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**United States Department of State  
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors  
Office of Inspector General**

# Office of Audits

## **Audit of Emergency Preparedness at the Washington Metropolitan Facilities of the Department of State**

**Report Number AUD/SI-07-27, March 2007**

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## Summary

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the federal government refocused its domestic security needs and responsiveness requirements, realizing that clear lines of command and effective planning could greatly reduce the loss of life, personal injury, and property damage.

As part of its responsibility to provide oversight to Department of State (Department) management, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an audit of emergency preparedness at the Department's Washington, DC, metropolitan facilities. The objective was to determine whether the Department had implemented an Emergency Preparedness Program in accordance with federal regulations and had adequately developed and distributed Facility Emergency Action Plans for each facility to all personnel.<sup>1</sup>

The Department had an Emergency Preparedness Program that was not fully implemented. Although it identified the bureaus and offices involved in the program, the Department had not clearly defined their specific roles and responsibilities; it had not developed policies and procedures to guide the program; and it had not complied with federal regulations and directives concerning implementation of the National Incident Management System and participation in the National Response Plan.

The Domestic Emergency Action Committee (DEAC), established by the Under Secretary for Management, had not provided the operational oversight and guidance outlined in its charter. Specifically, Facility Emergency Action Plans and standard operating procedures were not coordinated and consolidated into an overall Department Emergency Action Plan. Of the 40 facilities, encompassing 48 buildings<sup>2</sup> in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area that required plans, 18 facilities, affecting approximately 1,300 Department employees, did not have a plan. The existing 22 plans, along with the comprehensive Department Emergency Action Plan, either were outdated or were not in compliance with GSA guidelines and other federal regulations. The DEAC also did not verify that Facility Emergency Action Plans were tested through periodic drills and exercises or provide guidance for emergency action training programs, such as mandatory online emergency training.

Lastly, not all Washington, DC, metropolitan area facilities had emergency escape route signage and markings. At facilities where they were installed, the signage and markings, intended to guide individuals to safety in adverse conditions, were not luminescent, making them difficult to see at eye and floor levels. This shortcoming was highlighted during the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the Pentagon.

OIG recommended that the Department clearly define and codify in the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) the roles and responsibilities of bureaus and offices involved in the Department's

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<sup>1</sup> The General Services Administration (GSA) refers to the overall program as the Occupant Emergency Program and to the Facility Emergency Plans as occupant emergency plans. The former establishes procedures for safeguarding lives and property in and around a facility during an emergency; the latter is a facility-specific set of procedures to protect life and property under defined emergency conditions.

<sup>2</sup> State Annex-4 (SA-4), SA-7, SA-8, SA-11, and SA-32 have multiple buildings at their facilities that are covered under one plan for the facility. There are 40 facilities in the Washington area with 48 buildings.

Emergency Preparedness Program; establish policies and procedures for managing the program; comply with federal regulations and directives; reconvene the Domestic Emergency Action Committee to fulfill its oversight responsibilities; establish Facility Emergency Action Plans; periodically test these emergency plans; require online emergency training; and install appropriate escape route signage and markings at all Washington facilities.

## **Background**

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 are likely to have far-reaching effects on Americans for years to come. These events caused the loss of a significant number of lives and resulted in billions of dollars in property damage. They have spurred the government to refocus on emergency preparedness issues.

The Department is responsible for protecting its personnel and facilities during emergencies. An Emergency Preparedness Program establishes procedures for safeguarding lives and property in and around a facility during emergencies. By definition, an emergency situation can occur unpredictably and includes fires; bomb threats; explosions; chemical, biological, and radiological/nuclear incidents; natural and manmade disasters; civil disorder; catastrophic infrastructure failures; armed attacks; mass casualties; and workplace violence. Effective planning can substantially reduce the threat of loss of life or personal injury and damage to government property.

The Department has approximately 11,770 employees working at 40 facilities in the Washington metropolitan area, which encompasses Washington, DC, suburban Maryland, and Northern Virginia. Child care centers are located in two of the 40 facilities. Approximately 8,000 employees work in the Harry S Truman Building (HST). (See Figure 1.)

**Figure 1: Harry S Truman Building**



Source: A/OPR/FMS.

Within the Department, the Under Secretary for Management is responsible for emergency preparedness. The Under Secretary delegated the operational authority for emergency preparedness management to the Assistant Secretary for Administration. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and the Bureau of Administration shared responsibility for

emergency preparedness, with DS responsible for the protection of personnel and property at domestic facilities and the Bureau of Administration, Office of Operations (A/OPR) responsible for developing Facility Emergency Action Plans for domestic facilities.

In March 2003, the Under Secretary for Management established the Domestic Emergency Action Committee, charged with recommending to the Under Secretary actions to prepare for and respond to security threats and other contingencies that may affect Department personnel and facilities. The DEAC's charter sets forth its responsibilities for providing operational oversight and guidance by coordinating and consolidating Facility Emergency Action Plans and standard operating procedures, verifying that the facility plans are tested through periodic drills and exercises, and providing guidance for facility emergency training programs.

In October 2003, the Bureau of Administration's Assistant Secretary formed the Office of Emergency Management (A/OPR/OEM) to consolidate all emergency preparedness planning functions into a single entity to better coordinate the emergency preparedness planning process. A/OPR/OEM coordinates the DEAC's activities with the designated safety and health representatives from the other functional bureaus and offices that possess emergency preparedness responsibilities: DS, the Office of Medical Services, and the Bureau of Human Resources. A/OPR/OEM develops and maintains, in cooperation with the Department's bureaus and offices located in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area, a Comprehensive Emergency Plan for Department-owned or Department-leased facilities and provides technical guidance and assistance to bureaus in the development of their individual Facility Emergency Action Plans. Although A/OPR/OEM has the lead in coordinating the DEAC's activities, DEAC provides oversight and coordination for bureaus and offices having emergency preparedness planning responsibilities, including A/OPR/OEM.

### **Objectives, Scope, and Methodology**

The audit objectives were to determine whether the Department had implemented an Emergency Preparedness Program in accordance with federal regulations and had adequately developed and distributed Facility Emergency Action Plans for each facility to all personnel. The audit covered Department facilities in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area and their corresponding facility emergency plans. OIG did not examine the Department's Continuity of Operations Program during this audit.

To accomplish the objective, OIG interviewed Department officials, reviewed prior audit and inspection reports relating to emergency preparedness, and obtained background information on the Department's emergency preparedness for domestic facilities. OIG also interviewed officials from the Department of Homeland Security.

OIG reviewed and analyzed the 22 plans that were on file with A/OPR/OEM; conducted site visits at six Department Washington, DC, area facilities; interviewed key personnel; observed emergency fire drills at three facilities; reviewed after-action reports; and obtained and reviewed relevant program and budgetary documents. OIG also reviewed the OIG 2002 Main

State Security report<sup>3</sup> and the FY 2006 OIG inspection report on DS's Directorate of International Programs.<sup>4</sup>

Additionally, OIG sent a questionnaire to approximately 11,700 Department personnel and contractors in the Washington metropolitan area to determine their awareness of what to do in an emergency situation. The sample size and response rate by stratum are in Table 1, and survey responses are detailed in the Appendix.

**Table 1: Sample Size and Response Rate by Stratum**

| <b>Stratum</b>   | <b>Universe</b> | <b>Responses</b> | <b>Response Rate</b> |
|--|-----------------|------------------|----------------------|
| Employees whose primary workplace is HST               | 8,000           | 208              | 3%                   |
| Employees whose primary workplace is an annex facility | 3,770           | 395              | 10%                  |
| <b>Total</b>   | <b>11,770</b>   | <b>603</b>       | <b>5%</b>            |

Source: OIG questionnaire and responses from September 19 to November 11, 2005.

OIG conducted the audit in accordance with government auditing standards and included such tests and auditing procedures as necessary under the circumstances. OIG's Office of Audits, Security and Intelligence Division, performed this audit from August 2005 to January 2006. OIG discussed the audit findings with A/OPR/OEM officials on January 19, 2006, and held an exit conference on January 23, 2006, with Department officials, who generally agreed with the findings and recommendations. Additionally, subsequent to the exit conference, OIG has been in informal contact with Department officials and has monitored contemporary actions and developments related to emergency preparedness. The Office of the Under Secretary for Management, Bureau of Administration, and the Secretary's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism provided written comments on the draft report, which are incorporated where applicable and included in their entirety as Appendices B, C, and D, respectively.

