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Handling Misconduct - Whistleblowers
PROTECTION FOR WHISTLEBLOWER
OFFICE OF RESEARCH INTEGRITY
Position Paper #1
The Whistleblower's Conditional
Privilege To Report Allegations of Scientific Misconduct
DECEMBER 1993
Prepared by the Research Integrity
Branch, Office of the General Counsel, for the Office of Research Integrity
This paper may be copied without
permission. Additional copies may be obtained by calling ORI at (301) 443-5300,
or writing:
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES
Public Health Service
Office of Research Integrity
Suite 700
5515 Security Lane
Rockville, MD 20852
Consistent with PHS regulations, ORI believes
that whistleblowers possess a conditional privilege to disclose, in good faith
to the proper institutional or ORI officials, allegations of scientific
misconduct. Such a conditional privilege would protect whistleblowers from
defamation claims even where the allegations ultimately prove to be untrue.
However, whistleblowers who abuse the privilege by making bad faith allegations
or by intentionally violating the confidentiality of accused parties may not be
protected from defamation claims.
Introduction
In scientific misconduct cases, an individual who
discloses misconduct to a proper authority is termed the "whistleblower".(1) Accused scientists in some cases may choose to
retaliate against the whistleblower. Such retaliation may be manifested in a
number of ways, including a civil suit against the whistleblower for defamation.
The Public Health Service scientific misconduct
regulation aims to protect whistleblowers against a broad spectrum of
retaliatory actions. Under the PHS regulation, covered institutions must
undertake diligent efforts to "protect the positions and reputations of
those persons who, in good faith, make allegations [of scientific
misconduct]."(2)
The PHS regulation requires protection of good
faith whistleblowers. On the other hand, institutions must also provide the
individuals accused of misconduct "confidential treatment to the maximum
extent possible."(3) The regulation therefore does not condone a
whistleblower's intentional public allegation of misconduct, such as
disclosure to the media.
In addition to the PHS regulation which mandates
protection for whistleblowers against general retaliation, common law suggests
that such whistleblowers may be protected in civil defamation suits. In
particular, case law indicates that whistleblowers possess a conditional
privilege to disclose, in good faith to appropriate authorities, "defamatory" allegations of scientific misconduct.(4) The following
commentary summarizes this conditional privilege.
First, the general law of defamation and
conditional privilege will be reviewed. The discussion will then turn to the
various reasons why scientific misconduct allegations may be conditionally
privileged against defamation suits. Lastly, this paper will briefly address
potential abuses and resulting loss of the conditional privilege.
The Law of Defamation and Conditional
Privilege
A written or non-written communication is
defamatory if it "tends to injure plaintiff in his trade, profession or
community standing, or lower him in the estimation of the community."(5) An
allegation of scientific misconduct, whether or not substantiated by subsequent
investigation, will tend to injure the reputation of an accused scientist.
Therefore, a whistleblower's allegation of misconduct will often constitute
defamation.
The truth of a defamatory statement furnishes a
complete defense for the one who makes the statement. However, if the
conditional privilege applies, it may not be necessary for the whistleblower to
prove the truth of his allegation. The conditional privilege allows the
whistleblower to allege scientific misconduct even if the allegation proves to
be false;(6) he must merely have a good faith belief that the allegation
is true. "Good faith" encompasses, among other things, "an honest
belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an
unconscionable advantage."(7) See "Abuse of Privilege" discussion, below.
A whistleblower who discloses scientific
misconduct is not liable for defamation if he can claim a conditional privilege.
A conditional privilege may be invoked only if the allegation was made under
certain conditions, and the privilege is not abused.(8) The following section
describes four special instances of defamatory disclosure in which a conditional
privilege may be invoked. Any one of these kinds of defamatory disclosure will
establish the conditional privilege.
