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entitled 'Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing 
Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable 
Maintenance Program Are Needed' which was released on July 8, 2008.

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

July 2008: 

Afghanistan Reconstruction: 

Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining 
Impact and a Sustainable Maintenance Program Are Needed: 

GAO-08-689: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-689, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Afghan government, the United States, and other donors consider 
road reconstruction a top development priority for Afghanistan. Almost 
20 percent of the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) 
$5.9 billion in assistance to Afghanistan has been for roads. The 
Department of Defense (Defense) has committed about $560 million for 
roads, of which Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds 
account for over half. GAO examined (1) the status of road 
reconstruction and challenges affecting project implementation, (2) 
U.S. agencies’ efforts to evaluate the impact of road projects, and (3) 
efforts to develop a sustainable road maintenance program. GAO reviewed 
U.S. and Afghan governments’ planning, evaluation, and funding 
documents and interviewed relevant stakeholders in Afghanistan. 

What GAO Found: 

The United States and other donors have completed construction of 
several regional and national highways since 2002, but the status of 
other roads is uncertain and various challenges have delayed 
construction. The Afghan government and international donors planned to 
complete the high-priority regional highways by the end of 2008, and as 
of February 2008, about 60 percent of these roads were built. USAID has 
completed its portion, but completion of other portions is not expected 
until late 2009. Donors have committed to construct over 30 percent of 
national highways, which connect provincial capitals to the regional 
highways, and only USAID has completed portions of these highways. 
Detailed information on the status of provincial and rural roads is 
lacking. Although Defense reported committing CERP funds for 1,600 
kilometers of roads, data on the roads were incomplete and Defense has 
not reported information on these roads to USAID, as required. Poor 
security, project implementer limitations, and starting construction 
with limited planning have contributed to project delays and cost 
increases. 

Figure: Status of Afghan Highways for Which Donors Have Committed Funds 
Since 2002: 

Regional highways: Total kilometers for which funds are committed: 
United States: 715; 
Other donors: 2,525; 
Funds not committed: 0; 
Total highway kilometers: 3,240. 

Total kilometers completed: 
United States: 715; 
Other donors: 1,239; 
Funds not committed: 0. 

National highways: Total kilometers for which funds are committed: 
United States: 1,029; 
Other donors: 614; 
Funds not committed: 3,240; 
Total highway kilometers: 4,884. 

Total kilometers completed: 
United States: 726; 
Other donors: 0; 
Funds not committed: 0. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from USAID, the Consultative Group for the 
Transport Sector, and the Road Sector Master Plan. 

[End of figure] 

U.S. agencies have not conducted sound impact evaluations to determine 
the degree to which projects achieved the objective of economic 
development. Limitations of USAID’s funding, data collection, and 
frameworks to assess results have impeded its ability to evaluate 
project impact. Defense has not conducted any impact evaluations and 
lacks clear guidance on project evaluation. However, agency officials 
have noted some anecdotal examples of road construction impact, such as 
reduced travel times and increased commerce. Moreover, no other donor 
has performed impact evaluations. 

A sustainable road maintenance program has not been established, 
although it is a goal of the Afghan government and international 
donors. The Afghan government’s support of this goal has been limited 
due to factors such as a lack of resources and a fragmented 
institutional organization. As a result, international donors have 
agreed to temporarily fund road maintenance to protect their 
investments. While USAID plans to maintain about 1,500 kilometers of 
roads it built, it did not meet its 2007 target to maintain 100 
kilometers of reconstructed roads. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the USAID Administrator (1) take steps to improve 
its framework for assessing results, (2) conduct impact evaluations in 
coordination with other donors, and (3) work with the Afghan government 
to address and fund maintenance of roads. GAO also recommends that the 
Secretary of Defense (1) require impact evaluations of its CERP-funded 
road projects where applicable, and (2) ensure that information on CERP-
funded roads is reported to a USAID database, as required by CERP 
guidance. USAID and Defense agreed with our recommendations and have 
begun taking steps to implement them. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-689]. For more 
information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or 
johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Donors Have Made Progress in Building Highways, but Status of Other 
Roads Is Uncertain and Challenges Have Delayed Road Construction: 

Little Is Known about the Impact of Road Projects in Afghanistan: 

A Fiscally Sustainable Road Maintenance Program for Afghan Roads Has 
Not Been Established: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: USAID and Other Donor Road Project Data: 

Appendix III: CERP Funding Data for Road Projects by Province in 
Afghanistan: 

Appendix IV: USAID's Grant Agreement with UNOPS for Road Reconstruction 
in Afghanistan: 

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: USAID and Defense's Afghan Road Reconstruction Awards: 

Table 2: Afghan Ministries That Have Transportation Sector-Related 
Functions: 

Table 3: Examples of Goals and Measures for Road Operations and 
Maintenance in the Ministry of Public Works Strategic Plan: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Afghan Road Network Envisioned for 2015: 

Figure 2: Afghan Road Types and Characteristics: 

Figure 3: Road Reconstruction Funding by U.S. Agencies and Programs 
between Fiscal Years 2002 and 2007: 

Figure 4: Percentages of Donor Funds Committed for Regional and 
National Highways in Afghanistan, 2002-2007: 

Figure 5: Status of Donor-Funded Road Reconstruction in Afghanistan, as 
of February 2008: 

Figure 6: Donor-Funded Regional and National Highways in Afghanistan: 

Figure 7: USAID-Funded Roads in Afghanistan and Funding Levels by 
Province: 

Figure 8: Location of CERP and Military Construction Roads in 
Afghanistan and CERP Funding by Province: 

Figure 9: Elements of USAID's Results Framework in the Performance 
Management Plan (2006-2008): 

Figure 10: Elements of USAID's Results Framework of IRP for the 
Transportation Sector: 

Figure 11: Time Frame, Estimated Cost, and Total Kilometers for UNOPS 
Grant: 

Abbreviations: 

CERP: Commander's Emergency Response Program: 

IRP: Infrastructure and Rehabilitation Program: 

LBG: The Louis Berger Group: 

LBG/B&V: The Louis Berger Group/Black & Veatch Joint Venture: 

REFS: Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services program: 

UNOPS: United Nations Office for Project Services: 

USACE: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548: 

July 8, 2008: 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman: 
Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia: Committee on 
Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

Almost three decades of war largely destroyed Afghanistan's roads and 
other infrastructure. The remaining roads were only partially usable 
because of years without basic maintenance. In late 2001, approximately 
16 percent of Afghanistan's roads had been paved, in comparison with 
over 80 percent in neighboring Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan. After the United States and its allies removed the Taliban 
regime, the Afghan government and international donors identified road 
reconstruction as a top priority to spur economic development, promote 
governance, and improve security. As a result, the United States, 
through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), provided 
about $5.9 billion in development aid to Afghanistan from fiscal year 
2002 to fiscal year 2007, of which almost 20 percent has been committed 
to reconstruct roads. Additionally, the Department of Defense (Defense) 
has obligated about $600 million in Commander's Emergency Response 
Program (CERP) funds for civilian projects, of which about $300 million 
is for roads. Defense has also funded about $260 million in roads for 
military purposes. 

In this report, we (1) examine the status of donor-funded road 
reconstruction projects since 2002 and challenges affecting donors' 
ability to implement projects as planned, (2) assess U.S. agencies' 
efforts to evaluate the impact of road reconstruction projects, and (3) 
assess efforts to develop a sustainable maintenance program for donor- 
funded roads. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed USAID, Defense, and Afghan 
government strategic planning, funding, and evaluation documents 
relating to road reconstruction projects.[Footnote 1] We interviewed 
USAID and Defense officials and road program implementers, including 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and private contractors, in 
Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, we also visited road 
construction sites in Badakhshan, Nangarhar, and Khost provinces, and 
interviewed Afghan government officials, U.S. Provincial Reconstruction 
Team officials, and other international donors. We assessed the 
reliability of the data on road funding and project status provided to 
us, and used data that we determined to be sufficiently reliable for 
our purposes. We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 
through July 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
(See app. I for a complete description of our scope and methodology.) 

Results in Brief: 

The United States and other international donors have completed 
construction of about 2,700 kilometers of Afghan regional and national 
highways since 2002, but the status of other roads is uncertain and 
various challenges have delayed road construction. The Afghan 
government and international donors established the goal to complete 
Afghanistan's regional highway network (which consists of the "ring 
road" connecting several of Afghanistan's major cities and roads that 
connect the ring road to neighboring countries) by the end of 2008, and 
as of February 2008, about 60 percent of the network was complete. The 
United States, through USAID, has completed its commitment of 715 
kilometers, but the entire network is not expected to be completed 
until at least the end of 2009. USAID has also completed construction 
of 726 kilometers of national highways, which connect provincial 
capitals to the regional highways. The construction of about 900 
additional kilometers of these highways, funded by USAID and other 
donors, is not yet complete. Information on the status of provincial 
and rural roads is limited, as donors have not reported it to the joint 
Afghan government and international donor group responsible for 
collecting donor-funded road project data. Additionally, Defense 
reported completing 155 out of about 1,600 kilometers of CERP-funded 
civilian roads, but Defense's data are incomplete, and according to 
officials, they cannot identify the location of some CERP-funded roads. 
Moreover, Defense has not reported on the status of CERP-funded roads 
for inclusion in a USAID database, as required by its own guidance. 
Donors have made progress in constructing highways and smaller roads; 
however, completion is behind schedule and, in some cases, has cost 
more than expected. For example, although USAID constructed hundreds of 
kilometers of roads in 2006 and 2007, it did not meet its annual 
completion targets for those years. Challenges including poor security 
conditions, limited capacity of project implementers, and 
implementation without adequate planning have contributed to project 
delays and cost increases. 

U.S. agencies know little about the impact of road projects, since they 
have not conducted sound evaluations to determine the degree to which 
the projects have achieved the goals of economic development and 
humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, agency officials and others have 
reported some examples of projects' positive impact, such as increased 
commerce and decreased transportation costs. However, these results are 
based on a limited qualitative assessment or anecdotal information, and 
therefore cannot be generalized. USAID devoted limited resources for 
the design of impact evaluations and data collection, which are needed 
prior to project implementation to perform a sound evaluation. Although 
USAID started its first road reconstruction program in 2002, it did not 
contract for an impact assessment for this program until late 2006. In 
addition, data were not collected in a timely manner for the two major 
road projects that have been completed. For example, for one USAID 
project, baseline data were collected after substantial work had been 
done on the road, making it likely that an evaluation would understate 
its impact. USAID has recently developed an Afghanistan-specific 
results framework, which links project activities to desired impact. 
However, the frameworks have deficiencies and fall short of achieving 
their intended purpose. For example, the results framework described in 
the agency's performance management plan does not clearly explain how 
road construction would lead to increased income from the private 
sector. Additionally, the framework for its latest infrastructure 
program does not include targets, as baseline studies to determine 
appropriate targets were not completed as planned. Moreover, since no 
other donor has conducted impact evaluation of its road projects in 
Afghanistan, little is known about the impact of other road 
reconstruction. Completing sound impact evaluations is vital to ensure 
that the assistance provided by the United States and other 
international donors is achieving the intended results and desired 
outcomes. Defense has not evaluated its CERP-funded civilian road 
projects and has not provided clear guidance on evaluation of these 
projects. 

A sustainable road maintenance program has not been established, and 
the Afghan government relies on assistance from the international 
community, because its ability to maintain newly constructed roads is 
limited. The goal, set by the Afghan government in conjunction with 
international donors to establish a fiscally sustainable road 
maintenance program by the end of 2007, was not met. In part, this is 
because the Afghan government (1) faces significant human and financial 
resource constraints, (2) is hampered by a fragmented institutional 
structure consisting of multiple Afghan ministries with a stake in the 
transportation sector, and (3) lacks a comprehensive legal framework 
and means of enforcement of fee collection for the transportation 
sector. According to various plans, estimates of maintenance costs 
range from about $70 million to $90 million annually, not including 
rural roads. Since the Afghan government has not been able to maintain 
newly reconstructed roads, the European Commission and USAID have 
agreed to provide funding for 3 years to help maintain over 1,600 
kilometers of the roads they built. However, USAID did not meet its 
2007 target to maintain 100 kilometers of reconstructed roads. 

We make recommendations to the USAID Administrator to take steps to 
improve USAID's framework for assessing results and conduct impact 
evaluations for road projects, in coordination with other donors. We 
also recommend that the Administrator work with the Afghan government 
to address maintenance needs and require that future USAID road 
projects include plans to fund maintenance. Additionally, we recommend 
that the Secretary of Defense require impact evaluations of CERP-funded 
roads where applicable, and ensure that the status of CERP-funded road 
projects is reported for inclusion in a USAID database, as required by 
CERP guidance. 

