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KHRUSHCHEV ON NUCLEAR STRATEGY
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

Khrushchev on Nuclear Strategy

This is a working paper. It is intended as a small contribution to the work of those concerned with evaluating Soviet intentions, and as the first of several papers on problems in the Sino-Soviet military relationship. The conclusions of the paper appear as pages 14 and 15.

The Sino-Soviet Studies Group would welcome comment, addressed to Matthew Gallagher or W. P. Southard, who jointly prepared this paper.

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KHRUSHCHEV ON NUCLEAR STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

The rapid growth of Soviet ICBM capabilities poses critical problems for intelligence. The task, in its broadest terms, is to determine the strategic assumptions underlying the Soviet Union's present military development programs. This paper offers a modest contribution to this end by analyzing statements on war that Khrushchev has made in public speeches and in interviews from spring 1957 through his report to the Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960.

It may be asked why an effort should be made to describe Khrushchev's views when excellent analyses of Soviet military thought already exist, e.g. Raymond L. Garthoff's Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (1958) and his The Soviet Image of Future War (1959). One reason is that the thinking of a political leader like Khrushchev may diverge in some respects from the thinking of his military specialists. Another reason is that there may be a lag of theory behind practice, particularly in a period of rapid technological development. Khrushchev's statements, if for no other reason than that he is the dominant figure of the regime, may provide a useful supplement to the writings of Soviet military specialists.

Khrushchev has a range of choices. The Soviet Union, at one extreme, could adopt a minimum deterrent strategy, freeing its resources for other purposes while relying on its possession of a good retaliatory capability to deter the West from war. At the other extreme, Moscow could adopt a preventive war strategy, building its capabilities for a surprise knockout blow against the United States. The selection made from the spectrum of choices depends on the Soviet estimate of such matters as the balance of power, the consequences of a general war, Western intentions, the costs of achieving various levels of capability, etc.

Khrushchev has spoken directly on some of the matters to be considered in such a Soviet estimate. His genuine beliefs are, of course, difficult to determine, because his statements on war have been calculated for political effect.

Nevertheless, such statements seem to reveal certain assumptions which are of intelligence value. Because other observers may interpret the data differently, a compilation of Khrushchev's principal statements on war since early 1957 is appended.

I. The Balance of Power

Communist doctrine enjoins Khrushchev to keep under study the "relation of forces" in order to avoid "adventurism" (hazardous courses) on the one hand, and "right opportunism" (excessive caution) on the other. His statements in the past three years have expressed a calculation of recent achievement of an approximate balance of forces between the Soviet Union and the United States, with an increasingly confident estimate of the Soviet position in this balance.

In 1957, the year of the Soviet ICBM tests and the first sputniks, some of Khrushchev's statements seemed to imply a calculation of a decisive Soviet advantage. He claimed, for example, that the Soviet Union had "outstripped" the US in the development of the ICBMs and that the ICBM had "solved the question of delivering a hydrogen charge to any point on the globe." He was careful, however, at the same time, to describe the Soviet strategic capability against the American continent as composed not only of ICBMs but of "submarine missiles and other means which now exist," indicating a judgment that the ICBM alone (in whatever level of development it was available to the Soviet Union) did not give a decisive military advantage. Moreover, subsequent statements gave a more modest appraisal of the Soviet military position vis-a-vis the US.

In autumn 1958, in an apparently candid moment, Khrushchev told an American visitor: "We have kept up with you in the arms race. In fact, in some ways I think we are ahead." In the same month, another American who had talked with Khrushchev reported that Khrushchev did not appear to believe that the USSR had broken or was about to break the existing military stalemate with the US.

In spring 1959 Khrushchev again spoke of the balance as being so nearly equal that distinctions were not meaningful. Referring to instruments which measure the resistance of materials, Khrushchev observed that an instrument designed to measure strength in political and military affairs would show that the Bloc and the "imperialist states" were both "sufficiently strong at present."

In his report to the Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960, Khrushchev expressed confidence in the superiority of Soviet military strength. At the same time, he acknowledged that the West could inflict "great calamities" on the USSR in a general war. Further, while asserting a substantial Soviet lead in the development of missiles, he observed that the race is not over and that the West "may sooner or later draw even with us."

In sum, Khrushchev has not claimed a decisive advantage for the Soviet Union -- i.e., such an advantage as would guarantee a Soviet victory in a general war on terms acceptable to a responsible Soviet leader. He does not appear to believe that such an advantage has been achieved.

II. Consequences of a General War

Khrushchev has commented many times in recent years on the question of whether under current conditions a meaningful victory would be possible, for either the USSR or the U. S., in a general war.

His forecasts of the outcome of a military clash with the West have been expressed in striking concepts of destruction. Italy could be knocked out in "two hours," and Turkey in "fifteen minutes"; US bases could be attacked in a "matter of minutes"; West Germany could be destroyed in "ten minutes." Further, "it suffices to press but one button and not only airfields and the means of communications of various (military) headquarters, but whole cities, will be blown sky-high, whole countries can be destroyed."

Khrushchev has emphasized that the American continent would be within the range of action of a future general war, and that the United States would suffer great destruction. "It /the war/ will rage not only in Europe and Asia," he has said, "but with no less fury" in the United States; he pointed out that in such a war "the American people will suffer enormous losses." "It is high time," he declared on another occasion, "for the American strategists to come out of their fool's paradise (in which they believe) that in the event of a military conflict the territory of the United States would remain invulnerable." Most recently, in his 14 January report to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev declared that the USSR "would be able literally to wipe the country or countries which attack us /the Bloc/ off the face of the earth."

Khrushchev has conceded that a new war would be grim for the USSR as well. He admitted to an American journalist in 1957 that the Soviet Union would "suffer great losses" in a future war; on another occasion he spoke of the losses -- "and great ones" -- that the Soviet Union could expect. In his letter to Russell he described nuclear war as "exceptionally dangerous" for the "two" warring states "in terms of direct devastation and destruction of human beings." In his Dnepropetrovsk speech, he said: "We know that if such a war breaks out, great damage will be inflicted on us too, and that we too shall have to make great sacrifices. War does no one any good . . . ." Most recently (14 January) he acknowledged again, that "We, too, would suffer great calamities; "we would have many losses . . . ."

Khrushchev has sometimes qualified his assessment of the consequences of war for the USSR by asserting that Soviet capabilities for survival are superior. In this connection, he has specified that the wide dispersal of population and industry in the USSR gives the USSR a degree of resilience which the US does not have. In making this point in his 14 January report, Khrushchev observed that, despite the "great calamities" and "many losses" which the USSR would suffer in a new war, "yet we would survive," and the West "would suffer incomparably more."

