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Department of the Interior

Departmental Manual

Effective Date: 11/30/99

Series: Law Enforcement and Security

Part 441: Personnel Security and Suitability Requirements

Chapter 5: Adjudication Standards

Originating Office: Office of Managing Risk and Public Safety

441 DM 5

5.1 Basic Criteria. The adjudication criteria are applicable to federal applicants/employees, consultants, contractors, and other individuals who require access to classified national security information and/or assignment to sensitive duties and/or a position of public trust. Persons whose conduct and behavior are such that entrusting them with classified information or assigning them to sensitive duties, or a position of public trust is clearly consistent with the interests of national security or the efficiency of the federal service, include individuals who (a) are loyal to the United States, (b) comply with laws, (c) have demonstrated dependability in accepting and discharging responsibilities, (d) demonstrate good social adjustment and emotional stability, and (e) have the ability to exercise sound judgment in meeting adversity.

The adjudicator is charged with determining whether an individual is loyal, reliable, and trustworthy enough to promote the efficiency of the service and for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties. While reasonable consistency in reaching adjudicative determinations is desirable, the nature and complexities of human behavior preclude the development of a single set of guidelines or policies that are equally applicable in every case. Accordingly, the adjudicative guidelines (441 DM 5, Illustration 1) are not intended to be interpreted as inflexible rules of procedure but require dependence on the adjudicator's sound judgment, mature thinking, and careful analysis. Each case must be weighed on its own merits, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, and prior experience in similar cases.

Each adjudication is to be an overall common sense determination based upon consideration and assessment of all available information, both favorable and unfavorable, with particular emphasis being placed on the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct, the circumstances surrounding the conduct, the frequency of the conduct, the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct, voluntariness of participation, the presence or absence of rehabilitation, the motivation of the conduct, the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress and the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of the conduct.

All background investigations which develop material and significant evidence questioning the subjects loyalty to the United States, as noted in 441 DM 5, Illustration 1, Guideline A, Allegiance to the United States; Guideline B, Foreign Influence; or Guideline C, Foreign Preference; shall be referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by OPM. Similar information developed by the bureau/office shall be forwarded to Office of Managing Risk and Public Safety (MRPS) for submission to the FBI and OPM. The FBI will investigate as necessary and will report the result to OPM who will provide a copy to MRPS.

Under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922, individuals who have ever been convicted of an offense involving domestic violence shall not be considered for a position that requires possession of firearms and/or ammunition.

5.2 Initial Suitability Adjudication. One step in determining a person's suitability for Federal employment under the standard of the efficiency of the service is the referral process which involves (a) review of the person's application and application-related information received or developed by the reviewing office to identify any potentially disqualifying suitability issues, and (b) referral of applications in cases involving potentially disqualifying issues to qualified adjudicators for a determination of the person's employment suitability. This process occurs prior to initiating an investigation. It occurs during (a) the competitive examining process, or (b) initial consideration by a personnel office of an application. In cases of material falsification OPM has the adjudication responsibility. The following chart can be used to assist in the initial adjudication process.

5.3 Suitability Standards. Suitability is the basis for all federal employment. No person shall be employed or retained in a position in the federal service unless there is a reasonable expectation that the employment would promote the efficiency of the service. The process involves an assessment of conduct in terms of its nexus impact, or indicated potential impact, on the person's performance in a specific position, including any indicated risk of abuse of the public trust in carrying out specific duties. Conduct paralleling any of the following factors may be considered disqualifying:

5.4 Additional Considerations. The higher the level of authority and the more responsibilities associated with the position, the more serious the conduct becomes as a potentially disqualifying issue. Generally, offenses committed as a minor are treated as less serious than are the same offenses committed as an adult, unless the offense is very recent, is part of a pattern, or is particularly heinous. A juvenile offender is one who committed an act in violation of a law, regulation, or ordinance before his or her 18^th birthday and the offense for which charged was finally adjudicated in a juvenile court or under a youth offender law. A more flexible standard shall be applied when adjudicating, if the person either: (a) committed an offense prior to the 18^th birthday and the offense was adjudicated in a juvenile court, or (b) up to the age of 26 had a conviction set aside under the Federal Youth Correction Act or similar State authority. Contributing societal conditions can be considered in cases involving relatively minor issues.

