Using Steganography to Improve Hash Functions' Collision Resistance

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Abstract

Lately, hash function security has received increased attention. Especially after the recent attacks that were presented for SHA-1 and MD5, the need for a new and more robust hash function has become imperative. Even though many solutions have been proposed as replacements, the transition to a new function could be costly and complex. In this paper, we introduce a mode of operation that can be applied to any existing or future hash function in order to improve its collision resistance. In particular, we use steganography, the art of hiding a message into another message, to create a scheme, named Σ-Hash, which enforces the security of hashing algorithms. We will demonstrate how, apart from hash function security, Σ-Hash can also be used for securing Open Source code from tampering attacks and other applications.

1. Introduction

Cryptographic hash functions are nowadays an essential part to the majority of cryptographic protocols. A hash function is a process that takes an input of arbitrary size and returns a fixed size output, which is called hash value or message digest. It gives a solution to the "commitment scheme", where Alice has a solution to a problem and she wants to prove that the problem is solved without giving the solution away. In that case, she will hash her solution and send the hash to Bob, who can then generate the same hash if he finds the same solution. Currently, the most commonly used hashing algorithms are MD5 [2] and SHA-1 [1], which are both based on MD4 [3].

Hash functions should have the following cryptographic properties: first, pre-image resistance dictates that given the hash value h, it should be computationally infeasible to find any message m so that $h=hash(m)$. Moreover, a hash function should also be second pre-image resistant, which means that given a message m_1 it should be hard to find a message $m_2 \neq m_1$ so that $hash(m_1)=hash(m_2)$. Finally, collision resistance impairs that it should be hard to find two different messages m_1, m_2 so that $hash(m_1)=hash(m_2)$.

Most popular hash functions, such as MD5 and SHA-1 construct a hash value by applying a variant of the Merkle-Damgård construction [5],[6] to a compression function. According to this scheme, a long message is broken into equal-sized blocks with the final block being padded to the allowable block size. Then, a compression function is operated on the blocks to produce the fixed size hash value. If the compression function is collision-resistant then so will be the hash function [5],[6]. Even though the Merkle-Damgård construction ensures to some point the security of hash functions, it also has some vulnerabilities that can be exploited to attack such algorithms. Examples of such attacks include length extension and herding attacks.

The aforementioned characteristics of hash functions as well as the fact that hashes are relatively easy to compute for any given input, make them a very attractive solution for a number of applications. These include authentication, message integrity and digital signatures. For example, a message can be hashed in order to verify its authenticity. Similarly, files, including executables or even source code, are hashed so that users that download them can also verify their integrity.

Recently, various attacks [12],[13],[14] to these algorithms were presented provoking discussions in order to propose a new, safer hashing algorithm. Apart from the obvious problem of security and collisions

another issue has also emerged: existing applications and cryptographic algorithms should be able to easily migrate to a new possible function, a task that may not be easy. The hash transition problem, as it is referred to, has various aspects which have been examined in [7]. Randomized hashing [8] is a mode of operation that has been proposed for strengthening hash functions. It has been designed mainly for use in digital signatures schemes, without requiring any alterations in the existing algorithms and their implementation. It suggests converting existing hash functions into keyed functions, indexed by a random value.

Lately, especially with the emergence of the open source movement, it is very common for users to download open source programs, compile them locally and then execute them. This has led to a new form of attack, usually called source code tampering, where a malicious user alters the source code or even inserts arbitrary pieces into it. A user downloading such code has no way of knowing if the original source code has been tampered with and of course, cannot be expected to review every single line of code that he downloads. Hash functions provide a means for integrity checking which can mostly detect and correct errors introduced by the network. A malicious user that is able to modify the source code remotely he will as easily be able to also modify its hash value. Such kind of attacks may be countered with the use of digital signature. However, the use of digital signatures brings along all the known issues of public key cryptography: performance and communication overhead, key management issues, not to mention the growing number of identity theft and phishing incidents.

