

**X.509 Certification Practices Statement**  
**for the**  
**U.S. Government Printing Office**  
**Principal Certification Authority**  
**(GPO-PCA)**

**June 11, 2007**

**FINAL**

**Version 1.6.1**

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

## **SIGNATURE PAGE**

---

U.S. Government Printing Office  
Public Key Infrastructure Operating Authority

---

DATE

---

U.S. Government Printing Office  
Public Key Infrastructure Policy Authority Chair

---

DATE

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>1. INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1.1 OVERVIEW .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1.1 Certificate Policy .....	1
1.1.2 Relationship Between the GPO CP and this CPS.....	2
1.1.3 Relationship Between the FBCA CP and the GPO CP.....	2
<b>1.2 IDENTIFICATION .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>1.3 COMMUNITY AND APPLICABILITY .....</b>	<b>2</b>
1.3.1 PKI Authorities .....	2
1.3.1.1 GPO PKI Policy Authority (PA) .....	2
1.3.1.2 GPO Operational Authority (OA).....	2
1.3.1.3 GPO Operational Authority Oversight Administrator.....	2
1.3.1.4 GPO Operational Authority Officers .....	2
1.3.1.5 Entity Certification Authority .....	2
1.3.1.6 GPO Certification Authority.....	3
1.3.1.6.1 GPO Root Certificate Authority (CA) / Principal CA.....	3
1.3.1.7 GPO Registration Authority (RA) .....	3
1.3.1.8 GPO Naming Authority .....	3
1.3.2 Related Authorities .....	3
1.3.2.1 Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA).....	3
1.3.3 End Entities .....	3
1.3.3.1 Subscribers.....	3
1.3.3.2 Relying Parties .....	3
1.3.3.3 PKI Sponsor .....	3
1.3.4 Applicability .....	3
1.3.4.1 Usage Determination .....	3
1.3.4.2 Authorized Applications .....	3
1.3.4.3 Prohibited Applications .....	4
<b>1.4 CONTACT DETAILS.....</b>	<b>4</b>
1.4.1 Specification Administration Organization .....	4
1.4.2 Contact Information .....	4
1.4.3 Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy .....	4
<b>2. GENERAL PROVISIONS.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2.1 OBLIGATIONS .....</b>	<b>5</b>
2.1.1 CA Obligations .....	5
2.1.2 RA Obligations .....	5
2.1.3 Subscriber Obligations.....	5
2.1.4 Relying Party Obligations.....	5
2.1.5 Repository Obligations .....	5
2.1.6 Certificate Issuance to Non-GPO Parties.....	5
<b>2.2 LIABILITY .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2.3 FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY .....</b>	<b>5</b>

---

2.3.1	Indemnification by Relying Parties and Subscribers .....	5
2.3.2	Fiduciary Relationships .....	5
2.3.3	Governing Law .....	5
2.3.4	Administrative Processes .....	6
<b>2.4</b>	<b>INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT .....</b>	<b>6</b>
2.4.1	Severability of Provisions, Survival, Merger, and Notice .....	6
2.4.2	Dispute Resolution Procedures .....	6
<b>2.5</b>	<b>FEES .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>2.6</b>	<b>PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY .....</b>	<b>6</b>
2.6.1	Publication of CA Information .....	6
2.6.2	Frequency of Publication .....	6
2.6.3	Access Controls .....	6
2.6.4	Repositories .....	7
<b>2.7</b>	<b>COMPLIANCE AUDIT .....</b>	<b>7</b>
2.7.1	Frequency of Entity Compliance Audit .....	7
2.7.2	Identity/Qualifications of Compliance Auditor .....	7
2.7.3	Compliance Auditor's Relationship to Audited Party .....	7
2.7.4	Topics Covered by Compliance Audit .....	7
2.7.5	Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency .....	8
2.7.6	Communications of Results .....	9
<b>2.8</b>	<b>CONFIDENTIALITY .....</b>	<b>9</b>
2.8.1	Types of Information to be Kept Confidential .....	9
2.8.2	Types of Information Not Considered Confidential .....	10
2.8.3	Disclosure of Certificate Revocation/Suspension Information .....	10
2.8.4	Release to Law Enforcement Officials .....	10
2.8.5	Release as Part of Civil Discovery .....	10
2.8.6	Disclosure Upon Owner's Request .....	10
2.8.7	Other Information Release Circumstances .....	10
<b>2.9</b>	<b>INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS .....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>3.</b>	<b>IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>3.1</b>	<b>INITIAL REGISTRATION .....</b>	<b>11</b>
3.1.1	Types of Names .....	11
3.1.2	Need for Names to be Meaningful .....	11
3.1.3	Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms .....	12
3.1.4	Uniqueness of Names .....	12
3.1.5	Name Claim Dispute Resolution Procedure .....	12
3.1.6	Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks .....	12
3.1.7	Method to Prove Possession of Private Key .....	12
3.1.8	Authentication of Organization Identity .....	12
3.1.9	Authentication of Individual Identity .....	13
3.1.10	Authentication of Component and Server Identities .....	14
<b>3.2</b>	<b>CERTIFICATE RENEWAL, UPDATE, AND ROUTINE RE-KEY .....</b>	<b>14</b>
3.2.1	Certificate Re-Key .....	14
3.2.1.1	CA Certificate Re-Key .....	14
3.2.1.2	PCA Subscriber Certificate Re-Key .....	14
3.2.2	Certificate Renewal .....	14

---

3.2.3	Certificate Update .....	14
<b>3.3</b>	<b>RE-KEY AFTER REVOCATION .....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>3.4</b>	<b>REVOCATION REQUEST .....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>4.</b>	<b>OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS .....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>4.1</b>	<b>CERTIFICATE APPLICATION .....</b>	<b>16</b>
4.1.1	Cross-Certification Certificate Application .....	16
4.1.2	Subscriber Certificate Application.....	16
4.1.3	Delivery of Public Key for Certificate Issuance .....	16
<b>4.2</b>	<b>CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE.....</b>	<b>16</b>
4.2.1	Delivery of Subscriber’s Private Key to Subscriber .....	17
4.2.2	CA Public Key Delivery and Use .....	17
<b>4.3</b>	<b>CERTIFICATE ACCEPTANCE .....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>4.4</b>	<b>CERTIFICATE SUSPENSION AND REVOCATION .....</b>	<b>17</b>
4.4.1	Revocation .....	18
4.4.1.1	Circumstances for Revocation .....	18
4.4.1.2	Revocation Requesters.....	18
4.4.1.3	Procedure for Revocation Request .....	18
4.4.1.4	Certificate Revocation .....	18
4.4.1.5	Revocation Request Grace Period .....	18
4.4.2	Suspension .....	19
4.4.3	Revocation Lists.....	19
4.4.3.1	Revocation List Issuance Frequency .....	19
4.4.3.2	CRL/CARL Checking Requirements .....	19
4.4.4	On-Line Revocation Status Checking.....	19
4.4.5	Other Forms of Revocation Checking .....	19
4.4.6	Checking Requirements for Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements .....	19
4.4.7	Special Requirements Related to Key Compromise.....	19
<b>4.5</b>	<b>SECURITY AUDIT PROCEDURES .....</b>	<b>19</b>
4.5.1	Types of Events Recorded .....	20
4.5.2	Frequency of Processing Data .....	23
4.5.3	Retention Period for Security Audit Data.....	23
4.5.4	Protection of Security Audit Data.....	23
4.5.5	Security Audit Data Backup Procedures.....	23
4.5.6	Security Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External) .....	23
4.5.7	Notification to Event-Causing Subject .....	23
4.5.8	Vulnerability Assessments.....	24
<b>4.6</b>	<b>RECORDS ARCHIVAL.....</b>	<b>24</b>
4.6.1	Types of Events Archived.....	24
4.6.2	Retention Period for Archive .....	25
4.6.3	Protection of Archive.....	25
4.6.4	Archive Backup Procedures.....	25
4.6.5	Requirements for Time-Stamping of Records .....	25
4.6.6	Archive Collection System (Internal and External).....	25
4.6.7	Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information.....	26
<b>4.7</b>	<b>CA KEY CHANGEOVER.....</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>4.8</b>	<b>COMPROMISE AND DISASTER RECOVERY .....</b>	<b>26</b>

---

---

4.8.1	Computing Resources, Software, and /or Data are Corrupted.....	26
4.8.2	CA Signature Keys are Revoked .....	26
4.8.3	CA Signature Keys are Compromised.....	27
4.8.4	Secure Facility Impaired After a Natural or Other Type of Disaster.....	27
<b>4.9</b>	<b>CA CESSATION OF SERVICES.....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>5.</b>	<b>PHYSICAL, PROCEDURAL, AND PERSONNEL SECURITY CONTROLS .....</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>5.1</b>	<b>PHYSICAL CONTROLS FOR THE GPO-CA.....</b>	<b>28</b>
5.1.1	Site Location and Construction.....	28
5.1.2	Physical Access.....	28
5.1.3	Power and Air Conditioning .....	28
5.1.4	Water Exposures .....	29
5.1.5	Fire Prevention and Protection.....	29
5.1.6	Media Storage .....	29
5.1.7	Waste Disposal.....	29
5.1.8	Off-Site Backup .....	29
<b>5.2</b>	<b>PROCEDURAL CONTROLS FOR THE GPO-CA.....</b>	<b>29</b>
5.2.1	Trusted Roles .....	29
5.2.1.1	GPO OA System Administrator .....	30
5.2.1.2	GPO OA Officer – Master Users .....	30
5.2.1.3	GPO OA Officer – Security Officers.....	30
5.2.1.4	GPO OA Officer – Administrators .....	31
5.2.1.5	GPO OA Officer – Directory Administrators.....	31
5.2.1.6	GPO Security Compliance Auditor .....	31
5.2.1.7	GPO OA Backup Operator .....	31
5.2.1.8	Registration Authority .....	32
5.2.2	Separation of Roles .....	32
5.2.3	Number of Persons Required Per Task.....	37
5.2.4	Identification and Authentication for Each Role .....	38
<b>5.3</b>	<b>PERSONNEL CONTROLS .....</b>	<b>38</b>
5.3.1	Background, Qualifications, Experience, and Security Clearance Requirements	38
5.3.2	Background Check Procedures .....	38
5.3.3	Training Requirements.....	38
5.3.4	Retraining Frequency and Requirements.....	39
5.3.5	Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence .....	39
5.3.6	Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions .....	39
5.3.7	Contracting Personnel Requirements.....	39
5.3.8	Documentation Supplied to Personnel.....	39
<b>6.</b>	<b>TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS .....</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>6.1</b>	<b>KEY PAIR GENERATION AND INSTALLATION.....</b>	<b>41</b>
6.1.1	Key Pair Generation.....	41
6.1.2	Private Key Delivery to Subscriber .....	41
6.1.3	Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer .....	41
6.1.4	CA Certificates and Public Key Availability and Delivery to Entity CAs .....	41
6.1.5	Key Sizes .....	41
6.1.6	Public Key Parameters Generation .....	42
6.1.7	Parameter Quality Checking .....	42

---

6.1.8	Subscriber Key Generation .....	42
6.1.9	Key Usage Purposes .....	42
<b>6.2</b>	<b>PRIVATE KEY PROTECTION.....</b>	<b>42</b>
6.2.1	Standards for Cryptographic Module.....	42
6.2.2	GPO-CA Private Key Multi-Person Control .....	42
6.2.3	Private Key Escrow.....	43
6.2.3.1	Escrow of CA Encryption Keys.....	44
6.2.4	Private Key Backup .....	44
6.2.4.1	Backup of GPO-CA Private Signature Key.....	44
6.2.4.2	Backup of Subscriber Private Signature Key .....	44
6.2.5	Private Key Archival.....	44
6.2.6	Private Key Entry Into Cryptographic Module.....	44
6.2.7	Method of Activating Private Key .....	44
6.2.8	Method of Deactivating Private Key .....	45
6.2.9	Method of Destroying Private Key .....	45
<b>6.3</b>	<b>GOOD PRACTICES REGARDING KEY PAIR MANAGEMENT.....</b>	<b>45</b>
6.3.1	Public Key Archival.....	45
6.3.2	Usage Periods for the Public and Private Keys .....	45
<b>6.4</b>	<b>ACTIVATION DATA.....</b>	<b>46</b>
6.4.1	Activation Data Generation and Installation.....	46
6.4.2	Activation Data Protection.....	46
6.4.3	Other Aspects of Activation Data .....	46
<b>6.5</b>	<b>COMPUTER SECURITY CONTROLS.....</b>	<b>47</b>
6.5.1	Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements .....	47
6.5.2	Computer Security Rating.....	47
<b>6.6</b>	<b>LIFE CYCLE TECHNICAL CONTROLS .....</b>	<b>47</b>
6.6.1	System Development Controls .....	48
6.6.2	Security Management Controls.....	48
6.6.3	Life Cycle Security Ratings .....	48
<b>6.7</b>	<b>NETWORK SECURITY CONTROLS .....</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>6.8</b>	<b>CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE ENGINEERING CONTROLS .....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>7.</b>	<b>CERTIFICATE AND CARL/CRL PROFILES .....</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>7.1</b>	<b>CERTIFICATE PROFILE .....</b>	<b>50</b>
7.1.1	Version Numbers .....	50
7.1.2	Certificate Extensions .....	50
7.1.3	Algorithm Object Identifiers.....	50
7.1.4	Name Forms.....	50
7.1.5	Name Constraints.....	50
7.1.6	Certificate Policy Object Identifier.....	50
7.1.7	Usage of Policy Constraints Extension.....	51
7.1.8	Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics .....	51
7.1.9	Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policy Extension .....	51
<b>7.2</b>	<b>CARL/CRL PROFILE .....</b>	<b>51</b>
7.2.1	Version Numbers .....	51
7.2.2	CARL and CRL Entry Extensions.....	51
<b>8.</b>	<b>SPECIFICATION ADMINISTRATION .....</b>	<b>52</b>

