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Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed' which was released on July 
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Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, July 23, 2008: 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: 

Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed: 

Statement of Gene L. Dodaro: 
Acting Comptroller General of the United States: 

GAO-08-1021T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-1021T, a testimony before the Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In January 2007, the President announced a new U.S. strategy to stem 
the violence in Iraq and help the Iraqi government foster conditions 
for national reconciliation. In The New Way Forward, the Administration 
articulated near-term goals to achieve over a 12- to 18-month period 
and reasserted the end state for Iraq: a unified, democratic, federal 
Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself and is an ally in the 
war on terror. To support this strategy, the United States increased 
its military presence and financial commitments for Iraq operations. 

This testimony discusses (1) progress in meeting key security, 
legislative, and economic goals of The New Way Forward; and (2) past 
and current U.S. strategies for Iraq and the need for an updated 
strategy. 

GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, 
MNF-I, the UN, and the Iraqi government. GAO also had staff stationed 
in Baghdad. Since 2003, GAO has issued about 140 Iraq-related products, 
which provided baseline information for this assessment. 

What GAO Found: 

The United States has made some progress in achieving key goals stated 
in The New Way Forward. Looking forward, many challenges remain, and an 
updated strategy is essential. 

* In the security area, violence—as measured by the number of enemy-
initiated attacks—decreased about 80 percent from June 2007 to June 
2008, trained Iraqi security forces have increased substantially, and 
many units are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, as of 
July 2008, 8 of 18 provincial governments do not yet have lead 
responsibility for security in their provinces, and DOD reported that, 
in June 2008, less than 10 percent of Iraqi security forces were at the 
highest readiness level and therefore considered capable of performing 
operations without coalition support. The security environment remains 
volatile and dangerous. 

* In the legislative area, Iraq has enacted key legislation to return 
some Ba’athists to government, grant amnesty to detained Iraqis, and 
define provincial powers. The unfinished Iraqi legislative agenda 
includes enacting laws that will provide the legal framework for 
sharing oil revenues, disarming militias, and holding provincial 
elections. 

* On economic and infrastructure issues, Iraq spent only 24 percent of 
the $27 billion it budgeted for its reconstruction efforts between 2005 
and 2007. Although crude oil production improved for short periods, the 
early July 2008 average production capacity of about 2.5 million 
barrels per day was below the U.S. goal of 3 million barrels per day. 
In addition, while State reports that U.S. goals for Iraq’s water 
sector are close to being reached, the daily supply of electricity in 
Iraq met only slightly more than half of demand in early July 2008. 

Since 2003, the United States has developed and revised multiple 
strategies to address security and reconstruction needs in Iraq. The 
New Way Forward responded to failures in prior U.S. plans and the 
escalating violence that occurred in 2006. However, this strategy and 
the military surge that was central to it end in July 2008, and many 
agree that the situation remains fragile. 

GAO recommends an updated strategy for Iraq for several reasons. First, 
much has changed in Iraq since The New Way Forward began in January 
2007. Violence is down, U.S. surge forces are leaving, and the United 
States is negotiating a security agreement with Iraq to replace the 
expiring UN mandate. Second, The New Way Forward only articulates U.S. 
goals and objectives for the phase that ends in July 2008. Third, the 
goals and objectives of The New Way Forward are contained in disparate 
documents rather than a single strategic plan. Furthermore, the 
classified MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Joint Campaign Plan is not a strategic 
plan; it is an operational plan with limitations that GAO will discuss 
during the closed portion of the hearing. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommended that DOD and State, in conjunction with relevant U.S. 
agencies, develop an updated strategy for Iraq. DOD and State 
disagreed, asserting that The New Way Forward remains valid and that 
the Joint Campaign Plan guides U.S. efforts in Iraq. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1021T]. For more 
information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or 
christoffj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's recent report on U.S. 
efforts to secure, stabilize and rebuild Iraq.[Footnote 1] This report 
addressed (1) progress in meeting key security, legislative, and 
economic goals of The New Way Forward; and (2) past and current U.S. 
strategies for Iraq and the need for an updated strategy. 

In January 2007, the President announced a new U.S. strategy to stem 
the high levels of violence in Iraq and help the Iraqi government 
foster conditions for national reconciliation. In The New Way Forward, 
the Administration articulated near-term goals to achieve over a 12-to 
18-month period and reasserted the long-term goal or end state for 
Iraq: a unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and 
sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror. In support of this 
new strategy, the United States increased its military presence and 
financial commitments for operations in Iraq. In April 2008, the U.S. 
Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General of the Multinational 
Force-Iraq (MNF-I) testified that significant progress had been made 
toward achieving U.S. goals but that progress was fragile and 
reversible. 

From fiscal year 2001 through July 2008, Congress provided more than 
$800 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Global War on 
Terrorism.[Footnote 2] The majority of this amount has been for 
military operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Moreover, 
since fiscal year 2003, about $48 billion has been provided to U.S. 
agencies for stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, 
including developing Iraq's security forces, enhancing Iraq's capacity 
to govern, and rebuilding Iraq's oil, electricity, and water sectors, 
among others.[Footnote 3] 

To complete our work, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials 
from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; MNF-I and its 
subordinate commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National 
Intelligence Council; and the United Nations (UN). We also reviewed 
translated copies of Iraqi documents. In support of this work, we 
extensively utilized staff stationed in Baghdad from January through 
March 2008. Since 2003, we have issued about 140 Iraq-related reports 
and testimonies, which provided baseline information for our 
assessment.[Footnote 4] We performed this work in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Summary: 

The United States has made some progress in achieving key goals stated 
in The New Way Forward. For example, overall violence in Iraq has 
declined. Iraq has also enacted key legislation to return some 
Ba'athists to government and give amnesty to detained Iraqis. However, 
we agree with assessments that progress made in Iraq is fragile and 
many unmet goals and challenges remain. Future U.S. strategies should 
build on recent security and legislative gains and address the 
remaining challenges for the near and long term. 