5.5 Adverse Suitability Determinations. When proposing an adverse suitability action based on the results of a personnel background investigation, the case shall be referred to the bureau/office servicing personnel office. Unfavorable action can be taken under 5 CFR 731, 5 CFR 752, 5 CFR 315, or any other applicable authority. The applicant, appointee, or employee must be accorded such rights as may be specified therein. Adverse suitability determinations on contract employees shall be referred to the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) for action.

5.6 Security Criteria. In addition to the suitability criteria, the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (441 DM 5, Illustration 1), apply to persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information, and are to be used in all final clearance determinations.

5.7 Agency Authority for Making Security Determinations. Acting under 5 U.S.C. 7532, and E.O. 10450, the bureau/office security officer may suspend an employee without pay before employment is terminated. Under other authorities available to the Department, an employee may be reassigned or detailed temporarily to a Non-Sensitive position, or to a Non-Sensitive position or position with sensitive duties withheld, in which the interests of national security cannot be adversely affected by the employee. In the event of reassignment or detail, if the bureau/security officer decides to initiate removal proceedings against the employee the security officer may do so, as the suspension requirements of the U.S.C. are considered to have been met by the reassignment or detail. However, whether the employee is suspended without pay, or reassigned or detailed temporarily to a Non-Sensitive position, the bureau/office must comply with the procedures in this subchapter before terminating the employee.

5.8 Unfavorable Security Determination Due Process. Bureaus/offices are responsible for ensuring that the records used in making an adjudicative determination are accurate, relevant, timely, and complete to the extent reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual. Bureaus/offices are also responsible for complying with applicable due process requirements, as provided by law, rule, or regulation, when taking an unfavorable action based on information in an investigative file. The investigative file consists of all information pertaining to an individual's eligibility for a security clearance and/or assignment in a sensitive position. Before being rejected or not selected for a sensitive position, the person against whom an unfavorable security determination has been made shall have an opportunity to explain, refute and/or mitigate the actionable information that was used in making the unfavorable determination. Otherwise, persons may be unjustly rejected or not selected because of mistaken identity, unfounded allegations, or because certain mitigating circumstances were not known to the adjudicator.

A. A bureau/office will:

(1) provide the person with a written Statement of Reasons (SOR) for the decision. The bureau/office shall prepare a summary from the investigative file, but will not include information that: (1) is classified (i.e., Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential), even if the subject has a security clearance; (2) would reveal the identity of a source granted confidentiality; (3) is protected sensitive medical information as denoted in 5 CFR 297.205; or (4) is otherwise exempt from release by the Privacy Act;

(2) provide within 30 days, upon request and to the extent the documents would be provided if requested under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 522) or the Privacy Act (3 U.S.C. 552a), as applicable, any documents, records, and reports upon which a denial or revocation is based. If the decision was based on information contained in a background investigation file, the person shall be provided the investigative agency's address in order to request a copy of the investigative file.

(3) provide the person with an opportunity to respond to the SOR, and to request a review of that determination. The written response must be submitted within 45 days from the date the person received and signed for the SOR. (Upon request by the person and approval of the bureau/office security officer, if warranted, up to an additional 30 days may be granted.) If the individual does not respond to the SOR, the person shall be notified that a timely response was not received, and their eligibility for access to classified information or performance of sensitive duties is hereby denied/revoked. The person shall also be informed that the decision is final and is not subject to further appeal.

(4) review the documentation provided by the person and make a final bureau/office determination.

(5) provide the person with a Letter of Decision (LOD) that shall include:

(a) the reasons for the decision;

(b) the identity of the deciding authority;

(c) if the decision is unfavorable, the person shall be informed as to the right to appeal that decision to the Personnel Security Appeals Board (PSAB). The PSAB is a high level panel, appointed by the Assistant Secretary - Policy, Management and Budget, which shall be comprised of at least three members, two of whom shall be selected from outside the security field. The identify of the members of the PSAB shall not be revealed.

