

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General

Report of Inspection

Embassy Khartoum, Sudan
and
Constituent Post

Report Number ISP-I-07-23A, June 2007

~~IMPORTANT NOTICE~~

~~This report is intended solely for the official use of the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, or any agency or organization receiving a copy directly from the Office of Inspector General. No secondary distribution may be made, in whole or in part, outside the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, by them or by other agencies or organizations, without prior authorization by the Inspector General. Public availability of the document will be determined by the Inspector General under the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. 552. Improper disclosure of this report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

KEY JUDGMENTS	1
CONTEXT	3
EXECUTIVE DIRECTION	7
Facilities	9
Entry-level Program	10
Consulate General Juba.....	10
POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION.....	19
Political and Economic Reporting and Analysis	19
Public Diplomacy	23
Consular Affairs.....	29
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.....	35
Management Services	36
General Services Operations.....	43
Facilities Management Office	47
Information Management.....	48
Information System Security.....	50
Quality of Life	51
MANAGEMENT CONTROLS	53
Consular.....	53
Procurement.....	54
Financial Management.....	55
FORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS	57
INFORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS	63
PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS	69
ABBREVIATIONS	71

KEY JUDGMENTS

- Embassy Khartoum effectively manages a difficult U.S.-Sudanese relationship complicated by an array of factors including the U.S. government's sanctions regime, accusations of genocide against Sudan, and inclusion of Sudan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Despite obstacles thrown up by both the U.S. and Sudanese governments, U.S. engagement with Sudan is extensive and important, and there is cooperation on counterterrorism, support for both the African Union and UN missions, and delivery of humanitarian assistance in the South and Darfur.
- The political and bureaucratic jousting between the United States and Sudan hampers the embassy's operational effectiveness in such ways as delaying visa issuance, imposing travel restrictions, and impeding customs clearance.
- The lack of a "traditional" Sudan desk within the Bureau of African Affairs (AF) affects the embassy's capacity to manage some aspects of the bilateral relationship. Both AF's Sudan Programs Group (AF/SPG) and the embassy must work to strengthen coordination.
- The existence of the consulate general in Juba (opened in late 2005) is intended to underscore the U.S. government's commitment to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for southern Sudan, and to strengthen that region's government. The consulate general, however, lacks adequate staff, facilities, security, and general services support to be fully effective. The Department must overcome these shortfalls in Juba.
- The ad hoc arrangements that have allowed the U.S. government to establish an effective interagency presence in Darfur in support of several U.S. government priorities work well and provide a good example of the U.S. government's rapid response capabilities. Embassy Khartoum will now have to regularize staffing, security, and administrative support to maintain the U.S. government's strong engagement in Darfur.

CONTEXT

The reopening of Embassy Khartoum in 2003 reflected the U.S. government's hope that relations between Sudan and the United States were trending toward positive



interaction after years of strained relations and the inclusion of Sudan on the state sponsors of terrorism list and the imposition of unilateral economic sanctions. By 2003, the U.S. government was fully engaged in the international process that led in 2005 to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), ending the North-South war that had wracked the country for all but 11 years since its independence in 1956.

The years since then, however, have seen a continued mix of progress and

setbacks in bilateral ties. Diplomatic relations have been maintained, but at the level of chargé d'affaires. Despite some moves by the Sudanese to cooperate on counterterrorism, Sudan remains on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. Although Sudan's oil-driven economic growth is impressive at 12 percent annually — the third largest economy in Africa — the United States maintains its sanctions, effectively prohibiting all investment and allowing only a trickle of trade. The U.S. government has begun the construction of a NEC in Khartoum but has faced delays and obstructions caused by Sudanese unwillingness to clear construction materials and equipment through customs. Notwithstanding the difficulties of operating in Sudan, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has its largest, and arguably its most complex, humanitarian and development assistance program in Africa, with operations in Khartoum, Juba, Darfur, and Nairobi.

The CPA established an autonomous government in south Sudan based on a one-country/two-systems principle. U.S. humanitarian and development assistance began flowing to the war-ravaged South in an attempt to buttress the implementation of the CPA and develop capacity and good governance in the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). South Sudan's program by itself is among the largest U.S. assistance programs in Africa. In Juba, the Department has inaugurated a consulate general in temporary facilities that USAID has leased for many years and has also secured a long-term lease for property where the new consulate compound (NCC) will be built.

Sudanese policies regarding the conflict in Darfur have absorbed the lion's share of U.S. government attention toward the country in the last two years and diverted energies from the muted progress being made in the South. Sudan's intransigence in dealing with the human tragedy in Darfur has put the bilateral relationship in jeopardy. U.S. policy reflects the judgment that what is occurring in Darfur is genocide. The root causes of the conflict are complex, and Sudanese government policy has aggravated this situation. Sudan has used force directly against local militias and has armed Arab militias to execute a scorched-earth policy in some areas. Although the government in Khartoum has permitted a role for a weak African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur, it has prevented transition to a more competent U.N. force, as recommended by the United States and endorsed by the UN Security Council. At the same time, the United States has been a mainstay of humanitarian assistance to the people of Darfur and is funding the operations of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) there. In sum, the United States has spent over \$500 million to aid in international efforts to keep the peace and save lives in Sudan.

Not surprisingly, the ambiguities in the U.S.-Sudanese relationship affect the operational decisions of embassy and Department of State (Department) leadership daily. A good example is Sudan's thwarting of plans for facilities replacement and expansion in both Khartoum and Juba. (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2) the outcome of these current challenges may very well affect the U.S. government footprint in Sudan in major ways. The same can be said as the U.S. government's profile in Darfur grows and brings with it security and management issues. Personnel decisions and temporary duty support for critical programs often fall victim to a difficult visa regime that somewhat reflects the U.S. government's own rigor in issuing visas to Sudanese.

The current Mission Performance Plan for Embassy Khartoum looks to a more positive future, although acknowledging that Sudan's trajectory is anything but certain. In two or three years, the possibility exists that bilateral relations with Sudan could undergo fundamental transformations. Whatever the course of events, U.S. policy must retain the flexibility to continue to sanction negative actions and to acknowledge and respond to positive steps, should they occur. Getting the substance of this carrot-and-stick approach right is a challenge for the embassy, within the context of a difficult political, bureaucratic, and security environment.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

U.S.-Sudanese relations are among the most complex in the world. The challenges facing Embassy Khartoum are immense. They run the full spectrum from a difficult and often confusing political dialogue, and local bureaucratic hurdles that border on obstructionism, to security conditions that ebb and flow in response to threats that vary greatly from one part of the vast country to another. The embassy's front office, under the direction of a chargé with 15 months' service in Sudan and a deputy chief of mission (DCM) who arrived this past summer, has done a good job of participating in the formulation of U.S. government policy and explaining and advocating that policy to an often-skeptical Sudanese audience. The chargé is a strong leader who is universally respected for his knowledge of the Sudan portfolio and his clarity in framing it for the embassy staff. This is no easy task, since the policy itself is a complex amalgam of irritation at Sudan's behavior in South Sudan and Darfur, and on human rights generally, and of U.S. support for Sudan's humanitarian and development needs. Getting the balance right is a challenge. The chargé ensures close consultation with his interagency country team, giving each member the opportunity to weigh in on policy discussions. The final decisions on approach and substance are clearly his, however, and he carries this responsibility with confidence and self-assurance.

The DCM spent his initial months at post reading-in on the Sudan portfolio, taking the measure of the post management's strengths and weaknesses, and implementing appropriate working relationships with the country team. He has yet to become the routine intermediary that country team members approach regarding priority issues when the chargé is away from the embassy. During much of the inspection, however, the DCM acted as chargé and demonstrated his firm grasp of the key pending issues and his decisiveness in dealing with them. These issues included the security threats that led to an urgent warden message being disseminated, bilateral discussions on a knotty dispute between the two governments, analysis of a visit to Sudan by the Chinese president, and preparations for a high-level U.S. visit. The DCM has shown that he knows how to take advantage of such opportunities to take the reins, speak authoritatively, and make decisions. He is also making progress in crafting the appropriate authority relationships with the management officer and heads of other agencies at post. The chargé and DCM are jointly bolstering the DCM's authority in these relationships.

The embassy's executive office is at the nexus of a Washington policy triumvirate that is unique in many ways. The three significant sources of influence on the U.S. government's Sudan policy are AF's front office, the Special Envoy for Sudan, and Congress. Each of these players brings its own perspectives and expertise. While not without friction, the relationships largely work well and reflect the almost universal view from Washington that the Sudan government must be held accountable for its behavior. Not surprisingly, the attention that Sudan receives from U.S. policymakers affects doing business in Khartoum. The embassy manages these complexities well, expressing frustrations at the impediments Sudanese authorities throw up in their confrontations with Washington. At the same time, the embassy takes advantage of the high volume of senior visitors to maximize its access to Sudanese authorities and reinforce the U.S. government messages on South Sudan, Darfur, and human rights.

The chargé and DCM have extracted full benefit from the additional revenues made available to support Mission Sudan from AF/SPG and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). AF/SPG has fielded an officer to act as government technical manager, monitoring the massive contract that funded the construction of the AMIS camps in Darfur and their continued operation and maintenance. Cooperation between this office and the embassy's management section has occasionally fallen short, however. In addition, the chargé has expressed some concerns about chief of mission authority over the government technical manager, and these are addressed elsewhere in this report. The bottom line is that this resource has been critical in the embassy's ability to satisfy itself that contract implementation is working.

S/CRS has fielded personnel that have been the backbone of reporting and analysis on Darfur and the administration of the U.S. government operations there. S/CRS funded two two-year positions at Embassy Khartoum and also sent a series of officers to Darfur itself on short-term, temporary duty (TDY) assignments. The embassy has ensured full integration of these assets into its own operations. As a result, the U.S. government has benefited greatly from S/CRS involvement. Unfortunately, S/CRS is on the verge of terminating its involvement in the Sudan program in order to attend to priorities elsewhere. Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with AF, is working to replace these resources from within AF budgetary and position allocations.

FACILITIES

Embassy Khartoum's current facilities are unsatisfactory, (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2) (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2) . There are three additional operating sites spread across the city, one a newly renovated USAID office. In Juba, the consulate general is housed in a USAID-leased residential compound that doubles informally for workspace but does not meet office space standards. USAID has renovated another of its leased office buildings nearby. Its use as an interim office building is discussed elsewhere in this report. (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2) (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2) the construction of new facilities is in the works for both Khartoum and Juba. In Khartoum, NEC construction has already begun at a site some 19 kilometers from the current embassy location. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) team visited this site, which will meet all standards and provide ample space to collocate all U.S. government functions in Khartoum.

While the inspection was underway, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) notified the embassy that it had ordered the suspension of NEC construction because Sudanese authorities had obstructed the clearing through Sudanese customs of large numbers of containers of building material and equipment, posing a huge cost to the U.S. government. This decision remained in force as the inspection ended. The Department will take a final decision on the project by April 1, 2007. The ramifications for embassy operations of canceling the project could be significant. Embassy Khartoum, at the direction of the chargé, has identified its views on the potential impact for the Department in a clear and forceful message.

In Juba, the Department has signed a long-term lease for a 19-acre site on the edge of town and is moving forward with plans to build an NCC on it. This site will provide enough space for all the facilities projected for Consulate General Juba. Construction in a location as remote as this, with minimal infrastructure, will be costly. The embassy has concluded, reluctantly but with justification, that if the NEC in Khartoum is put on hold, as outlined above, it is likely that the NCC will also be put on hold.

Much of the substance of this report is premised on the belief that the current facilities in Khartoum and Juba are interim facilities. The OIG team concurs with Embassy Khartoum that any change in this planning will require hard decisions about the U.S. government footprint and/or security profile in Sudan.

