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RFF1212
Prior to the September 1957 fire, AEC and Rocky Flats officials had expressed
concerns about the possibility of fires with such pyrophoric metals as plutonium
(also fissionable and poisonous) and the flammable air filters in
plutonium-handling facilities.  Consequently, Building 71, a concrete structure
with minimal combustible material in it, was designed to be fireproof but
contained no automatic sprinklers, water standpipes, or floor drains because of
potential contamination, accountability, and criticality problems.  None of
those features appeared to be necessary when Building 71 personnel coped with a
fire in 1955 and a chemical explosion involving plutonium on June 14, 1957. The
interim alpha-phase plutonium apparatus in Room 180 did use considerable amounts
of flammable Plexiglas in dry box construction because of the difficulty in
fabricating glass enclosures that could be made contamination-tight without
breaking. [9]  For ventilation crucial to plutonium processing, Building 71
employed an exhaust filter plenum, which was a long, concrete-block room
containing 620 two-foot square Chemical Warfare Service filters vertically
mounted in a structural steel framework.  The individual exhaust systems
discharged into the plenum; four exhaust fans connected to the filtered side of
the plenum then directed the air into a common exhaust duct connected to a
concrete tunnel and stack. [10].
9  United States Atomic Energy Commission, "Small Metallic Plutonium Fire Leads
to Major Property Damage Loss," Serious Accidents 130 (November 27,
1957): 3; R. J. Walker, "Air Cleaning Operations at the Rocky Flats Plant,"
Fifth Atomic Energy Commission Air Cleaning Conference Held at the Harvard
Air Cleaning Laboratory, June 24-27, 1957 (Report No. TID-7551).

10  Report of Investigation, 10.



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