In responding to our draft report, USAID and Defense concurred with our 
findings and recommendations. USAID indicated that it has begun taking 
steps or plans to take steps to address our recommendations. Defense 
stated that it has included measures in its program guidance that 
emphasize requirements that address our recommendations. Defense also 
provided technical comments, which we have incorporated where 
appropriate. We have reprinted USAID's and Defense's comments in 
appendixes V and VI, respectively. 

Background: 

In 2001, when the United States and its allies removed the Taliban 
regime, Afghanistan was in economic crisis. The nation's roads had 
deteriorated, limiting economic growth and access to resources and 
services for its citizens. The Afghan government has recognized that 
improving the country's roads is an important element in lifting the 
population from poverty. It considers a viable major road network 
essential to becoming a transport and trading hub in Central Asia. 
Additionally, road access for rural areas would help to promote licit 
crops and broaden access to health and education. In 2003, the Afghan 
government and international donors proposed a road network for 
Afghanistan, which they hoped to complete by 2015. The proposed network 
(as shown in fig. 1) identifies the country's major roads, including 
the ring road, which links Afghanistan's major cities of Kabul, 
Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif.[Footnote 2] 

Figure 1: Afghan Road Network Envisioned for 2015: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of the Afghan Road Network envisioned for 2015. 
The map depicts provinces, regional highways, national highways, and 
provincial roads. 

Source: GAO from Afghanistan Information Management Services map. 

[End of figure] 

Afghanistan National Development Strategy: 

In February 2006, the Afghan government introduced the interim 
Afghanistan National Development Strategy and its accompanying 
implementation plan, the Afghanistan Compact. The compact included two 
benchmarks for roads: (1) a fully upgraded ring road as well as roads 
connecting the ring road to neighboring countries by the end of 2008, 
and (2) a fiscally sustainable system for road maintenance by the end 
of 2007.[Footnote 3] The Afghan government and international donors 
established the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board to oversee the 
implementation of compact benchmarks. In addition, representatives of 
relevant government ministries, agencies, and the international 
community have formed groups to address implementation issues. For 
example, the group working on roads is commonly referred to as the 
Consultative Group for the Transport Sector. 

Afghan Ministries: 

Several Afghan ministries have transportation sector-related functions. 
The two ministries with road construction and maintenance 
responsibilities are the Ministry of Public Works, which has 
jurisdiction over highways and provincial roads, and the Ministry of 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development, which oversees the rural roads. 
The Ministries of Transportation and Civil Aviation, Finance, Commerce, 
Interior, and Foreign Affairs collect fees or tolls associated with the 
transportation sector. Additionally, the Ministry of Finance disburses 
funds to other ministries for road maintenance and operations. The 
Ministry of Economy is responsible for all government procurement, 
including for road maintenance. 

Road Types: 

Since 2005, the Ministry of Public Works has attempted to standardize 
the nomenclature of roads in its Interim Road and Highway Standards, 
and estimated the length of roads in the Road Sector Master Plan. 
[Footnote 4] The four broad categories of Afghan roads are regional 
highways, national highways, provincial roads, and rural roads (see 
fig. 2). 

Figure 2: Afghan Road Types and Characteristics: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure contains photographs of each road type, as well as the 
following information: 

Road type[A]: Regional highways; 
Characteristics: Foster regional trade and economic linkages between
Afghanistan and neighboring countries. Includes the ring road and 
principal roads connecting to neighboring countries. These are 
generally paved roads[B]; 
Estimated length (kilometers): 3,200. 

Road type[A]: National highways; 
Characteristics: Promote trade and economic linkages. Connect capitals 
of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces to the regional highway network. These 
are generally paved roads; 
Estimated length (kilometers): 4,900. 

Road type[A]: Provincial roads; 
Characteristics: Improve administrative, trade, and economic contacts 
between district headquarters and respective provincial capitals and 
between important district headquarters. Connects provincial capitals 
to district headquarters. These may be paved or gravel roads; 
Estimated length (kilometers): 9,700[C]. 

Road type[A]: Rural roads; 
Characteristics: Bring remote areas into commercial contact with 
markets and seats of power. Includes roads inside districts. These are 
smaller roads that may be paved, gravel, or cobblestone; 
Estimated length (kilometers): 17,000[C]. 

Source: GAO analysis based on the Ministry of Public Works’ Interim 
Road and Highway Standards and Road Sector Master Plan. 

[A] Urban roads are excluded from this list, as these roads fall under 
the jurisdiction of local municipalities rather than national 
ministries. However, the Transport Sector Strategy, finalized in 
February 2008, includes an estimated 3,800 kilometers of urban roads. 

[B] We use "paved" to describe roads with an asphalt, concrete, or 
double bituminous surface treatment. 

[C] According to the 2008 Transport Sector Strategy, which is part of 
the final Afghanistan National Development Strategy, provincial roads 
are now estimated to be 34,000 kilometers long and the rural road 
network is estimated to be about 88,000 kilometers long. 

[End of figure] 

U.S.-Funded Afghan Road Projects: 

The United States, through USAID and Defense, has committed about $1.7 
billion for road reconstruction in Afghanistan between fiscal years 
2002 and 2007. USAID, whose commitments represent 67 percent of the 
total U.S. assistance, has funded highways and provincial roads through 
its infrastructure program. In addition, USAID has funded rural roads 
through its Agriculture, Alternative Development, and Quick Impact 
Project programs, as well as the World Bank-led National Emergency 
Rural Access Project. Defense, whose funding accounts for the remaining 
33 percent of the total U.S. assistance, has committed CERP funds for 
civilian road projects,[Footnote 5] and Military Construction and 
Military Engineering funds for roads for military purposes (see fig. 
3). 

Figure 3: Road Reconstruction Funding by U.S. Agencies and Programs 
between Fiscal Years 2002 and 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure contains photographs of a national highway and a rural 
road, as well as the following information: 

Road reconstruction commitments: $1.7 billion. 
USAID: 67%; 
Defense: 33%. 

USAID: 
Infrastructure: Large-scale infrastructure development such as regional
and national highways and provincial roads; 
Funds committed[A]: $1,053,000; 
Quick Impact Project: Small-scale projects undertaken during early 
phases of reconstruction to win local support; 
Funds committed[A]: $30,000,000; 
National Emergency Rural Access Project: A mulitilateral effort led by 
the World Bank to build roads in rural areas; 
Funds committed[A]: $20,000,000; 
Alternative Development and Agriculture: Includes rural road 
reconstruction to provide alternatives to poppy production and increase 
agricultural productivity, rural employment, and food security; Funds 
committed[A]: $19,000,000. 

Defense: 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program: Small-scale, urgent, 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects to immediately assist 
the Afghan people; 
Funds committed[A]: $304,000,000; 
Military construction: Construction of paved roads for military 
purposes; 
Funds committed[A]: $245,000,000; 
Military Engineering: Construction for urgent military purposes such
as combat trails for operations; 
Funds committed[A]: $15,000,000. 

Sources: GAO analysis of data from USAID, Army Budget Office, USACE, 
and Combined Joint Task Force-82; GAO (photos). 

[A] The funding data have been rounded to the nearest million and 
therefore may not match the total precisely. 

[End of figure] 

Since 2002, USAID and Defense have implemented road projects using 
contracts and grant awards. For its major infrastructure projects, 
USAID awarded contracts to the Louis Berger Group (LBG) in 2002 and to 
LBG-Black & Veatch Joint Venture (LBG/B&V) in 2006, and a grant to the 
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in 2004. Defense has 
awarded contracts for CERP-funded road projects to USACE or directly to 
local contractors through the U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
between 2004 and 2007.[Footnote 6] Table 1 lists U.S. government awards 
for road reconstruction in Afghanistan. 

Table 1: USAID and Defense's Afghan Road Reconstruction Awards: 

USAID: 

Year: 2002; 
Project name--instrument used: Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities 
and Services Program (REFS)--Contract; 
Implementer: LBG; 
Project description: Regional highway sections, including Kabul- 
Kandahar and Kandahar-Herat. 

Year: 2004; 
Project name--instrument used: Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of 
National Secondary Roads--Grant; 
Implementer: UNOPS; 
Project description: National highways and provincial roads, including 
Kandahar-Tarin Kowt and Feyzabad District Center Road. 

Year: 2006; 
Project name--instrument used: Afghanistan Infrastructure and 
Rehabilitation Program (IRP)--Contract; 
Implementer: LBG/B&V; 
Project description: National highways and provincial roads, including 
Keshim-Feyzabad. 

Defense: 

Year: 2004; 
Project name--instrument used: CERP-funded road projects--Contracts; 
Implementer: USACE or local contractors; 
Project description: Provincial and rural roads, including Nangarej-
Mandol and Gulum Khan. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and Defense data. 

[End of table] 

International Donor Funding for Afghan Highways: 

The United States and other international donors have committed over 
$2.2 billion for reconstruction of the regional and national highways 
identified in the Afghan government's Road Sector Master Plan. Of the 
total donor commitment for these roads, the United States (through 
USAID) has committed about 42 percent (over $960 million), followed by 
the Asian Development Bank (24 percent), Japan, and the World Bank (6 
percent each) (see fig. 4). The government of Afghanistan has also 
committed approximately $47 million for the construction of highways. 

Figure 4: Percentages of Donor Funds Committed for Regional and 
National Highways in Afghanistan, 2002-2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data: 

Percentages of Donor Funds Committed for Regional and National Highways 
in Afghanistan, 2002-2007: 
United States: 42%; 
Asian Development Bank: 24%; 
Japan: 6%; 
World Bank: 6%; 
Italy: 5%; 
European Commission[A]: 4%; 
Other[B]: 13%. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from the Consultative Group for the 
Transport Sector and USAID. 

[A] European Commission funding represents contributions by the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency. 

[B] Other donors include the Islamic Development Bank, India, Iran, 
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. 

[End of figure] 

Donors Have Made Progress in Building Highways, but Status of Other 
Roads Is Uncertain and Challenges Have Delayed Road Construction: 

The United States and other donors have completed construction of about 
2,700 kilometers of regional and national highways in Afghanistan since 
2002, but limited information is available on the status of provincial 
and rural roads and various challenges have delayed road construction. 
The Afghan government and international donors established the goal to 
complete Afghanistan's regional highway network by the end of 2008, and 
as of February 2008, about 60 percent of the network was complete. The 
United States, through USAID, has completed its commitment of 715 
kilometers, but the entire network is not expected to be completed by 
the end of 2008, as planned. The United States has also completed 
construction of 726 kilometers of national highways and construction of 
an additional 917 kilometers of these highways, for which the United 
States and other donors have committed funds, is ongoing or not yet 
started. Limited information is available on the status of provincial 
and rural roads, as donors have not reported these data to the joint 
Afghan government and international donor group that collects data on 
all Afghan road projects. Although Defense reported completing 
construction of 155 out of about 1,600 kilometers of CERP-funded 
civilian roads, project data are incomplete, and according to 
officials, they cannot identify the location of some CERP-funded roads. 
Moreover, Defense has not reported project data on CERP-funded roads 
for inclusion in a USAID database, as required by guidance. Donors have 
made progress, but road construction is behind schedule and, in some 
cases, has cost more than expected. For example, USAID has not met its 
annual completion targets for roads for 2006 and 2007. Challenges 
including poor security conditions, limited capacity of project 
implementers, and implementation without adequate planning have 
contributed to project delays and cost increases. 

The United States and International Donors Have Built or Committed 
Funds for Afghan Highways, but Data on Other Roads Are Limited: 

The United States and other donors have completed portions of the 
regional and national highways (see fig. 5). While the donors have also 
committed funds for the construction of provincial and rural roads, the 
overall status of these roads is uncertain because of the lack of 
available data. 

Figure 5: Status of Donor-Funded Road Reconstruction in Afghanistan, as 
of February 2008: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a horizontal bar graph depicting the following data: 

Regional highways: Total kilometers for which funds are committed: 
United States: 715; 
Other donors: 2,525; 
Funds not committed: 0; 
Total highway kilometers: 3,240; 
Total kilometers completed: 
United States: 715; 
Other donors: 1,239; 
Funds not committed: 0. 

National highways: Total kilometers for which funds are committed: 
United States: 1,029; 
Other donors: 614; 
Funds not committed: 3,240; 
Total highway kilometers: 4,884; 
Total kilometers completed: 
United States: 726; 
Other donors: 0; 
Funds not committed: 0. 

Provincial roads: Total kilometers for which funds are committed: 
United States: 420; 
Other donors: 0; 
Funds not committed: 9,236; 
Total highway kilometers: 9,656. 
Total kilometers completed: 187; 
United States: 187; 
Other donors: 0; 
Funds not committed: 0. 