(d) the person can appeal within 30 calendar days from the date the person received and signed for the LOD in one of two ways:

(i) by written appeal directly to the PSAB. A written appeal should include any supporting material not already provided substantiating why the LOD should be overturned in addition to any written statement the person wishes to make; or

(ii) by requesting to appear personally before an Administrative Hearing Examiner, designated by the Department, and to present relevant documents, materials, and information. The written results of the appearance and all relevant documentation shall then be sent by the Administrative Hearing Examiner to the PSAB. The expenses of the hearing shall be paid by the bureau or office denying eligibility and/or assignment in a sensitive position.

(e) the address to send the appeal to: Administrator, Personnel Security Appeals Board, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1849 C Street, N.W., MS 7356-MIB, Washington, D.C. 20240; and

(f) that if the person chooses not to appeal to the PSAB the determination made by the bureau/office security officer shall be the final decision and is not subject to further appeal.

B. The Administrative Hearing Examiner will notify the appellant of the time, date and place for the personal appearance, which generally will be held within 30 calendar days after the request. The personal appearance generally will be conducted at or near the appellant's duty station. At the appearance, the appellant will have an opportunity to present oral and documentary information on their own behalf. While the personal appearance is designed so that the appellant can represent themselves, the appellant may obtain legal counsel or other assistance at their own expense to be present at the appearance. Postponement of the personal appearance can be granted only for good cause.

The appellant should be prepared to address all of the security concerns and supporting adverse information. Also, all supporting documents should be organized and readily accessible for presentation to the Administrative Hearing Examiner presiding at the appearance and for use in answering questions. The Administrative Hearing Examiner presiding at the appearance will have already reviewed the investigative file. The appellant should be prepared to articulate the reason or reasons he or she believes that the LOD should be overturned. The hearing provides an opportunity to provide additional information and documentation when appropriate. Simply repeating information which is already part of the record should be avoided. The appellant will not have the opportunity to present or cross-examine witnesses. If the appellant wants the views of others presented, the appellant should obtain these views in writing (e.g., letters of reference, letters from medical authorities, affidavits, etc.) and present the documents to the Administrative Hearing Examiner. During the appearance, the appellant will be allowed to make an oral presentation and submit documentation. The appellant may be asked questions that should be answered clearly, completely, and honestly. The Administrative Hearing Examiner is not there to present the government's security concerns but rather to listen to any explanations that the appellant may have concerning their case.

At the end of the personal appearance, the appellant will be given an opportunity to make a closing statement. The appellant should stress the highlights rather than review the entire case. The appellant should show how the weight of all available information supports overturning the unfavorable personnel security determination. The Administrative Hearing Examiner will review the investigative file, consider the appellants comments and review any additional documentation submitted, and then make a recommendation to the Administrator, PSAB, as to whether the clearance, access, or employment in sensitive duties should be denied, revoked or reinstated. The Administrative Hearing Examiner will provide a written summary or recording of the personal appearance to the Administrator, PSAB.

C. The Administrator, PSAB, will provide the Administrative Hearing Examiner's written summary or recording of the personal appearance and recommendation, along with the appeal documentation to the PSAB. The PSAB will consider the recommendation of the Administrative Hearing Examiner along with the investigative file and render a decision. The decision of the PSAB shall be in writing, and final.

A person who has been determined ineligible for a security clearance and access to classified or sensitive information cannot be reconsidered for a security clearance or assignment of sensitive duties for at least 12 months from the date of the final decision of denial or revocation.

5.9 Continuous Evaluation. Individuals who have been found suitable for federal employment and eligible for access to classified information and/or assignment to sensitive duties must continue to meet the loyalty, reliability and trustworthiness standards while employed by the federal government. Whenever information is developed or received by the bureau/office regarding an employee that indicates access to classified information and/or retention in employment of that individual may not clearly be consistent with the interests of the national security or efficiency of the service, such information shall be evaluated against the adjudication criteria and if necessary, previously adjudicated information shall be re-adjudicated. A security or suitability adjudicative determination shall be made and the result processed as indicated previously in this chapter.

