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United States Government Accountability Office: GAO: 

Testimony: 

Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of 
Representatives: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 
October 4, 2007: 

Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq: 

Serious Challenges Confront U.S. Efforts to Build the Capacity of Iraqi 
Ministries: 

Statement of David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 

GAO-08-124T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-124T, a testimony before the Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The development of competent and loyal government ministries is 
critical to stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. The ministries are Iraq’s 
largest employer, with an estimated 2.2 million government workers. 
U.S. efforts to build the capacity of Iraqi ministries include programs 
to advise and help Iraqi government employees develop the skills to 
plan programs, execute budgets, and effectively deliver services. The 
administration received $140 million in fiscal year 2007 to fund U.S. 
capacity-building efforts and requested an additional $255 million for 
fiscal year 2008. 

This testimony discusses (1) U.S. efforts to develop ministry capacity, 
(2) the key challenges to these efforts, and (3) the extent to which 
the U.S. government has an overall integrated strategy. 

This statement is based on the report issued at this hearing. To 
accomplish our report objectives, we reviewed reports from and 
interviewed officials of U.S. agencies, the Iraqi government, the 
United Nations, and the World Bank. We conducted fieldwork in 
Washington, D.C.; New York City; Baghdad, Iraq; and Amman, Jordan. 

What GAO Found: 

Over the past 4 years, U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the 
Iraqi national government have been characterized by (1) multiple U.S. 
agencies leading efforts without overarching direction from a lead 
agency or a strategic plan that integrates their efforts; and (2) 
shifting timeframes and priorities in response to deteriorating 
conditions in Iraq. As of May 2007, six U.S. agencies were implementing 
about 53 projects at individual ministries and other national Iraqi 
agencies. Although the Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) have improved the 
coordination of their capacity-building efforts, there is no lead 
agency or strategic plan to provide overarching guidance. 

U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministerial capacity face four key 
challenges that pose risks to their success and long-term 
sustainability. First, Iraqi government institutions have significant 
shortages of personnel with the skills to perform the vital tasks 
necessary to provide security and deliver essential services to the 
Iraqi people. Second, Iraq’s government confronts significant 
challenges in staffing a nonpartisan civil service and addressing 
militia infiltration of key ministries. Third, widespread corruption 
undermines efforts to develop the government’s capacity by robbing it 
of needed resources, some of which are used to fund the insurgency. 
Finally, violence in Iraq hinders U.S. advisors’ access to Iraqi 
ministries, increases absenteeism among ministry employees, and 
contributes to the growing number of professional Iraqis leaving the 
country. 

The U.S. government is beginning to develop an overall strategy for 
ministerial capacity development, although agencies have been 
implementing separate programs since 2003. GAO’s work in this area 
shows that an overall strategy for capacity development should include 
(1) a clear purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) a delineation of U.S. 
roles and responsibilities and coordination with other donors including 
the United Nations; (3) goals and objectives linked to Iraqi 
priorities; (4) performance measures and milestones; and (5) costs, 
resources needed, and assessment of program risks. U.S. ministry 
capacity efforts have included some but not all of these components. 
For example, agencies are working to clarify roles and 
responsibilities. However, U.S. efforts lack clear ties to Iraqi-
identified priorities at all ministries, clear performance measures, 
and information on how resources will be targeted to achieve the 
desired end-state. 

State and USAID noted concerns over our recommendation to condition 
further appropriations and cited the appointment of an ambassador to 
supervise civilian capacity development programs. GAO does not 
recommend stopping U.S. investment in capacity development. The $140 
million in fiscal year 2007 funds remains available to continue efforts 
while developing an integrated strategy. In addition, the U.S. 
ambassador arrived in Iraq in July 2007 underscoring our point that 
U.S. efforts lacked overall leadership and highlighting the need for an 
overall integrated strategy. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that State, in consultation with the Iraqi government, 
complete an overall integrated strategy for U.S. capacity development 
efforts. Congress also should consider conditioning future 
appropriations on the completion of such a strategy. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-124T]. For more information, contact 
Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our report issued today on 
U.S. efforts to build the capacity of Iraqi ministries. The development 
of competent and loyal government ministries is critical to stabilizing 
and rebuilding Iraq. Iraq's 34 ministries are responsible for ensuring 
security through the armed forces and police and providing essential 
government services, such as electricity, water, and health care. The 
ministries are Iraq's largest employer, with an estimated 2.2 million 
government workers. 