ENTRY-LEVEL PROGRAM

The contingent of entry-level officers at Embassy Khartoum includes both generalists and specialists. The DCM is aware of his responsibility for providing a mentoring opportunity to both categories of employees. In his brief time at post, he has convened one get-together of entry-level personnel. He has laid out his hopes that the mentoring program will ensure opportunities for entry-level personnel to engage broadly in the work of the mission beyond their own portfolios. In fact, the nature of the workforce at Embassy Khartoum means this engagement comes naturally. As an example, entry-level personnel participate effectively in supporting the many high-level visitors that come to Sudan. The mentoring program suffers, like so much else, from the short tour of duty at Khartoum, which is chopped up by two rest and recuperation (R&R) trips. Opportunities for more intense mentoring will increase with the change to a two-year tour of duty later in 2007.

CONSULATE GENERAL JUBA

The U.S. government inaugurated a new consulate general in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, in December 2005. This very new office would not normally be the subject of a full inspection. The personnel assigned to Juba since its inauguration — both American and locally employed (LE) staff — have worked hard, with a heartfelt dedication and good front office direction, to get the office up and running. In the process they have faced numerous obstacles, but have nonetheless been successful in staying focused on the key issues that render a U.S. government presence in South Sudan so important— implementation of the 2005 CPA, establishment of capacity building and good governance within the GOSS, support for incipient health and education programs throughout the area, and infrastructural development. In many ways, the progress made in Juba is astonishing. The work that those assigned to Juba are doing has been important in helping to keep focus on the many south-north issues in Sudan while so much of the recent official attention to Sudan has centered on the tragedy in Darfur. The ad hoc difficulties of making Consulate General Juba fully operational, pending the building of an NCC are symptomatic of the challenges the Department faces in planning its support for new and significant policy initiatives.

The staff consists of the consul general and one additional Department reporting officer, who is currently assigned to a Khartoum-based position but largely resident in Juba. There is also a Department of Defense liaison officer, eight USAID

officers, four LE staff providing general services, one LE staff member for information technology, and five LE staff drivers. Security, upkeep, catering, and reception are the day-to-day functions of a contractor, African Expeditions. The USAID operations in South Sudan still receive significant support from the Sudan Field Office in Nairobi, so that American and Sudanese professional staffers come to Juba on TDY regularly. There are no Department LE staff members at Juba. An officer assigned by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is expected at post soon.

Both the Department and USAID require additional staff to ensure their continuing ability to do what is asked of them. USAID hopes, for example, that the Nairobi-based personnel of the Sudan Field Office — American and LE staff — will be able to relocate to Juba as soon as possible. Without the transfer to Juba of what is, in effect, the bulk of the USAID staff assigned to the South Sudan program, USAID's minimal footprint will be inadequate for its mission in South Sudan and untenable for management. Already the span of control of each one of the small nucleus of officers on the ground in Juba exceeds what should be asked of the manager. Furthermore, the provision of administrative support services is unsatisfactory, given the small general services office (GSO) staff assigned to Juba.

On the Department side, there appears no compelling reason to continue to send a Khartoum-based officer to fulfill the reporting obligations of the consulate general. This position should be established as a Juba position as soon as possible and advertised as such in the next assignment cycle. An additional reporting officer with a focus in part on economics could be sent to Juba from time to time. In the interim, the economic officer in Khartoum on temporary duty orders might usefully visit Juba and follow up on reporting the consulate has already done on oil-related issues.

Recommendation 1: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureaus of Human Resources and African Affairs, should establish as a Juba position the reporting officer position currently encumbered in Juba by an officer who is formally assigned to the political/economic section at Embassy Khartoum, advertising the position as such in the next assignment cycle. (Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with HR and AF)

Having a small cadre of Department LE staff is also likely to become a priority in Juba. Therefore, the following LE staffing decisions might be worth serious country team attention. During the inspection the public affairs officer (PAO) proposed the establishment of an LE staff position in Juba. Depending on decisions about which agency will provide which International Cooperative Administrative Support

Services (ICASS) services to Consulate General Juba (discussed at length in the Management section of this report), there will be a need for additional Department LE staff in Juba. For example, if, as seems likely, provision of the ICASS basic package that includes security falls to the Department, a security-related LE staff member could oversee the day-to-day operations of the security contractor's employees. The consul general also needs unclassified office management support, which could be met by an LE staff office manager. OIG made informal recommendations about staffing in Juba.

The basic administrative services provided to the existing staff in Juba are unsatisfactory, and consume an inordinate amount of time by officers having other responsibilities. The ICASS structure for Juba is not yet formally in place. It should be finalized as soon as possible and should reinforce the transfer of oversight for operations in Juba from Nairobi to Khartoum (see Recommendation 19 in the Management section of this report). Given the incipient GSO staff in Juba, provided by USAID, and the proportionally large USAID representation among the staff, it appears that, once finalized, some ICASS services in Juba will be provided by USAID. As a precursor, overall supervision of the small USAID GSO staff already in Juba has fallen to the USAID executive officer, who is also based in Juba but has responsibility for oversight of the entire USAID mission in Sudan. This is an untenable position for the USAID executive officer and has not worked well.

Recommendation 2: Embassy Khartoum should require that the service provider designated to provide general services support at Consulate General Juba provide adequate on-site supervision of the work of the locally employed staff. (Embassy Khartoum)

The growth of the staff at Consulate General Juba, essential to the U.S. government mission in South Sudan, is contingent on the U.S. government's ability to provide adequate facilities and conditions to accommodate such growth. A 19-acre NCC in Juba has a 99-year lease, and the U.S. government is moving forward with plans to build an NCC there. There are issues that may impede the construction of this new compound that are beyond the scope of this inspection. Judgments in this report are therefore based on the notion that facilities-related recommendations are interim solutions. Three key elements underscore the challenges the U.S. government faces as it anticipates interim growth in Juba and the need to support it: office facilities, residential facilities, and an LE staff local compensation plan that includes relocation support.

The second challenge for Consulate General Juba is that USAID is preparing a request for proposal for the construction of residential units on the existing residential compound in Juba. There is ample space for these units. They will enable the more numerous consulate staff to have adequate housing on a walled compound that meets residential security requirements. The number of units to be built will accord with the number of U.S. direct-hire staff slated to be working in Juba.

Recommendation 4: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should seek and obtain from the U.S. Agency for International Development concurrence in moving forward the request for proposal for the construction of an appropriate number of residential units on the existing walled residential compound in Juba. (Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with OBO)

The third challenge in Juba is the need to maintain a robust LE work force, which is essential to an effective U.S. government presence in South Sudan. USAID's existing Sudanese staff at the Sudan Field Office in Nairobi and at Embassy Khartoum fully expects to return to live and work in Juba as the U.S. presence in Juba expands. Southern Sudanese in the Department's employ in Khartoum may also return to Juba to take up positions with the Department. The conditions that LE staff will meet in Juba are significantly different than those in either Nairobi or Khartoum. Given the exceedingly high cost of housing in Juba and the fact that, following decades of civil war, few returning LE staff members have existing housing, the LE staff will also need financial help to resettle in Juba.

Recommendation 5: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should amend the local compensation plan for Consulate General Juba employees in consideration of conditions specific to that constituent post. (Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with HR)

Recommendation 6: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should develop, as part of its local compensation plan for Sudan, a relocation package of transfer benefits for eligible, locally employed, U.S. government staff members who are required in Juba. (Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with HR)

El Fasher, Darfur

The U.S. government has an important multiagency presence in Darfur, primarily in the regional capital of El Fasher, which the OIG inspectors visited. There is also a presence in Nyala, in South Darfur. This presence has grown in response to the changing requirements that the Darfur conflict has generated: support for AMIS, implementation of the recently signed Darfur Peace Agreement, participation in the Cease Fire Commission, encouragement of and support for the United Nations Mission in Sudan, and operation of a robust humanitarian assistance program for hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons in camps throughout Darfur. Each of these issues justifiably captures the attention of the U.S. government as a priority, and continued staffing of the operations in Darfur is as essential as it is problematic. The challenges include the disparate nature of the tasks performed, the physical distances between U.S. government work sites, the multiplicity of agencies represented, the uncertain and often-changing security situation, and the harsh work and living environment. There is a strong collegial approach in El Fasher that serves the U.S. government well. In fact, the ad hoc interagency arrangements that were rapidly implemented to meet U.S. government priorities in an area with minimal infrastructure could be a model for future such emergencies.

The Department has three officers in El Fasher, all on short-term assignments from offices in Washington that are providing funding for these resources. One officer was sent by AF/SPG as the government's technical manager and is overseeing a Department contract with Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) to build and operate the 32 base camps used by the AMIS forces throughout Darfur. Since its inception in 2004, the contract has been funded at well over \$250 million and recently expanded to include the provision of facilities for the UN mission in Sudan's first phase of operations. AF/SPG has filled this position with a series of short-term, temporary annuitants. The current incumbent, however, is a private employee on a six-month contract with a temporary employment agency. With the deployment of an individual on contract with a nongovernmental entity, the lines of authority with

the Chief of Mission have become blurred, a concern when the employee's working environment is fraught with security concerns. The issue of chief of mission authority over the incumbent has ramifications beyond Sudan. The Department's latest guidance on chief of mission authority (State 168672 of October 2, 2006) does not describe chief of mission authority for individuals in this sort of arrangement.

Recommendation 7: The Office of Rightsizing of the U.S. Overseas Presence, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs and Office of the Legal Adviser, should clarify chief of mission authority over the contracted government technical manager in Darfur, Sudan, who is overseeing implementation of an extensive government contract to support the African Union Mission in Sudan. (Action: M/R, in coordination with AF and L)

The two additional Department officers in El Fasher are political officers sent to Sudan, funded by S/CRS, to deepen the resources of the embassy's political section. These individuals are part of a series of officers sent for three-month TDY assignments. Both, however, are scheduled to depart by April 2007, and at the time of the inspection S/CRS was reportedly unwilling to continue to provide TDY personnel to Darfur. On its return to Washington, the OIG team learned that S/CRS will send additional personnel to Darfur for a brief period with the understanding that there is cost sharing with AF and that AF staffs the Darfur portfolio in the future. Darfur coverage is supplemented by episodic circuit riders from the political/economic section of Embassy Khartoum.

Other agencies in Darfur include the Department of Defense, with an officer of the Joint Liaison Element from Embassy Khartoum, and USAID, whose Darfur Field Office has two positions each in El Fasher and Nyala. In El Fasher, only one of these two positions is filled. Facilities also exist in El Fasher to accommodate staffing of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa based in Djibouti. After an absence of several months, two officers have been scheduled to arrive in El Fasher.

The complex and short-term nature of staffing of U.S. government operations and the variations in administrative and security support arrangements in El Fasher render the charge's oversight of work in Darfur particularly challenging. There is scarcely any chance that personnel will sign on for duty in Darfur for periods much longer than the six-month (State Department and the Department of Defense) to

one-year (USAID) maximums now in effect. However, continuity of staffing is essential and staffing gaps in any of the functions are untenable. Embassy Khartoum, which already has staffing gaps in its political/economic section that will continue through the summer transfer cycle, has begun exploring how best to deploy its own resources to support the Darfur priority.

Recommendation 8: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should establish a plan to provide continuity for reporting and managing the El Fasher remote operating site. (Action: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with AF)

The American staff in Darfur is not colocated and is supported by security guards, drivers, translators, and residential management staff hired under a variety of mechanisms. The security guards at the Department's residential and office facilities are part of the embassy's local guard force. Guards at the Department of Defense facilities, however, are hired directly. However, USAID in El Fasher shares accommodation with a nongovernmental implementing partner and depends on this partner for security and other support. The Department's drivers and translators have also been hired through a contract with the same nongovernmental organization, with funds coming from S/CRS. The residential staff is employed as casual workers, also funded by S/CRS.

Administrative and security support should be provided and funded by the Department, using the ICASS mechanisms at Embassy Khartoum. The security guards at all U.S.-government-occupied facilities in El Fasher have not been brought into the local guard program that already operates at the two Department facilities, and they are not under the direction of the regional security office in Khartoum. Also ICASS has not assumed responsibility for the drivers and translators currently funded by S/CRS and working under a contract with as USAID implementing partner. This funding will end in the coming months.