## **Audit Results**

This report presents the OIG's audit of the Department's Emergency Preparedness Program and Facility Emergency Action Plans. OIG's recommendations, if implemented, should assist the Department in quickly and effectively responding to an emergency situation in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area, which should result in a decreased risk of loss of life, personal injury, and destruction of government property.

### **Emergency Preparedness Program**

The Department had not effectively implemented, in accordance with federal regulations, its Emergency Preparedness Program, which establishes procedures for safeguarding lives and property in and around facilities during emergencies. This occurred because the Department had not clearly defined program roles and responsibilities, established formal policies and procedures for managing the program, or implemented requirements of the Homeland Security Presidential

<sup>3</sup> *Special Review of Main State Security* (SIO/A-02-55, Sept. 25, 2002).

<sup>4</sup> *Bureau of Diplomatic Security Directorate of International Programs* (ISP/I-06-03, Dec. 2005).

Directive/HSPD-5<sup>5</sup> regarding the National Incident Management System (NIMS) or the National Response Plan (NRP). Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, bureaus and offices are ill-prepared to respond adequately to an emergency.

### **Program Roles and Responsibilities**

Executive Order 12656, Section 101(b), Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, states that “effective national security emergency planning requires identification of functions to be performed during such an emergency.” In 1 FAM 014.7, Functional Statements, the Department is required to define an organizational unit’s area of responsibility to eliminate the potential for overlap and duplication. A February 2006 Government Accountability Office report on the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina emphasized the need for clearly defined roles and responsibilities, stating, “Prior to a catastrophic event, the leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for the response at all levels must be clearly defined and effectively communicated in order to facilitate rapid and effective decision making.”<sup>6</sup> Additionally, best business practices dictate that functional roles and responsibilities be clearly defined to manage a program effectively and efficiently.

The Department did identify, as required by federal regulations, the bureaus and offices that would implement its Emergency Preparedness Program, but it had not clearly defined their roles and responsibilities. For example, OIG reviewed the Department’s response to Hurricane Katrina. According to 1 FAM 211.2 (c), the Bureau of Administration is responsible for managing domestic emergencies. However, after the hurricane in August 2005, the Executive Secretariat, Operations Center coordinated the Department’s response because, Operations Center officials said, they felt the Department did not have an established plan to respond to a domestic emergency. A review of the Department’s lessons learned from the hurricane response showed that the Operations Center task force<sup>7</sup> wanted the role of A/OPR/OEM to be clarified.

In October 2005, the Under Secretary for Management tasked the Bureau of Administration with submitting an action memorandum to selected bureaus and offices to (1) delineate the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for domestic emergency management; (2) identify and explain the roles of existing bureaus and offices outside the Bureau of Administration that had emergency management capabilities and seek to build upon them; and (3) propose recommendations for consolidating duplicative emergency management functions and streamlining Department operations. The Bureau of Administration sent the memorandum to the affected bureaus and offices on November 2, 2005.

On the basis of bureau and office responses, the Bureau of Administration drafted a memorandum, dated November 25, 2005, that contained recommendations to consolidate functions and streamline Department operations. But as of the end of OIG’s fieldwork, the Bureau of Administration had not sent the action memorandum to the Under Secretary for Management because, according to A/OPR/OEM officials, not all parties would clear it. An

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<sup>5</sup> Subject: Management of Domestic Incidents (Feb. 28, 2003).

<sup>6</sup> *Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita* (GAO-06-365R, Feb. 1, 2006), p. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Participants included representatives from the Bureaus of Human Resources, Diplomatic Security, Resource Management, Information Resource Management, Consular Affairs, and Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary, and Offices of the Executive Secretariat, the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and Medical Services.

A/OPR/OEM official said that the Executive Secretariat had concerns regarding the recommendation for changing the organizational placement of A/OPR/OEM because the Executive Secretariat wanted to administer the Emergency Preparedness Program. The official also said that DS was concerned with A/OPR/OEM's conducting vulnerability assessments because that is a DS function, according to 1 FAM 263.1-2(C)(1), Security Standards and Compliance Branch, and 1 FAM 263.1-2(3), Facilities Security Division. Thus, the Department was unable to define clearly the emergency preparedness roles and responsibilities of the bureaus and offices because these entities could not agree on their roles and responsibilities and the Department did not adjudicate and resolve such disagreements.

The Under Secretary for Management also asked two former Department officials to review the Emergency Preparedness Program, focusing primarily on the Continuity of Operations Plan and the Critical Infrastructure Program. In January 2006, at the officials' request, the OIG team met with the officials, who generally agreed with the OIG's findings concerning the delineation of roles and responsibilities for emergency preparedness and said that they had found issues similar to those of the OIG team during their review.

OIG also found inconsistencies in the FAM as to which office was responsible for a particular aspect of the Emergency Preparedness Program. In 1 FAM 014.7, Functional Statements, the Department is required to define an organizational unit's area of responsibility to eliminate the potential for overlap and duplication. However, two sections of 1 FAM 200 (1 FAM 263.1 [8] and 1 FAM 213.9a [1]) showed both DS and A/OPR/OEM as responsible for developing emergency plans for domestic facilities.

The Under Secretary for Management should obtain responses to its tasking from the Bureau of Administration and ensure that affected Department bureaus and offices provide proper clearances for the action memorandum. Until this occurs, the Department's responses to an emergency could be delayed or inadequate, which increases the risk of loss of life, personal injury, and destruction of government property.

**Recommendation 1:** OIG recommends that the Under Secretary for Management obtain, from the Bureau of Administration, responses regarding bureaus' and offices' roles and responsibilities; resolve any differences or redundancies among offices; and clearly define and codify in the Foreign Affairs Manual the authority, roles, and responsibilities of bureaus and offices involved in the Department's Emergency Preparedness Program.

In its response, the Office of the Under Secretary for Management concurred with recommendation 1 and stated that it would review the roles and responsibilities tasker assigned to the Bureau of Administration in October 2005. On the basis of the Under Secretary's response, OIG considers this recommendation resolved pending further action.

## **Program Policies and Procedures**

A/OPR/OEM is required by 1 FAM 213.9a (1), Office of Emergency Management, to develop policies and procedures to respond to and recover from any domestic emergency. OIG found that the Emergency Preparedness Program did not have formal policies and procedures for management of the program. This occurred because the manuals that address these issues,



6 FAM 400 and 6 Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH)-1 H-000, had been in draft status since April 13, 2005, and August 19, 2005, respectively.

A/OPR/OEM officials said they did not know when the manuals would be finalized because their Planning and Preparedness Division, which was responsible for establishing the procedures, had only three staff members, one of whom was a contractor, and at least one vacant staff position. No one was assigned on a full-time basis to complete the procedures. A/OPR/OEM officials were not able to provide OIG with the approved full-time-equivalent staffing level for the Planning and Preparedness Division.

Without policies and procedures for managing the program, the Department's ability to respond quickly to an emergency is hampered and the potential for loss of life and damage to government property increases.

**Recommendation 2:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration ensure that the Office of Emergency Management's Planning and Preparedness Division has sufficient staffing to finalize 6 FAM 400, Office of Emergency Management Program, and the proposed 6 FAH-1 H-000, Domestic Emergency Handbook, and ensure that the emergency preparedness policies and procedures contained in these manuals are implemented and enforced in a timely manner.

In its response, the Bureau of Administration concurred with recommendation 2 and said that the Department will use the oversight of the DEAC to ensure that emergency preparedness policies and procedures are finalized, implemented and enforced in a timely manner. OIG considers this recommendation resolved pending further action.

### **Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5**

HSPD-5 requires federal agencies and departments to submit a plan to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and to the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security to adopt and implement the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and to participate in the development and maintenance of the National Response Plan (NRP). According to HSPD-5 (15) & (16), the NIMS should provide a "consistent nationwide approach for Federal, state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity." Further, the NRP "shall integrate Federal Government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan."

The Department did not comply with the requirements of HSPD-5. Officials of the Secretary's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT), the Department's liaison with DHS for NIMS and NRP matters, said that the draft NIMS implementation plan was not finalized and the NRP was inaccurate because of insufficient staffing dedicated to the project. Specifically, three full-time-equivalent personnel were involved in the NRP, but none of them worked on the projects full-time.

S/CT officials further told OIG that the Department had participated in developing the NRP and that S/CT was responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the information as it pertained to the Department's roles and responsibilities. For example, the NRP listed A/OPR/OEM as

being responsible for expediting the entry of approved foreign donated items into the United States; as being the conduit to all U.S. embassies and consulates worldwide; and as providing the consulates and embassies with information on DHS, state, local, tribal, and voluntary organization policies and procedures on unaffiliated volunteers and unsolicited donated goods management. An A/OPR/OEM official said that the NRP should have listed the Bureau of Resource Management as the proper office.