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441 DM 5

Illustration 1

Security Policy Board Issuance 2-97

Adjudicative Guidelines

for Determining Eligibility

for Access to

Classified Information

1. Introduction. The following adjudicative guidelines are established for all United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require access to classified information. They apply to persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information, to include sensitive compartmented information and special access programs and are to be used by government departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations.

2. The Adjudicative Process.

(a) The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines. The adjudicative process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole person concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following factors:

(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;

(2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation;

(3) The frequency and recency of the conduct;

(4) The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;

(5) The voluntariness of participation;

(6) The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes;

(7) The motivation for the conduct;

(8) The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress;

(9) The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

(b) Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final determination remains the responsibility of the specific department or agency. Any doubt as to whether access to classified information is clearly consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of the national security.

(c) The ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuing of eligibility for a security clearance is clearly consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall common sense determination based upon careful consideration of the following, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person, as explained further below:

(1) GUIDELINE A: Allegiance to the United States;

(2) GUIDELINE B: Foreign influence;

(3) GUIDELINE C: Foreign preference;

(4) GUIDELINE D: Sexual behavior;

(5) GUIDELINE E: Personal conduct;

(6) GUIDELINE F: Financial considerations;

(7) GUIDELINE G: Alcohol consumption;

(8) GUIDELINE H: Drug involvement;

(9) GUIDELINE I: Emotional, mental, and personality disorders;

(10) GUIDELINE J: Criminal conduct;

(11) GUIDELINE K: Security violations;

(12) GUIDELINE L: Outside activities;

(13) GUIDELINE M: Misuse of Information Technology Systems.

(d) Although adverse information concerning a single criterion may not be sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the individual may be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or recurring pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally unstable behavior. Notwithstanding, the whole person concept, pursuit of further investigation may be terminated by an appropriate adjudicative agency in the face of reliable, significant, disqualifying, adverse information.

(e) When information of security concern becomes known about an individual who is currently eligible for access to classified information, the adjudicator should consider whether the person:

(1) Voluntarily reported the information;

(2) was truthful and complete in responding to questions;

(3) sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where appropriate;

(4) resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security concern;

(5) has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment;

(6) should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending final adjudication of the information.

(f) If after evaluating information of security concern, the adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to warrant a recommendation of disapproval or revocation of the security clearance, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning that future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of access.

GUIDELINE A

Allegiance to the United States

3. The Concern. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the United States.

4. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

(a) Involvement in any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, sedition, or other act whose aim is to overthrow the Government of the United States or alter the form of government by unconstitutional means;

(b) Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;

(c) Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate the overthrow of the United States Government, or any state or subdivision, by force or violence or by other unconstitutional means;

(d) Involvement in activities which unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.

5. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

(a) The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual or organization and severed ties upon learning of these;

(b) The individual's involvement was only with the lawful or humanitarian aspects of such an organization;

(c) Involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest;

(d) The person has had no recent proscribed involvement or association with such activities;

GUIDELINE B

Foreign Influence

6. The Concern. A security risk may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants, and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.

7. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

(a) An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country;

(b) Sharing living quarters with a persons or persons, regardless of their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign influence or duress exists;

(c) Relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with any foreign government;

(d) Failing to report, where required, associations with foreign nationals;

(e) Unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator or employee of a foreign intelligence service;

(f) Conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government;

(g) Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure;

(h) A substantial financial interest in a country, or in any foreign owned or operated business that could make the individual vulnerable to foreign influence.

8. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

(a) A determination that the immediate family member(s), (spouse, father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and the United States;

(b) Contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official United States Government business;

(c) Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent;

(d) The individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons or organizations from a foreign country;

(e) Foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to affect the individual's security responsibilities.