* In the security area, violence--as measured by enemy-initiated 
attacks--decreased about 80 percent from June 2007 to June 2008, the 
number of trained Iraqi security forces has increased substantially, 
and many Iraqi units are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, 
as of July 2008, 8 of 18 provincial governments must still assume lead 
responsibility for security in their provinces. In addition, DOD 
reported that, in June 2008, less than 10 percent of Iraqi security 
forces were at the highest readiness level and therefore considered 
capable of performing operations without coalition support[Footnote 5]. 
The security environment remains volatile and dangerous. DOD reports 
that the United States has not achieved its goal of defeating al Qaeda 
in Iraq, local security forces (such as Sons of Iraq) have not 
reconciled with the central government, and the cease-fire agreement 
with the Mahdi Army remains tenuous. 

* In the legislative area, Iraq has enacted key legislation to return 
some Ba'athists to government, grant amnesty to detained Iraqis, and 
define provincial powers. However, questions remain about how the laws 
will be implemented and whether the intended outcomes can be achieved. 
Additionally, Iraq has not yet passed legislation that will provide the 
legal framework for sharing oil revenues, disarming militias, and 
holding provincial elections. The Iraqi government also faces 
logistical and security challenges in holding the scheduled 2008 
provincial elections--a key element of reconciliation for Sunnis. 
Finally, the government has not completed its constitutional review to 
resolve issues such as the status of disputed territories and the 
balance of power between federal and regional governments. 

* On economic and infrastructure issues, Iraq spent only 24 percent of 
the $27 billion it budgeted for reconstruction efforts between 2005 and 
2007. Although oil production improved for short periods, the July 2008 
average crude oil production capacity of about 2.5 million barrels per 
day[Footnote 6] was below the U.S. goal of 3.0 million barrels per day. 
[Footnote 7] In addition, while State reports that U.S. goals for 
Iraq's water sector are close to being reached, the daily supply of 
electricity in Iraq met slightly more than half of demand in early July 
2008.[Footnote 8] 

Since 2003, the United States has developed and revised multiple 
strategies and plans to address security and reconstruction needs in 
Iraq. The current strategy--The New Way Forward--responded to failures 
in prior U.S. plans that prematurely transferred security 
responsibilities to Iraqi forces or belatedly responded to growing 
sectarian violence. The New Way Forward was developed to address the 
escalating violence in 2006. However, this strategy and the military 
surge that was central to it are planned to end at the end of this 
month. Moreover, the UN mandate authorizing MNF-I to maintain security 
and stability in Iraq expires December 31, 2008.[Footnote 9] The United 
States and Iraq are conducting negotiations to provide the legal basis 
for the United States and its coalition partners to continue operations 
to support the Iraqi government after the UN mandate ends. Accordingly, 
we recommended that the Departments of State and Defense develop an 
updated strategy for how the United States will help Iraq achieve key 
security, legislative, and economic goals. This strategy should build 
on recent security and legislative gains, address unmet near-and long- 
term goals, and clearly articulate future goals, objectives, roles, 
responsibilities, and resources needed. The departments stated that 
they will review and refine the current strategy as necessary but 
asserted that The New Way Forward remains valid. DOD also stated that 
the classified Joint Campaign Plan provides a comprehensive, government-
wide plan to guide U.S. efforts in Iraq. 

We affirm the need for an updated strategy for several reasons. First, 
much has changed in Iraq since January 2007, when the President 
announced The New Way Forward. Violence is down, U.S. surge forces are 
leaving, and a new framework for the U.S. presence in Iraq needs to be 
agreed upon beyond the UN mandate. Second, The New Way Forward only 
articulates U.S. goals and objectives for the phase that ends in July 
2008. Third, the goals and objectives of The New Way Forward and the 
phase that follows it are contained in disparate documents rather than 
a single strategic plan. Furthermore, the classified Joint Campaign 
Plan[Footnote 10] is not a strategic plan; it is an operational plan 
with limitations that we will discuss during the closed portion of this 
hearing. 

Some Gains Made; Certain Security, Legislative, and Economic Challenges 
Remain: 

The United States has made some progress in achieving key goals stated 
in The New Way Forward; many challenges remain. 

Progress Made in Improving Security Conditions and Building Iraqi 
Security Forces, but Security Issues Still Need to be Addressed: 

Establishing a basic level of security is a key component of The New 
Way Forward. As we reported last month, overall violence fell from 
about 180 attacks per day in June 2007 to about 45 attacks per day in 
May 2008--primarily due to decreases in violence in Baghdad and Anbar 
provinces.[Footnote 11] Since that report, the average number of enemy- 
initiated attacks decreased to 30 per day in June 2008, representing 
the lowest level of violence since March 2004. (See fig. 1.) DOD, 
State, and UN reports attribute the reduction in violence to (1) the 
increase in U.S. combat forces that allowed a change in tactics; (2) 
the creation of nongovernmental security forces, such as Sons of Iraq; 
and (3) the Mahdi Army's declaration of a cease-fire. DOD had planned 
to withdraw U.S. surge forces and draw down U.S. forces to 140,000 by 
the end of July 2008. DOD reported that the number of U.S. forces in 
Iraq was about 153,300 as of June 1, 2008. 