Rural roads: Total kilometers for which funds are committed: 
United States: 2,651; 
Other donors: 0; 
Funds not committed: 14,349; 
Total highway kilometers: 17,000 estimated[A]. 
Total kilometers completed: 1,205; 
United States: 1,205; 
Other donors: 0; 
Funds not committed: 0. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from USAID, the Consultative Group for the 
Transport Sector, and the Road Sector Master Plan. 

[A] CERP-funded roads include rural and provincial roads. However, 
because we do not have CERP data disaggregated by road type and CERP 
funding is used for small-scale projects, we included all CERP-funded 
roads in the rural roads category. 

[End of figure] 

More than Half of Regional Highway Construction Is Complete, but 
Construction Is behind Schedule: 

Although more than half of the regional highway network in Afghanistan 
has been completed, construction is behind schedule. In its Afghanistan 
National Development Strategy, the Afghan government, in conjunction 
with international donors, established the goal of completing a fully 
upgraded regional highway network by the end of 2008. The construction 
of the regional highways is a top road reconstruction priority of the 
Afghan government and international donors, as these roads are expected 
to foster regional trade and contribute to Afghanistan's economic 
development. The United States and other donors have committed more 
than $1.5 billion for the over-3,200-kilometers-long regional highway 
network and had completed about 60 percent (1,954 kilometers) of these 
highways as of February 2008 (see figs. 6 and 7). The United States, 
through USAID, has completed the construction of the 715 kilometers of 
the regional highways it funded.[Footnote 7] In addition, it also 
managed the construction for the 115-kilometer-long Saudi-funded 
section, which is complete. However, construction of an additional 29 
percent (932 kilometers) of the regional highway network is ongoing and 
donors have committed funding but have yet to start construction of the 
remaining 11 percent (354 kilometers).[Footnote 8] Completion of at 
least 300 kilometers of the regional highway network is not expected 
until December 2009, in part because funding was not committed until 
September 2006. 

Figure 6: Donor-Funded Regional and National Highways in Afghanistan: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of Donor-Funded Regional and National Highways in 
Afghanistan. The following entities are specifically noted: 
* Regional highways; 
* Provincial boundaries; 
* Country capital; 
* Provincial capitals. 

Donor-funded road network: Portions funded by: 
Afghanistan; 
Asian Development Bank; 
European Union; 
India; 
Iran; 
Italy; 
Japan; 
Pakistan; 
Saudi Arabia; 
United States (USAID); 
World Bank; 
Islamic Development Bank. 
 
This map has Interactive features: Roll your mouse over this
symbol on each road for more details on that road section.
See Appendix II for project details. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from the Consultative Group for the 
Transport Sector and USAID. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 7: USAID-Funded Roads in Afghanistan and Funding Levels by 
Province: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of USAID-Funded Roads in Afghanistan and funding 
levels by Province. The following entities are specifically noted: 
* Regional highways; 
* Provincial boundaries; 
* Country capital; 
* Provincial capitals. 

USAID-funded road network: 
Regional highway; 
Saudi funded; USAID implemented; 
National highways; 
District roads; 
Road projects canceled; 
District center with road construction. 

Provinces with less than $10 million USAID funding: 
Badghis; 
Balkh; 
Baghlan; 
Bamyan; 
Daikondi; 
Faryab; 
Ghor; 
Jowzjan; 
Kapisa; 
Kunduz; 
Laghman; 
Nurestan; 
Paktila; 
Samangan; 
Takhar. 

Provinces with $10 million to $38 million USAID funding: 
Helmand; 
Kabul; 
Khost; 
Konar; 
Lowgar; 
Nangarhar; 
Nimruz; 
Panjshir; 
Parwan; 
Sar-e Pol; 
Uruzgan. 

Provinces with greater than $38 million USAID funding[A]: 
Badakhshan; 
Farah; 
Ghazni; 
Herat; 
Kandahar; 
Paktia; 
Wardak; 
Zabul. 

This map has Interactive features: Roll your mouse over this
symbol on each road for more details on that road section.
See Appendix II for project details. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

[A] USAID provided an average of $38 million for road reconstruction as 
part of its infrastructure program in 28 out of 34 provinces. 

[End of figure] 

Less than Half of the National Highways for Which Donors Have Committed 
Funds Are Complete: 

International donors have completed 44 percent (726 kilometers) of the 
1,600 kilometers of national highways for which they have committed 
approximately $716 million. The national highways are expected to 
connect the capitals of all 34 Afghan provinces to regional highways. 
USAID has completed construction of 726 kilometers of national highways 
and has committed funds for an additional 300 kilometers, which is 
under construction. Other donors, consisting of the Asian Development 
Bank, the World Bank, and Italy, have committed funds to construct 
about 600 kilometers of national highways, but none of these roads is 
complete (see app. II for the status of regional and national highway 
projects). 

Limited Information Is Available on Construction of Provincial and 
Rural Roads; Defense Has Not Reported Data on Its Civilian Roads, as 
Required: 

The status of provincial and rural road construction is uncertain 
because donors have not reported this information to the group 
collecting road project data for all Afghan roads. Additionally, 
Defense has not reported project details on its CERP-funded roads for 
inclusion in a USAID database, as required by CERP guidance. 

Limited Information on the Status of Provincial and Rural Roads: 

Afghanistan's Road Sector Master Plan identifies about 9,700 kilometers 
of provincial roads and an estimated 17,000 kilometers of rural roads, 
and the United States and international donors have funded and built 
some of these roads.[Footnote 9] However, limited information is 
available on donors' funding commitments and completion status for 
these roads. The Consultative Group for the Transport Sector, which 
includes officials from donor agencies and Afghan ministries involved 
in the transportation sector, is responsible for collecting information 
on all road projects. However, information on some provincial and all 
rural roads, which are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development, is currently not reported to the group, 
according to the official who collects road project data. The official 
noted that international donors have reported only road project 
information for roads that are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry 
of Public Works. 

According to USAID, it has completed construction of 237 kilometers of 
provincial roads, and construction of over 185 additional kilometers is 
under way.[Footnote 10] In addition, it has constructed over 1,000 
kilometers of rural roads, such as labor-intensive cobblestone roads 
and farm-to-market roads, as part of its Agriculture and Alternative 
Development programs. However, the agency could not provide the 
kilometers of roads constructed through its Quick Impact Project, which 
included construction of small roads during the early phase of 
reconstruction in Afghanistan. 

Defense Has Not Reported Data on Its Civilian Roads: 

Although Defense has provided CERP funding for road reconstruction 
since 2004, its project status data are incomplete. According to 
Defense officials in Afghanistan, Defense has committed CERP funds to 
construct approximately 1,600 kilometers of provincial and rural roads 
for civilian use, of which about 155 kilometers are reported as 
complete.[Footnote 11] In addition to civilian roads, Defense officials 
reported that about 540 kilometers of roads are under construction for 
military purposes, including 400 kilometers of roads that have been 
paved to prevent insurgents from planting improvised explosive devices. 
[Footnote 12] However, Defense's information on CERP-funded roads may 
not accurately represent kilometers of roads under construction or 
completed, as the project data provided to us were incomplete. For 
example, according to Defense officials in Washington, about $6 million 
of CERP funds was provided for roads in the provinces of Farah and 
Helmand (see app. III for CERP funding by province). However, as shown 
in figure 8, project location information provided by Defense officials 
in Afghanistan does not show any CERP roads in these provinces. 

Figure 8: Location of CERP and Military Construction Roads in 
Afghanistan and CERP Funding by Province: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of Afghanistan depicting the location of CERP and 
Military construction roads and CERP funding by Province, as well as 
the following information: 

Defense-funded roads: 
Military construction; 
Commander's Emergency Response Program; 

CERP funding level by province: Did not receive funding: 
Badghis; 
Baghlan; 
Daikondi; 
Faryab; 
Ghor; 
Jowzjan; 
Nimruz; 
Samangan; 
Sar-e Pol;
Takhar. 

CERP funding level by province: less than $1 million: 
Badakhshan; 
Balkh; 
Bamyan; 
Helmand; 
Herat; 
Kapisa; 
Kunduz; 
Laghman; 
Lowgar; 
Wardak. 

CERP funding level by province: $1 million to $13 million: 
Farah; 
Kandahar; 
Nangarhar; 
Paktia; 
Paktila; 
Parwan; 
Uruzgan; 
Zabul. 

CERP funding level by province: greater than $13 million[A]: 
Ghazni; 
Kabul; 
Khost; 
Konar;
Nurestan; 
Panjshir. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data; USAID and Defense (map). 

[A] Defense provided an average of $13 million in CERP funding for 
roads in 24 provinces. 

[End of figure] 

Although Defense is required by CERP guidance to report on the status 
of road projects to a USAID-maintained database, it has not done so. 
The 2006 CERP guidance requires data for all construction projects to 
be reported for inclusion in a USAID database. However, according to 
USAID, no CERP project data have been reported into the database. 
Furthermore, according to Defense officials in Afghanistan, Defense's 
data collection systems often change when a new military command takes 
charge, and project information is lost during the transition. They 
said that because of missing documentation and frequent staff rotation, 
they do not know where some CERP-funded roads were built prior to 
fiscal year 2006. As a result, a comprehensive database of all U.S.- 
funded road projects does not exist. 

Several Challenges Have Contributed to Delays and Cost Increases: 

Despite progress in building roads, construction is behind schedule. 
For instance, USAID did not meet its annual targets for kilometers of 
roads constructed as established in its Afghanistan Performance 
Management Plan (2006-2008).[Footnote 13] Specifically, for fiscal year 
2006, the agency set a target to complete 550 kilometers of roads, but 
completed only 393 kilometers. In 2007, its initial target of 580 
kilometers was later decreased to 423 kilometers, but the agency 
completed only 228 kilometers. It has also decreased the target for the 
current fiscal year from 550 kilometers to 314 kilometers. 

U.S. agencies and other donors have faced several challenges in 
implementing road projects, such as poor security conditions, 
limitations of project implementers, and starting construction with 
limited planning.[Footnote 14] These factors have contributed to 
project delays and cost increases. 

Poor Security Conditions: 

According to U.S. government and other donor officials, poor security 
is the most difficult challenge they face in implementing road 
projects. The security situation in some parts of the country has 
delayed road construction projects and increased costs. For example, 
USAID signed a contract for about $8 million to construct the Kajaki 
road in May 2007. According to USAID, this road is important as it 
connects the Kajaki dam, a source of water and power in southern 
Afghanistan, to the ring road. However, because attacks prevented 
contractors from working on the project, it was terminated in 2008 
after USAID had spent about $5 million. USAID's first Afghan 
infrastructure program also experienced cost increases due to 
deteriorating security. According to a USAID Office of the Inspector 
General report, almost $9 million of a proposed ceiling increase to the 
contract was directly attributable to increased security costs. 
[Footnote 15] Additionally, according to USACE road project data and 
officials, security issues resulted in frequent schedule delays for 
roads. For example, a contractor in Zabul province had six employees 
kidnapped, and as of May 2008, work on the project had not progressed 
for almost 60 days. 

According to donors we spoke with in Afghanistan, security is a major 
concern in the south and the east, and is also becoming a concern in 
the north. Due to deteriorating security conditions, as of February 
2008, Japan has been able to complete construction of only 12 percent 
of a 114-kilometer-long section of the Kandahar-Herat road in southern 
Afghanistan.[Footnote 16] This road section was originally estimated to 
be completed by July 2006. According to a Japanese official, the 
construction costs for this section have increased to more than three 
times the initial estimate. Additionally, because the Japanese 
contractor responsible for this section left due to increasingly 
dangerous conditions, Japan has re-awarded a contract for 50 kilometers 
of this road section to a local contractor. 

In addition to monetary costs, attacks in areas where roads are being 
reconstructed have resulted in loss of life and injuries among workers. 
As of March 2008, 162 contractors associated with USAID roads programs 
have been killed and 202 have been injured or disabled in attacks since 
2003.[Footnote 17] There are more casualties associated with road 
programs than with any other USAID program in Afghanistan, according to 
USAID data. Defense contractors have also suffered casualties. For 
example, one project was delayed by at least 30 days while the 
contractor organized a new team after 18 workers were killed in an 
attack, according to a USACE official. 

Project Implementer Limitations: 

Limited capacity of local project implementers has impeded donors' 
efforts to complete road construction projects on time and within 
budget. According to donor officials we spoke to, the list of capable 
local contractors is growing, but it still remains small. According to 
USACE officials, one of their objectives is to build local capacity by 
using Afghan contractors. However, the agency has had difficulties with 
poor subcontractor performance, which, according to USACE officials, 
has resulted in time delays. For example, although USACE planned to 
complete its first road project in June 2007, it was not until March 
2008 that USACE officials signed a letter documenting project 
completion. When we visited the project in October 2007, the contract 
cost had increased by about 45 percent and the completion date had been 
extended by over a year. USACE officials said they rejected work done 
on the project because of "poor contractor methods" and required the 
contractor to redo work. 