GUIDELINE C

Foreign Preference

9. The Concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.

10. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

(a) The exercise of dual citizenship;

(b) Possession and/or use of a foreign passport;

(c) Military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country;

(d) Accepting educational, medical, or other benefits, such as retirement and social welfare, from a foreign country;

(e) Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;

(f) Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another country;

(g) Seeking or holding political office in the foreign country;

(h) Voting in foreign elections;

(i) Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.

11. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

(a) Dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a foreign country;

(b) Indicators of possible foreign preference (e.g., foreign military service) occurred before obtaining United States citizenship;

(c) Activity is sanctioned by the United States;

(d) Individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship.

GUIDELINE D

Sexual Behavior

12. The Concern. Sexual behavior is a security concern if it involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or emotional disorder, may subject the individual to coercion, exploitation, or duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion.* Sexual orientation or preference shall not be used as a basis for or as a disqualifying factor in determining a person's eligibility for a security clearance.

* The adjudicator should also consider guidelines pertaining to criminal conduct (Guideline J) and emotional, mental, and personality disorders (Guideline I) in determining how to resolve the security concerns raised by sexual behavior.

13. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

(a) Sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted;

(b) Compulsive or addictive sexual behavior when the person is unable to stop a pattern of self-destructive or high-risk behavior or that which is symptomatic of a personality disorder;

(c) Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duress;

(d) Sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that which reflects lack of discretion or judgment.

14. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

(a) The behavior occurred during or prior to adolescence and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;

(b) The behavior was not recent and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;

(c) There is no other evidence of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotional instability;

(d) The behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or duress.

GUIDELINE E

Personal Conduct

15. The Concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that the person may not properly safeguard classified information. The following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or administrative termination of further processing for clearance eligibility:

(a) Refusal to undergo or cooperate with required security processing, including medical and psychological testing;

(b) Refusal to complete required security forms, releases, or provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of investigators, security officials or other official representatives in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.

16. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying also include:

(a) reliable, unfavorable information provided by associates, employers, coworkers, neighbors, and other acquaintances;

(b) the deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;

(c) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning relevant and material matters to an investigator, security official, competent medical authority, or other official representative in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination;

(d) personal conduct or concealment of information that may increase an individual's vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress, such as engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing or render the person susceptible to blackmail.

(e) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, including violation of any written or recorded agreement made between the individual and the agency;

(f) association with persons involved in criminal activity.

17. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

(a) The information was unsubstantiated or not pertinent to a determination of judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability;

(b) the falsification was an isolated incident, was not recent, and the individual has subsequently provided correct information voluntarily;

(c) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the falsification before being confronted with the facts;

(d) omission of material facts was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel, and the previously omitted information was promptly and fully provided;

(e) the individual has taken positive steps to significantly reduce or eliminate vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress;

(f) a refusal to cooperate was based on advice from legal counsel or other officials that the individual was not required to comply with security processing requirements and, upon being made aware of the requirement, fully and truthfully provided the requested information;

(g) association with persons involved in criminal activities has ceased.

GUIDELINE F

Financial Considerations

18. The Concern. An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Unexplained affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.

19. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

(a) A history of not meeting financial obligations;

(b) deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial breaches of trust;

(c) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;

(d) unexplained affluence;

(e) financial problems that are linked to gambling, drug abuse, alcoholism, or other issues of security concern.

20. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

(a) The behavior was not recent;

(b) it was an isolated incident;

(c) the conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation);

(d) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control;

(e) the affluence resulted from a legal source;

(f) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.

GUIDELINE G

Alcohol Consumption

21. The Concern. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control impulses, and increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information due to carelessness.

22. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

(a) Alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, or other criminal incidents related to alcohol use;

(b) alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job;

(c) diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence;

(d) evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program;

(e) habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment;

(f) consumption of alcohol, subsequent to a diagnosis of alcoholism by a credentialed medical professional and following completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program.

23. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

(a) The alcohol related incidents do not indicate a pattern;

(b) the problem occurred a number of years ago and there is no indication of a recent problem;

(c) positive changes in behavior supportive of sobriety;

(d) following diagnosis of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence, the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient rehabilitation along with aftercare requirements, participates frequently in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar organization, has abstained from alcohol for a period of at least 12 months, and received a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.