---

<b>8.1</b>	<b>SPECIFICATION CHANGE PROCEDURES .....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>8.2</b>	<b>PUBLICATION AND NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES .....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>8.3</b>	<b>CPS APPROVAL PROCEDURES .....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>8.4</b>	<b>WAIVERS .....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>APPENDIX A: CERTIFICATE AND CRL PROFILES .....</b>		<b>53</b>
<b>A.1</b>	<b>ROOT CA SELF-SIGNED CERTIFICATE FORMAT .....</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>A.2</b>	<b>SUBORDINATE CA CERTIFICATE FORMAT .....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>A.3</b>	<b>EXTERNAL CA CERTIFICATE FORMAT .....</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>A.4</b>	<b>ROOT CA CRL PROFILE FORMAT .....</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>A.5</b>	<b>ROOT CA CERTIFICATE REGISTRATION DATA REQUIREMENTS .....</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>APPENDIX B: ACRONYM LIST .....</b>		<b>58</b>



## RECORD OF CHANGES

<b>Version</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Author(s)</b>	<b>Reason</b>	<b>Description</b>
1.0	December 9, 2003	CygnaCom Solutions	Initial Document	Initial Document
1.1	March 22, 2004	CygnaCom Solutions	Policy correction	Refine badge requirements for personnel filling GPO PKI Trusted Roles.
1.2	November 9, 2004	CygnaCom Solutions	Changes based on CP update	Address text modified in the CP
1.2.1	November 11, 2004	CygnaCom Solutions	Changes CP/CPS mapping	Align section numbering and address issues that may arise during an audit
1.2.2	November 11, 2004	CygnaCom Solutions	Correcting possible audit issues	
1.3	July 8, 2005	Government Printing Office (GPO)	Address comments provided during Compliance Audit.	Several changes to address comments submitted by the PKI Compliance Audit firm.
1.4	February 27, 2006	U.S. Government Printing Office	Address Federal PKI (FPKI) Common Policy and PKI Shared Service Provider (SSP) requirements.	Several changes to address the FPKI Common Policy and PKI SSP requirements.
1.5	July 1, 2006	U.S. Government Printing Office	Address AICPA WebTrust for CA and GPO OIG compliance audit recommendations.	Changes to various sections to address the AICPA WebTrust for CA auditor and GPO OIG compliance audit recommendations.
1.6	August 3, 2006	U.S. Government Printing Office	Address GPO OIG and AICPA WebTrust for Audit compliance audit recommendations.	Changes to section 4.8 on Disaster Recovery and various other sections to address OIG and WebTrust auditor recommendations.
1.6.1	June 11, 2007	U.S. Government Printing Office	Clarification to alternate site location.	Minor change to accommodate OIG and AICPA WebTrust auditor recommendations.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The Government Printing Office (GPO) will implement a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to increase the security posture of the organization. The PKI will provide for the assurance levels defined in the GPO Certificate Policy (GPO CP). The PKI consists of products and services that provide and manage X.509 certificates for public key cryptography. Part of this PKI is a Certification Authority (CA) that issues and revokes X.509 certificates for public-key cryptography. The CA will bind the subscriber identity to each public key, of the subscriber's public/private key pairs, using X.509 certificates.

The GPO PKI will consist of an offline Principal CA (PCA) and one, or more, Subordinate CA (SCA). An offline CA is a CA that is not connected to the GPO computer network, and is therefore considered offline. The GPO CP defines the requirements for the creation and management of Version 3 X.509 public-key certificates. This Certification Practices Statement (CPS) defines the practices under which the GPO PCA will operate. This CPS is applicable to all entities with relationships with the PCA, including Master Users and Security Officers. This CPS provides these entities with a clear statement of the practices and responsibilities of the PCA, as well as the responsibilities of each entity in dealing with the PCA.

Security management services provided by the PCA include:

- Key Generation/Storage/Recovery
- Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Generation and Distribution
- Certificate Update, Renewal, and Re-key
- Certificate token initialization/programming/management
- System Management Functions (e.g., security audit, certificate tracking, certificate archive, etc.)

The trustworthiness of the X.509 certificates issued by the GPO PKI depends on the secure and trustworthy operation of the PCA, including equipment, facilities, personnel, and procedures.

This GPO CPS is consistent with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (IETF PKIX) RFC 2527, Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Framework.

The practices specified in this CPS are described in more detail in a GPO PKI Operating Procedures document.

### 1.1 OVERVIEW

This CPS provides for the issuance of cross-certificates for external CAs, subordinate CA certificates and Subscriber certificates to a limited number of Security Officers and other Administrators responsible for the proper operation and maintenance of the PCA.

#### 1.1.1 Certificate Policy

The practices described in this CPS are governed by and have been developed to support the GPO CP. The requirements in this CPS add to those in the CP. The GPO CP is incorporated into this document by reference.

### **1.1.2 Relationship Between the GPO CP and this CPS**

Only requirements not described in the GPO CP will be included in this CPS. Where the CPS does not add to the GPO CP, the phrase “As stipulated in the GPO CP” is used. Where the GPO CP specifies “No stipulation” and the CPS does not add to it, the phrase “No stipulation” is used.

### **1.1.3 Relationship Between the FBCA CP and the GPO CP**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

## **1.2 IDENTIFICATION**

This document is known as the GPO Principal Certification Authority Certification Practices Statement.

The practices stated herein conform to the requirements as defined in the GPO CP.

The PCA will be responsible for issuing cross-certificates and subordinate CA certificates, when approved by the GPO Policy Authority (PA) and directed by the GPO Operational Authority (OA). There will also be a limited number of Subscriber certificates issued by the PCA. These Subscribers will consist of individuals required to maintain and operate the PCA, referred to as “Trusted Roles”. Certificates that are created using these practices will assert the following policy Object Identifiers (OID):

id-gpo-certpcy-mediumAssurance	::= { 2 16 840 1 101 3 2 1 17 1 }
--------------------------------	-----------------------------------

The CA automatically populates the appropriate OID in the certificates.

## **1.3 COMMUNITY AND APPLICABILITY**

### **1.3.1 PKI Authorities**

#### **1.3.1.1 GPO PKI Policy Authority (PA)**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

#### **1.3.1.2 GPO Operational Authority (OA)**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

#### **1.3.1.3 GPO Operational Authority Oversight Administrator**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

#### **1.3.1.4 GPO Operational Authority Officers**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

#### **1.3.1.5 Entity Certification Authority**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

### **1.3.1.6 GPO Certification Authority**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

#### ***1.3.1.6.1 GPO Root Certificate Authority (CA) / Principal CA***

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

### **1.3.1.7 GPO Registration Authority (RA)**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

### **1.3.1.8 GPO Naming Authority**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

## **1.3.2 Related Authorities**

### **1.3.2.1 Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA)**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

## **1.3.3 End Entities**

### **1.3.3.1 Subscribers**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

### **1.3.3.2 Relying Parties**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

### **1.3.3.3 PKI Sponsor**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

## **1.3.4 Applicability**

The PCA is to be used to cross-certify with external CAs, when approved by the GPO PA. In addition, the PCA may be used to issue certificates to subordinate CAs and a limited number of individuals holding PCA Trusted Roles.

### **1.3.4.1 Usage Determination**

The Relying Party must determine if the certificates issued under the GPO-CAs are appropriate for their application. This may be determined by evaluating various risk factors including the value of the information, the threat environment, and the existing protection of the information environment. These determinations are made by the Relying Party and are not controlled by the GPO-PA or the GPO-OA.

### **1.3.4.2 Authorized Applications**

All GPO applications will have the PCA as the trust anchor. This means that any GPO application attempting to validate a certificate will begin with the PCA public key as the trusted public key. GPO applications are approved for the following security services provided by the GPO PKI:

- User Authentication

- Logical Access Control
- Secure Communication
- Digital Signature/Non-repudiation

The GPO PA may identify specific applications. This CPS will be updated as specific applications are identified.

### **1.3.4.3 Prohibited Applications**

Certificates issued by the PCA are only to be used as authorized.

## **1.4 CONTACT DETAILS**

### **1.4.1 Specification Administration Organization**

The GPO OA is responsible for all aspects of this CPS.

### **1.4.2 Contact Information**

Questions regarding this CPS shall be directed to the Chair of the GPO-PA, whose address can be found at <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pki>

### **1.4.3 Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

## **2. GENERAL PROVISIONS**

### **2.1 OBLIGATIONS**

The obligations described below pertain to the PCA and operations personnel. Other CAs which are issued certificates by the PCA or are in a trust chain up to a CA, that is issued a certificate by the PCA, are obligated to comply with the applicable sections of the MOAs.

#### **2.1.1 CA Obligations**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

#### **2.1.2 RA Obligations**

The RA will abide by all obligations defined in the GPO CP by following the procedures defined in this CPS.

#### **2.1.3 Subscriber Obligations**

Subscriber obligations are specified in the Subscriber agreement that each Subscriber applicant must sign prior to the time they receive their keys and certificates.

#### **2.1.4 Relying Party Obligations**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

#### **2.1.5 Repository Obligations**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

#### **2.1.6 Certificate Issuance to Non-GPO Parties**

The PCA may issue cross certificates to non-GPO parties, to provide interoperability. Certificates for non-GPO individuals, other than to manage and support the PCA, will need to be issued from the SCA, and will not be discussed in detail in this CPS.

### **2.2 LIABILITY**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

### **2.3 FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY**

#### **2.3.1 Indemnification by Relying Parties and Subscribers**

No stipulation.

#### **2.3.2 Fiduciary Relationships**

No stipulation.

#### **2.3.3 Governing Law**

As stipulated in Section 1 of the GPO CP.

### **2.3.4 Administrative Processes**

Administrative processes pertaining to this CPS shall be determined by the GPO OA pursuant to the agreement between it and the GPO PA for the operation of the PCA.

## **2.4 INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT**

### **2.4.1 Severability of Provisions, Survival, Merger, and Notice**

Should it be determined that any relevant section of the GPO CP is incorrect or invalid, all parties with certificates issued by the PCA will nevertheless abide by the practices as described in this CPS, until guidance is given for new policy and a new CPS is drafted.

### **2.4.2 Dispute Resolution Procedures**

The PA resolves any disputes over the interpretation or applicability of the CPS.

## **2.5 FEES**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

## **2.6 PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY**

### **2.6.1 Publication of CA Information**

The OA will deliver its CPS to the PA for approval. As stipulated in the GPO CP, this CPS will not be published in the Repository. Upon direction from the PA, the OA may make the CPS available under a non-disclosure agreement, in whole or in part, to CAs with planned or actual cross-certification agreements in place with the PCA.

The PCA will publish the following information to the repository:

- All certificates issued by the PCA
- All CRLs/ARLs issued by the PCA
- The PCA self-signed certificate

### **2.6.2 Frequency of Publication**

Certificates are issued, re-issued and published in accordance with the practices defined in this CPS.

Certificates are published in the directory as they are issued. CRLs and ARLs are published in the directory as they are issued. The frequency of CRL and ARL issuance is discussed in Section 4.4.3.1 of this CPS.

The ARL is manually moved from the PCA Master Directory to the SCA Master Directory on a monthly basis. The SCA Master Directory is configured to replicate any changes made as the changes occur.

### **2.6.3 Access Controls**

Only the PA has permission to modify, replace or remove this CPS. The PA may delegate some or all of this responsibility to the OA.

All Subscribers who have been issued certificates by the CA have read-only access to a copy of the CP through the GPO web site.

All cross-certified CAs are provided with copies of this CPS, if required to do so as part of the cross certification agreement and upon approval of the PA.

The PCA Master Directory is not connected to a Network; it is only connected to the PCA.

The CA application generates certificates and CRLs and has read, write and delete privileges to the master directory for PKI attributes. Directory Administrators and OA Officers have read, write and delete access for PKI-related attributes associated with individual entries in the master directory. The Master Directory information is automatically replicated to the shadow directories.

These access controls will be set with the native access control mechanisms of the Directory.

#### **2.6.4 Repositories**

The repository for the PCA is an X.500 Directory and is accessed using the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), version 3, as specified in Internet RFC 1777.

### **2.7 COMPLIANCE AUDIT**

#### **2.7.1 Frequency of Entity Compliance Audit**

A compliance audit will be performed prior to initial approval as the PCA, and once every 12 months thereafter.

#### **2.7.2 Identity/Qualifications of Compliance Auditor**

The GPO PA will have the responsibility to verify that the compliance auditor selected, by the GPO-OA, to audit the PCA and any applicable personnel meet the requirements governing the identity and qualifications of the compliance auditor that are stipulated in the GPO CP.

#### **2.7.3 Compliance Auditor's Relationship to Audited Party**

The compliance auditor is a firm in a contractual relationship with the GPO and has no GPO PKI management capabilities.