Since autumn 1959, Khrushchev has most often spoken of the consequences of a general war in terms of the terrible results "for mankind" rather than for specific peoples or blocs. He has observed that the number of victims would run into hundreds of millions; that nuclear weapons could strike any point on the globe; that "no country" would be able to escape a "crushing blow"; that a new war would entail the "destruction of all that has been created" in the course of history; and that war "would not spare anybody and would cause mankind unprecedented sacrifices, devastation and suffering. . . . ."

In sum, just as he has spoken of the balance of forces as being so nearly equal that distinctions are not meaningful, Khrushchev has tended to speak of general war as entailing consequences so severe for each participant as to be unacceptable. Even when he has asserted a superior Soviet ability to emerge from a nuclear exchange, he has not indicated willingness to accept losses on this scale.

III. American Intentions

Khrushchev holds the orthodox view that the United States is intransigently hostile to the Soviet Union and that American defensive measures are in fact an expression of this hostility. He has maintained since 1956, however, that general war is not inevitable and indeed that the prospect of war diminishes as the bloc becomes stronger and the West increasingly recognizes that situation.

In spring 1957 Khrushchev denied that he believed the US to be preparing war against the USSR. He repeated this later in 1957, but at the same time he referred to American bases as indicating that the US is "preparing" to strike a blow at the Soviet Union or at least "wants" to do so.

Several times in 1957 Khrushchev noted the possibility of a general war beginning by accident, such as an action by a deranged pilot. He made other such references in 1958; one specified possibility was the accidental dropping of a bomb on some territory (non-Soviet) being overflown by an American plane, which would be taken as a surprise attack and would set off a general war.

In May 1958, while reaffirming that wars are not "fatalistically inevitable," Khrushchev observed that any attempt to change the existing situation by force would require the reinstatement of the doctrine of the "inevitability of war." The implication was that any attempt by the US to split one of the satellites away from the USSR would lead to war.

In autumn 1958 Khrushchev for the first time indicated that he had some appreciation of the constitutional and traditional factors inhibiting the US from initiating war. Khrushchev observed to an American visitor that "the Soviet Union doesn't want war, and under your system the United States can't start a war."

Late in 1958, Khrushchev noted again (as in May 1958) the possibility of war beginning as a result of American miscalculation on a particular disputed issue. He cited, to another American visitor, American statements to the effect that the US would employ military means in Berlin -- statements made apparently in the belief that the USSR would not

retaliate with military means. Khrushchev warned that such a belief was false.

At the twenty-first party congress in January 1959, Khrushchev mentioned a third possibility of inducing a general war -- namely, a faulty estimate by the US of its own capabilities vis-a-vis the USSR. Khrushchev cited "American generals and statesmen" who contend that the American military position is superior because US bases surround the USSR while the Soviet Union has only a few ICBMs.. Khrushchev admonished those who may be tempted "to use this propitious moment for starting a war," and warned of the disastrous consequences" of "strategic plans . . . built on a false premise . . . ."

In the foregoing statement, Khrushchev was concerned with the possibility of an American decision to attack the USSR while American capabilities were relatively high. His reference to unrealistic plans could be projected, however, to cover the possibility of an American attack at a time when the US would know its capabilities to be much inferior but would decide to strike while it still had any capabilities at all.

Just as he had noted in autumn 1958 that the American system inhibited a deliberate recourse to war, so in June 1959 he offered no demurral when another American visitor stated that it should be obvious that the US would "never under any circumstances start a war." On several occasions subsequently in 1959 he conceded, in effect, that it is unlikely that American leaders are contemplating an attack on the Soviet Union.

In his 14 January report, Khrushchev implied at several points that he does not believe that the United States is about to strike the USSR. "It is hard to believe," he said, "that anyone in the United States is not aware of the catastrophic consequences to which a new world war would lead." Further, in discussing the possibility that the West would "draw even" in weapons development, he minimized the possibility that the West would then undertake a surprise attack. He returned in this report to his concept of an attack by "madmen"--a term used this time in a political rather than clinical sense--but he did not suggest that "madmen" now sit in "government, parliament and other responsible posts" in the West.

Khrushchev may genuinely believe in the possibility of a general war arising from an accident, from a miscalculation on a particular issue, or from an American estimate that the time has come to strike while American capabilities are high or exist at all. At least at this time, however, he appears to believe it probable that the United States, calculating the balance of power and the consequences of nuclear war, will refrain from initiating a general war.

IV. Soviet Intentions

Khrushchev, like Stalin, takes the position that the Soviet Union is never the aggressor. His statements on Soviet strategy have invariably assumed a Western attack on the USSR--an attack which, whatever its initial result, would leave the USSR in a strong enough position to win the war. However, some of Khrushchev's statements bear on the possibility that the USSR would actually deliver the first blow, under the concept of "pre-emptive" action. And some of these statements are relevant to a consideration of whether Khrushchev may be tempted to go beyond the "pre-emptive" concept to adopt a strategy of preventive war.

It is apparent that Khrushchev has a very high regard for the ICBM. As early as autumn 1957, Khrushchev was describing the ICBM as the "absolute weapon"--in that it could be launched very rapidly, could be delivered to any point of the globe, and could not be defended against. He has reaffirmed this evaluation on several occasions since that time, adding details. In the same period he has disparaged other weapons, remarking for example that bombers, fighters and surface fleets all are becoming obsolescent.

Khrushchev's 14 January report well illustrated his appreciation of missiles, particularly the ICBM. He observed that "almost the entire military air force is being replaced by rocket equipment," and that, while the submarine fleet "assumes great importance," surface vessels "can no longer play the part they once did." Further, he argued that the new weapons make feasible his proposed reduction of the armed forces--including the ground forces (which is absolute terms will probably bear the largest share of the reduction). He went on to specify that the Soviet armed forces have "combat means and firepower never before possessed" by any armed forces, that these weapons enable the USSR to wipe the attackers "off the face of the earth," that every strategic center in the enemy camp could be attacked in the first minutes of a war, and so on.

Khrushchev appears in his 14 January report to have moved some distance from existing Soviet doctrine--which has held that a new general war would be protracted

and would require the use of very large conventional forces. He does not appear, however, to have committed himself to the contrary propositions that the war would be short and would require only small forces. He noted at one point in his report that the USSR, should it be threatened, could increase "considerably" the size of its armed forces.

Khrushchev implied in his 14 January report that his positions are accepted by Soviet military leaders and specialists. In connection with his proposal for a reduction of the armed forces, he said that "We have studied this question in detail from every angle, consulted with the military and the general staff," and are able to state firmly that "our defense will be fully sufficient." Defense Minister Malinovsky's speech to the Supreme Soviet, later the same day, did in fact give emphatic support to Khrushchev's positions.