S/CT officials said that they were compiling a list of corrections for the NRP, but the corrections had not been submitted to DHS as of November 2005. Without accurate information, the Department may not be able to respond quickly and adequately to an emergency, which increases the potential risk of loss of life and destruction of government property.

**Recommendation 3:** OIG recommends that the Secretary's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism dedicate sufficient staff to finalize the National Incident Management System and to correct the inaccuracies in the National Response Plan and that it submit the information to the Department of Homeland Security in a timely manner.

In its response, S/CT said that it could not disagree with recommendation 3 in that S/CT should have staff to meet a national priority and submit information to DHS in a timely manner. However, S/CT did not agree with the report narrative preceding the recommendation and suggested that it and the recommendation be removed from the report. Specifically S/CT said it did provide the NIMS implementation plan to DHS in March 2005 and it submitted NRP updates to DHS and the Homeland Security Council in February 2006. OIG's review of S/CT's comments and supporting documentation show that the implementation plan submitted to DHS was not the final plan approved by the Department. Further, S/CT provided OIG with evidence that it was still working with DHS officials to craft a final implementation plan as of January 2006. OIG stands by its recommendation as written and considers this recommendation to be unresolved.

## **Facility Emergency Action Plans**

The Department had not effectively implemented its Facility Emergency Action Plans, which are facility-specific procedures established to protect life and property under defined emergency conditions. Specifically, emergency action plans either were nonexistent or were outdated or noncompliant. This occurred because the DEAC, established by the Under Secretary for Management to provide oversight to bureaus and offices involved in domestic emergency preparedness, did not provide the required leadership. Also, the responsibility for developing the plans changed, and new federal requirements (NIMS and NRP) were pending. Without effective Facility Emergency Action Plans, the Department may be ill-prepared to respond adequately to domestic emergencies.

## **Domestic Emergency Action Committee**

The DEAC is responsible for recommending actions to the Under Secretary for Management to prepare for and respond to security threats and other domestic incidents that

could affect Department personnel and facilities,<sup>8</sup> and for providing operational oversight and guidance on emergency preparedness management. However, the DEAC had not coordinated and consolidated domestic Facility Emergency Action Plans and standard operating procedures into an overall Department Emergency Action Plan, verified that emergency plans were tested through periodic drills and exercises, or provided guidance for emergency action training programs.

The OIG found that the DEAC was not fulfilling its responsibilities because it had been without leadership when the Under Secretary for Management position was vacant from February through August 2005. Also, at the time of OIG's audit, the DEAC had met only eight times since December 2003, with the most recent meeting occurring in February 2005. The DEAC charter did not specify periodic committee meetings. An official with the Office of the Under Secretary for Management said that the DEAC did not meet because the new Under Secretary was learning the duties of the position and therefore had not had time to convene a meeting.

OIG concluded that the DEAC needs to meet on a regular basis to carry out its oversight responsibilities and that these meetings should be recorded and documented. Without a strong coordinated and consolidated approach to emergency management, the Department was ill-prepared to respond to emergencies that could increase the risk of loss of life, personal injury, and destruction of government property.

**Recommendation 4:** OIG recommends that the Under Secretary for Management reconvene the Domestic Emergency Action Committee to fulfill the oversight responsibilities outlined in the charter, require the Committee to meet on a regular basis, and document the results of the meetings.

In its response, the Office of the Under Secretary for Management concurred with the recommendation and said that it would schedule a DEAC meeting. On the basis of the Under Secretary's response, OIG considers this recommendation resolved pending further action.

The Under Secretary took exception to the date OIG listed as the last DEAC meeting (February 2005) and related text by noting a subsequent meeting was held February 2, 2006. Although OIG appreciates this additional information, the date provided was after the close of OIG's fieldwork, and therefore, no change to the date or text is necessary.

### **Facility Emergency Action Plans**

A Facility Emergency Action Plan is a set of procedures to protect life and property in federally occupied space under defined emergency conditions. The plan covers and provides for major types of emergencies and subsequent actions, such as evacuating the building or sheltering-in-place.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Committee members consist of the Under Secretary for Management, who chairs the committee; Assistant Secretaries for Administration, Diplomatic Security, Resource Management, and Public Affairs; Chief Information Officer; Designated Agency Safety and Health Officer; Director General; Director, Foreign Service Institute; Executive Secretary; Legal Adviser; and the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

<sup>9</sup> Sheltering-in-place means selecting an interior room, with no or few windows, and taking refuge there when evacuating the building is not an option.

According to the Code of Federal Regulations (29 CFR §1910.38 (b), (c), and (f)), emergency action plans must be in writing, be kept in the workplace, be available for review, have procedures for accounting for all employees after an evacuation, and be reviewed with each employee when the plan is developed or when the employee is assigned initially to a job. Executive Order 13347 §1(a), Individuals With Disabilities in Emergency Preparedness, states that departments and agencies must consider the unique needs of agency employees with disabilities and individuals with disabilities whom the agency serves in their emergency planning. Additionally, 41 CFR §102-74.240(b) requires that federal agencies review plans and organizations annually.

The Department did not have Facility Emergency Action Plans on record with A/OPR/OEM for all facilities in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area, and the plans that were on record were either out-of-date or did not meet federal requirements regarding emergency drills and emergency training. Of the 40 facilities in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area, 18 facilities, employing about 1,300 employees, did not have a Facility Emergency Action Plan on record. In addition, responses to the OIG's questionnaire (see Table 1) indicated that only half of the respondents knew that there was an emergency action plan for their workplace or had read it, and only one-third of these indicated that they had been briefed on the plan within the first month of their employment.

Of the 22 plans on record, including the Department's Emergency Action Plan, 18 did not address employees who had special needs. Facility managers at two of the three facilities that had the fire drills said they did not know how many individuals in their facilities had special needs or where these individuals were located. Also, 88 percent of the respondents to the questionnaire who said they had special needs indicated that special arrangements, such as a buddy system, had not been established to assist them in an emergency situation.

In addition, none of the plans provided adequate guidance on how to account for employees after an evacuation. In that regard, OIG observed fire evacuation drills at three facilities and found that only one facility had procedures to account for employees after the evacuation.

Before September 11, 2001, Facility Emergency Action Plans addressed fire evacuation only. After September 11, 2001, the Department decided to address emergency scenarios such as fires, bomb threats, and natural disasters and to model these plans after the overseas emergency action plans. Bureau of Administration officials said that they had an informal agreement with DS in which the Bureau of Administration would develop the plans and DS would review them. Bureau of Administration officials said they focused their efforts on revising the facility plans for the 20 buildings with the highest threat levels as assigned by DS in accordance with Department of Justice and GSA criteria. They also said that plans for lower priority buildings were not yet being addressed but that they had revised plans for about 15 to 18 of the 20 highest threat facilities before A/OPR/OEM became responsible for developing the plans. A/OPR/OEM said that it had adopted the revised plans.

However, A/OPR/OEM said that it wanted to prepare a model Facility Emergency Action Plan based on the NRP, NIMS, and other federal regulations for emergency action plans. Therefore, it awarded a contract for a pilot project for SA-1 to WPS Emergency Planning. A/OPR/OEM officials said that the NIMS-compliant plan the contractor developed would be a

model for all domestic Department facilities and would serve to standardize the plans for each facility. The model plan was in draft as of December 2005. OIG concluded that the issue of Facility Emergency Action Plans needs to be addressed in a timely manner so that employees are fully aware of what to do in an emergency.

**Recommendation 5:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration ensure that the model Facility Emergency Action Plan is in compliance with federal regulations and guidelines to account for employees after an evacuation and to include provisions to assist individuals with special needs, such as a buddy system. Once approved, the model plan should be used to prepare or revise Department Facility Emergency Action Plans.

**Recommendation 6:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration prepare Facility Emergency Action Plans for those facilities currently without plans, review and update existing plans, and ensure that all employees are briefed on the existence and contents of the plans. The model Facility Emergency Action Plan, once approved, should be the basis for the preparation of all subsequent Department Facility Emergency Action Plans.