1. Communication to One Who May Act in the
Public Interest
A whistleblower may claim a conditional privilege if he
reasonably believes that the facts he alleges affect a public interest of such
importance that he should communicate the matter to a person authorized to
respond to the allegation.(9)
Federal statute and regulations create a legal
mechanism by which ORI is authorized to respond to misconduct allegations. PHS
research grant applicants and awardees are accountable to the statutorily
established Office of Research Integrity (ORI).(10) When an allegation of
scientific misconduct surfaces, the grantee institution which supervises the
accused scientist must initiate an inquiry, and possibly a subsequent
investigation, in accordance with the PHS regulation.(11) ORI may conduct its
own investigation if necessary and impose sanctions in addition to those imposed
by the institution if appropriate.(12)
Moreover, allegations regarding misconduct in PHS
funded research clearly affect "important public interests," i.e., the
advancement of scientific research, the public health, and conservation of
public funds.(13) This public interest requires that allegations of misconduct
be brought to ORI or authorized institutional officials.
In sum, Federal statute and regulations recognize
the important public interest in detecting and deterring scientific misconduct,
and create an administrative structure by which whistleblowers may communicate
misconduct allegations to those authorized to take action. Thus, ORI considers a
whistleblower's good faith allegation to ORI or an authorized institutional
official to be conditionally privileged as a communication of matters affecting
important public interests.
On the other hand, ORI believes that a
whistleblower would not have a conditional privilege to publicly disclose
misconduct allegations to unauthorized persons because this contravenes one of
the requirements of the privilege(14) and the regulatory requirement to protect
the confidentiality of accused individuals.(15)
2. Common Interest
A whistleblower's good faith allegation of
scientific misconduct may be conditionally privileged under a second rubric. A
conditional privilege exists if the whistleblower reasonably believes that the
recipient of the allegation shares a common interest in the subject matter
communicated, i.e., scientific misconduct.(16)
The whistleblower and ORI (or the grantee
institution) share a common interest in bringing scientific misconduct to light
and preventing further misconduct. When the whistleblower discloses possible
misconduct to ORI or an authorized institutional official, the shared
information strikes a common interest. The whistleblower need only have a
correct or reasonable belief that the recipient of the information shares
a common interest and is entitled to receive the information.P>While one
formulation of the conditional privilege suggests that the recipient must be entitled
to know the "common interest" information, courts have phrased the
privilege somewhat differently. One court, for example, stated that the
conditional privilege applies to "statements concerning a matter of common
interest to the publisher and recipient which is furthered by the
communication."(17) In any case, the common interest in prosecuting
misconduct is furthered by the whistleblower's disclosure, and ORI is
entitled to receive all information on scientific misconduct associated with PHS
funds.
Whistleblowers and ORI share a common interest in
the disclosure of scientific misconduct. Hence, ORI believes that the good faith
whistleblower who reports misconduct to proper institutional or ORI officials
possesses a conditional privilege and would not be liable for defamation.
3. Protection of a Common Interest
A third situation in which a conditional
privilege for "defamatory" allegations exists is similar to (but
narrower than) the "common interest" occasion considered above. One
court described the privilege this way: "When one has an interest in the
subject matter of a communication, and the person (or persons) to whom it is
made has a corresponding interest, every communication honestly made, in
order to protect such common interest, is privileged by reason of the
occasion."(18)
To claim this privilege, the whistleblower's good
faith allegation must be based on more than mere possession of a common
interest; its objective must be to protect the common interest.(19) The
good faith whistleblower seeks to protect a common interest - the integrity of
scientific research - by disclosing misconduct. Thus, ORI believes that such
disclosures, even though defamatory, are privileged.
Some courts have extended this conditional
privilege to defamatory statements made pursuant to a duty.(20) Besides, or
instead of, having a common interest in scientific integrity, persons with
knowledge of possible misconduct may have a duty to "blow the whistle"
under institutional policies and procedures. Even if this duty is not expressly
imposed, a conditional privilege to allege misconduct may nonetheless exist. A
defamatory communication may be made with respect to a duty that is
"public, personal, or private, either legal, judicial, political, moral, or
social...."(21) The whistleblower who exercises his public or personal duty
to protect a common interest - scientific integrity - may assert a conditional
privilege in a defamation suit.