Additionally, according to USAID officials and a report on USAID's 
first major road program, LBG terminated multiple subcontracts during 
construction of the Jalalabad-Asmar road because of poor performance, 
which resulted in an estimated 3-to 4-month delay for each termination. 
Moreover, USAID paid over $7 million for the construction of several 
segments of this road, all of which required rework. In an end-of-year 
progress report to USAID, UNOPS stated that it had terminated 10 
contracts in 2005 due to poor contractor performance that had resulted 
in construction delays. According to USAID officials, one of the 
reasons they opted to award funds to UNOPS was to support their 
capacity building of local contractors, even though USAID officials 
knew it would likely result in delays and additional cost. Each 
terminated contract results in cost overruns due to the recurrent cost 
of getting the contractor's equipment and materials to the construction 
site and building a new construction camp, according to a USAID 
official. 

USAID's concerns about UNOPS's performance led to the termination of 
the grant agreement after USAID had awarded over $365 million (see app. 
IV for more details). USAID officials expressed concern about UNOPS's 
financial management of grant funds and, in July 2007, required UNOPS 
to have an independent financial audit done as a condition to approving 
funds to cover cost overruns.[Footnote 18] In December 2007, USAID 
terminated the grant due to "serious shortcomings in [UNOPS's] 
financial and technical management" of the grant, according to USAID's 
technical officer for the grant. At the time of the grant's 
termination, construction of one major road project was only 60 percent 
complete, although grant funds were depleted. 

Starting Construction with Limited Planning: 

Limited planning by donors prior to starting construction has resulted 
in increased costs.[Footnote 19] According to a senior Ministry of 
Public Works official, there have been several instances of cost 
increases because donors have started construction without adequate 
planning, such as completing engineering studies prior to construction. 
For example, according to the ministry official, the cost of a regional 
highway section that the Asian Development Bank funded increased from 
$28 million to $56 million because detailed design work had not been 
completed prior to project implementation. As a result of this cost 
increase, the project had to be put on hold for up to 3 years. The 
official stated that other donors, including Italy and the United 
States, have also faced similar challenges. 

According to a USAID official, detailed planning, including engineering 
and feasibility studies, can take 1 year or more and such studies may 
not be feasible due to deteriorating security conditions. Additionally, 
long time frames for projects have not been acceptable in Afghanistan 
due to pressure from donors and the Afghan government to show faster 
results, according to USAID officials.[Footnote 20] As a result, USAID 
has not completed project designs before beginning construction of its 
road projects. For example, in a memo approving an expansion of the 
UNOPS grant, USAID officials stated that the political context 
necessitated having some roads under contract within weeks and under 
construction "as soon as possible." In some cases, UNOPS was unable to 
develop complete project descriptions and corresponding cost estimates 
before it awarded contracts. In another case, according to a USAID 
Office of Inspector General report, a detailed assessment of bridges 
and an old road had not been done when USAID awarded the construction 
contract for the Kandahar-Herat road.[Footnote 21] As a result, work 
plans were modified during construction, contributing to a 43 percent 
cost increase. Our review of contract file documentation for one of the 
four U.S.-built sections of the Kandahar-Herat road showed a net 
increase of over $10 million, due in part to revisions of construction 
requirements of bridges. 

Little Is Known about the Impact of Road Projects in Afghanistan: 

U.S. agencies involved in road reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan 
know little about the impact of road projects, since they have not 
conducted assessments to determine the degree to which the projects 
have achieved economic development and humanitarian assistance goals. 
While agencies reported some examples of positive impact, these are 
based on limited data, a qualitative evaluation, or anecdotal 
information, and therefore cannot be generalized. Several factors have 
limited agencies' abilities to conduct impact assessments. For USAID, 
these include limited attention to the design of impact evaluations 
prior to project implementation, lack of timely data collection for its 
two major road projects, and deficiencies in the frameworks for 
assessing results of Afghanistan road projects. For Defense, they 
include failure to assess the results of its road projects and lack of 
clear guidance on the evaluation of its CERP-funded projects. Moreover, 
since no other donor has conducted impact evaluation of its road 
projects in Afghanistan, little is known about the impact of other road 
reconstruction as well. Completing sound impact evaluations in 
coordination with other donors involved in road reconstruction is vital 
to ensure that the assistance provided by the United States and other 
international donors is achieving the intended results and desired 
outcomes. 

USAID Has Not Performed Sound Impact Assessments; Examples of Impact 
Are Mostly Anecdotal: 

USAID has not performed a sound impact assessment of its completed road 
projects in Afghanistan. Because of this, there is limited evidence of 
the positive impact of U.S.-funded road projects. In some cases the 
limited evidence comes from a USAID-funded qualitative study, while in 
other cases it is based on rough estimates, anecdotes, or impressions. 
Neither the qualitative study nor the anecdotes shared by U.S. 
officials are representative and therefore the results are not 
generalizable. Examples of positive results reported in the qualitative 
study or via anecdotes and impressions include the following: 

According to USAID, the ring road is being heavily used and travel 
times have decreased. Additionally, USAID estimates that 3,500 labor 
days are produced for each kilometer of road constructed. However, it 
could not provide us data to support this estimate. 

Photograph: CERP-Funded Paved Road. 

Source: GAO. 

[Traffic on the newly paved sections of Defense’s CERP-funded Kadem 
Tana road in Khost province. According to Defense officials, 
reconstructed roads have led to increased commerce and opened lines of 
communications between different districts]. 

* Defense officials told us that they observed that traffic increased 
significantly when a new road is built. According to these officials, 
new roads have led to an increase in the number of gas stations, which 
is evidence of an increase in commerce. Moreover, according to these 
officials, roads have opened lines of communication among districts, 
provinces, and the central government, thereby improving local 
governance. Because they did not quantify these changes, they cannot 
demonstrate the extent to which these projects led to observed impacts. 

* According to some local elders we spoke with in a village close to 
Jalalabad, Nangarhar province, the cobblestone road constructed with 
USAID funds had enabled access to markets for agricultural products, as 
well as to clinics and hospitals for the local population; generated 
employment for daily laborers during road construction; increased 
commerce as new shops have been constructed along the road; and 
promoted community participation as locals contributed their land to 
widen the road. 

* UNOPS performed a qualitative study, funded by USAID, of the impact 
of rehabilitated district roads and concluded that improvements to 
these roads led to increased employment opportunities, reduced 
transport costs, and increased traffic flows. In addition, the road 
improvements helped to raise land values and encourage the development 
of a marketing network. The results of this study were based on 
discussions with a nonrepresentative group of respondents and did not 
include a comparison, for example, of how employment opportunities 
changed for a comparable location that did not benefit from a new road. 

* LBG provided some estimates of the reductions in travel time and cost 
savings from USAID's completed road projects. The road reconstruction 
led to a reduction in travel time between 30 and 50 percent, and in 
vehicle operating cost savings between 25 and 62 percent, according to 
the estimates. These estimates are based on surveys by LBG's engineers. 
However, LBG officials could not verify the accuracy of these numbers, 
and to date, USAID has not financed a follow-up study of its completed 
projects to support them. 

Limitations in USAID's Planning Efforts Impede Its Ability to Assess 
Impact: 

Limitations in planning for evaluation prior to project implementation, 
problems with data collection, and weaknesses associated with USAID's 
Afghanistan-specific results frameworks have impeded impact assessments 
of its road projects. 

Limitations in Funding and Data Collection: 

USAID's plans show that the agency focused little attention and funding 
on the design of impact assessment for its first road reconstruction 
program prior to project implementation. Sound evaluation design 
includes plans to collect data before, during, and after project 
implementation.[Footnote 22] Although its first large road 
reconstruction program was launched in 2002, USAID did not issue a task 
order to perform a socioeconomic impact assessment for this program 
until October 2006. Although an assessment was planned for spring 2008, 
no assessments for transport infrastructure projects have been 
completed under this task order. 

Additionally, USAID officials did not collect data for the two major 
completed road projects, the Kabul-Kandahar and Kandahar-Herat 
highways, in a timely manner to allow them to accurately measure impact 
over time. Baseline data on project beneficiaries and a control group 
collected before project implementation are used for comparison with 
data collected after the project is completed to assess the project's 
net results. Two baseline studies were conducted, one each for the 
USAID-funded sections of the Kabul-Kandahar and Kandahar-Herat roads. 
However, the baseline study for the Kabul-Kandahar road was undertaken 
after considerable work had already been done, so an evaluation 
comparing conditions before and after this project is likely to 
understate its impact. While USAID conducted the baseline study for the 
Kandahar-Herat road before starting construction, it has not collected 
follow-up data since the project's December 2006 completion. Although 
USAID officials have not completed a baseline study for any projects in 
its latest roads program, they intend to collect baseline data for six 
road projects and have begun efforts for one of them. 

Limitations in Frameworks Linking Reconstruction Activities to Impact: 

While USAID recently designed a framework that links reconstruction 
activities in Afghanistan to expected impacts, weaknesses in 
Afghanistan-wide and program-specific frameworks also impede assessment 
of the efficient use of resources and evaluation of project impact. 

Although USAID has developed an Afghanistan-specific framework to 
assess results, it does not clearly explain how road reconstruction 
will lead to the agency's strategic objective. In its Afghanistan 
Performance Management Plan (2006-2008), developed following a 2005 GAO 
recommendation, USAID lays out a logical framework to link road 
reconstruction activities to its strategic objective of a licit 
thriving economy led by the private sector.[Footnote 23] The framework 
includes objectives, indicators to identify how progress will be 
measured, and annual targets as numeric goals that help to assess 
progress toward objectives (see fig. 9).[Footnote 24] However, the plan 
does not explain how the kilometers of roads constructed (output) would 
lead to impacts such as an increase in foreign direct investment and 
income from the private sector. Specifically, the plan does not include 
outcome indicators (such as cost and time savings) that would link the 
outputs to impact indicators. 

Figure 9: Elements of USAID's Results Framework in the Performance 
Management Plan (2006-2008): 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of Elements of USAID's Results Framework 
in the Performance Management Plan (2006-2008), as follows: 

Performance Management Plan objectives: 
* Activity level: 
- Road networks expansion; 
* Intermediate: 
- Improved physical infrastructure; 
- Accelerated growth in the rural economy; 
- Increased incomes through economic growth; 
* Strategic: 
- A licit thriving economy led by the private sector. 

Performance Management Plan indicators: 
* Output: 
- 1. Kilometers of roads reconstructed: 
Year: 2006: Kilometers: 550; 
Year: 2007: Kilometers: 580[A]; 
Year: 2008: Kilometers: 550[A]; 
* Outcome: 
- Not included; 
* Impact: 
- Increased foreign direct investment; 
- Decreased income from drugs; 
- Increased income from the private sector. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

[A] The targets for 2007 and 2008 were subsequently reduced to 423 
kilometers and 314 kilometers respectively. 

[End of figure] 

USAID also established a program-specific framework to link projects 
that are part of USAID's most recent road program, IRP, to USAID's 
strategic objectives, though the framework does not include output 
indicators and associated targets to assess progress.[Footnote 25] 
Unlike the countrywide plan, the IRP framework contains outcome 
indicators such as vehicle operating costs and time savings (see fig. 
10). These indicators measure progress toward intermediate objectives, 
which link to the strategic objectives of a licit economy led by the 
private sector and improving health and education of Afghans. However, 
the framework does not include output indicators and associated targets 
that would allow the agency to assess progress annually. 

Figure 10: Elements of USAID's Results Framework of IRP for the 
Transportation Sector: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of Elements of USAID's Results Framework 
of IRP for the Transportation Sector, as follows: 

IRP objectives: 
* Activity level: 
- Expanded and improved access to transportation; 
- Improved private sector growth; 
- Accelerated market-led growth in agriculture; 
* Intermediate: 
- Expanded and improved access to economic infrastructure; 
- Increased income through economic growth; 
- Rehabilitated rural economy; 
- Increased access to education; 
- Increased access to health care; 
* Strategic[A]: 
- A licit thriving economy led by the private sector; 
- A better-educated and healthier population. 

IRP indicators: 
* Output: 
- Not included;
* Targets: 
- Not included;
* Outcome: 
- Reduced vehicle operating costs; 
- Reduced travel times; 
- Increased household income; 
- Increased rates of school attendance; 
* Impact: 
- Increased foreign direct investment; 
- Decreased income from drugs; 
- Increased income from the private sector. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

[A] The strategic objectives in the IRP framework are based on 
objectives in USAID's Afghanistan Performance Management Plan (2006- 
2008). 