Recommendation 9: Embassy Khartoum should regularize administrative services at El Fasher to all agencies, specifically the services of the local guard force, drivers, and translators, using the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services mechanism. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REPORTING AND ANALYSIS

The problems facing the combined political/economic section include maintaining adequate staffing and ensuring its continuity. The section cannot advance U.S. policy goals in Sudan without resolving these problems. Embassy Khartoum has three daunting tasks: monitoring and aiding the implementation of the CPA between Sudan's Government of National Unity (GNU) and the GOSS; negotiating the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement between the GNU and the rebels; and addressing human rights, religious freedom, violence against women, and trafficking in persons nationwide. The U.S. government has made large political and financial investments in hopes of seeing the agreements successfully realized and the unity of Sudan preserved.

Either task would be a challenge to the section, were it adequately staffed at any given moment. It is rarely adequately staffed, nor is there any sure prospect that it will be on a consistent basis in the near future. Fortunately, good writing skills, a strong personality, and a talent for trenchant analysis make the chargé an added asset for the political section. Essential meetings and developments, mostly on Darfur, are well covered, but there is little time or manpower to cover other subjects, such as the economy or local politics. Numerous visitors also diminish the time section members can devote to reporting. The use of one-year assignments and frequent R&Rs make short-term and long-term continuity within the section problematic, though this should improve with the switch to two-year postings starting in the summer of 2007. U.S.-imposed sanctions and the designation of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism make bilateral relations difficult and limit the section to reporting and analysis. There are no funds for law enforcement and narcotics control programs and little cooperation on these issues with the GNU. Matters relating to the environment, science, and technology are not a priority for the embassy, given its limited resources. Refugee and migration affairs are handled by a regional refugee coordinator based in Addis Ababa, and USAID provides humanitarian assistance to internally displaced people in Sudan. The Department funds a program to modernize the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army in the South, which the political officer resident in Juba oversees.

Washington sources in AF, USAID, and the office of the Special Envoy for Darfur, give high marks to embassy reporting, although sanctions and designation of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism often make it difficult for the section to find a common ground for host-nation engagement. Coordination between the Special Envoy and AF in Washington is generally perceived as satisfactory, but the embassy's requests for guidance occasionally appear to fall between the cracks. As with any embassy, there is sometimes a different perception of policy priorities, a view that there should be greater field coordination, and a concern that queries are not answered adequately. The attention given to the ongoing crisis in Darfur competes for attention with the implementation of the CPA in South Sudan.

The embassy must apply to Sudan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs for meetings with most government officials. However, a number of officials from the South, who are serving in the GNU because of the terms of the CPA, are accessible, as are certain government advisors. Sudanese interlocutors outside the government are relatively accessible. Indeed, the United States remains popular with many Sudanese outside of GNU and Islamist circles. Relations with other embassy sections and agencies are good. Both the section and USAID clear on cables that have a common import. The religious freedom report and the human rights report are well documented and well written, although both make for depressing reading.

The Sudanese economy is booming, growing at some 12 percent a year, although most of the growth is limited to Khartoum. Coverage of the economy is intermittent because, of the two positions for economic officers assigned to the section (three, if one counts Juba, where there is one political and one economic officer position), only one position is filled occasionally by an annuitant on when-actually-employed status. This person has spent most of his career in Africa and is now on his sixth short-term deployment to Sudan. His reports are a real asset to the section. Oil, banking, the transparency of monetary transfers to the GOSS and Chinese penetration of the Sudanese economy are covered to the extent possible. Other subjects, such as environmental degradation, the impact of population growth on the economy, agriculture, and a close examination of the country's resource base are passed over for lack of time. The OIG team informally recommended that whoever holds the economic portfolio in Khartoum occasionally visit Juba until an economic officer is permanently assigned there.

Management

Affable and knowledgeable, the chief of the political/economic section nevertheless finds himself overshadowed by the chargé and USAID director, who both have strong personalities and are exceptionally dynamic. The USAID director came

to the job with long-term relationships with Sudanese officials and sits on international donor bodies as deputy chairperson of the Assistance Evaluation Commission and as chairperson of the Wealth-Sharing Working Group. The newly arrived DCM does not have a strong political background and thus far has refrained from becoming deeply involved in the section. The section chief's deputy is a superb field manager and control officer who is often in Darfur or working on high-level visits, duties he clearly prefers to administering the section. The section chief makes a special effort to mentor the entry-level officers, although opportunities are few. Morale in the section is high. The officers in the section came to Khartoum because they wanted to serve there.

The section is typified by a horizontal structure in which everyone must be ready to take on somebody else's portfolio at short notice and in which people are largely left to their own initiative. This could be a recipe for anarchy, but it works well because the talented staff works well together and is willing to pitch in whenever and wherever needed. The section chief, who has flourished as a manager in more benign environments, has tried to "verticalize" the structure by assigning reporting and supervisory responsibilities but has been frustrated by vacancies, turnovers, and frequent absences of people on leave.

Staffing

On paper, the section is deceptively large, even overstaffed. In reality, however, rarely more than half its positions are encumbered at any one time. There are 15 positions, four funded by S/CRS. Three regular positions are vacant, although two may be filled by summer 2007. By mid-February 2007, there may be a fourth vacancy, as the section chief has accepted a call to serve in Iraq. There is little likelihood that S/CRS will replace the two highly qualified officers who have been on TDY assignments in Darfur, once they leave in late March. (Usually only one is present, although both were in El Fasher during the inspection.) S/CRS is currently funding two other positions, a political officer and an office management specialist (OMS) in Khartoum for a two-year period. These positions are under the control of AF and will not be renewed. Their present incumbents serve one-year tours of duty. The OMS funded by S/CRS supports the S/CRS team in Darfur and helps with official visitors. The section is also well served by a competent, experienced OMS in a regular position. The annuitant, who has done useful economic reporting, is scheduled to leave in early May. Thus, by mid-May, the section will consist of six officers and the two OMSs. Of the six officers, one is resident in Juba, and three are entry-level officers. This situation will remain until a yet-undetermined number of replacements arrive over the summer.

One of the mid-level officers assigned to Khartoum in an FO-03 position is resident in Juba. This officer had reported to the section chief in Khartoum. At the suggestion of the section chief, and with the concurrence of the consul general and DCM, the officer's work requirements and rating and review relationships have been rewritten. The OIG team concurs. In addition to their economic and political tasks, officers assigned to Juba will likely also have limited consular and public diplomacy responsibilities. No money has yet been budgeted for any LE staff support for these officers, although one Khartoum-assigned political assistant does spend half of his time in Juba, reporting to the political officer. In addition to his reporting and analysis, the political officer in Juba oversees a large assistance project directly financed by the Department, not USAID. This is a problematic \$40-million project carried out by DynCorp to train and modernize the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army.

Because of its role in helping broker the CPA, the United States is popular in South Sudan. Access to local officials is unrestricted, although travel outside Juba is limited by transportation difficulties and security concerns. Policing is weak, and a Ugandan group, the Lord's Resistance Army, has hijacked a number of vehicles and killed people during violent robberies. The political officer often travels with UN agencies to meet contacts outside of Juba. Communications are difficult. Reporting is limited to Sensitive But Unclassified items, which are transmitted by e-mail through a USAID server to Khartoum and Washington. Cell phones provided by the Department do not cover the South well. Personnel in Juba have bought cell phones locally to use a Ugandan cell phone service that offers better coverage in the South.

The most senior LE staff member in the political/economic section has just retired. He will be retained on a personal services contract for a few months, but with him an institutional memory will disappear, as will a wealth of contacts. It will be difficult to replace him with someone of the same caliber. Another LE staff member, a Southerner, covers the South and often travels to Juba to help the political officer there. Participation in a political/economic tradecraft course in Washington in late 2006 has enhanced his reporting. A third staffer, from western Sudan, covers Darfur and often travels there. The fourth is the economic/commercial assistant. He works closely with the annuitant, covering the economy when the latter is at post. He said he regrets that sanctions prevent him from doing any significant commercial work. Sanctions have been lifted for certain commercial activities in the South, although the oil industry has been specifically excluded. The LE staff attend the twice-weekly staff meetings and serve as important guides to a society that is usually impenetrable to outsiders. The entry-level officers have individually sought out LE staff members for information and knowledge.

By the summer of 2007, a completely new dynamic may be in place in the political section, as the current chargé, USAID director, and the section chief and his deputy will have been replaced by new officers, and the S/CRS personnel will be elsewhere. The conversion to two-year assignments may slow the pace of change somewhat. However, the section in Khartoum, with its short tours of duty, is currently not a good training ground for first-tour officers, unless they have had relevant professional or regional experience prior to joining the Foreign Service. The present staffing pattern and turnover do not allow for consistent mentoring. A special effort should be made to attract seasoned officers with experience in the Middle East or nearby parts of Africa. Some knowledge of Arabic is desirable, although not all members of the section need have this skill since most educated Sudanese have a good grasp of English. Officers serving in Juba can do without Arabic, as English is the preferred second language in the South, compared to the local version of Arabic or other native tongues.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Overview

Under a new, activist, PAO and with the support of mission leadership, Embassy Khartoum's public diplomacy effort has taken on new life and is experimenting with a variety of programs. Sudan offers a difficult environment but one where there is an appreciative audience and opportunities to make an impact. The public affairs section (PAS) is on the fourth floor of the chancery building and consists of the PAO, an assistant PAO paneled for the summer of 2007, and five Sudanese LE staff. The office has an operating budget of \$481,000 for FY 2007.

Twenty years ago Embassy Khartoum had been a model of a mission with a dynamic, full-service, public diplomacy operation that included an active cultural center, self-supporting English-language-teaching program, impact on the local media, and every kind of cultural and exchange program. It operated in an open environment where English was the language of instruction in the educational system. Sudan exported teachers, professors, and technocrats to many regional neighbors.

Today, "Arabization" has resulted in a generation of Sudanese who have minimal foreign language skills. The nation's educational system is poor. The regime, which came to power through a military coup, implements Islam's Sharia law and limits free expression. The U.S. government, responding to security concerns, policies of the Sudanese government, and budget cuts, has imposed economic sanctions on Sudan,

closed the cultural center, terminated the language courses, closed the embassy in the 1990s, and discontinued most of the exchange programs. These changes and the rapid turnover of staff have caused interaction with the large network of well-positioned contacts to atrophy.

The American initiatives of the past are well remembered and, in spite of obstacles, inroads are possible for this strong PAS. In 2003, after a decade in which no American officers advanced public diplomacy from Khartoum and the LE staff shrank to two people with limited support, a series of short-term PAOs began to recreate the PAS. The PAO, who arrived in September 2006 and is a political cone officer, is also an Arabic speaker and a former journalist. Before coming to Sudan, he prepared by taking the appropriate training and developing a Washington support network for his section's programs. By visiting the African Resource Service office in Paris, he established a conduit for books, films, and speakers that few PAOs outside of Francophone Africa are even aware of.

The section's LE staff is skilled and motivated and is breaking new ground in educational and cultural programming and press operations. A newly hired, computer-savvy LE staff member is being groomed for the twin roles of webmaster and information resource assistant. The Internet is in its infancy in Sudan, but the post, although still relying on hard-copy distribution of the Washington File and press releases, is positioning itself to use the impending impact of technology in the expanding Sudanese economy and to reach a new generation of Sudanese who had been lost to Western influence.

Educational and Cultural Initiatives

Even Sudanese leaders who oppose other U.S. government initiatives in their country have admitted that their educational system has deteriorated. They see the country as disadvantaged by the loss of English language capacity. The PAO is building on that awareness to develop an English language outreach effort. He is testing the waters in Washington and in several parts of Sudan for establishing American Corners, identifying venues for American book donations, and developing educational and cultural exchange activities, including even Fulbright and Humphrey Fellowship programs.

PAS Khartoum is working to reestablish contact with alumni of American exchange programs. The Fulbright and Humphrey programs have had distinguished alumni and great prestige in Sudan, and a modest noncommission Fulbright program

could succeed in Sudan. The post is making contacts to nominate for Humphrey Fellowships. The government of Sudan has been subject to sanctions since the 1990's. Because most educational and cultural institutions in the country are government run, giving grants and fellowships to Sudanese institutions and employees could be problematic. Further complicating the matter, areas in the South, Darfur, and some areas of eastern Sudan are exempt from these sanctions.