#### **2.7.4 Topics Covered by Compliance Audit**

Within each compliance audit, the auditor verifies that the CPS complies with the GPO CP. The compliance audit also verifies that the operational and technical controls used by the PCA. Compliance should be checked against the following, as a minimum, elements of this CPS:

- Identification & Authentication (Section 3)
  - Initial Registration
  - Certificate Renewal, Update, and Routine Re-key
  - Rekey After Revocation
  - Revocation Request
- Operational Requirements (Section 4)
  - Application for a Certificate



- Certificate Issuance
- Certificate Acceptance
- Certificate Suspension and Revocation
- Security Audit Procedures
- Records Archival
- Key Changeover
- Compromise and Disaster Recovery
- CA Termination
- Physical, Procedural & Personnel Security (Section 5)
  - Physical Controls
  - Procedural Controls
  - Personnel Controls
- Technical Security Controls (Section 6)
  - Key Pair Generation & Installation
  - Private Key Protection
  - Other Aspects of Key Pair Management
  - Activation Data
  - Computer Security Controls
  - Life-cycle Technical Controls
  - Network Security Controls
  - Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls
- Certificate & CRL Profiles (Section 7)
  - Certificate Profile
  - ARL/CRL Profile
- Specification Administration (Section 8)
  - Specification Change Procedures
  - Publication and Notification Procedures
  - CPS Approval Procedures

### **2.7.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency**

There are three possible actions to be taken as a result of identification of a deficiency:

- Continue to operate as usual
- Continue to operate but at a lower assurance level
- Suspend operation

If a deficiency is identified, the GPO PA, will determine which of the following actions to take.

- If operations are continued as usual or at a lessened assurance level, the GPO PA and OA are responsible for ensuring that corrective actions are taken within 30 days. At that time, or earlier if agreed by the GPO PA and the Compliance Auditor, the compliance audit team will re-audit the failed requirements. If, upon re-audit, corrective actions have not been taken, the GPO PA will determine if more severe action (suspended operation) is required.
- If operations are suspended, all PAs of cross-certified CAs are notified. The GPO PA and OA are responsible for reporting the status of corrective action to the Compliance

Auditor on a weekly basis. The GPO PA and Compliance Auditor together will determine when re-audit is to occur. If the deficiencies are deemed to have been corrected upon re-audit, the PCA will resume service and new certificates will be issued to the cross-certified CAs if appropriate.

### **2.7.6 Communications of Results**

The compliance auditor will communicate results of all compliance audits to the GPO PA through a Compliance Audit Report. The report will contain a summary table of topics covered, areas in which the PCA was found to be non-compliant, and a brief description of the problem(s) for each area of non-compliance. The report will also contain the detailed results of the compliance audit for all topics covered, including the topics in which the PCA passed and the topics in which the PCA failed.

Notification of compliance audit failure, the topics of failure, and reason(s) for failure will be provided immediately, upon the conclusion of the compliance audit, in a written form to the OA and to the PA.

## **2.8 CONFIDENTIALITY**

PCA information not requiring protection may be made publicly available, according to the stipulations of this CPS in the sub-sections below.

### **2.8.1 Types of Information to be Kept Confidential**

Each Subscriber's private signing key is confidential to that Subscriber. The CA and RA are not provided any access to those keys.

Information held in audit trails is considered confidential to the PCA and is not released to external parties, unless required by law.

Personal information held by the RA, other than that which is explicitly published as part of a certificate, CRL, ARL, CP or this CPS is considered confidential to the GPO PKI and is not released unless required by law.

Generally, the results of annual audits are kept confidential, with exceptions as outlined in Section 2.7.6 of this CPS.

This CPS itself is considered sensitive. This CPS will only be made available by the OA and the PA for internal GPO use, including use by the PKI trusted role staff. Upon direction from the PA, the CPS may be made available under a non-disclosure agreement, in whole or in part, to CA's with planned or actual cross-certification agreements in place with the PCA.

Operational details of the PCA, including physical and logical maps, connection diagrams, security measures, software used, disaster recovery plans and personnel utilization are considered sensitive and will be made available only to the OA, Compliance Auditors, and others when approved by the PA.

Information in transit between the RA and the PCA is automatically encrypted by the PCA and RA components to provide data confidentiality. Information stored on the RA workstation or PCA server is protected by password. The RA keeps paper information (e.g., registration forms) in a locked container when the RA is not present.

### **2.8.2 Types of Information Not Considered Confidential**

Information included in certificates and CRLs issued by the PCA are not considered confidential. Information in the GPO CP under which the PCA operates, is not considered confidential.

### **2.8.3 Disclosure of Certificate Revocation/Suspension Information**

When the PCA revokes a certificate, a revocation reason is included in the CRL entry for the revoked certificate. This revocation reason code is not considered confidential and can be shared with the general public.

### **2.8.4 Release to Law Enforcement Officials**

The GPO PA accepts all requests for information release to law enforcement officials and, working with the GPO General Counsel, will determine the applicability of compliance with the request.

The GPO PA keeps copies, either paper or electronic, of each request for information release to law enforcement officials.

### **2.8.5 Release as Part of Civil Discovery**

The GPO PA accepts all requests for information release as part of civil discovery and, working with the GPO General Counsel, will determine the applicability of compliance with the request.

The GPO PA keeps copies, either paper or electronic, of each request for information release to law enforcement officials.

### **2.8.6 Disclosure Upon Owner's Request**

The RA accepts digitally signed confidential information disclosure requests from Subscribers. If the signature is valid and the request is for information pertaining to the Subscriber, the RA will provide the requested information in a suitable format.

### **2.8.7 Other Information Release Circumstances**

The PCA RA will not disclose any confidential information to a third party. All requests for information will be forwarded to the PA for a decision on release in accordance with the GPO CP.

## **2.9 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS**

Certificates, CRLs and ARLs, issued by the PCA are the property of the PCA.

This CPS is the property of the PCA.

The Distinguished Names (DNs) used to represent End-Entities within the PCA domain in the directory and in certificates issued to End-Entities within that domain are the property of GPO.

With respect to licensed applications, this CPS does not modify ownership of licensed applications or licensing agreements for such applications.

### 3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

This section contains the practices to be followed in identifying and authenticating the subjects who have Trusted Roles or who will receive certificates issued by the PCA. Additional practices are defined for identification and authentication of subordinate CAs and cross-certified CAs.

#### 3.1 INITIAL REGISTRATION

##### 3.1.1 Types of Names

The PCA uses the X.500 Distinguished Names (DN) for all Subscribers. The DN may consist of naming elements C, O, OU and CN. The Naming Authority approved DN structures are as follows:

- For human Subscribers filling Trusted Roles:
  - CN = [Subscriber first and last name, and *optionally*, a serial number] - The value of the serial number *can* be generated automatically to ensure uniqueness across all commonNames within a given directory path.
  - OU = [Administrators]
  - OU = [Government Printing Office]
  - O = [U.S. Government]
  - C = [US]
- For certificates issued to Subordinate CAs:
  - OU = [CA Name, as directed by the GPO PA]
  - OU = [Certification Authorities]
  - OU = [Government Printing Office]
  - O = [U.S. Government]
  - C = [US]
- For certificates issued to cross-certified CAs:
  - As agreed by the GPO PA

Certificates will contain a subscriber alternate name form in the subjectAltName field. The subscriber alternate name will be the rfc822 e-mail address. For subordinate and cross-certified CAs, the alternate name will be the rfc822 e-mail address for the OA responsible for the CA.

CRL distribution points are named with the commonName attribute with a value generated by the CA application and are named subordinate to the PCA.

##### 3.1.2 Need for Names to be Meaningful

The value of the commonName attribute used in naming a PCA Subscriber is the Subscriber's first and last names.

When the PCA certifies an SCA, it must impose restrictions on the name space used by the SCA, these restrictions must be at least as restrictive as the PCA name constraints.

PCA issued Cross certificates at the Medium Assurance level shall have name constraints excluding the GPO name space specified by the GPO Naming Authority (i.e. certificates issued by non-GPO CAs under the GPO name space are not trusted).

### **3.1.3 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms**

Distinguished names (DNs) and their component Relative Distinguished Names (RDNs) are to be interpreted as defined in X.500.

### **3.1.4 Uniqueness of Names**

Names are unambiguously defined as set forth in this CPS. The directory will be managed in such a way as to ensure that no two individuals are assigned the same DN, and therefore the same electronic identity. The CA DN must also be unique.

### **3.1.5 Name Claim Dispute Resolution Procedure**

Given that the only Subscriber certificates to be issued by the PCA are for those individuals responsible for operating and maintaining the PCA, naming conflicts are expected to be extremely rare. In the event of a naming conflict, the GPO PA has final authority to resolve the conflict.

### **3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks**

The RA will not knowingly assign names that contain trademarks. The RA need not seek evidence of trademark registrations nor in any other way enforce trademark rights.

### **3.1.7 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key**

Digital certificates bind a public key to the identity of the individual to assure Relying Parties that signing performed by the private key was done and decryption will be done by the individual whose public key appears on the certificate. This requires that an individual safeguard their private key and any activation data used to access that key.

The CA requires proof of possession of the private key before creating and signing a certificate containing the associated public key. Proof of possession, of a private key, is handled automatically by the CA, the Subscriber message is protected by PKIX-Certificate Management Protocol (CMP). Proof of possession, of a private key, can also be accomplished by other means such as PKCS 7 or PKCS 10 requests.

Possession of the private key for the Subscriber can be accomplished by using the private key to sign the certificate request, or initiate PKIX-CMP operation.

The Subscriber's encryption key pair is generated by the CA. A PKIX-CMP operation transfers the private key to the Subscriber, together with the corresponding certificate, using digitally signed data from the PCA.

In the case of cross-certificates, the PKIX-CMP, PKCS 7 or PKCS 10 requests initiated by the subject CA, provides the proof of possession.

### **3.1.8 Authentication of Organization Identity**

The PCA does not issue organization certificates, except to other CAs. The certificates issued by the PCA to other CAs (either cross-certificates or subordinate CA certificates) are issued according to the requirements defined in the GPO CP and this CPS.

All requests for CA certificates include identity information of the requesting representative which is forwarded to the GPO PA for approval. In the event of a cross-certificate request, the GPO PA verifies the authority of the requestor to act on behalf of the requesting CA by contacting the indicated Policy Authority of the requesting CA via telephone or in-person. A record of the authority verification including the date, time, name of the person spoken with and signature of the GPO PA is kept by the PA.

### **3.1.9 Authentication of Individual Identity**

The PCA Subscribers will consist of personnel holding PCA Trusted Roles, Subordinate CAs and CAs that are cross certified with the PCA.

All Subscribers of the PCA will have their identity authenticated by appearing in-person. The acceptable identification documentation required by Subscribers is as follows:

- Trusted Roles
  - GPO issued GPO Employee badge or GPO issued GPO Contractor badge and another picture ID
- Subordinate CAs Sponsor
  - GPO issued GPO Employee badge or GPO issued GPO Contractor badge and another picture ID
- Cross Certified CAs Sponsor
  - Federal picture ID or 2 other forms of ID one of which must be a government issued picture ID (i.e. State issued Drivers License or State issued Picture ID Card)

The authentication is documented by the following:

- A signed declaration by the GPO PA or OA that it personally verified the identity of the Subscriber in accordance with the requirements of this CPS, including the form of identification used, the identifying number of the ID and the date and time of the verification
- A declaration of identity, signed with a handwritten signature by the Subscriber in the presence of the person performing the identity authentication. The GPO PA will keep the original signed declaration for its own files
- A Registration Request form signed by the applicant and by the GPO PA or OA representative that personally verified the identity of the Subscriber in accordance with the requirements of this CPS, including the form of identification used, the identifying number of the IDs and the date and time of the verification
- The CA administrators shall check to ensure that the certificate registration information supplied by the subscriber matches the identification credentials supplied for in-person proofing, and that no errors are contained in the certificate registration information supplied by the subscriber.

Any certificates issued to the PCA Subscribers will be stored on a FIPS 140 validated cryptographic module, as stipulated in the GPO CP.

### **3.1.10 Authentication of Component and Server Identities**

The PCA will not be issuing certificates to Components or Servers.

## **3.2 CERTIFICATE RENEWAL, UPDATE, AND ROUTINE RE-KEY**

### **3.2.1 Certificate Re-Key**

#### **3.2.1.1 CA Certificate Re-Key**

The PCA keys are manually updated prior to expiration of the current key pair. Authentication of the Subscriber's identity as defined in Section 3.1.9 of this CPS will be repeated once every three years.

CA re-keys are manual processes and require a formal script that details the steps taken. The script must show that the required separation of roles was observed. The script will include a notification process for all CAs, RAs and subscribers that rely on the CA's certificate that it has been changed. The completed script is retained by the OA as an audit trail of the CA re-key operation. All individuals participating during a CA re-key are identified in the script and must present a valid government issued picture ID for verification of identity. All CA re-keys are authenticated during the re-key process, using the information in the certificate request and a thumbprint (MD5 Hash) received using a secure out-of-band method; these steps are part of the formal script.

For cross-certification relationships, no automatic key update process is applied. If the GPO PA determines that a cross-certification agreement is to extend beyond the original period, a new cross-certificate is issued, prior to expiration of the current one. Issuance of new certificate requires the same identification and authentication process used for the initial cross-certification.

#### **3.2.1.2 PCA Subscriber Certificate Re-Key**

The PCA Subscriber keys are manually updated prior to expiration of the current key pairs.

Subscribers of the PCA shall have their affiliation with GPO reviewed every re-key.

### **3.2.2 Certificate Renewal**

The PCA does not support certificate renewal. If a Subscriber requires certificate renewal for any reason, the Subscriber will require a certificate re-key.

### **3.2.3 Certificate Update**

The PCA will support certificate update for name change. When a Subscriber's name changes (i.e. due to marriage) the name data contained in a certificate requires changing. A DN change will be performed creating a new set of certificates issued with the new name and new keys after the Subscriber provides, in person, proof of name change.