[End of figure] 

Because the IRP framework for assessing impact was not fully based on 
the estimated benefits in the cost-benefit analysis used to select road 
projects, USAID cannot verify that IRP projects will lead to the 
estimated benefits and expected impact. A cost-benefit analysis should 
be the basis for setting indicators and their target values in a 
framework linking the project to expected impact. USAID's cost-benefit 
analysis identified the indicators used in the framework and the target 
values that could be used to measure annual progress toward those 
indicators.[Footnote 26] However, USAID did not include those 
measurable targets in its results framework for IRP. In its monitoring 
and evaluation plan for IRP, USAID stated that targets would be set 
based on baseline studies for individual projects by the end of 2007. 
However, baseline studies have not been completed and no targets have 
been set to date. Therefore, the estimated benefits from USAID's cost- 
benefit analysis used to select IRP road projects may differ from the 
expected impact identified by the IRP framework. 

Defense Has Not Assessed the Impact of and Lacks Clear Guidance for 
CERP Projects: 

Defense has not conducted any impact assessment of its civilian road 
projects. Defense's objective for CERP is to enable local U.S. military 
commanders to respond to small-scale, urgent humanitarian relief and 
reconstruction requirements. Because CERP is used for urgent local 
needs such as small roads, the impact of such projects may be difficult 
to quantify. Although CERP-funded projects contain measures of desired 
impact--such as improved public sentiment toward local and national 
governments, increased jobs and economic growth, and increased local 
support to deter terrorist recruitment--it is not stated how these 
indicators will be measured and what data collection efforts are 
planned. Additionally, while CERP guidance for Afghanistan requires 
project proposals to have an "adequate" plan to measure success in 
achieving the desired impact, it does not contain criteria for 
developing such a plan for performance measurement and evaluation. 

No Other Donors Have Performed Impact Evaluations: 

No other donors that we spoke to have performed impact evaluations of 
their road projects, and therefore little is known about the impact of 
road reconstruction in Afghanistan. Representatives from Japan, the 
European Commission, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank 
said they had not performed any evaluations to assess the impact of 
roads they funded. Because various donors are constructing different 
parts of an interconnected road network, attributing impact to a 
specific donor's road project is difficult. Therefore, conducting 
impact evaluations in coordination with other donors is vital to ensure 
that the assistance provided by the United States and other 
international donors is achieving the desired outcomes. 

The World Bank has, however, taken some steps to allow for future 
impact evaluations. For example, the bank developed a rough cost- 
benefit analysis for its emergency infrastructure project in 
Afghanistan, which allows for a framework to assess the outcomes of its 
project. For its National Emergency Rural Access Program, which 
includes the construction of rural roads, the bank plans to undertake a 
rigorous impact evaluation. 

A Fiscally Sustainable Road Maintenance Program for Afghan Roads Has 
Not Been Established: 

A fiscally sustainable program for road maintenance has not been 
established, although the Afghan government and international donors 
set a goal to do so by the end of 2007. Several factors have 
contributed to the Afghan government's maintenance shortfall, including 
(1) its lack of human and financial resources, (2) a fragmented 
institutional organization, and (3) the lack of a comprehensive legal 
framework and means to enforce fee collection for the transportation 
sector in Afghanistan. Since 2005, various plans have estimated that 
road maintenance would cost between about $70 million and $90 million 
annually. Because the Afghan government has not been able to maintain 
newly reconstructed roads, the European Commission and USAID have 
agreed to fund maintenance on a temporary basis for the roads they 
built. However, USAID did not meet its 2007 target to maintain 100 
kilometers of reconstructed roads. 

The Target Date for Achieving a Fiscally Sustainable Road Maintenance 
Program Has Not Been Met due to Various Limitations: 

The target to establish a fiscally sustainable road maintenance program 
for Afghanistan by the end of 2007 was not met. The Afghan government, 
in conjunction with international donors, established this target in 
the interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Although the 
target date was subsequently extended to March 2008, according to an 
official from the Consultative Group for Transport Sector, a 
maintenance program has not been established. Moreover, while the final 
Afghanistan National Development Strategy, issued in April 2008, still 
includes the goal of establishing a maintenance program, it does not 
include a date by which the program should be established. 

Several factors have limited the Afghan government's support for road 
maintenance activities. These include (1) resource constraints such as 
a lack of human and financial resources and weak private sector 
capacity, (2) a fragmented institutional organization, and (3) the lack 
of a comprehensive legal framework and means to enforce road-related 
fee collection. 

Lack of Resources: 

According to the Transport Sector Strategy (2008-2013), ministries and 
institutions involved in the transportation sector lack human capacity 
and organization to carry out tasks such as budgeting, procurement, and 
contract administration, which are necessary to implement a road 
maintenance program. Donor officials we spoke to in Afghanistan stated 
that the Afghan government is not able to attract young workers due to 
low wages. According to a March 2008 United Nations report, low 
salaries place many working Afghans, including government employees, at 
risk of falling below the poverty line. A senior official at the 
Ministry of Public Works with whom we spoke noted that his ministry 
cannot pay adequate salaries to its engineers and technical staff. For 
example, the general director for maintenance is paid only about $200 
per month, while a person with similar qualifications could earn five 
times that salary in the private sector, according to the official. 

According to a USAID official and a senior Afghan government official, 
the Afghan government also lacks financial resources to cover road 
maintenance costs. The Ministry of Public Works' Road Sector Master 
Plan estimated in 2005 that the total maintenance cost for regional and 
national highways and provincial roads would be $38 million for 2007. 
In October 2007, a senior ministry official told us that while the 
Ministry of Public Works estimated that it needed $30 million to 
maintain roads in 2007, the Ministry of Finance had allocated only $8 
million. Thus, the Ministry of Public Works planned only to undertake 
routine maintenance, and postpone more expensive periodic maintenance 
work.[Footnote 27] 

Weak private sector capacity has also hindered the Afghan government's 
ability to carry out road maintenance. Many donors have recommended 
that the Ministry of Public Works involve more private sector entities 
in its road maintenance efforts. However, according to a senior 
official at the ministry, the private sector still lacks the capacity 
to undertake and complete road maintenance projects. For example, in 
2006, the Ministry of Public Works requested bids for maintenance of 
the Kabul-Kandahar road three times without receiving a single bid. In 
its 2005 assessment of road maintenance needs in Afghanistan, the World 
Bank recommended that Ministry of Public Works staff perform urgent 
maintenance until private sector contractors have the capacity to do 
so. According to a USAID needs assessment of the transportation sector, 
the Afghan private sector's participation is also limited due to a lack 
of available cash and debt financing. This lack of initial funding 
hinders local companies from bidding for costly road projects, as road 
contractors usually get paid later in the life of the contract, thus 
requiring them to have the resources to finance project start-up costs. 

Fragmented Institutional Organization: 

The Afghan government's participation in road maintenance has also been 
limited by a fragmented organization of the transportation sector and 
the lack of a comprehensive legal framework for this sector. Numerous 
ministries are involved in road operations and maintenance (see table 
2). According to officials from USAID and the European Commission, 
donors affiliated with the Consultative Group for the Transport Sector 
consider this fragmented governance a major impediment to effective 
management, and they recommended consolidating the transportation 
sector under a single ministry in the draft Transport Sector Strategy. 
However, USAID officials and a Ministry of Finance official said that 
ministries with a stake in the transportation sector are expected to 
oppose such a recommendation. The Transport Sector Strategy finalized 
in February 2008 includes a recommendation to establish an 
interministry working group for the transportation sector, but falls 
short of recommending consolidation of transportation sector functions 
under one ministry. Additionally, donors have recommended that, in 
accordance with international best practices, a road fund be 
established to ensure that revenues from road user charges are used 
only for road operations and maintenance. However, the Ministry of 
Finance, which currently receives revenues from road-related charges, 
has opposed this. 

Table 2: Afghan Ministries That Have Transportation Sector-Related 
Functions: 

Ministry: Public Works; 
Road-related function: Manages construction and maintenance for 
regional and national highways and most provincial roads. 

Ministry: Rural Rehabilitation and Development; 
Road-related function: Manages construction of rural infrastructure, 
including rural roads and some provincial roads. 

Ministry: Transportation and Civil Aviation; 
Road-related function: Inspects and issues commercial transit permits 
and collects fees from all domestic and international commercial 
vehicles. 

Ministry: Finance; 
Road-related function: Collects road tolls on major highways. 

Ministry: Interior; 
Road-related function: Manages registration and collection of fees for 
commercial and private vehicles, safety inspections, and traffic 
control. 

Ministry: Commerce; 
Road-related function: Collects transit fees and can also charge a 
penalty for loads in excess of authorized limits. 

Ministry: Foreign Affairs; 
Road-related function: Issues transit permits to foreign commercial 
vehicles entering and exiting Afghanistan. 

Ministry: Economy; 
Road-related function: Conducts baseline studies for infrastructure 
projects. Its donor-supported unit currently is also responsible for 
all government procurement of goods and services, including road 
maintenance over $200,000. 

Source: USAID Transport Sector Needs Assessment. 

[End of table] 

Lack of a Comprehensive Legal Framework and Enforcement of Fee 
Collection: 

The government also lacks a comprehensive legal framework for the 
transportation sector. According to the Transport Sector Strategy and 
USAID needs assessment of transportation sector capacity, the existing 
decrees and laws do not clearly delineate the responsibilities of 
various Afghan ministries involved in the transportation sector. For 
example, as shown in table 2, more than one ministry collects fees from 
and issues permits to commercial vehicles. Consequently, there are 
overlapping jurisdictions and functions. Additionally, according to 
these documents, transportation sector laws are incomplete. For 
example, while there is a traffic regulation law that defines 
restrictions on drivers and regulates the weight of vehicles, it does 
not set the penalties for vehicle overloading, according to the 
strategy. Overloaded vehicles cause the most serious damage to roads in 
Afghanistan, according to USAID's needs assessment. 

Additionally, the Afghan government has not been able to generate 
sufficient revenues for road maintenance due, in part, to ineffective 
enforcement of tolls and fee collection. For instance, according to a 
USAID needs assessment, the Ministry of Finance started a new system of 
issuing stickers for a fee based on vehicle size to drivers who use 
toll roads. However, the ministry had no mechanism to ensure that 
vehicles passing through road checkpoints had the stickers that allowed 
them to use the toll road. According to the assessment, the Ministry of 
Finance did not appear to have coordinated its efforts with the 
Ministry of Interior, which controls the Afghan National Police who man 
the checkpoints and have enforcement authority.[Footnote 28] 
Consequently, the effort failed. A senior Ministry of Public Works 
official confirmed that the sticker system had failed to generate 
expected toll revenues. Moreover, the Afghan Parliament as well as the 
Ministry of Public Works have opposed a fuel tax as a revenue 
generation option on the grounds that it is difficult to implement and 
may adversely affect the poor or those who use fuel for electricity 
generators.[Footnote 29] 

Plans Estimate Costs and Funding Options for Road Maintenance: 

A variety of donor-funded plans have estimated costs and funding 
options for road maintenance. Some of the funding options are already 
being used by Afghan ministries, but with limited success. 
Additionally, the estimates of maintenance costs do not include rural 
roads. 

In May 2005, the World Bank issued the Afghanistan Road Maintenance 
Note, which identified maintenance costs as about $72 million annually 
for major roads by the year 2011, when the regional and priority 
national highways were expected to be completed. The document 
recommended that the Afghan government develop clear policies for road 
maintenance and prepare a maintenance program for the World Bank-funded 
emergency road project that was implemented during the early stage of 
reconstruction in Afghanistan. 

In April 2006, the Asian Development Bank-funded Road Sector Master 
Plan estimated the cost of road maintenance to be $85 million to $90 
million annually between 2011 and 2015 once construction of the 
currently funded road network is completed. This cost estimate does not 
include maintenance costs for rural roads. The plan presented several 
options to fund road maintenance, such as a fuel tax, vehicle 
registration fees, and road tolls. Various Afghan ministries were 
already using some of these mechanisms, such as road tolls and vehicle 
registration fees; however, these methods have been plagued by problems 
such as lack of enforcement and corruption. As a result, revenues from 
these sources were less than $4 million in 2004.[Footnote 30] 

In April 2007, the Ministry of Public Works published the final draft 
of its strategic plan, with funding and technical assistance from 
USAID. The plan estimated road maintenance costs for the next 5 years 
at about $400 million (or an average of $80 million annually) for 7,000 
kilometers of highways and provincial roads. It articulated goals and 
measures as well as proposed activities such as developing public and 
private sector capacity, standards for road maintenance, and a revenue 
generation system (see table 3). However, this plan only covers roads 
and activities under the Ministry of Public Works' jurisdiction, and 
does not include rural roads that are under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.[Footnote 31] 

Table 3: Examples of Goals and Measures for Road Operations and 
Maintenance in the Ministry of Public Works Strategic Plan: 

Operation and maintenance strategic goal: 
To create a viable and efficient road maintenance system to keep the 
roads open year-round and allow people and goods to move safely and 
efficiently in Afghanistan; 
Some indicators: 
* Forty well-trained managerial staff; 
* Formulation of about 7,000 kilometers of maintenance projects in the 
next 5 years; 
* Maintenance project contracts with about 500 private companies in the 
next 5 years; 
* Creation of eight maintenance training centers; 
* New contract rules. 