Recommendation 10: Embassy Khartoum should request, and the Office of the Legal Adviser and the Bureau of African Affairs should provide, a clarification of which public diplomacy activities and funds can be used in the various parts of Sudan in the context of current sanctions. (Action: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with L and AF)

Recommendation 11: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, should develop a plan for reestablishing the Sudanese Fulbright Program and on competing for Humphrey Fellowships in the context of the existing sanctions regime. (Action: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with ECA)

The post is eager to expand its International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP). It has nominated ten candidates for FY 2007, but it is unclear how many slots will be funded. The post has been active in debriefing visitors and in December 2006 re-created a mission-wide IVLP selection committee. Both the Secretary of State and Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs have directed that public diplomacy and public outreach be a part of every Foreign Service officer's responsibilities. The OIG team informally recommended that, for maximum impact, the IVLP selection committee be chaired by the DCM, that embassy elements' future allotments of nominees be subject to their diligence in debriefing and maintaining contact with their nominees, and that participation in the IVLP program and public outreach be written into the work requirements of mission officers. The nature of public outreach activities in Sudan will be subject to security concerns.

Management Operations

Public affairs work is operational, and increasingly the work of PAOs revolves around budgets, grants management, implementing electronic technology, and the logistics of programs. PAS Khartoum's "secret weapon" in a complex logistical environment has been the rehiring of a former LE staff member of the executive office of the U.S. Information Service. The employee works closely with the PAO, has updated needed computer skills, and works most effectively with the financial management, general services, and information technology offices at post and with Washington support offices to assure the PAO operates smoothly and has time to execute programs. At the OIG team's suggestion, PAS is simplifying its procurement procedures by initiating use of a purchase card.

A review of the financial and grants files showed PAS now has usable hard-copy and electronic files. It is making use of new software and is scanning records into computers to assure that there will be no recurrence of past inadequacies in record-keeping. The office had funds for four regular IVLP grants in FY 2006 but received support from Washington for ten additional grants. As the office is expanding grants activity to support local conferences and cultural programs, it will have to be even more attentive to grants management. The OIG team informally recommended that, beginning with the files for FY 2006, the post press all of its grantees to provide with their files a signed written report on their program.

The revitalized public diplomacy initiative is expanding its list of contacts. The PAO, with front office support, is encouraging the rest of the mission staff to implement the Secretary's encouragement of outreach efforts. The increase in contacts and programs will require a computerized contact-management system. The OIG team informally recommended PAS canvass other posts and investigate the variety of applications, such as Goldmine, that can serve PAS outreach, reporting, and mission-wide protocol needs.

The PAO has extended his tour from one to two years. His LE staff report that this extension has been a powerful factor in motivating them. This also indicates there will be a continuity in programming and interpersonal communication that has long been absent, to the detriment of the American image in the country. The PAO comes to the assignment with solid Arabic skills that mission PAOs have not had for years. To be effective in a society that has been aggressively Arabizing for two decades, the PAO must have these skills.

Recommendation 12: Embassy Khartoum should request, and the Bureaus of Human Resources and African Affairs should approve, designating the public affairs positions in Khartoum as Arabic-language designated positions. (Action: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with AF and HR)

Southern Sudan has distinct cultures and needs and a semiautonomous political and economic nature. In addition, PAS Khartoum is seeking to expand its outreach to the southern provinces that are exempt from sanctions. However, there is no full-time, public affairs LE staff position to support the public diplomacy needs of the consulate and appropriate programs from Khartoum.

Recommendation 13: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should create a Juba-based locally employed staff position for a public affairs assistant to report to the consul general in Juba and seek to fill it as soon as logistical support is available in Juba. (Action: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with AF)

The mission has begun NEC construction, and the foundation is already built. The size and quality of the facility will affect future public diplomacy programming. The mission is planning an increase in PAS staff size and the development of a working Information Resource Center. The OIG team informally recommended that embassy leadership and OBO representatives review the space allocations and plans for public access.

Information Activities

The chargé is an effective communicator in English and Arabic. He has made well-targeted appearances on the local media, but has been careful not to overdo it, given the number of high-level American voices that are heard in Sudan. During this inspection, the President's Special Envoy, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, New Mexico's governor, and former President Carter all visited Sudan. For all the differences between the U.S. and Sudanese governments, the mission has access and open lines of communication to the most senior officials and the media. The challenge is in making sure that Sudan receives a coherent American message.

Embassy Khartoum has reduced the duplication of media reporting within the mission. The PAO does media reaction cables for the embassy but only when there is a specific issue of interest. The monitoring of the national media is now summarized in the one-page, daily Sudan Morning News e-mail alert. The post uses all the new materials available to missions through the INFOCENTRAL web site and the Under Secretary for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy's Rapid Response Unit and Echo Chamber reports. USAID has just added an American citizen development outreach coordinator to its staff, which should bring new assets and expertise to informing the host country about American assistance to Sudan.

The PAO has established a proactive notional travel plan to reach the different program venues in this vast country. He has submitted a Public Diplomacy Action Plan that incorporates a program calendar, the elements of the former United States Information Service Institutional Analysis, and a written link between Mission Performance Plan goals and PAS operations. The OIG team informally recommended that he include PAS in the mission reporting plan so that, prior to the arrival of his successor, his assessments of the state of the educational system and the media can be shared with the mission and Washington as a part of the annual reporting cycle.

Broadcasting Board of Governors Operations

There is no Voice of America bureau or other established Broadcasting Board of Governors' presence in Sudan, but Voice of America's English stringers and Radio Sawa's Arabic stringers, from other African offices, pass through Sudan, particularly through Darfur and the South.

In July 2006, representatives of Radio Sawa, the Broadcasting Board of Governors' youth-oriented Arabic-language radio network, met in Khartoum with officials of the government-run Sudan Radio and Television Corporation to win permission from the Sudanese government to broadcast in the popular FM frequency to Sudanese audiences. A memorandum of understanding was signed by both parties (the chargé and Sudan Radio and Television Corporation's director general) on July 12, 2006. The Radio Sawa office in Tangier, Morocco, issued an invoice for \$100,000 to the Sudan Radio and Television Corporation for the initial construction of transmission facilities. In January 2007 two Radio Sawa representatives came to Khartoum to identify transmitter locations. Sudanese authorities identified a transmitter and frequency, and transmission from a temporary, leased facility could begin as early as the spring of 2007.

CONSULAR AFFAIRS

Embassy Khartoum's basic consular objectives (including a specific antiterrorism effort) focus on protecting American citizens and safeguarding U.S. borders. The FY 2008 Mission Performance Plan offers no consular unit involvement in policy or functional strategy and lacks objectives targeting these goals. A recently arrived vice consul, the first Khartoum-resident consular officer since 1996, manages the unit. A designated mid-level consul in Cairo supplies first-line support for the vice consul. The embassy provides American citizens, refugee/asylee, and limited nonimmigrant visa (NIV) services. The Department authorizes special coordination with Embassy Cairo for other NIV and immigrant visa applications. The constraints on the consular unit include supervisory oversight, LE staff skill levels, service limitations, computer systems issues, and physical space. The OIG inspection team helped resolve the supervisory concern, but thorny variables still affect the other issues. The OIG team made several informal recommendations to enhance performance, including better employee direction and training; development of a formal outreach, representation, and reporting program; and enhanced file maintenance. Moving to the NEC will offer more solutions for this consular unit, but until then contingency plans must be made. Coordination between the consular unit and other sections at post is satisfactory. The unit's overall effectiveness in supplying competent and timely services is within acceptable limits, given the conditions described above.

Consular Management Issues

One vice consul and three LE staff work in Embassy Khartoum's consular unit. The vice consul is responsible for the section's sensitive materials. Until October 2006, a circuit-riding consul (position 30-5015-148 on Khartoum's current staffing pattern) who is based in Cairo supervised the unit and visited about once a month. One legacy Khartoum LE staff position exists in Cairo as well. Under the former indirect arrangement, Khartoum's senior LE staff member failed to keep his professional knowledge current or properly manage his two subordinates. Employees also lacked computer skills and performance benchmarks. Managers advocated that the LE staff receive career-related instruction, and two employees completed some training. The absence of a resident consul, however, prevented regular or adequate follow-up.

On the vice consul's arrival, lines of authority required clarification, including the tasking of assignments, LE staff performance report preparation, and responsibility for overall planning. During the inspection, the consular officers successfully organized these issues, and the vice consul began work on establishing authority,

revising position descriptions, and identifying, implementing, tracking, and holding employees to training programs. The vice consul encourages employees to develop professional skills via distance-learning consular courses offered by the Foreign Service Institute and by participating in Washington-based and regional training. The unit uses on-the-job training as well. Concise, written standard operating procedures would assist employees as they train and would serve as ready reference material and help ensure consistent services. The vice consul accepted the OIG team's informal recommendation to prepare such written guidance.

The Department has not authorized the consular unit to perform most NIV services. The reasons include inadequate security, insufficient client space, absence of a resident mid-level consul, poor basic and advanced functional skills of the LE staff, the need for additional employees, and many other factors. Fixing most of these concerns would necessitate massive chancery upgrades, reconfiguration, additional employees, and training. The Department believes that an NEC is the first step in restoring full NIV services. Once the NEC opens, consular positions sited in Cairo would return to Khartoum, paving the way for resumption of normal consular functioning. At the time of the inspection, however, bilateral diplomatic sniping resulted in the suspension of NEC construction. Because the NEC is not a sure thing, and consular policy issues such as Sudanese sensitivity on visa eligibility issues enter the mix, a proactive planning process is necessary. U.S. embassies in Kenya, Uganda, and Egypt that shoulder part of Embassy Khartoum's consular workload should be involved.

Recommendation 14: The Bureau of Consular Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Khartoum, Embassy Cairo, Embassy Kampala, and Embassy Nairobi, should prepare a detailed, formal plan for reestablishing full consular services in Khartoum. The plan should include contingency arrangements if the new embassy compound is not available, as anticipated. (Action: CA, in coordination with Embassy Khartoum, Embassy Cairo, Embassy Kampala, and Embassy Nairobi)

Khartoum's consular unit receives about 20 print communications and about 150 telephone inquiries per week. Dealing with these inquiries and supporting consular computer applications requires good working-level computer systems skills. Presently, the embassy's information management section supports the consular unit. Information management employees, with Bureau of Consular Affairs' help desk

assistance, strive to fix malfunctions, but recurring basic problems plague the unit. The OIG team counseled post leadership to provide training for the unit's employees and to have employees from Cairo travel to Khartoum to provide on-the-job guidance.

American Citizens Services

A Department warning, last updated in October 2006, advised Americans to avoid travel to Sudan. About 370 U.S. citizens, many of them U.S. and Sudanese dual-nationals living in the consular district, have registered with the consular unit, and the vice consul estimates that about 3,000 Americans live and work in Sudan. In FY 2006, the consular unit adjudicated approximately 60 consular reports of the birth of an American citizen abroad, 200 passport requests, and performed roughly 150 notarial services. The unit carefully scrutinizes passport and report of birth applications and accompanying documents, and the National Passport Center quickly responds to requests for services.

Americans in the consular district may encounter minor or serious problems. The consular unit needs to enhance its working relationships with local authorities to help resolve such problems. Representational, outreach, and reporting plans support this effort; the vice consul began this work during the inspection.

Catastrophes could affect U.S. citizens in the consular district, and the vice consul began work on a disaster assistance plan during the inspection. The warden system meets requirements for developing effective emergency safety and/or evacuation plans for Americans. When emergencies occur, Embassy Khartoum coordinates with U.S. and friendly nations' embassies in neighboring countries to protect Americans and keep concerned parties and the Bureau of Consular Affairs informed. Such measures are effective.

Visas

Nonimmigrant Visas

Rigorous visa applicant assessment protects U.S. borders by identifying and excluding terrorists, reducing illegal immigration, and encouraging bona fide travel to the United States. Sudan's inclusion on the list of state sponsors of terrorism triggers additional name and identity research for almost every visa applicant (as Section 306 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 provides). The Department in 2005 granted authority for Embassy Khartoum to examine

diplomatic, international organization, and U.S. government-sponsored exchange visitor NIV applications. On a case-by-case, exceptional circumstance basis, and upon the Department's approval, the embassy may adjudicate visitor visa requests. The consular unit evaluated about 460 applications in 2006. This number will likely remain fairly constant until the NEC becomes available. Overall, about 10 percent of Embassy Khartoum's NIV applicants fail to qualify for visas. The unit focuses on eligibility decisions, emphasizing legal/procedural parameters and antiterrorist concerns. The vice consul adheres to requirements for lawful and fair eligibility screening while improving efficiency.

