The Guatemala Inquiry

On March 30, 1995, President Clinton directed the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) to conduct a government-wide review of allegations surrounding the 1990 death of U.S. citizen Michael DeVine and the 1992 disappearance of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, a Guatemalan antigovernment guerilla married to a U.S. citizen. The review was in response to charges that a Guatemalan Army officer implicated in these events was a paid informant of the Central Intelligence Agency. The IOB requested that the Offices of Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State investigate the roles and activities of their respective agencies in connection with the events in Guatemala.

In its classified report to the IOB, the Office of the Inspector General made a number of recommendations. The most significant were:

• strengthen Chief of Mission oversight of intelligence activities;
• change procedures and practices to facilitate intelligence information-sharing and improve policy coordination among agencies;
• reissue guidance to Department employees on the handling and dissemination of intelligence information; and
• provide mandatory intelligence briefings for ambassadors-designate prior to departure for post.

In 1996, OIG established an Intelligence Oversight Division to promote these practices through rigorous intelligence oversight reviews in each post management inspection.

Improving Accountability and Reducing Material Weaknesses

Congressional criticism of the Department for management controls weaknesses has been long-standing. Over the past six years, the Department had made a concerted effort to reduce the number of management control weaknesses. OIG partnered with the Department aggressively to address weaknesses identified by OIG and reported in the annual accountability report. For fiscal year 1999, the Department reported closure of material weaknesses in personal property management, worldwide disbursing and cashiering, rehabilitation and maintenance of real property overseas, accounting for the working capital fund, strengthening immigrant and nonimmigrant visa processing, management of major acquisitions, and information management, specifically in the areas of contingency planning, main frame security, and systems modernization. At the end of the 1999 fiscal year reporting period, the number of reported material weaknesses had been reduced from 19 to 4.

Information Technology Management/Security

Rapid advancements in information technology (IT) and heightened interconnectivity through the Internet have revolutionized the way in which the world communicates and conducts business. Recognizing the critical role that security issues played in the IT arena, OIG realigned its resources to focus on emerging information technology issues. OIG audits of the Department's classified and unclassified computer systems identified numerous vulnerabilities that OIG worked with the Department to help correct. OIG security inspections of Western Hemisphere posts in 1997 and 1998 disclosed that five posts had inadequate information security programs and that the information systems security officers were inadequately trained. As a result of OIG findings and recommendations, the Department began offering a training course specifically tailored for information security officers in early 1999.

Beginning in 1998, OIG became an effective partner with the Department to address the management challenge created by the Y2K computer technology problem. In the period leading up to January 1, 2000, OIG worked closely with the Department, foreign governments, and international organization on the Y2K problem. OIG developed best practices and guidance that could be used to address other emerging global information technology management issues, such as computer security, critical infrastructure protection (Presidential Decision Directive PDD-63), Internet governance, and the digital divide. OIG's Y2K best practices and lessons learned report was based on data collection and dozens of meetings with senior executives, project managers, and information technology professionals at a variety of public and private organizations around the globe. (Documents II-2-5)

Sorting Out Chief of Mission (COM)/Commander in Chief (CINC) Security Responsibilities

Since 1996, OIG teams closely monitored the issue of COM/CINC security responsibilities. The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-399) assigned responsibility to the Secretary of State to provide protection of all U.S. Government personnel on official duty abroad (other than personnel under the command of a United States area military commander) and their accompanying dependents. The Departments of State and Defense (DOD) began negotiating a memorandum of understanding to delineate responsibilities pursuant to this after the Accountability Review Board released its report on the Office of Program Manager/Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM/SANG) and al-Kobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996. OIG argued that many military "stovepipe" organizations had not been placed under the protective umbrellas of either a COM or a CINC as required by law and cited that most Chiefs of Mission were concerned about delays and wanted to negotiate their own agreements with CINCs.

In March 1999, OIG issued a summary report, Results of Security Inspections of U.S. Diplomatic Posts in the Bureau of Western Hemishphere Affairs (SIO-I-99-18), of its security inspections of Western Hemisphere posts. OIG recommended that the Department ensure that all posts had country specific implementing agreements signed by the COMs and CINCs and that the Department provide additional guidance to COMs concerning their responsibility for protection of U.S. civilian and military personnel assigned to their jurisdiction.