Intermediate objective: 
To create a Revenue Generation System to help with sustainability of 
operations and maintenance.
Indicator: Sustainable operations and maintenance generation by the end 
of 2008; Proposed activities: 
* Establish a revenue generation department; 
* Study different ways to generate revenue and implement them; 
* Create a toll collection system; 
* Install scales in various places to control vehicle tonnage; 
* Create effective road user tax system. 

Source: Ministry of Public Works Strategic Plan. 

[End of table] 

Donors Have Recently Started Maintenance Programs for Sections of the 
Major Roads; USAID Did Not Meet its 2007 Maintenance Target: 

Since 2006, the European Commission and USAID started separate 3-year 
road maintenance programs that would cover over 1,600 kilometers of the 
regional highways they built. However, USAID did not meet its 2007 
target to maintain 100 kilometers of reconstructed roads. 

In June 2006, the European Commission initiated a road maintenance 
program for the 150-kilometer section of the regional highway from 
Kabul to Jalalabad, the construction of which it had previously funded. 
USAID signed a task order under the IRP contract effective in November 
2007 for an estimated cost of $33 million for a 3-year road maintenance 
program covering about 1,500 kilometers of roads it has completed. 
Additionally, Defense has provided ad hoc assistance for road 
maintenance using CERP funding. For example, CERP funds have been used 
to provide road maintenance equipment to local governments and to 
undertake some urgent winter maintenance. 

USAID's road maintenance program includes establishing a Road 
Maintenance Unit housed in the Ministry of Public Works to implement 
maintenance projects with the assistance of a contractor. Additionally, 
the contractor will establish new management procedures and develop 
manuals on maintenance-related topics such as planning, budgeting, 
contracting, and performance monitoring. 

In its Performance Management Plan (2006-2008), USAID identified 
kilometers of reconstructed road maintained as the indicator to measure 
progress toward road maintenance and established yearly targets for 
fiscal years 2007 and 2008. However, because USAID had not started any 
maintenance, it did not meet its target of 100 kilometers of 
reconstructed roads maintained for fiscal year 2007. Additionally, 
while USAID proposed measuring Afghan government contributions toward 
road maintenance by calculating the increase in the Ministry of Public 
Works' budget for this purpose, our review of the Performance 
Management Plan found that it did not include annual targets or report 
on actual contributions of the ministry. Therefore, it is not clear 
whether or to what extent the Afghan government has increased its 
support for road maintenance. 

Photograph: USAID-Funded Road Lacking Routine Maintenance: 

Source: GAO. 

A culvert that is part of the USAID-funded Jalalabad - Asmar road in 
Nangarhar province. Due to lack of regular maintenance, the culvert is 
blocked by overgrown grass and debris. 

[End of figure] 

Conclusions: 

The United States and other international donors have committed 
billions of dollars toward road reconstruction in Afghanistan to 
promote economic and social development as well as security and 
stability. While some have noted that reconstructed roads contribute 
positively to economic and social conditions in Afghanistan, there is 
currently little evidence based on sound impact assessments that these 
projects have resulted in expected benefits. Because donors are 
building an interconnected road network, coordination in planning and 
conducting impact assessments would complement individual donors' 
efforts to assess the impact of their own projects and could result in 
more efficient use of resources. Moreover, without a sustainable road 
maintenance program, newly constructed roads will ultimately 
deteriorate, expected benefits will not materialize, and the billions 
of dollars spent on road reconstruction would be wasted. There is a 
lack of comprehensive information on all donor-funded road projects in 
Afghanistan, as donors are not reporting road project data 
systematically and regularly to the Consultative Group for the 
Transport Sector, a joint Afghan government and donor group responsible 
for collecting these data. Furthermore, there is a lack of 
comprehensive data on U.S.-funded road projects, as agencies are not 
reporting information for all their civilian road projects to a USAID 
database. In the absence of complete information on all road projects 
in Afghanistan, the Afghan government and international donors will not 
be able to efficiently coordinate their efforts and better plan future 
road projects. Additionally, due to lack of coordination among Afghan 
ministries involved in the transportation sector, it is not clear 
whether or when the Afghan government will be able to assume greater 
responsibility for its road construction and maintenance activities. 
Improvements in efforts to assess, maintain, and document road 
reconstruction projects are necessary for USAID and Defense to provide 
better assurance that their efforts will achieve U.S. and Afghan 
government road reconstruction goals. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve evaluation as well as efficiency and effectiveness of USAID- 
funded road reconstruction projects, we recommend that the 
Administrator of USAID take the following actions: 

* improve the results framework to ensure that it is based on expected 
benefits from a cost-benefit analysis with clearly stated goals, 
indicators, and targets and: 

* in coordination with other donors, consider building impact 
evaluations into project design and perform such evaluations after 
project implementation. 

To ensure the evaluation of CERP-funded roads, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Defense require impact evaluations of these projects where 
applicable. 

Until the Afghan government is able to establish a road maintenance 
program, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID: 

* work with the Afghan government to take steps to address urgent 
maintenance needs, such as formulating and enforcing vehicle weight 
standards, while continuing to take steps to address long-term 
maintenance needs, such as by developing a maintenance implementation 
plan and: 

* require that future agreements for road reconstruction projects 
include plans detailing options for funding road maintenance. 

To ensure that Defense and USAID officials have adequate information to 
make effective future project management decisions, we recommend that 
the Secretary of Defense require that data for Defense's CERP-funded 
road projects be reported for inclusion in USAID's database, as 
required by CERP guidance. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

USAID and Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report, 
which are reproduced in appendixes V and VI, respectively. USAID and 
Defense agreed with our findings, conclusions, and recommendations. In 
response to our recommendations, USAID stated that it is conducting an 
assessment of the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat road, which will be completed by 
early fall 2008, and will revise its results framework for road 
reconstruction projects to include goals, indicators, and targets, and 
to link it to a cost-benefit analysis. USAID also indicated it will 
introduce the issue of impact evaluations to the joint government-donor 
forum for road sector policy coordination. USAID also stated that it 
will offer a technical assistance package to the Afghan government to 
help draft road regulations needed to maintain Afghanistan's roads, and 
highlighted plans to follow through with the $33 million it committed 
in fiscal year 2008 for road maintenance while longer-term solutions 
for road maintenance are being developed. Defense indicated that its 
CERP guidance has been revised to include a requirement that proposals 
for CERP projects include performance metrics and indicators for 
evaluating projects. The guidance also requires Defense to transfer 
project data to all required databases, including USAID's, as part of 
CERP project closeouts. USAID and Defense also reviewed a draft of this 
report for technical accuracy. Defense provided technical comments, 
which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees. We will also make copies available to others on request. In 
addition, this report is available on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any questions concerning 
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors 
to this report are listed in appendix VII. 

Signed by: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To review the status of donor-funded road projects, we obtained road 
project data on international donors from the Consultative Group for 
the Transport Sector, a coordination body that includes donor 
representatives and Afghan officials from relevant ministries. For U.S.-
funded roads, we obtained relevant data from the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE), and the Department of Defense's (Defense) Army Budget Office 
as well as the Combined Joint Task Force in Afghanistan. 

To assess the reliability of the data on the commitments made by 
international donors, we (1) interviewed the USAID-funded contractor at 
the Consultative Group for the Transportation Sector who is responsible 
for compiling these data on a monthly basis based on information 
provided by all the donors and the government of Afghanistan, and (2) 
performed some basic reasonableness checks of the data against other 
sources of information. We determined that the data are sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of (1) assessing the status of road projects, 
and (2) making a broad comparison of the United States' contributions 
to those of other major donors. However, the data have various 
limitations, including the fact that they are largely self-reported by 
donor nations to the Afghan government, are affected by differences in 
exchange rates, and may not represent all road projects. Due to these 
limitations and the fact that we could not contact each of the donors, 
we were unable to determine the reliability of the most current status 
of projects and the precise dollar amounts committed by every donor. 
Nevertheless, because these are the best available data on donor-funded 
road reconstruction projects, we present the status and funding amounts 
reported by each donor in appendix II. 

For USAID road projects, we primarily used data from its database 
called Geobase. These data were for two USAID departments involved in 
road construction: the Office of Infrastructure, Engineering and Energy 
and the office of the Provincial Reconstruction Team. While we received 
comprehensive information for Office of Infrastructure, Engineering and 
Energy roads, we obtained Provincial Reconstruction Team road data only 
for completed Quick Impact Projects and not for current road projects. 
The amount of funding for the current road projects is very small, 
according to USAID officials. 

For Defense road projects, we obtained data from several departments 
and agencies. For USACE-implemented projects, which include a number of 
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)-funded road projects and 
all Military Construction-funded roads, we obtained detailed data 
directly from the agency. Defense officials in Afghanistan provided 
data for projects that used CERP, Military Construction, and Military 
Engineering funds. CERP and Military Construction project data included 
kilometers of roads for completed and ongoing projects. However, 
funding information for a large number of CERP projects was missing. 
Consequently, we obtained funding data for CERP from the Army Budget 
Office at the Pentagon. Last, due to sensitivity of Military 
Engineering roads, Defense officials provided only the aggregate funds 
committed for these projects. 

To assess challenges in implementing road reconstruction projects, we 
interviewed agency officials from USAID and Defense in Washington, 
D.C., and in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, we met with officials in 
Kabul and Bagram. We also met with U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team 
officials during site visits to road projects in Badakhshan, Nangarhar, 
and Khost provinces. We reviewed USAID's major contract and grant 
agreements and select Defense CERP contracts and analyzed contract file 
documents, such as agency memorandums, modifications to contracts, and 
contract summary reports where appropriate and available. We also 
reviewed construction industry best practices and USAID and Defense 
Inspector General reports relating to road construction. 

To examine USAID and Defense's assessment of impact of road 
reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, we reviewed documentation 
including agencywide guidance for monitoring and evaluation, 
performance monitoring plan, and documents for USAID's Rehabilitation 
of Economic Facilities and Services (REFS) program and Infrastructure 
and Rehabilitation Program (IRP) projects and Defense's CERP projects. 
We limited our review of results frameworks to USAID's overall 
Performance Management Plan, and its REFS and IRP programs. We did not 
assess the framework for the projects implemented under the United 
Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) grant. We assessed the 
documents for the following elements: a logical framework to assess 
results; statement of strategic and intermediate goals; output, 
outcome, and impact indicators; and targets for these indicators. 
Additionally, we reviewed the explanation of how targets were selected 
and if they were met. We also reviewed articles and books on monitoring 
and evaluation that provided us tools to assess impact evaluation of 
the completed road projects and helped identify methodological 
challenges in the design and implementation of such evaluations. 

To assess the extent of road maintenance for newly constructed roads, 
we reviewed pertinent strategic and planning documents, and interviewed 
Afghan and donor officials during our fieldwork. To identify the 
national goal for road maintenance and progress on this goal, we 
reviewed the Afghan Compact, the interim and final Afghan National 
Development Strategy, and the periodic Joint Coordination and 
Monitoring Board reports. To identify USAID's maintenance goals and 
progress on these, we reviewed USAID's Afghanistan Performance 
Management Plan (2006-2008) and the agency's reporting on these goals. 
To identify the extent to which donors and the Afghan government have 
discussed and planned for road maintenance, we reviewed key documents 
including the World Bank's Road Maintenance Note, Road Sector Master 
Plan for Afghanistan, Ministry of Public Works Strategic Plan, draft 
and final Transport Sector Strategy, and Needs Assessment for Transport 
Sector for USAID-funded road projects. To assess USAID's project for 
road maintenance, we reviewed the relevant contract to identify details 
of the plan. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: USAID and Other Donor Road Project Data: 

Regional highways: 

No.: 1; 
Road projects: Kabul-Kandahar (Sections B to F); 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (LBG); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $311; 
Kilometers: 389; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 2; 
Road projects: Kabul-Kandahar (Section G); 
Donor (Implementer): Japan; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $29; 
Kilometers: 50; 
Status: Complete. 

No.3: 
Road projects: Kandahar-Herat (Section 1); 
Donor (Implementer): Japan; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $100; 
Kilometers: 114; 
Status: Ongoing. 

