Pakistan, the increasing contacts of many kinds with the Arab states, headed by Egypt," the establishment of "sincere friendship" with Cambodia, and "better understanding" with the Japanese "people." And again, lest anyone conclude that the CCP had changed its mind about Taiwan, Peng Chen in his May Day address called for the "liberation of Taiwan,...the further reduction of world tension, and the upholding of peace in Asia and the rest of the world" in that order.

By late summer of 1956 the Chinese Communists had made appreciable gains in the Near East, including recognition by Egypt and Syria and the conclusion of trade agreements with other countries. They had also scored further successes in the Far East, with increased commercial and cultural relations with Japan, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Nepal. Furthermore, they had made a number of commercial and cultural contacts with Latin American states, although none had recognized Peiping.

In September 1956, during the eighth congress of the Chinese Communist party, CCP leaders continued to express satisfaction with the generally moderate Sino-Soviet foreign policies, while leaving room for more aggressive action in promising areas.

Mao Tse-tung himself, in his opening day address to the congress, said inter alia:

> As a result of the unceasing efforts of peace-loving countries and peoples, there has been a trend

> toward relaxation of tension in the international situation.... We must try to establish normal diplomatic relations...with all countries willing to live peacefully with us. We must give active support to the national independence and liberation movement in countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as to the peace movement and righteous struggles in all countries throughout the world.... We must completely frustrate the schemes of the imperialists to create tension and prepare for war.

Liu Shao-chi, in making the political report to the congress, used Khrushchev's tactics of February 1956--discussing the liberation struggle in terms of countries all over the world gaining or seeking "national independence," rather than in terms of "liberation" movements employing armed force. Liu called in general terms for Chinese support of the "struggle against colonialism and for national independence" in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; he did not address himself directly to the question of Far Eastern strategy. Liu and other spokesmen noted that China stood for "peaceful coexistence" with all non-Communist countries, even the United States, but that at the same time it supported the cause of all oppressed nations and sought to annex Taiwan.

Mikoyan spoke for the Soviet party at the Chinese congress. Reaffirming Khrushchev's policy--contrary to Stalin's policy--of encouraging and exploiting any "independence" movements which might weaken the West, Mikoyan remarked that "it is definitely harmful to lump together...all the countries not belonging to the socialist camp and to include them mechanically in the camp of capitalism" (as Stalin had tended to do). He went on to state that Communists must "regard positively" some of the domestic and foreign policies of a number of non-Communist Asian and African governments, and to observe that

> the development of these countries and their policy weakens imperialism, deepens the crisis of the capitalist system, finishes off colonialism as one of the mainstays of this system, and brings nearer the end of capitalism.

Peiping embroidered the line taken by the eighth congress in statements throughout October--for example during the visits of Indonesian President Sukarno, Pakistani Prime Minister Suhrawardy, and Chairman U Nu of the Burmese AFPFL. By the end of October, however, Peiping's attention was largely occupied by developments in the Near East and Eastern Europe.

On 1 November a Chinese Communist statement officially condemned the British and French armed intervention in the Suez crisis, describing it as the "most outrageous and shameless act of aggression in human history." Within a week Peiping's propaganda on developments in Egypt had become a major campaign comparable to the "liberate Taiwan" campaign of 1954. The Chinese line ran parallel to the Soviet one but was stated even more emphatically.

New Chinese Role in Intrabloc Relations

Also on 1 November, Peiping issued a declaration endorsing the Soviet declaration of 30 October which had admitted and promised to correct "mistakes" in intrabloc relations. The Chinese statement went beyond the Soviet self-criticism in criticizing past Soviet policies. At the same time, Peiping introduced the theme that the "highest duty" of Communist states was to maintain their "unity," regardless of past mistakes. This reasoning permitted the Chinese on 4 November to endorse the massive Soviet armed intervention in Hungary; the statement distinguished sharply between developments in Poland, where the government remained Communist and retained its "policy of friendship" with the USSR, and those in Hungary, where the government had become anti-Communist and had announced its intention to leave the bloc.