Effective, Efficient, and Secure Operations and Infrastructures

The August 1998 bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania underscored the vulnerability of U.S. overseas posts and caused the Department and OIG to change their approach to security management and oversight. In the aftermath of the bombings, OIG reviewed previous security inspections and other documents to identify ways to make embassies safer from vehicle bomb attacks.

During the course of this review, it became apparent that a change in embassy bomb procedures could save lives and limit casualties. OIG recommended what became known as the "duck and cover" response and the imminent danger notification signal (IDNS). The recommendation was subsequently included in Admiral Crowe's report by the accountability review board and implemented by the Department.

Prior to the bombings in Africa, the Department generally allocated security resources to overseas posts based on the threat category of the city in which the diplomatic facility was located. The Department used threat information from a variety of intelligence and other sources and published a classified "Composite Threat List." Threats fell into four categories: political violence, human intelligence, technical intelligence, and crime. Threat levels in each of these categories ranged from critical to low. Embassies with a "critical threat" rating were generally allocated more funds for security enhancements than those assigned a "low threat" rating. The bombings caused the Department and the intelligence community to recognize that the threat had changed dramatically and that the allocation of resources based primarily on the use of the composite threat list was inadequate. The Department began to factor in the vulnerability of all posts to terrorist attacks when determining post threat assessments.

Protecting Classified Information

Following several incidents at Main State, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence directed OIG to conduct a review of the effectiveness of Department policies and procedures for protecting classified documents at the Department's headquarters facility. OIG's report, Protecting Classified Documents at State Department Headquarters (SIO/A-99-46), found that the Department had programs in place to evaluate an individual's need to handle classified information, but improvements were required to enhance security awareness and controls to prevent unauthorized access. Highly classified documents relating to intelligence reporting were not safeguarded in accordance with government regulations and significant numbers of uncleared visitors were permitted unescorted access to the Main State headquarters facility. OIG also found that the Department's security incident program was not effective.

As a result of this review, the Department instituted a new escort policy in August 1999. Also, in October 2000 the Department revised and strengthened the Information Security Incident Program.

Beginning in 1997, OIG made 83 formal recommendations for embassies to perform the required emergency training drills. In a May 31, 2000, information memorandum to the Under Secretary for Management, OIG recommended that the Under Secretary remind COMs of their responsibilities to conduct emergency drills. In June 2000, an ALDAC message was issued to all ambassadors and principal officers emphasizing the importance of emergency drills.

Moscow Chancery Oversight

In October 1994, OIG created the Moscow Oversight team to work side-by-side with the Moscow Embassy Building Control Office. The two worked together from the decision to rebuild the Chancery (because bugs placed by Soviet intelligence had compromised the building) through the design and construction of a new, secure chancery facility, which opened May 15, 2000. Department management and congressional leadership commended this innovative oversight for its effectiveness in identifying potential vulnerabilities.

Merger of the Office of Inspector General

On April 26, 1996, President Clinton signed Public Law 104-134, an omnibus appropriations bill, which contained a provision that merged the Office of Inspector General of the United States Information Agency with the Office of Inspector General of the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. As a result, the USIA Office of Inspector General ceased to exist and all personnel were transferred to the Department of State. The entire staff of the former USIA OIG relocated to existing State Department quarters within one working day of the President's signing of the appropriations bill. The merger allowed for broader, more efficient oversight within the U.S. foreign affairs community. OIG refashioned its mission, strategic plan, and organizational structure to handle new oversight responsibilities for public diplomacy and international broadcasting. The merger legislation also provided OIG with new flexibility for inspecting U.S. missions abroad by repealing the requirement to inspect each post or bureau once every 5 years. (Document II-6)

The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for fiscal year 1999 (Public Law 105-277) abolished the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the United States Information Agency and transferred their functions to the Department of State. It also established the Broadcasting Board of Governors as a separate entity within the Executive Branch and authorized the Inspector General of the Department of State to exercise the same authorities with respect to the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the International Broadcasting Bureau.