Figure 1: Average Daily Attacks, May 2003 to June 2008: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple line graph depicting the following data: 

Month: May 2003; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 0; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	0; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 4; 
Total average daily attacks: 3.71. 

Month: June 2003; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 0; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	0; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 12; 
Total average daily attacks: 11.87. 

Month: July 2003; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 1; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	0; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 15; 
Total average daily attacks: 15.23. 

Month: August 2003; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 1; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	0; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 16; 
Total average daily attacks: 17.13. 

Month: September 2003; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 1; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	1; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 21; 
Total average daily attacks: 23. 

Month: October 2003; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 1; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	2; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 29; 
Total average daily attacks: 31.74. 

Month: November 2003; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 3; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	3; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 29; 
Total average daily attacks: 34.3. 

Month: December 2003; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 2; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	2; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 20; 
Total average daily attacks: 24.06. 

Month: January 2004; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 2; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	4; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 19; 
Total average daily attacks: 24.06. 

Month: February 2004; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 2; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	4; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 20; 
Total average daily attacks: 25.41. 

Month: March 2004; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 4; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	4; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 23; 
Total average daily attacks: 30.16. 

Month: April 2004; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 3; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	4; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 51; 
Total average daily attacks: 58.53. 

Month: May 2004: 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 4; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	5; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 52; 
Total average daily attacks: 60.81. 

Month: June 2004; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 6; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	6; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 43; 
Total average daily attacks: 55.07. 

Month: July 2004; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 5; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	6; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 43; 
Total average daily attacks: 54.61. 

Month: August 2004; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 7; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	9; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 78; 
Total average daily attacks: 94.06. 

Month: September 2004; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 7; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	6; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 56; 
Total average daily attacks: 69.3. 

Month: October 2004; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 7; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	8; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 62; 
Total average daily attacks: 76.87. 

Month: November 2004; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 7; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	10; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 77; 
Total average daily attacks: 93.2. 

Month: December 2004; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 7; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	9; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 48; 
Total average daily attacks: 63.29. 

Month: January 2005; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 16; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	15; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 60; 
Total average daily attacks: 90.55. 

Month: February 2005; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 6; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	7; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 49; 
Total average daily attacks: 61,89. 

Month: March 2005; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 4; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	6; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 39; 
Total average daily attacks: 50.13; 

Month: April 2005; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 4; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	7; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 47; 
Total average daily attacks: 58.2. 

Month: May 2005; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 5; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	10; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 53; 
Total average daily attacks: 68.29. 

Month: June 2005; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 6; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	12; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 51; 
Total average daily attacks: 68.4. 

Month: July 2005; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 5; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	8; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 63; 
Total average daily attacks: 76.16. 

Month: August 2005; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 7; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	11; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 66; 
Total average daily attacks: 83.68. 

Month: September 2005; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 5; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	10; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 68; 
Total average daily attacks: 83.5. 

Month: October 2005; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 7; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	13; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 79; 
Total average daily attacks: 98.74. 

Month: November 2005; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 6; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	11; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 51; 
Total average daily attacks: 68.7. 

Month: December 2005; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 9; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	13; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 58; 
Total average daily attacks: 80.84. 

Month: January 2006; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 7; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	13; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 51; 
Total average daily attacks: 71.39. 

Month: February 2006; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 14; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	16; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 56; 
Total average daily attacks: 86.14. 

Month: March 2006; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 19; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	18; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 57; 
Total average daily attacks: 94.29. 

Month: April 2006; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 20; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	21; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 68; 
Total average daily attacks: 109.23. 

Month: May 2006; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 22; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	23; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 72; 
Total average daily attacks: 118.03. 

Month: June 2006; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 27; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	25; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 70; 
Total average daily attacks: 121.13. 

Month: July 2006; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 30; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	30; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 82; 
Total average daily attacks: 141.68. 

Month: August 2006; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 27; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	27; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 82; 
Total average daily attacks: 136.42. 

Month: September 2006; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 35; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	30; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 102; 
Total average daily attacks: 166.8. 

Month: October 2006; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 41; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	31; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 104; 
Total average daily attacks: 176.32. 

Month: November 2006; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 34; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	31; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 94; 
Total average daily attacks: 158.97. 

Month: December 2006; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 29; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	31; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 103; 
Total average daily attacks: 162.48. 

Timeframe of New Way Forward begins: 

Month: January 2007; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 30; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	31; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 106; 
Total average daily attacks: 166.77. 

Month: February 2007; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 25; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	31; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 109; 
Total average daily attacks: 164.46. 

Month: March 2007; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 27; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	30; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 100; 
Total average daily attacks: 157.26. 

Month: April 2007; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 29; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	32; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 102; 
Total average daily attacks: 163.07. 

Month: May 2007; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 30; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	32; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 110; 
Total average daily attacks: 172.32. 

Month: June 2007; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 25; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	30; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 122; 
Total average daily attacks: 177.43. 

Month: July 2007; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 26; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	27; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 101; 
Total average daily attacks: 154.87. 