The Yugoslav-Soviet dispute was renewed hotly, on Yugoslav intiative, in November and December 1956. Tito's charges, essentially, were that the Khrushchev leadership had not appreciably modified the Stalinist internal system and had persisted in a Stalinist course in intrabloc relations. The Chinese stayed away from the controversy through November and most of December, but at the end of December they published another long article, "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," which was and remains the most elaborate statement on intrabloc relations to have come from any bloc party.

The CCP's statement of late December, described as reflecting the discussion at an enlarged meeting of the party's politburo, was remarkable for the assurance with which the Chinese party surveyed the entire bloc scene, organized the bloc's problems, and offered solutions for those problems. Although it is arbitrary to fix definite points at which Mao Tse-tung and his spokesmen passed from pronouncing on China strategy to pronouncing on Far Eastern strategy and from speaking on Far Eastern strategy to originating propositions

on global strategy, the 29 December statement might be regarded as completing the transition from the second stage to the third. As the Chinese leadership said in that statement, the question of putting Stalin in perspective was one of great importance, not only with respect to intrabloc relations but also to "the common struggle of the Communist forces of the world against imperialism. So it is necessary to expound further our views on this question."

Peiping's statement proceeded from the "most fundamental fact--the antagonism between the imperialist bloc of aggression and the world's popular forces." Although "we /Communists/ have consistently" favored peaceful coexistence, "the imperialists are bent on destroying us; we must therefore never forget the stern struggle with the enemy; i.e., the class struggle on a world scale." "Contradictions" /conflicts/ between Communist states and parties were "not basic," as were the "contradictions" between the imperialist camp and the bloc, between imperialism and oppressed nations, between the rulers and the ruled in imperialist states. In other words, as Moscow also had contended, problems in intrabloc relations--admittedly important problems which must be solved--must be subordinated to the common struggle against the West.*

The Chinese statement went on to defend the main lines of Soviet development under Stalin and to describe him as a builder of socialism, a defender of the USSR, a leader of the world Communist movement, and "an implacable foe of imperialism" (a description Peiping was later to use in counterattacking Khrushchev). After a lengthy discussion (irrelevant here) of the means of preserving bloc unity against the West, the statement reaffirmed the policy of creating a broad anti-imperialist front which had been outlined by Soviet leaders in 1952-53, developed in Soviet statements subsequently, and endorsed by the Chinese:

> The socialist countries, the proletariat in the imperialist countries, and the countries striving for national independence--these three forces have bonds of common interest in their struggle against imperialism.... /Despite recent tension/, with the joint struggle of these three forces... plus the concerted efforts of all other peace-loving forces in the world, a new lessening of tension can be achieved....

---

* This was not to say, however, as some Western observers appear to believe, that problems in intrabloc relations will magically disappear if they are declared to represent "contradictions" instead of conflicts.

> Socialist countries are persisting in their efforts for peaceful coexistence with the capitalist countries, to develop diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with them, to settle international disputes through peaceful negotiations, to oppose preparations for a new world war, to expand the peace area in the world and to broaden the scope of application of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

Somewhat less blandly:

> The strengthening of the international solidarity of the proletariat will make the imperialist warmongers think twice before embarking on new adventures. Therefore...the forces of peace will eventually triumph over the forces of war.

And finally:

> The cause of the proletariat will not be thrown back but will make ever more progress. The fate of imperialism is quite different. There, in the imperialist world, fundamental conflicts of interest exist between imperialism and the oppressed nations, among the imperialists themselves, and between the governments and peoples of these imperialist countries. These conflicts will grow more and more acute, and there is no cure for them.

The Chinese Communists were brought to the center of the stage in the first week of January 1957 when Chou En-lai interrupted his tour of seven Asian countries to visit Moscow, Warsaw, and Budapest. In thus inviting the Chinese party to assist in maintaining bloc unity for the continuing struggle with the West, the Soviet party could not reasonably hope that the Chinese thereafter would refrain from stating their views on the strategy for the struggle as well as on the means of maintaining "unity."