Anticorruption Outreach

In their efforts to fight government corruption and develop standards of ethical conduct, many countries looked to the United States as a model. At the request of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the Office of the Inspector General in 1997 began a dialogue with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Inspector General led a delegation that included representatives from OIG and the U.S. Office of Government Ethics to Beijing that same year. OIG anticorruption outreach initiatives expanded globally since the initial 1997 exchange with the PRC and by the end of 2000 included South Africa, Namibia, Uganda, Armenia, Hungary, Latvia, Israel, Ukraine, Vietnam, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and the United Nation's Office of Internal Oversight, among others. (Document II-7)

OIG participated in the Vice President's global forum on fighting corruption in February 1999. The Inspector General moderated a panel on Internal Oversight: Prevention, Detection and Investigation. (Document II-8)

In 1998, the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Republic of Chile establishing cooperation between the Inspector General of the Department of State and Chile's General Internal Auditing Advisory Board. The goal was to promote public policies that strengthen government administration and accountability to ensure the proper use of public resources. (Document II-9)

In 2000, the United States and Argentina signed an exchange agreement between the OIG and the Anticorruption Office of the Argentine Republic. OIG was charged with responsibility for providing information about mechanisms to enhance transparency, reinforce the highest standards of conduct and strengthen anticorruption efforts. (Document II-10)

The Anticorruption Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-309) required the United States to assist in improving accountability in foreign countries by supporting the establishment of audit offices, inspector general offices, third party monitoring of government procurement agencies and anticorruption agencies. The law also required the United States to promote responsive, transparent, and accountable legislative oversight and whistleblower protection.

A Regional Policy for Africa

In 1996-1997, the Office of the Inspector General conducted 18 post inspections in Africa. OIG found a need for improved policy coordination in Washington, a better policy coordination between the African posts and Washington, and, of immediate concern, numerous examples of a deteriorating resource base. The top priority policy goals for many of the missions inspected at that time included protection of U.S. citizens, democracy and economic reform, and human rights. These ambitious goals presented a management challenge for these underfunded posts.

In March 1997, the OIG issued an information memorandum making several recommendations which included: 1) revisiting the currency of national security policy for Africa and to improve policy guidance given to African post; 2) providing the posts with appropriate tools to do their jobs; 3) addressing the problems of staffing gaps with more service discipline in the assignments process; 4) providing training for post administrative staff employees; and 5) expanding the client base to maintain essential support services for the African posts.

Export Licensing Controls Reviews

In 1993, OIG joined with the Inspectors General from the Departments of Commerce, Energy, and Defense to conduct a review of the Government's export licensing process. The review detailed a fragmented process for dual-use licensing responsibilities within the Department of State and confusion at overseas posts on responsibilities for end-use checks and verifications, and a lack of program files and documentation. The1993 joint agency report called for the Department of Commerce, in cooperation with the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, to provide a mechanism for resolving criteria for disputes at progressively higher levels and to periodically review the referral criteria.

In August 1998, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs requested an interagency review of the export licensing process for dual-use and munitions commodities by the Inspectors General for the Departments of Defense, Energy, Treasury, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Committee specifically requested that OIG include in its report an assessment of four specific areas of export licensing at the Department of State: 1) reviewing the legislative authorities to determine if any inconsistencies or ambiguities existed; 2) reviewing the licensing process to determine whether it was consistent with national security and foreign policy objectives; 3) evaluating the adequacy of the databases and audit trails in the export licensing process; and 4) assessing the effectiveness of end-use monitoring.

This major undertaking concluded that the export licensing process was working as intended and that the Department consistently executed its export licensing responsibilities in accordance with established policies and procedures. (Document II-11)

The Laser Visa Program

Public Law 104-208 (1996) amended the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (Public Law 82-414) to require that each border crossing identification document include a biometrics identifier (such as a fingerprint or handprint of the alien) that was machine readable. Thus, an alien presenting a border crossing identification card would not be permitted to enter the United States unless the biometrics identifier contained on the card matched the appropriate biometrics characteristic of the alien. The statute stipulated that this technology should be incorporated into any border crossing identification card by September 30, 1999.