Sudanese residents wishing to apply for all other types of NIVs may submit applications to Embassy Cairo. Embassy Khartoum's consular district residents enjoy special visa-application benefits there. Embassy Cairo's consular district for visa processing includes those who are resident in Sudan, and applicants may schedule visa interviews in Cairo. Khartoum's consul, based in Cairo, manages these cases and has specialized knowledge of Sudan. Applicants travel to Cairo for interviews, and if successful, generally return to Sudan to await the outcome of their Section 306 security processing. Such inquiries usually take a few days but sometimes require several months. After security processing, Embassy Cairo posts Sudanese visa candidates' names on its web site, either inviting individuals to provide additional information or to send their passports to Cairo for visa issuance.

Immigrant and Other Visas

Embassy Cairo adjudicates all immigrant and Diversity Immigrant Program visas for Sudanese residents. Embassy Khartoum processed around 300 refugee and asylee "following to join" cases in FY 2006.

Antifraud Program

A large percentage of Sudanese applicants fail to qualify for visa issuance in Cairo. Candidates may submit sham documents or use false identities in attempts to qualify for visas. All applicants must be evaluated for possible terrorist or criminal involvement and other forms of disqualifying behavior. The consular unit performs antifraud work, such as verifying identity and citizenship, substantiating entitlement to visa classification, and authenticating family relationships. To assess visa eligibility determinations, in addition to the personal clearance work, the consular unit and security office investigate suspicious applications. Almost no opportunities exist to examine cases outside of Khartoum. Sudan's inclusion of the list of state sponsors of terrorism prompts additional name and identity research for almost every visa

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Embassy Khartoum Resources, FY 2006

Agency	U.S. Direct-Hire Staff	U.S. Local Hire Staff	LE Staff	Total Staff	Total Funding	Notes
State – Diplomatic and Consular Programs	30	0	13	43	\$4,100,600	(1)
State – ICASS	6	0	235	241	\$6,292,900	(2)
State – OBO	5	0	42	47	\$2,041,500	(3)
State – Diplomatic Security	2	0	122	124	\$1,400,800	
State – Public Diplomacy	2	0	6	8	\$479,900	
State – Representation	0	0	0	0	\$38,500	
State – Public Diplomacy Representation	0	0	0	0	\$9,500	
Defense Intelligence Agency	5	0	3	8	\$312,140	
NAVY – Country Coordination Element	3	0	0	3	\$175,000	(4)
Air Force – Joint Liaison Element	4	0	0	4	\$254,000	(4)
USAID – Operating Expenses	17*	0	18*	35	\$6,314,000	
USAID – Darfur Field Office	0	0	3	3	\$108,000,000	
USAID – International Disaster Assistance	0	0	9	9	\$125,000,000	
USAID - PL 480	0	0	3	3	\$390,979,000	
USAID – Office of Transitional Initiative	1	0	1	2	\$8,000,000	
USAID – Development Assistance	0	0	0	0	\$90,692,000	
USAID – Economic Support Funds	0	0	0	0	\$19,800,000	
TOTAL	75	0	455	530	\$763,889,840	(5)

Notes: Chart includes mission staffing and funding for Department of State, Defense attaché office, Navy Country Coordination Element, Air Force Joint Liaison Element, and USAID. USAID funds are allotted to Regional Financial Management Center Nairobi for Sudan, including Khartoum and Juba. Due to nonavailability of funding target for FY 2007, actual total funding for FY 2006 was provided.

* USAID operating expenses included six direct hires in Juba, 11 direct hires in Khartoum, seven LE staff in Khartoum, and 11 LE staff in Juba. USAID funding amounts were provided by USAID’s Foreign Service national financial specialist.

- (1) Diplomatic and Consular Programs funding includes Worldwide Security Upgrade funds for an assistant regional security officer position.
- (2) ICASS funding includes funding for local guard program and leases.
- (3) OBO funding includes NEC Worldwide Security Upgrade funds.
- (4) Funding for the Navy Country Coordination Element and Air Force Joint Liaison Element provided using Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests.
- (5) Other Funds: \$90 Million for PA&E, AMIS contract and \$450,000 from S/CRS and AF Executive Office in support of the Darfur Peace Agreement.

MANAGEMENT SERVICES

Management of administrative services at Embassy Khartoum is difficult. The resource chart above, reflecting the multiple sources of funding, demonstrates the complexity of embassy management operations. The relationship with the Sudanese government adds to the frustration in customs clearances and obtaining visas for TDY assistance. At the time of the inspection, the NEC faced possible termination. Without the NEC, the direction and scope of management services will change because the embassy does not meet security standards. The consulate in Juba and the outreach effort in El Fasher will demand more management support as each evolves.

Despite the lack of infrastructure in Sudan, management has developed a reasonable level of administrative services. The scores on the quality of life survey verified this since the averages reported were only slightly below the worldwide averages of posts inspected by the OIG. Considering the operating environment, these scores reflect positively on post management. Pouch services and the cafeteria received the lowest scores. Human resources and finance received the highest scores. General services and facilities, however, require more hands-on management by the management officer. In interviews, officers expressed concern about safety and maintenance of housing. Management controls, discussed below, also need to be improved. Specific attention should be given to OIG recommendations on R&R travel with respect to Department directives. Resources do not appear to be problematic because Khartoum's high international profile compels the Department to support most of its needs.

Morale is high. The positive change in morale since the last OIG inspection three years ago is due in part to the leadership skills of the management officer, who understands what is necessary to complete tasks where there is limited local infrastructure. The management officer is engaged at all levels of embassy operations. These skills are critical in a post where, despite the constant demands and distractions of the environment, 13 USAID employees have been integrated into embassy administrative services and their office moved inside the chancery. This relocation is no small task for any embassy.

The OIG team does not believe there will be a significant improvement in future management services or attention to internal controls unless the post has competent American staff to establish appropriate controls. The one-year tour of duty results in little more than half a year of boots-on-the-ground service for American officers. Assignments to Sudan are viewed by some officers as less desirable than those to Iraq and Afghanistan. As the post is in AF's purview, there are few perceived rewards to be gained by bidding on positions in Sudan. The solution

is to assign experienced officers or use a pool of TDY officers having proven competencies to serve the management sections where deficiencies exist. At the time of the inspection the most deficient service at Embassy Khartoum was in the GSO. Without competent American officers, the mission will have difficulty achieving the professionalism required at such a critical, high-visibility post.

Recommendation 15: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should assign an experienced supervisory general service officer on either a permanent or temporary basis to assist in stabilizing the post's procurement, housing, inventory, and motor pool operations. (Action: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with AF)

Rightsizing

Embassy Khartoum is a strong proponent of rightsizing. It uses the National Security Decision Directive-38 process effectively to determine the validity of positions to be established at post and has made strides in developing systems of shared administrative services in Khartoum and Juba. As a result, the Department is the service provider in Khartoum, and USAID is the primary service provider in Juba. A final ICASS contract for Juba remains a work in progress. USAID joined the housing pool in Khartoum, a major step in consolidating services.

The future of the NEC and NCC, detailed elsewhere in this report, is the major determinant of rightsizing in Sudan. The size, location, and security concerns of the existing interim facility in Khartoum and the desired interim facility in Juba will not accommodate the staffing levels envisioned by the rightsizing reviews of mission Sudan. The future of the footprints of the embassy and consulate are therefore contingent on the completion of the NEC and NCC.

Locally Employed Staff Issues

A well-organized LE staff committee meets regularly with management and believes management will take steps to ensure that inflation is covered in pay raises. At the time of the inspection, a spot survey for inflation and salary increases was pending in the Department. The last rate increase was in October 2006. The pay of the LE staff is one of the best in the country, and its five-day workweek is considered a real plus.

The LE staff committee requested the OIG team's assistance in determining whether danger pay was a possibility for certain positions. The Department's response to the request described how the LE staff, who face a significant level of harassment due to employment with the U.S. government, may qualify for a Unique Condition of Work Allowance in accordance with 3 FAH-2 H-227, B. Salary Schedule Determination, Section 17.

Recommendation 16: Embassy Khartoum should review its locally employed staff positions to determine whether any meet the requirements for a Unique Condition of Work Allowance, prepare a justification for those meeting the requirements, and send the justification to the Department for approval. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Training gaps result from the closure of the embassy from 1996 to 2002. Most notably, these gaps are in technical skills and language skills, both of which would allow LE staff members to obtain higher competency levels. Leadership and management training would also allow LE staff members' supervisors to assume greater responsibility and accountability.

In the course of the inspection, the embassy began updating its comprehensive training plan to identify training needs. The results will provide a baseline for a sustained training program for each person, as requested by the Bureau of Human Resources. Once completed, funds should be allocated by the post and additional requests made to the bureau. The FY 2007 budget presents a struggle because a congressional Continuing Resolution may be in effect all year. However, a lack of trained LE staff contributes to poor service and inefficiencies. The post has not examined all expenditures and worked with AF to provide necessary funding for training. Additionally, cross-cultural differences are viewed as a problem. There was one episode of violence on the job this year, and cultural differences exist among staff who are from different regions of Sudan.

Recommendation 17: Embassy Khartoum should develop an ongoing, funded training program for the English language, technical skills, and cultural diversity for locally employed staff and American officers. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Human Resources Office

The human resources office includes an officer, two assistants, and one clerk. Since 2003, human resources has hired over 100 LE staff, established policies, and developed Department programs. The human resources officer is a third-tour officer with a strong background and experience outside the Department and should provide good support to management during this posting.

In general, requirements are up to date. A visitors' handbook has been developed for the continual flow of visitors. During the inspection there were usually 40-some visitors, including those on TDY assignments, each day. The major change for HR will begin in May 2007 with the change of the tour of duty to two years with accompanying adult family members and three R&R trips. One-year tours cause a lack of continuity. Section chiefs are often first-tour officers who do not have management experience. The post's danger pay (25 percent), differential (25 percent), and cost of living (35 percent) allowances are up to date. Two new American positions, an assistant regional security officer, and two political-economic officers, have been assigned as part of a global repositioning of resources. Since 2005 there have been no curtailments.

The LE staff handbook was published in January 2007 and a Defined Contribution Plan has been initiated for LE staff members' retirements. The embassy policy on awards was up to date as of November 2006. A new \$750 cash award for the LE staff each quarter has been added to the program. This type of innovation is essential to good management and motivation.

Currently, the management officer is the final signature on a departing employee's checkout sheet. Tickets are sometimes issued before all bills have been paid or a provision has been made to pay the bill for the employee upon departure. This function should be the responsibility of the HR office. The OIG team made an informal recommendation on this.

Financial Management Office

The financial management office is staffed with one American financial management officer, a financial specialist with strong experience, an accountant, two voucher examiners, and a Class B cashier. Two employees have just been hired, and the focus is on training and development. The quality of leadership provided by a second-tour

officer was demonstrated in two distinct and difficult arenas. The first was establishing electronic funds transfers (EFT). The use of EFTs eliminates the work in preparing cash payrolls and eliminates internal control vulnerabilities for cash payments to LE staff members. Each pay period, more EFT accounts are established, and by April 2007 all LE staff were expected to be receiving their pay via EFTs.

The second issue demonstrating the officer's leadership is still in process and involves revising the policy for charging TDY visitors while at post. At present, the TDY policy is standard for all posts. Under the policy, billing begins after the TDY-er's 61st day at post or when the total assessed bill is greater than \$2,500. The ICASS council is the final approving authority for a policy change, but the change being requested by the officer is a progressive one and is endorsed by the OIG team. The post averages 40 or more TDY visitors a day, and they rarely stay 61 days. Nonetheless, they still use an array of administrative services, most notably, motor pool, cashiering, cell phones, medical unit, and airport expediting. The visitors use ICASS services and do not pay for them.