## **3.3 RE-KEY AFTER REVOCATION**

All PCA Subscribers must repeat the initial certificate registration and request process in order to obtain a new certificate after a revocation.

### **3.4 REVOCATION REQUEST**

Subscribers request to have their certificate revoked by submitting a digitally signed message request to the OA. If a Subscriber does not have his signature key, he shall make the request in person so he can present their identity-proofing credentials to the OA.

Subscriber revocation requests can be made by a Subscriber or another person authorized to act on behalf of the Subscriber (e.g., supervisor, HR department, etc.). All certificate revocation requests are communicated to the OA via secure means, either electronically or in person.

Trusted Personnel performing revocation must authenticate to revoke certificates.

Any requests to revoke a Subordinate CA, a cross-certified CA or the PCA certificate will be made to the GPO OA and will be approved or denied by the GPO PA.

All certificate revocation requests will be communicated to the GPO OA via secure means (i.e. digitally signed email), or in person.



## **4. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS**

### **4.1 CERTIFICATE APPLICATION**

#### **4.1.1 Cross-Certification Certificate Application**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

#### **4.1.2 Subscriber Certificate Application**

Because all PCA Subscribers are individuals filling Trusted Roles, the GPO OA nominates the individuals to the GPO PA in a signed memorandum - electronic transmission with digital signature is permitted. The GPO PA authorizes (digital signature on the memorandum is permitted) the GPO OA to add the nominee to the appropriate Trusted Role in the directory and to approve a certificate for that nominee.

Prior to certificate issuance, PCA Subscribers must complete in-person identification and authenticate, as specified in Section 3.1.9.

Upon successful completion of the identification and authentication procedures, the PCA Subscriber's PKI account is created. The CA generates a shared secret consisting of a reference number and an authorization code. The shared secret information is printed and provided to the Subscriber. The Subscriber receives a blank hardware token if required.

The Subscriber creates their profile (on token if required) using the shared secret information and the newly generated Subscriber private signature key. The PCA generates the Subscriber's certificate.

The signed certificate application is forwarded to the OA, who keeps a copy of all Subscriber certificate applications.

The OA forwards all completed requests for PCA certificates to the PA.

#### **4.1.3 Delivery of Public Key for Certificate Issuance**

PCA Subscriber's encryption public keys are generated by the PCA, and thus require no delivery mechanism.

PCA Subscriber signature or non-repudiation verification public keys are generated on the Subscriber's hardware or software token, and delivered to the CA using the PKIX-CMP protocol.

## **4.2 CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE**

For certificates issued to subscribers on hardware tokens (smartcards, for example), an authorized PKI Trusted Role staff member will issue the token to the subscriber. The OA and Trusted Role staff shall securely maintain the stock of hardware tokens prior to issuance. The token serial number of any token issued to a subscriber shall be recorded on the certificate application paperwork. Tokens may be re-used for other subscribers once the key destruction process, using the vendor supplied initialization and key zeroization software, has been

implemented by an authorized Trusted Role staff member. Tokens associated with a key compromise event are not to be re-used.

#### **4.2.1 Delivery of Subscriber's Private Key to Subscriber**

Subscribers generate their own signature private key, and as such, there is no need for delivery of the private signature key.

The Subscriber uses the private signing key they just generated to digitally sign the certificate request corresponding to that key. Upon receipt of a valid request, the PCA automatically generates an encryption key pair and issues a signature verification public key certificate and an encryption public key certificate for that Subscriber. The CA's signature verification certificate, both Subscriber certificates and the Subscriber's decryption private key are securely provided to the Subscriber using the PKIX-CMP protocol to provide both integrity and privacy.

In the case of cross-certificates, the requesting CA generates its own signature private key, and as such, there is no need for delivery of the private signature key. The cross-certification certificate is provided to the subject CA using the PKIX-CMP protocol to provide both integrity and privacy.

In some cases, the PKIX-CMP may be supplemented by the use of other procedures such as Public Key Crypto Standard 10 (PKCS 10), or Cisco's Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP).

#### **4.2.2 CA Public Key Delivery and Use**

The PCA's signature verification certificate will be provided to all Subscribers during the certificate issuance phase. The communication between the PCA and the Subscribers is protected using the PKIX-CMP protocol.

Relying Parties must also be granted access to the PCA's public key certificate in order to establish and verify certification trust paths. In order to distribute the PCA public key certificate, the PCA publishes its public key certificate in the GPO PKI Repository.

Additionally, the PCA's verification certificate may be distributed via an SSL protected GPO web site or other means as directed by the PA.

### **4.3 CERTIFICATE ACCEPTANCE**

All Subscribers will submit a signed PKI Subscriber Agreement, which includes a certificate request form and the Subscriber Obligations. The Subscriber's signature on the PKI Subscriber Agreement will be deemed as the acceptance of the certificate. In the case of cross-certification certificates appropriate MOAs will need to be signed by both PAs.

### **4.4 CERTIFICATE SUSPENSION AND REVOCATION**

The GPO PCA does not support suspension, and as such, the following sub-sections pertain strictly to certificate revocation.

## **4.4.1 Revocation**

### **4.4.1.1 Circumstances for Revocation**

Certificates will be revoked when any of the following circumstances occur:

- Subscriber's private key is lost, stolen, compromised or suspected of being compromised
- Subscriber is suspected of fraud or other adverse behavior
- Subscriber is no longer affiliated with the operation or maintenance of the PCA
- Subscriber leaves the GPO
- Subscriber violates or is suspected of violating the Subscriber Agreement
- Subscriber or other authorized party asks for Subscriber's certificate to be revoked

### **4.4.1.2 Revocation Requesters**

The PA or OA can request revocation of any Subscriber certificate issued by the PCA.

A Subscriber can always request revocation of a certificate in which they are listed as the certificate subject.

Requests for revocation of a cross-certification certificate can be made by the PA of the cross-certified CA or by the GPO PA. The GPO PA will review and approve or deny all requests to revoke a cross-certification certificate.

If appropriate, the Subscriber will be notified by email or other written means when revocation of their certificate is completed.

### **4.4.1.3 Procedure for Revocation Request**

When any of the circumstances for revocation occur, the certificate will be revoked, as follows:

- Authenticate revocation request
- Establish a secure connection to the CA server
- Authenticate to the CA server
- Revoke the certificate

The CA server completes the revocation process.

If the revocation is being requested for reason of key compromise or suspected fraudulent use, then the revocation request so indicates.

Hardware token will be surrendered to the OA, and the OA will ensure it is protected commiserate with the sensitivity of the information that the certificate on the token could protect until the token is zeroized or destroyed.

### **4.4.1.4 Certificate Revocation**

Revocation shall take effect upon the publication of the CRL (identifying the reason for the revocation, which may include loss, compromise, or termination of employment). Information about a revoked certificate shall remain on the CRL even after the certificate expires.

### **4.4.1.5 Revocation Request Grace Period**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

#### **4.4.2 Suspension**

The GPO CP does not permit suspension.

#### **4.4.3 Revocation Lists**

Certificates that have been revoked shall **not** be removed from the CRL, they shall remain on the CRL even after the certificate expires.

##### **4.4.3.1 Revocation List Issuance Frequency**

The PCA server is configured to issue CRLs at least once a day and ARLs at least once per month. Additional CRLs/ARLs will be issued upon certificate revocation. Upon issuance, the new CRL/ARL will be published in the directory.

The OA will ensure that the CRL/ARL is up-to-date according to the practices of this CPS.

##### **4.4.3.2 CRL/CARL Checking Requirements**

Each certificate issued by the PCA includes the full DN of the CRL Distribution Point to be checked during the verification of the certificate. Relying parties, when working in an online mode, shall check the current CRL, identified by the DN in the certificate's cRLDistributionPoints extension field, along with any other CRLs required in certificate chain processing prior to trusting the certificate. CRL checking is done automatically by the Entrust software.

When working in an offline mode, relying parties are not able to perform full CRL checking. When relying parties do not perform CRL checking, they accept the certificates at their own risk.

#### **4.4.4 On-Line Revocation Status Checking**

The PCA does not support on-line revocation/status checking other than via CRLs as described in this CPS.

#### **4.4.5 Other Forms of Revocation Checking**

No alternate methods of revocation advertisements are used for Subscriber certificates.

#### **4.4.6 Checking Requirements for Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements**

There are no other forms of revocation advertisement used.

#### **4.4.7 Special Requirements Related to Key Compromise**

CARLs are used to advertise CA private key compromise or loss.

### **4.5 SECURITY AUDIT PROCEDURES**

All material security events on the CA's system should be automatically recorded in audit trail files. Such files shall be securely archived per this CPS and in accordance with any other GPO information systems security policies.

As specified in the GPO CP, there are other auditable events that are not captured in the electronic audit logs. These events, such as physical access events, are manually recorded in

paper logs. The OA is responsible for ensuring that all manual audit log events, as defined by the GPO PA and the compliance auditor are properly logged and the logs maintained as required.

#### 4.5.1 Types of Events Recorded

The following table identifies audit events that are recorded for the PKI. These events may be recorded electronically by the operating system on the CA or Directory servers, the CA application software or manually by a Trusted Role:

Auditable Event	Method	Location
<b>SECURITY AUDIT</b>		
Any changes to the Audit parameters, e.g., audit frequency, type of event audited	Manually	CP or CPS change control
Any attempt to delete or modify the Audit logs	Automatically	OS logs
<b>IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION</b>		
Successful and unsuccessful attempts to assume a role	Automatically	CA logs
Change in the value of maximum authentication attempts	Automatically	CA logs
Maximum number of unsuccessful authentication attempts during user login	Automatically	CA logs
An Administrator unlocks an account that has been locked as a result of unsuccessful authentication attempts	Automatically	CA logs
An Administrator changes the type of authenticator, e.g., from password to biometrics	Automatically	CA logs
<b>KEY GENERATION</b>		
Whenever the CA generates a key. (Not mandatory for single session or one-time use symmetric keys)	Automatically	CA logs
<b>PRIVATE KEY LOAD AND STORAGE</b>		
The loading of Component private keys	Automatically	CA logs
All access to certificate subject private keys retained within the CA for key recovery purposes	Automatically	CA logs
<b>TRUSTED PUBLIC KEY ENTRY, DELETION AND STORAGE</b>		
All changes to the trusted public keys, including additions and deletions	Automatically	CA, OS logs <sup>1</sup>
<b>PRIVATE KEY EXPORT</b>		

<sup>1</sup> Auditing of changes to trusted public keys can take place in various locations. These changes will be audited by the server OS or CA application (if performed through the CA).

<b>Auditable Event</b>	<b>Method</b>	<b>Location</b>
The export of private keys (keys used for a single session or message are excluded)	Automatically	CA logs
<b>CERTIFICATE REGISTRATION</b>		
All certificate requests	Manually	OA logs
<b>CERTIFICATE REVOCATION</b>		
All certificate revocation requests	Manually	OA logs
<b>CERTIFICATE STATUS CHANGE APPROVAL</b>		
The approval or rejection of a certificate status change request	Manually	OA logs
<b>CA CONFIGURATION</b>		
Any security-relevant changes to the configuration of the CA	Automatically	CA logs
<b>ACCOUNT ADMINISTRATION</b>		
Roles and users are added or deleted	Automatically	CA logs
The access control privileges of a user account or a role are modified	Automatically	CA logs
<b>CERTIFICATE PROFILE MANAGEMENT</b>		
All changes to the certificate profile	Automatically	CA logs
<b>REVOCATION PROFILE MANAGEMENT</b>		
All changes to the revocation profile	Automatically	CA logs
<b>CERTIFICATE REVOCATION LIST PROFILE MANAGEMENT</b>		
All changes to the certificate revocation list profile	Automatically	CA logs
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>		
Installation of the Operating System	Automatically	OS logs
Installation of the CA	Automatically	CA, OS logs
Installing hardware cryptographic modules	Automatically	CA logs
Removing hardware cryptographic modules	Automatically	CA logs
Destruction of cryptographic modules	Automatically	CA logs
System Startup	Automatically	OS logs
Logon Attempts to CA applications	Automatically	CA logs
Receipt of Hardware / Software	Manually	OA logs
Attempts to set passwords	Automatically	OS logs
Attempts to modify passwords	Automatically	OS logs

<b>Auditable Event</b>	<b>Method</b>	<b>Location</b>
Backing up CA internal database	Automatically	CA logs
Restoring CA internal database	Automatically	CA logs
File manipulation (e.g., creation, renaming, moving)	Automatically	OS logs
Posting of any material to a repository	Automatically	CA, OS and Dir logs
Access to CA internal database	Automatically	CA logs
All certificate compromise notification requests	Manually	OA logs
Loading tokens with certificates	Automatically	CA logs
Shipment of Tokens	Manually	OA logs
Zeroizing tokens	Manually	OA logs
Re-key of the CA	Automatically	CA logs
Configuration changes to the CA server involving:		
<i>Hardware</i>	Manually	OA logs
<i>Software</i>	Manually	OA logs
<i>Operating System</i>	Manually	OA logs
<i>Patches</i>	Manually	OA logs
<i>Security Profiles</i>	Manually	OA logs
<b>PHYSICAL ACCESS / SITE SECURITY</b>		
Personnel Access to room housing CA	Manually	OA logs
Access to the CA server	Manually	OA logs
Known or suspected violations of physical security	Manually	OA logs
<b>ANOMALIES</b>		
Software Error conditions	Automatically	CA logs
Software check integrity failures	Automatically	CA logs
Receipt of improper messages	Automatically	CA, OS logs
Misrouted messages	Automatically	OS logs
Network attacks (suspected or confirmed)	Automatically	CA, OS logs
Equipment failure	Manually	OA logs
Electrical power outages	Manually	OA logs
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) failure	Manually	OA logs
Obvious and significant network service or access failures	Manually	OA logs
Violations of Certificate Policy	Manually	PA logs
Violations of Certification Practice Statement	Manually	OA logs

---

Auditable Event	Method	Location
Resetting Operating System clock	Automatically	OS logs

#### 4.5.2 Frequency of Processing Data

The Security Compliance Officer reviews the audit logs for policy violations or other significant events at least as often as specified in the GPO CP.