Khrushchev seems to believe in the possibility that the Soviet Union could in fact strike the first blow if an enemy attack appeared imminent. This concept has been discussed in Soviet military literature as "pre-emptive" action. The discussions have generally affirmed that the USSR would be able to get in the first blow by virtue of discovering the enemy's preparations to attack. This would mean beating the enemy to the punch, as distinct from absorbing the blow and retaliating.

Khrushchev may have been referring to "pre-emptive" action, conceived rather narrowly, in a May 1959 statement in which he took note of statements about American ability to devastate the USSR with air attacks "in a matter of hours." He observed that the USSR did not depend on aircraft and could launch more devastating attacks in a "matter of minutes from missile bases within the USSR."

In his 14 January report, Khrushchev twice implied the possibility of effective pre-emptive action. He said that the Soviet armed forces have the necessary firepower to deter an enemy attack or to "give him a proper rebuff should he attempt (sic) to attack." Again, in noting the hypothetical possibility of a surprise attack, he implied that surprise would probably not be achieved. His formulation was, "even if one supposes for a moment that it /the attacker/ succeeded in inflicting a surprise attack..."

It is obvious, however, that Khrushchev is not relying on the mere possibility that effective pre-emptive action could be taken. He has consistently held that the Soviet Union, however hard it might be hit, should be able and would be able to retaliate with even greater force.

Khrushchev put this clearly in his 14 January report. Assuming that a surprise blow could in fact be struck, he said, would the attacker "be able to put out of order immediately all the stocks of nuclear weapons, all the rocket installations, on the territory of the power attacked? Certainly not." A large state thus attacked, he went on, would "always be able to give a powerful rebuff to the aggressor." Khrushchev specified that Soviet missile facilities were so sited as "to insure duplication and triplication," so that if some retalitory capabilities were knocked out the USSR could yet "hit the targets from reserve positions."

Khrushchev's apparent position as a dedicated missileman, and as one convinced of the military and technical soundness of his position, might suggest that he would be tempted to go beyond the concept of "pre-emptive" action and to adopt a strategy of preventive war. That is, Khrushchev's assessment of the speed with which an ICBM attack can be launched, of the accuracy with which it can be delivered, and of the enormous damage it can inflict, could conceivably lead him to believe that the advantages of a first strike would be decisive--and consequently, that the USSR should attempt to seize these advantages by preventive war.

Khrushchev's 14 January report argues against this line of thought. His positions (noted above) on the unlikelihood of a successful surprise attack, and on the retaliatory power which would survive an attack, were stated as applying to any large state, not simply the USSR. At another point in his report, he observed that modern methods of waging war do not give "any country" a decisive advantage through surprise attack.

In this connection, if it is argued that Khrushchev's 14 January report does not genuinely represent his views and that he has really adopted a strategy of preventive war, he would be expected to be thinking in terms of a

particular period of time in which to initiate hostilities--a period in which his forces would have overwhelming superiority and the risk of employing them aggressively would be small. On this hypothesis, the concept of "pre-emption" could be used as a planning and training doctrine to cover secret preparations for a preventive strategy. Suitable American intentions could easily be "discovered" at whatever time the USSR was prepared to strike.

However, Khrushchev presumably recognizes that American retaliation to an ICBM attack will become more nearly automatic as the American ICBM system becomes hardened, and hence that surprise attack will tend increasingly to lose its advantages. The practical questions, therefore, are (1) whether Khrushchev foresees a period in the next few years in which the relative Soviet and American capabilities could make feasible a Soviet-initiated general war, and (2), if so, whether Khrushchev is taking steps to exploit the arrival of such a period, beginning his preparations now and concentrating his military and economic resources to that end.

At least one of Khrushchev's interviews seems to bear directly on these questions. In June 1959 Khrushchev told an American visitor that if the Soviet Union were to spend 30 billion rubles on missiles in the next five or six years, it could achieve the capability to destroy every industrial center in the United States and Europe. Khrushchev went on to remark that he was speaking only of the Soviet potential, not of Soviet intentions.

This statement is interesting, on the one hand, as an indication of Khrushchev's possible thinking in terms of a point in time at which his forces could have overwhelming superiority. The statement is of greater interest, on the other hand, as an indication that Khrushchev was not thinking in terms of a Soviet dash toward an early point in time at which Soviet capabilities would be in an optimum position relative to US defensive capabilities.

A similar lack of commitment to a program of maximum military development was reflected in Khrushchev's 14 January report. He said that present Soviet allocations to the military were well below Soviet economic capabilities, and that additional "tens of billions" of rubles could be allocated if international developments were to require that.

CONCLUSIONS

The pattern of strategic thinking which emerges from Khrushchev's statements on war projects a future which is not immediately alarming, but is hardly reassuring, in terms of U.S. security interests.

The central element in Khrushchev's thought appears to be a belief that the USSR and the U.S. hold in roughly equal measure weapons of terrible destructive power. In consequence, he seems to believe that the United States at this time is deterred from initiating general war, and he himself seems to be deterred.

The prospect of a period of military stalemate, in which general war will be unacceptable to either side, is in his view compatible with Soviet interests. He probably believes that Soviet strategy should aim to maintain and reinforce this situation, and that the USSR can effectively exploit this situation by various forms of action short of general war.

In this connection, Khrushchev does not necessarily regard limited war as unlikely in the next few years. Khrushchev's calculation of an approximate balance of power, deterring both sides from general war, describes a situation in which it might be concluded that limited war could be waged with relatively small risks. Soviet armed forces are apparently to retain the capabilities for limited war as well as for general war.

Khrushchev appears to believe in the possibility of effective Soviet "pre-emptive" action against an enemy attack. At present, the danger seems small that American statements and actions will be interpreted by Khrushchev as indicating American intentions which would justify the USSR in striking the first blow under the "pre-emptive" concept. The danger would, of course, increase if Khrushchev were to see signs of American restlessness to employ U.S. nuclear capabilities, or of American distress or desperation over a deteriorating U.S. position.

In any case, Khrushchev clearly does not rely on the possibility of effective "preemptive" action. He intends to maintain a military capability which will enable the

Soviet Union to absorb a heavy blow and to retaliate effectively.

The limited evidence considered in this paper does not permit a judgment as to whether Khrushchev is seriously tempted by a strategy of preventive war. The evidence simply appears, on balance, to give some small support to the view that Khrushchev to date has not adopted such a strategy and is not at this time attempting to achieve the capabilities which would make such a strategy feasible.

