ASRS Database Report Set

Pilot / Controller Communications

Report Set Description	A sampling of reports which highlight issues involving communications between pilots and controllers.
Update Number	13.0
Date of Update	May 13, 2008
Number of Records in Report Set	50
Number of New Records in Report Set	17
Type of Records in Report Set	For each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the reporting of a specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de- identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.

Linda J. Connell, Director

Aviation Safety Reporting System

Lenda J Connell

CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area "A" than area "B" simply because the airmen who operate in area "A" are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

One thing that can be known from ASRS statistics is that they represent the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 1999 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 1999. Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS lies in the **report narratives**. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. The values of these narrative reports lie in their qualitative nature. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.



ACN: 776138 (1 of 50)

Synopsis

GIV FLT CREW RPTS ALT DEV DEPARTING TEB AFTER CAPT COMPLIES WITH CLRNC INTENDED FOR ANOTHER ACFT WITH SIMILAR SOUNDING CALL SIGN.

ACN: 775414 (2 of 50)

Synopsis

CONFUSED BY THE EXISTENCE OF BOTH A FILED RTE THEY SHOULDN'T FLY AND CLEARED RTE THEY SHOULD HAVE ON THEIR ACARS DELIVERED PDC, MLG FLT CREW PICKS THE WRONG ONE AND HAS A TRACK DEV.

ACN: 766081 (3 of 50)

Synopsis

B737 FLT CREW RECEIVES MULTIPLE CHANGES TO RWY ASSIGNMENT DURING SEAVU 1 INTO LAX, WHICH THE FLT CREW COMPLY WITH.

ACN: 765547 (4 of 50)

Synopsis

MISCOMMUNICATION AND UNFAMILIARITY WITH FDC NOTAMS FOR ATL RESULT IN ALT DEV ON LA GRANGE STAR FOR ACR FLT CREW.

ACN: 760159 (5 of 50)

Synopsis

B717 FLT CREW LANDS 25L IN IMC AT LAX AFTER TWO RWY CHANGES WITH CLEARANCE FOR ILS 25R.

ACN: 758814 (6 of 50)

Synopsis

PRC TWR CTLR FAILED TO COMMUNICATE WITH TFC ON BASE, RESULTING IN DIRECTED TURN AWAY FROM THE TFC PATTERN, TIPH PROCS CITED AS CONTRIBUTORY.

ACN: 758668 (7 of 50)

Synopsis

ZLA CTLR DESCRIBED NEAR LOSS OF SEPARATION WHEN FLT CREW RESPONDED TO WRONG ALT CLRNC, CTLR FAILED TO HEAR INCORRECT READBACK.

ACN: 754433 (8 of 50)

Synopsis

A CE560 FLT CREW ON THE TEB 5 WAS GIVEN AN EARLY HDG CHANGE TO 280 DEG AND WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN 1500 FT. THE CREW EXPERIENCED AN EXCURSION FROM ASSIGNED ALT AS THEY BEGAN A SLOW CLB WITHOUT CLRNC.

ACN: 753886 (9 of 50)

Synopsis

B737-400 FLT CREW CLIMBED THROUGH ASSIGNED ALT. PF FAILED TO SET 29.92 DURING CLIMBOUT.

ACN: 753385 (10 of 50)

Synopsis

PHL CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING INCREASED LCL CTL TAXI WORKLOAD WHEN LNDG 9R AND DEP 9L DURING CURRENT CONSTRUCTION.

ACN: 753124 (11 of 50)

Synopsis

ISP CTLR DESCRIBED WRONG RWY DEP, ALLEGING THAT TIPH RESTRICTIONS WERE A CAUSAL FACTOR IN THIS PLTDEV.

ACN: 749180 (12 of 50)

Synopsis

CONFLICT DEVELOPS BETWEEN SKY DIVER JUMP PLANE AND IFR CITATION WHEN AN UNEXPECTED DESCENT IS INITIATED BY JUMP ACFT.

ACN: 748855 (13 of 50)

Synopsis

ZTL CTLR DESCRIBED TCAS RA AT FL320, RESULTING IN CONFLICT WITH THIRD ACFT, CTLR QUESTIONING TCAS RA INSTRUCTIONS.

ACN: 748441 (14 of 50)

Synopsis

GULFSTREAM 5 WAS ESTABLISHED SHORT FINAL WHEN AN ACFT CROSSED THE RWY MIDFIELD. FLT CREW EXECUTED GO-AROUND.

ACN: 746053 (15 of 50)

Synopsis

C560XL FLT CREW RPTS MISUNDERSTANDING AND/OR CONFLICT WITH ANOTHER ACFT DURING VISUAL APCH TO RWY 17 AT SLC.

ACN: 741162 (16 of 50)

Synopsis

DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON WHICH RWY WAS ASSIGNED FOR AN ARR AT LAX.

ACN: 740862 (17 of 50)

Synopsis

CE750 FLT CREW MAKES IMPROPER INITIAL CONTACT WITH N90 WITH THE CTLR READING THE TEB 5 OVER THE RADIO, CAUSING THE RPTR TO MISS THE TURN TO 280 DEGS AT 1500 FT.

ACN: 740766 (18 of 50)

Synopsis

ZFW CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING SID NAMES/NUMBERS POSSIBLY CAUSING CONFUSION BETWEEN THE NUMBER TWO AND ROUTING TO.

ACN: 740740 (19 of 50)

Synopsis

B767 FLT CREW RECEIVES CLRNC TO CLB FROM SBGR CTLR, USING NONSTANDARD TERMINOLOGY THAT THE CREW DOESN'T UNDERSTAND.

ACN: 740437 (20 of 50)

Synopsis

C208 PLT FLIES TEB SID ALTS VICE DALTON OFF RWY 19 AT TEB.

ACN: 740433 (21 of 50)

Synopsis

AIR CARRIER ARRIVING IN EGLL FINDS WORKLOAD INCREASED BY RWY ASSIGNMENT CONFUSION.

ACN: 739995 (22 of 50)

Synopsis

LANGUAGE BARRIER WITH ZSPD CONTROL LEADS MD11 FLT CREW TO FOLLOW ALTS AS SHOWN ON THE VMB STAR VICE AWAITING CLRNC TO LOWER ALTS. SEPARATION PROBLEM RESULTS.

ACN: 739173 (23 of 50)

Synopsis

CAPTAIN OF B767 MISSPELLS WAYPOINT BETTE ON RE-CLEARANCE DUE TO WX OUT OF JFK. SUBSEQUENT DIRECT CLRNC RESULTS IN HEADING TOWARD BETTY, ENGLAND VICE BETTE AS PLANNED.

ACN: 737406 (24 of 50)

Synopsis

A319 MISSES CROSSING RESTR AT DALAS ON THE ERLIN ARR INTO ATL AFTER ZTL CTLR CHANGES LNDG TO RWY 27L.

ACN: 737105 (25 of 50)

Synopsis

B737 CAPT ON APCH TO SKRG EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING ATC LANGUAGE AND ALT ASSIGNMENT CLARITY DURING MEDAL 1 ARR PROC.

ACN: 737028 (26 of 50)

Synopsis

B747 FLT CREW REQUESTED FL310 FROM ATC WHICH WAS NOT GRANTED. THE NEXT CONTROLLER SEEMED TO BE UPSET THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT AT FL310.

ACN: 735013 (27 of 50)

Synopsis

B737 FLT CREW REPORTS DIFFICULTIES DURING THE APPROACH TO RWY 24 AT BHM. CAPTAIN NOT AWARE GS OTS AND TEMPORARY DISPLACED THRESHOLD BARRIERS NOT VISIBLE UNTIL VERY CLOSE TO THE RWY.

ACN: 734878 (28 of 50)

Synopsis

TPA CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING INCREASED FREQUENCY OF PLT'S FAILING TO USE HEAVY WHEN REQUIRED DURING COM.

ACN: 732958 (29 of 50)

Synopsis

A320 CAPTAIN, WHILE MAINTAINING VISUAL SEPARATION, REPORTS NMAC WITH AN F16 AT 16000 FEET 30 NM WEST OF DTW.

ACN: 732580 (30 of 50)

Synopsis

A C525 CLEARED THE RUNWAY AFTER LANDING BY TURNING ONTO ANOTHER ACTIVE RUNWAY, CAUSING AN AIRCRAFT THAT WAS CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF TO ABORT.

ACN: 731922 (31 of 50)

Synopsis

B737-400 FLT CREW DECLARES MINIMUM FUEL, REQUESTS DIVERT TO ALTERNATE, EMER DECLARED BY TOWER AND FLT CREW LANDS.