Before Chou reached Moscow, Khrushchev at a New Year's Eve party in the Kremlin came a little toward acceding to the Chinese view on the stature of Stalin--a question which, as Peiping had insisted, was central to the question of global strategy. Khrushchev praised Stalin as a "great Marxist" and a "great fighter against imperialism." Khrushchev enlarged on these phrases, without really giving much ground, at a reception for the Chinese Communist delegation on 17 January:

> The term 'Stalinist'...is inseparable from the great title of Communist..; for every Marxist-Leninist the main thing is to defend the interests of the working-class and the cause of socialism, to struggle against the enemies of Marxism-Leninism--/so/ let us hope that every Communist will know how to fight as Stalin did.

Khrushchev on this occasion went on to observe that Communist pronouncements on the inevitability of the downfall of the capitalist system should not be interpreted as an assertion that this will happen "as a result of our using force against it." Khrushchev said rather that capitalism will recede as a result of internal conflicts.

The Sino-Soviet joint statement of 18 January, which followed Sino-Polish and Sino-Hungarian statements, reaffirmed inter alia the global strategy of attempting to unite "all forces in the international area that can be united...in a joint effort and resolute struggle" against the "imperialist aggressive bloc." The USSR and Communist China declared their support for the (anti-Western) "aspirations of the countries and peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America," and the bloc and these countries were to cooperate on the basis of the "five principles of peaceful coexistence." The statement reiterated the Sino-Soviet desire "to establish peaceful coexistence" even with the United States, a desire frustrated by the American wish to prevent an improvement of relations with the USSR and the American "hostile policy" toward Communist China.

Hardening of Chinese Positions

Chou En-lai resumed his Asian tour in the latter part of January and returned to Peiping on 5 February. Speaking shortly thereafter, in phrases reflecting varying degrees of success in his talks with Asian leaders, he claimed "better relations than ever" with Cambodia, noted agreement on "many questions" but not on all with India, reported an "exchange of views" with Burma and "frank talks" with Pakistan, referred to "friendly talks" with Afghanistan and "friendly and sincere" talks with Nepal, and described as "fully satisfactory" his talks with Ceylon. Chou observed that the "five principles" reaffirmed in joint statements on his tour would continue to be "strictly" observed by Peiping. He concluded that the "forces for peace are constantly growing," and that lasting peace could be won by concerted action by the bloc, "nationalist" countries, and all peace-loving peoples.

During the spring of 1957, Mao Tse-tung was largely occupied with his experiment in liberalization, and then, after the experiment blew up, with the antirightist campaign. There were some indications during the spring, however, of the progress of his thinking on larger matters such as the prospects and consequences of general war. On one occasion he expressed the view privately that Soviet strength in nuclear weapons was a solid deterrent to general war initiated by the West, and on another he said that he thought the USSR and the United States were about equally strong in nuclear weapons; he implied in the latter conversation that he regarded over-all Soviet and American military strengths as approximately equal, so that there existed a state of true mutual deterrence.

In roughly this same period there was an increase in the reporting of Chinese Communist private remarks on the consequences of a general war with nuclear weapons. Several Chinese Communist leaders (including military) were said to have stated in conversations with visiting delegations that they calculated that in a nuclear war two or three or four hundred million Chinese might be killed, but that if so, two or three or four hundred million would survive.* The implication of such remarks--that a meaningful victory for China would be possible--need not be accepted at face value, because Chinese leaders have often made ridiculous assertions in private which they were free to disown if published. The statements were nevertheless consistent with Mao's earlier and later remark that half the world would survive a general war, with the tone of Mao's public statements of that time on general war, and with some of Mao's thinking in the succeeding year on the "leap forward" and the commune program.

In June 1957, in the official version of the "contradictions" speech which he made but did not publish in February, Mao discussed the possibility of a "third world war." The Chinese party, he said, must be "against" war but "not afraid of it." He employed (without sourcing) the formula introduced by Malenkov in 1949 and reiterated in 1952: that World War I was followed by the birth of the USSR and World War II by the formation of the bloc, and that a World War III would lead to the collapse of the world capitalist system. In Mao's words: "It is quite likely that the whole structure of imperialism will utterly collapse."