In its response to this report, the Bureau of Administration concurred with recommendations 5 and 6. The Bureau of Administration said that the SA-1 pilot project has been completed, is in compliance with federal regulations and guidelines and is in use at SA-1. The Bureau has begun working on developing the Facility Emergency Action Plan for the Harry S Truman Building using lessons learned from the SA-1 project. A/OEM (formerly A/OPR/OEM) plans to present the new Facility Emergency Action Plans for SA-1 and HST to the DEAC for its approval and then use them to update all existing plans and develop plans for those facilities that do not currently have one.

Additionally, as noted in its response shown in Appendix C, the Bureau has made a number of improvements in the area of emergency preparedness since the completion of the audit. OIG recognizes and appreciates the Bureau of Administration's efforts in this area. OIG considers recommendation 5 and 6 to be resolved pending further action.

### **Emergency Drills**

According to 29 CFR §1910.38 (b) and (c), emergency action plans are to contain procedures for reporting a fire or other emergency and for emergency evacuation, including the type of evacuation. Also, employers are required to designate and train employees, such as floor wardens, to assist in a safe and orderly evacuation of other employees. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) guidelines suggest holding practice evacuation drills to familiarize employees with the emergency procedures, their escape routes, and assembly locations so that employees can respond promptly and properly in an emergency. Facilities also should conduct drills as often as necessary to keep employees prepared, and employees should practice shelter-in-place procedures.

The Department had not conducted all emergency evacuation drills recommended by federal guidance, and its procedures for conducting these drills varied among facilities. This occurred, according to A/OPR/OEM officials, because management often viewed drills as disruptive to operations and did not support these exercises. The officials further explained that

they did not have the requisite authority to dictate practicing the shelter-in-place drill to bureau management.

The Department did conduct fire drills in which personnel evacuated facilities. In fact, according to OIG's questionnaire, of the seven emergency scenarios listed, each requiring evacuation or shelter-in-place, only fire evacuation drills were performed with regularity; that is, about 1.9 times per year. But the conduct of evacuation drills varied among the facilities. For example, SA-6 (Figure 3) used floor wardens to help employees evacuate the building, ensuring that the facility was completely evacuated. Not all employees evacuated during the drills at SA-20 and HST (Figures 2 and 1, respectively). A Bureau of Administration official told OIG that at SA-20, some employees ignored the alarm and did not evacuate. The official further said that they did not account for the employees in the building after the evacuation because their procedures did not require it. Bureau of Administration officials said that during the drill at HST, not all personnel participated, some were given exception passes, and others just closed or locked their office and ignored the alarm. However, during the HST fire evacuation drill, OIG noted that some offices had, independent of their procedures, established assembly points to account for their employees.

**Figure 2: State Annex 20**



Source: A/OPR/FMS.

**Figure 3: State Annex 6**



Source: OBO/MSD.

The Department did not conduct shelter-in-place drills. For example, the OIG questionnaire showed that scenarios requiring shelter-in-place were not reported as occurring at least once per year. Also, more than three of four questionnaire respondents indicated that they did not know where to go to shelter-in-place, and more than half noted not knowing what to do if a shelter-in-place was invoked. Without required drills and uniform procedures for drills, employees are placed at greater risk of loss of life or personal injury in an emergency.

**Recommendation 7:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration designate the Office of Emergency Management as the authority for conducting emergency evacuation and shelter-in-place drills. The bureau should advise Department management of this authority, the importance of conducting these drills, and the need for the Department's cooperation.

**Recommendation 8:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration require the Department's bureaus and offices to conduct, at a minimum, semiannual evacuation and shelter-in-place drills for emergency situations such as fires, chemical or biological exposure, hostage situations, physical threats, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks. Procedures for these drills should be consistent from facility to facility and require full participation of all Department personnel.

**Recommendation 9:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration require the model Facility Emergency Action Plan to include and address the use of trained floor wardens to assist employees in evacuating a building or directing the employees to designated shelter-in-place areas, the use of evacuation assembly points, and the use of roll calls to account for employees after an evacuation.

In its response, the Bureau of Administration concurred with recommendations 7, 8, and 9. The Bureau said that the DEAC has conveyed A/OEM's authority to the Department and will include this authority in the new FAM and FAH as described in recommendation 2. Additionally, the Bureau has tasked A/OEM to conduct ten drills and exercises per quarter depicting the scenarios described in recommendation 8. Finally, requirements for trained floor wardens, use of evacuation assembly points and roll calls will be included in all future Facility Emergency Action Plan requirements. The Bureau also said that it implemented the use of these requirements in the SA-1 pilot project. OIG considers recommendations 7, 8, and 9 to be resolved pending further action.

## **Employee Training**

According to 29 CFR §1910.38(f) (1), (f) (2), an employer must review the emergency action plan with each employee covered by the plan when the plan is developed or the employee is assigned initially to a job, when the employee's responsibilities under the plan change, and when the plan is changed. OSHA guidance suggests that employees receive training about the types of emergencies that may occur and the proper course of action. In addition, 1 FAM 213.9 (c) states that A/OPR/OEM expands the Department's emergency management awareness, education, and formal training, in coordination and consistent with the Foreign Service Institute's crisis management program and other training activities.

According to A/OPR/OEM officials, most Department personnel had not received emergency preparedness training as required by federal regulations. This occurred, according to A/OPR/OEM officials, because the Department, when requested, declined to make the training mandatory.

A/OPR/OEM had taken positive steps by developing and implementing an emergency preparedness training course on its *ePrepare* website to provide Department personnel with vital information and resource material to assist them in raising their awareness of and preparedness for potential threats, hazards, and response to emergencies at work and at home. A/OPR/OEM also established employee outreach through Department, bureau, and facility town hall meetings and fairs. However, A/OPR/OEM officials said that as of August 2005, only 250 of the 20,000 domestic-based personnel had completed the training, and only 14.4 percent of the respondents to OIG's questionnaire indicated that they had taken the online training course.

Without the training, many personnel will be unprepared to react in an emergency situation, which increases the risk of loss of life and personal injury.

**Recommendation 10:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration develop and implement a policy to require all Department domestic-based personnel to complete the online emergency preparedness training course.

In its response, the Bureau of Administration concurred with recommendation 10 and will present the recommendation to the DEAC. OIG considers recommendation 10 to be resolved pending further action.

## **Other Matters: Escape Route Signage and Markings**

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the issue of signage and markings for escape routes took on added significance. For example, when heavy smoke filled the Pentagon, visibility was reduced, and people were forced to crawl on the floor to the exits. As a result, luminescent tape was subsequently placed on the walls six inches above the floor to illuminate the paths to exits. During its audit, the OIG also observed conditions relating to escape route signage and markings inside Washington, DC, metropolitan area facilities that need to be addressed.

According to 29 CFR §1910.38(c) (2), federal agencies are required to have procedures for emergency evacuation, by type of evacuation, including exit route assignments. Further, 29 CFR §1910.37(b)(4) states that if the direction of travel to the exit is not immediately apparent, signs must be posted along the exit access indicating the direction of travel to the nearest exit, and the line-of-sight to an exit path must be clearly visible at all times.

Three of the six Washington facilities visited during the audit (SA-6, SA-39, and SA-44) did not have escape route signage or markings at eye level, and only 53.5 percent of the respondents to OIG's questionnaire indicated that their workplace displayed evacuation route signs. The lack of signage and markings occurred because the Department did not have emergency preparedness policies and procedures to address evacuation and adequate Facility Emergency Action Plans.

To address the lack of signage and markings, A/OPR/OEM officials advised OIG that standardized luminescent escape route signage and markings would be installed at all domestic facilities as part of a pilot emergency preparedness plan project.

Without luminescent evacuation signs or markings at both eye and floor levels, there is no assurance that employees will be able to see the route to evacuate safely in an emergency.

**Recommendation 11:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration include procedures for the mandated emergency evacuation route assignments, signage, and markings in the Facility Emergency Action Plans as required by the Code of Federal Regulations (29 CFR) and proceed with its pilot project to install signage and markings at all domestic facilities.



In its response, the Bureau of Administration concurred with recommendation 11. The Bureau said that it mandated emergency evacuation route assignments, signage, and markings in the SA-1 pilot project and will do so in all future Facility Emergency Action Plans. OIG considers recommendation 11 to be resolved pending further action.

## Recommendations

**Recommendation 1:** OIG recommends that the Under Secretary for Management obtain, from the Bureau of Administration, responses regarding bureaus' and offices' roles and responsibilities; resolve any differences or redundancies among offices; and clearly define and codify in the Foreign Affairs Manual the authority, roles, and responsibilities of bureaus and offices involved in the Department's Emergency Preparedness Program.