Here, motivated by source code tampering attacks, we introduce a mode of operation for hash functions, inspired by randomized hashing, that uses steganography to enhance collision resistance of current and future hashing algorithms. Steganography is used to hide a secret message into another message. It derives from the combination of the Hellenic words Stegano (sealed) and Graphy (writing) and it means secret writing. Secret information can be embedded into any object that is characterized by redundancy. Thus, various steganographic algorithms have been proposed to hide information in images, sound, video or even plain text. In this paper we use steganographic functions to produce hash values that are more resistant to collisions. This mode of operation, called Σ-Hash (Sigma Hash), can be used in conjunction with any hashing algorithm. Due to the properties of the steganographic algorithms that can be used it is hard for an attacker to produce collisions for Σ-Hash.

The structure of this paper is as follows: in section 2 we briefly examine some of the recent attacks on hash functions. Subsequently we present the basics of steganography. In section 4 the proposed Σ-Hash scheme is presented and analyzed. Finally, we provide some concluding remarks.

2. Attacks to Hash Functions

As we have already mentioned, even though hash functions are carefully designed to satisfy the required security properties, they are still vulnerable to collision attacks. Due to their nature, it will always be possible to find two different inputs that will produce the same output. Using the birthday paradox [16] an attacker can find a collision for a hash function of range r in $r^{1/2}$ operations. This is considered the simplest attacking method, equivalent to a brute force attack. A birthday attack is considered computationally infeasible for modern algorithms as for example 2^{80} operations are required for SHA-1. Moreover, the length extension property of the Merkle-Damgård transformation allows the use of padding in order to create collisions.

Nevertheless, other more efficient techniques have been proposed that can identify collisions in fewer steps. The first attack in SHA-0 was presented by Wang [4] in 1997. Earlier, in 1993 some form of collisions for MD5 had been found [12]. Recently, Wang's team discovered collisions in MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128, and RIPEMD [13], while the authors in [9] presented a technique that can be used to find collisions in SHA-0 with a 2^{51} complexity. An extension of this technique enabled the authors to find collisions in some reduced versions of SHA-1, showing that modern hash algorithms may indeed be vulnerable. Finally, Wang et al showed in [14] that a collision can be found in SHA-1 with 2^{69} computations.

Even though these attacks are only theoretical, they demonstrate that the currently most widely used hash algorithms are indeed vulnerable and eventually, faster and more practical attacks will be discovered. Actually, in the case of MD5, the authors of [15] managed to create two X.509 certificates with different public keys but the same MD5 hash, showing that a practical attack is feasible.

3. Steganography

Steganography dates back thousands of years as it was widely used before any cryptographic system was developed. Herodotus describes one of the first cases of using steganography in the ancient world. Many

similar examples have met the public eye since then, which proves the fact that information hiding in some cases is essential.

Steganography concerns itself with ways of embedding a secret message into a cover object, without altering the properties of the cover object evidently. The embedding procedure is typically related with a key, usually called a stego-key. Without knowledge of this key it will be difficult for a third party to extract the message or even detect its existence. Once the cover object has data embedded in it, it is called a stego object. Thus, for example, we might embed information in a cover-sound giving a stego-sound; or embed information in a cover-image giving a stego-image.

There has been a rapid growth of interest in this subject over the past years. This is due partly to the fact that the entertainment industry has become interested in techniques for hiding encrypted watermarks inside their products (e.g. CDs, DVDs) and partly to various restrictions which governments established regarding cryptography that made people and business study and advance methods of hiding their private information in seemingly innocent cover data. Methods that have been proposed include hiding messages inside unused space in sound, image and video files, TCP/IP headers, between file system gaps and bad sectors, inside executables and "fake spam" emails and even inside white spaces in text or HTML code. In general, any object which demonstrates increased redundancy can be used to hide information. Steganographic techniques can be classified into two main categories: substitution techniques, which involve the substitution of redundant bytes of the cover message and transform domain techniques, which embed information in the transform space of the signal (e.g. in the frequency or spatial domain). Other categories include spread spectrum, distortion as well as statistical techniques [11].

Image steganography usually involves hiding information in the Least Significant Bits (LSB) in the spatial or frequency domain. It exploits human vision in the following way: the eye can only discern about 1 million colors, so in a 24 bit per pixel image, changing the value of the LSB in a pixel or in a DCT coefficient will not cause a discernible difference under regular viewing. Audio steganography works in a similar way as image steganography and exploits human hearing capabilities. Again, data can be hidden into the LSB. Other methods for audio steganography include spreading the signal into the unused frequency spectrum (using Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum), introducing echo into a signal or by using the phase coding method, similar to the echo method and relies on the relative insensitivity of the human ear to phase changes.