U.S. efforts to build the capacity of Iraqi ministries include programs 
to advise and help Iraqi government employees develop the skills to 
plan programs, execute budgets, and effectively deliver services. In 
2005 and 2006, the United States provided $169 million for programs to 
help build the capacity of key civilian and security ministries. The 
administration received an additional $140 million in fiscal year 2007 
and requested $255 million for fiscal year 2008. 

My testimony today discusses (1) the nature and extent of U.S. efforts 
to develop the capacity of Iraqi ministries, (2) the key challenges to 
these efforts, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. government has an 
overall integrated strategy. 

This statement is based on the report we issued today.[Footnote 1] To 
accomplish our report objectives, we reviewed and analyzed U.S., Iraqi, 
donor government, United Nations (UN), and World Bank reports and data. 
We conducted fieldwork in Washington, D.C.; New York City; Baghdad, 
Iraq; and Amman, Jordan. At these locations, we met with officials and 
contractors working for the Departments of State (State), Defense 
(DOD), Treasury, Justice, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, European Union, and 
the Iraqi government. We conducted our review in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Summary: 

In summary, we found the following: 

* U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi national 
government have been characterized by (1) multiple U.S. agencies 
leading efforts, without overarching direction from a lead agency or a 
strategic plan that integrates their efforts; and (2) shifting 
timeframes and priorities in response to deteriorating conditions in 
Iraq. 

* U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministerial capacity face four key 
challenges that pose risks to their success and long-term 
sustainability. These include significant shortages of Iraqi ministry 
employees with the necessary skills to conduct key tasks, partisan 
influence over and militia infiltration of some ministries, corruption 
within the ministries, and poor security conditions that endanger 
employees and cause skilled workers to leave the country. 

* The U.S. government is beginning to develop an overall strategy for 
ministerial capacity development, although agencies have been 
implementing separate programs since 2003. GAO's work in this area 
shows that an overall strategy for capacity development should include 
(1) a clear purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) a delineation of U.S. 
roles and responsibilities and coordination with other donors, 
including the United Nations; (3) goals and objectives linked to Iraqi 
priorities; (4) performance measures and milestones; and (5) the costs, 
resources needed, and assessment of program risks. Individual U.S. 
capacity development efforts have included some but not all of these 
components. 

We recommend that State, in consultation with the Iraqi government, 
complete an overall integrated strategy for U.S. capacity development 
efforts. Congress also should consider conditioning future 
appropriations on the completion of such a strategy. 

Background: 

As of September 2007, the Iraqi government included 34 ministries 
responsible for providing security and essential government services. 
U.S. capacity development programs target 12 key ministries: State and 
USAID focus on 10 civilian ministries while DOD is responsible for the 
Ministries of Defense and Interior. These 12 ministries employ 67 
percent of the Iraqi government workforce and are responsible for 74 
percent of the 2007 budget (see table 1). 

Table 1: Estimated Staff Numbers and 2007 Annual Budget for Key Iraqi 
Ministries: 

Key Ministries: Finance; 
Staff[A]: 10,000; 
Staff as percentage of total: <1%; 
2007 budget (U.S. dollars in millions): $14,436[B]; 
Ministry budget as percentage of total: 3%. 

Key Ministries: Interior; 
Staff[A]: 408,000; 
Staff as percentage of total: 18; 
2007 budget (U.S. dollars in millions): 3,183; 
Ministry budget as percentage of total: 8. 

Key Ministries: Defense; 
Staff[A]: 200,000; 
Staff as percentage of total: 9; 
2007 budget (U.S. dollars in millions): 4,141; 
Ministry budget as percentage of total: 10. 

Key Ministries: Health; 
Staff[A]: 151,000; 
Staff as percentage of total: 7; 
2007 budget (U.S. dollars in millions): 1,818; 
Ministry budget as percentage of total: 4. 

Key Ministries: Education; 
Staff[A]: 515,000[C]; 
Staff as percentage of total: 23; 
2007 budget (U.S. dollars in millions): 1,821; 
Ministry budget as percentage of total: 4. 

Key Ministries: Agriculture; 
Staff[A]: 10,000; 
Staff as percentage of total: <1; 
2007 budget (U.S. dollars in millions): 108; 
Ministry budget as percentage of total: <1. 

Key Ministries: Water Resources; 
Staff[A]: 17,000; 
Staff as percentage of total: 1; 
2007 budget (U.S. dollars in millions): 353; 
Ministry budget as percentage of total: 1. 