**Recommendation 2:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration ensure that the Office of Emergency Management's Planning and Preparedness Division has sufficient staffing to finalize 6 FAM 400, Office of Emergency Management Program, and the proposed 6 FAH-1 H-000, Domestic Emergency Handbook, and ensure that the emergency preparedness policies and procedures contained in these manuals are implemented and enforced in a timely manner.

**Recommendation 3:** OIG recommends that the Secretary's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism dedicate sufficient staff to finalize the National Incident Management System and to correct the inaccuracies in the National Response Plan and that it submit the information to the Department of Homeland Security in a timely manner.

**Recommendation 4:** OIG recommends that the Under Secretary for Management reconvene the Domestic Emergency Action Committee to fulfill the oversight responsibilities outlined in the charter, require the Committee to meet on a regular basis, and document the results of the meetings.

**Recommendation 5:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration ensure that the model Facility Emergency Action Plan is in compliance with federal regulations and guidelines to account for employees after an evacuation and to include provisions to assist individuals with special needs, such as a buddy system. Once approved, the model plan should be used to prepare or revise Department Facility Emergency Action Plans.

**Recommendation 6:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration prepare Facility Emergency Action Plans for those facilities currently without plans, review and update existing plans, and ensure that all employees are briefed on the existence and contents of the plans. The model Facility Emergency Action Plan, once approved, should be the basis for the preparation of all subsequent Department Facility Emergency Action Plans.

**Recommendation 7:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration designate the Office of Emergency Management as the authority for conducting emergency evacuation and shelter-in-place drills. The bureau should advise Department management of this authority, the importance of conducting these drills, and the need for the Department's cooperation.

**Recommendation 8:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration require the Department's bureaus and offices to conduct, at a minimum, semiannual evacuation and shelter-in-place drills for emergency situations such as fires, chemical or biological exposure, hostage situations, physical threats, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks. Procedures for these drills should be consistent from facility to facility and require full participation of all Department personnel.

**Recommendation 9:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration require the model Facility Emergency Action Plan to include and address the use of trained floor wardens to assist employees in evacuating a building or directing the employees to designated shelter-in-place areas, the use of evacuation assembly points, and the use of roll calls to account for employees after an evacuation.

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## Abbreviations

|           |  |
|-----------|--|
| A/OPR     | Bureau of Administration, Office of Operations                       |
| A/OPR/OEM | Office of Emergency Management                                       |
| CFR       | Code of Federal Regulations  |
| DHS       | Department of Homeland Security                                      |
| DEAC      | Domestic Emergency Action Committee                                  |
| DS        | Bureau of Diplomatic Security  |
| FAH       | Foreign Affairs Handbook   |
| FAM       | Foreign Affairs Manual   |
| GAO       | Government Accountability Office                                     |
| GSA       | General Services Administration                                      |
| HSPD      | Homeland Security Presidential Directive                             |
| NRP       | National Response Plan   |
| NIMS      | National Incident Management System                                  |
| OIG       | Office of Inspector General  |
| OSHA      | Occupational Safety and Health Administration                        |
| S/CT      | Office the Secretary, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism |

## Methodology and Results of OIG’s Emergency Preparedness Questionnaire

### Methodology

OIG collected information from Department personnel and contractors in the Washington area regarding the information they received about what to do in an emergency situation. On the basis of its review of Department guidance and federal guidelines on emergency preparedness, OIG developed a questionnaire to be completed by occupants of Main State and Department annexes in the Washington metropolitan area only. OIG distributed the questionnaire via Department Notice on September 19 and October 14, 2005, to elicit as much information as possible. Some of the annexes surveyed included several buildings. The total number of buildings surveyed was 48. The cutoff date for data collection was November 11, 2005.

As indicated in the Table, OIG received 603 responses from the 11,770 employees and contractors working in the Washington area, for an overall response rate of 5 percent. Responses were received from 31 of the 48 buildings surveyed. The majority of workers in the Washington area, approximately 8,000, work at the Harry S. Truman Building (HST), also called Main State. The response rate from the occupants of HST was 208, which is 34 percent of the total number of respondents (603) and 2 percent of the total universe of 11,770. Of the respondents, 82 percent were direct-hire employees; 13 percent were contractors; and about 5 percent were other, such as when actually employed personnel.

**Table: Sample Size and Response Rate by Stratum**

| Stratum      | Universe      | Responses  | Response Rate |
|--------------|---------------|------------|---------------|
| HST          | 8,000         | 208        | 3%            |
| Annexes      | 3,770         | 395        | 10%           |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>11,770</b> | <b>603</b> | <b>5%</b>     |

Source: OIG questionnaire and responses from September 19 to November 11, 2005.

Notes on data presentation:

- (1) Responses to the questions are expressed in percentages unless indicated otherwise.
- (2) Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding; additionally, the number of responses to each question was not identical because respondents did not always answer all questions.
- (3) A tilde (~) indicates that this question was answered infrequently; therefore, the results expressed in percentages or otherwise were not sufficiently meaningful to be reported.
- (4) An asterisk (\*) indicates that responses such as “Don’t know” were filtered from the data, when necessary, for clarity of the analysis and presentation. By eliminating these responses from the analysis of question 11, for example, only respondents actually providing assessments of the guidance provided by the Emergency Action Plan for various emergencies were included in calculating the rates of perceived adequacy or inadequacy.
- (5) Questions 30, 31, 32, and 33 were rendered not applicable (NA) because no respondents indicated that they worked at any of the Department’s Child Care Centers.

## Results of OIG's Questionnaire

Q1 Please indicate your Division/Office symbol.

**93.2% responded to this question.**

Q2 Please provide your primary workplace. (Check one.)

|  |   |  |
|--|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> [34.6%] Harry S. Truman | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-10  | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.3%] SA-24                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.2%] Blair House     | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.2%] SA-11  | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-25                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> [15.0%] SA-1            | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.2%] SA-11A | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 1.2%] SA-26                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> [ 1.8%] SA-2            | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.3%] SA-11B | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 1.2%] SA-27                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> [ 3.3%] SA-3            | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-12  | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-28                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.5%] SA-4 Central    | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.2%] SA-13  | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 2.2%] SA-29                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.7%] SA-4 East       | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 1.7%] SA-14  | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-31                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.3%] SA-4 South      | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 2.2%] SA-15  | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.5%] SA-32                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-5            | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-16  | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-33                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> [ 1.8%] SA-6            | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.3%] SA-17  | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.5%] SA-34                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-7A           | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-18  | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-37                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-7B           | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-19  | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 9.0%] SA-39                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-7C           | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 4.7%] SA-20  | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 6.3%] SA-42                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-8B           | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.3%] SA-21  | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.3%] SA-43                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-8E           | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.7%] SA-22  | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 7.8%] SA-44                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.0%] SA-9            | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 1.2%] SA-23  | <input type="checkbox"/> [ 0.8%] Other (Please Specify.) |

Q3 About how many years has this building been your primary workplace? (Round your answer up to the nearest whole year; enter zero if less than six months.)

**Responses averaged 5.29 years**

Q4 Please provide your employment status within the Department of State. (Check one.)

[81.7%] Department of State Direct Hire  
 [13.1%] Department of State Contractor  
 [ 2.2%] Department of State WAE  
 [ 3.0%] Other (Please Specify.) \_\_\_\_\_

Q5 Are there other tenants in your building besides Department of State?

[42.0%] Yes  
 [58.0%] No  
 [ \* ] Don't know

**Q6** Are you aware of the Department of State’s Occupant Emergency Program?

- [69.5%] *Yes* -----> **Continue**
- [30.5%] *No* -----> **Go to Q8**

**Q7** How would you rate the Department’s Occupant Emergency Program? (**Check one; select “Don’t know” only if you are not familiar enough with the Program to render a judgment.**)

- [11.3%] *More than adequate*
- [58.0%] *Generally adequate*
- [20.8%] *Of marginal or borderline adequacy*
- [ 6.0%] *Inadequate*
- [ 3.9%] *Very Inadequate*
- [ \* ] *Don’t know*

**Q8** Have you taken the Department’s on-line Domestic Emergency Management course?

- [14.4%] *Yes*
- [85.6%] *No*

**Q9** Are you aware of or have you read the Emergency Action Plan for your primary workplace?

- [52.8%] *Yes* -----> **Continue**
- [47.2%] *No* -----> **Go to Q13**

**Q10** Within the first month of your employment at your primary workplace, were you briefed on the Emergency Action Plan?