A proposal to develop a fixed daily rate to pay for a basket of administrative services that starts the day the TDY visitor arrives at post is waiting for approval by the Department. The ICASS council at post approved the policy, but the ICASS Service Center says that legal approval is needed. The post has not received a decision from the Legal Adviser, although payment out of the Department's appropriation to support other agencies could violate the law. Until there is a decision, the post will try to direct-charge all TDY visitors where possible.

In view of the resource implications for the entire Department, the Office of the Legal Adviser needs to assess the ICASS Service Center's proposal. If so, the TDY-charging policy proposed by the ICASS Service Center should be approved.

Recommendation 18: The Office of the Legal Adviser should decide on the proposal from Embassy Khartoum to develop a fixed daily rate for temporary duty employees that covers the cost of a basket of administrative services beginning the day the employees arrive at post. (Action: L)

International Cooperative Administrative Support Services

Embassy Khartoum uses the ICASS Lite module and services six agencies. The ICASS council meets quarterly and is led by an experienced officer who understands the management process. Minutes of the meetings are prepared, and actions are tracked from meeting to meeting. The council's charter is current, and all agencies have signed the subscription of services. The memorandum of understanding between the embassy and the ICASS service provider, the management section, was signed October 1, 2006. One innovative feature of the ICASS council is its mini-sessions to review cost centers with the provider, serviced agencies, and local employees. The OIG team received no negative comments on the ICASS process at post.

Juba Issues Regarding International Cooperative Administrative Support Services

Embassy Khartoum's management office and USAID's Sudan Field Office have been engaged since October 2005 in negotiating and establishing shared administrative services for Consulate General Juba. In Juba, the lack of infrastructure and services, and the need to coordinate between Department and USAID elements in Khartoum, Juba, and Nairobi have made the task more difficult. Some progress has been made, but shortcomings remain that affect the ability of consulate general personnel to perform their duties.

Many of the administrative and logistical problems in Juba result from the ICASS system's state of flux. There is consensus that USAID will provide the majority of services, and the Department will maintain responsibility for others. In November 2006, Embassy Khartoum advised Washington of a joint Department-USAID recommendation regarding designation of ICASS service providers by category. However, the designations appear to be outdated already, and many service descriptions and standards are incomplete, unclear, or nonexistent. They also fail to meet the requirements of 6 FAH-5 H-213. The result is misunderstanding and confusion on the part of service providers and customers. Furthermore, USAID Juba depends largely on its Sudan Field Office in Nairobi for administrative and logistical support although Juba is a constituent post of Embassy Khartoum.

Recommendation 19: Embassy Khartoum should develop and implement a shared administrative services support system for Consulate General Juba that assigns service responsibility, describes each service, defines standards of performance, and provides support and oversight from Embassy Khartoum, not Embassy Nairobi. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

One result of the ineffective shared services system manifests itself in communications. As the ICASS provider of information management technical support in Juba, USAID has done yeoman's work in establishing a voice and Internet network in an environment with only a rudimentary telecommunications infrastructure. It does not, however, provide the consistent, reliable, quality access to the Department's unclassified intranet system that Department personnel in Juba deem essential. Department users access the Department's network using a KeyFOB authentication system that is cumbersome, slow, and intermittent.

The existing radio network is also inadequate. Given the unreliable local cellular phone system and the operational environment, radios are an important means of communication for personnel who leave the consulate compound. Personnel in Juba have cobbled together the current system from old equipment, and it has limited range and capability. USAID procured a new system, and the equipment is at post. There has been disagreement on how it should be programmed and installed, thereby causing deployment delays. This matter is also discussed in the classified annex to this report.

Recommendation 20: Embassy Khartoum should develop and implement a plan that will give Department employees at Consulate General Juba consistent, reliable, quality access to the Department's Sensitive But Unclassified networks. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 21: Embassy Khartoum should coordinate the programming and deployment for the new radio network equipment that will provide adequate radio communications for Consulate General Juba's personnel. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

American personnel use a private clinic in Juba under contractual arrangements. In the short time this arrangement has been operational, employees appear satisfied. However, oversight of the LE staff members' health program is less successful. The November 2006 joint Department-USAID recommendation on ICASS assigned this service to the Department. Considering the health hazards in Juba, such as malaria and cholera, there is a clear need for regularly scheduled visits by a health practitioner. Among other services, the practitioner could develop and implement preventive medical programs, provide appropriate direct medical care to consulate general personnel, survey facilities in Juba that may be used by consulate general personnel, and coordinate as appropriate on the LE staff health benefit program to facilitate reimbursements that have not been paid.

Recommendation 22: Embassy Khartoum should develop and implement a health services program for Consulate General Juba. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

GENERAL SERVICES OPERATIONS

Several factors hindered the development of the nascent GSO, which includes two Foreign Service officers and 72 LE staff members. The supervisory general services officer lacked experience and was absent from post for over 40 percent of the possible work days during a one-year tour due to R&R, annual leave, and other authorized absences. The frequent and lengthy absences disrupted continuity in the section. The GSO's review and corrections to ratify approximately 300 unauthorized procurement commitments in 2006 was time-consuming and prevented needed attention to the motor pool, inventories, and housing. In addition, the GSO's workload spiked in 2006 due to increases in U.S. staff levels and large numbers of TDY and VIP visitors. Finally, the office's LE staff are still relatively new employees who have not developed to their potential and could benefit from more effective supervision, technical training, and professional development.

Notwithstanding the considerable challenges, the GSO has made progress in automating some business processes, such as fuel consumption and accountability, facilities management, and expendable supplies accountability. The GSO has not yet fully implemented the Department's Web Post Administrative Software Suite

(WebPASS), which has been designated as the standard for future development of overseas automation tools supporting administrative tasks. Doing so would improve management controls and increase productivity.

Recommendation 23: Embassy Khartoum should develop and implement a plan to use, to the extent practicable, the Department's Web Post Administrative Software Suite. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

The performance of the first-tour assistant general services officer was also noteworthy, since she has provided the main string of continuity during her time at post. A positive attitude, quickness to learn, and plain common sense have earned this officer the respect of LE colleagues.

Travel

A local agent of Carlson-Wagonlit, Olympia Travel Agency, provides travel services to Embassy Khartoum, based on a memorandum of understanding. The agency has an office in the chancery building that is staffed by one of its employees. The agency employee is supervised by the management officer, rather than the travel supervisor, an LE staffer. The agent said he had not received training on U.S. government travel regulations or practices and was unfamiliar with basic information such as contract fares or whether his agency was capable of booking them.

Recommendation 24: Embassy Khartoum should provide information to its local travel agent on pertinent government travel regulations and Department and post policies, in accordance with the memorandum of understanding with its travel management center. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 25: Embassy Khartoum should name the locally employed staff member who is travel supervisor as the supervisor of the travel management center employee, with responsibility for oversight and for providing pertinent information regarding travel regulations and policies. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

The embassy policy regarding R&R travel, in this time of budget constraints, is not the most cost effective one. The embassy's travel management center does not take advantage of contract fares, when available, which results in higher costs to the government. In one case involving R&R travel from Khartoum to California, travel was estimated to cost over \$8,000. Use of the city-pair fare for the leg from London to California could have resulted in a savings of approximately \$3,800 and would have complied with guidance in 14 FAM 531.5.

The embassy also uses restricted business-class fares, but it does not use restricted economy-class fares. Posts now have the option, in accordance with 14 FAM 564.2, to use restricted or penalty fares, if deemed practical and economical to the government.

Recommendation 26: Embassy Khartoum should establish and implement procedures for using contract fares whenever possible, including for rest and recuperation travel. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 27: Embassy Khartoum should review its policy regarding the use of restricted and penalty airfares and, as appropriate, provide its travel management center with a written policy for the use of these fares. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Employees may elect to travel to any U.S. city for authorized R&R. In some cases, employees take circuitous routes and stop at points abroad. According to 14 FAM 531.5, such travel should be funded on a cost-constructed basis against the designated relief point, which in this case is London. Embassy Khartoum is funding such travel on a cost-constructed basis against the estimated cost of travel to the U.S. point, normally a much higher amount.

Recommendation 28: Embassy Khartoum should review its rest and recuperation travel policy for compliance with Department regulations and amend it as appropriate. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 29: Embassy Khartoum should review past rest and recuperation travel for compliance with regulations and take corrective action as appropriate. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Motor Pool

Motor pool operations are generally well run. The dispatchers allocate their assets efficiently 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and LE drivers properly record daily vehicle usage. The motor pool operates three shifts, and there is a “down room” in a building adjacent to the chancery. Drivers have access to two OpenNet Plus workstations in the down room but cannot log onto the network after the close of business daily or on weekends. Swing- and night-shift drivers therefore are denied access to e-mail, Intranet, and distance learning opportunities. The OIG team informally recommended that the embassy arrange network access for these drivers. The fuel station is at the GSO compound, and the pump operator demonstrated compliance with procedures that were safe and ensured accountability.

Until recently, personnel were not allowed to have personally owned vehicles at post, and the embassy provided on and off-duty transportation services to employees. This is allowable under 14 FAM 418.2-2, which addresses other authorized use of government-owned vehicles. The chief of mission also authorizes the assignment of 26 self-drive vehicles to specific employees or sections, but operators are not keeping usage records in accordance with 14 FAM 418.6-1.

Recommendation 30: Embassy Khartoum should develop and implement a motor vehicle usage policy that includes operator maintenance and usage responsibilities, particularly for self-drive vehicles. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Property Management

Property management has deficient storage facilities and records, and the warehouse lacks proper shelving; large and heavy items are stacked one upon another. With limited mechanical handling equipment and insufficient shelving, the retrieving of large items could pose a safety problem. Many boxes are directly on the

warehouse floor, not on pallets to protect them from water damage during the rainy season. Proper storage and better handling equipment would safeguard the property from damage and create safer operating conditions for placement and retrieval of property. Department criteria on this matter are laid out in 4 FAM 413.7

Recommendation 31: Embassy Khartoum should implement to the extent practicable the Department of State criteria pertaining to warehousing and property storage, to include proper shelving and/or racking, material handling equipment, ventilation, storage for flammable materials, and overall safety and security procedures. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Housing

The number of USAID and OBO staff members in Khartoum increased significantly during 2006. As a result, the GSO focused much of its attention and assets on increasing the housing pool by a total of 15 apartments and one single-family unit. Locating adequate housing units in a very constrained real estate market and making the units ready for occupancy are considerable challenges. The effort taxed the capabilities of the general services officers and the facilities manager, but the result is a housing pool that is suitable and reasonably well maintained.

FACILITIES MANAGEMENT OFFICE

The facilities maintenance office is critical to ensuring the proper upkeep of office and residential properties. The post's staffing pattern includes a facility manager position, but so far only TDY personnel have served in it, generally for six-month periods. A permanent officer is due to arrive in the summer of 2007 on a two-year assignment, which should bring some continuity to leadership and management of the section. Until his arrival, the bureau plans to continue TDY coverage. Operationally, there is a facilities maintenance handbook, and the post is developing a new make-ready checklist. There are 41 LE staff members, whom the current facilities manager considers to be knowledgeable and dependable workers. Their workload has increased significantly, however, prompting the current facilities manager to request additional positions. Post management has acknowledged that the additional staff needs and related hiring will be priorities for the next facility manager.

Safety, Health, and Environmental Management

OBO's Safety, Health, and Environmental Management (SHEM) and Fire Safety offices have surveyed the post and issued reports, but more work must be done to emphasize safety, enforce standards, and train personnel. In one case, OIG inspectors found large containers of battery acid stored in a storeroom in the GSO compound. The substance was not in a separate storage unit for hazardous materials, was not marked as hazardous, and at least one container was uncapped. In another case, involving termite infestation of four U.S. government-owned townhouses, the senior general services officer arranged for a local contractor to administer insecticide at the properties and did not consult the post occupational safety and health officer to ensure that the treatment and materials complied with OBO's Integrated Pest Management program. In following up on the March 2005 SHEM report, the OIG team noted that facilities management had not corrected deficiencies to some machinery and had no records of compliance.