4. Protection of the Whistleblower's Own
Interest
Lastly, the whistleblower may claim a
conditional privilege to allege scientific misconduct if he has a reasonable
belief that the facts alleged affect his own important interests, and that the
recipient of the information can protect those interests.(22) On occasion, the
whistleblower's allegation of scientific misconduct may stem from a situation
directly and adversely affecting his own interests. For example, one
researcher's scientific misconduct may impinge upon another scientist's
associated research. If the latter becomes a whistleblower in order to protect
his own important research, a conditional privilege may be invoked.
Thus, a personal motive does not necessarily
deprive the whistleblower of a conditional privilege to allege misconduct.
Rather, if the whistleblower has a correct or reasonable belief that making the
misconduct allegation will guard his important interests, and the recipient of
the information (e.g., ORI) can help to protect that interest, the whistleblower
may claim a conditional privilege.(23)
Although the specific facts of each
whistleblowing case will determine whether the conditional privilege applies,
the law set forth above would seem to grant such a privilege to the
whistleblower who reports a case of scientific misconduct to ORI or a proper
institutional authority in order to protect an important interest - either the
public's interest in preserving the integrity of publicly funded research, ORI's
interest in prosecuting scientific misconduct, or the whistleblower's interest
in protecting his own important research activities.
Each of the four situations discussed above
affords the whistleblower a conditional privilege to make a "defamatory" allegation of scientific misconduct. Each of these
circumstances involves a socially important value - the protection of speech
designed to further important public or private interests - which necessitates
the conditional privilege.(24) Even if allegations sometimes turn out to be
false, the conditional privilege serves to encourage good faith allegations of
scientific misconduct, and accordingly, a corresponding reduction in misconduct.
The social policy supporting the conditional privilege is not advanced, however,
if the whistleblower abuses the privilege by making a bad faith allegation or an
unwarranted disclosure (to the media, for example).
Abuse of Privilege
Although an allegation of scientific
misconduct might otherwise be privileged, the whistleblower may be liable for
defamation if he abuses the privilege. Abuse of the privilege may occur in
several ways:
- the whistleblower knows that the defamatory
matter is false (or he has reckless disregard for the truth);
- the defamatory matter is disclosed for some
purpose other than that for which the privilege is given;
- the disclosure is made to a person not
reasonably believed to be necessary for accomplishment of the privilege's
purpose; or
- the allegation includes defamatory matter not
reasonably believed to be necessary to accomplish the privilege's purpose.(25)
These various abuses may be described
collectively as "bad faith" or "malice." Whether or not a
whistleblower abuses his conditional privilege will be a fact specific inquiry.
Because the PHS regulation recognizes only good faith allegations of scientific
misconduct(26) and seeks to protect the confidentiality of accused
individuals,(27) ORI believes that an allegation which is not made in good faith
or which violates the confidentiality of the accused should not be protected.
For example, a whistleblower might abuse the privilege by making an allegation
he knows to be false or by disclosing misconduct to unauthorized persons such as
the media. Such bad faith disclosures constitute abuse of the conditional
privilege and would not be protected against defamation actions.
Though bad faith whistleblowers may forfeit the
conditional privilege, case law clearly instructs that the conditional privilege
carries with it a presumption of good faith. In other words, the burden of
showing bad faith falls on the plaintiff who brings suit for defamation.(28)
Conclusion
The threat of retaliation poses a major
deterrent for whistleblowers. The current scientific misconduct regulation
directs covered institutions to undertake "diligent efforts to protect the
positions and reputations of" good faith whistleblowers. 42 C.F.R.
50.103(d)(13). On the other hand, the regulation also seeks to protect the
confidentiality of accused scientists. 42 C.F.R. 50.103(d)(3). Although the
regulation does not specify the precise contours of its whistleblower
protection, this paper shows that whistleblowers may be protected in defamation
suits.