Key Ministries: Planning; 
Staff[A]: 2,000; 
Staff as percentage of total: <1; 
2007 budget (U.S. dollars in millions): 210; 
Ministry budget as percentage of total: 1. 

Key Ministries: Oil; 
Staff[A]: 75,000[D]; 
Staff as percentage of total: <3; 
2007 budget (U.S. dollars in millions): 2,451; 
Ministry budget as percentage of total: 6. 

Key Ministries: Electricity; 
Staff[A]: 84,000; 
Staff as percentage of total: <4; 
2007 budget (U.S. dollars in millions): 1,474; 
Ministry budget as percentage of total: 4. 

Key Ministries: Justice; 
Staff[A]: 16,000; 
Staff as percentage of total: 1; 
2007 budget (U.S. dollars in millions): 125; 
Ministry budget as percentage of total: <1. 

Key Ministries: Municipalities and Public Works; 
Staff[A]: 3,000; 
Staff as percentage of total: <1; 
2007 budget (U.S. dollars in millions): 370; 
Ministry budget as percentage of total: 1. 

Key Ministries: Subtotal - Key ministries; 
Staff[A]: 1,491,000; 
Staff as percentage of total: 67; 
2007 budget (U.S. dollars in millions): 30,490; 
Ministry budget as percentage of total: 74. 

Key Ministries: Other ministries and entities; 
Staff[A]: 727,000[E]; 
Staff as percentage of total: 33; 
2007 budget (U.S. dollars in millions): 10,564; 
Ministry budget as percentage of total: 26. 

Key Ministries: Total; 
Staff[A]: 2,218,000; 
Staff as percentage of total: 100%; 
2007 budget (U.S. dollars in millions): $41,054; 
Ministry budget as percentage of total: 100%. 

Source: Government of Iraq and State Department. 

Note: Iraqi data are from the Iraq National Budget 2007. The number of 
employees is rounded to the nearest thousand. 

[A] Staff numbers include ministry estimates of funded staff positions. 
A census of ministry employees, required by the IMF Standby Agreement, 
has yet to be completed. 

[B] Ministry operations account for about 1 percent of this figure. The 
remainder is for general activities of the state, including food basket 
distribution, welfare, and pensions. 

[C] This figure includes schoolteachers employed by the national 
government. 

[D] This figure includes the employees of 15 publicly funded but 
independently operated oil companies. 

[E] This figure includes staff at all other ministries and employees at 
the National Assembly, the Ministry Council, the President's Office, 
the Supreme Justice Council, and the national ministry staff located at 
the provincial level. 

[End of table] 

U.S. Efforts to Build Iraqi Government Capacity Lack Unified Direction: 

U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi national 
government are characterized by (1) multiple U.S. agencies leading 
individual efforts without overarching direction from a lead entity or 
a strategic approach that integrates their efforts with Iraqi 
government priorities and (2) shifting time frames and priorities in 
response to deteriorating conditions in Iraq. 

As of May 2007, six U.S. agencies were implementing about 53 projects 
at individual ministries and other national Iraqi agencies. State, 
USAID, and DOD lead the largest number of programs and provide about 
384 U.S. military, government, and contractor personnel to work with 
the ministries. DOD provides over half (215) of the personnel to the 
Ministries of Defense and Interior to advise Iraqi staff in developing 
plans and policies, building ministry budgets, and managing personnel 
and logistics. State and USAID together provide an additional 169 
advisors to the 10 key civilian ministries. 

Although State, USAID, and DOD have improved the coordination of their 
capacity-building efforts since early 2007, there is no lead agency or 
strategic plan to provide overarching guidance. Two factors explain the 
lack of a lead agency. First, from their inception in 2003, U.S. 
ministry capacity-building efforts evolved without an overall plan or 
the designation of a lead entity. U.S. agencies provided distinct 
assistance to four successive governments in response to Iraq's 
immediate needs, according to U.S. officials.[Footnote 2] This approach 
first began under the Coalition Provisional Authority whereby U.S. 
advisors ran the ministries using U.S. and Iraqi funds and made 
personnel and budget decisions. Attempts to create an overall capacity 
development plan were dropped in late 2003 after the United States 
decided to transfer control of the ministries to an interim government. 

A second factor has been the delay in implementing recommendations from 
a 2005 State assessment that characterized U.S. capacity development 
programs as uncoordinated, fragmented, duplicative and disorganized. 
State recommended a unified effort among State, DOD, and USAID, with 
the latter providing overall coordination and leadership. The 
recommendations were not implemented. However, in July 2007, State 
named an ambassador to direct civilian capacity-building programs, 
including USAID efforts. 