ACN: 731716 (32 of 50)

Synopsis

ELM LCL CTLR WITNESSED PROBABLE OPERROR AT APPROX 4000 WHEN RADAR CTLR ISSUED QUESTIONABLE VECTOR.

ACN: 730106 (33 of 50)

Synopsis

A CE750 FLT CREW WAS CLEARED FOR THE RNAV RWY 26 APPROACH TO FXE FROM THE NORTHEAST. THEY FLEW TO THE IAF (FORSU) AND EXECUTED A PROCEDURE TURN, WHICH WAS NOT EXPECTED BY THE CONTROLLER.

ACN: 729932 (34 of 50)

Synopsis

A CESSNA PILOT DEPARTED TTN WITHOUT TKOF CLRNC AFTER MISINTERPRETING THE LOCAL CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS.

ACN: 729099 (35 of 50)

Synopsis

CL60 PLT DESCRIBED INCIDENT ON APCH TO TEB WHEN N90 CTLR ISSUED CLRNC THAT PREVENTED COMPLIANCE WITH DANDY XING ALT ON THE ILS RWY 6.

ACN: 727766 (36 of 50)

Synopsis

CE650 CREW DESCENDS ON THE BARIN1 RNAV ARRIVAL TO IAD WITHOUT RECEIVING CLEARANCE TO 'DESCEND VIA THE BARIN1.'

ACN: 726595 (37 of 50)

Synopsis

B777 LANDS AT JFK WITHOUT A CLRNC.

ACN: 726367 (38 of 50)

Synopsis

DC10 FLT CREW HAS A TRACK DEV DURING THE CIVET 5 ARR TO LAX.

ACN: 725315 (39 of 50)

Synopsis

ACR FLT CREW EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING ACR CALL SIGN NOT MATCHING ACFT PAINT JOB CREATING A POTENTIAL SAFETY PROBLEM.

ACN: 724226 (40 of 50)

Synopsis

CTLR DESCRIBED INCIDENT WHEN ACFT WAS ISSUED STOP INSTRUCTIONS TO AVOID A RWY INCURSION RESULTING IN A PROP STRIKE.

ACN: 723079 (41 of 50)

Synopsis

ZOB ASSOCIATE CTLR DESCRIBED OPERROR AT APPROX FL260 WHEN CTLR ISSUED CTL CLRNCS TO ACFT WITH SIMILAR CALL SIGNS RESULTING IN A CONFLICT.

ACN: 723012 (42 of 50)

Synopsis

CRJ200 FLT CREW HAS A TRACK/HEADING DEVIATION DURING KENNEDY 1 DEP.

ACN: 720554 (43 of 50)

Synopsis

C172 PLT DESCRIBED INCIDENT WHEN TKI TWR CTLR USED UNCLR VERBIAGE TO ISSUE A GAR EXPECTING THE ACFT TO ENTER R TFC FROM THE GAR.

ACN: 720078 (44 of 50)

Synopsis

ZNY CTLR DESCRIBED POTENTIAL SEPARATION LOSS AT 12000 FT BTWN 2 ACFT BECAUSE OF SIMULTANEOUS USE OF MULTIPLE FREQS.

ACN: 719698 (45 of 50)

Synopsis

A B757 CREW ON THE LGA KORRY 3 STAR DSNDED BELOW THEIR CLRED ALT WHEN TASK SATURATED WITH HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS AND DSCNT CLRNC.

ACN: 719184 (46 of 50)

Synopsis

PLT RPTS AN NMAC WITH A SEMINOLE AFTER DEPARTING PARALLEL RWYS WITH A CONFUSING ATC CLRNC.

ACN: 718579 (47 of 50)

Synopsis

ZMP CTLR DESCRIBES LEGAL LOSS OF SEPARATION AT 5100 FT WHEN INCORRECT PHRASEOLOGY WAS USED CLBING ACFT THROUGH OCCUPIED ALT.

ACN: 717709 (48 of 50)

Synopsis

CITATION CE500 FLT CREW HAS TRACK-HDG DEV DURING DEP FROM CNO.

ACN: 716351 (49 of 50)


Synopsis

BELL DEPARTING APC HAS MISCOM WITH TWR CTLR, AND OVERFLIES LNDG ACFT.

ACN: 712748 (50 of 50)

Synopsis

A RPTR STATES THAT APCH CTLRS MUST ADVISE PLTS THAT ARE MAKING APCHS TO RWY 27R WHEN ACFT EXIT AND REENTER THE CLASS B AIRSPACE, THEREBY CREATING ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD FOR THE CTLRS.



Time / Day

Date: 200802

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: TEB.Airport

State Reference: NJ

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 2000 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions: IMC
Weather Elements: Rain
Weather Elements: Turbulence

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Corporate
Make Model Name: Gulfstream IV
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID: TEB

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 120 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 10000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1500

ASRS Report: 776138

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Function. Oversight: PIC Qualification. Pilot: ATP Qualification. Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot: Commercial

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 140 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 24400

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 24400 Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1060

ASRS Report: 776137

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence: FAR

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas: Company

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DEPARTING TEB ARPT ON THE TEB 5 SID, OUR ACFT CLBED WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE DEP CTLR. ACCORDING TO THE SID, OUR ACFT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT 2000 FT MSL AT THE TIME OF THE ALT DEV. THE CAPT, WHO WAS HAND FLYING THE ACFT. MISTAKENLY HEARD A CLB CLRNC FOR ANOTHER COMPANY ACFT WITH A VERY SIMILAR CALL SIGN WHICH HAD DEPARTED THE SAME RWY AND WAS FLYING THE SAME SID. THE CAPT REACHED OVER AND CHANGED THE ALT SELECTOR IN THE COCKPIT TO 9000 FT MSL AND BEGAN AN AGGRESSIVE CLB FROM 2000 FT MSL. THIS ALL TRANSPIRED AT THE TIME THE ARPT TOWER CTLR HAD PASSED US OVER TO THE DEP CTLR, ADDITIONALLY, THERE WAS MODERATE TURBULENCE ON THE DEP WHICH WAS IMC AND THE CTLR REQUESTED THAT OUR XPONDER BE 'RECYCLED' AND THAT WE SQUAWK 'IDENT.' THESE ACTIONS REQUIRED ME AS CO-PLT TO BE 'HEADS DOWN' IN THE COCKPIT FOR A LONGER THAN USUAL PERIOD AS THE TURBULENCE MADE THESE ACTIONS MORE DIFFICULT THAN USUAL. THE DEP CTLR QUESTIONED WHAT ALT WE WERE CLBING TO AND INFORMED US THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN CLRED TO CLB. THERE WERE NO APPARENT TFC CONFLICTS AND THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO CONTINUE OUR CLB TO 8000 FT MSL WITH A R TURN 20 DEGS TO A HDG OF 300. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL AND THERE WAS NO INDICATION FROM THE CTLR OF ANY TFC CONFLICT OR FURTHER ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY HIM OR US. THERE ARE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS ALT DEV. HERE ARE SOME OF THE SIGNIFICANT ISSUES IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER: 1) ACFT WITH NEARLY IDENTICAL CALL SIGNS DEPARTED FROM THE SAME RWY IMMEDIATELY AFTER EACH OTHER, AND FLYING THE SAME SID. THIS CAN OBVIOUSLY LEAD TO MISCOMMUNICATION BETWEEN CTLRS AND PLTS IN THE RESPECTIVE ACFT AND REQUIRES SPECIAL ATTENTION REGARDING COM PROCS. POSSIBLE SOLUTION: ALLOW A DEP OF A NON-COMPANY ACFT BETWEEN THE TWO COMPANY ACFT WITH SIMILAR CALL SIGNS TO LESSEN THE CHANCE FOR CONFUSION. 2) SIDS WITH SIGNIFICANT ALT, HDG, AND DISTANCE CONSTRAINTS REQUIRE CLOSE ADHERENCE TO ALL STANDARD OPERATING PROCS. THIS COUPLED WITH HIGH DENSITY TFC AT MANY OF THE ARPTS WHERE WE OPERATE REQUIRES PLTS TO BE VIGILANT FOR ALL SEGMENTS OF THE ARPT AND DEP REGIMES. OUR COMPANY DICTATES THAT THE CO-PLT MAKES ALL CHANGES TO THE ALT ALERTER IN THE COCKPIT. THIS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT WHEN THE PF IS HAND FLYING THE ACFT. THIS ENSURES BOTH PLTS ARE AWARE