The Departments of State and Justice implemented the Border Biometrics (Laser Visa) Program in April 1998. The Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs had responsibility for the adjudication of all Mexican nonresident alien border-crossing documents and INS had responsibility for production of the laser visa cards. The program consolidated all B-1/B-2 nonimmigrant visa adjudications at Embassy Mexico City and constituent posts and consular agencies. This replacement program was projected to replace approximately 5.5 million old border-crossing cards at an estimate of 900,000 per year. OIG conducted an inspection of the program in June 1998. As a result of OIG recommendations in the report on the Inspection of the Border Biometrics (Laser Visa) Program (ISP-I-99-12), Congress extended the timeline for completion of the border-crossing card replacement program to September 30, 2001.

Significant Investigations

• In early 1990 an OIG investigation of a conspiracy to steal fuel oil from Embassy Tokyo disclosed evidence that Foreign Service Nationals and contract employees systematically stole fuel oil from the embassy for resale on the black market. OIG and the Department of Justice's Office of Foreign Litigation aggressively worked to pursue civil action for damages against the thieves. Similar action was initiated against the two maintenance contractors whose negligence in overseeing their contractual duties allowed the scheme to operate undetected for 16 years. OIG worked jointly with the Tokyo Metropolitan Police that resulted in the Tokyo High Court executing a formal adjudication. In separate actions, co-conspirators agreed to provide restitution of approximately $30,500 and $10,500 respectively. OIG also determined that a lack of oversight by embassy maintenance contractors resulted in a loss of approximately $6.4 million. A civil suit filed in the Tokyo District Court sought damages from the contractor as well as individuals involved in the theft scheme. In January 1994, one of the former contractors agreed to a $2 million settlement with the U.S. Government. In April 1998, the second contractor agreed to pay a total of $500,000 in restitution.
   
  
• OIG, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Internal Revenue Service announced a 61-count indictment against two U.S. citizens who were principal officers of Interbank on charges of conspiracy, immigrant and visa fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, filing false tax returns, and bankruptcy fraud on August 11, 2000. From 1997 to 1998 approximately 320 false applications for alien investor visas were filed with the Immigration and Naturalization Service for adjudication. More than $130 million was transferred back and forth through the Bahamas to create fraudulent accounts statements for their clients whom invested $500,000 each. If convicted, the defendants would be required to forfeit $17 million to the U.S. Government.
   
  
• A U.S. Embassy official assigned to Guyana and a Guyanese citizen were arrested in Chicago and Miami and charged with conspiracy to sell U.S. visas in Guyana. Agents of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and OIG Investigators, together with U.S. federal and local law enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice's Public Integrity Section and the U.S.Attorney's Office, executed numerous search warrants over the weekend of March 18, 2000. Authorities seized more than $500,000 in U.S.currency and 10 gold bars from safe deposit boxes controlled by the American embassy employee. Additionally, authorities restrained funds in 12 accounts controlled by the embassy employee at four different financial institutions and seized assets totaling more than $535,000 on March 20, 2000.

Integration of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Over the years the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) suffered a decline in the congressional support it had previously enjoyed. In 1995 Congress unsuccessfully sought to consolidate ACDA and the other foreign affairs agencies into the State Department. By 1997 the Clinton administration decided to merge ACDA and USIA into the State Department and to realign AID more directly with the State Department as part of a broad reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies.

Prior to the integration of ACDA into the Department of State in April 1999, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs was responsible for integrating and prioritizing the full range of international security, nonproliferation, and arms control issues into the Department of State's conduct of foreign policy. The portfolio included directing and coordinating arms control policy; nonproliferation policy (including nuclear, chemical, missile, and conventional weapons proliferation); export control policy; and certain foreign assistance programs. The Under Secretary exercised and after the integration of ACDA continued to exercise various authorities relating to the imposition of proliferation sanctions as required by U.S. law.

Discussions on ACDA's future as part of a broader reorganization of the U.S. foreign affairs agencies (i.e., State, ACDA, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), and the Agency for International Development (AID)) took place at the close of the Bush administration (1992) and at the start of the Clinton administration (1993). By July 1993 the President decided to retain an independent ACDA, and in 1994 Congress endorsed this approach and attempted to strengthen ACDA by amending the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 (ACDA's founding statute).