Shifting priorities also have affected U.S. capacity development 
efforts, particularly in response to continued security problems. In 
early 2007, the U.S. mission refocused its capacity development program 
as part of the surge strategy associated with the administration's New 
Way Forward. Rather than focusing on 12 civilian and security 
ministries, State and DOD targeted 6 key ministries (Interior, Defense, 
Planning, Finance, Oil, and Electricity) and focused on short-term 
improvements to address immediate problems with budget execution, 
procurement, and contracting. Accordingly, U.S. capacity development 
efforts shifted from long-term institution building to immediate 
efforts to help Iraqi ministries spend their capital budgets and 
deliver better services to the Iraqi people. Improvements were expected 
by September 2007. 

Low Capacity of the Iraqi Ministries and Other Challenges Pose Risks to 
U.S. Efforts: 

U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministerial capacity face four key 
challenges that pose a risk to their success and long-term 
sustainability. 

First, Iraqi government institutions have significant shortages of 
personnel with the skills to perform the vital tasks necessary to 
provide security and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. 
When the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) removed Ba'athist party 
leaders and members from upper-level management in government, 
universities, and hospitals in 2003, most of Iraq's technocratic class 
was forced out of government.[Footnote 3] A September 2006 U.S. embassy 
assessment[Footnote 4] noted that the government had significant human 
resource shortfalls in most key civilian ministries. The majority of 
staff at all but 1 of the 12 ministries surveyed was inadequately 
trained for their positions, and a quarter of them relied heavily on 
foreign support to compensate for their human and capital resource 
shortfalls. The lack of trained staff has particularly hindered the 
ability of ministries to develop and execute budgets. For example, in 
2006, the Iraqi government spent only 22 percent of its capital budget. 
For January through July 2007, spending levels have improved with about 
24 percent of capital budgets spent. However, as we reported in early 
September 2007, it is unlikely that Iraq will spend the $10 billion it 
allocated for 2007 for capital budgets by the end of this 
year.[Footnote 5] 

Second, Iraq's government confronts significant challenges in staffing 
a nonpartisan civil service and addressing militia infiltration of key 
ministries. In June 2007, DOD reported that militias influenced every 
component of the Ministry of Interior. In particular, the Ministry has 
been infiltrated by members of the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq 
[Footnote 6] and its Badr Organization, as well as Muqtada al-Sadr's 
Mahdi Army [Footnote 7]. Furthermore, the Iraqi civil service remained 
hampered by staff whose political and sectarian loyalties jeopardized 
the civilian ministries' abilities to provide basic services and build 
credibility among Iraqi citizens, according to U.S. government reports 
and international assessments [Footnote 8]. DOD further found that 
government ministries and budgets were sources of power for political 
parties, and staff ministry positions were rewarded to party cronies. 
The use of patronage hindered capacity development because it led to 
instability in the civil service as many staff were replaced whenever 
the government changed or a new minister was named, according to U.S. 
officials. 

Third, according to State, widespread corruption undermines efforts to 
develop the government's capacity by robbing it of needed resources, 
some of which are used to fund the insurgency; by eroding popular faith 
in democratic institutions seen to be run by corrupt political elites; 
and by spurring capital flight and reducing economic growth. According 
to a State assessment, one-third of the 12 civilian ministries surveyed 
had problems with "ghost employees" (that is, nonexistent staff listed 
on the payroll). In addition, the procedures to counter corruption 
adopted at all but one of the civilian ministries surveyed were partly 
effective or ineffective. Similar problems existed in the security 
ministries, according to DOD[Footnote 9]. 

Finally, the security situation remains a major obstacle to developing 
capacity in areas vital to the government's success. The high level of 
violence hinders U.S. advisors' access to their counterparts in the 
ministries, increases absenteeism among ministry employees, and 
contributes to "brain drain" as ministry employees join the growing 
number of Iraqis leaving the country. According to a UN report, between 
March 2003 and June 2007, about 2.2 million Iraqis left the country and 
2 million were internally displaced. According to U.S. and 
international officials, the flow of refugees exacerbates Iraqi 
ministry capacity shortfalls because those fleeing tend to be 
disproportionately from the educated and professional classes. A 
November 2006 UN report stated that an estimated 40 percent of Iraq's 
professional class had left since 2003. 