- [32.3%] *Yes* -----> **Continue**
- [67.7%] *No* -----> **Go to Q13**
- [ \* ] *Don’t know/can’t recall*> **Go to Q13**

**Q11** How would you rate the briefing you received on the Emergency Action Plan for your primary workplace? (**Check one.**)

- [30.0%] *More than adequate*
- [50.0%] *Generally adequate*
- [20.0%] *Of marginal or borderline adequacy*
- [ 0.0%] *Inadequate*
- [ 0.0%] *Very inadequate*
- [ 0.0%] *Don’t know/can’t recall*

**Q12** For your primary workplace, how would you rate the guidance provided by the Emergency Action Plan for a ... (**Check one box in each row; select “Don’t know” only if you are not familiar enough to render a judgment.**)

|   | <i>More than adequate</i> | <i>Generally adequate</i> | <i>Of marginal or borderline adequacy</i> | <i>Inadequate</i> | <i>Very inadequate</i> | <i>Don't know</i> |
|---|---------------------------|---------------------------|---|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| Medical emergency?  | 18.9%                     | 62.2%                     | 8.1%                                      | 5.4%              | 5.4%                   | *                 |
| Rescue (mechanical or other entrapment)?                        | 19.4%                     | 52.8%                     | 16.7%                                     | 5.6%              | 5.6%                   | *                 |
| Fire?   | 37.5%                     | 52.5%                     | 7.5%                                      | 2.5%              | 0.0%                   | *                 |
| Bomb threat?  | 37.5%                     | 50.0%                     | 5.0%                                      | 5.0%              | 2.5%                   | *                 |
| Bomb explosion?   | 27.0%                     | 45.9%                     | 18.9%                                     | 5.4%              | 2.7%                   | *                 |
| Suspicious package?   | 43.6%                     | 43.6%                     | 10.3%                                     | 0.0%              | 2.6%                   | *                 |
| Hazardous substance (spill, leak)?                              | 29.7%                     | 51.4%                     | 13.5%                                     | 2.7%              | 2.7%                   | *                 |
| Chemical incident?  | 27.0%                     | 45.9%                     | 16.2%                                     | 8.1%              | 2.7%                   | *                 |
| Biological incident?  | 26.3%                     | 47.4%                     | 15.8%                                     | 7.9%              | 2.6%                   | *                 |
| Radiological incident?  | 23.7%                     | 44.7%                     | 13.2%                                     | 13.2%             | 5.3%                   | *                 |
| Natural disaster (i.e., hurricane, tornado, flood, earthquake)? | 20.0%                     | 45.0%                     | 22.5%                                     | 7.5%              | 5.0%                   | *                 |
| Terrorist attack?   | 24.2%                     | 42.4%                     | 18.2%                                     | 12.1%             | 3.0%                   | *                 |
| Civil disorder (i.e., hostage takeover or physical threat)?     | 30.6%                     | 36.1%                     | 19.4%                                     | 11.1%             | 2.8%                   | *                 |
| Armed attack?   | 26.5%                     | 41.2%                     | 23.5%                                     | 5.9%              | 2.9%                   | *                 |
| Workplace violence?   | 30.6%                     | 36.1%                     | 25.0%                                     | 2.8%              | 5.6%                   | *                 |
| Other? (Please specify _____.)                                  | ~                         | ~                         | ~   | ~                 | ~                      | *                 |

**Q13** Do you have a specific role or duties to perform (such as, Floor Monitor/Warden, Handicapped Monitor, etc.) in the event of an emergency?

[17.7%] *Yes* -----> **Continue**  
 [82.3%] *No* -----> **Go to Q16**

**Q14** Please provide in the space below your specific role, duties, title, etc. with respect to an emergency.

**9.6% responded to this question.**

**Q15** Did you receive any training to prepare you for your role, duties, etc. with respect to an emergency?

[56.1%] *Yes*  
 [43.9%] *No*



**Q16** Are the evacuation routes clearly posted on the walls of your workplace?

- [53.5%] *Yes*
- [46.5%] *No*
- [ \* ] *Don't know*

**Q17** Do you know what to do when a shelter-in-place is invoked?

- [42.5%] *Yes*
- [57.5%] *No*

**Q18** Do you know the designated location for shelter-in-place in your primary workplace?

- [22.7%] *Yes*
- [77.3%] *No*

**Q19** During the time that this building has been your primary workplace, about how many times per year have you participated in ... **(Fill in each box; place a zero in the box if you have never participated in that type of drill).**

|   |                           |
|---|---------------------------|
| fire drills?  | [Responses averaged 1.87] |
| shelter-in-place drills?                            | [Responses averaged 0.08] |
| chemical or biological exposure drills?             | [Responses averaged 0.10] |
| hostage takeover drills?                            | [Responses averaged 0.01] |
| physical threats drills?                            | [Responses averaged 0.06] |
| natural disaster drills?                            | [Responses averaged 0.03] |
| terrorist drills?                                   | [Responses averaged 0.02] |
| other? <b>(Please specify type of drill _____.)</b> | [Responses averaged 0.44] |

**Q20** Did you receive a Department of State Emergency Reference Card (which is about the size of your Department ID) with the phone numbers of the people to call in the event of an emergency?

- [71.7%] *Yes*
- [28.3%] *No*
- [ \* ] *Don't know/can't recall*

**Q21** Does your Bureau/Office have an up-to-date emergency phone tree?

- [81.2%] *Yes*
- [18.8%] *No*
- [ \* ] *Don't know/can't recall*

**Q22** Do you know how to use an emergency phone tree?

- [77.9%] *Yes*
- [22.1%] *No*

**Q23** Do you know who the Handicapped Monitor is for your primary workplace?

[12.1%] *Yes*  
[87.9%] *No*

**Q24** Are you a person with special needs?

[ 2.7%] *Yes* -----> **Continue**  
[97.3%] *No* -----> **Go to Q27**

**Q25** Have you notified your supervisor/manager of your special needs?

[68.8%] *Yes*  
[31.3%] *No*

**Q26** Have arrangements been established to assist you in the event of an emergency (i.e., Buddy System)?

[11.8%] *Yes* -----> **Go to Q28**  
[88.2%] *No* -----> **Go to Q28**

**Q27** Although you are not a person with special needs, are you nonetheless aware of ...

|  | <i>Yes</i> | <i>No</i> |
|--|------------|-----------|
| People with special needs in your office?          | [43.9%]    | [56.1%]   |
| Procedures in place for people with special needs? | [24.2%]    | [75.8%]   |

**Q28** Does your primary workplace have a child care center?

[32.1%] *Yes*  
[67.9%] *No*  
[ \* ] *Don't know*

**Q29** Do you have a child at the Department's Child Care Center (i.e., SA-1 or SA-42/FSI)?

[ 1.5%] *Yes*  
[98.5%] *No*

**Q30** Do you work at the Department's Child Care Center?

[ 0.0%] *Yes* -----> **Continue.**  
[100.0%] *No* -----> **Go to Q34.**

**Q31** As an employee of the Department's Child Care Center, do you . . .

|   | <i>Yes</i> | <i>No</i> |
|---|------------|-----------|
| have children assigned to you in the event of an emergency? | <b>NA</b>  | <b>NA</b> |

|  |    |    |
|--|----|----|
| know, if the children assigned to you know to follow your lead in the event of an emergency? | NA | NA |
| know the primary and secondary evacuation routes?  | NA | NA |
| know the location of the shelter-in-place?   | NA | NA |
| know, if the Center conducted evacuation and shelter-in-place drills?                        | NA | NA |
| know whom to contact in the event of an emergency?   | NA | NA |

**Q32** Are you aware of the evacuation procedures for the Department's Child Care Center?

**NA** ] *Yes*

**NA** ] *No*

**Q33** Are you aware of the shelter-in-place procedures for the Department's Child Care Center?

**NA** ] *Yes*

**NA** ] *No*

**Q34** Please use the space below to continue or elaborate on any answer or to provide any additional information that you think is important or pertinent. If you were sent to this question directly after completing **Q2**, your primary workplace is outside the geographic area of this particular survey.

**27.9% of respondent provided comments.**

**THANK YOU FOR YOUR Participation.**

Department Comments

Office of the Under Secretary for Management



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

[www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

FEB 27 2007

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

TO: OIG – Bill Todd

FROM: M/P – Marguerite Coffey *MC*

SUBJECT: Audit of Emergency Preparedness (AUD/SI-07-XX)

In response to your memorandum of February 21, 2007, Under Secretary Fore has asked me to comment on your draft audit report concerning “Emergency Preparedness at the Washington Metropolitan Facilities of the Department of State.”