Text based steganography uses methods that are similar to those for image and audio steganography. However, in many cases, hidden messages in texts need to be carefully protected since an abnormality in natural language can be easily detected. Techniques with such characteristics include syntactic and semantic manipulation of a given text or aesthetic manipulation, such as the white space method. The later involves adding spaces or tabs at the end of words or lines. This modification only slightly affects text's appearance. For example, the following HTML code can be used to add binary 0 or 1, by adding a space after the keyword "region", as shown. An extra space can represent binary 1 and its absence binary 0.

<region id="Image" width="176" height="144" />
<region id="Image" width="176" height="144" />

Additionally, markup languages, like HTML, can be used to store data. One can store binary values based on the simplicity of such languages as well as the freedom to rearrange tags without changing the displayed page. Programming languages like C or Java have stricter rules and thus less redundancy. However, one could always use steganographic methods that are based on aesthetic changes. For example, white space steganography could be used as most compilers disregard spaces and tabs. Moreover, one could operate steganographic functions on source code comments, or even insert carefully coded comments in order to hide a message.

The amount of data that can be hidden in a cover object is often referred to as embedding capacity. The embedding capacity is directly related with the secrecy of the message. Usually, the distortions in the cover object caused by the steganographic algorithm become more obvious as a user tries to add more hidden data. Evidently, there is a point of balance when the embedded data do not alter the cover object significantly enough to arouse suspicion.

4. The Σ-Hash Scheme

The proposed scheme combines Steganography and hash functions in order to improve the collision resistance of the latter. In this section we will describe in detail the proposed method.

4.1. Hashing

The Σ-Hash scheme involves three steps: hashing, embedding and Σ-Hashing, which corresponds to hashing the stego-object. Let M denote the original

message that will be Σ-Hashed. During the first step M is hashed using any hashing algorithm f_h, to produce the hash value H:

$$f_h(M) = H$$

In the second step we embed the hash value H to M. This can be done by using any known steganographic algorithm f_s. The stego-key for the embedding process will be again the hash value H that was produced in the first step. The output of this step will be a stego-object called M_S as follows:

$$f_s(M, H, H) = M_S$$

By choosing H as a key we eliminate the need for a key exchange and maintenance, as the hash value will be exchanged anyway. Furthermore, the steganographic process ensures that the secret message, in our case the hash value, will be spread across the original message, regardless of its size and without affecting its appearance and functionality. Thus, the original object will remain functional, regardless of the embedded message.

In the third step the stego-object M_S is hashed using any hashing algorithm, possibly the same as in the first step:

$$f_h(M_S) = H_S$$

where H_S is the hash value of the stego-object.

We have now computed two different hash values for seemingly the same object. The first one, H, is the usual hash value, while the second one, H_S, is computed over an alternate version of the original object, which contains a secret message, embedded to it using steganography. The final hash function that will be used is produced by XOR-ing H and H_S:

$$\Sigma\text{-}Hash = H \; XOR \; H_S$$

Σ-Hash is distributed along with the stego-object M_S and can be verified according to the steps described in section 4.2. Figure 1 depicts how this public mode of Σ-Hash functions.



Figure 1. Σ-Hash public mode

Alternatively, a user may choose to keep H private and only publish H_S. In this case:

$$\Sigma\text{-}Hash = H_S$$

This private mode, viewed in Figure 2, can be used from the author of M, to monitor possible attempts for collision attacks, as we describe in section 4.3. In the next section we will present how a Σ-Hash can be verified.

4.2. Verifying

In order to verify the validity of the given hash functions in terms of ensuring that there is no attempt for collision attack, three steps should be followed. Firstly, the given object, M_S is hashed in order to produce H_S' which is then XOR-ed with Σ-Hash:

$$f_h(M_S) = H_S'$$

$$H' = \Sigma\text{-}Hash \; XOR \; H_S'$$

In the case of the private mode there is no need for XOR-ing as H' is already known to be equal to H and kept private.



Figure 2. Σ-Hash private mode

As we mentioned in the previous section H' is used as the key for embedding random data to M. Thus, in order to retrieve H, which is stored as a secret message using steganography, the inverse steganographic function f_s^{-1} is performed, using H' as the stego-key:

$$f_s^{-1}(M_S, H') = H$$

Evidently, H' should be equal with H, otherwise a collision attack has been attempted.