The United States Is Beginning to Develop a Strategy for Capacity 
Development Efforts: 

In February 2007, State officials provided GAO with a three-page, high- 
level outline proposing a U.S. strategy for strengthening Iraqi 
ministerial capacity. This document was a summary with few details and 
no timeline. A senior USAID official indicated that it is uncertain 
whether the high-level summary will be developed into a strategy, 
although the administration received $140 million in funding for its 
capacity development efforts in fiscal year 2007 and requested $255 
million for fiscal year 2008. 

GAO has previously identified the desirable elements of a strategy: a 
clear purpose, scope, and methodology; a delineation of U.S. roles, 
responsibilities, and coordination; desired goals, objectives, and 
activities tied to Iraqi priorities; performance measures; and a 
description of costs, resources needed, and risks. Table 2 summarizes 
the key elements of a strategy and provides examples of the status of 
the U.S. approach as of September 2007. 

Table 2: Status of U.S. Capacity Development Strategy: 

Key component: Clear purpose, scope, and methodology; 
Description: Addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of its 
coverage, and the process by which it was developed; 
Status of efforts: 
* Limited discussion of purpose and methodology for overall strategy; 
* Scope of capacity development efforts has shifted. 

Key component: Delineation of U.S. roles, responsibilities, and 
coordination; 
Description: Addresses who will be implementing the strategy, what 
their roles will be compared with others, and the mechanisms for 
coordinating their efforts; 
Status of efforts: 
* Roles not clearly delineated between USAID, MNSTC-I, and the embassy; 
* Limited documentation on how efforts are to be integrated, such as a 
security cooperation office and a lead agency; 
* Interagency task force helping to clarify roles and responsibilities, 
and coordination. 

Key component: Desired goals, objectives, and activities; 
Description: Addresses what the strategy is trying to achieve, 
priorities, and steps to achieve those results, consistent with Iraqi 
priorities; 
Status of efforts: 
* U.S. Embassy-Baghdad defined overall end-state: assist Iraq's 
transition to self-sufficiency; 
* MNSTC-I priorities and objectives for the Ministry of Defense, 
consistent with Iraqi priorities; 
* Overall, Iraqi government priorities not clearly identified. 

Key component: Performance measures; 
Description: Performance measures to gauge results; 
Status of efforts: 
* Status of efforts to develop performance measures is unclear; 
* U.S. embassy is using process or output measures at civilian 
ministries; uncertain about future assessments; 
* MNSTC-I is in process of developing outcome and results measures at 
the security ministries. 

Key component: Description of costs, resources needed, and risk; 
Description: Addresses what the strategy will cost; what sources and 
types of resources are needed; and where resources and investments 
should be targeted, balancing benefits, costs, and risks; 
Status of efforts: 
* No assessments of risk provided with agency funding requests for 
fiscal years 2007-2008; 
* No estimates of long-term costs and resources needed to achieve 
program results. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. ministry capacity-building efforts. 

[End of table] 

As table 2 shows, U.S. agencies have developed some of these elements 
in their programs for capacity building at individual ministries, but 
not as part of an overall U.S. strategy. For example: 

* We found little evidence that the U.S. government has clearly defined 
the purpose, scope, and methodology for developing an overall strategy. 
Agencies have provided some limited information on why an overall 
strategy is needed, what it will cover, and how it will be developed. 

* A Joint Task Force on Capacity Development, established in October 
2006, has helped U.S. agencies better delineate roles and 
responsibilities and coordinate their efforts. However, we found no 
plans on how the capacity development programs of State, USAID, and DOD 
will be unified and integrated. 

* While U.S. agencies have clearly identified the overall goals of 
capacity development at the Iraqi ministries, most U.S. efforts lack 
clear ties to Iraqi priorities for all ministries. 

* While DOD is developing measures to assess progress at the security 
ministries, such measures have not been developed for Iraqi civilian 
ministries. 

* U.S. agencies have not identified the costs and resources needed to 
complete capacity development programs beyond the budget for fiscal 
year 2007 and the 2008 budget request. Agencies have not provided 
information on how future resources will be targeted to achieve the 
desired end-state or how the risks we identified will be addressed. 

* In addition, efforts to improve cooperation with the UN and other 
international donor nations and organizations have encountered 
difficulties. For example, U.S. efforts are to be coordinated with the 
Iraqi government and the international donor community through the 
Capacity Development Working Group. However, the group did not meet for 
about a year after forming in late 2005 and did not meet from February 
through May 2007. 