The audit logs are made available during any compliance audits.

#### 4.5.3 Retention Period for Security Audit Data

The audit trail data is kept live on the CA or RA hardware for two months. After the 2<sup>nd</sup> month, the audit trail data is archived in accordance with this CPS. Once the audit trail data has been archived, the data will be removed from the CA or RA hardware.

#### 4.5.4 Protection of Security Audit Data

Current physical logs (e.g., visitor sign-in logs) will be kept in the CA equipment location rooms. Only authorized personnel will have access to the physical log and only authorized personnel will make entries in physical log or other paper audit records

The audit trail is stored in regular operating system flat files. Each audit trail file consists of an audit header, which contains information about the audits in the file and list of events. A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is created for each of the CA audit events and the audit header. Each CA audit trail file has a different audit key used to generate the MAC. The Entrust master key for the PCA is used to protect the audit key. The audit key is stored in the audit header encrypted with the master key.

The audit trail can be spread across many files. A new audit trail file is created when the current audit trail file reaches a preset size of 1 Mbyte or the Entrust master key is updated.

#### 4.5.5 Security Audit Data Backup Procedures

The security audit data backup are archived on a monthly basis. All files including the latest audit trail file are copied to magnetic tape (or some other secure media) and stored in a secure archive facility.

#### 4.5.6 Security Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External)

The CA audit system is internal to the Entrust Authority Security Manager software. The CA audit system is automatically invoked at CA system startup, and ceases only at CA system shutdown. If it is determined that the automated CA audit system has failed and is not operational, CA operations shall be suspended until the audit system failure has been resolved. The GPO PA shall determine whether to resume operations after such an audit system failure.

#### 4.5.7 Notification to Event-Causing Subject

The GPO CP imposes no requirement to notify a Subject that an event was audited.



#### 4.5.8 Vulnerability Assessments

The OA and the Compliance Auditor will be watchful for anomalies and attempts to violate the integrity of the system, including the equipment, its physical location, and its personnel. The OA will, as part of its regular security audit review, look for events such as repeated failed actions, requests for privileged information, attempted access of system files, unauthenticated responses, and continuity of security audit data. Suspicious activity will be reported to the PA.

### 4.6 RECORDS ARCHIVAL

#### 4.6.1 Types of Events Archived

The following table identifies the archive records that are retained:

Archive Records
CA accreditation (if applicable)
Certification Practice Statement
Contractual obligations
System and equipment configuration
Modifications and updates to system or configuration
Certificate requests
Revocation requests
Subscriber Identity Authentication data
Documentation of receipt and acceptance of certificates
Documentation of receipt of tokens
All certificates issued or published
Record of CA Rekey
All ARLs and CRLs issued and/or published
All Audit Logs
Other data or applications to verify archive contents
Documentation required by compliance auditors
Certificate Policy
Other agreements concerning operations of the CA
Subscriber agreements (if any)
Subscriber encryption-decryption key pairs (if any)

#### **4.6.2 Retention Period for Archive**

Archive records are kept for at least the period specified by the GPO CP. Applications required to process the archive data will also be maintained for the archive retention period. The OA is responsible for knowing where the archived material is, and for ensuring that it is not lost during reorganizations, physical organization moves, and so on.

Archive records that have been kept for 10 years are transferred to a PA approved archive facility for indefinite storage.

#### **4.6.3 Protection of Archive**

The archive data will be digitally signed when appropriate. This will provide an integrity check that can be used to verify that the data has not been modified.

Long-term archive data for the PCA will be recorded on read-only media and stored off-site in a fireproof safe/vault with locks. Short-term media (e.g., tapes) will be stored in a location separate from the CA equipment. The archive media is protected by physical security in that it is retained in a restricted access location to which only the PA and OA, or their designated representatives, have access. This location will adhere to the physical security practices defined in this CPS.

The archives will be labeled with the CA DN and the date.

A list of Security Officers that have the permissions necessary to access and delete the on-line archive files will be maintained at the CA site, and all accesses will be recorded. These records will be made available to the auditors during compliance audits.

#### **4.6.4 Archive Backup Procedures**

Archive files are backed up along with the security audit logs, as described in Section 4.5.5.

Paper archives may be backed up to microfiche, or other long-term storage solution, as directed by the PA.

#### **4.6.5 Requirements for Time-Stamping of Records**

Time-stamping of records is accomplished via the CA system, using the CA system clock. The CA system clock is synchronized on a periodic basis with an authoritative time source, to ensure that the CA system clock is accurate.

#### **4.6.6 Archive Collection System (Internal and External)**

PCA archive data will be collected as part of the routine system backup procedures, along with directory shadowing, and explicit file copies of PCA files that do not reside in the underlying PCA database. Paper based CA records that are required for archive will be copied or digitally scanned, and packaged by the Operational Authority for transmittal to the archive site. The Operational Authority shall verify that all required archive records are contained in packages that are transmitted and moved to the archive facility.

#### **4.6.7 Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information**

The archive system automatically verifies the archive media immediately after archive creation.

The OA will provide access to archive information to the Compliance Auditor or other authorized requestor. The OA is responsible for ensuring that the request comes from an authorized source. The archive condition is verified during every compliance audit.

#### **4.7 CA KEY CHANGEOVER**

The certificates for the PCA and Subscribers to the PCA are set up for manual key update, as defined in this CPS. As such, the encryption and digital signature key pairs must be manually updated prior to expiry. Following CA key changeover, the new CA key will be used to CRLs and certificates going forward.

#### **4.8 COMPROMISE AND DISASTER RECOVERY**

The PA and OA maintain a GPO PKI Contingency Plan, which is updated periodically (at least on an annual basis) or as major system changes dictate, to define how the PKI is restored to service in a reasonably timely manner in the event of a failure. The GPO PKI Contingency Plan shall define the acceptable system outage and recovery time periods.

In any key compromise situation, a report will be filed with the PA indicating the circumstances under which the compromise occurred. The PA will determine if a possible follow up investigation and potential action is required.

##### **4.8.1 Computing Resources, Software, and /or Data are Corrupted**

In the event of an inoperative PCA due to equipment damage, software or Operating System failure, or data corruption, where all copies of the CA signature keys are **not** destroyed, the following steps, at a minimum, are taken to recover a secure environment:

- The PCA infrastructure (hardware and software) will be re-built and/or restored from backup as necessary at an alternate facility
  - The alternate facility is located at least 50 miles from the primary PCA facility
  - The PCA infrastructure is already built and on stand-by at the alternate facility
- The PCA shall be reconstituted within 72 hours, in the event of a catastrophic failure
- The directory data, encryption certificates and CRLs/ARLs, are restored if the directory becomes unusable and must be restored from backup or if the directory is suspected to be corrupt

##### **4.8.2 CA Signature Keys are Revoked**

In the event of an inoperative PCA, where all copies of the PCA signature keys are **not** destroyed, the following steps, at a minimum, are taken to recover a secure environment:

- Notify the PA of the situation in writing

- The PCA infrastructure (hardware and software) will be re-built and/or restored from backup as necessary
- The directory data, encryption certificates and CRLs/ARLs, are restored if the directory becomes unusable and must be restored from backup or if the directory is suspected to be corrupt
- The Policy Authority shall be informed, as well as any other entity Policy Authorities that the GPO PCA is cross-certified with, in the event that the CA cannot issue a CRL within 72 hours after the time specified in the next update field of its currently valid CRL

#### **4.8.3 CA Signature Keys are Compromised**

In the event of the compromise of the PCA private key, the PA will be informed via secure communication from the OA. The PA will notify any CAs that the PCA is cross certified with of the compromise, so they can revoke cross certificates. The PA will authorize and instruct the OA on recovery of the PCA.

The OA will notify the Subscribers of the PCA of the key compromise via a secure communication. Once the PCA is recovered, every PCA Subscriber will be required to re-register in-person and get their new certificates.

#### **4.8.4 Secure Facility Impaired After a Natural or Other Type of Disaster**

In the event of a disaster of the PCA when the PCA private key is not compromised and is available, the following steps, as a minimum, are taken to recover a secure environment:

- The PCA infrastructure (hardware and software) will be re-built at an alternate facility
- The directory data, encryption certificates and CRLs/ARLs, are restored to the directory
- In the event that the disaster results in all copies of the CA keys being destroyed, the Policy Authority (PA) shall be notified at the earliest feasible time, and the PA shall take actions it deems appropriate

### **4.9 CA CESSATION OF SERVICES**

In the event that the PCA ceases operation or is otherwise terminated:

- All Subscribers and Relying Parties must be promptly notified of the cessation
- All Subscribers will be notified of cessation using email communication, if email is available
- All CAs with which cross-certification agreements are current at the time of cessation will be informed so that cross-certificates to the PCA may be revoked
- All certificates issued by the PCA shall be revoked no later than the time of cessation (any CRL issued must be valid until 30 days after the last certificate issued by the PCA expires)
- All current and archived PCA identity proofing, certificate, validation, revocation/suspension, renewal, policy and practices, billing, and audit data shall be archived

## **5. PHYSICAL, PROCEDURAL, AND PERSONNEL SECURITY CONTROLS**

### **5.1 PHYSICAL CONTROLS FOR THE GPO-CA**

The PCA equipment is labeled as being for authorized use only. PCA equipment is in a controlled facility as described below. PCA cryptographic modules are protected against theft, loss, and unauthorized use as described below.

#### **5.1.1 Site Location and Construction**

PCA equipment is located in facilities approved by GPO as being appropriate for storing sensitive material. The OA will keep a copy of documentation approving the PCA site and will provide the documentation for inspection during compliance audits.

#### **5.1.2 Physical Access**

An integrated physical access control and intrusion detection system will restrict access to authorized personnel, detect unauthorized access, and provide for the audit of all entries to and exits from the controlled areas. Sensors monitor exit and entrance doors.

The Security Zone is designated as a two-person zone.

An access control policy is posted in the Operations zone and includes sign-in sheets for visitors. The policy requires all persons to wear an approved building pass and visitors to be escorted at all times within these high security zones.

Entrance to, and exit from, all controlled areas is monitored by closed circuit television (CCTV) and an appropriate system is used to record images or persons passing through the area. In addition, an appropriate camera and time-lapse recorder will record activity in the security zone. The camera is placed such that persons in the room are recorded, but such that keystrokes typed on the system console may not be recovered by image enhancement. Images/recordings are maintained for a minimum of 90 days. (Note: The requirement for video recording within the security zone shall be waived if it violates local employment or privacy regulations/legislation.)

CA facilities are checked by security personnel at least once per business day to ensure that the physical protection mechanisms are still operating and ensure that there has not been an attempt to gain unauthorized access to the CA area. Records of these checks (including the names of the individuals making the check, along with a date and time) will be provided to the auditor during every compliance audit.

Only trusted PKI personnel will be given the keys, access cards, or the combination numbers required to access the CA equipment rooms/zones (as noted above visitors must sign in and will be escorted at all times).

#### **5.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning**

All controlled access areas in the Security Zone shall be equipped with:

- An appropriately sized uninterruptible power supply sufficient to allow for the systems to complete current actions and shutdown without data loss, and for six (6) hours of uninterruptible power for the directory servers
- Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning appropriate for a commercial data processing facility
- Emergency lighting

These environmental controls shall conform to local standards and shall be appropriately secured to prevent unauthorized access and/or tampering with the equipment.

No liquid, gas, exhaust, etc. pipes shall traverse the controlled space other than those directly required for the area's HVAC system.

#### **5.1.4 Water Exposures**

The PCA equipment will be installed such that it is not in danger of exposure to water. Sprinklers used for fire control have a contingency plan for recovery should the sprinklers malfunction, or cause water damage outside of the fire area.

#### **5.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection**

The PCA secure facility is fully wired for fire detection, alarm and suppression. Routine, frequent inspections of all systems are made to assure adequate operation.

#### **5.1.6 Media Storage**

All media is stored away from sources of heat, and away from obvious sources of water or other obvious hazards. Electromagnetic media (tapes, diskettes, etc.) are stored away from obvious sources of strong magnetic fields (audio speakers, monitors). Archived material is stored in a room or building separate from the PCA equipment until it is transferred to the approved archive storage facility.

#### **5.1.7 Waste Disposal**

Sensitive media and documentation that are no longer needed and are to be destroyed shall be destroyed in a process that renders the material unrecoverable.

#### **5.1.8 Off-Site Backup**

Full system backups, sufficient to recover from system failure, are to be accomplished not less than once per week. A full system backup shall be stored at an off-site location (separate from the CA equipment), with physical controls commensurate with the operational CA.