During the inspection, an LE staff transportation and motor vehicle specialist from Embassy Cairo arrived to conduct defensive and safe-driving training for motor pool personnel. This type of training represents a very positive move in post's safety program.

Recommendation 32: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should correct safety, health, environmental, and fire safety conditions in the workplace and residences. (Action: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with OBO)

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Embassy Khartoum maintains a comprehensive information management program to support its 243 authorized users. The information management officer and his staff provide excellent service to customers. Information resources, telecommunications, and the mission's web pages were rated high on OIG's management questionnaire. However, the OIG team found several key areas requiring management attention, including communications among Juba and El Fasher and the embassy, mail and pouch operations, radio programs, (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2) , and equipment inventory. The OIG team also reviewed the embassy's information program center operations. The results of that review are reported in a classified annex to this report.

(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

Mail and Pouch

Embassy Khartoum has had two major security incidents that risked technically compromising classified pouch shipments. One incident took place in July 2006 and the second in January 2007. In these incidents, Sudanese Foreign Ministry authorities refused tarmac access to embassy personnel, airport customs officials solicited bribes, and baggage handlers attempted to move the pouches without their escorts. In the second incident, the classified pouch was technically compromised by being out of sight of cleared Americans for approximately 30 minutes. The embassy immediately reported both incidents to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. During this inspection, the DCM met with appropriate Sudanese government officials to assure the security of classified pouches by securing tarmac access passes and seeking assistance from airport management. The embassy is developing a step-by-step plan for dealing with future incidents.

Radio Check Program

There is inadequate participation from the embassy community in the radio check program, which could negate the program's effectiveness. The regional security officer conducts monthly radio checks. The participation rate for the embassy and other agencies averages around 20 to 25 percent. Additionally, the regional security officer could not provide a written procedure for performing radio checks. The OIG team informally recommended that the embassy increase management support for the program and develop and implement procedures for the radio check program.

INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY

(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

Recommendation 33: (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

Equipment Inventory

The embassy's equipment inventory process needs improvement. Inventory of unclassified equipment was not performed annually and unclassified computer equipment lacked Nonexpendable Property Application identification numbers. Additionally, the inventory of unclassified equipment was inaccurate regarding the equipment on hand and serial numbers. During the inspection, the inventory was performed and Nonexpendable Property Application numbers were assigned.

Records Management

The information management officer was not aware of, nor had he received training in, his responsibilities for records management. Additionally, the embassy does not have an established records disposal program. The OIG team made an informal recommendation that the information management officer, as post records coordinator, receive training in records management and establish a records disposal program.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Community Liaison Office

No formal position has been established for the community liaison office coordinator. However, even without adult family members, embassy management has seen the need for recreational activity. American staff work long hours with few outside sources of entertainment or opportunity for outreach in the community. As a result, the nurse in the medical unit is part-time CLO coordinator. Having lived in Khartoum for over 25 years, she is both knowledgeable and committed to activities for post staff that can be managed within the security restrictions. With the assistance of American officers, the embassy has begun a project to assist an orphanage. This type of outreach is a positive direction for mission staff. The post has identified nine positions for American family members. The Caravan, the monthly post newsletter, is helpful and informative. OIG's quality of life questionnaires rated the usefulness of the CLO well above the worldwide averages.

Overseas Schools

(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6) , is accredited from grades K through 9, and will undergo evaluation next year for accreditation for K through 12. It also has started the development of the International Baccalaureate program. KAS offers advanced placement courses in calculus, physics, and art and plans to add economics in the next academic year.

KAS has 223 children enrolled, representing 40 nationalities. Seventeen percent of the students are American, 17 percent are Sudanese, and the remainder is from other countries. The teaching staff numbers 35.

KAS's latest grant from the Department totaled \$20,000. The Department also provided security upgrade grants that were used to build a brick wall around the school compound, install shatter-resistant window film, purchase a public address system, and provide a radio that is on the embassy's network. In addition, the embassy has provided a Thuraya satellite telephone for emergency use.

The school's office manager indicated that the relationship with the embassy was very good, and that the school appreciated the assistance and support the embassy provides. She mentioned specifically the chargé's participation in the school's recent

50th anniversary celebration and the PAO's assistance. She said the school could use some assistance with book shipments, a subject that she plans to pursue with embassy contacts.

Medical

The embassy medical unit, lead by a locally hired, Western-trained nurse provides treatment of minor injuries, some routine lab work, immunizations, some common medicines and prescription drugs, counseling, and referral services. The local post medical advisor is with the regional medical officer, based in Cairo. Hospitals are used only in extreme emergencies, as those with serious illness and injuries are evacuated to London. In the last year, there were no evacuations of post staff. On the workplace and quality of life questionnaires, the medical unit was rated well above the worldwide average. The need to expand oversight of health services in Juba is covered elsewhere in the report.

American Employees Recreation and Welfare Association

The employee association is well managed and has a property on the Blue Nile that is an oasis, providing a true recreational break for embassy employees. The facility also has the embassy swimming pool, maintained by the GSO, and a parking lot. Fifty-two members and invitees use the facility. Adequate inventory controls are in place. However, at the time of the inspection, the annual outside audit of the association's financial statement for FY 2006 was underway.

Equal Employment Opportunity/Federal Women's Program

American employees reported that Embassy Khartoum's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) program met their expectations. The EEO coordinator, who completed the required training program in November 2006, said no employees registered EEO complaints or sought counseling in the past year. During the inspection, the coordinator began developing a program to provide an EEO-type resource for LE staffers, as required by 97 State 53229. The OIG team suggested contacting neighboring U.S. missions for information on creating such a program. The Federal Women's Program coordinator said no one sought her assistance with Federal Women's Program issues. Coordinators were publicizing EEO and Federal Women's Program materials and guidance mission-wide in the course of the inspection.

MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

Embassy Khartoum has completed and submitted its risk management questionnaires. The scores were relatively high, but the OIG inspectors noted some areas where management controls could be strengthened. In some cases, embassy personnel took prompt action and corrected deficiencies on the spot. Other remedies will require considerable management emphasis and resource commitment.

CONSULAR

Embassy Khartoum's vice consul serves as the accountable consular officer (ACO). The ACO correctly implements Consular Management Handbook policies governing fees, controlled equipment, sensitive blank document supplies, and restricted computer access controls. The ACO corrected several equipment inventory issues during the inspection. All NIV refusals must be reviewed by a supervisory officer, who must also spot-check approved NIV applications. Embassy Khartoum fully complies with these rules. The visa referral system satisfies all mandated policies.

Consular archives contain many outdated and extraneous items. For instance, there are federal benefit checks and beneficiary lists dating from 2004, and the materials retained for precedent guidance are not identified as such. Some items lack TAG filing system indicators. These conditions fail to comply with consular and records management guidance. OIG's 2004 inspection found these same conditions. This long-standing situation requires correction.

Recommendation 34: Embassy Khartoum should review consular section file holdings, comply with Foreign Affairs Manual, Consular Management Handbook, and Records Management Handbook requirements governing document maintenance, and confirm ongoing recordkeeping in accord with those requirements. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

The consular cash and receipt handling method satisfies all regulatory conditions. The ACO and consular subcashier and their alternates correctly perform their duties. The ACO and subcashier designations are in order. A review of randomly selected consular accounts revealed no bookkeeping errors.

PROCUREMENT

The supervisory general services officer arrived in January 2006 and did not have a valid contracting warrant. Therefore, the procurements that were signed became unauthorized commitments that each required an elaborate ratification process through the Office of the Procurement Executive. By the time the error was caught, the supervisory general services officer had signed almost 300 procurements totaling over \$2 million. The process has consumed an inordinate amount of staff time and effort that could have been devoted to other pressing needs. At the time of the inspection, approximately 30 commitments remained to be ratified.

Embassy Khartoum has implemented some Web PASS applications, but not the procurement program that OIG informally recommended that it implement in its 2004 report (ISP-I-04-46A, August 2004, p. 31). Doing so would improve management controls and facilitate workflow via the interface with the financial management and property control sections. The post also has not taken full advantage of programs such as the use of purchase cards to streamline and simplify acquisitions and payments. During the inspection, however, the post began qualifying at least one LE staffer in the public diplomacy section for a card.

Residential furniture records were incomplete and many arrival and departure inventories were missing. The nonexpendable property clerk said he sends the inventories to occupants, but occupants do not return them with signatures. This happens despite reminders and the 14 FAM 416.3g requirements that inventories for new occupants be signed within 30 days of arrival.

Recommendation 35: Embassy Khartoum should develop and implement a policy of residential property accountability that includes performing required inventories and maintaining required records. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

The GSO is automating its expendable supply system and has concentrated its efforts on inputting data into the Department's WebPASS program. It has neglected, in the meantime, to post inventory changes for generator and maintenance parts and

supplies issued since June 2006. OIG informally recommended that the inventory changes be posted to the records to ensure that adequate control of stock inventory is maintained in accordance with 14 FAM 414.4.

Other management control weaknesses in the GSO are described elsewhere in the report. The recommended remedial action to improve expendable supply accountability and stock control, vehicle maintenance and usage, and travel management procedures should raise the embassy's management control posture. More fulsome implementation of automated systems in the property, motor vehicle, procurement, and facility maintenance sections will improve process visibility and provide an operational interface. The ability to define processes, track transactions, and identify bottlenecks should provide the basis for a quality management system, such as the ISO 9000:2001 international standard that many embassies are implementing.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

The OIG team observed the monthly verification of the Class B cashier (b) (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2) and it met all requirements. One issue is that (2) temporary money holders often do not file receipts with the cashier within the 24-hour requirement. The financial management officer follows up personally with each employee. The post also has a waiver from the U.S. Treasury to make cash payments. Representation vouchers and official residence expenses vouchers meet regulations. A sample of voucher payments from the Status of Obligations for FY 2006 was reviewed, and payments were in accordance with regulations. Certifications for the Post Assignment Travel allotment were correct. Time and attendance records were not reviewed, but there were no indications of problems.

Embassy Khartoum has moved forward to improve controls on cellular telephone charges. The financial management office has arranged for the local telecommunications company to provide billing information electronically. Voucher personnel will be able to process the data more quickly and accurately and then transmit the data to each telephone user for better reconciliation and prompt payment of any personal calls.

FORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureaus of Human Resources and African Affairs, should establish as a Juba position the reporting officer position currently encumbered in Juba by an officer who is formally assigned to the political/economic section at Embassy Khartoum, advertising the position as such in the next assignment cycle. (Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with HR and AF)

Recommendation 2: Embassy Khartoum should require that the service provider designated to provide general services support at Consulate General Juba provide adequate on-site supervision of the work of the locally employed staff. (Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 3: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureaus of Overseas Buildings Operations, Diplomatic Security, and African Affairs, should work with the U.S. Agency for International Development to revise its draft request for a security standards waiver to focus exclusively on the preexisting office building on the long-term-leased office compound, forego its request for a waiver of security standards for refitting the warehouse as office space, and seek Department concurrence for the request. (Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with OBO, DS, and AF)

Recommendation 4: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should seek and obtain from the U.S. Agency for International Development concurrence in moving forward the request for proposal for the construction of an appropriate number of residential units on the existing walled residential compound in Juba. (Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with OBO)

Recommendation 5: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should amend the local compensation plan for Consulate General Juba employees in consideration of conditions specific to that constituent post. (Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with HR)

Recommendation 6: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should develop, as part of its local compensation plan for Sudan, a relocation package of transfer benefits for eligible, locally employed, U.S. government staff members who are required in Juba. (Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with HR)

Recommendation 7: The Office of Rightsizing of the U.S. Overseas Presence, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs and Office of the Legal Adviser, should clarify chief of mission authority over the contracted government technical manager in Darfur, Sudan, who is overseeing implementation of an extensive government contract to support the African Union Mission in Sudan. (Action: M/R, in coordination with AF and L)

Recommendation 8: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should establish a plan to provide continuity for reporting and managing the El Fasher remote operating site. (Action: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with AF)