A major benefit for the administration of the decision was the agreement by the Senate leadership to allow a vote on Senate consent to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Senate consented to ratification on April 24, 1997. Six days earlier on April 18, the White House had announced the President's plan for reorganizing the foreign affairs agencies.

The 1997 negotiations among the ACDA Director, the Secretary of State, the National Security Adviser, and the Office of the Vice President on the merger of ACDA with the Department of State resulted in strengthening the position of the existing Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. The permanent title of Senior Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State for Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament was added to the Under Secretary's title to preserve much of the ACDA Director's statutory relationship with the President and the National Security Council.

In October 1998 Congress passed the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act. This mandated that ACDA be merged into the State Department by April 1, 1999. Although morale in both the Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) and ACDA suffered, the employees continued to perform their own jobs while meeting the constant demands of preparing numerous papers and attending endless meetings in preparation for the merger. The transition itself was a smooth one. ACDA's entire personnel complement was transferred to State as were its four bureaus: Multilateral Affairs (MA), Strategic and Eurasian Affairs (SEA), Intelligence, Verification and Information Management (IVI), and Nonproliferation and Regional Affairs (NP), which were consolidated and transferred to State to create two new bureaus, Arms Control (AC) and Nonproliferation (NP). The first three ACDA bureaus were merged to become the new Bureau of Arms Control. A small number of personnel from State/PM who had worked on similar issues were also transferred to this bureau. The Nonproliferation Bureau was created by merging ACDA's Bureau of Nonproliferation and Regional Affairs with those offices in PM that had nonproliferation responsibilities. The existing State PM Bureau was then refocused to concentrate on defense trade, defense export licensing, security assistance funding and other defense relationship issues (i.e., between State and the Department of Defense and the United States and other nations).

The two new bureaus along with the refocused PM Bureau constituted the State Department's Arms Control and International Security structure until February 1, 2000. On that date, pursuant to the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of November 1999 (a part of the State Department Authorization Bill for FY 2000), a fourth Bureau of Verification and Compliance (VC) was established. VC was created from the AC Bureau out of what had been the components of the former ACDA IVI Bureau. Strong bipartisan support on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from Chairman Jesse Helms and Ranking Minority Member Joseph Biden for a separate component to monitor the verification provisions of arms control agreements and assure compliance with them spurred the creation of this bureau.

As Senior Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State for Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament, the Under Secretary during the Clinton administration attended and participated, at the direction of the President, in National Security Council (NSC) and subordinate meetings pertaining to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament and had the right to communicate, through the Secretary of State, with the President and members of the NSC on these issues. The Under Secretary led the interagency policy process on nonproliferation and managed global U.S. security policy, principally in the areas of nonproliferation, arms control, regional security and defense relations, and arms transfers and security assistance. By delegation from the Secretary, the Under Secretary performed a range of functions under the Foreign Assistance Act, Arms Export Control Act, and related legislation.

Integration of the U.S. Information Agency

The Foreign Affairs and Restructuring Act of 1998

The Foreign Affairs and Restructuring Act abolished the U.S. Information Agency effective October 1, 1999, and transferred all USIA functions, except those given to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), to the Secretary of State. The transfers to the Department included overseas information and cultural programs and functions associated with the Bureau of Information, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Office of Research and Media Reaction, Worldnet interactive dialogues, and appropriate management and administrative support operations. (The Act also abolished the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and transferred its functions to the Department of State effective April 1, 1999.)

Also effective October 1, 1999, the Act established a new entity, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and transferred to the BBG international broadcasting functions associated with USIA's International Broadcasting Bureau, the Voice of America Worldnet Television, Radio and TV Marti, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Asia, but excluding Worldnet interactive dialogues and similar overseas public diplomacy programs.

Other significant provisions of the Act established an Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy; provided that the Secretary of State would have access to BBG satellite facilities; and provided that all former USIA employees would be assigned positions in the State Department with retention of personal grade, salary, and seniority.

