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United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General

Report of Inspection

Summary Review of Public Diplomacy Efforts

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KEY JUDGMENTS

- The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has made a personal priority of improving public diplomacy coordination within the Department of State (Department) and in the interagency process and has made important progress in this area, including implementing recommendations of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
- Public diplomacy strategic planning has improved but could be stronger, especially at the mission level.
- The Department has made important, promising progress in the difficult task of measuring the impact and outcomes of public diplomacy efforts rather than just totaling public diplomacy activities undertaken, as has primarily been done in the past. The prospects for further progress are encouraging.
- The need to increase public diplomacy officers' foreign language capabilities is a long-term challenge. Public diplomacy officers wanted to expand their foreign language competencies, and other mission officers said they would like to assist with public diplomacy outreach but lack sufficient language skills.
- In general, the management controls of embassy public affairs programs were found to be good, but some areas needed improvement. Public affairs sections may also have been overburdened by the administrative requirements of grants monitoring and may require additional support.
- The Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R/PPR) has worked with a performance measurement consultant to identify 15 performance measurement indicators for public diplomacy programs, and these should prove useful tools for posts to engage in quantitative assessment of their programs.

Dr. Louis A. McCall, Coordinator for International Broadcasting and Public Diplomacy Evaluations, conducted this review, which focused on material OIG had gathered on the Department's public diplomacy efforts during FY 2005 and FY 2006.

CONTEXT

Public diplomacy is the Department's tool to fight what the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has termed the "war of ideas."¹ In the Department's *FY 2005 Performance and Accountability Report*, the Inspector General said public diplomacy is one of the most serious management and performance challenges facing the Department. The Secretary of State has said, "When it comes to our public diplomacy we simply must do better."² This report highlights areas where the Department's public diplomacy effort has improved, areas where it could improve, and how the public diplomacy activities of various Department entities reflect and contribute to achieving the Department and Administration's strategic goals.

¹Public diplomacy testimony, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Karen Hughes, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Washington, DC, November 10, 2005.

²Announcement of Nominations of Karen P. Hughes as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and Dina Powell as Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Benjamin Franklin Room, Washington, DC, March 14, 2005.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

The Under Secretary has emphasized in testimony to Congress the importance and prominence of public diplomacy and promised to reinvigorate America's public diplomacy efforts.³ She has done this by articulating a public diplomacy strategy and by disseminating instructions that facilitate more rapid responses by chiefs of mission to host country audiences. No longer is Washington preclearance required for ambassadors to speak out.⁴ The Under Secretary has also:

- Created an office of performance evaluation and established an environment conducive to the development of a culture of performance measurement that emphasizes impact;
- Restructured the Department's lines of communication for public diplomacy; and
- Led an interagency process of coordinating strategic communication.

The Under Secretary heads a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for strategic communication, formed in April 2006 at the direction of the President, and has organized a separate high-level interagency group. These efforts promote the President's freedom agenda and counter ideological support for terrorism. To improve coordination of public diplomacy within the Department, one deputy assistant secretary in each regional bureau has been double-hatted with responsibility for public diplomacy, reporting to the relevant regional assistant secretary and to the Under Secretary. These deputy assistant secretaries and the heads of their bureaus' public diplomacy offices meet with the Under Secretary, or a designee, weekly. Additionally, the heads of the bureaus' public diplomacy offices meet separately each week with the Director of R/PPR. In operational terms, the success of a public diplomacy program begins with direction and active involvement from the Ambassador,

³Public diplomacy testimony, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Karen Hughes, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Washington, DC, November 10, 2005.

⁴Department of State telegram, *Speaking on the Record*, STATE 6202, January 12, 2006.

Assistant Secretary, or assistant secretary equivalent. Coordinating public diplomacy programs and achieving a unified, clear, and compelling message will have greater opportunity for success when there is involvement, direction, and oversight at the top.

The Department's functional offices also understand and value the importance of public diplomacy. Two offices in particular – the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) and the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) – were found by OIG's FY 2006 inspections to have active public diplomacy programs that were driven from the top. The S/CT Coordinator was leading by example, undertaking an active public diplomacy role that involved making regular addresses and engaging with the press. This created the expectation that all S/CT staff would be involved in public diplomacy. PRM, meanwhile, had been energized in its public diplomacy outreach because the Deputy Secretary instructed it to generate higher visibility for the generous contributions of the U.S. government to international humanitarian efforts.

OIG inspections found the embassies in Kuala Lumpur, Warsaw, Chisinau, Cairo, and Amman had a clear grasp of the importance of public diplomacy. The ambassadors of those missions also demanded much from their public affairs sections (PAS) and public affairs officers (PAO) and saw themselves as key spokespersons for America's message when participating in official appearances and events in their host nations.

POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

The Under Secretary has made improved public diplomacy strategic planning a top priority and has also made progress on achieving greater public diplomacy inter-agency coordination. Nevertheless, this review determined that some bureaus were missing opportunities to tell America's story and that many embassies had no way to measure the impact of public diplomacy programs beyond counting those activities or the articles the activities generated. This situation may improve with implementation of the metrics becoming available from R/PPR.

MEASUREMENT OF IMPACT

Measuring the impact of public diplomacy efforts is difficult because simply totaling the number of public diplomacy activities provides no indication of whether they resulted in the desired outcomes, such as increased understanding of U.S. policies or the American system of government and promoting tolerance. In fall 2004, the Department established R/PPR, which provides long-term strategic planning and performance measurement capability for public diplomacy and public affairs programs.⁵ R/PPR surveyed public diplomacy measures found in Mission Performance Plans (MPPs) and identified 898 different indicators. R/PPR worked with a performance measurement consultant to distill that number to a more manageable 15. The Office of Management and Budget has given preliminary approval for those 15 public diplomacy performance measurements. Of the 15, nine are outcome measures (three long-term and six annual), five are annual output measures, and one is an annual efficiency measure. Posts will be required to use some of these 15 measures in future strategic planning documents.

Based on the logic model exercise that R/PPR has been conducting with select bureaus and PAOs, R/PPR believes the new performance measures are adaptable to the wide variety of public diplomacy programming and circumstances. The next step will be to allocate resources to support collecting the data to measure

⁵Department of State Department Notice Number 2004-11-004, November 2, 2004.

performance. In the fall of 2006, the Department implemented and began testing a framework for data collection that included the launching of four integrated projects. These projects were designed to collect the data to establish baselines and set targets that the Department believes will strengthen the ability to demonstrate the effectiveness of public diplomacy. The projects are the American Customer Satisfaction Index, the Mission Activity Tracker, the Performance Measurement Data Collection Project, and the Strategic Media Outreach Program Assessment.

EMBASSIES BUENOS AIRES AND CAIRO ENGAGE IN MEASUREMENT

Prior to R/PPR's development of metrics for measuring public diplomacy efforts, at least two embassies were engaged in measuring their public diplomacy efforts through means other than simple totaling of their efforts. One was Embassy Buenos Aires, where PAS has worked closely with R/PPR to improve its MPP performance indicators. However, only one indicator included a true outcome measurement – measuring the percentage of increase in positive editorials supporting U.S. policies on MPP priority themes. The remaining four indicators provided for increased use of PAS information or requests for PAS programming. Such indicators may indirectly show that the embassy was successfully changing the opinions of the host nation's elites or general public – but not by how much. Nor did these indicators provide the embassy with a tool to measure which efforts are most effective. The Buenos Aires PAS now surveys every exchange grantee before and after travel to the United States, to measure immediate changes in attitudes and behavior.

The other embassy already engaged in measurement was Embassy Cairo. In Egypt, polls of public attitudes repeatedly showed little support for U.S. policy in the region. Changing these perceptions is essential to explain U.S. policies and to increase Egyptian exposure to Americans and American society, and Embassy Cairo's PAS has been properly focusing on this task. Embassy Cairo, at the time of OIG's inspection in October 2004, said it planned to contract for research that would provide objective data to measure the effectiveness of specific public diplomacy programs and activities.

At other posts, however, OIG's inspections found most embassies inspected were simply totaling the number of their public diplomacy activities, rather than attempting to measure the activities' impact. Many embassies could only offer anecdotal evidence, not quantifiable measures, to demonstrate programs' impact. This was the case at the time of inspections at Embassy Manama in October 2005 and Embassy Sanaa in November 2005. Other posts lacked metrics for assessing activities' impact or did not engage in such assessment. They include:

- Embassy San Salvador, where the PAS had no useful MPP performance indicators or effective performance measurement tools;
- Embassy Santiago, where the PAS offered little-to-no budget connection between public diplomacy activities and desired outcomes and had no way to measure the good results of grants other than the surveys of exchange visitors;
- Embassy Budapest, where the PAS had no way to measure public diplomacy success except counting the decrease of hostile press articles on visa application problems;
- Embassy Warsaw, where the MPP did not provide appropriate performance indicators against which to measure its energetic performance;
- Embassy Kabul, which did not adequately capture, measure, or report on the impact of its public diplomacy programs;
- Embassy Lusaka, which had not done an influence analysis report in the two years prior to the inspection; and
- Embassy Riyadh, which had not done influence analysis or results reporting in the year prior to the inspection.

The missions with deficient programs to measure public diplomacy impact will receive needed help from the 15 public diplomacy performance measures that R/PPR is sending to the field to provide guidance and indicators for valid public diplomacy performance measurement. The measures will enable embassies to capture and track the impact of their public diplomacy and public affairs programming. However, to be truly effective, resources will have to accompany the new guidance. PAOs commonly said their public diplomacy effort cannot be measured or that the cost of measurement would far exceed what is available in their post's public diplomacy budgets. Because valid performance measurement means accountability and a solid basis for funding decisions, the next step is to secure those resources.

Recommendation 1: The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Resource Management, should identify the resource needs for implementing an improved public diplomacy measurement program, develop a plan to fund it, and provide the funding, beginning with the highest-priority posts. (R, in coordination with RM)

IMPROVING STRATEGIC PLANNING

The Under Secretary is actively working with bureaus and missions to improve public diplomacy strategic planning. In her first year, she urged bureaus to host joint Chief of Mission-PAO conferences where she and the Assistant Secretaries emphasized the importance of integrating public diplomacy into policy. The Under Secretary has begun working with select missions – in an effort that will be broadened – to develop comprehensive public diplomacy strategic plans that counter ideological extremism. These plans will become models for missions to use in developing and coordinating public diplomacy strategies to address MPP goals and objectives.

The Under Secretary has made it a priority to highlight more effectively the U.S. contribution to economic development, the fight against HIV/AIDS and other potential pandemics, and addressing man-made and natural global challenges. Building on the President's most recent State of the Union address, she has built a "Partnership for a Better Life" web site to focus attention on the ways the United States is partnering with countries and people around the world to help people build better, more productive lives. She has strengthened cooperation with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and pioneered new public/private partnerships to reinforce this message and demonstrate how the United States helps people around the world. She has also encouraged ambassadors and PAOs to find ways to underscore these themes in their public diplomacy efforts.

Public diplomacy strategic planning at overseas missions has many opportunities for improvement. Some of the shortcomings found during OIG inspections included:

- Gaborone's PAS staff was not integrated into the embassy's strategic planning process;

- Embassy Lusaka needed better integration of its public diplomacy effort into mission priorities so that PAS activities could be prioritized and focused on MPP goals;
- Mission Saudi Arabia lacked a public diplomacy strategy and notional planning budgets for the public diplomacy efforts of Embassy Riyadh and Consulates General Dhahran and Jeddah; and
- Embassy Santiago's PAS needed to gain greater strategic direction from the MPP process so that it could shift its programming to support critical mission priorities more effectively and increase impact.

Among the bureaus, there is also room for improvement. OIG's inspection of PRM, for instance, found that, although PRM had a good story to tell, it had not been telling it effectively. International audiences had heard little of the U.S. government's leading role in humanitarian work, and greater U.S. public understanding and support for PRM's programs should be cultivated. OIG recommended that PRM, in coordination with the Under Secretary and the Department's regional bureaus, establish a comprehensive, multiyear public communications plan.

The situation in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental Scientific Affairs (OES) was analogous to PRM's in that OES was missing opportunities for its achievements to be appreciated by the American public and foreign audiences and to generate public support for U.S. objectives. Although advances in science and technology represent respected and important outgrowths of America's intellectual and economic freedoms, OES was missing opportunities to tell America's story in this area to foreign publics, largely due to inadequate staffing. At the time of the inspection, OES had one senior advisor who was responsible for public affairs and public diplomacy, supported by one public diplomacy officer. OES also gave little front office attention to crafting a well-organized plan for external communication.

ACHIEVING INTERNAL AND INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

OIG and GAO previously identified the need for greater interagency coordination on public diplomacy, with the Department playing the lead role. The Under Secretary has made this a priority and has seen progress. In the area of counterterrorism, an interagency group is looking at ways to win the war of ideas and to counteract Muslim extremists' messages. To counter extremists' use of the Internet,

the National Counterterrorism Center is coordinating an interagency effort in which S/CT has the lead role. S/CT in turn has given the lead for the initiative's public diplomacy aspects to the Office of Strategic Communication in the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP). Other bureaus, such as the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, are also involved.

To respond to concerns about public diplomacy coordination within the Department and the interagency process, a deputy assistant secretary in each regional bureau was double-hatted to answer to the Under Secretary and to the Assistant Secretary of his or her bureau. This was an important step forward. The weekly meetings between the Under Secretary or her designee and the deputy assistant secretaries and the heads of the public diplomacy offices in the bureaus have also helped public diplomacy coordination.

At the working level, the Interagency Strategic Communication Fusion Team, launched in January 2003, meets regularly at the Department. The team's chief of staff is from R/PPR, which coordinates the Department's public diplomacy presence in the interagency process in consultation with the relevant bureaus.⁶ Staff support for the team is provided by representatives of the Office of Strategic Communication. Team members who are drawn from participating government offices, bureaus, and agencies, share information about their organization's plans and activities to leverage each other's communication with international publics. The team does not task, but coordinates and de-conflicts the production and dissemination of information products. S/CT's cooperation with the team has been good. The Under Secretary has also launched a number of working-level interagency groups that meet regularly to coordinate public diplomacy.

The recently formed PCC for Strategic Communications, headed by the Under Secretary, was established to institutionalize interagency public diplomacy coordination. The PCC is developing an overarching, interagency strategic communications plan.

⁶Department of State Department Notice Number 2004-11-004, November 2, 2004.

Coordination at Overseas Posts

At the embassy level, some missions do a good job of coordinating public diplomacy between Department sections and other federal agencies represented at post. For example, at Embassy Lima the PAS was signing off on individual public diplomacy campaigns for coordination between agencies and sections. OIG's inspection report on this post recommended strengthening coordination by including public diplomacy on the agenda of MPP interagency committee meetings.

Communication between PAS and other embassy elements was excellent at the time of the inspection of Embassy Bucharest in November 2004. There, PAS provided public affairs support for all embassy elements and worked especially closely with the USAID mission in administering and promoting Support for Eastern European Democracy-funded reform programs. The PAS also worked with the embassy's law enforcement working group and Department of Defense elements regarding military training and assistance.

At Embassy Amman, PAS partnered with other mission elements and many Washington elements on its programs. For instance, USAID worked closely with PAS to coordinate its programs for building democracy and civil society. USAID has signed a Participating Agency Service Agreement with PAS. This has supported the PAS' Civic Awareness and Student Leadership programs and furthered cooperation with the Jordanian Ministry of Education on a civic education pilot project, among other activities. For business and women's issues, PAS worked with the Middle East Partnership Initiative on the Business Internships for Young Muslim Women program and on a major grant to develop films highlighting violence against women in the region. In fact, the post's cultural affairs officer was coordinator of the mission interagency working group addressing Middle East Partnership Initiative programs in Jordan.

The Under Secretary has sought to transform public diplomacy by making public diplomacy part of the job description for every Foreign Service officer, including ambassadors, and having them evaluated on their public diplomacy contributions. The standard in most embassies that OIG inspected, including those in Panama City, San Salvador, Riga, Warsaw, and Manama, was for there to be some participation in public diplomacy outreach efforts by a broad cross section of officers at post. Embassy Warsaw's PAS, for example, runs a mission speakers bureau with participation from officers of all ranks and from nearly all sections. Those officers not participating in the speakers bureau may still make presentations to more specific target audiences, such as universities or trade associations of specific interest to their sections.

At the posts in Manama, Riga, and Budapest, there was a pattern of especially close cooperation between PAS and the consular section for outreach. The PAS and consular section in the embassies in Budapest, Warsaw, and Riga were cooperating on public diplomacy activities to ease host nation dissatisfaction regarding their exclusion from the U.S. visa waiver program.

At some embassies, public diplomacy coordination needed improvement. Embassy Gaborone's PAS had weak coordination with other sections, and the PAS at Embassy Lusaka needed to meet with other embassy offices to collaborate better. Embassy Santiago's PAS needed to strengthen its planning and routine interaction with other sections and agencies. OIG informally recommended that Santiago's PAS meet with the agencies and sections supporting MPP goals to agree upon and develop influence analysis and written operational campaigns to advance priority public diplomacy activities.

TENSION BETWEEN PHYSICAL SECURITY AND PROGRAMMING OUTREACH

There must be a balance between the need for physical security and the openness required for public diplomacy outreach. As more new embassy compounds are constructed and PAS operations are colocated into these new facilities, the balance tends to swing in favor of tighter security. Even moving activities to off-campus venues is not always the solution, because the programming environment itself is extremely challenging in nations such as Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia's programming environment includes such challenges as cultural norms and security concerns, and Afghanistan's environment is in such a tumultuous state that a decision has been made to provide less direct oversight of the post's administration of some public diplomacy grants, which are virtually the post's only tool to develop and maintain contact with key organizations such as nongovernmental organizations. At the time of OIG's inspection in Afghanistan in October 2005, the public diplomacy program had no speaker programs, Information Resource Center, or digital videoconferences, and virtually no mechanisms for follow-up engagement with exchange visitor alumni.

HUMAN RESOURCES

Nearly all PAS officers consulted said public diplomacy training was adequate and the experienced public diplomacy officers said the newer generation of public diplomacy officers receives even more training than they did. With one exception, no officers said their public diplomacy training was insufficient for their public diplomacy duties. The exception was an officer in Saudi Arabia, where public diplomacy officers had not received the required public diplomacy training. The Under Secretary's office is examining the training continuum offered to Foreign Service officers and Foreign Service nationals (FSN) to ensure that it meets the needs of transformational diplomacy.

TRAINING

The need for cross training of FSNs was noted in OIG's inspections of Embassies Sanaa, Gaborone, Lusaka, and Hanoi, but was not seen as an issue at any European post inspected. At Embassy Kabul's PAS, there was a general need for FSN training. In Afghanistan, as in other high-danger posts with short tours of duty for Foreign Service officers, well-trained FSNs were critical to the smooth functioning and institutional memory of the PAS. This was due to the frequent turnover of U.S. direct-hire employees, understaffing of American positions, staffing gaps, and the rest and recuperation breaks that are part of the assignment package for such hard-to-fill posts. Although not a hard-to-fill post, Embassy Hanoi had a PAS with general FSN training needs. Furthermore, the embassies in Hanoi and Gaborone had webmaster issues. Gaborone lacked an FSN webmaster while Hanoi's webmaster needed additional training. The FSNs at embassies in San Salvador and Panama City have benefited from multiple training opportunities, including training in Fort Lauderdale, at Mexico City, at regional conferences in Buenos Aires, and from regional officers based in other countries in the region. Digital videoconferences have also been used for training.

LANGUAGE ISSUES

Foreign Service officers generally value training that raises their facility in the host nation's language. In non-English-speaking countries, officers face two language gaps. One is the difference between an officer's language capability and the language level the officer would like to have. In this instance, officers may have the language proficiency required for their positions, but their professionalism and the desire to take full advantage of the opportunities to represent the United States cause them to value improved skill in the host country's language. Public diplomacy officers expressed this view at embassies in Bamako, Dakar, Panama City, San Salvador, and Sanaa.

The other gap is an actual skills gap, where the officer lacks any host-country language training or has insufficient language training for the public diplomacy job. For example, the information officer at Embassy Santo Domingo needed language training to work in Spanish with the local press. In Saudi Arabia, none of the public diplomacy officers had received the Arabic language training required for their positions. At Embassy Budapest, most of the officers were capable and ready to carry out public diplomacy outreach, but the difficulty of the Hungarian language limited the number of officers who could make a presentation in Hungarian. Previous work by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy and GAO has drawn attention to the language skills gap as a critical challenge that is not limited to public diplomacy.⁷ A recent GAO report said that 35 percent of Department staff in public diplomacy positions did not meet language requirements. Some of the officers GAO met with had the language proficiency required for their assignments but nevertheless said they were not sufficiently fluent to effectively perform their jobs.⁸

One recurring theme from OIG inspections was the desire to have IIP provide additional language materials. Posts in Santiago and Buenos Aires wanted to receive IIP-produced materials in a more timely fashion and in greater quantity. Materials sought included electronic IIP products on MPP themes, Washington File articles, quarterly Article Alert summaries, electronic journals, publications, and poster shows. Embassy Buenos Aires' PAS said it could not shape national media coverage on

⁷*Changing Minds and Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World*, Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, October 1, 2003, pp. 26-28; *State Department Efforts Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges*, GAO-06-707T, May 3, 2006, p. 10; *Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps*, GAO-06-894, August 2006; *Workforce Planning Could Help Address Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls*, GAO-02-514T, March 12, 2002, p. 5.

⁸*Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps*, GAO-06-894, August 2006, pp. 28 and 31.

breaking issues because IIP disseminates Spanish-language translations up to two days after it provides the original English-language news stories in the Washington File. It saw as having little use the translations of newsworthy items that are not provided on a same-day basis.

Embassies Santiago and Buenos Aires were doing extensive translations of English-language documents into Spanish. In a Best Practice, these posts then put those documents on a list-serve that makes them available to other posts where Spanish is the host country language.

Best Practice: Sharing With Other Posts Documents Translated at Post

Issue: The Bureau of International Information Programs cannot fulfill all of the document translation needs in the volume, breadth of subject matter, and time frame desired by posts.

Response: The public affairs sections of embassies in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and Santiago, Chile, translate from English into Spanish a number of relevant public diplomacy documents and post the translations to a list-serve for use by other posts in the Spanish-speaking world.

Result: Other posts using this service can save limited resources, directing their public diplomacy staffs to other program-related activities. The Bureau of International Information Programs can redirect their limited resources to filling other gaps in the provision of Spanish-language materials to posts in the Spanish-speaking world.

Several posts in francophone West Africa, including the embassies in Conakry, Bamako, and Dakar, would benefit from having IIP translate all major presidential/executive branch addresses and the common documents that posts need to have on their web sites. It is expensive, redundant, and unnecessary for a dozen posts in francophone Africa to be translating the same speech on the Millennium Challenge Account, for example. Translations done by the Department would likely be timelier and ensure an authoritative common translation. This is true also for world languages other than French. IIP reported that it had developed and implemented a plan to coordinate translation of major foreign policy addresses and key documents into world languages, for which it provides advance notice to posts.

Arabic-language Materials

Because of the investment of Arab Peninsula governments in Islamic religious training for African countries having Muslim majorities, a portion of those countries' populations can read Arabic although they may not be literate in their native languages. Therefore, embassies in Dakar and Bamako needed Arabic-language materials to facilitate Muslim outreach. In Senegal and Mali, there had been some success in distributing the Department's now-defunct Arabic-language publication, titled "Hi." Thus, the need remains for materials in Arabic in Africa, preferably with a focus on Africa and U.S. relations with the continent.

RIGHTSIZING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STAFFS

Some public diplomacy programs had problems due to staff shortfalls. Too few public diplomacy staff members and staffing gaps were issues at the embassies in Saudi Arabia and Viet Nam. In Mali, the PAO served as deputy chief of mission for nine out of the first 13 months at post, limiting the time available to focus on public diplomacy. Likewise, the PAO at Embassy Senegal was distracted by serving as acting deputy chief of mission for an extended period. The PAO in one Middle East mission complained that the PAS staff was being increasingly burdened with political reporting unrelated to its public diplomacy mission. The PAS was doing political reporting because the Ambassador and deputy chief of mission had determined that the political section was overburdened. However, the added reporting made it harder for PAS officers to fulfill their public diplomacy mission.

MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

In general, embassy public affairs programs have good management controls, although scattered individual areas needed improvement. For example, Embassy Harare did not reconcile receipts with purchases in its public diplomacy program. There were also recurrent public diplomacy management control problems with grants programs.

GRANTS MANAGEMENT

Embassy Kabul's PAS has an active grants program that obligated nearly \$800,000 in FY 2005. However, the entire public diplomacy grants process in Afghanistan, from questionable awards to sloppy recordkeeping, was in disarray, leading to several OIG recommendations. Grants-related problems were also found at:

- Embassy Sanaa, where public diplomacy grants management also needed improvement;
- Embassy Harare, where public diplomacy grants were not coordinated with MPP priorities and were not monitored; and
- Embassy Lilongwe, which did not link grants to MPP objectives, did not require grant reports, and had inappropriate grants-related money handling.

Public affairs sections may be overburdened by the administrative requirements of grants monitoring and may require additional support.

RECOMMENDATION

Recommendation 1: The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Resource Management, should identify the resource needs for implementing an improved public diplomacy measurement program, develop a plan to fund it, and provide the funding, beginning with the highest-priority posts. (R, in coordination with RM)

ABBREVIATIONS

Department	Department of State
FSN	Foreign Service national
GAO	Government Accountability Office
IIP	Bureau of International Information Programs
MPP	Mission Performance Plan
OES	Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental Scientific Affairs
OIG	Office of Inspector General
PCC	Policy Coordination Committee
PAO	Public affairs officer
PAS	Public affairs section
PRM	Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
R/PPR	Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
S/CT	Coordinator for Counterterrorism
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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