No.: 3; 
Road projects: Kandahar-Herat (Section 2); 
Donor (Implementer): Saudi Arabia, USAID (Implementer); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): Saudia Arabia, $52; USAID, $13; 
Kilometers: 116; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 4; 
Road projects: Delaram-Zaranj; 
Donor (Implementer): India; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $84; 
Kilometers: 216; 
Status: Ongoing. 

No.: 5; 
Road projects: Kandahar-Herat; (Sections 3 to 5); 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (LBG); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $181; 
Kilometers: 326; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 6; 
Road projects: Herat-Islam Qala; 
Donor (Implementer): Iran; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $45; 
Kilometers: 120; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 6; 
Road projects: Herat-Armalik; 
Donor (Implementer): Iran; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $25; 
Kilometers: 60; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 7; 
Road projects: Herat-Torghondi; 
Donor (Implementer): Afghanistan; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $30; 
Kilometers: 119; 
Status: Pending. 

No.: 8; 
Road projects: Armalik-Leman[B]; 
Donor (Implementer): Islamic Development Bank; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $10;
Kilometers: 50; 
Status: Pending. 

No.: 9; 
Road projects: Leman-Bala Murghab[C]; 
Donor (Implementer): Asian Development Bank; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $176; 
Kilometers: 143; 
Status: Pending. 

No.: 9; 
Road projects: Bala Murghab-Qaysar; 
Donor (Implementer): Asian Development Bank; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $55; 
Kilometers: 90; 
Status: Ongoing. 

No.: 9; 
Road projects: Qaysar-Andkhoy; 
Donor (Implementer): Asian Development Bank; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $75; 
Kilometers: 210; 
Status: Ongoing. 

No.: 9; 
Road projects: Andkhoy-Mazar-e Sharif; 
Donor (Implementer): Asian Development Bank; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $36; 
Kilometers: 182; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 9; 
Road projects: Mazar-e Sharif-Pol-e Khomri-Hayratan; 
Donor (Implementer): Asian Development Bank; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $34; 
Kilometers: 265; 
Status: Ongoing. 

No.: 10; 
Road projects: Andkhoy-Aquina; 
Donor (Implementer): Islamic Development Bank; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $20; 
Kilometers: 37; 
Status: Ongoing. 

No.: 11; 
Road projects: Pol-e Khomri-Kunduz-Sher Khan Bandar and Kunduz-Taloqan; 
Donor (Implementer): World Bank; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $30; 
Kilometers: 232; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 11; 
Road projects: Pol-e Khomri-Kabul; 
Donor (Implementer): World Bank; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $68; 
Kilometers: 202; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 11; 
Road projects: Pol-e Khomri-Doshi; 
Donor (Implementer): Islamic Development Bank; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): Unknown; 
Kilometers: Unknown; 
Status: [Empty]. 

No.: 12; 
Road projects: Kabul-Jalalabad; 
Donor (Implementer): European Commission[D]; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $66; 
Kilometers: 142; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 13; 
Road projects: Jalalabad-Torkham; 
Donor (Implementer): Pakistan; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $50; 
Kilometers: 74; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 14; 
Road projects: Kandahar-Spin Boldak; 
Donor (Implementer): Asian Development Bank[E]; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $25; 
Kilometers: 61; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 14; 
Road projects: Kandahar-Spin Boldak; 
Donor (Implementer): Afghanistan; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $13; 
Kilometers: 42; 
Status: Pending. 

Subtotal[F]: 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $1,528; 
Kilometers: 3,240. 

National highways: 

No.: 15; 
Road projects: Kabul-Gardez; 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (LBG and UNOPS); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $47; 
Kilometers: 120; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 16; 
Road projects: Gardez-Khost; 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (LBG/B&V); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $69; 
Kilometers: 98; 
Status: Ongoing. 

No.: 17; 
Road projects: Lashgar Gah-Ring road; 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $13; 
Kilometers: 49; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 18; 
Road projects: Ghazni-Sharan; 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $20; 
Kilometers: 63; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 19; 
Road projects: Pol-e Alam-Ring road; 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $7; 
Kilometers: 35; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 20; 
Road projects: Farah-Ring road; 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $18; 
Kilometers: 68; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 21; 
Road projects: Panjshir Valley road; 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $21; 
Kilometers: 67; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 22; 
Road projects: Ghazni-Gardez; 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (LBG/B&V);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $63; 
Kilometers: 102; 
Status: Ongoing. 

No.: 23; 
Road projects: Sheberghan-Sar-e Pol; 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $15; 
Kilometers: 54; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 24; 
Road projects: Keshim-Feyzabad; 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (LBG/B&V); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $118; 
Kilometers: 103; 
Status: Ongoing. 

No.: 25; 
Road projects: Kandahar-Tarin Kowt; 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $25; 
Kilometers: 149; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 26; 
Road projects: Jalalabad-Asmar; 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $38; 
Kilometers: 121; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 27; 
Road projects: Mazar-e Sharif-Dara i Suf; 
Donor (Implementer): Asian Development Bank; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $69; 
Kilometers: 151; 
Status: Pending. 

No.: 28; 
Road projects: Yakawlang-Bamyan; 
Donor (Implementer): [Empty]; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $59; 
Kilometers: 99; 
Status: Pending. 

No.: 29; 
Road projects: Maidanshahr-Bamyan Segment 1; 
Donor (Implementer): Italy; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $31;
Kilometers: 54; 
Status: Ongoing. 

No.: 29; 
Road projects: Maidanshahr-Ounai Pass Segment 2; 
Donor (Implementer): Italy; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $72; 
Kilometers: 82; 
Status: Ongoing. 

No.: 30; 
Road projects: Taloqan-Keshim; 
Donor (Implementer): World Bank; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $22; 
Kilometers: 68; 
Status: Ongoing. 

No.: 31; 
Road projects: Kajaki Dam-Ring road[G]; 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (LBG/B&V); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $5; 
Kilometers: 0; 
Status: Terminated. 

No.: 32; 
Road projects: Charikar-Bamyan; 
Donor (Implementer): World Bank; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $5;
Kilometers: 160; 
Status: Pending. 

Subtotal: 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $716; 
Kilometers: 1,644. 

Total for regional and national highways: 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $2,243; 
Kilometers: 4,883. 

Provincial roads: 

No.: 33; 
Road projects: Kandahar-Bikah; 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $24; 
Kilometers: 94; 
Status: Ongoing. 

No.: 34; 
Road projects: Spin Boldak-Bikah; 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (USACE); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $20; 
Kilometers: 68; 
Status: Ongoing. 

No.: 35; 
Road projects: Bikah-Shinkay[G]; 
Donor (Implementer): USAID; 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $13; 
Kilometers: 71; 
Status: Terminated. 

No.: 36; 
Road projects: District Center Roads (various); 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $8; 
Kilometers: 78; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 37; 
Road projects: District Roads (various); 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $21; 
Kilometers: 105; 
Status: Complete. 

No.: 38; 
Road projects: Urban Roads (2); 
Donor (Implementer): USAID (LBG and UNOPS); 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $5; 
Kilometers: 5; 
Status: Complete. 

Total for provincial roads: 
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $91; 
Kilometers: 420. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from USAID and the Consultative Group for 
the Transport Sector. 

[A] Funding represents funds spent for completed projects and committed 
for ongoing and pending projects. 

[B] The government of Afghanistan is in negotiations with the Asian 
Development Bank for an additional $10 million for the reconstruction 
of this road section. 

[C] The government of Afghanistan will contribute an additional $4 
million to this project. 

[D] The Swedish International Development Agency contributed funds for 
this project. 

[E] Asian Development Bank funding for this project includes 
contributions from the governments of Kuwait and Japan. 

[F] Funding data have been rounded and therefore may not precisely 
match the total. 

[G] These road projects have been terminated due to poor security 
conditions. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: CERP Funding Data for Road Projects by Province in 
Afghanistan: 

No.: 1; 
Province: Badakhshan; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $6,920. 

No.: 2; 
Province: Badghis; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0. 

No.: 3; 
Province: Baghlan; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0. 

No.: 4; 
Province: Balkh; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $85,599. 

No.: 5; 
Province: Bamyan; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $3,640,945. 

No.: 6; 
Province: Daikondi; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0. 

No.: 7; 
Province: Farah; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $2,644,655. 

No.: 8; 
Province: Faryab; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0. 

No.: 9; 
Province: 
Ghazni; Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $15,248,511. 

No.: 10; 
Province: Ghor; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0. 

No.: 11; 
Province: Helmand; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $3,308,548. 

No.: 12; 
Province: Herat; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $186,534. 

No.: 13; 
Province: Jowzjan; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0. 

No.: 14; 
Province: Kabul; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $30,997,244. 

No.: 15; 
Province: Kandahar; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $11,348,614. 

No.: 16; 
Province: Kapisa; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $4,239,841. 

No.: 17; 
Province: Khost; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $15,943,071. 

No.: 18; 
Province: Konar; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $20,561,192. 

No.: 19; 
Province: Kunduz; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $26,356. 

No.: 20; 
Province: Laghman; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $3,040,482. 

No.: 21; 
Province: Lowgar; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $433,018. 

No.: 22; 
Province: Nangarhar; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $11,943,432. 

No.: 23; 
Province: Nimruz; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0. 

No.: 24; 
Province: Nurestan; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $106,589,515. 

No.: 25; 
Province: Paktia; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $3,148,669. 

No.: 26; 
Province: Paktika; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $45,670,849. 

No.: 27; 
Province: Panjshir; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $5,739,590. 

No.: 28; 
Province: Parwan; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $10,367,817. 

No.: 29; 
Province: Samangan; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0. 

No.: 30; 
Province: Sar-e Pol; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0. 

No.: 31; 
Province: Takhar; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0. 

No.: 32; 
Province: Uruzgan; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $3,575,960. 

No.: 33; 
Province: Wardak; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $304,774. 

No.: 34; 
Province: Zabul; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $4,439,748. 

Province: Province not stated; 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $293,956. 

Total: 
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $303,785,839. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army Budget Office data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: USAID's Grant Agreement with UNOPS for Road Reconstruction 
in Afghanistan: 

Throughout the life of its road reconstruction grant with UNOPS, USAID 
increased its size over 10 times, from $35 million to over $365 
million, adding nearly 700 kilometers of roads to the original 300, and 
extending the period of performance by nearly 3 years (see fig. 11). 
USAID transferred several roads from REFS to UNOPS because REFS hit its 
contract ceiling. According to USAID officials, they did not want to 
use LBG as the prime contractor for all of their major infrastructure 
projects in Afghanistan, especially in light of "congressional and 
private sector" criticism of LBG's management of other Afghan 
infrastructure projects. However, USAID required UNOPS to subcontract 
engineering responsibilities for the transferred roads to LBG, adding 
an extra layer of management. After the termination of the grant due to 
concerns about UNOPS's financial management, five senior UNOPS 
officials associated with the USAID program resigned or were released, 
according to a USAID official. 

Figure 11: Time Frame, Estimated Cost, and Total Kilometers for UNOPS 
Grant: 

[See PDF for image] 

Time frame: 
Grant start date: February 2004 (original period of agreement: 12 
months); 
First extension granted: (First schedule extension: 16 months)
Second extension granted: (Second schedule extension: 18 months); 
Grant suspension date: December 2007. 

Total estimated amount: 
Grant start date: $35 million; 
First extension granted: $218 million; 
Second extension granted: $311 million; 
October 2006: $314 million; 
December 2006: $366 million; 
Grant suspension date: $366 million. 

Planned total kilometers: 
Grant start date: 300; 
First extension granted: 858; 
Second extension granted: 913; 
October 2006: 1077; 
December 2006: 987; 
Grant suspension date: 959. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

USAID: 
From The American People: 

Mr. Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 
Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 26, 2008: 

Dear Mr. Johnson: 

USAID appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your draft 
audit report, "Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in 
Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a 
Sustainable Maintenance Program are Needed," GAO-08-689. We found the 
report to be a comprehensive and detailed assessment of U.S. road 
construction efforts in Afghanistan, and a realistic picture of the 
security, geographic, and institutional constraints we face daily. 

We concur with your recommendations. We intend to take steps to address 
the recommendations as follows: 

1. Recommendation: That USAID take the following actions for USAID-
funded road reconstruction projects (page 54): 

* Improve the results framework to ensure that it is based on expected 
benefits from a cost-benefit analysis with clearly stated goals, 
indicators and targets; and; 

* In coordination with other donors, consider building impact 
evaluations into project design and perform such evaluations after 
project implementation. 

USAID Response: We recognize the importance of impact evaluations and 
to this end, we are currently conducting an assessment of the Kabul-
Kandahar-Herat road, our biggest road investment to date. The 
assessment should be completed in early fall of 2008. 