The Act required that the administration develop a detailed plan for implementation of the reorganization, with submission to Congress within 60 days. The plan was submitted December 30, 1998, with modification issued March 1999. (Document II-12)

The rationale for the reorganization initiative, announced by the President on April 18, 1997, was that public diplomacy should be at the heart of American foreign policy formulation within the Department of State. The Plan to Congress noted that:

Integrating USIA and bringing public diplomacy insights into play sooner will result in more effective policies that are persuasive to foreign audiences. The infusion of USIA's strategic approach to public diplomacy, open style, close ties with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), technology for open communications, and skillful Internet use will make U.S. foreign policy more agile.

Task Force for Reorganization Planning and Implementation

The Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, with the USIA Reorganization Coordinator, chaired the Task Force for Reorganization Planning and Implementation. Joint working groups were established to resolve major issues such as overseas operations; personnel; technology; space planning; legal issues; security; the role of public diplomacy in regional and functional bureaus; training, budget, and financial coordination; and a series of other issues affecting the integration of the public diplomacy function within the Department in Washington and the field.

An important Task Force goal was to maintain an open and transparent process. An outreach unit established regular communication with employees on the progress of the merger through Web sites, broadcast messages, and town hall meetings with reorganization principals. Representatives of employee unions were active participants.

Other significant Task Force goals included a respect for the Secretary's mandate to "preserve and strengthen" public diplomacy in the Department; establishment of clear public diplomacy program relationships with Department offices and the field; strengthening of technology innovation and Internet capability; establishment of responsive customer service systems; the use of best practices; and equity in the treatment of all employees throughout the crosswalk assignment process.

At the time of the merger, USIA had 6,715 full-time permanent positions. The crosswalk was designed to transfer 1,294 U.S. positions, 652 American positions overseas, and 2,080 Foreign Service National positions to the State Department. The broadcasting entity received 2,689 positions. (See Document II-13)

Creation of an Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs

The reorganization included the creation of a new Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to advise the Secretary on public diplomacy and public affairs and provide policy oversight for the Bureau of Public Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (responsible for exchange and academic and cultural programs), and the Office of International Information Programs (which was accorded Bureau status and made responsible for development and production of information and policy advocacy programs for foreign audiences). The Under Secretary was also delegated authority for advising the Secretary on all facets of public diplomacy resources, including the allocation of those resources to the regional and functional bureaus and the oversight of their use in the bureaus. Evelyn S. Lieberman was sworn in as the first Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs on October 1, 1999.

Integration of the Agency for International Development

The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 also affected the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but to a lesser degree than ACDA and USIA. USAID remained a distinct agency with a separate appropriation. The Administrator of USAID was to be under the direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State. Under the President's direction, the Secretary of State was to coordinate all U.S. development and other economic assistance. As before, USAID continued its foreign assistance programs in the areas crucial to achieving sustainable development and advancing U.S. foreign policy interests: economic growth and agricultural development; population, health, and nutrition; the environment; democracy and governance; education and training; and humanitarian assistance.

The Secretary of State's coordinating activities included 1) approving an overall strategy for foreign assistance and economic cooperation; 2) ensuring program and policy coordination among U.S. government agencies in carrying out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Control Export Act, and other relevant assistance acts; 3) pursuing coordination with other countries and international organizations; and 4) resolving policy, program, and funding disputes among U.S. government agencies. Activities relating to promotion of exports of U.S. goods and services would continue to be primarily the responsibility of the Secretary of Commerce. Coordination activities relating to U.S. participation in international financial institutions and multilateral efforts in the areas of currency stabilization, currency convertibility, debt reduction, and comprehensive economic reform programs continued to be primarily the responsibility of the Secretary of the Treasury.

The Act of 1998 provided that the press office and certain administrative functions of USAID be integrated into the Department of State. The Press Office was integrated into State's Bureau of Public Affairs (PA), which would be responsible for issuing all USAID statements and press releases and for providing media support services. Administrative services and such other areas as training, storage, housing, and security would be shared with State through the International Cooperative Administrative Support Service (ICASS). The Act also abolished the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA), established by Executive Order in 1979 as a coordinating mechanism, but not active in recent years.