AND AGREE ON ANY ALT CHANGES AND HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING ALT ASSIGNMENT AND/OR CHANGES IN ALT. THE CAPT DID NOT FOLLOW THESE PROCS AND I WAS TOO BUSY WITH MY HEAD DOWN TO NOTICE UNTIL I FELT THE CONTINUED CLB FROM 2000 FT MSL AND SAW THAT 9000 FT HAD BEEN SET INTO THE ALT ALERTER. AUTOMATION CAN GREATLY REDUCE THE WORKLOAD ON BOTH THE PF AND THE PNF IF IT IS USED CORRECTLY. OUR COMPANY ENCOURAGES ITS USE. ITS USE HERE MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED THE AGGRESSIVE CLB AND ALLOWED MORE TIME TO VERIFY THE ALT. 3) IMPROPER RADIO DISCIPLINE AND COCKPIT COM WAS A MAJOR FACTOR TO THIS DEV. UPON MY SWITCHING FREQUENCIES FROM TWR TO DEP CTLRS, THE CAPT HEARD THE TAIL END OF A CLRNC FOR A CLB FOR OUR COMPANY ACFT. WHILE THE CTLR INSTRUCTED ME TO CHK OUR XPONDER, THE CAPT COMMENCED A CLB AND DID NOT TELL DEP THAT HE WAS CLBING. HE DID NOT TELL ME HE WAS CLBING. WHEN I REALIZED WE WERE CLBING AND SAW THAT THE ALT ALERTER HAD BEEN CHANGED I ASKED HIM WHAT ALT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO. HE SAID 9000 FT. I ASKED IF HE WAS SURE. I CHKED WITH DEP AND PASSING APPROX 3000 FT MSL TOLD THEM THAT WE WERE CLBING TO 9000 FT. AT THAT TIME DEP INFORMED US THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN CLRED TO CLB. I TOLD THE CAPT TO LEVEL OFF AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER THAT THE CTLR CONTINUED OUR CLB TO 8000 FT. IN BUSY SITS ESPECIALLY IN THE TERMINAL AREA, ALWAYS FOLLOW PROPER RADIO PROTOCOL. HAVE POSITIVE COM ESTABLISHED WITH EACH CTLR AND MAKE SURE ALL CREW MEMBERS ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH WHAT THOSE INSTRUCTIONS ARE.

Synopsis

GIV FLT CREW RPTS ALT DEV DEPARTING TEB AFTER CAPT COMPLIES WITH CLRNC INTENDED FOR ANOTHER ACFT WITH SIMILAR SOUNDING CALL SIGN.

Time / Day

Date: 200802

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SJC.Airport

State Reference: CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 5500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: NCT.TRACON Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: Medium Large Transport

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial Route In Use.Departure.SID : DANV

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Experience. Flight Time. Last 90 Days: 257

Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1300

ASRS Report: 775414

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 238

ASRS Report: 775430

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Advisory Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

CAPT AND I ARRIVED EARLY TO GATE AND HAD PLENTY OF TIME TO COMPLETE OUR DUTIES. I, FO HAD BEEN TO SJC SEVERAL TIMES BUT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME I WOULD BE DEPARTING RWY 12L WITH THE TYPICAL BEING RWY 30R. THE EVENT STARTS WITH MYSELF OBTAINING THE PDC FROM SJC CLRNC FOR OUR FLT TO OUR DEST. THE PDC CONTAINED A CHANGE IN OUR RTE FROM THE FILED RTE WHICH WAS THE FIRST TIME I HAD SEEN THIS WHILE RECEIVING A PDC. OUR FLT PLAN WAS A (SEE FILED RTE) TO (CITY) AND OUR RELEASE HAD US FILED SJC.DANV2.LIN.PEONS.INSLO.DTA.J84.OBH ETC. THE PDC CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING: -ALTAM7.LIN.PEONS.INSLO.DTA- I WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THIS CHANGE FORMAT AND SUBSEQUENTLY ASKED THE CAPTAIN FOR HIS HELP. MY INEXPERIENCE WITH DEPARTING RWY 12L ALSO PLAYED INTO MY ASKING FOR ASSISTANCE. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE CLRNC AND ITS INTENT. I ASKED IF WE SHOULD JUST CALL CLRNC BUT THEN WE REALIZED WE HAD THE EXPLANATION ON OUR WX PACKAGE. THE CAPT READ THE EXAMPLE ON THE PAGE AND I FOLLOWED ALONG FROM THE FO SEAT. WE BOTH THOUGHT THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE PDC AND SUBSEQUENTLY WENT WITH THE DANV2 AS OUR DEP SID. NORMAL PUSH AND START AND TAXI TO RWY 12L. NORMAL DEP AND CLBOUT. WE WERE BOTH UNSURE OF OUR EXACT ALT, BUT WE BELIEVE AT APPROX 5000 FT TO 6000 FT DEP ASKED US IF WE 'WERE GOING TO MAKE THE TURN.' WE REPLIED THAT WE WERE ON THE DANV2 WHICH WAS A RADAR VECTOR SID. CTLR ASKED US IF WE HAD RECEIVED THE ALTAM7 FROM CLRNC WHICH AT THE TIME WE WERE SURE WE HAD INTERPRETED THE PDC AS THE DANV2. DEP HAD US TURN TO 300 DEGS AND RESUME THE ALTAM7 DEP FROM THAT POINT. THERE DID NOT SEEM TO BE ANY TFC SEPARATION ISSUES AND THE CTLR SWITCHED US TO ANOTHER NORCAL DEP CTLR. NORMAL CLB FROM THIS POINT ON. UPON LEVELING AT CRUISE WE BEGAN TO LOOK AT OUR CLRNC, THE PDC MESSAGE AND AGAIN REVIEWED THE WX PACKAGE EXPLANATION OF PDC RTE CHANGES. IT WAS DURING THIS REVIEW THAT WE REALIZED WE HAD ERRED IN OUR UNDERSTANDING. WE HAD INDEED FLOWN THE WRONG SID AND HAD COMPLIED WITH THE WRONG CLRNC. AFTER REVIEWING OUR PDC AND THE EXAMPLE ON OUR WX PACKAGE THE PHRASEOLOGY IS CLR. HOWEVER, THE MINUS SYMBOLS DID LEAD BOTH OF US TO THINK THAT THIS WAS THE CHANGED RTE NOT THE NEW ROUTING TO FOLLOW. IN OUR MINDS THE NEW RTE WOULD HAVE BEEN SURROUNDED BY THE PLUS SYMBOLS. BUT TO AN EVEN GREATER DEGREE THAN UNDERSTANDING THE PDCS, A CALL TO CLRNC TO CLARIFY THE RTE WOULD HAVE BEEN THE EASIEST AND BEST WAY TO VERIFY OUR RTE. MORE DILIGENCE WILL BE MADE WHEN THE NEXT RTE CHANGED PDC IS RECEIVED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 775430: MY ONLY SUGGESTIONS WOULD BE A CLEARER FORMAT OF THE PDC. EITHER HAVE ONLY THE CLEARED ROUTING SHOW UP IN THE PDC MESSAGE, OR CLEARER ANNOTATION FOR THE REVISED ROUTING, SO THERE IS LESS OF A CHANCE THAT A CREW FLIES THE UNREVISED ROUTE.

Synopsis

CONFUSED BY THE EXISTENCE OF BOTH A FILED RTE THEY SHOULDN'T FLY AND CLEARED RTE THEY SHOULD HAVE ON THEIR ACARS DELIVERED PDC, MLG FLT CREW PICKS THE WRONG ONE AND HAS A TRACK DEV.