GUIDELINE H

Drug Involvement

24. The Concern.

(a) Improper or illegal involvement with drugs raises questions regarding an individual's willingness or ability to protect classified information. Drug abuse or dependence may impair social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

(b) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, and include:

(1) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens),

(2) inhalants and other similar substances.

(c) Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.

25. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

(a) Any drug abuse (see above definition);

(b) illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution;

(c) diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or

psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug dependence;

(d) evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment program;

(e) failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed by a credentialed medical professional. Recent drug involvement, especially following the granting of a security clearance, or an expressed intent not to discontinue use, will almost invariably result in an unfavorable determination.

26. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

(a) The drug involvement was not recent;

(b) the drug involvement was an isolated or aberrational event;

(c) a demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future;

(d) satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program, including rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without a recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical professional.

GUIDELINE I

Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorders

27. The Concern. Emotional, mental, and personality disorders can cause a significant deficit in an individual's psychological, social and occupational functioning. These disorders are of security concern because they may indicate a defect in judgement, reliability, or stability. A credentialed mental health professional (e.g., clinical psychologist or psychiatrist), employed by, acceptable to or approved by the government, should be utilized in evaluating potentially disqualifying and mitigating information fully and properly, and particularly for consultation with the individual's mental health care provider.

28. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

(a) An opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that the individual has a condition or treatment that may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or stability;

(b) information that suggests that an individual has failed to follow appropriate medical advice relating to treatment of a condition, e.g., failure to take prescribed medication;

(c) a pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, anti-social or emotionally unstable behavior;

(d) Information that suggests that the individual's current behavior indicates a defect in his or her judgment or reliability.

29. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

(a) There is no indication of a current problem;

(b) recent opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that an individual's previous emotional, mental, or personality disorder is cured, under control, or in remission and has a low probability of recurrence or exacerbation;

(c) the past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g., one caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has been resolved, and the individual is no longer emotionally unstable.

GUIDELINE J

Criminal Conduct

30. The Concern. A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.

31. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

(a) Allegations or admissions of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged;

(b) a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.

32. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

(a) the criminal behavior was not recent;

(b) the crime was an isolated incident;

(c) the person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are no longer present in that person's life;

(d) the person did not voluntarily commit the act and/or the factors leading to the violation are not likely to recur;

(e) acquittal;

(f) there is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation.

GUIDELINE K

Security Violations

33. The Concern. Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to safeguard classified information.

34. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

(a) unauthorized disclosure of classified information;

(b) violations that are deliberate or multiple or due to negligence.

35. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include actions that:

(a) were inadvertent;

(b) were isolated or infrequent;

(c) were due to improper or inadequate training;

(d) demonstrate a positive attitude towards the discharge of security responsibilities.

GUIDELINE L

Outside Activities

36. The Concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

37. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include: any service, whether compensated, volunteer, or employment with:

(a) foreign country;

(b) foreign national;

(c) a representative of any foreign interest;

(d) any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.

38.Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

(a) Evaluation of the outside employment or activity indicates that it does not pose a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities;

(b) the individual terminates the employment or discontinues the activity upon being notified that it is in conflict with his or her security responsibilities.

GUIDELINE M

Misuse of Information Technology Systems

39. The Concern. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and information. Information Technology Systems include all related equipment used for the communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, and storage of classified or sensitive information.

40. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

(a) Illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology system;

(b) illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation or denial of access to information residing on an information technology system;

(c) removal (or use) of hardware, software, or media from any information technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations;

(d) introduction of hardware, software, or media into any information technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations.

41. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

(a) The misuse was not recent or significant;

(b) the conduct was unintentional or inadvertent;

(c) the introduction or removal of media was authorized;

(d) the misuse was an isolated event;

(e) the misuse was followed by a prompt, good faith effort to correct the situation.

11/30/99 #3290

Replaces 7/17/89 #2864

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