We concur with Recommendations One and Four which are currently assigned to M and will inform you of our progress as appropriate. Most immediately, the M Front Office will review the roles and responsibilities tasker assigned to the Bureau of Administration in October of 2005. M will also schedule a DEAC meeting and ensure that it meets on regular basis.

We request the following edits to this draft audit report:

- The last DEAC meeting was convened on Friday, February 2, 2006. The OIG draft says that the last meeting of the DEAC was in February 2005.
- In that same paragraph, please delete the last sentence which is inaccurate and inappropriate in lieu of the correct date of the last DEAC meeting.

Should you have any questions or concerns please contact Susan Curley of my staff who can be reached at 202-647-0550 and at [curleysa@state.gov](mailto:curleysa@state.gov).

UNCLASSIFIED

**Department Comments**

**Bureau of Administration**




United States Department of State

*Assistant Secretary of State  
for Administration*

*Washington, D.C. 20520*

MAR 13 2007

TO:           OIG – Mr. Howard J. Krongard  
FROM:        A – Lee Lohman, Acting   
SUBJECT:    Draft Audit of Emergency Preparedness at the Washington  
              Metropolitan Facilities of the Department of State (AUD/SI-07-XX)  
RE:           Krongard Transmittal Memo February 21, 2007 for the January 2006  
              OIG Audit Report

The Bureau of Administration appreciates the opportunity to review and provide written comments on the draft audit report on emergency preparedness at the Department's Washington metropolitan facilities. Our comments pertain to recommendation 2, and then recommendations 5 through 11. We are pleased to report that much has been accomplished since the audit was completed in January 2006 and that we are working very hard to improve emergency planning and preparedness throughout the Department. Although Bureau-level Emergency Action Plans (BEAPs) were not a focus of your audit, in concert with the Department's Domestic Emergency Action Committee (DEAC), we have increased their importance during the past year. Also since the audit was completed, the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) has reported directly to the Assistant Secretary for Administration. For that reason, this document will refer to OEM as A/OEM.

**Recommendation 2:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration ensure that the Office of Emergency Management's Planning and Preparedness Division has sufficient staffing to finalize 6-FAM 400, Office of Emergency Management Program, and the proposed 6 FAH-1 H-000, Domestic Emergency Handbook, and ensure that the emergency preparedness policies and procedures contained in these manuals are implemented and enforced in a timely manner.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

2

**The Bureau of Administration Agrees with Recommendation 2:** We have been working with the Bureaus of Resource Management and Human Resources to increase the staffing and budget for A/OEM. Additional staffing and budget requests for A/OEM are included in the FY 08 Bureau Budget Plan.

A/OEM/PPD held back changes to 6 FAM 400 in hopes of adopting DS's "Crisis and Emergency Planning Application" (CEPA). Delays in DS's implementation schedule had a spillover effect on A/OEM's. Those have now been resolved, and A/OEM is working with DS on the required FAM and FAH changes. The draft changes should be completed within the next two months and then sent out for clearance and publication.

A/OEM/PPD also drafted 1 FAM 200 and 213.9 changes and is awaiting a final decision to transfer the Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP) from RM to A/OEM/PPD. Once resolved, these draft changes should be published.

The Department will use the oversight of the Domestic Emergency Action Committee to ensure the emergency preparedness policies and procedures contained in the referenced FAMs and FAHs are implemented and enforced in a timely manner.

**Recommendation 5:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration ensure that the model Facility Emergency Action Plan is in compliance with federal regulations and guidelines to account for employees after an evacuation and to include provisions to assist individuals with special needs, such as a buddy system. Once approved, the model plan should be used to prepare or revise the Department Facility Emergency Action Plans.

**The Bureau of Administration Agrees with Recommendation 5:** State Annex No. One's (SA-1) Facility Emergency Action Plan (FEAP Pilot Project) has been completed and is now in use. This FEAP is compliant with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the Incident Command System (ICS), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). It will account for employees after an evacuation, includes provisions to assist individuals with special needs and uses the buddy system. A/OEM/PPD is incorporating the lessons learned from that process into the FEAP for the Harry S Truman building (HST) which is currently being developed.

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In addition, the Bureau of Administration is pleased to report a number of developments since the completion of the OIG Audit as follows:

- A/OEM/PPD trained over 175 personnel and implemented a new Warden Program.
- In association with FSI, it developed an on-line certification training course for Wardens, Monitors and Emergency Response personnel.
- Established a new emergency radio communications program for use by Wardens and Monitors for accountability purposes during emergencies:
- Obtained 400 handheld radios, five new emergency radio frequencies and established an OEM base station radio system that will enable the Department to have direct communications with all Executive Directors during an emergency.
- Purchased and issued 35 emergency evacuation chairs for persons with special needs and provided hands-on-training to 125 people with special needs and their "buddies."
- Developed a special needs training program so that bureaus can better serve this group of employees in their emergency planning.
- Rationalized the assembly points in an evacuation for the Foggy Bottom Campus to prevent overlaps.

All of these programs have been tested and exercised in accordance with FPC-65.

**Recommendation 6:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration prepare Facility Emergency Action Plans for those facilities currently without plans, review and update existing plans, and ensure that all employees are briefed on the existence and contents of the plans. The model Facility Emergency Action Plan, once approved, should be the basis for the preparation of all subsequent Department Facility Emergency Action Plans.

**The Bureau of Administration Agrees with Recommendation 6:** The FEAP for SA-1 has been completed. A/OEM/PPD conducted several briefings for Bureau Executives, Warden, Monitors and DS Uniformed Security and Operations personnel on the contents of the FEAP during its development. Notices were issued to SA-1 Employees informing them of the existence of the new FEAP and the planned exercises. Operational Handbooks were developed and issued to Wardens and key emergency response personnel. This plan was tested and exercised on September 25, 2006 and employees were requested to provide after action comments. A/OEM/PPD briefed key personnel and developed a list of

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“lessons learned” that was included in the overall report. In addition, A/OEM/PPD conducts monthly training sessions of emergency procedures, including FEAP requirements, for all new civil and Foreign Service personnel as well as returning FSOs. This information is also included in the A/OEM/PPD Noontime Series and Forum meetings held in HST and other State Annexes. When possible, these meetings are recorded and broadcast on BNet. This information is also posted on the OEM website.

HST’s FEAP is scheduled for completion the end of March, 2007. The lessons learned from the SA-1 pilot project FEAP and the HST FEAP will be used to finalize our Model Plan. Concurrently, DHS is developing a new Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) (The General Services Administration is no longer responsible for OEP’s as reported in the OIG Audit). Once completed, the OEP will be used to ensure that our plan meets all requirements. It will then be presented to the DEAC for its approval and then be used to update all existing FEAPs and to develop new FEAPs for those facilities that do not have any plans. These plans will be updated and posted as required on the OEM website.

**Recommendation 7:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration designate the Office of Emergency Management as the authority for conducting emergency evacuation and shelter-in-place drills. The Bureau should advise Department management of this authority, the importance of conducting these drills, and the need for the Department’s cooperation.

**The Bureau of Administration Agrees with Recommendation 7:** The Under Secretary for Management and the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Administration have confirmed that A/OEM is the authority for conducting emergency evacuation and shelter-in-place drills, and has tasked them to conduct a minimum of forty drills and/or exercises annually. OEM’s authority was conveyed to the Department through the DEAC. This authority will be outlined and included in the new FAMs and FAHs as described under Recommendation 2. The FAM and FAH will highlight the requirements of these drills and exercises as described in FPC-65.

Since the completion of the OIG Audit, A/OEM/PPD implemented and/or reviewed 175 evacuation events in the NCR, conducted two announced and two unannounced Department telephone tree drills, three table-top exercises, 1,200 weekly announcements (done by each of the three guard shifts weekly) and testing of the Department’s emergency public address systems in DOS controlled

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facilities, conducted seven monthly radio tests with bureaus of the A/OEM/PPD Emergency Communications System, and conducted six internal A Bureau tests of the Alert Management System (as approved by the IRM ITCCB for to all domestic Department systems). In addition, A/OEM/DCP conducts quarterly Mission Critical Team (MCT) drills, coordinated with the Executive Directors.

**Recommendation 8:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration require the Department's bureaus and offices to conduct, at a minimum, semiannual evacuation and shelter-in-place drills for emergency situations such as fires, chemical or biological exposure, hostage situations, physical threats, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks. Procedures for these drills should be consistent from facility to facility and require full participation of all Department personnel.