APPENDIX

A SELECTION OF KHRUSHCHEV'S STATEMENTS ON WAR, 1957-59

1. CBS Interview, 29 May 1957

(Cutler recalled Khrushchev's recent statement (to Catledge) that the US is unquestionably preparing a war against the USSR and asked for comment.)

(Khrushchev:) That is no opinion of mine. I merely said what your politicians, your generals, your commanders and admirals say. God knows how many speeches are made in your country and all of them try to prove that the US is capable of destroying the Soviet Union in a matter of hours. We, on the contrary, do not indulge in such talk; our politicians do not make speeches showing how we are going to destroy the US.....

(Schorr recalled Marshal Zhukov saying something to that effect.)

(Khrushchev:) Let us recall what Marshal Zhukov said. I think Zhukov did not say that. Why do you not indicate when and where Zhukov said anything like we are going to destroy America? Here is what we said, and I do not deny it: If military and certain political leaders in the US say that they can destroy the Soviet Union, if present-day weapons make it possible to destroy another country, that country which they wish to destroy apparently is also capable of destroying a certain country. We are sure of our strength on this score.....

FBIS Daily Report, 4 June 1957

2. Reston Interview, 7 October 1957

The present period is something like a turning point. Military specialists believe that planes, whether bombers or fighters, are in their decline. Bombers have such speeds and altitudes that they are vulnerable to attack by modern rockets /missiles/. Fighters, on the other hand, now have such a great speed that their use against fighters is becoming

difficult, while against bombers they are also insufficiently effective. Moreover, fighters are manned by people, whom of course we do not want to lose.

I am not implying that all this is true of our contry only. Although the United States does not have the rocket today, you will have it, since science is constantly developing. The same may be said of the Soviet Union: if today we do not have something that you have, we will have it, too.....

NYT, 10 October 1957

3. Toronto Telegram Interview

The producing of intercontinental missles has solved the question of delivering a hydrogen charge to any point of the globe. Distance no longer prevents this. If reference has to be made to the military bases in Europe, Africa, and Asia, then there have been in existence for a long time already missiles which can reach any region of these continents. I think that it is not a secret now that there is an assortment of missiles with which any task of air operations of strategical character can be solved. It is, of course, also no longer a secret that such missiles have now both atomic and hydrogen war-heads.... Is it really possible to presume that military bases are known only to those who set them up? And when the position of these bases is known then, considering present developments in rocket and other technics, these bases can be incapacitated quickly....

Soviet News Bulletin (Canada)
4 November 1957

4. Shapiro Interview, 14 November 1957

German militarists understand that if they were to launch a war now, several hours would be sufficient to crush all the bases in West Germany which are of military importance. Such are realistic conditions. Therefore we think that in the long run it will be possible to bring the most war-like people to their senses. However much they are spoiling for a fight, a straitjacket could be put on them also....

The American people however do not want war and fear it. And not without reason, I believe, for war today is a grim war; and the United States, barring the Civil War and the small campaign against Mexico, still does not know what war

means. If war is not averted, the Americans will experience the most devastating war ever known by mankind. It will rage not only in Europe and Asia but, with no less fury, in the United States.

Some American leaders threaten the Soviet Union, saying that they have encircled our country with military bases. It is true, we are surrounded by American bases. But it should be borne in mind that modern military techniques make it possible to keep all of America's vital centers under fire from submarines and with the help of ballistic missiles, and to blockade the US coast. This means that the United States is now just as vulnerable as any other country....

(Shapiro:) Are military bases losing their importance with the development of rocket weapons?

(Khrushchev:) Unquestionably. Bombers could in their time be stopped by antiaircraft fire, artillery, or rockets, but there is no stopping the intercontinental ballistic missile.

You will say: But will not the Soviet Union suffer too? Of course, we too will suffer great losses. But look at the vast spaces on our map and look at Germany, France, and Britain. One does not have to be a strategist, a military man, to see the difference.

(Shapiro:) America too has vast expanses.

(Khrushchev:) Not quite as vast. And it should be kept in mind that American cities such as New York, Chicago, San Francisco and others have a large concentration of industries. Our industries are more widely dispersed. Moreover, the reorganization of industry that we have carried out insures a more autonomous management of industry, which also is a plus strategically....

The United States has rockets, but not intercontinental ones. For us, the intercontinental ballistic missile is a settled question. If necessary, we can launch any number of sputniks we want. And we will launch them, for there is no technical problem to it. It is merely a matter of placing the necessary equipment in place of the hydrogen charge. We have already developed an

intercontinental ballistic missile with a hydrogen warhead. However, the tests were conducted with blanks. We would like never to have to launch rockets with hydrogen warheads.

(Shapiro:) You said earlier that bombers have been made obsolete by the development of rocket techniques, but our military leaders say that this is not so.

(Khrushchev:) But they cannot say differently. If they admitted that it is so, the American taxpayers would say: You have taken so many billions from us and built bombers. What are you going to do with them? Your military leaders are hard put to it to give up the policy they have pursued thus far with regard to the technical equipment of the army.

(Shapiro:) You believe that the Soviet Union has surpassed the United States not only regarding the intercontinental ballistic missile, but also in the manufacture of rockets in general?

(Khrushchev:) Most assuredly....Our designers have also developed rockets that can, in the event of an attack on our country, dispose of any base in Europe, Asia, and Africa. On the very first try our rocket hit the target....

FBIS Daily Report, 19 November 1957

5. Hearst Interview, 22 November 1957

I also want to tell you, Mr. Hearst, that in the creation of new types of weapons we have outstripped your country. We now possess the absolute weapon, perfect in every respect and created in a short period of time. I am not saying this to intimidate, there is no need for that; I am simply stating a fact! Our scientists, engineers, technicans, and workers have produced the most up-to-date weapon. The Soviet Union possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles. It has missiles of different systems for different purposes; all our missiles can be fitted with atomic and hydrogen warheads. Thus, we have proved our superiority in this question. And if war now breaks out--and it can be unleashed only by the aggressive circles of the United States of America, because other countries will not dare to unleash it--then this will be a great misfortune for the peoples of those countries on whose territories American bases are situated, and from which

the USA is preparing to strike a blow at the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Obviously, the peoples whose governments have, behind the peoples' backs, permitted American military bases to be set up on the territory of their countries, may suffer severely. This is not a threat either. But since the USA has set up military bases and wants to strike blows at the Soviet Union from these bases, we are forced to take protective measures. The American bases are not situated on plots of wasteland, but on densely populated territories, and we hope that the peoples of those countries, where the military bases are situated, will soberly appraise the situation and will understand what military blocs, NATO in the first place, lead to. That is the first point.