Time / Day

Date: 200712

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: POM.VORTAC Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 12000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: SCT.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-700 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 185

Experience.Flight Time.Type: 185

ASRS Report: 766081

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

Experience. Flight Time. Last 90 Days: 186

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Approach Qualification.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Returned To Intended or Assigned Course

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE APCHING LAX VIA THE SEAVU 1 ARR. INITIALLY, WE WERE CLRED TO KONZL AT 17000 FT MSL, MAINTAIN 250 KTS, ONCE HANDED OVER TO SOCAL, WE WERE CLRED TO 10000 FT MSL, MAINTAIN 250 KTS. APCHING SEAVU, WE WERE GIVEN THE CLRNC TO DSND VIA THE SEAVU 1 ARR FOR RWY 24R. I WAS THE PLT MONITORING AND READ BACK THE CLRNC. THE CAPT (PF) AND I BOTH WERE CONFIDENT OUR CLRNC WAS FOR RWY 24R. AS WE PASSED LUVYN, ON OUR WAY TO SHURL, SOCAL THEN ASKED IF WE HAD BEGUN OUR TURN FOR RWY 25R. I REPLIED THAT WE WERE HEADED FOR RWY 24R. SOCAL THEN GAVE GUIDANCE TO START OUR TURN FOR RWY 25R, CLRED ILS RWY 25R. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED WITH A L TURN. AT THIS POINT WE CHANGED FREQS TO ANOTHER SOCAL FREQ. AS WE BEGAN TO GET STABILIZED ON THE RWY 25R LOC, SOCAL ADVISED US, 'THIS WILL REALLY CONFUSE YOU NOW, WE ARE SWITCHING RWYS ON YOU AGAIN, INTERCEPT THE LOC FOR RWY 25L, THE FREQ IS 109.9.' WE WERE ABLE TO INTERCEPT THE LOC, STABILIZE IN A TIMELY MANNER AND WERE COMFORTABLY SET ON THE APCH WELL PRIOR TO THE FINAL APCH FIX. WE CHKED IN WITH TWR AND WERE CLRED TO LAND RWY 25L. THE APCH AND LNDG WERE UNEVENTFUL. THE RADIOS WERE VERY BUSY. RWYS WERE SWITCHED FOR MULTIPLE FLTS ARRIVING INTO LAX. THERE WERE NUMEROUS 'EDITORIAL COMMENTS' REGARDING HOW BUSY THE CTLRS WERE WORKING ('TAKE THE WEEK OFF WITH PAY') ETC. SOCAL SEEMED VERY COMFORTABLE WITH OUR CHANGE FROM RWY 24R, TO RWY 25R, TO RWY 25L. WE QUICKLY AND APPROPRIATELY RESPONDED TO ALL CLRNCS. THERE WERE NO TFC CALLS OR TCAS CONCERNS, AND ALL RADIO PARTICIPANTS WERE CALM, COOL, AND COLLECTED. THE REASON FOR THE SUBMISSION OF THIS RPT IS TO COMMUNICATE OUR CONCERNS REGARDING MULTIPLE RWY CHANGES IN A DYNAMIC CLASS B AIRSPACE. WITH SIMILAR SOUNDING RWYS, AIRCREWS AND CTLRS MUST BE ESPECIALLY VIGILANT AND PROACTIVE. ENSURING ALL PARTIES UNDERSTAND CLRNCS AND ARE PREPARED FOR LAST MINUTE CHANGES.

Synopsis

B737 FLT CREW RECEIVES MULTIPLE CHANGES TO RWY ASSIGNMENT DURING SEAVU 1 INTO LAX, WHICH THE FLT CREW COMPLY WITH.

Time / Day

Date: 200712

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ATL.Airport

State Reference : GA

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZTL.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-700 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Route In Use.Arrival.STAR: LA GRANGE

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot : ATP ASRS Report : 765547

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

ASRS Report: 765528

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Crossing Restriction Not Met

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector. Other. Controller A : 3

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Chart.STAR: LA GRANGE

Narrative

I WAS THE NON FLYING PILOT. WE WERE ON THE LA GRANGE ARRIVAL INTO ATL. WE THOUGHT WE WERE GIVEN A CROSSING RESTRICTION OF TIROE AT 12,000 FEET AND 250 KNOTS. THIS IS WHAT IS SHOWN TO EXPECT ON THE ARRIVAL CHART. APPROACHING HONIE INTERSECTION THE CONTROLLER ASKED US IF WE WERE GOING TO MAKE HONIE AT 12,000 FEET. HE ADVISED US THAT WE WERE GIVEN HONIE AT 12,000 FEET AND 250 KNOTS. THE CONTROLLER THEN HANDED US OFF TO ATL APPROACH. ATL APPROACH THEN GAVE US A CLEARANCE TO DESCEND TO 12,000 FEET, WHICH WE COMPLIED WITH. BASED ON THE ARRIVAL CHART, THE 'EXPECT' CLEARANCE IS TIROE AT 12,000 FEET. THIS WAS OUR MINDSET APPROACHING ATL. THIS CROSSING POINT HAS BEEN CHANGED IN A NOTAM BUT I HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE CROSSING RESTRICTION AT BOTH INTERSECTIONS SEVERAL DIFFERENT TIMES. THIS NOTAM IS ALSO BURIED IN THE MIDDLE OF ABOUT 3 PAGES OF VERY MEANINGLESS NOTAMS. A PERSONAL PET PEEVE OF MINE HAS BEEN THE INORDINATE AMOUNT OF TRIVIAL NOTAMS WE RECEIVE THAT ACTUALLY SURROUND THE VERY IMPORTANT ONES, SUCH AS NEW CROSSING RESTRICTIONS AND RUNWAY CLOSURES. THIS NEW CROSSING RESTRICTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN PUT INTO THE NEW CHART REVISION CYCLE ABOUT 2 MONTHS AGO IF IT WAS INTENDED TO BE USED. PLEASE DO NOT PLAN NEW CROSSING RESTRICTIONS AND/OR PUT THEM INTO USE UNTIL THEY ARE POSTED IN THE CHARTS. THIS MAKES THINGS VERY CONFUSING WHEN A NEW RESTRICTION IS BEING USED THAT CONFLICTS WITH THE CHART. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM RPTR ACN 765528: WE WERE GIVEN CROSS TIROE AT FL140. NEXT WE WERE CLEARED DIRECT HONIE AND THE LGC ARRIVAL. AS WE CROSSED HONIE THE CONTROLLER SAID SINCE YOU DID NOT MAKE HONIE AT FL140 CROSS TIROE AT FL120. I REPLIED THAT WE WERE TO CROSS TIROE AT FL140 AND WOULD EXPIDITE TO FL120. THE LGC ARRIVAL IN ATL STATES EXPECT TIROE AT FL140 FOR WEST LANDINGS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR 765547 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPTAIN FELT THIS WAS PRIMARILY A FAILED COMMUNICATION ISSUE. HE STATED THAT THE FLT CREW KNEW THERE WAS A NOTAM BUT HAD FORGOTTEN TO PROGRAM THE FMC IN CONCERT WITH THE NOTAM CHANGES. THE CAPTAIN ALSO STRESSED THE DIFFICULTY IN RETRIEVING PERTINENT INFORMATION FROM THE VOLUMINOUS AND DATED NOTAM PRESENTATION.

Synopsis

MISCOMMUNICATION AND UNFAMILIARITY WITH FDC NOTAMS FOR ATL RESULT IN ALT DEV ON LA GRANGE STAR FOR ACR FLT CREW.

Time / Day

Date: 200711

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: LAX.Airport

State Reference: CA

Environment

Flight Conditions: IMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: LAX. Tower Operator. Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B717

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Landing: Roll

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 210

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 9500 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 3500

ASRS Report: 760159

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP ASRS Report: 760164

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Local

Events

Anomaly.Incursion: Runway

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Consequence.FAA: Assigned Or Threatened Penalties Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