The common law has forged a conditional privilege
for defamatory statements made under certain circumstances. ORI believes that
good faith allegations of misconduct made to proper ORI and institutional
officials fall within those situations, and thus, those allegations are
privileged. However, allegations not made in good faith or made with intent to
violate the confidentiality of the accused are not condoned by PHS regulations
and may constitute abuse of the conditional privilege, leaving the whistleblower
unprotected from defamation claims.
Endnotes
1. PHS' current misconduct regulation uses the
term "misconduct in science." 42 C.F.R. Part 50, Subpart A. However,
the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 has revised the
statutory language by substituting the phrase "research misconduct." Pub. L. No. 103-43 (June 10, 1993), amending 493 of the PHS Act (42 U.S.C.
289b). Although the statutory term has been changed, this paper utilizes the
terminology found in the current misconduct regulation.
2. 42 C.F.R. 50.103(d)(13). See also 42
C.F.R. 50.103(d)(2); PHS Policies and Procedures for Dealing with Possible
Scientific Misconduct in Extramural Research, 1.6(a)(2)(ii), 56 Fed. Reg. 27384,
27387-27388 (1991).
In addition, Congress has recently directed the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to promulgate a
regulation protecting whistleblowers in scientific misconduct cases. NIH
Revitalization Act of 1993, supra, n. 1. The forthcoming regulation will
establish standards for preventing and responding to retaliation against good
faith whistleblowers in the terms and conditions of their employment with
regulated entities. Id., 163, 107 Stat. 142 (PHS Act 493(e)).
3. 42 C.F.R. 50.103(d)(3). See also PHS
Policies and Procedures, supra, 1.6(a)(2)(i), 56 Fed. Reg. at 27387.
4. The conditional privilege in defamation suits
is a privilege accorded by the common law of the individual states. Although
slight variances in the application of the privilege may exist among states, the
principles discussed herein are generally recognized. In addition, the PHS
regulation may form a basis for adoption of the conditional privilege under
state law.
5. Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe,
366 F.2d 649, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1966). A defamatory printing or writing constitutes
libel, whereas a publication of defamatory matter by spoken words or any form of
communication other than libel constitutes slander.
6. Persons subject to a defamation suit may be
able to assert one of two privileges: Absolute or conditional
("qualified"). An absolute privilege applies only in legislative and
judicial proceedings. Allegations of scientific misconduct usually occur in a
pre-adjudicatory context, and thus do not trigger an absolute privilege.
Nevertheless, the whistleblower may claim a conditional privilege.
7. Black's Law Dictionary 693 (6th ed. 1990).
Some courts have applied an objective standard in
defining the "good faith belief" requirement of a conditional
privilege. That is, the defendant must have a reasonable belief - one
that a reasonable person might hold - that the defamatory statement is true. See
Afro-American Publishing Co., 366 F.2d at 656 (The conditional privilege
"is applicable only if the publisher believes the statements to be true,
has reasonable grounds for this belief and says no more than reasonably appears
to be necessary to protect the interest"); Reynolds v. Arentz, 119
F. Supp. 82, 87 (D. Nev. 1954) (quoting 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, 89, p.143)
(A qualified privilege comprehends communications made "with reasonable or
probable grounds for believing them to be true...."). Thus, a
whistleblower's subjective (personal) belief in the truth of his allegations may
not be sufficient in itself to trigger a conditional privilege.
8. "One who publishes defamatory matter
concerning another is not liable for the publication if
(a) the matter is published upon an occasion
that makes it conditionally privileged and
(b) the privilege is not abused."
Restatement (Second) of Torts 593.
9. "An occasion makes a publication
conditionally privileged if the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable
belief that
(a) there is information that affects a
sufficiently important public interest, and
(b) the public interest requires the
communication of the defamatory matter to a public officer or a private
citizen who is authorized or privileged to take action if the defamatory
matter is true."
Restatement (Second) of Torts 598.
10. NIH Revitalization Act of 1993, 161.
11.42 C.F.R. 50.103(c)(3), (d). See also
PHS Policies and Procedures for Dealing With Possible Scientific Misconduct in
Extramural Research, 1.6(2), 56 Fed. Reg. at 27387.