### **5.2 PROCEDURAL CONTROLS FOR THE GPO-CA**

#### **5.2.1 Trusted Roles**

The GPO CP defines the following Trusted Roles:

- OA System Administrator
- OA Officer – Master User

- OA Officer – Security Officer
- OA Officer – Administrator
- OA Officer – Directory Administrator
- Security Compliance Auditor
- OA Backup Operator

The following table identifies the relation of the GPO Trusted Roles, and Entrust product roles:

GPO Role	Entrust Role
OA System Administrator	N/A
OA Officer – Master User	Master User
OA Officer – Security Officer	Security Officers (includes the First Officer)
OA Officer – Administrator	Administrator
OA Officer – Directory Administrator	Directory Administrator
Security Compliance Auditor	Auditor
OA Backup Operator	N/A

Each role is explained in following sections.

#### **5.2.1.1 GPO OA System Administrator**

The OA System Administrator is responsible for initially installing and configuring the PCA operating system and for performing ongoing system administration duties such as account management, access control management, system configuration management, database maintenance, software upgrades, and compromise reporting.

#### **5.2.1.2 GPO OA Officer – Master Users**

There are three Entrust Authority Master Users. Their Entrust Authority Master User passwords are documented and stored in a safe approved by the OA. The Master Users have authority to:

- Configuring certificate profiles or templates
- Generating and backing up CA keys
- Maintain Entrust Authority services (consisting of Administration Service and Key Management Service) plus the Entrust Authority database
- Recover the Entrust Administration service, in the event its profile becomes damaged
- Backup, re-encrypt and restore from backup as necessary, the Entrust Manager database

#### **5.2.1.3 GPO OA Officer – Security Officers**

The Entrust Security Officer created during the installation of the Entrust Authority is the *First Officer*. The First Officer, drawing from selected GPO personnel, creates additional Entrust Security Officers. The main role of the Security Officers is to set and administer the PCA's

security policy as it applies to all Subscribers. Security Officers use Entrust Administration as their interface to Entrust Authority and have the following privileges:

- Set the security policy for the PCA, and alter it
- Verifying the identity of Trusted Role Subscribers and accuracy of information included in certificates
- Add, delete and revoke other Entrust Security Officers, Entrust Administrators, and Directory Administrators
- Authorize sensitive operations, such as adding and deleting Security Officers and Administrators
- Approving and executing the issuance, updates and revocations of CA certificates
- Manage cross-certification agreements and issue, update and revoke cross-certificates
- All Entrust Administrator privileges

The names of the Security Officers will be made available to the Compliance Auditor during each compliance audit.

#### **5.2.1.4 GPO OA Officer – Administrators**

For the PCA, the Administrator role is held by the RA. The RAs are responsible for:

- Verifying the identity of all Subordinate CAs and Subscribers
- Securely communicating requests to and responses from the CA
- Executing revocation requests received from authorized sources

The name of the Registration Authority will be made available to the Compliance Auditor during each compliance audit.

For the PCA, there are no Local Registration Authorities.

For the PCA, there are no Trusted Agents.

#### **5.2.1.5 GPO OA Officer – Directory Administrators**

The Directory Administrators are responsible for maintaining the certificate repository. The Directory Administrator can be an OA Officer – Security Officer or OA Officer – Administrator, but may **not** be an OA Officer – Master User.

#### **5.2.1.6 GPO Security Compliance Auditor**

The Security Compliance Auditor also known as the Security Compliance Officer (SCO) is responsible for reviewing, but not modifying audit logs, various reports, the Security Policy and user properties. The Security Compliance Officer is responsible for performing or overseeing internal compliance audits to ensure that CA is operating in accordance with the CP and its CPS.

The Security Compliance Officer role has been established and a number of individuals have been assigned to the role. The names of the Security Compliance Officer(s) will be made available to the Compliance Auditor during each compliance audit.

#### **5.2.1.7 GPO OA Backup Operator**

The OA Backup Operator is responsible for performing backups, duplicating backups, secure storage of backups, and restoring from backups.



### 5.2.1.8 Registration Authority

For the PCA, the RA duties are divided between the OA Officer – Security Officers and the OA Officer – Administrators.

For the PCA, there are no Local Registration Authorities or Trusted Agents.

### 5.2.2 Separation of Roles

The following table identifies the GPO Trusted Roles and the privileges assigned to each role within the Entrust CA:

Privilege	Trusted Roles			
	OA Officer Master User	OA Officer Security Officer	OA Officer Administrator	Security Compliance Auditor/Officer
<b>Default User Policy certificate</b>	N/A	Security Officer Policy	Administrator Policy	Auditor Policy
<b>Audit Logs</b>				
View own logs		X	X	X
View all logs		X	X	X
<b>Bulk &amp; Report</b>				
Process bulk files		X	X	
Create reports		X	X	X
<b>Certificates</b>				
Admin all categories		X	X	
Admin selected categories				
Admin all types		X	X	
<b>Certification Authority</b>				
Stop, Start and Maintain CA Services	X			
Recover Admin Service	X			
Backup and Restore CA databases	X			
View CA certificates		X	X	X
Update CA signing keys		X		
Revoke CA keys		X		

Privilege	Trusted Roles			
	OA Officer Master User	OA Officer Security Officer	OA Officer Administrator	Security Compliance Auditor/Officer
View list of imported CAs		X		X
Import/Export CA public keys		X		
<b>CA Cross-Certification</b>				
View		X		X
Initiate		X		
Revoke		X		
Complete		X		
<b>CA Subordinate</b>				
View		X		X
Add subordinate CAs		X		
Revoke		X		
<b>Directory</b>				
Bind to Directory		X	X	
Change Directory password		X	X	
View entries		X	X	X
Create, Delete, Modify entries		X	X	
<b>User Groups</b>				
View		X	X	X
Rename		X		
Create		X		
Delete		X		
Admin all groups		X		
Admin any group to which they belong			X	
<b>License Information</b>				
View		X	X	

Privilege	Trusted Roles			
	OA Officer Master User	OA Officer Security Officer	OA Officer Administrator	Security Compliance Auditor/Officer
Modify		X		
<b>Policy OIDs</b>				
Admin all OIDs		X	X	
<b>Queued Requests</b>				
View queued requests		X	X	X
Modify queued requests		X	X	
Create queued requests		X		
Delete queued requests		X		
Cancel queued requests		X		
Cancel request authorization		X		
Approve request authorization		X	X	
<b>Roles</b>				
View		X	X	X
Modify		X		
Create		X		
Delete		X		
Admin all roles		X		
Admin selected roles			X <sup>1</sup>	
<b>Searchbases</b>				
View		X	X	X
Modify		X		
Create		X		
Delete		X		
Admin all searchbases		X	X	

<sup>1</sup> End-User Roles

Privilege	Trusted Roles			
	OA Officer Master User	OA Officer Security Officer	OA Officer Administrator	Security Compliance Auditor/Officer
Admin selected searchbases				
<b>Security Policies</b>				
View security policies		X	X	X
Modify security policies		X		
Export certificate specs.		X	X	X
Import certificate specs.		X		
Export user templates		X	X	X
Import user templates		X		
Force CRLs		X		
View CRLs		X	X	X
View user policies		X	X	X
Modify user policies		X		
Create user policies		X		
<b>User Templates</b>				
Admin all templates		X	X	
Admin selected templates				
<b>Users</b>				
View		X	X	X
Add		X	X	
Re-activate		X	X	
Deactivate/Remove		X	X	
Change DN		X	X	
Modify properties		X	X	
Revoke certificates		X	X	
Update key pairs		X	X	
Set for key recovery		X	X	

Privilege	Trusted Roles			
	OA Officer Master User	OA Officer Security Officer	OA Officer Administrator	Security Compliance Auditor/Officer
Cancel key recovery		X	X	
Modify key update options		X		
View activation codes		X	X	
<b>Users – Advanced</b>				
Modify OIDs		X		
Change user's role		X		
Modify group membership		X	X	
Import new users		X		
Export to another CA		X		
Archive users		X		
View archived users		X		X
Retrieve archived users		X		
Restore information to Directory		X	X	
Perform PKIX requests		X	X	
Create user profile		X		
Recover user profile	X <sup>2</sup>	X		
<b>Users – Other</b>				
View attribute certificate		X	X	X
Modify attribute certificate		X	X	
Create attribute certificate		X	X	
Delete attribute certificate		X	X	
View registration password		X		
Modify registration password		X	X	
Validate registration password		X		

<sup>2</sup> Master Users can setup Security Officers for recovery

Privilege	Trusted Roles			
	OA Officer Master User	OA Officer Security Officer	OA Officer Administrator	Security Compliance Auditor/Officer
Notify client		X	X	
Modify Directory properties		X	X	

The GPO PA shall enforce separation of role for sensitive PKI functions by assigning the duties of OA Officer – Master User, OA Officer – Security Officer, OA Officer – Administrator, Security Compliance Auditor and OA System Administrator to separate individuals. No individual shall hold more than one of these roles.

In addition, there is separation between personnel that create policies, implement policies, perform registration, and perform audits. To ensure that no one corrupt individual may modify the operation of the CA, all security sensitive functions shall require authorization by more than one individual.

### 5.2.3 Number of Persons Required Per Task

All Entrust Security Officer operations need at least one Security Officer authorization. Certain functions, such as activation of the CA Private Key, will be protected by multi-person controls. The following operations need two authorizations:

- Generation of GPO-PCA Signing Keys
- Activation of GPO-PCA Signing Keys
- Using GPO-PCA Signing Keys
- Deactivation of GPO-PCA Signing Keys
- Backing up or Duplicating of GPO-PCA Private Signing Key
- Physical Control or Backups of GPO-PCA Signing Keys
- Physical Access or Control of the Cryptographic Module
- Physical Access or Control of the GPO-PCA
- Physical Access or Control of the GPO-PCA Safes and/or Secure Containers
- Physical Access to the of PCA Signing Keys
- Audit Log Review and Oversight
- Adding and deleting Security Officers
- Setting default certificate lifetimes
- Cross-certifying with other CAs
- CA master key updates
- Recovery of Administrator and Officer accounts
- CA hardware, OS, and application software maintenance

## **5.2.4 Identification and Authentication for Each Role**

Subscribers filling RA role authenticate to the CA system using PKI credentials stored on their hardware token.

## **5.3 PERSONNEL CONTROLS**

### **5.3.1 Background, Qualifications, Experience, and Security Clearance Requirements**

PCA Master Users, Security Officers, Registration Authorities, Security Compliance Officers, and System Administrators are selected based on loyalty, trustworthiness, and integrity. All individuals filling Trusted Roles for the PCA must be US citizens. Copies of documentation proving an individual's citizenship and security clearance status (if applicable), for PCA Trusted Role personnel, will be maintained by the OA, and made available during compliance audits.

In addition to the above, individuals filling Trusted Roles for the PCA will:

- Have not knowingly been previously relieved of their PKI duties or responsibilities for reasons of negligence or non-performance of duties
- Are appointed in writing by the PA
- Have not knowingly been denied a security clearance, or had a security clearance revoked
- Have not been convicted of a felony offense
- Have successfully completed an appropriate training program
- Have demonstrated the ability to perform their duties
- Are trustworthy

### **5.3.2 Background Check Procedures**

Prospective employees for these Trusted Roles will be informed that personnel screening (e.g., references, credit checks, criminal record checks, etc.) will be conducted on any person that is being considered for such a position.

If approved by the PA, an active, current GPO security clearance may be used in lieu of the personnel screening identified above.

If the trustworthiness of an individual is questioned while he or she is on the job, then the person will be removed from the Trusted Role position while the problem is being investigated.

### **5.3.3 Training Requirements**

Training for each individual Trusted Role for the PCA will include both the requirements and operations of the role and the PKI in general. An employee that has been assigned to a Trusted Role shall not begin working in that role until the person is trained for that role. The OA is responsible for ensuring that training is accomplished for employees that serve in Trusted Roles.

Records of the training that has been provided shall be maintained on site in paper or electronic media (e.g., a text document or a spreadsheet) and shall be made available to the Compliance Auditor during every compliance audit.

### 5.3.4 Retraining Frequency and Requirements

Any significant change to this CPS, PKI hardware or software will require retraining of affected personnel. The OA will inform individuals filling Trusted Roles for the PCA when retraining is required, and will provide any required retraining.

### 5.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence

No stipulation.

### 5.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions

Any person that operates in violation of the GPO CP or the practices and procedures stated herein, whether through negligence or with malicious intent, may have privileges revoked and may be subject to administrative and disciplinary action. Repeated or significant violation of policy may result in revocation of the individual's public key certificate or a formal notification by the PA to cease the operation.

### 5.3.7 Contracting Personnel Requirements

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

### 5.3.8 Documentation Supplied to Personnel

All CA operators are provided appropriate system, application and cryptographic module documents which are retained at the CA location.

At a minimum, the following documentation will be supplied:

<b>Role</b>	<b>Documentation Supplied</b>
Master Users	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Chrysalis Luna documentation (from vendor)</li><li>• Entrust Security Manager Operations Guide</li><li>• PA approved CP</li></ul>
System Administrator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Windows 2000 on-line documentation (help files)</li><li>• Entrust Security Manager Operations Guide</li><li>• PA approved CP</li><li>• PA approved CPS</li></ul>
Security Officer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Windows 2000 on-line documentation (help files)</li><li>• Entrust Security Manager Operations Guide</li><li>• Entrust Security Manager Administration Guide</li><li>• Chrysalis Luna documentation (from vendor)</li><li>• PA approved CP</li><li>• PA approved CPS</li></ul>
Registration Authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Entrust Security Manager Administration Guide</li><li>• PA approved CP</li><li>• PA approved CPS</li></ul>





## **6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS**

### **6.1 KEY PAIR GENERATION AND INSTALLATION**

#### **6.1.1 Key Pair Generation**

Entrust software will initiate the process of generating the key pairs for the PCA Subscriber. Use of Federal Information Processing System (FIPS) approved cryptographic modules precludes exposure of plaintext key outside of the cryptographic modules. The PCA Subscriber's signature key pair will be generated on a FIPS 140 Level 1 or higher (the OA Officer – Administrator will be generated on a Level 2 hardware token), validated cryptographic module and the Subscriber's public signature key is delivered to the CA at that time, and the Subscriber's encryption key pair will be generated at the CA machine, and the Subscriber's private encryption key will be delivered to the Subscriber at that time. For subscribers that have keys issued on hardware tokens, an authorized GPO PKI Trusted Role staff member (Security Officer or Registration Authority) shall issue the token to the subscriber.