APPROX 45 MINS PRIOR TO LNDG, THE FO INQUIRED ABOUT SPECIFIC ISSUES RELATED TO LAX AS HE HAD NEVER OPERATED AT THAT ARPT. I BRIEFED HIM ON ISSUES SUCH AS USUAL RWY ASSIGNMENT, VIGILANCE FOR HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS, ETC. I ALSO BRIEFED THE CIVET 5 ARR, WHAT TO EXPECT FOR ALT CLRNC, AND HOW WE SHOULD MANAGE THE FCP. THE FO THEN BRIEFED THE ILS RWY 24R, AS I HAD SET IT IN THE FMS PER THE LATEST INFO. I PRESET THE SECONDARY FLT PLAN FOR RWY 25L AS BACKUP. PRIOR TO GRAMM INTXN, SOCAL APCH CLRED US 'TO DSND VIA THE CIVET 5, EXPECT THE ILS 25L.' I SET 7000 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW OF THE FCP DUE TO THE ALT RESTR AT FUELR INTXN, AND ACTIVATED THE SECONDARY FLT PLAN FOR RWY 25L. THE FO AND I VERIFIED THE XING RESTRS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CIVET 5 ARR. BTWN EDDSO AND LUVYN INTXNS, I HARD TUNED THE ILS TO RWY 25L FOR REF. PRIOR TO REACHING FUELR INTXN, SOCAL APCH CLRED US FOR THE ILS RWY 25L. I SET 1900 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW OF THE FCP, AND VERIFIED THE ENTRY WITH THE FO AS PER THE GS INTERCEPTION ALT AT LIMMA INTXN. WE WERE ALSO ASSIGNED 200 KTS BY SOCAL APCH. AFTER PASSING GAATE INTXN, SOCAL APCH INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN 3500 FT AND 'SET UP FOR THE ILS 25R.' I RESET THE ALT WINDOW IN THE FCP TO 3500 FT AND THE FO VERIFIED IT. I SELECTED THE ILS RWY 25R AND INSERTED IT INTO THE FLT PLAN. DUE TO A WAYPOINT BEHIND THE ACFT POS, THE ACFT STARTED A 30 DEG BANK L TURN. THE FO REALIZED THE DEV IMMEDIATELY AND DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT TO MAINTAIN HDG AND ALT. THE FO BRIEFED THE APCH AND NOTED THE CHANGE IN BARO SETTING, WHICH WAS CHANGED ON BOTH FCP CTLS. WE ALSO OBSERVED SHELL, FOGLA, AND GRIMY INTXN IN THE FMS. I SET 1900 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW OF THE FCP AGAIN, AS THAT IS THE GS INTERCEPTION HT AT FOGLA INTXN FOR RWY 25R. IT WAS VERIFIED BY THE FO. I ASSISTED THE FO IN LOSING ALT BY SETTING APPROX -1000 FPM WITH THE SCROLL WHEEL. THE FO ASKED FOR CONFIGN OF THE ACFT, AND I AGREED AND COMPLIED. CTLR STATED 'CLRED FOR THE APCH AND CONTACT TWR.' THE FO ASKED FOR, AND I SELECTED THE APCH-LAND PUSHBUTTON ON THE FCP. THE LOC AND GS CAPTURED, AND WE COMPLETED THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST. THE FO HAD THE ACFT STABILIZED IN AIRSPD, GS, AND LOC BY 1900 FT. AS I CONTACTED THE TWR, I WAS STILL SETTING THE MISSED APCH SETTING IN THE FCP. I READ BACK THE LNDG CLRNC, BUT WAS CONCENTRATING ON THE FO HAND-FLYING AN ILS IN IMC CONDITIONS. AT 1000 FT, I CALLED AND VERIFIED MISSED APCH SET. AT 600 FT, I CALLED 'APCH LIGHTS IN SIGHT,' AND THE FO CALLED 'CONTINUING,' AS HE LATER INDICATED HE DID NOT HAVE THE APCH LIGHTING SYS IN SIGHT. THE 500 FT CALL WAS NORMAL IN AIRSPD AND SINK RATE. THERE WERE NO OTHER CALLS FROM LAX TWR FOR ENTIRETY OF THE APCH. SHORTLY AFTER THE 500 FT CALL, THE FO CALLED THE RWY IN SIGHT AND, 'TAKING OVER VISUALLY.' I SILENTLY RECONFIRMED BEING ON GS AND LOC, AND THE NEEDLES WERE CTRED. THE AIRSPD WAS ON BUG. AFTER LNDG ROLLOUT, WE CLRED THE RWY TO THE R AND HELD BEHIND AN AIRBUS 320. AS WE WERE GIVEN TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, THE GND CTLR ASKED US TO CALL TWR FOR POSSIBLE PLTDEV. AFTER THE ACFT WAS

PARKED AT THE GATE AND APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETE, I CALLED THE NUMBER AND TALKED TO A TWR CTLR WHO INFORMED ME THAT WE HAD LANDED ON RWY 25L. WITH A LNDG CLRNC FOR RWY 25R. I EXPLAINED THE POOR HANDLING BY SOCAL APCH CLOSE TO THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT, BUT HE SIMPLY GAVE ME THE NUMBER TO SOCAL APCH. HE STATED THAT NO MEN, EQUIP, OR OTHER ACFT WERE IN OR NEAR RWY 25L AND THAT IT WAS OPEN BUT THAT HE WAS FILING A 'PRELIMINARY PLTDEV RPT' WITH THE LOS ANGELES FSDO. THE EVENT OCCURRED DUE TO THE DISTRS OF CHANGING MULTIPLE APCHS CLOSE TO THE ARPT, POOR CTLR HANDLING OF OUR ACFT, AND THE FAILURE TO DECLINE A SUB-STANDARD CLRNC. WE WERE WELL AHEAD OF THE ACFT UNTIL THE LATE CHANGE IN RWY ASSIGNMENT. THE CTLR FAILED TO ANALYZE OUR POS IN RELATION TO THE RWY ENVIRONMENT, FAILED TO GIVE VECTORS OR XREF INFO. SUCH AS 'X MI FROM THE XXX FIX.' THE LAX TWR CTLR FAILED TO MONITOR OUR PROGRESS WHILE WE WERE IN IMC CONDITIONS. I FAILED TO MAINTAIN MAX SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, TO DECLINE A SUBSTANDARD CLRNC, AND FAILED TO ASK FOR VECTORS BACK TO THE APCH. AS FAR AS THE AUTOMATION, MY ONLY PRESUMPTIONS ARE THAT THE LOC FOR RWY 25L WAS STILL CAPTURED, AND WE WERE DISTR BY THE ACFT DEV DUE TO THE RWY CHANGE. ALSO, THE HARD TUNING OF THE RWY 25L LOC IN NAV-RAD PAGE MAY HAVE HAD AN IMPACT. BEING MORE DEFENSIVE IN THE CARE OF THE ACFT IN DIFFICULT ATC SITS WOULD RELIEVE THE CREW FROM RUSHING INTO A SIT. SOCAL IS CONGESTED AIRSPACE, THEY USE NONSTANDARD PHRASEOLOGY, AND REPOSITIONING ACFT FOR AN APCH CAUSES HUGE PROBS. LAX TWR CTLRS SEEMED AS UNAWARE OF OUR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AS WE WERE. THEY ONLY SAID SOMETHING AFTER IT WAS ALL OVER. THERE WAS NEVER A QUERY OF OUR POS, OR A GAR INSTRUCTION.

Synopsis

B717 FLT CREW LANDS 25L IN IMC AT LAX AFTER TWO RWY CHANGES WITH CLEARANCE FOR ILS 25R.

Time / Day

Date: 200710

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: PRC.Airport

State Reference : AZ

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: PRC.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach Flight Phase.Landing: Roll

Person: 1

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Local

Qualification.Controller: Non Radar Experience.Controller.Non Radar: 10 Experience.Controller.Radar: 10

ASRS Report: 758814

Person: 2

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Events

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : FAA

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS WORKING THE LCL 1 POS ON RWY 21L WITH THE LCL 2 POS OPEN DURING MODERATE TFC. I HAD ALREADY GIVEN A CESSNA ON L DOWNWIND A LNDG

CLRNC AND HAD SEVERAL OTHER ACFT IN THE PATTERN WHEN AN ACFT CALLED FOR DEP. A SEMINOLE JUST CROSSED THE LNDG THRESHOLD AND I KNEW I COULD GET THE DEP OUT IF I UTILIZED TIPH. THE LNDG CESSNA HAD ALREADY TURNED BASE AND I INSTRUCTED HIM TO CANCEL LNDG CLRNC, CONTINUE L BASE, TFC HOLDING IN POS. I INSTRUCTED THE DEP, TFC L BASE, RWY 21 POS AND HOLD AND AS SOON AS THE PREVIOUS ARR EXITED THE RWY I GAVE THE CESSNA THAT WAS IN POS TKOF CLRNC. I LOOKED OUT TO SEE THE CESSNA ON BASE APPARENTLY OVERSHOOT FINAL AND ADVISED HIM AS SUCH. HE RESPONDED THAT I INSTRUCTED HIM TO CONTINUE ON BASE. THE LCL 2 CTLR HAD MANY ACFT IN THE PATTERN FOR RWY 21R AND I QUICKLY HAD THE CESSNA TURN AWAY FROM THE ARPT AND ENTER A R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 21L. I COORD WITH THE LCL 2 CTLR AND RE-SEQUENCED THE CESSNA INTO THE ARRS FOR RWY 21L. AFTER THE CESSNA SAFELY LANDED, I BRIEFLY TOLD THE PLT THAT MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT CLR, THAT I WAS SORRY, AND I WILL CHANGE MY PHRASEOLOGY FOR THAT SIT. THE PLT RESPONDED THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT FLYING INTO THE R DOWNWIND TFC BUT WAS JUST FOLLOWING OUR INSTRUCTIONS. I ADVISED HIM THAT HE SHOULD ALWAYS ASK FOR CLARIFICATION IF THERE IS EVER ANYTHING THAT IS UNCLR OR THAT HE HAS A CONCERN ABOUT. I BELIEVE THAT IF WE WERE STILL UTILIZING THE OLD TIPH RULES THAT THIS INCIDENT NEVER WOULD HAVE HAPPENED. THE RIDICULOUS REQUIREMENT THAT WE CAN ONLY PUT AN ACFT INTO POS WITH NO OTHER ACFT CLRED, ESPECIALLY AT A VFR ARPT, DOES NOTHING TO ENSURE THAT THERE WILL NOT BE A FLYOVER. EXTRA EYES IN THE CAB TO MONITOR THE TFC AND WATCH FOR MISTAKES IS THE BEST ANSWER FOR PREVENTING INCURSIONS OR ACCIDENTS. THE NEW TIPH RULES ACTUALLY RELAX THE REQUIREMENT TO HAVE EXTRA STAFFING IN THE CAB WHEN USING TIPH. WE CAN NOW USE TIPH WHEN THERE IS NOBODY BEHIND US TO ASSIST. THE NEW RULES HAVE LED TO MANY GAR'S BECAUSE THE CTLRS FORGET TO CLR THE ACFT ON FINAL TO LAND AFTER UTILIZING TIPH TO GET A DEP OUT. THESE NEW TIPH PROCS ARE YET ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF POOR PROCS DEVELOPED WITHOUT INPUT FROM THE CTLRS.