4.3. Attacking Σ-Hash

We consider an attacker that wishes to attack Σ-Hash in terms of collision resistance. Such an attacker would initially have two choices: find a collision for the hash of M or for the hash of M_S. In any case this would mean that M' or M_S' should be found so that:

$$H' = f_h(M') = f_h(M) = H \text{ or}$$

$$H_S' = f_h(M_S') = f_h(M_S) = H_S$$

respectively.

Considering the first choice, an attacker computes M' that produces the same hash value with M. In this case the embedding of H to M' would produce a significantly different stego-object $M_S' \neq M_S$. Robust steganographic algorithms ensure that the hidden data are not embedded into a specific area of the cover object but instead are equally and randomly spread into it. Thus, even slight variations in the contents of the cover object can produce different stego-objects. The hash value of a different stego-object M_S' would be different from H_S and so would be the final *Σ-Hash* value.

We argue here that a steganographic algorithm fed with the same key and secret message but slightly different input should produce alternate outputs. In detail, inputs should different significantly enough to be regarded as two separate objects. For instance we consider two images that only differ in some least significant bits. If we attempt to embed the same information in these images, using the same key and the LSB algorithm, the stego-object will be identical in both cases. However, one could easily regard the two original images as identical. Thus, if significant bits in cover objects are different then steganography will produce different outputs. Especially in text based steganography, where two different cover objects are most likely expected to also vary in length, the stego-object will always be different. This fact also ensures that H_S. will also be different from H since M_S is similarly significantly differ from M.

Similarly, an attacker may choose to find a collision for H_S by carefully choosing a different stego-object M_S' so that: $f_h(M_S') = H_S$. In that case the inverse steganographic operation on M_S' will give off a different secret message than the expected hash value H. As the stego-object will be different from the original one, the steganographic algorithm will fail to provide the original hidden message. Again, even if the stego-object has only slightly been altered, the fundamental properties of steganography ensure that the original hidden message cannot be retrieved.

Evidently, an attacker should be able to overcome the difficulties set by steganography in order to successfully attack Σ-Hash. Efficient steganographic algorithms ensure that alterations to cover-objects result in different stego-objects and alterations to stego-objects make original hidden messages impossible to retrieve. An attacker would have to find a collision for H that also produces the same stego-object M_S, something that is considered hard, having in mind the attacks we described in section 2. It should also be mentioned that it is hard even to extract M from M_S as most steganographic functions are not reversible.

4.4. Applications

Naturally, Σ-Hash can be used to enforce hash function security. Its use can be applied to all known applications of hashing algorithms as long as the verification process is altered to match the one required by Σ-Hash.

As we have already mentioned, Σ-Hash was originally designed as a solution to source code tampering. An attacker able to modify the source code will also be able to modify the hash that will be used to verify its integrity. Thus, an unsuspicious user may download and execute arbitrary code without realising that the original code has been modified. However, if Σ-Hash is used, the attacker will not be able to successfully compute the new *Σ-Hash* value as he does not have knowledge of the cover object. In detail, the attacker can only alter the stego object as M_S is only published. Suppose that he has also found a collision for H_S. When a user will try to verify *Σ-Hash*, he will not be able to extract the correct information from M_S, and thus verification will fail. Similarly, Σ-Hash can be used to prevent phishing attacks. This can be done by using it to verify the hash value of a phishing web page. A phishing site will always be slightly different compared to the original page and thus the secret message, that is H, will not be extracted correctly. In such cases steganography is used as a second layer of verification which is hard to bypass.

5. Remarks

In this paper we introduced Σ-Hash, a novel mode of operation for hashing algorithms that uses steganography to achieve better collision resistance. We presented the details of our scheme, which can be used with any existing or future hash function, and analyzed how collisions are avoided. Practically, steganography makes the process of finding collisions computationally even harder, while the overhead that it produces is relatively small as most steganographic algorithms have small complexity.

Currently we are working on a proof of concept implementation of Σ-Hash that will enable us to experiment with further applications. We have demonstrated that our scheme can be used to avoid source code tampering, or phishing attacks. We intend to present further applications of Σ-Hash, using a real world implementation with commonly used hash algorithms. Finally, we will provide suggestions for specific steganographic algortihms which are optimal for using with Σ-Hash.

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