12. 42 C.F.R. 50.104(a)(6),(7).
13. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. 52.9.
14. See n. 9, supra.
15. See n. 3, supra.
16. "An occasion makes a publication
conditionally privileged if the circumstances lead any one of several persons
having a common interest in a particular subject matter correctly or reasonably
to believe that there is information that another sharing the common interest is
entitled to know."
Restatement (Second) of Torts 596.
17. Gray v. Allison Division, General Motors
Corp., 52 Ohio App.2d 348, 370 N.E.2d 747, 750 (1977) (emphasis added).
18. Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 38 S.E.2d
641, 643 (S.C. 1946) (emphasis added) (Defendant bank employee accused another
employee of theft in the presence of bank president and director).
Defamatory communications which protect a common
interest with either recipient(s) or third persons are conditionally
privileged. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 595(1)(a).
19. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 595
(Protection of Interest of Recipient or a Third Person).
Protection of the common interest is not a
necessary element of the plain "common interest" privilege discussed
above. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 596 comment c ("Under the
[`Common Interest' rule] it is not necessary to the existence of the privilege
stated that the defamatory matter be published for the protection of the common
interest. The rule is based on the fact that one is entitled to learn from his
associates what is being done in a matter in which he has an interest in common
with them").
20. The Fourth Circuit, for example, held that a
conditional privilege exists "with respect to a statement where it concerns
a matter as to which the person making it has a bona fide duty or interest and
is made in good faith in the performance of the duty or the protection of the
interest to a person having a corresponding duty or interest with relation
thereto." Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Watson, 55 F.2d 184, 187 (4th
Cir. 1932) (Manager, who had duty to investigate any charge of dishonesty among
store's employees, charged plaintiffs with stealing). See also McMillion v.
Armstrong, 378 S.W.2d 670, 673 (Ark. 1964); Louisiana Oil Corporation v.
Renno, 157 So. 705, 708 (Miss. 1934).
21. Reynolds v. Arentz, 119 F. Supp. 82,
87 (D. Nev. 1954) (quoting 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, 89, p.143) (Defendant
corporation representative, who had duty to promote adequate medical services
for employees, made privileged defamatory statements concerning county nurse).
See also Kenney v. Gurley, 208 Ala. 623,
95 So. 34, 37 (1923) (Dean of school wrote that student had a venereal disease)
(quoting Lawson v. Hicks, 38 Ala. 279, 285) (A conditional privilege
exists "where the author of the alleged mischief acted in the discharge of
any public or private duty, whether legal or moral, which the ordinary
exigencies of society, or his own private interest, or even that of another,
called upon him to perform").
22. "An occasion makes a publication
conditionally privileged if the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable
belief that
(a) there is information that affects a
sufficiently important interest of the publisher, and
(b) the recipient's knowledge of the defamatory
matter will be of service in the lawful protection of the interest."
Restatement (Second) of Torts 594.
23. See Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe,
366 F.2d 649, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("Historically a [conditional] privilege
has been marked out for the person who publishes an alleged libel in the bona
fide prosecution of his own interests..."). See also Kenney v. Gurley,
supra, n. 21.
24. See Gray v. Allison Division, General
Motors Corp., 370 N.E.2d 747, 750 (1977) ("The concept of privilege
holds that conduct which involves a specific interest of social importance
merits protection and should be immune from liability").
25. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 599
comment a.
26. 42 C.F.R. 50.103(d)(13).
27. 42 C.F.R. 50.103(d)(3).
28. See, e.g., Bell v. Bank of Abbeville,
38 S.E.2d 641, 643 (S.C. 1946) (In the case of a privileged communication,
"the presumption of malice is rebutted. The effect is to cast upon the
plaintiff the necessity of showing malice in fact - that is, that the defendant
was actuated by ill will in what he did and said, with the design to causelessly
and wantonly injure the plaintiff"). See also Gray v. Allison, 370
N.E.2d at 750; Louisiana Oil Corporation v. Renno, 157 So. at 708; Kenney
v. Gurley, 95 So. at 37.
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