Synopsis

PRC TWR CTLR FAILED TO COMMUNICATE WITH TFC ON BASE, RESULTING IN DIRECTED TURN AWAY FROM THE TFC PATTERN, TIPH PROCS CITED AS CONTRIBUTORY.

Time / Day

Date: 200710

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: HEC.VORTAC

State Reference : CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 33000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZLA.ARTCC Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name : Learjet 60 Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase Descent: Intermediate Altitude

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZLA.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B757-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Climbout: Intermediate Altitude

Person: 1

Affiliation.Government: FAA
Function.Controller: Radar
Qualification.Controller: Radar
Experience.Controller.Radar: 22

ASRS Report: 758668

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot : ATP Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Qualification.Pilot: Private

Experience. Flight Time. Last 90 Days: 100

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 4500

Experience.Flight Time.Type: 500

ASRS Report: 758378

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe Anomaly.Non Adherence: Clearance

Independent Detector.ATC Equipment: Conflict Alert Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment: TCAS Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 2 Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Alert

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Miss Distance. Horizontal: 36000

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I HAD RECEIVED A BRIEFING TO TAKE THE SECTOR FROM THE PREVIOUS R-SIDE CTLR. HE DSNDED ACFT X, AN LJ60, TO FL340. THE PLT CORRECTLY RESPONDED TO THIS CLRNC. I THEN TOOK OVER THE SECTOR AND HAD ACFT Y, A B752 CLBING TO FL310. WHEN ACFT Y CROSSED THE SECTOR 38 BOUNDARY I CLBED HIM TO FL330 AND THE PLT RESPONDED CORRECTLY. I THEN DSNDED ACFT Z FROM FL310 TO FL240, CALLING THE ACFT 'ACFT Z,' AND I HEARD THE PLT RESPOND CORRECTLY. WHEN ACFT X AND ACFT Y WERE 20 MI APART I CALLED THE TFC TO ACFT X AS A B757 CLBING TO FL330 AND TOLD HIM TO EXPECT LOWER WHEN CLR. THE PLT SAID HE WAS LOOKING. I WAS ABOUT TO CALL THE TFC TO ACFT Y WHEN I NOTICED ACFT X'S MODE C INDICATE FL335. I ASKED ACFT X TO CONFIRM LEVEL AT FL340, BUT I FELT THAT THESE 2 ACFT COULD COLLIDE AND WITHOUT WAITING FOR A RESPONSE I INSTRUCTED ACFT X TO TURN 90 DEGS R IMMEDIATELY AND ACKNOWLEDGE WITH AN IDENT. IN THE SAME BREATH I INSTRUCTED ACFT Y TO TURN 90 DEGS R IMMEDIATELY. WHEN I UN-KEYED I GOT A BLOCKED RESPONSE AND REPEATED THE CLRNC TO ACFT Y AND THE PLT RESPONDED. WHEN THE ACFT WERE LATERALLY SEPARATED I TURNED ACFT Y TO A 060 DEG HDG FOR ADDITIONAL TFC AND LATER CLRED HIM TO INW. I CLRED ACFT X DIRECT HEC. I FELT THIS WAS A PLTDEV ON ACFT X'S PART. THE PLT WAS INSTRUCTED TO CALL IN TO ZLA ON THE NEXT FREQ. IT TOOK ABOUT 20 MINS TO RELIEVE ME FROM THE SECTOR AND AFTER I WAS RELIEVED I TOOK A WALK AROUND THE FACILITY PARKING LOT TO WORK OUT SOME OF THE ADRENALINE THAT WAS IN MY SYS. WHEN I RETURNED I WAS TOLD BY THE OPS MGR THAT THEY HAD CONFIRMED THAT ACFT X WAS ASSIGNED AND ACKNOWLEDGED FOR FL340 AND THAT THEY WERE FILING A PLTDEV AGAINST THE PLT. I WOULD NEED TO WRITE A STATEMENT AND THE OM SET UP THE FALCON SYS FOR REPLAY WITH AUDIO. THE OM ASKED IF I WOULD LIKE A UNION REP AND I SAID AFFIRMATIVE AND WHILE WAITING FOR THE REP I PLAYED THE FALCON DISPLAY. I THOUGHT I HEARD SOME NOISE AFTER ACFT Z RESPONDED TO MY FL240 CLRNC AND I REPLAYED IT AGAIN AND TURNED UP THE VOLUME. YOU CAN HEAR ACFT Z RESPONDING TO THE CLRNC AND IF YOU LISTEN CAREFULLY THERE IS AN 'ACR X 240.' THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY ACFT X RESPONDING TO ACFT Z'S CLRNC. I ASKED THE OM TO LISTEN AND HE CONFIRMED WHAT I HEARD ALTHOUGH HE WAS SURPRISED SINCE BOTH HE AND MY SUPVR LISTENED

TO THE FALCON AND NEITHER ONE HEARD ACFT X RESPONDING. SUBSEQUENTLY OTHER MGRS HAVE LISTENED TO AUDIO AND THEY ALSO MISSED THIS READBACK. THE OM ASKED ME NOT TO TAKE THIS PERSONALLY, BUT SINCE I HAD MISSED THE READBACK IF A LOSS OF SEPARATION HAD OCCURRED I WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE. THE PLTDEV WAS THEN CANCELED AND THE PLT WAS INFORMED. THE OM SAID HE HAD A LONG DISCUSSION WITH THE PLT ABOUT THE BAD READBACK SINCE ACFT Z AND ACFT X SOUND NOTHING ALIKE. I INFORMED THE OM THAT I AM NOT CERTAIN THAT ACFT X'S BAD READBACK EVER MADE IT THROUGH THE ELECTRONICS TO MY HEADSET. I NEVER LET NOISE, HETERODYNE, OR GENERALLY POOR QUALITY READBACKS GO BY WITHOUT QUESTIONING THE PLTS. AS A GENERAL OBSERVATION PLTS ARE BECOMING VERY LAID BACK LATELY WITH THEIR RADIOS. I AM CONSTANTLY NEEDING TO REPEAT MYSELF AND CORRECT READBACKS. THEY ARE VERY BAD WITH NOT USING THEIR CALL SIGNS AND WITH MAKING UP THEIR OWN POOR PHRASEOLOGY. THERE NEEDS TO BE SOME EMPHASIS PLACED ON GOOD RADIO COMS WITH THE PLT THROUGH THEIR OPERATOR/OWNERS AND WITH THE FAA IN GENERAL. IF ACFT X HAD BEEN PAYING ATTN THIS NMAC WOULD NEVER HAVE OCCURRED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 758378: I WAS PF OF ACFT X. WE WERE DSNDING FROM FL400 AND GIVEN INTERMEDIARY DSCNTS. TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION, THE LAST CLRNC ATC GAVE US WAS TO DSND TO FL240. I HEARD THE PNF CONFIRM FL240. WITH ATC. FL240 WAS ROLLED INTO OUR ALT SELECTOR TO WHICH I REITERATED, 240, ALT SELECT. WE WERE ROUGHLY AT FL360 AT THAT POINT. I SET UP THE VNAV IN ANTICIPATION OF DSNDING TO THE NEXT 12000 FT RESTR AND NOTICED IT WOULD TAKE A 2000 FPM DSCNT TO COMPLY. AT ABOUT 33700 FT, ATC INFORMED US THAT OUR TFC WOULD STOP AT FL330 AND THAT WE COULD EXPECT LOWER AFTER PASSING TFC. AT THAT MOMENT WE REALIZED SOMETHING WAS WRONG. WE WERE CLOSING THE DISTANCE BTWN OUR TFC AND DSNDING TO THEIR ALT. WE DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND STARTED A R TURN. JUST THEN, ATC COMMANDED A R 90 DEG TURN. TFC WAS GIVEN THE SAME INSTRUCTION. WE GOT A TA ALERT IN THE TURN AND CONTINUED OUR DSCNT TO INCREASE SEPARATION. AFTER WE WERE CLR OF THE CONFLICT, THE CTLR GAVE US A CLRNC TO CLB BACK TO FL340 AND SHORTLY AFTER A DSCNT TO FL280 DIRECT HEC. WE WERE GIVEN A NUMBER TO CONTACT ZLA UPON LNDG. WE WERE TOLD THAT THE ZLA INVESTIGATION FOUND THAT WE REPLIED TO ANOTHER CLRNC TO FL240 AND THEY DID NOT CATCH THE MISTAKE. THEY ADVISED NO ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN.