USAID will revise its Results Framework for road reconstruction 
projects to include a reference to cost-benefits analysis, with goals, 
indicators and targets. USAID will begin this effort with the Strategic 
Provincial Roads - South and East Afghanistan activity, applying a 
framework. for capturing the cost-benefit and impact that is being used 
by the Afghan National Rural Access Program. This will be a major step 
forward in developing a single national model for such analyses. 

USAID will introduce the issue of impact evaluations as an element of 
project design and post-project follow-up to the Roads Working Group, 
the joint government - donor forum for road sector policy coordination. 
In addition, USAID is assisting the Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan to collect the road network data required for 
cost/benefit evaluations and forecasting of future benefits. These data 
(traffic frequency, vehicle operating costs, time savings and 
transaction costs) will be entered into the Highway Development and 
Management econometric model, the world-wide standard for road sector 
cost-benefit analysis. 

2. Recommendation: Until the Afghan government is able to establish a 
road maintenance program, we recommend (page 54) that USAID: 

* Work with the Afghan government to take steps to address urgent 
maintenance needs, such as formulating and enforcing vehicle weight 
standards, while continuing to take steps to address long-term 
maintenance needs, such as developing a maintenance implementation 
plan; and; 

* Require that future agreements for road construction projects include 
plans detailing options for road maintenance. 

USAID Response: Responsibility for controlling vehicle weights is 
currently divided among four Afghan ministries. Improved implementation 
of axle load controls will require organizational reform, based on 
either new legislation or a Presidential Decree. USAID will offer a 
technical assistance package to the Afghan Government to help draft the 
regulations and procedures required to establish an axle-load control 
program. 

USAID set aside $33 million for road operations and maintenance in 
October 2007, to maintain roads financed by USAID for three years after 
completion, while longer term solutions are being developed. 

USAID is working with the Ministry of Public Works to establish a Road 
Maintenance Unit (RMU), staffed with knowledgeable planners, engineers 
and economists. USAID provided $5 million to support the establishment 
of the RMU, to include capacity building, training, and equipment. The 
RMU will develop a national road maintenance plan as well as formulate 
and execute a maintenance program. The RMU will have the ability to 
plan, execute and manage contracts with private firms for maintenance 
and to collect the data needed to determine the best economic and 
financial solutions using proven economic models. 

We are proud of the accomplishments USAID has achieved in road 
construction in Afghanistan, in the face of difficult security and 
harsh terrain. We are committed to ensuring the sustainability of our 
investments and look forward to sharing information on our progress in 
the coming months with the GAO. 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and 
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this 
review. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Sean R. Mulvaney: 
Assistant Administrator: 
Bureau for Management: 

cc: Jim Nussle, Director of OMB: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

The Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs: 
2700 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-2700: 

June 26, 2008: 

Mr. Charles Johnson Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Mr. Johnson: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GAO-08-689, 'Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in 
Constructing Roads, But Assessments for Determining Impact and a 
Sustainable Maintenance Program Are Needed,' dated June 9, 2008 (GAO 
Code 320494). 

My point of contact is Ms. Madeline LePage, (703) 695-2859, or email: 
madeline.lepage@osd.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 
James J. Shinn: 

Attachment: DoD response to draft GAO report: 

GAO Draft Report Dated June 9, 2008: 
GAO-08-689 (GAO Code 320494): 

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made In Constructing Roads, But 
Assessments For Determining Impact And A Sustainable Maintenance 
Program Are Needed: 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation: 

Recommendation: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
require impact evaluations of the CERP funded road projects. (p.54 
Draft Report) 

DOD Response: The Department of Defense concurs with this GAO 
recommendation. The most recent Commander's Emergency Response Program 
(CERP) guidance, dated June 6, 2008, documents the requirement that 
project proposals include performance metrics/indicators in the 
proposal packages. These indicators are further required to be used 
during the project and as part of the project close-out process for 
evaluating projects upon completion. 

Recommendation: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
require that data for Defense's Commander's Emergency Response Program 
(CERP) funded road projects are reported for inclusion in U.S. Agency 
for International Development's database, as required by CERP guidance. 
(p. 55/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: The Department concurs with this recommendation and in 
fact incorporated in the June 2008 revision to the Department of 
Defense's guidance specific direction that CERP project close-outs 
include the transfer of project data to all required databases. This is 
in addition to the GAO referenced theater guidance which required that 
road project data be reported to USAID for their database. 

Attachment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the person named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant 
Director), Jaime Allentuck, Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott, Gergana Danailova- 
Trainor, Karen Deans, Etana Finkler, and Mona Sehgal made key 
contributions to this report. Michael Armes, Timothy DiNapoli, Mark 
Dowling, Cindy Gilbert, John Hutton, and Jena Sinkfield also provided 
technical assistance. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to 
Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable 
Afghan National Security Forces. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-661]. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008. 

Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police 
Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help 
Ensure Accountability. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-883T]. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for 
Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-801SP]. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007. 

Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating 
Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-78]. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 
15, 2006. 

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating 
Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S. 
Goals. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-742]. 
Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005. 

Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made 
Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575]. Washington, D.C.: June 
30, 2005. 

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited 
Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-403]. Washington, 
D.C.: June 2, 2004. 

Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to 
Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-607]. Washington, D.C.: June 
30, 2003. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Reconstruction includes rehabilitation and construction of roads 
and bridges. Road lengths are provided in kilometers, as the Afghan 
government, U.S. agencies, and other donors have set goals and reported 
data on roads in kilometers. One kilometer is equal to about 0.62 
miles. 

[2] More than 60 percent of the population lives within 50 kilometers 
of the ring road. 

[3] The President of Afghanistan approved the final Afghanistan 
National Development Strategy on April 21, 2008. 

[4] The Road Sector Master Plan for Afghanistan was released in April 
2006. According to this plan, except for current projects, most roads 
either have not been surveyed or earlier survey information has been 
lost. Additionally, some roads are being extended or realigned as part 
of current rehabilitation projects. Therefore the road inventory is 
changing continuously and it is not possible to compile a list of 
precise road lengths. 

[5] CERP funding for road projects has increased from $2.6 million in 
fiscal year 2004 to $143 million in fiscal year 2006, and decreased 
slightly to $107 million in fiscal year 2007. 

[6] Provincial Reconstruction Teams are intended to deliver assistance 
to advance military goals and enhance security, increase the reach of 
the Afghan central government in the provinces, and allow assistance 
agencies to implement projects. In 2007, there were 12 U.S.-led 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. 

[7] According to an Afghan official and a donor official, the U.S.- 
funded road projects tend to be more expensive than those funded by 
other donors. The cost of construction depends on, among other factors, 
site characteristics (such as mountainous terrain, flat plains, and 
rocky soil), technical specifications for construction, and security 
conditions. Because we do not have information on the site conditions 
and design specifications for roads constructed by different donors, we 
are unable to comment on how the cost of U.S.-funded sections compares 
to the cost of those sections funded by other donors. 

[8] These roads include about 160 kilometers of highways for which the 
Afghan government has committed funds. 

[9] According to the Afghan government's Transport Sector Strategy, 
road classification and definitions proposed in the Road Sector Master 
Plan are not fully consistent with those used in a memorandum of 
understanding, signed prior to this plan, between the Ministry of 
Public Works and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. 
As a result, some roads classified as provincial roads under the plan 
are classified as rural roads in the memorandum. Therefore, in the 
absence of adequate coordination between the two Afghan ministries, 
some transport infrastructure may not be improved. 

[10] USAID-funded provincial roads include various district center and 
district roads. We have also included about 5 kilometers of urban roads 
in this category. 

[11] We obtained information on CERP funding and project status from 
multiple sources. Specifically, the Army Budget Office in Washington 
provided CERP funding data. Defense officials in Afghanistan provided 
project-specific data for CERP-funded road projects. However, this 
information was incomplete. We obtained more complete project-specific 
data from USACE for the CERP-and Military Construction-funded road 
projects they implement, which we used to supplement the data from 
Defense officials in Afghanistan. Despite our efforts to gather 
information on all CERP-funded road projects, we were unable to find a 
comprehensive data source. For more information on our methodology and 
data collection efforts, see appendix I. 

[12] Defense officials did not provide project-specific data on 
Military Engineering roads, as they consider this information to be 
sensitive. 

[13] Although USAID provided us aggregate data for kilometers of roads 
built since 2002, officials could not provide data by fiscal year prior 
to 2006. 

[14] Agency officials have also identified other challenges--such as 
mountainous terrain, extreme weather conditions, and increases in 
material costs--that have contributed to delays or increases in project 
cost. For example, diesel fuel costs increased to higher levels than 
anticipated, thereby increasing the cost of road reconstruction, which 
depends on diesel-run vehicles. According to a USAID official, diesel 
fuel that cost $0.65 per liter in 2007 rose to $0.85 per liter by April 
2008 and USAID officials have struggled to make reasonable predictions 
for future costs. 

[15] USAID Office of the Inspector General, 5-306-06-005-P, Audit of 
USAID/Afghanistan's Reconstruction of the Kandahar-Herat Highway under 
the Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services (REFS) Program 
(May 18, 2006). 

[16] According to a Japanese official, donors, like Japan, who do not 
have their own military for protection have to rely on the Afghan 
government for security. However, the official noted that the Afghan 
National Army, which should help secure areas, is either missing from 
key places or does not have the necessary weapons and training. 

[17] Most of these contractors were local Afghans. 

[18] As of April 2008, USAID had not received the results of the audit. 
Additionally, the United Nations Board of Auditors published reports in 
2004 and 2007 noting concerns about UNOPS-wide internal accounting and 
financial management systems. The auditors highlighted, for example, 
nearly $3 million in project-related costs incurred without authorized 
budgets. 

[19] Projects for which construction begins with limited planning may 
result in actual costs that exceed original estimates. Construction 
Industry Institute best practices suggest that actual costs for 
projects for which limited information on conditions is available can 
be expected to range from 20 percent lower to 30 percent higher than 
estimated costs. See Construction Industry Institute, Improving Early 
Estimates: Best Practices Guide (Austin, Texas, September 1998). 

[20] To get work done quickly, USAID used cost-reimbursable contracts 
for the projects in its first and most recent road programs. With cost- 
reimbursable contracts, the government pays contractors allowable costs 
and a fee that may be related to performance. The government assumes 
the risk of cost overruns. USACE-implemented projects have used fixed 
price contracts, under which the government pays a fixed price even if 
the actual total cost of the product or service falls short of or 
exceeds the contract price. With fixed price contracts, the contractor 
assumes the risk of cost overrun. 

[21] Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Reconstruction of the Kandahar-Herat 
Highway under the Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services 
(REFS) Program. 

[22] Evaluation design helps to determine the choice of the group that 
does not benefit from the project, the way people are assigned either 
to a (control) group that does not benefit from the project or to the 
group that is expected to benefit from the project, and the data 
collection methods to be employed to determine project impact. 

[23] USAID's Performance Management Plan (2006-2008) includes three 
strategic objectives for its programs in Afghanistan: a thriving licit 
economy led by the private sector, a democratic government with broad 
citizen participation, and a better educated and healthier population. 

[24] Baseline values are used to establish subsequent annual targets. 
For road projects, USAID used 939 kilometers as its plan's baseline, 
because that was the number of kilometers of road it had constructed in 
2004 and 2005. 

[25] USAID's first major infrastructure program, REFS, predated its 
Afghanistan Performance Management Plan (2006-2008). Although the REFS 
program did have goals of promoting economic recovery and political 
stability, it lacked a well-developed results framework. 

[26] GAO could not verify some of the assumptions used to generate 
estimated benefits in the analysis. For example, the expected impact of 
IRP is based on a study that shows a correlation between per capita 
income and quantity of paved roads for a cross section of low-income 
countries. However, we could not verify the results because LBG was 
unable to provide us this study. 

[27] According to the Ministry of Public Works Strategic Plan, routine 
maintenance includes small-scale work, such as roadside clearing and 
cleaning of silted culverts to ensure "the daily use and safety of 
existing roads in the short-run and to prevent premature deterioration 
of the roads." Periodic maintenance covers activities, such as 
resurfacing and pavement reconstruction, conducted at relatively long 
intervals "to preserve the structural integrity of the road." 

[28] GAO has examined the training of the Afghan National Police as 
part of its broader review of the Afghan National Security Forces. This 
report was issued in June 2008. Afghanistan Security: Further 
Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed 
Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-661] (Washington, 
D.C.: June 18, 2008). 

[29] According to a Ministry of Public Works official, as much as 80 
percent of fuel may be illegally imported to Afghanistan. 

[30] Data on government revenues for 2004 were the latest available 
when the Road Sector Master Plan was developed. 

[31] The Transport Sector Strategy (2008-2013), which addresses the 
governance of the entire transportation sector, also noted the lack of 
a rural road maintenance program. 

[End of section] 

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441 G Street NW, Room LM: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: 
Voice: (202) 512-6000: 
TDD: (202) 512-2537: 
Fax: (202) 512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: