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United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General

Report of Inspection

Office of Cuba Broadcasting

Report Number ISP-IB-07-35, June 2007

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KEY JUDGMENTS

- The Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) has significantly improved its broadcasting operations under the strong leadership of the current director and with the support of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB). The director and his experienced and talented senior staff have implemented an organizational realignment that combined the radio and television components of OCB and streamlined its operations. This reorganization has facilitated efforts to improve the quality of broadcasts.
- IBB quality reviews show that radio and television broadcasts have markedly improved over the past two years in production quality and content. Greater emphasis is needed on internal quality control to ensure editorial standards are followed.
- The introduction of new technology allows OCB to broadcast television signals live into Cuba using airborne platforms. These continuously moving aircraft make it significantly more difficult for the Cuban government to jam or disrupt the signal. Indications are that more Cubans are watching Television Marti, broadcast, and OCB has increased the quantity of daily programs.
- The airborne platforms concept was originated by the technical operations staff at OCB. Now operational, this innovative approach has applications for transmitting broadcast signals into other hostile theaters of operation. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) team considers the use of an airborne platform, Aero Marti, to be a Best Practice.
- As Cuba transitions from the Fidel Castro regime, OCB will be challenged to continually produce high-quality programs that meet the informational and entertainment needs of the diverse Cuban populace. What is missing is a long-term strategic plan that anticipates the future needs of the Cuban audience, provides a template on how to compete with commercial broadcasters, and addresses what to do with OCB and its broadcasting facilities if and when uncensored broadcasting is allowed inside a democratic Cuba.

CONTEXT

In 1983, after a three-year bipartisan effort, Congress passed the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act (Public Law 98-111). The year following, OCB was created to direct the operations of Radio Marti and, in 1990, TV Marti was created; both provide Spanish-language news, features, and entertainment programs to Cuba. In addition, OCB has a web site (www.martinoticias.com). The Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act requires Radio Marti to follow Voice of America journalistic standards and guidelines for presenting a variety of news and information in an accurate and objective manner. The station broadcasts 24/7, using medium wave (better known as AM) and shortwave signals.



Office of Cuba Broadcasting facilities

TV Marti programming includes four-and-a-half hours of daily newscasts as well as programs about public affairs, culture, music, sports, and entertainment. The station broadcasts commentary and information about events in Cuba and elsewhere to promote the free flow of information and ideas on the island.

OCB currently has 169 authorized direct-hire positions in FY 2007. Of these, 152 positions are encumbered, and 17 are vacant. In addition, there are about 120 talent contractors. The FY 2007 budget is \$33.6 million, including salaries and benefits of \$17.5 million and general operating expenses of \$16.1 million.

OCB is at a critical juncture in its history. The Presidential Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC) was established in 2004 to identify additional means by which the United States could increase efforts to help the Cuban people bring about an expeditious end to the Fidel Castro dictatorship and regain their freedom. The comprehensive framework is composed of six related tasks to achieve the following:

- Empower Cuban civil society;
- Break the Cuban dictatorship's information blockade;

- Deny resources to the Cuban dictatorship;
- Illuminate the reality of Castro's Cuba;
- Encourage international efforts to support Cuban civil society; and
- Undermine the regime's "succession strategy."

The key element that relates directly to OCB is the strategy to break the regime's information blockade. The Cuban Communist Party controls all mass media and communication on the island. CAFC has thus far published two reports with recommendations in a variety of areas, including broadcasting measures specific to OCB.

On July 31, 2006, the Cuban regime announced that Fidel Castro was stepping aside due to poor health and that his brother Raul would be running the day-to-day operations of the government. While it remains to be seen where Cuba is headed – and numerous credible post-Castro scenarios exist – the departure of Fidel Castro from active leadership itself constitutes a sea-change in Cuban politics. As such, it affords an opportunity for OCB to help shape the transition during the post-Castro era. To respond, OCB has at its disposal a variety of means of transmitting radio, television, and Internet broadcasts.


Figure 1: Radio and TV Marti Transmission Delivery Methods

Medium	Transmission Location	TV/Radio	Hours	Comments
Shortwave	Delano, CA Greenville, NC	Radio	24 hours daily	Ten frequencies
Medium wave	Marathon, FL	Radio, Channel 1180 AM	24 hours daily	100 kilowatts
HISPASAT satellite		Radio and TV	24 hours daily	
Commando Solo C-130 airplane	On-board use of recorded Digital videodiscs	TV, Channel 13	four hours weekly	No live broadcasts
Aero Marti Gulf Stream twin-engine propeller planes	On-board transmissions	TV, Channel 20 (ultra-high frequency)	five hours Monday-Saturday evenings	Possible future uses for very high frequency and FM broadcasting
Radio "Mambi"	South Florida	Radio WAQI, 710 AM	One hour on week nights	Leased time 50 kilowatts
TV Azteca on DirecTV	Miami	TV, Channel 38	Two 30-minute newscasts, weekdays	Leased time
OCB Internet	OCB	Radio and TV	24 hours daily	Includes streaming and on-demand archives

The OIG team's inspection sought to determine whether OCB was effectively managing its resources to meet its current and planned broadcasting mission.

OCB is organized according to the following chart:

Figure 2: OCB Organizational Chart



EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

Since OCB's inception, the organization has been controversial. Interest groups, politicians, and some in the media who favor a more open policy of engagement and free trade with Cuba have opposed OCB's mission and frequently complained about its broadcasts. Critics have faulted the programs as one-sided, sometimes vulgar, and prone to glossing over news that is critical of the U.S. government and Miami's Cuban exile community. The critics also have alleged that the poor quality of broadcast programs, particularly of Television Marti, precludes any chance of realizing the U.S. government's goals of promoting democracy. In any case, the critics pointed out that the broadcast signal was effectively jammed by the Cuban government and thus only reached a miniscule audience at considerable expense.

These criticisms, along with continually negative press, internal disagreements among employees as to OCB's appropriate role, and allegations of ineffectual management, have historically harmed OCB's employee morale. In fact, OIG has several times reviewed OCB operations and noted the presence of internal strife.¹

This was the state of affairs when the President appointed the current director of OCB on April 1, 2003. Over the past four years, the director is widely credited by officials of BBG, IBB, and the Department of State with using his strong leadership and managerial skills to significantly improve OCB operations. The OIG team concurs with this assessment. With the support of the BBG and IBB personnel, the quality of programming has significantly improved. The organization is also more efficient, thanks to a major reorganization that combined Radio and TV Marti's programming and news operations.

Office of Cuba Broadcasting Employee Attitudes About Management Are Generally Positive

The director has been a hands-on manager and an assertive, inspiring leader, much to the benefit of OCB, although this style itself has intimidated some employ-

¹ Previous OIG reports include *Review of the Effectiveness and Implementation of Office of Cuba Broadcasting's New Program Initiatives* (IBO-A-03-01, January 2003); *Review of Office of Cuba Broadcasting's Administrative Practices* (99-IB-023, September 1999); and *Review of Policies and Procedures for Ensuring That Radio Marti Broadcasts Adhere to Applicable Requirements* (USIA-99-IB-010, June 1999).

TECHNICAL AND BROADCAST OPERATIONS

OCB's Technical Operations Directorate and Broadcast Operations Directorate have worked closely to ensure that Radio and TV Marti programs reach Cuba and have the desired impact. Recommendations by CAFC to improve OCB operations have largely been implemented. Aero Marti appears to be succeeding in getting the television broadcast signal into Cuba. Leased airtime on local satellite and cable stations is yet another new transmission strategy whose effectiveness has not yet been established. IBB's Office of Performance Review also says radio and television programs are improving, although there is a need to continually monitor quality. OCB is assisting Cuban dissidents in many ways, and recent audience research indicates that more Cubans are tuning in to the broadcasts. OCB now needs to prepare a long-term strategic plan.

Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Initiatives Generally Have Been Implemented

OCB management has successfully complied with CAFC directed-recommendations. The recommendations and their status are as follows:

- Direct the immediate deployment of the C-130 Commando Solo airborne platform for weekly airborne radio and television transmissions.
Status: Completed.
- Use airborne platforms to overcome Cuba's ability to jam and disrupt Radio and Television Marti broadcasts.
Status: Two Aero Marti aircraft are up and operational.
- Fund the transmission of TV Marti via satellite television into Cuba by the most effective means possible.
Status: Completed.
- Replicate the successes of other U.S. broadcasters in developing a larger Cuban audience by developing nontraditional programs addressed to Cuban youth, women, and Afro-Cubans.
Status: Partially completed; ongoing.
- Provide audiotapes, videotapes, compact discs, and digital video discs to non-governmental organizations for distribution in Cuba.
Status: Partially completed; ongoing.

Aero Marti Is a Big Investment but Appears To Be Paying Off

On October 24, 2006, OCB began using a Gulf Stream One aircraft, a twin-engine propeller plane called Aero Marti, to fly over U.S. waters and transmit TV Marti into Cuba. The first transmission involved a World Series baseball game – which the Castro government chose not to jam. A second Aero Marti plane will soon be operational. There have already been anecdotal indications that increased viewership for TV Marti in Cuba has resulted from the airborne platforms.

OCB had historically found it difficult to transmit its television signal into Cuba due to extensive jamming and signal disruption by the Cuban government. A blimp lofted about 8,000 feet above sea level in the Florida Keys was used to transmit the television signal but was criticized for its lack of effectiveness; severe weather also continuously threatened its operations. The permanent loss of the blimp in a 2005 hurricane set in motion studies designed to find an alternative means of transmitting the signal into Cuba.

In May 2003, OCB experimented with using a specially equipped Department of Defense C-130 aircraft, known as Commando Solo, to augment the blimp. Weekly flights began in August 2004 and continue to this day. However, using a large military cargo aircraft remains prohibitively costly for daily operations.

Aero Marti Is a Best Practice

OCB deserves credit for initiating the Aero Marti concept. Local funds were allocated to study the feasibility of developing a small airplane with the capacity of transmitting the signal, and OCB worked directly with private contractors who developed the technology. Following up on this initiative, CAFC recommended “making available funds to acquire and refit an aircraft for dedicated airborne radio and television transmissions into Cuba.”



Aero Marti in flight

Responding to the need, Congress provided \$10 million for the project, which, under OCB’s leadership, became operational in short order. The project’s contract solicitation was made on March 8, 2006, and Aero Marti took to the air five months later. The annual cost for leasing two Aero Marti planes, including fuel, operation,

and maintenance, is \$5.9 million, a fraction of the expenses incurred when using the C-130 aircraft. More broadly, Aero Marti may have applications in other theaters of operation, particularly where hostile governments attempt to block broadcast signals.

Satellite and Cable Initiatives Were Implemented

In accordance with CAFC recommendations, BBG directed the leasing of airtime on commercial satellite television channels and on commercial AM radio stations in South Florida. Specifically, BBG/IBB leased time on TV Channel 38 in Miami (WPMF, “TV Azteca”), which is carried on DirecTV satellite. At present, Channel 38 carries TV Marti news for 30 minutes in the morning and 30 minutes at night – transmissions that are said to be received in Cuba. (Clandestine use of satellite dishes in Cuba, which number between 30,000 and 50,000, is increasing.) Anecdotal information suggests that Cubans in the United States provide their Cuban relatives with access to DirecTV. The OIG team found that IBB followed the proper procedures in selecting the station.

OCB also followed CAFC’s recommendation, and a BBG mandate, when it leased time on a local AM radio station – Radio Mambi. The goal with new strategies is to reach Cuba or, at least, to have so many different transmissions to Cuba that the island’s government must use increasing resources to fund its jamming. However, the OCB director has doubts about its effectiveness, primarily because the time slot in use is so late (from midnight until 1:00 a.m.). In his view, these funds could be put to better use elsewhere. The Radio Mambi lease will be up for renewal after six months, and a formal review of its efficacy would be prudent at that time.

Because these options would result in the availability of Radio and TV Marti programming in a small geographical area of South Florida, BBG notified members of Congress of the proposed plan before entering into the leases and sought consultations on the possible infringement of the Smith-Mundt Act, which bans domestic dissemination of programs produced for a foreign audience. While some of this programming may spill over onto the viewing area of U.S. audiences, BBG said “these audiences have been considered unintentional or inadvertent and, given the limitations of transmission technology, unavoidable if the Radio and TV Marti are

to achieve their statutory mission.” The transmission would be allowable under the mission-based exceptions of the Radio and TV Marti Act.² The OIG team concurs that the leases were appropriately entered into.

Recommendation 1: The International Broadcasting Bureau should review the Radio Mambi and TV Azteca lease arrangement at the end of the lease period and assess whether they provide additional listeners and viewers and are worth the cost or whether they could be replaced with lease options for other stations. (Action: IBB)

In commenting on the draft report, BBG said that OCB concurred with this recommendation. Although it is difficult to measure audience preferences within Cuba, given that Cuba is a closed society, OCB is making every effort to gauge audience reach and accessibility, using Radio Mambi as a broadcast platform. OCB is also working closely with the IBB Office of Marketing and Program Placement to study other alternatives. OCB, in conjunction with IBB, was scheduled to decide this matter by May 30, 2007.

Quality of Radio and Television Programs Is Improving With an Emphasis on Television

Radio and TV Marti programs are improving. First, BBG mandated a change to all-news programming for Radio Marti. Second, OCB combined the radio and television divisions and then focused on improvements in television. The emphasis on television was particularly on the new transmission options and indications that more Cubans were watching TV Marti. Production quality improved through redesigned newscasts and the use of new anchors, identification of TV Marti throughout the shows, and upgraded sets.

Radio and TV Marti also made additions and improvements in programming to targeted audiences. The first CAFC report stressed the need to “improve U.S. outreach to Cuban civil society.” In particular, it noted that youth, women, and Afro-Cubans constitute “key segments necessary to the continued growth of the Cuban civil society.” Both Radio and TV Marti are creating programming that goes beyond traditional offerings in support of a democratic Cuba to focus on the issues of youth, women, Afro-Cubans, and civil society.

²According to BBG, the Radio Marti Act authorizes the U.S. government to lease time on other-commercial or noncommercial educational AM-band radio broadcasting stations if broadcasts to Cuba on Radio Marti (1180 AM) are subject to jamming or interference that is 25 percent or more than the average daily jamming or interference in the 12 months prior to September 1, 1983.

For example, TV Marti programs for youth include Alto Voltaje and Prensa Libre. The show Voces, produced in conjunction with The Mississippi Consortium for International Development, was created especially for Afro-Cubans. Another show, Mundo Artístico, is a biweekly entertainment magazine that appeals to women. (See Appendix A for the range and schedule of radio news, news programs, and newscasts, and Appendix B for the range and description of Radio TV's shows.)

Office of Cuba Broadcasting Must Remain Diligent About Quality Control

The OCB director believes OCB's success depends on its credibility. Without it, Cubans would have no use for Radio or TV Marti. With it, Radio and TV Marti are uniquely valuable tools for shaping the post-Castro era. Accordingly, the OIG team reviewed IBB and OCB procedures and policies that address programming and production quality. In so doing, the team applied the quality standards for balance, sourcing, and tone provided in OCB's Editorial Guidelines and also drew on the Voice of America Charter, which stipulates that journalists be accurate, objective, and comprehensive. To maintain these standards, OCB uses in-house procedures and IBB performance reviews. The OIG team supports the recommendations calling for adherence to guidelines that were made in recent IBB performance reviews.

According to OCB managers, there are several forms of in-house review and quality control. These include daily news editorial meetings as well as direct supervision by program chiefs and other managers. Radio Marti's writers or broadcasters must get approval of their programming from their supervisor or the editor on duty. A Radio Marti news manager said that the system was stretched and did not always provide the needed degree of review.

IBB's Office of Performance Review continues to make yearly recommendations about standards, with some recommendations having been repeated since 1999. (See Appendix C for a summary of relevant recommendations.) In February 2007, IBB, while recommending some further improvements, noted a major upgrade in TV Marti's adherence to OCB and Voice of America guidelines. Likewise, Radio Marti had improved its quality in recent years. IBB, however, offered recommendations on such topics as refresher training courses for talent and journalists as well as the development of creative ways to coach news stringers in Cuba to bring their on-air delivery up to Radio Marti standards.

Guidelines sometimes are breached; for instance, in one case a talk show host monopolized the conversation while editorializing, leaving little airtime for the guest to speak. IBB recommended that OCB managers and producers meet with program

Office of Cuba Broadcasting Is Assisting Cuban Dissidents in Ways Beyond Traditional Broadcasting

Besides OCB's traditional broadcasting, OCB is engaged in other means of assisting Cubans. As of March 18, 2007, it had facilitated five digital videoconferences with Cuban dissidents, including two attended by members of the OIG team. OCB has also participated in contingency planning sessions with the U.S. Coast Guard's Operation Vigilant Sentry to advise the Coast Guard on how best to frame public service messages for Cuba. OCB has partnered with the Mississippi Consortium to address issues of Afro-Cubans and human rights and has provided nongovernmental organizations with audiotapes, videotapes, compact discs, and digital video discs, in accordance with a CAFC recommendation.

Audience Research Is Inconclusive but More Cubans Are Tuning In

BBG's strategic plan (*Marrying the Mission to the Market*) stresses using audience research to plan appropriate programming for target audiences and align the budget with planning. However, it is exceedingly difficult to conduct audience research in a totalitarian country, where audiences are loathe to discuss media preferences lest they be subject to retaliation. Nonetheless, OCB has received a variety of audience research data on the reception, quality, and impact in Cuba of Radio and TV Marti. BBG's research contractor, InterMedia, and its subcontractor for OCB, Casals and Associate, provide yearly listening statistics and results from focus groups and listening panels.³

In January 2007, OCB received the results of a survey of recent Cuban arrivals that was commissioned by Spanish Radio Productions with the cooperation of Miami Dade College. This survey found listening rates within Cuba were significantly higher than previously reported, especially for TV Marti. These positive results are also reflected in a February 2007 survey by the United States Interests Section in Havana. The director of OCB considers it significant that the most recent surveys showing higher television viewership were conducted after Aero Marti began operations.

OCB management said that it can more closely meet the needs of target audiences in Cuba if it has accurate information about audience preferences. It has already begun to focus on youth, women, democracy, and improved production techniques.

³ InterMedia's latest reports were released in May, November, and December of 2006.

OCB management found the focus groups were of limited help because they were based on a group of people who were listening to or viewing short segments of programs (such as those that were two minutes long). Panels of viewers or listeners, on the other hand, allow individuals to review whole programs at home and then complete a thoughtful, private questionnaire, providing greater benefit to OCB.

Recommendation 3: The International Broadcasting Bureau's Office of Performance Review, in coordination with the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, should make greater use of audience panels for assessing its audience's programming preferences. (Action: IBB, in coordination with OCB)

BBG said that OCB concurred with this recommendation and that the IBB Office of Performance Review is working with OCB to implement panel reviews to better gauge audience reaction to TV Martí programming, using recent Cuban arrivals to the United States.

There Is a Need for a Nimble Long-Term Strategic Plan

OCB has been thorough in developing contingency programming for use in the first 48-hours after Fidel Castro's death and now should focus on long-term strategic planning that is nimble and flexible enough for rapidly changing situations.

OCB is covered under BBG's strategic plan and contributed to the FY 2007 draft U.S. International Broadcasting performance plan for Latin America but has no long-term overall plan or a strategic plan for the Internet. Managers in the news division have written goals and future objectives and told the OIG team about their long-term visions for OCB. They have discussed the challenges with their Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty colleagues, who experienced similar situations when the Soviet Union fell and they had to reinvent their mission and goals.

Strategic planning should anticipate future implications for funding, programming, and transmission needs. In the shorter term, OCB should plan how to compete with commercial broadcasting, including how to counter the increasingly successful broadcasts of "TELESUR," a satellite television initiative funded by Venezuela and designed to promote anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America.

In the longer term, if Cuba allows OCB to be present on the island, OCB will have significant resource requirements. The plan should also consider OCB's role, should uncensored broadcasting be allowed in a democratic Cuba – a circumstance

that might itself eliminate the need for new programming. Other long-term plans might include provisions for using OCB as a base for expanded coverage into Latin America, especially Venezuela. One scenario might involve combining the efforts of OCB and Voice of America.

Recommendation 4: The Office of Cuba Broadcasting should prepare a long-range strategic plan for the approval of the Broadcasting Board of Governors that includes contingency planning for a time when uncensored broadcasts are allowed in Cuba. (Action: OCB)

BBG said that OCB concurred with this recommendation, and its director will convene meetings with senior managers by May 31, 2007, to outline and discuss long-range strategic goals for OCB that are consistent with the new BBG Strategic Plan for 2008–2013. The director will also assign areas of responsibilities for further, more-detailed, long-range planning with the aim of producing an OCB long-range strategic plan for BBG approval by September 30, 2007.

ADMINISTRATION AND SECURITY

Although it is the smallest of OCB's three directorates, the Directorate of Administration has a wide-ranging and significant impact on the organization's ability to achieve its mission. Accordingly, the OIG team reviewed at length the directorate's administrative and security operations with the objective of improving operations, strengthening security, and fostering higher morale.

Revised Position Descriptions and Job Reclassifications Are Needed, Due to the Reorganization

The reorganization and the shift to all-news broadcasting actually required few job-title changes and only minimally affected position descriptions since most employees continued to do essentially the same work, albeit within a revised structure. However, the accretion of duties, especially in the information systems support and technical divisions, which must cope with increased demands for support and technology upgrades, has meant that many position descriptions are out of date and/or incomplete. The pressure of doing more with less, reduced budgetary resources, delays in filling open positions, and a major increase in the amount and range of the workload, has left many employees feeling that their position descriptions and classifications do not properly reflect their scope and level of work.

For example, in the information technology (IT) area, where only four individuals fill six slots, there has been a considerable expansion and cross-coverage of duties. The digitalization of the television and radio operations created a need to keep more network servers up and running. The rate of change in technology means it is difficult to stay current without specialized training, which has been sporadically available. Of course, if IT personnel are away at training, this further strains the remaining IT staff. The OCB IT staff views their range of responsibilities as much broader than those of their IBB Washington counterparts. However, the corresponding Washington staff members are each classified one pay grade higher than the OCB IT staff, causing morale problems. Similar concerns were voiced by the OCB staff in other technical roles.

A major IBB effort to review and adjust classifications would build confidence in the fairness and completeness of the position structure in OCB. OCB manage-

ment should, however, be quick to communicate to all employees that classification reviews can result in position downgrades and the sustaining of current grades as well as upgrades. Employees must be aware of the risks. This comprehensive review may reduce the number of positions required but should help assure the most efficient use of scarce resources, and it might affect the number of talent vendors needed in the future.

Recommendation 5: The International Broadcasting Bureau should perform a comprehensive review and reclassification of the position descriptions in the Office of Cuba Broadcasting. (Action: IBB)

BBG concurred with this recommendation and said that a position management and classification review of all OCB administrative support positions was scheduled for April 2007. While it is not feasible to conduct a complete audit of all OCB positions, the planned review will extend to related positions within OCB and in other IBB elements.

Overtime and Compensatory Time Policy Is Outdated and Inconsistently Applied

With fewer people available to do the work, pressure traditionally builds to allow overtime. IBB has, however, instituted an annual overtime cap of \$150,000 which effectively means that OCB overtime is tightly controlled and, in some areas, all but prohibited. For example, IT overtime is tightly controlled. Although compensatory time off is allowed, permitting an employee to use compensatory time off puts pressure on those who have to cover for that employee. The limitation on the amount of overtime makes it incumbent on management to have a clear policy requiring advanced approval for overtime and necessitates a means to prioritize which areas can incur overtime expenses. OIG informally recommended that OCB review its policy on overtime and compensatory time, last issued in early 2003, and reissue it again to all employees.

Formal Training Program Is Needed With Commensurate Funding

Tight budgets and the pressures to get work done have meant that organized training programs have become irregular. There has recently been some limited training of the technical and IT staff. OCB has no organized training records, and

employees do not develop individual training programs. This is a notable gap – the more so given that many OCB employees operate in fast-changing technical worlds such as digital television and radio or IT.

The OIG team found that employee records of previous training were incomplete. It is important that throughout OCB there be a proper record of individual training maintained by each employee and that training plans be prepared by employees and by the directorates. This will allow OCB management to have a better sense of its training priorities and more able to allocate funding accordingly.

Recommendation 6: The Office of Cuba Broadcasting should create, fund, and maintain an organized training program that will maximize the professional qualifications of its workforce and allow the Office of Cuba Broadcasting to stay current with technology. (Action: OCB)

BBG said that IBB concurred with this recommendation. OCB is covered by the IBB training plan. Therefore, OCB's efforts in this area should be directed toward coordinating and integrating OCB training needs within the IBB plan. IBB discussed this approach with the OCB chief of staff and plans to include a training planning component in the upcoming OCB position management review.

Use of Talent Vendors Complies With International Broadcasting Bureau Policy

OCB has traditionally made extensive use of outside vendors to provide needed skills (producing, directing, writing, editing, etc.) to supplement skills of the OCB workforce. OCB closely follows the procedures detailed in the Contracting for Talent and Other Professional Services Handbook. The handbook spells out how to solicit potential vendors, evaluate proposals, clear employees for working with OCB, and compensate employees.

In FY 2005, OCB had 146 vendors who each provided a minimum of \$2,500 in services, for a total outlay of \$2.2 million. Since its reorganization, OCB has sought to perform more work in-house, an initiative that has been somewhat slowed by the need to produce more television programming for Aero Marti. In FY 2006, 122 talent vendors were used, for a total expense of \$2.1 million. During the quarterly solicitations for talent, individual managers in OCB can supplement the number of

ing passive participation by those working outside the time of the meeting. Above all, these meetings would allow management to take the pulse of OCB's rank and file employees, provide them with catharsis, solicit their input on impending decisions, and prevent inaccurate rumors from gaining a foothold.

OCB might also publish a monthly in-house e-mail newsletter that includes information about OCB, IBB, and the U.S. government; personnel developments at OCB and pending changes; possible official and unofficial visitors; and other matters of interest. This newsletter could also include employee contributions and news items.

Procurement and Contracting Follow Relevant Procedures

The four largest contracting actions that involve OCB are:

- fabrication of the broadcasting and antenna equipment for the Aero Marti planes;
- aircraft fuel and operating costs for Aero Marti;
- the lease for Radio Mambi; and
- the lease for TV Azteca on DirecTV.

OCB spent \$6.9 million in FY 2006 on the development contract with Lockheed Martin to devise the broadcasting mechanism for Aero Marti. The fuel and operating costs for the aircraft are estimated at \$5.9 million per year and are covered under an interagency contract with the United States Army. The TV Azteca contract, for transmission on Channel 38 via DirecTV to Cuba, costs \$195,000 per six-month period. The Radio Mambi contract, which affords leased time into Cuba, costs \$182,500 per six-month option.

These four contracts were processed in IBB's Office of Contracts in Washington. The OIG team discussed these contracts with the BBG legal counsel, the director of the IBB Office of Contracts, and OCB's congressional coordinator, and performed a cursory review of the voluminous files for the contracts.

As noted, the OIG team reviewed the processing of talent vendors and found it consistent with the IBB Handbook and appropriate to the needs of OCB.

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The establishment of a full-time security officer would effectively integrate the disparate security functions and provide the OCB director with professional advice on day-to-day security operations.

Recommendation 7: The Office of Cuba Broadcasting should request authority to hire a full-time professional security officer. (Action: OCB)

BBG said that IBB management plans to visit OCB in Miami to review security and other administrative issues and determine what further action concerning this recommendation will be taken.

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survey will be communicated to OCB management.

Information Security Officer Position Approved But Not Yet Filled

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been authorized to hire an IT specialist who would focus on IT and FISMA compliance. The OIG team informally recommended that, once the information security position is filled, that individual should work closely with the OCB security officer, who should provide input into the employee's annual performance appraisal.

Informal Recommendation 4: The Office of Cuba Broadcasting should use its nepotism form when recruiting new direct-hire employees.

On personal questionnaires and in interviews, employees clearly said management did not put enough effort into communicating with employees.

Informal Recommendation 5: The Office of Cuba Broadcasting should improve communications with employees by using periodic group meetings and electronic newsletters.

IBB/Security and OCB management are not pleased with the cost of the guard program and would prefer the option of contracting for their own services, believing they could obtain better quality service at perhaps a 30-percent-lower cost.

Informal Recommendation 6: The Office of Cuba Broadcasting should determine the feasibility of soliciting bids for its contracted guard services.

OCB has been authorized to hire an IT specialist who would focus on IT and FIS-MA compliance and who should work closely with the OCB security officer.

Informal Recommendation 7: The Office of Cuba Broadcasting should, once the information security position is filled, have that individual work closely with its security officer, who should provide input into the employee's annual performance appraisal.

ABBREVIATIONS

BBG	Broadcasting Board of Governors
CAFC	Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba
FISMA	Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FPS	Federal Protective Service
IBB	International Broadcasting Bureau
IT	Information technology
IBB	International Broadcasting Bureau
OCB	Office of Cuba Broadcasting
OIG	Office of Inspector General

APPENDIX A: RADIO MARTI NEWS PROGRAMS AND NEWSCASTS

1. **Las Noticias Como Son** – A daily political talk show on the most important news events in Cuba and around the world with emphasis on Cuba.
2. **Sports News** – Half-hour daily sports show.
3. **La Noticia Por Dentro** – A weekend analysis of the week’s most relevant topics.
4. **Resumen Semanal** – A weekly roundup of the most important news, politics, sports, culture, and interviews.
5. **Opiniones** - Analysis and commentaries with guest experts.
6. **Contacto Cuba** - News on the opposition movement in Cuba.
7. **Sin Censores Ni Censura** – A daily show on the press with participation from independent journalists in Cuba.
8. **Transicion** - Issues related to the post-Castro transition.
9. **Militares y Democracia** - The role of the military in a democratic society.

Radio Marti Newscasts

In addition to the above news programs, Radio Marti has newscasts Monday through Friday from 12:00 a.m. until 9:00 a.m. (except for Monday when it is off the air from midnight until 5:00 a.m.), 11:00 a.m. until 1:00 p.m., 2:00 p.m. until 4:00 p.m., 5:00 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. until midnight.

On Saturday and Sunday, there are hourly newscasts and more news programs.

APPENDIX B: TV MARTI PROGRAMS

1. **La Oficina del Jefe:** A satirical program that derives its humor from the current political situation in Cuba. Six characters are placed on a fictional island with comedy situations that refer to present regime.
2. **La Pantalla de Azogue:** A showcase for accepted films and those not allowed in Cuba, including classic Cuban films, films made in or about Cuba by Cuban or foreign filmmakers, and films by Cuban directors in exile. The program has a host and presents five to six clips of a movie, with a discussion in between. Sometimes, the show features actors, directors, or other experts.
3. **Conversemos:** A discussion program on womens' issues that every week presents an array of topics of great interest to Cuban women.
4. **Nuestra America:** A discussion program on the current situation in Latin America. Hosted by renowned journalist Juana Isa, accompanied by many important guests, this program covers all Hispanic issues.
5. **Temas Y Debates:** A debate program where two hosts use two news packages, or a journalist's expert opinion, to establish and discuss a topic.
6. **Marco de Marcos:** A one-on-one interview program with popular Cuban personalities, from the recently arrived to those in exile but not forgotten.
7. **AltoVoltaje:** A music program shot on location and targeted to youth. The program presents the most recent music videos from such places as Miami Beach, Key West, festivals, and boat shows.
8. **Prensa Libre:** A round-table discussion hosted by a journalist who invites one guest to discuss a certain topic enhanced by video and/or graphics. Topics include interviews with young Cuban television stars in exile and reports on environment problems.
9. **Cuba: La Hora del Cambio:** A discussion program that started as a platform for the many changes that Cuba needed after a transition. After July 2006, when Fidel Castro stepped out of power, the program embarked on a new phase where many young Cuban Americans are being interviewed to present projects developed for a future Cuba.

- 10. Desde Hollywood:** Targeted to a young audience, this program presents trailers of recent upcoming Hollywood movies and interviews with their stars, usually in Spanish. Robin Williams has presented his trailer in Spanish, for instance.
- 11. Traspaso del Poder:** A program created after July 2006 to discuss events in Cuba, from Fidel Castro's illness to a profile of his brother Raul Castro and his entourage.
- 12. Voces:** A program produced in conjunction with The Mississippi Consortium for International Development showing the Cuban audience, specially blacks, the importance of the Human Rights movement in the United States and how they can bring about a future Cuba without racial discrimination.
- 13. Panorama:** A discussion program between an economist and the hostess on which Cuban and international economical issues related to Cuba are discussed.
- 14. El Fracaso de la Revolucion:** A special series analyzing the failure of the Cuban Revolution; from education to health, all aspects are debated among the knowledgeable hosts and guests.
- 15. Bonco en Miami:** A new satire program hosted by a renowned comedian who uses his personal experience to convey the life of a recently arrived young person in the United States. Combined with music and entertainment, this program is aimed to young audiences.
- 16. Resumen Deportivo:** A weekly sports review where all things related to sports are discussed, from baseball to boxing, tennis, football, and even golf. Includes interviews with Latin American sports personalities and video footage.
- 17. Puntos de Vista:** A discussion program where a host and two journalists discuss the hot international issues of the month, from economics in China to politics in Chile.
- 18. Mundo Artístico:** A biweekly entertainment magazine on the Latin American and American show-business world, movie releases, and music launches.

19. Acompañame: A special program recorded on location that focuses on how to do business in the United States and draws on the statements of recently arrived Cubans who have created small businesses -- from the restaurant owner to the car-wash magnate.

20. Special Programs: A variety of special programs to commemorate historical Cuban dates.

Because 60 percent of the Cuban population is of African descent, TV Marti is working in conjunction with the Mississippi Consortium for International Development and the Center for Understanding of the African Descent to increase the production of projects dealing with issues of human and civil rights.

APPENDIX C: RELEVANT RECOMMENDATIONS IN IBB'S PERFORMANCE REVIEWS OF RADIO AND TV MARTI (2004-2007)

2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Prepare a mission statement for operations directed at target audiences in a post-Castro Cuba.• Create a program to teach and update journalistic skills to Cuba's independent journalists.• Provide refresher training for talent and journalists to avoid monologues and editorializing.• Screen out insufficiently sourced news items.• Create mechanisms for editorial control.• Continue to separate news from views.• Continue television progress on live news, removal of dated programs, new and varied formats, and studio sets.• Avoid self-censorship.
2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Revamp and upgrade television programming schedule.• Continue to incorporate live broadcasts from the field.• Provide television programming for youth and include youth in focus groups.• Reallocate staff and contracting resources to meet the demands of television.• Do not omit television news angles that could be perceived as adverse to the current presidential administration, the U.S. government, or the exile community; avoid self-censorship.• Expand working relationships with Voice of America.
2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Continue work on a comprehensive plan with specific mission and goals for a post-Castro Cuba.• IBB's Office of Research should discuss with BBG a task force for post-Castro Cuba and programs on democracy building.• Work on programming and formats for radio, television, and the Web.• Continue to reallocate staff and contracting resources to meet the demands of television.
2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Work on a contingency plan for post-Castro Cuba.• Focus on new programming and enhanced cooperation between Radio and TV Marti.• Create youth programming.• Control long monologues.• Improve sound quality.• Establish working relations between OCB and Voice of America.

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