Synopsis

ZLA CTLR DESCRIBED NEAR LOSS OF SEPARATION WHEN FLT CREW RESPONDED TO WRONG ALT CLRNC, CTLR FAILED TO HEAR INCORRECT READBACK.

Time / Day

Date: 200709 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: TEB. Airport

State Reference: NJ

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 1500 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 1800

Environment

Flight Conditions: Marginal

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Citation V Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial Route In Use.Departure.SID: TEB

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience. Flight Time. Last 90 Days: 110

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 5200 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1100

ASRS Report: 754433

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Crossing Restriction Not Met Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 2 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Advisory

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Assigned Altitude Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE DEPARTED TEB FROM RUNWAY 24 ON THE TEB 5 DEPARTURE TO PARKE INTERSECTION. SHORTLY AFTER BEING HANDED OFF TO DEPARTURE AND LEVELING AT 1500 FT MSL, WE WERE GIVEN A HEADING OF 280. I DID NOT HEAR IT BUT APPARENTLY WE WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN 1500 FT. BEING ON THE TEB 5, I THOUGHT WE WERE ABLE TO CLIMB TO THE FINAL ALTITUDE ON THAT PROCEDURE WHICH IS 2000 FT MSL. AFTER INITIATING A SLOW CLIMB FROM 1500 FT, WE QUERIED ATC ABOUT THE ALTITUDE ASSIGNMENT AND WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN 1500 FT. WE NEVER EVEN GOT TO 1800 FT BEFORE RETURNING TO 1500 FT. ATC ACTUALLY THEN CLEARED US TO 4000 FT BEFORE WE EVEN GOT BACK TO 1500 FT. AS THERE WAS LITTLE TRAFFIC THAT DAY, THERE WAS NO AIRCRAFT NEAR US AND ATC NEVER MENTIONED ANY TRAFFIC OR ALTITUDE DEVIATION TO US. IT WAS HARD TO HEAR THE CONTROLLER AND THE WAY THE TEB 5 IS DEPICTED, IT LOOKED LIKE WE WERE ALLOWED TO CLIMB TO 2000 FT WHEN HE VECTORED US.

Synopsis

A CE560 FLT CREW ON THE TEB 5 WAS GIVEN AN EARLY HDG CHANGE TO 280 DEG AND WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN 1500 FT. THE CREW EXPERIENCED AN EXCURSION FROM ASSIGNED ALT AS THEY BEGAN A SLOW CLB WITHOUT CLRNC.

Time / Day

Date: 200709

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZAN.ARTCC

State Reference : AK

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 34000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZAN.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-400 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 180

Experience.Flight Time.Type: 700

ASRS Report: 753886

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Radar Qualification.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation : Overshoot Anomaly. Non Adherence : Clearance

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE CLBING TO OUR ASSIGNED CRUISE ALT OF 34000 FT. WE GOT A CALL AT APPROX 33000 FT. I LOOKED AT THE MESSAGE, THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AND STARTED TO LEVEL THE PLANE OFF. THE FO WAS FLYING AND THE AUTOPLT WAS ON HIS SIDE. I LOOKED AT THE MESSAGE WHEN I LOOKED AT THE ALTIMETER, IT READ 34400 FT. I THEN ASKED THE FO WHAT HIS READ AND HE SAID 34000 FT. AT THIS TIME ZAN ASKED US OUR ALT. HE SHOWED US 400 FT HIGH. WE THEN REALIZED HIS ALTIMETER WAS STILL SET TO THE DEP ARPT. WE DSNDED TO 34000 FT. WHEN NEAR AN ASSIGNED ALT WATCH THE LEVELOFF. DON'T BOTH LOOK AT CDU. ALSO I WAS WEARING A STANDARD BOOM MIKE. FO HAD ON A NOISE CANCELING, AND SOMETIMES WE MISCOMMUNICATED. SUCH AS CLB CHK, 'ALTIMETERS 2992' WHICH WAS NOT CHKED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER STATED THAT THE FLT DID RECEIVE AN ACARS MSG JUST PRIOR TO LEVELOFF. THE PNF'S ATTENTION WAS DIVERTED, CONFIDENT THAT THE PF WOULD LEVEL THE ACFT, SINCE THE AUTOPILOT WAS ENGAGED. ALTHOUGH THE CLIMB CHECK THROUGH TRANSITION ALT WAS THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN COMPLETED, THE PF WAS USING AN UNAPPROVED NOISE-CANCELING HEADSET, AND MAY NOT HAVE HEARD THE CALLOUT. THE REPORTER IS CONCERNED THAT THE USE OF SUCH HEADSETS IS CREATING CONFUSION AND INHIBITS EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION.

Synopsis

B737-400 FLT CREW CLIMBED THROUGH ASSIGNED ALT. PF FAILED TO SET 29.92 DURING CLIMBOUT.

Time / Day

Date: 200708

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: PHL. Airport

State Reference: PA

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Night

Person: 1

Affiliation.Government: FAA
Function.Controller: Local
Qualification.Controller: Military
Qualification.Controller: Radar
Experience.Controller.Military: 10
Experience.Controller.Radar: 22

ASRS Report: 753385

Events

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas: FAA

Situations

ATC Facility. Procedure Or Policy: PHL. Tower

Narrative

I WAS ASSIGNED TO THE TWR. PHILADELPHIA TWR WAS LNDG RWY 9R AND DEPARTING RWY 9L. DUE TO CONSTRUCTION ALL ACFT LNDG RWY 9R THAT EXIT THE RWY PRIOR TO THE END MUST BE GIVEN EXTENSIVE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. THIS ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD PLACED ON THE LCL CTLR IS IN MY OPINION A SAFETY HAZARD. THIS 1 PERSON MUST ISSUE PROGRESSIVE INSTRUCTIONS, ENSURE AND WATCH EVERY ACFT TO MAKE SURE THEY READ BACK THE CORRECT TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, TAXI CORRECTLY AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 9L. THEY MUST DO ALL OF THIS AND CONTINUE TO WORK ALL THE RWY 9R ARRS. THIS WORKLOAD IS JUST TOO MUCH FOR 1 PERSON. MY RECOMMENDATION TO ALLEVIATE THIS WOULD BE TO HAVE FINAL CTL INCREASE SPACING BY 1 MI, THEREFORE EVERY ACFT COULD ROLL TO THE END AND TURN OFF AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 9L WITH VERY LITTLE ADDITIONAL PHRASEOLOGY.

Synopsis

PHL CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING INCREASED LCL CTL TAXI WORKLOAD WHEN LNDG 9R AND DEP 9L DURING CURRENT CONSTRUCTION.

Time / Day

Date: 200709

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ISP.Airport

State Reference: NY

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ISP.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 Flight Phase.Ground : Takeoff Roll

Person: 1

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Local

Experience.Controller.Limited Radar: 20

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1: 15 Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position2: 3

ASRS Report: 753124

Person: 2

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence : Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : FAA

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ACFT ON IFR FLT PLAN, PLT UNFAMILIAR WITH FIELD. PLT WAS INSTRUCTED TO TAXI TO RWY 33L VIA TXWY C AND RWY 10. PLT CROSSED RWY 33L AND WAS

INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT ON THE OTHER SIDE (RWY 28). PLT WAS CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 33L, BUT DEPARTED RWY 28. I EXPECTED HIM TO DO SO, AND GOT PERMISSION FROM GND CTL TO USE RWY 28. I COULD NOT INSTRUCT THE ACFT TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD AS I WOULD HAVE LIKED, AS WE DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT STAFFING TO USE TIPH. NO OTHER ACFT WERE INVOLVED, AND NO PAPERWORK WAS FILED. PREVENTING THE PLT FROM XING THE RWY WHILE TAXIING WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT, BUT IF I WERE ALLOWED TO USE TIPH, THE ACFT WOULD HAVE DEPARTED THE CORRECT RWY.