Chrysalis-ITS LunaCA3 hardware tokens will be used to generate and store the PCA private key. The PKI administrators will authenticate to the CA using smart cards in order to invoke the CA signing key.

The CA key pair generation will be in compliance with PKCS#1, including the tests for primality. The private key will never be exposed outside the module in unencrypted form.

#### **6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber**

Private signature keys will be generated and remain within the crypto boundary of the cryptographic module of the key owner, thus no delivery is required.

Private decryption keys will be delivered by the PCA using the security protection provided by PKIX-CMP.

#### **6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer**

Public keys are delivered to the CA electronically in a certificate request in accordance with PKIX-CMP.

#### **6.1.4 CA Certificates and Public Key Availability and Delivery to Entity CAs**

GPO-CA certificates shall be posted in the border directory, so Entity CAs have access. For the GPO-PCA to issue a cross certificate to an Entity CA the public keys must be transport using a secure, out-of-band method. The GPO PCA certificate is a self-signed certificate. The border directory shall implement access controls sufficient to prevent a certificate substitution attack.

#### **6.1.5 Key Sizes**

The PCA key modulus is 2048 bits for RSA.

Subscriber's key modulus is 1024 bits or greater for RSA.

The PCA uses AES-256 for database encryption.

### **6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

### **6.1.7 Parameter Quality Checking**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

### **6.1.8 Subscriber Key Generation**

Subscriber's signature keys shall be generated by the Subscriber (the client software or hardware being used by the Subscriber) and the encryption keys shall be generated by the CA. Both software and hardware may be used, as specified in Section 6.2.1. Any pseudo-random numbers used for key generation material shall be generated by a FIPS approved module.

### **6.1.9 Key Usage Purposes**

Keys are certified for use in signing, non-repudiation or encrypting. Certificates used for digital signatures set the *digitalSignature* bit and the *nonRepudiation* bit. Certificates to be used for data encryption set the *keyEncipherment* bit. GPO-CA certificates shall set two key usage bits: *cRLSign* and *CertSign*.

## **6.2 PRIVATE KEY PROTECTION**

### **6.2.1 Standards for Cryptographic Module**

The relevant standard for cryptographic modules is the latest version of the FIPS 140 series, *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*.

CA signing private key storage is performed using a hardware cryptographic module that is validated to FIPS 140 Security Level 3 (or higher).

Private key storage for PCA Subscribers is performed using a cryptographic module that is validated to FIPS 140 Security Level 1 (or higher).

Private key storage for PCA Subscribers that assert the Federal PKI Common Policy OID for id-fpki-common-hardware shall use a FIPS 140 Level 2 or higher validated cryptographic module for all private key operations.

Private key storage for PCA OA Officer - Subscribers is performed using a cryptographic hardware module that is validated to FIPS 140 Security Level 2 (or higher).

All cryptographic modules operate such that the private asymmetric cryptographic keys are never output in plaintext (unencrypted).

### **6.2.2 GPO-CA Private Key Multi-Person Control**

Multi-person control requires that more than one individual independently authenticate themselves to the system that will perform CA operations. This mechanism prevents any single party (CA or otherwise) from gaining access to the certificate-signing key.

The CAs private signing key, and any backup copies, are generated and stored on a hardware security module (HSM). The HSM enforces multi-person access control for the CA.

The LunaCA3 PED Keys are used to initialize and login to the LunaCA3 hardware tokens, to create clones and to enforce multi-person (M-of-N) controls. The following paragraphs describe the various PED keys and their intended uses:

**Gray PED Key** - The Gray PED Key is the default key used to initialize and potentially re-initialize the LunaCA3 Token. Any Gray PED Key can be used to initialize or re-initialize any Token. There will be a total of 3 Gray PED Keys. Once the key generation ceremony is complete the 3 Gray PED Keys will be secured with tamper-evident seals and securely stored by the OA.

**Blue PED Key** - The Luna Security Officer (LSO) PED Key is used to clone Tokens. The LSO PED Key holds the LSO PIN and is used for creating Token users and changing Token passwords. There will be a total of 3 Blue PED Keys. Once the key generation ceremony is complete, all Blue PED Keys will be secured with tamper-evident seals and securely stored by the OA.

**Black PED Key** - The Black PED Key is used to login to the Luna Token when starting Entrust/Authority. There will be 3 Black PED Keys. Once the key generation ceremony is complete, one Black PED Key will be held in the possession of the Luna User; the other Black PED keys will be secured with tamper-evident seals and securely stored by the OA.

**Red PED Key** - The Red Key, Cloning PED Key, is used to clone LunaCA3 tokens. It carries the domain identifier for the Tokens. It is created/imprinted with the first Token and then carries the domain to the other Tokens thus permitting PED Key cloning amongst only those Tokens. There will be 3 Red PED Keys. Once the key generation ceremony is complete, the 3 Red PED Keys will be secured with tamper-evident seals and securely stored by the OA.

**Green PED Key** - The Green PED keys are used for M of N capabilities. M of N is an optional access-restriction function to further enhance the security of LunaCA3 token operations. M of N involves an additional password or PIN, applied to the token, which must accompany the User or LSO login keys. The M of N password is a shared secret that is distributed (or split) among several Green PED keys. M of N will be 1 of 3. The shared secret will be split amongst 3 Green PED keys. There will be 1 Green PED key required at each login. Any future login to the token requires that 1 of the 3 green share keys be provided, in addition to either the blue LSO key or the black Luna User key. Once the key generation ceremony is complete 2 sets of 3 Green PED Keys will be secured with tamper-evident seals and securely stored by the OA. The 3 remaining Green PED keys will be distributed to the appropriate individuals.

The OA maintains a list of personnel that have been given access to the PED keys. The list will be made available for inspection during compliance audits.

### 6.2.3 Private Key Escrow

Under no circumstances are signature keys used to support non-repudiation or digital signature services escrowed by a third party.

The PCA escrows all private encryption keys.

### **6.2.3.1 Escrow of CA Encryption Keys**

The CA keys shall not be escrowed.

### **6.2.4 Private Key Backup**

The Hardware Security Module (HSM) containing the CA root keys will be cloned in order to support the high availability CA configuration and Disaster Recovery. Cloning, copies the contents of one secure cryptographic token, to another, without exposing the keys outside of the HSM. The cloning procedure maintains hardware secured backups and verifiable audits through a direct hardware-to-hardware backup procedure. To prevent unauthorized use of backup materials, backup tokens maintain the same access controls as the original.

The token will be cloned 2 times to create 3 identical tokens (1 production, 1 production backup and 1 off-site backup) of the CA root keys. The initial cloning procedure will be performed as part of the key generation ceremony.

The OA periodically tests all tokens, including the clones, to ensure that they are operational. Tokens that have failed will be immediately replaced by new clones.

#### **6.2.4.1 Backup of GPO-CA Private Signature Key**

The PCA private signature keys are backed up under the same multi-person control as the creation of the original signature key. This backup/cloning procedure is completed as a formal script that specifies the detailed step-by-step procedure. The script defines the individuals that are required to complete the backup/cloning procedure and meet the multi-person control requirement.

A single copy of the signature key is securely stored at the PCA location. A second copy will be securely stored at an off-site backup location. Copies of the signature key shall be stored on cryptographic tokens and shall be placed in secure containers, and the activation information for the signature key shall be placed in a separate security container, in tamper-evident envelopes, from the cryptographic tokens.

#### **6.2.4.2 Backup of Subscriber Private Signature Key**

All Subscriber private signature keys shall be in the sole control of the Subscriber.

### **6.2.5 Private Key Archival**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

### **6.2.6 Private Key Entry Into Cryptographic Module**

Private keys are generated within the cryptographic module. Use of FIPS 140 validated cryptographic modules prevents exposure of unencrypted key outside the cryptographic modules.

### **6.2.7 Method of Activating Private Key**

The CA cryptographic module retrieves and activates the CA private signing key only when needed. The CA private signing key is never exposed outside of the cryptographic module.

Activation of the CA private signature key requires the Black or Blue PED Key and the associated PIN in addition to one or more Green PED Keys.

The Subscriber is authenticated to the cryptographic module before the activation of any private key(s). Methods of authentication include but are not limited to passphrases, PINs or biometrics. Entry of activation data is protected from disclosure (i.e., the data is not displayed while it is entered).

Subscriber private keys are activated when the Subscriber logs into (i.e. authenticates to) the certificate application.

### **6.2.8 Method of Deactivating Private Key**

The private keys remain active for the period of login. The login period is ended either by the Subscriber logging out from the certificate application or automatically as determined by a preset timer. For PCA Subscribers, the idle-timer is set to 15 minutes.

The CA's private signature key is deactivated automatically by the CA's cryptographic module when the key is no longer needed.

The Subscriber's cryptographic card will be deactivated as described above or by removing the smartcard from the reader.

### **6.2.9 Method of Destroying Private Key**

PCA Subscriber smartcards are reinitialized using a vendor-supplied utility.

## **6.3 GOOD PRACTICES REGARDING KEY PAIR MANAGEMENT**

### **6.3.1 Public Key Archival**

The public keys are archived as part of the certificate archival.

### **6.3.2 Usage Periods for the Public and Private Keys**

The PCA key pairs are set up for manual update. The PCA key validity period is as follows:

<b>Key Type</b>	<b>Private Key Validity Period</b>	<b>Certificate Validity Period</b>
Signature	10 years	20 years

The PCA Subscriber key pairs are set up for manual update. The key validity periods for PCA Subscribers (Trusted Roles) is as follows:

<b>Key Type</b>	<b>Maximum Private Key Validity Period</b>	<b>Maximum Certificate Validity Period</b>
Encryption	Not Applicable	3 years

Signature or Non-Repudiation	3 years	3 years
------------------------------	---------	---------

## 6.4 ACTIVATION DATA

### 6.4.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation

Activation data (biometrics, password or PIN) will be used to protect access to use of a private key. Password-type activation data (i.e. not biometric or PIN) used by the Subscribers is required to meet the following criteria:

- Must include at least three of the following four criteria:
  - At least eight characters
  - At least one numeric character
  - At least one uppercase character
  - At least one lowercase character
  - At least one special character
- No repetition of the previous 12 passwords

PIN-type activation data is required to be between 4 to 8 digits in length, inclusive.

Biometric-type activation data is dependent on the manufacturer and type of biometric system in use.

CA activation data shall not be transmitted electronically over a network, and shall be controlled in accordance with CA Key Generation Ceremony documentation, which is maintained by the Policy Authority.

### 6.4.2 Activation Data Protection

Activation data for Subscribers is not to be written down. However, if activation data is written down, it will be secured at the level of the data that the associated cryptographic module is used to protect, and will not be stored with the cryptographic module.

### 6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation Data

PCA Subscribers change their cryptographic module passwords not less than once every three months.

Procedures followed to change PED Key PINs can be found in the LunaCA3 documentation.

Changing of passwords is manually recorded in the OA Password Change log (the passwords themselves are never recorded in the log).

## **6.5 COMPUTER SECURITY CONTROLS**

The CA server instantiation is tightly controlled and audited as part of the key generation ceremony. All software loaded on the CA server is from original manufacturer distribution media.

The PCA server is built on Windows 2000 (with the current Service Pack). The Windows 2000 operating system will have the following security features enabled: identification and authentication for all users, discretionary access control, and security audit. The Windows 2000 operating system is designed and configured to provide self-protection and process isolation.

The PCA server operates with the minimal number of local accounts required. No one will be able to perform remote login. The PCA will only run the network services required to operate the CA.

### **6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements**

The operating system requires authenticated logins, provides discretionary access control, audit capability, and enforces domain integrity boundaries.

The CA Software is validated FIPS 140-1 level 1 and the HSM is validated FIPS 140-1 level 3, they provide the following security technical controls:

- Require authenticated logins
- Provide Discretionary Access Control
- Provide a security audit capability
- Restrict access control to GPO-CA services and PKI roles
- Enforce separation of duties for PKI roles
- Require identification and authentication of PKI roles and associated identities
- Prohibit object re-use or require separation for GPO-CA random access memory
- Require use of cryptography for session communication and database security
- Archive GPO-CA history and audit data
- Require self-test security related GPO-CA services
- Require a trusted path for identification of PKI roles and associated identities
- Require a recovery mechanisms for keys and the GPO-CA system

### **6.5.2 Computer Security Rating**

There is no requirement for a computer security rating.

## **6.6 LIFE CYCLE TECHNICAL CONTROLS**

The effectiveness and appropriateness of the security settings described in this CPS are reviewed on a yearly basis. A risk and threat assessment is performed to determine if key lengths need to be increased or operational procedures modified to maintain the required level of system security.