The second point is that it should be taken into account that the United States of America has never actually waged war on its own territory and your people do not know what war means. If a war is unleashed now by the aggressive circles of the USA, it will be waged not only in Europe, Asia, or Africa; this war will immediately be carried onto the territory of the United States of America because now the intercontinental ballistic missiles make it possible to hit targets in any area of the globe. In this case, the American people will suffer enormous losses. All means--intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine missiles, and other means which now exist--will be used in case of an armed conflict. You yourself understand that this is the logic of war, the logic of struggle....

Believe me, gentlemen, that we want only peace and friendship. The Soviet Union has intercontinental ballistic missiles with hydrogen warheads. But I have already stated on behalf of our party and the Government of the Soviet Union, on behalf of the Soviet people, and I repeat now, that we shall never launch such a missile against the USA if the USA itself does not compel us to this by beginning a war against us directly or through its satellites. The Soviet Union will never resort to arms first, atomic and hydrogen weapons included, but will keep them to deal any aggressor an appropriate counterblow....

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(Considine interjected: You said that in case of war, American bases, both in the country and abroad, will be demolished by Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. Does this mean that already today they are specially trained on all these targets?)

(Khrushchev continued:) This is a question for the Chief of the General Staff, as it lies outside the scope of my duties. That's what the General Staff exists for, to be ready in case of war to hit those centers which are decisive for the speedy ending of the war, for defeating the enemy.

In connection with this, I would like to express my views with regard to statements made by certain representatives of military circles and published in the press. It was reported that, allegedly, a part of the American bomber force, with hydrogen and atomic bombs, is constantly in the air, and always ready to strike against the Soviet Union. Reports have it that one-half of the planes are in the air.

This is very dangerous. Such a situation serves as an illustration of the extent of the military psychosis in the USA. When planes with hydrogen bombs take off that means that many people will be in the air piloting them. There is always the possibility of a mental blackout when the pilot may take the slightest signal as a signal for action and fly to the target that he had been instructed to fly to. Under such conditions a war may start purely by chance, since retaliatory action would be taken immediately.

Does this not go to show that in such a case a war may start as a result of a sheer misunderstanding or of a derangement in the normal psychic state of a person, which may happen to anybody. Such a horrible possibility must be excluded. It may be that both sides will be against war, and yet war may still start as a result of the military psychosis whipped up in the United States of America....

The fact that the Soviet Union was the first to launch an artificial earth satellite, which within a month was followed by another one, speaks of a lot. If necessary, tomorrow we can launch ten or twenty satellites. All that is required for this is to replace the warheads of an intercontinental ballistic rocket with the necessary instruments, and launch the whole thing with the instruments. There's a satellite for you....

PRAVDA, 29 November 1957

6. Interview with W. Sinnbeck, editor of Dansk Folkstyre, 15 January 1958

The launching of the Soviet sputniks first of all shows the outstanding successes scored by the Soviet Union in the development of science and technology and also that the USSR has outstripped the leading capitalist country, the United States, in the field of scientific and technical progress.

The launching of the sputniks also shows, without doubt, that a serious change has occurred in the balance of forces between the countries of socialism and capitalism in favor of the socialist nations.

FBIS Daily Report, 15 January 1958

7. London Times Interview, 31 January 1958

Now that the Soviet Union is not alone and the mighty socialist camp, embracing almost a billion people, is growing stronger, hopes to destroy the socialist countries by force are illusory. This is out of the question. That is why we maintain powerful armed forces--they serve to cool the ardor of the imperialist madmen.

FBIS Daily Report, 15 February 1958

8. Armed Forces Day Celebration, 23 February 1958

Khrushchev said that the armed forces were being equipped with "the most terrifying weapons of all time. . . such weapons as have never existed before."

NYT, 24 Feburary 1958

9. Second Letter to Russell, 5 March 1958

The Soviet Union, of course, has weapons against these /U.S./ bases. It also has inter-continental ballistic rockets. And although the United States of America lies a considerable way from the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union now possesses the means of fighting against the USA if the latter should unleash war against us. The Soviet Union had these means previously also, in the form of inter-continental bombers, but the ballistic rocket is of course an improved weapon....

You know very well, Lord Russell, that modern armaments, atomic and hydrogen bombs, will be exceptionally dangerous during a time of war not only for the two warring states, in terms of direct devastation and destruction of human beings; they will also be deadly for states wishing to stay aside from the military operations, since the poisoned soil, air, food, etc., would become the source of terrible torments and the slow annihilation of millions of people. There is in the world today an enormous quantity of atom and hydrogen bombs. According to the scientists' calculations, if they were all to be exploded simultaneously, the existence of almost every living thing on earth would be threatened.

Soviet News, London,
21 March 1958



12. Luncheon for Finnish President, May 1958

In order to establish stability in the world and avert a new war, it is necessary to recognize the status quo--that is, the prevailing situation--and not to try to change that situation by force. Otherwise, the inevitability of war will have to be recognized.

FBIS RPB, RS. 18, 25 June 1958

13. Letter to President Eisenhower, 7 September 1958

Does it not seem to you, Mr. President, that such dispatch of warships now in one direction, now in another, loses today much of its sense, at least with respect to countries possessing modern weapons? I do not know what your military advisers tell you, but it seems to us they cannot but know that the heyday of surface navy powers is over. In the age of nuclear and rocket weapons of unprecedented power and rapid action, these once formidable warships are fit, in fact, for nothing but courtesy visits and gun salutes, and can serve as targets for the right types of rockets. This may hurt the pride of the people closely connected with the navy, but these are the incontestable facts one cannot ignore.

FBIS Daily Report,
9 September 1958

14. [redacted] October 1958

Khrushchev asserted that the USSR had no navy nor any submarines in the Black Sea, but yet Soviet missiles "could wipe out Turkey in 15 minutes."

(During the walk he said:) "There are two things you must understand. The Soviet Union doesn't want war, and under your system the United States can't start a war. Isn't it foolish therefore to continue endlessly this cold war?"

"We have kept up with you in the armaments race. In fact, in some ways I think we are ahead."

[redacted]

15. Lippman Interview, 25 October 1958

/Khrushchev's view of the existing military balance of power/ rests...on his confidence that the Soviet Union has mastered the intermediate and short range missiles to a point there it can dominate with them Germany and western Europe, Turkey and Iran. I do not know, of course, whether his confidence in these missiles is justified. But there is no doubt that he assumed their existence in his thinking, and that they have now become, as the saying goes, a principal instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

On the other hand, nothing that he said implied that he thinks the USSR has long range missiles which have broken, or are about to break, the existing military stalemate with the United States. His conception of his military position in relation to the United States is that neither country can defeat the other in a direct conflict, but that the American forward positions, particularly in Germany and Turkey, can, because of the development of the rocket, no longer be defended. He feels, therefore, that American policy rests on an obsolete estimate of the existing balance of power.

New York Herald Tribune,
10 November 1958

16. Remarks at Kremlin Reception, 7 November 1958

Khrushchev said that the Soviet Union could knock Italy out in two hours by using rockets based on Soviet territory, but since this would involve shooting over other peoples' territory, the Soviet Union would establish adequate bases in Albania, if Italy persisted in her present plans.

17. Military Academy Speech, 14 November 1958

Given modern means of destruction, the emergence of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the creation of intercontinental ballistic rockets and winged rockets, and submarines armed with ballistic and winged rockets, of what significance is the fact that the NATO armed forces can now insure the establishment of communications between Paris and Oslo in a few seconds? Now it suffices to press but one button and not only airfields and the means of communications of various headquarters, but whole cities will be blown sky-high, whole countries can be destroyed. Such is the enormous destructive power of modern weapons created by man.

Moscow Radio Broadcast
15 November 1958

18. Humphrey Interview, 1 December 1958

(Regarding Berlin, Khrushchev said:) Some of your military men have made stupid statements lately, statements to the effect that the United States will break through with

tanks if the East German Republic tries to get in the way. The Soviets have tanks, too, lots of them, and I warn you that we will use them. We have rockets, too, and we don't even have to fire them from East Germany. We can send them from the USSR.

/Regarding nuclear weapons, Khrushchev made three points, according to Humphrey: (1) The Soviet Union now has a superabundance of atomic and hydrogen bombs of all sizes and missiles to deliver them anywhere it chooses; (2) The Soviet Union seriously wants an agreement to suspend further tests of nuclear weapons; (3) The Soviet Union has no intention of agreeing to anything that will restrict its ability to deliver surprise attacks/

Humphrey article LIFE
12 January 1959

19. Concluding Speech at Twenty-first Party Congress, 5 February 1959

....American generals and statesmen often say that the United States is in a more favorable position militarily than the Soviet Union, because it has a string of military bases in the territories of European and Asian countries which may be used to strike at our country, whereas the Soviet Union, they say, still has few intercontinental rockets.

For this reason, they assert that war is not really a great menace to the United States. For example, U.S. Defense Secretary McElroy stated the other day that the United States would conduct military operations from the territories of its allies located near the borders of the USSR, while the Soviet Union would have to depend solely on rockets that it can launch from its own territory....

When strategic plans are built on a false premise this can lead to errors holding disastrous consequences for the cause of peace. If a state thinks that at any given moment its adversary lacks the weapon to strike at its territory, the temptation may arise to use this propitious moment for starting a war. If any US statesmen happen to think that today their territory is invulnerable they might arrive at the conclusion that the right time has come for them to start a war, and to pay the price of war with the blood

and lives of Englishmen, Frenchmen, Italians, Germans, Turks, and their other allies, whose territory would in the event of war be laid bare with intermediate and short-range rockets, while the United States would, in the opinion of these myopic military "strategists," be able to safeguard itself from destruction....

I think it is high time for the American strategists to come out of their fool's paradise that in the event of a military conflict the territory of the United States would remain invulnerable. For a long time now this has not accorded with reality, and has been nothing more than wishful thinking on the part of America's generals. In point of fact, the Soviet Union has today the means to deliver a crushing blow to the aggressor at any point of the globe. After all, it is not a mere figure of speech when we say we have organized serial production of inter-continental ballistic rockets. Nor do we say it to threaten anyone, but rather to bring clarity into the existing state of affairs.

PRAVDA, 6 February 1959

20. Remarks at Berlin Airport en route to Leipzig, 4 March 1959

There exist instruments which measure the resistance of materials. If it were possible to invent an instrument which would measure with the same precision, in politics and in military affairs, the resistance of both sides, the socialist camp and the imperialist states, it would show you that both sides are sufficiently strong at present....

We do not want war, and we will do everything to prevent it. But if the Western powers were to start war, its outcome, given modern military technology, would be fatal to them. After all when they say that they have military bases close to our frontiers, it is to be understood that these bases are not located on the moon, but in densely populated areas. And if these bases are close to us, this means that we are close to them.

FBIS Daily Report
5 March 1959

21. Kremlin Press Conference, 19 March 1959

Some exceedingly boastful American generals and admirals say that the US, if it started a war now, would

destroy the USSR in several days. Obviously they are weak in mathematics. Otherwise they might ask themselves the question: and how long would it take to destroy the United States if it unleashed a war? For war is not a one-sided operation; it can turn badly against the side which begins it. It is common knowledge that the other side has no fewer forces and possibilities than those represented by Taylor and Burke.

FBIS Daily Report
20 March 1959

22. Interview with German SPD Editors, 5 May 1959

You may say: But would the Soviet Union suffer no losses in the event of war? Yes, it would have losses, and great ones. But, while we would suffer losses, the Western powers would be literally wiped off the face of the earth.

FBIS Daily Report
11 May 1959

23. Interview with Florida Businessmen, 19 May 1959

Khrushchev said that the USSR had no intention of instigating a war; that for all of the bragging US generals had done about their ability to devastate the USSR with air attacks in a matter of hours, the USSR didn't depend on aircraft, but could launch more devastating attacks in a "matter of minutes from missile bases within the USSR."

When one of our /US/ generals makes an irresponsible statement about how our country could destroy the USSR in a half hour, he /Khrushchev/ is forced to reply in similar vein by indicating that within a few minutes Soviet missiles could destroy our missile bases located in countries that are our allies. He added that when these statements continue to be repeated he may even have to point out that things could be done to the US in a relatively short time. As long as we have our rockets in Allied territory they can be considered as nothing but a threat to the USSR.

He then went on to say that their missiles outdated our bomber force. He stated flatly that there is no defense possible against Soviet missiles. He remarked that the USSR decided several years ago that bombers never would

fly much above 45 thousand feet, nor faster than twice the speed of sound for more than a few minutes, and that therefore, they were easy targets to destroy...."We will never use our missiles first."

[redacted] ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

24. Speech at Writers' Congress, 23 May 1959

We are experiencing an expansive development of science and technology. Our technology changes and our artillery changes. Things happen now as in the song: "The cudgel and the wooden plow have been laid up. The machine is queen in their place." The artillery and air force have been replaced by the rocket, which has already been launched into the cosmos and is a satellite of the sun. You must match the development of technology. Sharpen and improve your weapons, so that you may fire at a longer range and more accurately.

PRAVDA, 24 May 1959

25. Vlore, Albania, Speech, 31 May 1959

The imperialists know our might. To attack us is tantamount to suicide; one would be insane to do so. I do not believe they are as stupid as all that; I believe they are aware of the consequences which the unleashing of a war against the socialist countries may have for them.

FBIS File

26. Harriman Interview, 23 June 1959

(Khrushchev did not object when Harriman stated that it should be obvious that the US would never under any circumstances start a war....)

(Khrushchev:) We developed the hydrogen bomb before the US. We have an intercontinental bomb which you have not. Perhaps this is the crucial symbol of our position....

The West seemed to forget that a few Russian missiles could destroy all of Europe. One bomb was sufficient for Bonn and three to five would knock out France, England, Spain, and Italy. The US had a winged, pilotless plane whose speed was 1,000 kilometers per hour, which was within easy range of Soviet fighters. US missiles, he said, could carry

a warhead of only ten kilograms, whereas Russian missiles could carry 1300 kilograms. Under these circumstances, it was unrealistic to threaten the Soviets..../The weights cited by Khrushchev apparently referred to the US and Soviet earth satellites./

We will put an end to your rights in Berlin. If you want to use force to preserve your rights, you can be sure that we will respond with force. You can start a war if you want, but remember it will be you who are starting it, not we. If you want to perpetuate or prolong your rights, this means war. You recognized West Germany on conditions contrary to those agreed upon during the war.... If you continue to operate from a position of strength, then you must decide for yourselves. We too are strong and we will decide for ourselves.

What good does it do you to have 11,000 troops in Berlin? If it came to war, we would swallow them in one gulp.

"West Germany knows that we could destroy it in ten minutes. If Germany faces the question of whether to exist or not, its decision may be different from that of today." When it was suggested that Moscow and Leningrad were equally susceptible to destruction, Khrushchev retorted that Leningrad is not Russia. Irkutsk and other Siberian cities would remain, but "one bomb is sufficient to destroy Bonn and the Ruhr, and that is all of Germany. Paris is all of France, London is all of England.. You have surrounded us with bases, but our rockets can destroy them. If you start a war, we may die, but the rockets will fly automatically."

Harriman suggested that Soviet decisions with regard to Berlin should not be taken too lightly. Mr. Khrushchev replied that it had all been carefully thought out. "Don't you think otherwise," he said. "Your generals talk of tanks and guns defending your Berlin position. They would burn," he said.

"I am giving you a secret of the General Staff which your military can use in competition in ballistic missiles. I am talking seriously now. If we spend 30 billion rubles on ballistic missiles, in the next 5-6 years, we can destroy

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every industrial center in the US and Europe. Thirty billion rubles is no great sum for us. In the Seven Year Plan, we are spending on power, gas, etc., no less than 125 billion rubles. Yet to destroy all Europe and the US would cost us only 30 billion. We have this possibility. If we save 11 billion in one year, if we overfulfill our plan by 5%, this will give us a savings of 55 billions in five years. Yet we only need 30 billion ....I am talking about potentialities. Of course, we will make some missiles, but we won't use them. We know if you use yours, it would be silly. Who would lose more? Let us keep our rockets loaded and if attacked we will launch them."

"At any time we desire, we can destroy Formosa. I will tell you confidentially, we have given the Chinese rockets which are in the Chinese hinterland but within range of Formosa and can destroy it at will. Your Seventh Fleet will be of no avail. Fleets today are made to be destroyed. If the Chinese decide to take Formosa, we will support them even if it means war."

27. Dnepropetrovsk Speech, 28 July 1959

I further told.../Mr. Nixon/...that if the West German militarists went to war, we could in a few hours by retaliatory action wipe West Germany from the face of the earth, along with the other countries where military bases are located that are aimed against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. We know that if such a war breaks out, great damage will be inflicted on us, too, and that we, too, shall have to bear great sacrifices. War does no one any good...

Comrades, the Central Committee of our party and the Soviet Government believe that a situation has at present been created in which the imperialists will hardly dare to launch a war against our motherland and against the countries of socialism. Our forces and those of our socialist allies are colossal, and in the West, apparently, this is now understood.

FBIS Daily Report
30 July 1959

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28. Letter to Adenauer, 18 August 1959 (released 26 August)

The Federal Republic does not yet possess such an army /a strong army/, but it can create one if it wants to do so, and, as realists, we recognize this. But it should be borne in mind that if the West Germans use all the economic potential and manpower resources of their country for creating the most powerful army in West Europe, even the strength of that army would not be equal to the power of our army and those of our allies...

FBIS file

29. Veshenskaya Meeting, 30 August 1959

Despite all these negative features, we regard the international situation as not being bad at all. Why? Is it not a contradiction? No. Although the dyed-in-the-wool militarists apparently have not yet finally dropped the attempts to "try their luck"--to undertake a military adventure against the socialist countries--it is a fact that every year the number of the advocates of such adventures is diminishing. Even many block-headed imperialists come to realize that acting with military means against the Soviet Union and the socialist countries is a very risky and dangerous business, that it is a double-edged weapon. Some of the fanatical militarists admit that having unleashed war they may perish in its flames.

FBIS Daily Report
1 September 1959

30. National Press Club Speech, 16 September 1959

In the Twentieth Century mankind has already had two world wars, and they claimed more victims than any other war in the past. Now that people have learned to control the energy of the atom, and rockets have been developed capable of covering thousands of kilometers in a matter of minutes, the most advanced planes, warships, and tanks used in World War II look like toys compared with the latest means of warfare. Under these circumstances it would be sheer madness to allow a new world war to come to a head.

FBIS Supplement "Speeches by N. S. Khrushchev during his US visit"

31. UN Speech, 18 September 1959

It is hard to imagine the consequences for mankind of a war in which these monstrous means of destruction and annihilation were used. If it were allowed to start, the number of victims would run not into millions but into tens and even hundreds of millions of human lives. It would be a war in which there would be no difference between the front and the rear, between soldiers and children.

FBIS Supplement, "Speeches by N. S. Khrushchev during his US visit."

32. Los Angeles Speech, 19 September 1959

In the not-so-distant past great spans of land and oceans served as a natural barrier against the extension of armed conflicts, against their leaping from continent to continent. Both World War I and World War II devastated mainly Europe, and some areas of Asia and Africa. The situation is different today. The distances between most remote points on the globe are measured now in mere tens of minutes, and the most devastating means of destruction--nuclear weapons--can be carried to any area of the globe.

FBIS Supplement "Speeches by N. S. Khrushchev during his US visit."