Conclusion: 

Current U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the Iraqi government 
involve multiple U.S. agencies working with Iraqi counterparts on many 
issues. GAO, for example, is working with the Iraqi Board of Supreme 
Audit to enhance its auditing skills and capacity. However, U.S. 
efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq's ministries must address 
significant challenges if they are to achieve their desired outcomes. 
U.S. efforts lack an overall strategy, no lead agency provides overall 
direction, and U.S. priorities have been subject to numerous changes. 
Finally, U.S. efforts confront shortages of competent personnel at 
Iraqi ministries, and sectarian ministries contend with pervasive 
corruption. The risks are further compounded by the ongoing violence in 
Iraq as U.S. civilian advisors have difficulties meeting with their 
Iraqi counterparts and skilled Iraqi professionals leave the country. 

Congress appropriated $140 million in May 2007 for capacity building 
and the administration requested up to $255 million for fiscal year 
2008. We believe that future U.S. investments must be conditioned on 
the development of an overall integrated U.S. strategy that clearly 
articulates agency roles and responsibilities, establishes clear goals, 
delineates the total costs needed, and assesses the risk to U.S. 
efforts. The strategy would also need to consider any expanded role of 
multilateral organizations, including the United Nations and World 
Bank. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

GAO recommends that State, in consultation with the Iraqi government, 
complete an overall integrated strategy for U.S. capacity development 
efforts. 

Key components of an overall capacity development strategy should 
include a clear purpose, scope, and methodology; a clear delineation of 
U.S. roles, responsibilities, and coordination, including the 
designation of a lead agency; goals and objectives based on Iraqi- 
identified priorities; performance measures based on outcome metrics 
and milestones; and a description of how resources will be targeted to 
achieve the desired end-state. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Given the absence of an integrated capacity development strategy, it is 
unclear how further appropriations of funding for ministry capacity 
development programs will contribute to the success of overall U.S. 
efforts in Iraq. Congress should consider conditioning future 
appropriations on the completion of an overall integrated strategy. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In commenting on a draft of the report accompanying this testimony, 
State and USAID noted (1) their concern over our recommendation to 
condition future appropriations for capacity development on the 
completion of a strategy; (2) the recent appointment of an ambassador 
to supervise all short-and medium-term capacity development programs; 
and (3) the need to tailor capacity development needs to each Iraqi 
ministry. In response to the agencies' first comment, we do not 
recommend stopping U.S. investment in capacity development; the $140 
million in supplemental funding appropriated in fiscal year 2007 
remains available for the agencies to continue their efforts. Rather, 
we recommend that Congress condition future funding on the development 
of an overall integrated strategy. 

We acknowledge that State named an ambassador to coordinate the 
embassy's economic and assistance operations. However, this action 
occurred in July 2007, underscoring our point that U.S. capacity 
development efforts have lacked overall leadership and highlighting the 
need for an overall integrated strategy. Finally, our recommendation 
does not preclude U.S. agencies from tailoring capacity development 
efforts to meet each ministry's unique needs. A strategy ensures that a 
U.S.-funded program has consistent overall goals, clear leadership and 
roles, and assessed risks and vulnerabilities. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 
any questions that you or other Members have at this time. 

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For questions regarding this testimony please me on (202) 512-5500, or 
Mr. Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade, on 
(202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this 
statement were Tetsuo Miyabara, Patrick Hickey, Lynn Cothern, Lisa 
Helmer, Stephen Lord, and Judith McCloskey. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO-08-117, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity 
Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide 
Efforts and Manage Risk (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2007). 

[2] The four governments are the Coalition Provisional Authority (April 
2003 to June 2004); the interim government (June 2004 to May 2005); the 
transitional government (May 2005 to May 2006); and the permanent 
government (May 2006 to the present). 

[3] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government 
Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks, GAO-07-
1195 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2007). 

[4] Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, Baseline Assessment of Core 
Functions at Key Civilian Ministries, Sept. 2006. The number of 
ministries assessed on a core function varied. 

[5] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraq Government 
Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks, GAO-07-
1195 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2007). 

[6] This organization changed its name from Supreme Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq in May 2007. 

[7] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress 
in Accordance with The Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, 
Section 9010, Public Law 109-289 (Washington, D.C.: June 2007). 

[8] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for 
Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9, 2007). 

[9] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress 
in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, 
Section 9010, Public Law 109-289 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2007). 

[End of section] 

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