Month: August 2007; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 22; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	24; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 77; 
Total average daily attacks: 123.42. 

Month: September 2007; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 19; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	24; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 59; 
Total average daily attacks: 101.73. 

Month: October 2007; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 15; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	18; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 48; 
Total average daily attacks: 81.39. 

Month: November 2007; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 11; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	18; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 34; 
Total average daily attacks: 62.97. 

Month: December 2007; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 9; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	15; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 37; 
Total average daily attacks: 61.77. 

Month: January 2008; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 11; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	13; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 34; 
Total average daily attacks: 57.65. 

Month: February 2008; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 9.34; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	9.41; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 29.79; 
Total average daily attacks: 48.55. 

Month: March 2008; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 9.06; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	14.42; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 45; 
Total average daily attacks: 68.48. 

Month: April 2008; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 7.3; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	15.17; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 42.83; 
Total average daily attacks: 65.3. 

Month: May 2008; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 7.32; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	10.52; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 26.74; 
Total average daily attacks: 44.58. 

Month: June 2008; 
Average daily attacks on civilians: 6.3; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces:	9.07; 
Average daily attacks on coalition: 15.3; 
Total average daily attacks: 30.7. 

Source: GAO analysis of DIA-reported Multi-National Force-Iraq data, 
June 2008. 

[End of figure] 

The New Way Forward also set the goal of developing capable Iraqi 
security forces and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi 
government. Since 2003, the United States has provided more than $20 
billion to develop Iraqi security forces. The number of trained Iraqi 
forces increased from about 323,000 in January 2007 to about 478,500 as 
of April 30, 2008. DOD reports that about 65 percent of Iraqi army 
battalions are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, the 
number of units at the highest readiness level, as assessed by DOD, 
accounts for less than 10 percent of total units (see fig. 2). The 
development of independent Iraqi security forces was a benchmark 
established by Congress and derived from commitments made by the Iraqi 
government. The number of independent Iraqi security forces as measured 
by Operational Readiness Assessments (ORA) level 1 continues to be an 
important measure of the capabilities of Iraqi security forces. In late 
June 2008, DOD reported that 12 Iraqi army battalions were capable of 
planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations (ORA 
level 1) in January 2007 and April 2008. 

Figure 2: Iraqi Security Force Operational Readiness, January 2007 and 
March 2008: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a combination of two stacked vertical bar graphs 
depicting the following data: 

Date: January 2007; 
Security force: National Police; 
Number of battalions, ORA level 1 - capable of planning, executing, and 
sustaining counterinsurgency operations: 0; 
Number of battalions, ORA level 2 - capable of planning, executing, and 
sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Iraqi security force or 
coalition force assistance: 8; 
Number of battalions, ORA level 3 - partially capable of conducting 
counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units: 19; 
Number of battalions, ORA level 4 - forming and/or incapable of 
conducting counterinsurgency operations: 1.5. 
Number of battalions, total: 27. 

Date: January 2007; 
Security force: Iraqi Army; 
Number of battalions, ORA level 1 - capable of planning, executing, and 
sustaining counterinsurgency operations: 11.6; 
Number of battalions, ORA level 2 - capable of planning, executing, and 
sustaining counterinsurgency operations with|Iraqi security force or 
coalition force assistance: 78; 
Number of battalions, ORA level 3 - partially capable of conducting 
counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units: 16.7; 
Number of battalions, ORA level 4 - forming and/or incapable of 
conducting counterinsurgency operations: 8. 
ORA level 1 and 2 combined: 93 battalions in the lead; 
Number of battalions, total: 115. 

Date: March 2008; 
Security force: National Police; 
Number of battalions, ORA level 1 - capable of planning, executing, and 
sustaining counterinsurgency operations: 0; 
Number of battalions, ORA level 2 - capable of planning, executing, and 
sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Iraqi security force or 
coalition force assistance: 11; 
Number of battalions, ORA level 3 - partially capable of conducting 
counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units: 19; 
Number of battalions, ORA level 4 - forming and/or incapable of 
conducting counterinsurgency operations: 6; 
Number of battalions, total: 36. 

Security force: Iraqi Army; 
Date: March 2008; 
Number of battalions, ORA level 1 - capable of planning, executing, and 
sustaining counterinsurgency operations: 11; 
Number of battalions, ORA level 2 - capable of planning, executing, and 
sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Iraqi security force or 
coalition force assistance: 88; 
Number of battalions, ORA level 3 - partially capable of conducting 
counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units: 44; 
Number of battalions, ORA level 4 - forming and/or incapable of 
conducting counterinsurgency operations: 27; 
ORA level 1, 2, and some of 3 combined: 112 battalions in the lead; 	
Number of battalions, total: 171. 	 

Source: GAO analysis of data presented in testimony by the Commanding 
General of MNF-I and MNC-I documents. 

[End of figure] 

Several factors have complicated the development of capable Iraqi 
security forces, including the lack of a single unified force, 
sectarian and militia influences, continued dependence on U.S. and 
coalition forces for logistics and combat support, and training and 
leadership shortages. 

The New Way Forward also stated that the Iraqi government would take 
responsibility for security in all 18 provinces by November 2007. 
However, as of mid-July 2008, 8 provincial governments do not yet have 
lead responsibility for security in their provinces. According to the 
MNF-I Commanding General, the coalition continues to provide planning, 
logistics, and other assistance even after security responsibilities 
have transferred to provincial Iraqi control. 

Security conditions remain volatile and dangerous. In June 2008, DOD 
reported that the influence and areas of operation of al Qaeda in Iraq 
have been degraded, but the terrorist group remains a dangerous and 
adaptable enemy capable of carrying out high-profile attacks. Thus, the 
United States has not achieved its goal of defeating al Qaeda in Iraq 
and ensuring that no terrorist safe haven exists in Iraq. In addition, 
Sons of Iraq have not reconciled with the Iraqi government and the 
cease-fire agreement with the Mahdi Army is tenuous.[Footnote 12] 
According to MNF-I, various Sons of Iraq groups total at least 105,000 
members while the Mahdi Army has 25,000 to 40,000 active members. 
Violence also has displaced many Iraqis from their homes. The UN 
estimates that 2.7 million people have been displaced in Iraq and 2 
million additional Iraqis have fled the country, primarily to Jordan 
and Syria. 

Iraq Has Enacted Legislation to Promote Reconciliation, but Critical 
Laws Are Still Being Debated: 

To facilitate national reconciliation, The New Way Forward identified 
legislation that the Iraqi government committed to enact with U.S. 
support and set a goal for enacting all key legislation by December 
2007. In early 2008, the Iraqi government enacted laws to return some 
Ba'athists to government service, give amnesty to certain detainees in 
Iraq's justice system, and define provincial powers. However, questions 
remain about how these laws will be implemented and whether the 
intended outcomes can be achieved. For example, the government has not 
established the commission needed to reinstate former Ba'athists in the 
government or released most of the 20,000 prisoners and detainees 
approved for release. 

Three additional laws considered critical for national reconciliation 
have not been enacted. These include laws that set the rules for Iraq's 
provincial elections, define the control and management of Iraq's oil 
and gas resources, and provide for disarmament and demobilization of 
Iraq's armed groups. The Iraqi government also faces logistical and 
security challenges in holding the scheduled 2008 provincial elections--
a key element of reconciliation for Sunnis. UN and IFES reports 
estimate that it would take about 8 months to prepare for the 
elections, while State estimates that elections could be held 4 to 5 
months after an elections law is passed.[Footnote 13] Finally, the 
government has not completed its constitutional review to resolve 
issues such as the status of disputed territories and the balance of 
power between federal and regional governments. 

Iraq Has Made Limited Progress in Spending Its Capital Investment 
Budgets and Has Not Met Oil Production Goals or Demand for Electricity: 

The New Way Forward emphasized the need to build capacity in Iraq's 
ministries and help the government execute its capital investment 
budget; this is particularly important as the $48 billion in U.S. 
funding for Iraq reconstruction and stabilization efforts is almost 90 
percent obligated. However, expenditure data from Iraq's Ministry of 
Finance show that, between 2005 and 2007, Iraq spent only 24 percent of 
the $27 billion it budgeted for its own reconstruction efforts. 

As displayed in figure 3, total government spending for capital 
investments increased from 23 percent in 2005 to 28 percent in 2007. 
[Footnote 14] However, Iraq's central ministries, responsible for 
security and essential services, spent only 11 percent of their capital 
investment budgets in 2007[Footnote 15]--a decline from similarly low 
spending rates of 14 and 13 percent in 2005 and 2006, respectively. 
Spending rates for central ministries critical to the delivery of 
essential services varied from the 41 percent spent by the Water 
Resources Ministry to the less than 1 percent spent by the Ministries 
of Oil and Electricity in 2007. Iraq is expected to have additional 
resources to spend on reconstruction projects in 2008. As of May 2008, 
Iraqi crude oil was selling at about $104 per barrel, higher than the 
$57 per barrel used to develop Iraq's 2008 budget.[Footnote 16] 

Figure 3: Iraqi Budget Execution Ratios for Total Government and 
Selected Ministries, 2005 to 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple vertical bar graph depicting the following 
data: 

Total government: 
Budget execution ratio, 2005: 23%; 
Budget execution ratio, 2006: 19%; 
Budget execution ratio, 2007: 28%. 

Central ministries: 
Budget execution ratio, 2005: 14%; 
Budget execution ratio, 2006: 13%; 
Budget execution ratio, 2007: 11%. 

Water resources: 
Budget execution ratio, 2005: 65%; 
Budget execution ratio, 2006: 46%; 
Budget execution ratio, 2007: 41%. 

Oil: 
Budget execution ratio, 2005: 4%; 
Budget execution ratio, 2006: 5%; 
Budget execution ratio, 2007: 0.03%. 

Electricity: 
Budget execution ratio, 2005: 48%; 
Budget execution ratio, 2006: 23%; 
Budget execution ratio, 2007: 0.06%. 

Source: GAO analysis of official Ministry of Finance budget and 
expenditure data. 

[End of figure] 

U.S. government, coalition, and international agencies have identified 
a number of factors that challenge the Iraqi government's efforts to 
fully spend its budget for capital projects. These challenges include 
violence and sectarian strife, a shortage of trained staff, and weak 
procurement and budgeting systems. 

Developing competent and loyal Iraqi ministries is critical to 
stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. In 2005 and 2006, the United States 
provided about $169 million for programs to help build the capacity of 
key civilian ministries and the Ministries of Defense and Interior. As 
part of The New Way Forward, the Administration sought an additional 
$395 million for these efforts in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. We found 
that multiple U.S. agencies were leading individual efforts and 
recommended that Congress consider conditioning future appropriations 
on the completion of an integrated strategy for U.S. capacity 
development efforts.[Footnote 17] In June 2008, State noted that the 
embassy was in the process of implementing GAO's recommendation. 

Providing essential services to all Iraqi areas and communities and 
helping Iraq maintain and expand its oil exports are key goals of The 
New Way Forward. Overall crude oil production has increased or improved 
for short periods; however, the early July 2008 average crude oil 
production capacity of about 2.5 million barrels per day has not 
reached the U.S. goal of 3 million barrels per day.[Footnote 18] 
Meanwhile, the daily supply of electricity met only 54 percent of 
demand in early July 2008.[Footnote 19] 

The State Department reports that U.S. goals for Iraq's water sector 
are close to being reached. Since April 2006, U.S. efforts have focused 
on producing enough clean water to reach up to an additional 8.5 
million Iraqis. As of March 2008, State reported that U.S.-funded 
projects had provided an additional 8 million Iraqis with access to 
potable water. Several factors present challenges in delivering 
essential services, including an unstable security environment, 
corruption, a lack of technical capacity, and inadequate strategic 
planning. Our May 2007 report recommended that U.S. agencies work with 
the Iraqi government to develop an integrated energy strategy for the 
oil and electricity sectors.[Footnote 20] In June 2008, State indicated 
that it was encouraging the Iraqi government to develop an integrated 
energy strategy. 

Need for Updated U.S. Strategy in Iraq: 

Since late 2003, the United States has employed numerous strategies and 
plans to address the security and reconstruction needs of Iraq. For 
example, the multinational force's security transition plan called for 
Iraqi security forces to assume security responsibilities on an 
accelerated basis during spring 2004. This attempt failed when Iraqi 
security forces performed poorly during an insurgent uprising. Further, 
a series of campaign plans and a strategy document attempted to 
integrate U.S. military and civilian efforts in Iraq but did not 
anticipate the escalation in violence during 2006. To address the high 
levels of violence, the administration announced The New Way Forward 
strategy in January 2007. While the documents that comprise The New Way 
Forward and the phase that follows clearly state the importance the 
Administration places on continued U.S. support for Iraq, they 
represent an incomplete strategic plan because they only articulate 
goals and objectives for the near-term phase that ends in July 2008. 

The United States Has Used Several Strategies to Address Security and 
Reconstruction Challenges in Iraq: 

In October 2003, the multinational force outlined a four-phased plan 
for transferring security missions to Iraqi security forces.[Footnote 
21] The plan's objective was to allow a gradual drawdown of coalition 
forces first in conjunction with the neutralization of Iraq's 
insurgency and second with the development of Iraqi forces capable of 
securing their country.[Footnote 22] Citing the growing capability of 
Iraqi security forces, MNF-I attempted to shift responsibilities to 
them in February 2004 but did not succeed in this effort. Iraqi police 
and military units performed poorly during an escalation of insurgent 
attacks against the coalition in April 2004. 

After the collapse of the Iraqi security forces in early 2004, the 
Administration completed three key documents that outlined the evolving 
U.S. strategy for Iraq. First, during the summer of 2004, MNF-I 
completed a campaign plan that elaborated on and refined the original 
strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces at 
the local, regional, and national levels. Further details on this 
campaign plan are classified.[Footnote 23] Second, in November 2005, 
the National Security Council (NSC) issued the National Strategy for 
Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President's existing strategy for 
achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq. The 
administration prepared this strategy document in response to a study 
of the U.S. mission that found, among other things, that no unified 
strategic plan existed to effectively integrate U.S. government 
political, military, and economic efforts.[Footnote 24] Third, in April 
2006, MNF-I and the U.S. embassy in Baghdad issued the first joint 
campaign plan, which attempted to integrate U.S. political, military, 
and economic efforts in Iraq. Further details of this campaign plan are 
classified.[Footnote 25] 

In July 2006, we reported that the NSVI represented an incomplete 
strategy.[Footnote 26] The NSVI's purpose and scope were clear because 
the strategy identified U.S. involvement in Iraq as a vital national 
interest and Iraq as a central front in the war on terror. The strategy 
also discussed the threats and risks facing the coalition forces and 
provided a comprehensive description of U.S. political, security, and 
economic goals and objectives in Iraq over the short, medium, and long 
term. However, the NSVI only partially identified the agencies 
responsible for implementing it, the current and future costs of U.S. 
involvement in Iraq, and Iraq's contribution to its future needs. 

The NSVI did not anticipate that security conditions in Iraq would 
deteriorate as evidenced by the increased numbers of attacks that 
followed the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. 
Enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners 
increased through October 2006 and remained at high levels through the 
end of the year. During 2006, according to State and UN reports, 
insurgents, death squads, militias, and terrorists increased their 
attacks against civilians, largely on a sectarian basis. 

Current Strategic and Operational Plans for Iraq: 

In response to the escalating violence, the President in January 2007 
announced The New Way Forward, which established a new phase in U.S. 
operations in Iraq. The strategy altered the administration's 
assumptions regarding the security and political conditions in Iraq and 
their effect on the achievement of U.S. goals. The administration, 
however, has not revised its strategic plan for Iraq to include U.S. 
goals and objectives for The New Way Forward, which ends this month, or 
for the phase that follows. Instead, according to State and DOD 
officials, the administration is relying on a set of 8 documents to 
explain U.S. strategic goals and objectives for Iraq (see table 1). 
[Footnote 27] Four documents defined the original strategic goals and 
objectives of The New Way Forward phase. The administration believed 
the strategy's goals and objectives were achievable by the end of a 12 
month-to 18 month-long phase, which ends in July 2008. Four different 
documents describe the phase that follows The New Way Forward. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Table 1: Documents That Explain the Current U.S. Strategy for Iraq: 

New Way Forward phase (January 2007 through July 2008): 
* Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review, NSC, January 2007; 
* The President's address to the nation, January 10, 2007; 
* Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq, January 10, 2007; 
* Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials, Office of the 
Press Secretary, White House, January 10, 2007; 

"Way Forward" Phase (begins July 2008): 
* The President's address on Iraq, September 13, 2007; 
* The President's address on Iraq, April 10, 2008; 
* Fact Sheet: "The Way Forward in Iraq," April 10, 2008; 
* The testimony of the Secretary of Defense, April 10, 2008. 

Source: Information from State and DOD officials. 

[End of table] 

We found that the documents for the phase that follows The New Way 
Forward do not specify the administration's strategic goals and 
objectives in Iraq or how it intends to achieve them, although they 
clearly state the importance the administration places on continued 
U.S. involvement in and support for Iraq. Further, while they predict 
continued progress in the security, political, and economic areas, they 
do not address the remaining challenges to achieving either unmet U.S. 
goals and objectives or the desired U.S. end state for Iraq.[Footnote 
28] 

Moreover, the current UN mandate for the multinational force in Iraq, 
under Security Resolution 1790, will expire December 31, 2008, without 
further UN action. This resolution reaffirmed MNF-I's authority to take 
all necessary measures to maintain security and stability in Iraq, in 
accordance with the Iraqi government's request for the continued 
presence of MNF-I. The United States and Iraq are negotiating an 
agreement to provide the United States and its coalition partners with 
the legal basis necessary to conduct operations to support the Iraqi 
government after the UN mandate ends. 

State and DOD cite the classified MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Joint Campaign 
Plan as providing a roadmap for future U.S. operations in Iraq. 
[Footnote 29] According to a May 2008 State Department report, the 
Joint Campaign Plan supports the implementation of U.S. efforts in Iraq 
along four lines of operation: political, security, economic, and 
diplomatic. The plan recognizes the importance of enhancing security 
and protecting the Iraqi population and of advancing the political line 
of operation to help Iraqis establish legitimate, representative 
governance in their country at both the national and provincial levels. 

A campaign plan, however, is an operational, not a strategic plan, 
according DOD's doctrine for joint operation planning.[Footnote 30] A 
campaign plan must rely on strategic guidance from national authorities 
for its development. For example, the April 2006 MNF-I/U.S. embassy 
Baghdad Joint Campaign Plan relied on the NSC's prior strategic plan, 
the NSVI, as a basis for the plan's development.[Footnote 31] 
Activities at the strategic level include establishing national and 
multinational military objectives, as well as defining limits and 
assessing risks for the use of military and other instruments of 
national power. In contrast, activities at the operational level 
establish objectives that link tactics on the ground to high-level 
strategic objectives. The development of a campaign plan, according to 
doctrine, should be based on suitable and feasible national strategic 
objectives formulated by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--with appropriate 
consultation with additional NSC members, other U.S. government 
agencies, and multinational partners. 

Joint doctrine also states that effective planning cannot occur without 
a clear understanding of the end state and the conditions that must 
exist to end military operations and draw down forces. According to 
doctrine, a campaign plan should provide an estimate of the time and 
forces required to reach the conditions for mission success or 
termination. Our review of the classified Joint Campaign Plan, however, 
identified limitations in these areas, which are discussed in a 
classified GAO report.[Footnote 32] We will provide more information on 
the Joint Campaign Plan in the closed portion of this hearing. 

Recommendation: 

The New Way Forward and the military surge that was central to it end 
in July 2008. Moreover, the UN mandate authorizing MNF-I to maintain 
security and stability in Iraq expires December 31, 2008; the United 
States and Iraq are negotiating the legal framework to allow the United 
States and its coalition partners to conduct operations to support the 
Iraqi government after the UN mandate ends. Given these uncertainties, 
the decreasing levels of enemy-initiated attacks, and weaknesses in 
current DOD and State plans, an updated strategy is needed for how the 
United States will help Iraq achieve key security, legislative, and 
economic goals. Accordingly, we recommend that DOD and State, in 
conjunction with relevant U.S. agencies, develop an updated strategy 
for Iraq that defines U.S. goals and objectives after July 2008 and 
addresses the long-term goal of achieving an Iraq that can govern, 
defend, and sustain itself. This strategy should build on recent 
security and legislative gains, address the remaining unmet goals and 
challenges for the near and long term, clearly articulate goals, 
objectives, roles and responsibilities, and the resources needed, as 
well as address prior GAO recommendations. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 
questions that you or other Members have at this time. 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For questions regarding this testimony, please call Joseph A. 
Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade, on (202) 512- 
8979. Other key contributors to this statement include Audrey Solis, 
Assistant Director; Judith McCloskey, Assistant Director; Ashley Alley; 
Monica Brym; Daniel Chen; Lynn Cothern; Leah DeWolf; Walker Fullerton; 
Tetsuo Miyabara; and Kathleen Monahan. Edward George, Jr.; Andrea 
Miller; Jena Sinkfield; and Cynthia Taylor provided technical 
assistance. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: 
Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-837] (Washington, D.C.: June 
23, 2008). 

[2] This figure includes appropriations for domestic and overseas 
military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism, such as 
Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, as well as stabilization and reconstruction appropriations for 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Of this amount, $65.9 billion will be available 
October 1, 2008. 

[3] This amount includes $2 billion appropriated in June 2008 for 
reconstruction and stabilization activities in Iraq in the Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, P.L. 110-252. This amount does 
not include $1.1 billion appropriated in the same Act for similar 
activities in Iraq after October 1, 2008. About $20 billion for 
improving Iraqi security forces included in this amount is also 
included in DOD's reporting of Global War on Terrorism appropriations. 

[4] To see GAO reports on Iraq, click on [hyperlink, 
http://GAO.gov/docsearch/featured/oif.html]. 

[5] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress 
in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2008, 
Section 9010,P L. 109-289 (Washington, D.C.: June 2008). 

[6] Department of State/Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Iraq Weekly 
Status Report, July 9, 2008. 

[7] This is the U.S. goal as stated in Secretary of the Army Update, 
Gulf Regional Division, Iraq, April 3, 2008. 

[8] Iraq Weekly Status Report, July 9, 2008. 

[9] UN Security Council Resolution 1790 (Dec. 18, 2007); S/RES/1790 
(2007); S/RES/1546 (2004). 

[10] GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Should Identify and Prioritize the 
Conditions Necessary for the Continued Drawdown of Forces in Iraq, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-700C] (Washington, 
D.C.: June 2008). 

[11] According to DIA, the incidents captured in military reporting do 
not account for all violence throughout Iraq. For example, they may 
underreport incidents of Shi'a militias fighting each other and attacks 
against Iraqi security forces in southern Iraq and other areas with few 
or no coalition forces. DIA officials stated, however, that they 
represent a reliable and consistent source of information that can be 
used to identify trends in enemy activity and the overall security 
situation. 

[12] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress 
in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2008, 
Section 9010, P.L.109-289 (Washington, D.C.: March and June 2008). 

[13] IFES, formally known as the International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems, is an international election assistance organization. In 
Iraq's 2005 elections, IFES provided election assistance to the Iraqi 
government. IFES is also providing support for Iraq's upcoming 
provincial elections. 

[14] The total government budget includes the central government 
ministries, provinces, and Kurdistan region. The central government 
ministries include the ministries of oil, water, electricity, public 
works, health, housing and construction, defense, interior, and other 
spending units. 

[15] The central government ministries include the ministries of oil, 
water, electricity, public works, health, housing and construction, 
defense, interior, and other spending units. We use the term 
"investment budgets" to refer to capital goods and capital projects. 

[16] GAO will issue a separate report on Iraq's estimated unspent and 
projected oil revenues from 2003 through 2008. 

[17] GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity 
Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide 
Efforts and Manage Risk, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-117 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.1, 2007). 

[18] This is the U.S. goal as stated in Secretary of the Army Update, 
Gulf Regional Division, Iraq, April 3, 2008. 

[19] Iraq Weekly Status Report, July 9, 2008. 

[20] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help 
Restore Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sectors, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-677] (Washington, D.C.: May 
15, 2007). 

[21] See GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges 
in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-431T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 15, 2005). 

[22] For more information on this security transition plan, see GAO, 
Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, 
and Oversight Issues, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
04-902R] (Washington, D.C: June 28, 2004). 

[23] See GAO's classified report, Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should 
Link Economic, Governance, and Security Indicators to Conditions for 
Stabilizing Iraq, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-
868C] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2005). 

[24] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed 
to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006). 

[25] See GAO's classified report, Plans for Stabilizing Iraq, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-152C] (Washington, 
D.C.: Oct. 18, 2006). 

[26] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-788]. The 
desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy are 
purpose, scope, and methodology; detailed discussion of problems, 
risks, and threats; the desired goal, objectives, activities, and 
outcome-related performance measures; description of future costs and 
resources needed; delineation of U.S. government roles, 
responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms; and a description of the 
strategy's integration among and with other entities. 

[27] DOD also identified the testimonies of the current and prospective 
Commanding Generals of MNF-I, May 22, 2008, as articulating future U.S. 
goals and objectives. However, DOD did not provide written statements 
for either officer's testimony. 

[28] These documents also discuss the ongoing drawdown of U.S. troops 
in Iraq that will end in July 2008 and generally describe the U.S. 
military transition that would occur in Iraq over an unspecified period 
of time in the future. The U.S. military would continue to (1) conduct 
combat operations; (2) train, equip, and support Iraqi security forces; 
(3) transfer security responsibilities to them as provinces become 
ready; and (4) over time move into an overwatch role. In this role, 
U.S. forces would increasingly focus on targeted raids against the 
terrorists and extremists, continue to train Iraqi forces, and be 
available to help Iraq's security forces if required. 

[29] State Department, Report to Congress: Submitted Pursuant to U.S. 
Policy in Iraq Act, Section 1227(c) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163), as amended by 
Section 1223 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008 (P.L. 110-181); May 2008. 

[30] DOD, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning, Dec. 26, 
2006. 

[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-788]. 

[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-700C]. 

[End of section] 

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