33. Article in Foreign Affairs,

The point is that with military techniques what they are today, there are no inaccessible places in the world. Should a world war break out, no country will be able to shut itself off from a crushing blow...

Is it possible that when mankind has advanced to a plane where it has proved capable of the greatest discoveries...for the establishment of a stable peace... /that it will instead turn to/...the preparation of another war and ...the destruction of all that has been created by its labor over many milleniums?

Foreign Affairs, October 1959

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34. Speech in Peiping, 1 October 1959

The socialist countries...have created mighty potential forces...They have the means to defend themselves from the attacks of imperialist aggressors...But we must think realistically and understand the contemporary situation correctly. This, of course, does not by any means signify that if we are so strong then we must test by force the stability of the capitalist system...

FBIS Daily Report (Far East)
1 October 1959

35. Vladivostok Speech, 6 October 1959

Some time ago a prominent Western statesman declared that Khrushchev is afraid of war and that therefore he will not start it. In a conversation with Mr. Eisenhower, I asked him: "What do you think? Is this statement correct or not? If that public figure says that I fear war, and I would reply that he fears war, to what would this lead? Is this wise? This would resemble two cocks facing each other ready to lay hold and peck each other. What do you think about this question, Mr. President?"...He replied: "I am a military man, and frankly I am very much afraid of war." "You are quite right," I told him. "Only an unreasonable person can be fearless of war in our days."

FBIS Daily Report
8 October 1959

36. Speech to Supreme Soviet, 31 October 1959

At last ever broader circles...begin to understand that a war under the present conditions, with the existence of nuclear and rocket weapons, threatens with unprecedented sacrifices and destruction primarily those countries which would venture to unleash a new world war...

Under the present relationship of forces in the international arena..., nobody can, without losing his sense of reality, propose any other way toward devloping relations among states with different social systems than peaceful coexistence...

In a few minutes the most potent means of destruction... can be transferred to any point on the globe. A new war would not spare anybody and would cause mankind unprecendented sacrifice, devastation, and suffering...

FBIS Daily Report
2 November 1959

37. Report to Supreme Soviet, 14 January 1960

...We are several years ahead of other countries in the creation and mass production of intercontinental ballistic rockets of various types...

It is hard to believe than anyone in the United States is not aware of the catastrophic consequences to which a new world war would lead. Neither millions, nor even billions of dollars can insure the aggressors against being smashed if they unleash a new war...

We have every right to say that never before in the whole of the glorious history of the existence of the Soviet state has the defense of our country been so safely secured against any fortituous incidents and encroachments from outside as at present....

Our state has at its disposal powerful rocket equipment. The military air force and navy have lost their previous importance...This type of armament is not being reduced but replaced. Almost the entire military air force is being replaced by rocket equipment. We have by now sharply cut, and it seems will continue sharply to cut and even discontinue the manufacture of bombers and other obsolete equipment. In the navy, the submarine fleet assumes great importance, while surface ships can no longer play the part they once did. In our country the armed forces have been to a considerable extent transferred to rocket and nuclear arms...

...the arms we now possess are formidable...The arms being designed and, so to speak, in the portfolios of scientists and designers are incredible arms...

The proposed reduction of the armed forces will in no way weaken the firepower of our armed forces, and this is the main point. In fact, the state maintains its army for the very purpose of having the firepower necessary to withstand the likely enemy and to prevent him from attack or give him a proper rebuff should he attempt to attack our country.

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The Soviet Army now has combat means and firepower never before possessed by any army.../I repeat that/ should any madman launch an attack on our state or on other socialist states we would be able literally to wipe the country or countries which attack us off the face of the earth.

Any sober-minded person understands full well that atomic and hydrogen weapons constitute the greatest threat to those countries which have a great density of population. In the event of a new world war all countries would ultimately suffer in one way or another. We too would suffer great calamities; we would have many losses, yet we would survive. Our territory is immense and the population is less concentrated in major industrial centers than in many other countries. The West would suffer incomparably more...

Naturally, impregnability is a rather relative concept. One must not ignore the fact that our opponents will not be marking time. Even though these states do not now have as many rockets as we do, and if their rockets are not as highly developed, they can make good their temporary lagging, improve their rocket technology, and may, sooner or later, draw even with us.

The United States has set itself the task of catching up with the Soviet Union in the production of rockets in five years. They will naturally make every effort to raise their rocketry from the state it is now in and reach a better position. But it would be naive to think that we are meanwhile going to sit with arms folded....

The following question arises:...If the possibility is not excluded that some capitalist countries will draw even with us in the field of modern armaments, will they not, possibly, act perfidiously and attack us first in order to make use of the factor of surprise attack with such a formidable weapon as the rocket atomic weapon and thus have an advantage for achieving victory? No, modern means of waging war do not give any country such advantages. One can be the first to attack; for this one does not need to be particularly clever, one must instead be reckless to do this...

Let us, however, assume that some state or group of states succeeds in preparing and carrying out a surprise attack on a power which has nuclear and rocket weapons. But could the attacking side, even if one supposes for a moment that it succeeded in inflicting a surprise attack, be able to put out of order immediately all the stocks of nuclear weapons, all the rocket installations, on the territory of the power attacked? Certainly not. The state subjected to a sudden attack, if, of course, the state in question is a sufficiently big one, will always be able to give a powerful rebuff to the aggressor. We take into account the fact that foreign military bases are located around our country. That is why we site our rocket facilities in such a way as to insure duplication and triplication... We are creating such a system that if some means earmarked for a retaliatory blow were put out of commission one could always send into action the means duplicating them and hit the targets from reserve positions.

All this is quite sufficient to exercise a sobering influence on any person of normal psychology... But, naturally, one cannot speak for madmen... Like a mother who on leaving home makes sure that no flammable material...falls into the hands of a silly child..., nations ought to take care that government, parliament and other responsible posts for insuring peace are not penetrated by people who have mad and criminal aims..."

/Again with regard to concern lest the reduction in the armed forces endanger the USSR/,...Now if war begins, military operations would proceed differently... War would begin in the heart of the warring countries; moreover there would not be a single capital, not a single major industrial or administrative center, not a single strategic area which would not be subjected to attack, not only during the first days, but during the first minutes of the war...

We are embarking on the reduction of our armed forces not because of any economic or budgetary weakness, but because of our strength and might... And it should be clear to everybody that should a situation arise which would require an increase in expenditure for the maintanance of the army, our budget and our economy

would make it possible to allocate extra tens of billions of rubles for strengthening the security of our motherland. Should the country be threatened with immediate danger of attack, not only should we be able to maintain our armed forces at their present strength but to increase them considerably...

--FBIS Daily Report,
Supplement No. 1, 1960,
14 January 1960