Mao concluded the published version of this speech with a statement of three basic Chinese policies:

*Such remarks have been repeated to visitors in 1960.

> To strengthen our solidarity with the Soviet Union,...with all socialist countries--this is our fundamental policy; then,...we must strengthen and develop our solidarity with the Asian and African countries, and all peace-loving countries and peoples.... As for the imperialist countries, we should also unite with their peoples and strive to coexist in peace with those countries, do business with them, and prevent any possible war, but under no circumstances should we harbor any unrealistic notions about those countries.

The caveat in the final clause was to get increasing emphasis in the 1957-60 period, as Mao's opposition to Soviet policies hardened.

In early July 1957 the Soviet party announced the removal of Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov from the Soviet party leadership. Molotov was accused, inter alia, of having opposed measures "intended to alleviate international tension," of having opposed measures to "improve relations" with Yugoslavia, of having opposed "normalizing relations" with Japan, and of having opposed "fundamental propositions worked out by the party on the possibility of preventing wars under present conditions, on the possibility of differing ways of transition to socialism in different countries, and on the need for strengthening contacts between the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the progressive parties of foreign countries." In other words, Molotov was accused essentially of being an unreconstructed Stalinist.

The action against Molotov put the Chinese party in an awkward position. Mao for many years had appeared to admire Molotov for the same reasons as he had Stalin. Yet in recent years the Chinese party had endorsed some of the propositions and cooperated in all of the policies Molotov was accused of opposing. In the few months before mid-1957, however, the Chinese party had again been changing its course, going at least in the general direction of Molotov, as witness the official version of Mao's "contradictions" speech, which appeared only three weeks before the purge of Molotov--a speech in which Mao took a very hard line toward unorthodoxy both in the bloc and within China.

Mao decided to support Khrushchev's action against the "antiparty group," if for no other reason than that the action was an accomplished fact. In a brief note to the Soviet party

central committee--a note which indicated that the Chinese party had not been informed in advance--the CCP central committee commented only that the action would "help to further the unity and consolidation" of the Soviet party--a remarkably minimal statement. There was no further comment in Chinese Communist media.

Summary

In the period 1956-57, Mao retained the Leninist-Stalinist world view of the two camps and of the conflicts working in the imperialist camp, and he seemed to agree with Khrushchev on a strategy of developing a broad anti-imperialist front, eventually isolating the United States. This was to be done by steadily expanding the "peace zone" of Communist and non-Communist states.

Mao continued in this period to agree with the Soviet position that a general war was not inevitable, but he apparently disliked the emphasis of Khrushchev's concurrent modification of doctrine to allow for the peaceful accession to power of Communist parties in some non-Communist countries. With respect to general war, Mao continued to agree with the Soviet view that general war should be avoided if possible, and he believed that Soviet military strength constituted a solid deterrent. Mao went a bit beyond Soviet positions, however, in asserting that the bloc should not fear a general war, and he may have moved some distance further toward a belief that China specifically could emerge from such a war with a meaningful victory.

With regard to Far Eastern strategy, Mao appeared to remain satisfied with the results of a generally conciliatory bloc policy in the area, although he was clearly aware that the results had been small in the bloc's relations with several Far Eastern countries and he may have been getting more restive about Taiwan. Peiping continued to follow conservative military principles with respect to the use of armed force against Taiwan.

The most important development of the period, in terms of Sino-Soviet relations, was the increasing Chinese willingness to differ publicly with the Soviet party on important matters—the handling of the reassessment of Stalin, the scope of the reassessment, the revision of Stalinist positions, the conduct of intrabloc relations and the rationale of Chinese domestic

policies. The strong Chinese challenge to Soviet authority was yet to develop and was delayed by evidence of Soviet successes in military technology during 1957, but even by mid-1957 it was clear that Khrushchev had something to worry about.

END