**The Bureau of Administration Agrees with Recommendation 8:** A/OEM/PPD has been tasked to conduct a minimum of ten drills and exercises per quarter. The drills and exercises are designed to prepare for the scenarios depicted in the OIG recommendations. To ensure drills and exercises are consistent from facility to facility, A/OEM is using standardized planning templates. Supervisors are informed of the requirements contained in FPC-65 and are asked to ensure all employees participate. A/OEM/PPD will monitor these drills and exercises to ensure conformance and provide After Action Reports to Management.

**Recommendation 9:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration require the model Facility Emergency Action Plan to include and address the use of trained floor wardens to assist employees in evacuating a building or directing the employees to designated shelter-in-place areas, the use of evacuation assembly points, and the use of roll calls to account for employees after an evacuation.

**The Bureau of Administration agrees with Recommendation 9.** The SA-1 Pilot Project implemented the use of trained floor wardens to assist employees in evacuating a building or directing the employees to designated shelter-in-place areas or assembly points as appropriate. Wardens and Bureau Executive offices were trained to conduct roll calls to account for employees, in accordance with OSHA regulations, after an evacuation and report the results to the NIMS compliant Incident Commander. These same procedures are included in the requirements for the development of the HST FEAP, and will be included in the Model Plan and all future FEAP requirements.

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**Recommendation 10:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration develop and implement a policy to require all Department domestic-based personnel to complete the online emergency preparedness training course.

**The Bureau of Administration agrees with Recommendation 10:** A/OEM/PPD will present this recommendation to the DEAC for resolution. At the time the online emergency preparedness training course was developed, A/OEM was informed that we could not require all Department domestic-based personnel to complete the online emergency preparedness training course because it is rarely part of an employee's job requirements. Completing this course was compared to the DS online Information Security course that all employees are required to complete annually. The protection of information is a requirement contained in employee job elements. There are currently no job requirements for emergency preparedness. A/OEM/PPD will resurface this issue with the Bureau of Human Resources and FSI to seek a resolution to this issue and report the findings to the OIG.

**Recommendation 11:** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration include procedures for the mandated emergency evacuation route assignments, signage, and markings in the Facility Emergency Action Plans as required by the Code of Federal Regulations (29 CFR) and proceed with its pilot project to install signage and markings at all domestic facilities.

**The Bureau of Administration Agrees:** A/OEM/PPD included procedures for the mandated emergency evacuation route assignments, signage, and markings in the SA-1 pilot FEAP project. During the development of the SA-1 FEAP it was discovered that the existing floor plans and signage for SA-1 were outdated. As the floor plans are updated by A/OPR/RPM, they will become the basis for hiring a contractor to install new signage and route markings. We will report back to OIG when this has been completed.

A/OEM/PPD has included a signage and marking requirement into the HST FEAP currently under development. Once completed, the HST FEAP will be used to develop the Model Plan which will provide mandated emergency evacuation route assignments, signage and markings in all other future FEAPs.

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Department Comments

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism



United States Department of State

Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism  
Washington, D.C. 20520

March 7, 2007

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TO:           OIG – Howard J. Krongard  
FROM:        S/CT – Frank C. Urbancic, Acting *FU*  
SUBJECT:     Draft Audit of Emergency Preparedness at the Washington Metropolitan  
              Facilities of the Department of State (AUD/SI-07-XX)  
REF:         Krongard Transmittal Memo February 21, 2007

Thank you for your request for S/CT written comments on the draft report and information on actions taken or planned on Recommendation 3.

S/CT cannot disagree with Recommendation 3, which is that we should have sufficient staff to meet a national priority and that we should submit information to DHS in a timely manner.

S/CT suggests that the draft narrative preceding the recommendation provides an inaccurate description of how S/CT dealt with its responsibilities with respect to NRP and NIMS, and further suggests that the draft narrative and Recommendation 3 should be removed from the draft audit report. Specific inaccuracies are:

- The audit says the Department did not comply with HSPD-5, that the draft NIMS compliance was not finalized. The reason it was not “final” was because DHS never sent to the Department comment or concurrence on next steps to implement the plan that S/CT submitted to DHS, on time, in March, 2005.
- The audit says that S/CT did not submit NRP corrections as of November, 2005. This is an accurate, but not relevant, statement. DHS’s original due date for submitting corrections (all agencies) was December 2005 (one year after the NRP was signed). However, as the “Katrina Lessons Learned” (all agency) effort began, HSC and DHS informally postponed the deadline for corrections, pending a formal review of the entire NRP. Despite the lack of a new deadline, S/CT provided DHS and the HSC with “non-Katrina” changes to the NRP on February 10, 2006. Neither DHS nor HSC engaged with those changes, however, as they moved toward a new effort, the total top-down review of NRP.

S/CT agrees with OIG that more needs to be done to bring the Department into compliance with its responsibilities under the NRP, and is working with other

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Department elements on that. We do not agree that the draft narrative preceding Recommendation 3 is accurate or pertinent. Should OIG decide to retain that draft language, the following is the S/CT response to the Recommendation.

**Recommendation 3:** OIG recommends that the Secretary's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism dedicate sufficient staff to finalize the National Incident Management System and to correct the inaccuracies in the National Response Plan and that it submit the information to the Department of Homeland Security in a timely manner.

At the time the NRP was first drafted, S/CT only had one full-time person working on NRP-related issues, and he could not dedicate a full time schedule to the NRP given the press of other responsibilities. Over the course of the year since the drafting of the NRP, S/CT eventually had three full-time-equivalent personnel involved on the NRP, but again, none of them could work on the project full time.

In June of 2006 S/CT-HS obtained by contract the services of a full-time, on-site, cleared person, whose duties include the development of Standard Operating Procedures and designations of responsibility to support the Department's planning for and response to Incidents of National Significance under the National Response Plan. Prior to that, one of the three direct-hire employees in S/CT-HS dedicated half her time to NRP/NIMS issues, between October, 2005 and October 2006. The Deputy Coordinator for Homeland Security devotes a significant amount of her time coordinating NRP issues among Department Bureaus and with the Federal Homeland Security Community.

In December 2005, State and other agencies were told by DHS and the HSC via the Domestic Threat Reduction and Incident Management (DTRIM) policy coordinating committee that the deadline for NRP updates was informally postponed so that it could be incorporated into the HSC-led Katrina Lessons Learned Process. However, when it became clear that a new deadline was not forthcoming in the short term, S/CT-HS transmitted to the Homeland Security Council and the Department of Homeland Security, Department-cleared **non-Katrina related** recommended changes to the National Response Plan in February 2006 to address improvements in the International Affairs aspects of the Plan.

Subsequent to Hurricane Katrina, the Department participated in the HSC "Katrina Lessons Learned" effort, and submitted to HSC a compliance report indicating changes in Department requirements to meet its responsibilities under the NRP during a domestic Incident of National Significance. A significant action under that process was State's development (by S/ES-O and USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) of the International Assistance System (IAS) whereby State, USAID/OFDA and FEMA will handle offers of assistance by foreign entities to assist the United States in domestic emergencies.

In the summer of 2006, HSC initiated a top-to-bottom review of the NRP and NIMS. The review is to be completed in summer, 2007. The effort is intended to clarify roles and responsibilities of agencies, authorities of lead agencies according to the nature of the emergency, and command, control and communication capabilities of national

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leadership. State has been involved in this process through the Homeland Security Council's Domestic Readiness Group (DRG) and FEMA's Emergency Support Function Leaders' Group (ESFLG.) State's primary representation for these efforts is A/OEM, with S/CT-HS in a backstop and support role.

State has submitted all NRP/NIMS review and revision materials on or ahead of schedule since the beginning of the review.

S/CT-HS has partnered with A/OEM and with S/ES-O/CMS to improve the Department's internal organization better to comply with the requirements of NRP, NIMS and associated plans and policies. As OIG notes in the audit, the Department lacks unity of command in this area, and needs to develop Department-wide compliant and unified SOPs, with associated designations of responsibility, training, exercises, and systems development.

S/CT-HS' mandate is focused on dealing only with the anti-terrorism components of the NRP, yet originally undertook many of the non-terrorism components due to the press of circumstances. While S/CT-HS staff is sufficient to meet this limited mandate, S/CT-HS would require additional staff to address the full range of NRP components.

Attachment:

Memorandum dated Feb 21 as stated.

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