### **6.6.1 System Development Controls**

The CA server hardware was purchased new and is dedicated for use as the PCA within the GPO PKI. All hardware was kept in tamper-evident sealed containers, with access restricted to authorized individuals. All access to any of the PKI hardware, prior to installation in the CA facility, was manually recorded in a paper log maintained by the OA. The OA will make this log available to the Compliance Auditors during any compliance audit.

The CA software is dedicated to providing the PCA functions. Only OA-approved software has been loaded on the CA servers.

The CA hardware has been installed in the CA facility in accordance with the physical security safeguards as defined in this CPS. These physical safeguards serve to restrict access to the CA hardware to a limited number of trusted individuals. These physical safeguards in combination with the network security controls defined in this CPS restrict the ability for malicious software to be installed on the CA hardware.

RA hardware and software shall be scanned for malicious code on first use and periodically afterward.

### **6.6.2 Security Management Controls**

The installation and configuration of the CA software is performed under very strict, scripted guidelines as part of the key generation ceremony with each step being videotaped and audited by the Compliance Auditor identified in this CPS.

The GPO follows a formal software implementation methodology whereby all PKI software upgrades and/or modifications to production systems are first installed and evaluated in a test environment. All software modifications and/or upgrades are installed in a test environment and evaluated by the OA.

At the completion of the evaluation period, the GPO OA submits to the GPO PA a digitally signed production software or hardware modification request indicating the specific hardware device, software title and version number to be modified. In addition, the report indicates the new hardware device, software title and version number, as well as a list of modifications or enhancements that the new hardware or software provides. The GPO PA is responsible for reviewing and approving the production software or hardware modification request. If the GPO PA approves the request, it will be returned to the GPO OA digitally signed by the GPO PA.

### **6.6.3 Life Cycle Security Ratings**

There is no requirement for life cycle security ratings.

## **6.7 NETWORK SECURITY CONTROLS**

The PCA server and the Root Directory are isolated from the rest of the GPO network infrastructure by an air gap, meaning that there is no physical network connectivity between the PCA subnet and any other network infrastructure. There is no remote access to the PCA.

The PCA will publish certificates, CRL's and ARL's to the Root Directory or PCA Master Directory. Data from the Root Directory will be transferred to the Master Director by the OA using removable physical media, such as floppy disk.

All administrative operations required by the PCA take place directly on the PCA server.

## **6.8 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE ENGINEERING CONTROLS**

There are no additional requirements for cryptographic modules besides those stated elsewhere in this CPS.

## **7. CERTIFICATE AND CARL/CRL PROFILES**

### **7.1 CERTIFICATE PROFILE**

The PCA issues X.509 Version 3 certificates and supports the following fields:

- Version: Version field is set to v3
- Signature: Identifier for the algorithm used by the CA to sign the certificate
- Issuer: Certificate issuer (CA) Distinguished Name
- Validity: Certificate validity period - notBefore start date and notAfter end date are specified
- Subject: Certificate subject Distinguished Name
- Subject public key information: Algorithm identifier (RSA or DSA), public key parameters (if applicable) and public key

For the actual format of certificates issued by the GPO PCA, see Appendix A.

Certificates issued by the PCA shall conform to the Federal PKI (FPKI) X.509 Certificate and CRL Extensions Profile (FPKI-PROF).

#### **7.1.1 Version Numbers**

Certificates issued by this CA are issued with the version number set to v3.

#### **7.1.2 Certificate Extensions**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

#### **7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

#### **7.1.4 Name Forms**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

#### **7.1.5 Name Constraints**

At a minimum the following branch will be excluded in cross certificates, such that DNs containing the following are only used within GPO and not from any external entity (don't trust certificates claiming to be GPO certificates if they are not issued by a GPO-CA): c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=Government Printing Office. The PA shall make the determination on other names constraints to be excluded or permitted.

#### **7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifier**

Subscriber certificates issued by the PCA shall assert two certificate policy OIDs: 1) the GPO certificate policy OID (as stipulated in Section 1.2 of the GPO CP); and 2) one of the FPKI Common Policy OIDs (as further stipulated in Section 1.2 of the GPO CP).

### **7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints Extension**

No stipulation.

### **7.1.8 Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

### **7.1.9 Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policy Extension**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

## **7.2 CARL/CRL PROFILE**

For the profile of CRL and ARL issued by the GPO PCA, see Appendix A.

### **7.2.1 Version Numbers**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

### **7.2.2 CARL and CRL Entry Extensions**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

## **8. SPECIFICATION ADMINISTRATION**

### **8.1 SPECIFICATION CHANGE PROCEDURES**

Errors, updates, or suggested changes to this CPS document shall be communicated to the OA. Such communication must include a description of the change, contact information for the person requesting the change, and an impact assessment.

Notice of all changes to this CPS that may materially impact users of this CPS (other than editorial or typographical corrections) will be provided to the PCA Subscribers and cross-certified CAs.

### **8.2 PUBLICATION AND NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES**

A copy of this CPS will be available to all individuals serving as Trusted Roles in this PKI.

### **8.3 CPS APPROVAL PROCEDURES**

Changes to this document will be reviewed and approved by the PA.

The GPO PA will make the determination that this CPS complies with GPO CP. The PA will also determine if a change to this CPS is acceptable and that the changed CPS continues to comply with the GPO CP.

The PA will provide written confirmation of CPS approval, which the PA will retain and make available for inspection during compliance audits.

### **8.4 WAIVERS**

As stipulated in the GPO CP.

## APPENDIX A: CERTIFICATE AND CRL PROFILES

This appendix contains the profiles for the certificates and CRL issued by the Root CA. Since the Subscriber certificates issued by the Root CA are used for authenticating to the Root CA only, their format is not included.

### A.1 ROOT CA SELF-SIGNED CERTIFICATE FORMAT

Field	GPO Root CA Value
Version	V3 (2)
Serial Number	Must be unique
Issuer Signature Algorithm	sha-1WithRSAEncryption { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 }
Issuer Distinguished Name	ou=GPO Root CA, ou=Certification Authorities, ou=Government Printing Office, o=U.S. Government, c=US
Validity Period	20 years from date of issue in Generalized Time format
Subject Distinguished Name	ou=GPO Root CA, ou=Certification Authorities, ou=Government Printing Office, o=U.S. Government, c=US
Subject Public Key Information	2048 bit RSA key modulus, rsaEncryption { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 }
Issuer's Signature	sha-1WithRSAEncryption { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 }
Extensions	
Authority key identifier	Octet String (20 byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the GPO Root CA's public key information)
subject key identifier	Octet String (20 byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the GPO Root CA's public key information)
key usage	c=no; digitalSignature, keyCertSign, cRLSign
Basic Constraints	c=no; cA=True; no path length constraint

## A.2 SUBORDINATE CA CERTIFICATE FORMAT

Field	Subordinate CA Value
Version	V3 (2)
Serial Number	Must be unique
Issuer Signature Algorithm	sha-1WithRSAEncryption { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 }
Issuer Distinguished Name	ou=GPO Root CA, ou=Certification Authorities, ou=Government Printing Office, o=U.S. Government, c=US
Validity Period	Depends on the Assurance level of the CA
Subject Distinguished Name	ou=<CA Name>, ou=Certification Authorities, ou=Government Printing Office, o=U.S. Government, c=US
Subject Public Key Information	1024 or 2048 bit RSA key modulus, rsaEncryption { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 }
Issuer's Signature	sha-1WithRSAEncryption { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 }
Extensions	
Authority key identifier	Octet String (20 byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the GPO Root CA's public key information)
subject key identifier	Octet String (20 byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the Subject CA's public key information)
key usage	c=yes; digitalSignature, keyCertSign, cRLSign
Certificate policies	c=no; { 2 16 840 1 101 3 2 1 17 1 }
Basic Constraints	c=yes; cA=True; path length constraint = 0
Policy Constraints	Not Present
Authority Information Access	C=no; optional; pointer to OCSP Responder
CRL Distribution Points <sup>1</sup>	c = no; always present

<sup>1</sup> The CRL distribution point extension shall only populate the distributionPoint field. The field shall only contain the URI name form. The reasons and cRLIssuer fields shall not be populated. The CRL shall point to a full and complete CRL only (i.e., a CRL that does NOT contain the issuer distribution point extension).

### A.3 EXTERNAL CA CERTIFICATE FORMAT

Field	Subordinate CA Value
Version	V3 (2)
Serial Number	Must be unique
Issuer Signature Algorithm	sha-1WithRSAEncryption {1 2 840 113549 1 1 5}
Issuer Distinguished Name	ou=GPO Root CA, ou=Certification Authorities, ou=Government Printing Office, o=U.S. Government, c=US
Validity Period	Depends on the assurance level of the CA
Subject Distinguished Name	As designated by the GPO PA
Subject Public Key Information	1024 or 2048 bit RSA key modulus, rsaEncryption {1 2 840 113549 1 1 1}
Issuer's Signature	sha-1WithRSAEncryption {1 2 840 113549 1 1 5}
Extensions	
Authority key identifier	Octet String (20 byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the GPO Root CA's public key information)
subject key identifier	Octet String (20 byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the Subject CA's public key information)
key usage	c=yes; digitalSignature, keyCertSign, cRLSign
Certificate policies	c=no; {2 16 840 1 101 3 2 1 15 i} i = 1, 2, 3, and/or 4 <sup>1</sup>
Policy Mapping	Maps each of the policies listed in the Certificate Policies extension listed above to subject CA domain policy
Basic Constraints	c=yes; cA=True; path length constraint absent
Name Constraints	c=yes; permitted subtrees: <TBD>; excluded subtrees: ou=Government Printing Office, o=U.S. Government, c=US
Policy Constraints	c=yes; inhibit policy mapping skipCerts = 0, 1, 2 <sup>2</sup> ; require explicit policy, skipCerts = 0/
Authority Information Access	C=no; optional; pointer to OCSP Responder
CRL Distribution Points <sup>3</sup>	c = no; always present

<sup>1</sup> The field shall contain all certificate policies that are equal to or lower. For example, for a medium assurance CA, there will be three OIDs in the field.

<sup>2</sup> Value of 0 for cross certificate to other domain, value of 1 for a Bridge CA, value of 2 for a Bridge CA with membrane and commitment to have proper skipCerts value.

<sup>3</sup> The CRL distribution point extension shall only populate the distributionPoint field. The field shall only contain the URI name form. The reasons and cRLIssuer fields shall not be populated. The CRL shall point to a full and complete CRL only (i.e., a CRL that does NOT contain the issuer distribution point extension).



#### A.4 ROOT CA CRL PROFILE FORMAT

Field	Root CA CRL Value
Version	V2 (1)
Issuer Signature Algorithm	sha-1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer Distinguished Name	ou=GPO Root CA, ou=Certification Authorities, ou=Government Printing Office, o=U.S. Government, c=US
thisUpdate	UTCT
nextUpdate	UTCT; thisUpdate + 28 days
Revoked certificates list	0 or more 2-tuple of certificate serial number and revocation date (in UTCT)
CRL extensions	
CRL Number	Integer
Authority Key Identifier	Octet String (20 byte SHA-1 hash of the binary DER encoding of the GPO Root CA's public key information)
CRL entry extensions	
Invalidity Date	Optional
Reason Code	Always Present; Will not include certificateHold

## A.5 ROOT CA CERTIFICATE REGISTRATION DATA REQUIREMENTS

The GPO PKI Certificate Registration Form (depicted below) defines the data required to be submitted by subscribers to the GPO PCA for user certificate issuance.

### GPO PKI Certificate Registration Form SECTION 1.

(This section to be completed by applicant prior to in-person registration)

<b>USER INFORMATION (Please print)</b>			
First Name		Middle Name	
Last Name		Email Address	
Telephone #		Organization	
Address/Room Number			
Fed. Gov't-issued Picture ID Number			
Fed. Gov't-issued Picture ID Type			
Non-Fed. Gov't-issued Picture ID Number *			
Non-Fed. Gov't-issued Picture ID Type *			
Non-Fed. Gov't-issued ID Number *			
Non-Fed. Gov't-issued ID Type *			
User Signature			
User's Supervisor (Print)			
User's Supervisor Signature			
* required only when no Fed. Gov't-issued Picture ID is available			

## SECTION 2.

**(This section to be completed by Registration Authority at time of Registration)**

<b>RA INFORMATION (Please print)</b>			
RA First Name		RA Last Name	
Telephone #		Email Address	
Date of Registration Request			
Fed. Gov't-issued Picture ID verified			
Non-Fed. Gov't-issued Picture ID verified *			
Non-Fed. Gov't-issued ID verified *			
* required only when no Fed. Gov't-issued Picture I.D is available			

## SECTION 3.

**(This section to be completed by RA & User upon completion of Registration)**

<b>PKI REGISTRATION INFORMATION (Please print)</b>			
PKI Credential Type (software or smartcard)			
PKI Smartcard Type (if smartcard credential)			
PKI Smartcard Identifier or Serial Number			
PKI Credential Issuance Completed			
User Full DN			
RA Name (print)		User Name (print)	
Signature		Signature	
Date		Date	

## **APPENDIX B: ACRONYM LIST**

This appendix contains a list of acronyms used in this document.

ARL	Authority Revocation List
CA	Certification Authority Certificate Authority
CP	Certificate Policy
CPS	Certification Practices Statement
CPWG	Certificate Policy Working Group
CARL	Certification Authority Revocation List
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
FBCA	Federal Bridge Certification Authority
GPO	Government Printing Office
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
OA	Operational Authority
PA	Policy Authority
PCA	Principal Certification Authority
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
RA	Registration Authority
SCA	Subordinate Certification Authority