Recommendation 9: Embassy Khartoum should regularize administrative services at El Fasher to all agencies, specifically the services of the local guard force, drivers, and translators, using the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services mechanism. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 10: Embassy Khartoum should request, and the Office of the Legal Adviser and the Bureau of African Affairs should provide, a clarification of which public diplomacy activities and funds can be used in the various parts of Sudan in the context of current sanctions. (Action: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with L and AF)

Recommendation 11: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, should develop a plan for reestablishing the Sudanese Fulbright Program and on competing for Humphrey Fellowships in the context of the existing sanctions regime. (Action: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with ECA)

Recommendation 12: Embassy Khartoum should request, and the Bureaus of Human Resources and African Affairs should approve, designating the public affairs positions in Khartoum as Arabic-language designated positions. (Action: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with AF and HR)

Recommendation 13: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should create a Juba-based locally employed staff position for a public affairs assistant to report to the consul general in Juba and seek to fill it as soon as logistical support is available in Juba. (Action: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with AF)

Recommendation 14: The Bureau of Consular Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Khartoum, Embassy Cairo, Embassy Kampala, and Embassy Nairobi, should prepare a detailed, formal plan for reestablishing full consular services in Khartoum. The plan should include contingency arrangements if the new embassy compound is not available, as anticipated. (Action: CA, in coordination with Embassy Khartoum, Embassy Cairo, Embassy Kampala, and Embassy Nairobi)

Recommendation 15: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should assign an experienced supervisory general service officer on either a permanent or temporary basis to assist in stabilizing the post's procurement, housing, inventory, and motor pool operations. (Action: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with AF)

Recommendation 16: Embassy Khartoum should review its locally employed staff positions to determine whether any meet the requirements for a Unique Condition of Work Allowance, prepare a justification for those meeting the requirements, and send the justification to the Department for approval. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 17: Embassy Khartoum should develop an ongoing, funded training program for the English language, technical skills, and cultural diversity for locally employed staff and American officers. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 18: The Office of the Legal Adviser should decide on the proposal from Embassy Khartoum to develop a fixed daily rate for temporary duty employees that covers the cost of a basket of administrative services beginning the day the employees arrive at post. (Action: L)

Recommendation 19: Embassy Khartoum should develop and implement a shared administrative services support system for Consulate General Juba that assigns service responsibility, describes each service, defines standards of performance, and provides support and oversight from Embassy Khartoum, not Embassy Nairobi. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 20: Embassy Khartoum should develop and implement a plan that will give Department employees at Consulate General Juba consistent, reliable, quality access to the Department's Sensitive But Unclassified networks. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 21: Embassy Khartoum should coordinate the programming and deployment for the new radio network equipment that will provide adequate radio communications for Consulate General Juba's personnel. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 22: Embassy Khartoum should develop and implement a health services program for Consulate General Juba. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 23: Embassy Khartoum should develop and implement a plan to use, to the extent practicable, the Department's Web Post Administrative Software Suite. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 24: Embassy Khartoum should provide information to its local travel agent on pertinent government travel regulations and Department and post policies, in accordance with the memorandum of understanding with its travel management center. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 25: Embassy Khartoum should name the locally employed staff member who is travel supervisor as the supervisor of the travel management center employee, with responsibility for oversight and for providing pertinent information regarding travel regulations and policies. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 26: Embassy Khartoum should establish and implement procedures for using contract fares whenever possible, including for rest and recuperation travel. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 27: Embassy Khartoum should review its policy regarding the use of restricted and penalty airfares and, as appropriate, provide its travel management center with a written policy for the use of these fares. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 28: Embassy Khartoum should review its rest and recuperation travel policy for compliance with Department regulations and amend it as appropriate. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 29: Embassy Khartoum should review past rest and recuperation travel for compliance with regulations and take corrective action as appropriate. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Recommendation 30: Embassy Khartoum should develop and implement a motor vehicle usage policy that includes operator maintenance and usage responsibilities, particularly for self-drive vehicles. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 31: Embassy Khartoum should implement to the extent practicable the Department of State criteria pertaining to warehousing and property storage, to include proper shelving and/or racking, material handling equipment, ventilation, storage for flammable materials, and overall safety and security procedures. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 32: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should correct safety, health, environmental, and fire safety conditions in the workplace and residences. (Action: Embassy Khartoum, in coordination with OBO)

Recommendation 33: (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

Recommendation 34: Embassy Khartoum should review consular section file holdings, comply with Foreign Affairs Manual, Consular Management Handbook, and Records Management Handbook requirements governing document maintenance, and confirm ongoing recordkeeping in accord with those requirements. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

Recommendation 35: Embassy Khartoum should develop and implement a policy of residential property accountability that includes performing required inventories and maintaining required records. (Action: Embassy Khartoum)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

INFORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Informal recommendations cover matters not requiring action by organizations outside of the inspected unit and/or the parent regional bureau and are not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent OIG inspection or onsite compliance review will assess the mission's progress in implementing the informal recommendations.

Executive Direction:

There are no Department LE staff at Juba. A small cadre of such employees is likely to become a priority in Juba as Department programs there expand.

Informal Recommendation 1: Embassy Khartoum should develop a plan to gradually increase the Department's locally employed staff at Consulate General Juba, including as priority positions a public affairs assistant, a security specialist, and an office management assistant.

Given the importance of oil to the economy of South Sudan, a reporting officer is needed in Juba for temporary assignments to focus on economic reporting, particularly on oil economics.

Informal Recommendation 2: Embassy Khartoum should send a reporting officer with a focus on economic reporting to Juba from time to time, with a specific focus on oil economics.

Public Affairs:

Although the Secretary of State and Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs have directed that public diplomacy and public outreach be a part of every Foreign Service officer's responsibilities, Embassy Khartoum has not written participation in mission exchange programs and public outreach into the work requirements of mission officers.

Informal Recommendation 3: Embassy Khartoum should write participation in mission exchange programs and public outreach subject to security considerations into the work requirements of mission officers.

The post's IVLP is growing, and a mission-wide selection committee has been established. The committee will need the support of mission-wide leadership.

Informal Recommendation 4: Embassy Khartoum should name the deputy chief of mission as the chair for the International Visitor Leadership Program.

Although all mission elements have been active in nominating visitors, all sections have not been debriefing their nominees or maintaining contact with their nominees.

Informal Recommendation 5: Embassy Khartoum should base its allotment of nominees to embassy elements on how well the embassy elements debrief and maintain contact with their nominees from the previous cycle. .

The number of PAS grants is likely to grow very quickly. Although current records are adequate, there are elements of the records also in the financial management office, the files of the program officer, and in PAS's central grants files. Few files are complete and have signed reports from the grantee.

Informal Recommendation 6: Embassy Khartoum should, beginning with FY 2006 files, maintain all documentation for each grant in its central grants files and should press all grantees to provide their files with a signed written report on their program.

Greater PAS outreach is generating more contacts. The post is keeping computerized records very well, but with the coming expansion, the post will need a contact management system to serve outreach and reporting needs. Washington offices and a lively worldwide network of public affairs LE staff can help the post select an appropriate computer application that may also serve general mission protocol needs.

Informal Recommendation 7: Embassy Khartoum should canvass other posts and investigate the variety of applications, such as Goldmine, that can serve both public affairs section outreach and reporting needs, and mission-wide protocol needs.

The mission is planning an increase in PAS staff size and the development of a working Information Resource Center. These plans were developed several years ago before Information Resource Center operations were begun. The plan may have space allocation and public access issues.

Informal Recommendation 8: Embassy Khartoum should work with Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations representatives to review space allocation and public access in view of existing plans for growth in the public affair section's staff and program.

The PAO is an experienced reporting officer who will be working with educational decisionmakers and opinion leaders and addressing cultural trends in Sudan with a proximity that other mission officers will lack.

Informal Recommendation 9: Embassy Khartoum should include the public affairs officer in the mission reporting planning process to provide an analysis of the state of the educational system and media in Sudan.

Consular Affairs

Embassy Khartoum's consular objectives include an antiterrorism effort and focus on protecting American citizens and safeguarding U.S. borders. The FY 2008 Mission Strategic Plan, however, does not include consular unit involvement in policy or functional strategy or any objectives targeting these goals.

Informal Recommendation 10: Embassy Khartoum should include the consular unit's responsibilities in the coming Mission Strategic Plan.

The consular unit has no outreach, representation, and reporting plans. Such plans, linked as much as possible to the consular package's narrative and the Mission Strategic Plan, would help the unit focus its effort.

Informal Recommendation 11: Embassy Khartoum should develop, request funding for, and implement written consular outreach, representation, and reporting plans, including targets throughout the country.

The consular unit lacks an automated, telephone-based public information system. This hinders the provision of accurate and consistent guidance to those seeking services, and it wastes employee time on repetitive and routine calls.

Informal Recommendation 12: Embassy Khartoum should organize the consular unit's existing telephone system so that its inquiry-response telephone capability is online, and train employees on equipment maintenance, basing the scripts on Embassy Cairo's examples.

The consular unit has no Disaster Assistance Handbook for cases involving mass-casualty catastrophes affecting American citizens.

Informal Recommendation 13: Embassy Khartoum should prepare a Consular Disaster Assistance Handbook.

Consular unit employees do not have post-specific, written standard procedures and use an individually crafted approach for their casework. This is inefficient. Concise, written standard operating procedures would assist employees as they train and would serve as ready reference material and help ensure consistent services.

Informal Recommendation 14: Embassy Khartoum should develop standard operating procedures based on Bureau of Consular Affairs-approved models.

Consular unit employees' professional skills, including computer proficiency, are weak in spite of some training.

Informal Recommendation 15: Embassy Khartoum should design and implement a targeted employee training program for consular staff that may include training in federal benefits, victim assistance, English correspondence writing, customer service instruction, and other core consular topics and could use knowledge drawn from senior consular locally employed staff members from neighboring posts.

Supervisory counseling for consular unit employees has not been documented, impeding the preparation of performance evaluations and employee mentoring.

Informal Recommendation 16: Embassy Khartoum should document in writing the substance of the consular supervisor's of formal employee counseling sessions.

Management Issues

Employees transferring out of post often receive airline tickets without clearing all of their debts or making a provision to pay them.

Informal Recommendation 17: Embassy Khartoum should place responsibility for employee departure checkout with the human resource office, which should issue tickets as the final stop on the departure clearance sheet and verify that a provision has been made for paying outstanding debts.

Embassy drivers work three shifts in order to provide service 24 hours a day, seven days a week, but they do not have OpenNet Plus network access after 4:30 p.m. on workdays or on weekends. During those times, they cannot access e-mail, Intranet web sites, or Department-sponsored distance learning programs.

Recommendation 18: Embassy Khartoum should provide motor pool drivers with access to the OpenNet Plus network for information and professional development purposes.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

	Name	Arrival Date
Chargé d’Affaires	Cameron Hume	10/17/05
Deputy Chief of Mission	Roberto Powers	8/23/06
Chiefs of Section		
Consular	Kathryn Hoffman	10/04/06
Management	Jonita Whitaker	8/25/05
Political/Economic	Eric Whitaker	8/25/05
Public Affairs	Joel Maybury	9/20/06
Regional Security	Steven Bernstein	8/31/06
Other Agencies		
USAID	Katherine Almquist	6/30/06
Department of Defense	Lt. Colonel Joseph Bovey	1/19/07

ABBREVIATIONS

ACO	Accountable consular officer
AF	Bureau of African Affairs
AF/SPG	Sudan Programs Group
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
CLO	Community liaison office
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DCM	Deputy chief of mission
Department	Department of State
ECA	Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
EFT	Electronic funds transfer
FSN	Foreign Service national
GNU	Government of National Unity
GOSS	Government of Southern Sudan
GSO	General services office
HR	Human resources
IVLP	International Visitor Leadership Program
ICASS	International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
KAS	Khartoum American School
LE	Locally employed

NCC	New consulate compound
NEC	New embassy compound
NIV	Nonimmigrant Visa
OBO	Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OMS	Office management specialist
PA&E	Pacific Architects and Engineers
PAO	Public affairs officer
PAS	Public affairs section
R&R	Rest and recuperation
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SHEM	Office of Safety, Health, and Environmental Management
TDY	Temporary duty
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WebPASS	Web Post Administrative Software Suite

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~