Synopsis

ISP CTLR DESCRIBED WRONG RWY DEP, ALLEGING THAT TIPH RESTRICTIONS WERE A CAUSAL FACTOR IN THIS PLTDEV.

Time / Day

Date: 200708

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

State Reference : IA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 10500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: DSM.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 Flight Phase.Descent : Vacating Altitude

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: DSM.TRACON

Make Model Name: Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot Qualification.Pilot: Commercial Qualification.Pilot: Instrument Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 30 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 340

Experience.Flight Time.Type: 320

ASRS Report: 749180

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Required Legal Separation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 2 Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Alert

Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Airspace Structure

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I HAD BEEN FLYING SKYDIVERS OVER THE WINTERSET ARPT. I HAD BEEN FLYING ALL DAY LONG AND MADE SEVERAL JUMP RUNS. WHEN I WOULD TKOF EACH TIME I WOULD CONTACT DES MOINES APCH AND TELL THEM I WAS JUST OFF WINTERSET CLBING TO 10500 FT WITH JUMPERS. I HAD DONE THIS SEVERAL TIMES THAT DAY. I WOULD CLB UP TO ALT STAYING WITHIN 5 NM OF THE ARPT. I WOULD BE IN CONTACT WITH DES MOINES APCH THE WHOLE WAY TO ALT AND ON THE WAY BACK DOWN. I ALSO STAY ON AND MONITOR THE LCL FREQ FOR OTHER LCL TFC. I WOULD ANNOUNCE MY INTENTIONS ON THE LCL FREQ. THE SITUATION STARTED WHEN I TOOK OFF. DES MOINES APCH CTL WAS VERY BUSY. I WAS ABLE TO CONTACT DES MOINES APCH SHORTLY AFTER TKOF JUST LIKE I HAD BEEN SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE THAT. THE CTLR SAID TO RPT 1 MIN TO JUMPERS AWAY, I SAID ROGER RPT 1 MIN TO JUMPERS AWAY. THE AIRPLANE IS EQUIPPED WITH A MODE C XPONDER AND I HAD THE SAME CODE ALL DAY. AT THIS POINT NOTHING IS OUT OF THE ORDINARY. DES MOINES APCH CONTINUED TO BE EXTREMELY BUSY. THERE WAS CONTINUOUS RADIO XMISSIONS FROM THE CTLR AND CALLING ACFT AND IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE TO GET ON THE RADIO TO CALL DES MOINES APCH. IT CONTINUED TO BE VERY BUSY. I GOT TO ALT 10500 FT WITHIN 2 NM OF THE WINTERSET ARPT. I WAS ABLE TO GET IN TO DES MOINES APCH AND I RPTED 'I AM TURNING JUMP RUN, 1 MIN TO JUMP.' THE CTLR SAID 'ROGER ACFT X' SO I CONTINUED. DES MOINES APCH IS STILL VERY BUSY AT THIS POINT. ABOUT A MIN LATER THE JUMPERS LEFT THE PLANE, I WAS ABLE TO GET IN ON DES MOINES APCH AND ANNOUNCED JUMPERS AWAY OVER WINTERSET. I DID NOT HEAR A RESPONSE FROM THE CTLR. AT THIS POINT I AM WITHIN 3 NM FROM THE ARPT. I CALL BACK AND RPT JUMPERS AWAY AND STARTING TO DSND. I THOUGHT THE CTLR SAID ROGER, SO I CONTINUED TO DSND. THE RADIOS ARE STILL VERY BUSY AT THIS POINT. I AM ABOUT 10000 FT AND THE CTLR COMES BACK AND I THOUGHT HE SAID STAY AT OR BELOW 11000 FT. I SAID ROGER THAT I AM AT 10000 FT. THE CTLR COME BACK 'NO! TFC A CITATION 12 O'CLOCK 1 MI 10000 FT. I WANTED YOU ABOVE 11000. ACFT X SQUAWK VFR FREQ CHANGE APPROVED, DON'T CALL ME BACK THE REST OF THE DAY.' THE RADIOS ARE STILL VERY BUSY AND I REPLIED ROGER GOING VFR. I AM STILL ABOUT 4 NM N OF THE ARPT STARTING TO TURN BACK INBOUND AND CONTINUE TO DSND AND LAND. I NEVER SAW THE OTHER TFC. I DID NOT MAKE EVASIVE ACTION. I WAS COMMUNICATING WITH DES MOINES APCH LIKE I ALWAYS DO. I WAS WITHIN 5 NM OF THE ARPT LIKE USUAL. DES MOINES APCH WAS VERY BUSY AT THE TIME AND I THINK IT WAS JUST A MISCOM BTWN THE CTLR AND ME. I AM ASSUMING THAT THE CITATION WAS ON AN IFR FLT PLAN AND WAS TALKING TO DES MOINES. I DON'T KNOW WHY THE CTLR WOULD HAVE ROUTED HIM THAT CLOSE TO WINTERSET WITH JUMPERS IN THE AIR. I DON'T KNOW IF THE CITATION HAD TCAS OR IF HE SAW ME OR IF HE MADE EVASIVE ACTION. THE CTLR CALLED THE ARPT MGR LOOKING FOR ME. I CALLED HIM BACK ON HIS PERSONAL CELL PHONE. HE APOLOGIZED AND SAID HE WAS UNPROFESSIONAL AND WE DISCUSSED THE SITUATION AND CONCLUDED IT WAS A MISCOM. HE SAID HE WAS VERY BUSY. HE ALSO SAID THE SITUATION SET OFF AN ALARM.

Synopsis

CONFLICT DEVELOPS BETWEEN SKY DIVER JUMP PLANE AND IFR CITATION WHEN AN UNEXPECTED DESCENT IS INITIATED BY JUMP ACFT.

Time / Day

Date: 200706

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: VUZ.VORTAC

State Reference : AL

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 32000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC Weather Elements : Rain

Weather Elements: Thunderstorm

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZTL.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A320

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZTL.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A321

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Radar

Qualification.Controller: Developmental Experience.Controller.Limited Radar: 0.01

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 500

ASRS Report: 748855

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Critical

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Required Legal Separation Independent Detector.ATC Equipment: Conflict Alert Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment: TCAS

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1 Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Alert

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Consequence.FAA: Investigated Miss Distance.Vertical: 600

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Aircraft Problem Areas : FAA

Narrative

ACFT X CALLED AND ASKED TO DEVIATE L OF COURSE 3 TIMES, 2 OF WHICH WERE BLOCKED BY OTHER ACFT CALLING AT THE SAME TIME. ON THE THIRD CALL, WHEN I FINALLY HEARD HIM, I APPROVED A L DEV TO GO TO THE N SIDE OF A DEPICTED CELL, AND THEN DIRECT TO ATL WHEN ABLE. MY PLAN HERE WAS TO HAVE ACFT X NOW PASS ON THE N SIDE OF ACFT Y AND KEEP MY LATERAL SEPARATION IN THAT WAY. ABOUT 6 SECONDS ALTER, I NOTICED THAT ACFT X WAS ONLY GOING TO SKIRT THE EDGES OF THE DEPICTED WX, AND NOT FOLLOW THE SAME PATH AS THE OTHER ACFT FLYING THROUGH THERE, AND WAS NOW GOING TO BE IN MORE OF A CONFLICT WITH ACFT Y (ABOUT THIS TIME A TRACKER PLUGGED IN AND BEGAN MONITORING THE SITUATION). AT THIS TIME. I STOPPED ACFT X AND ASSIGNED HIM PRESENT HDG, THINKING I STILL HAD LATERAL WITH THE OTHER ACFT Y. NOW, MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED TO THE CLOSE PROX OF ACFT Z AND THE OVERFLT OF SQS AT FL340 FROM THE NORTHERN SECTOR. AFTER SEVERAL MINS OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLTS, I WAS ABLE TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION. AT THE SAME TIME THIS WAS HAPPENING, AN ACFT NEAR RMG VORTAC WAS HOPING TO CLB AND DEVIATE TOWARD ATL -- WHICH TOOK BOTH MY ATTN AND THE D-SIDE'S ATTN. I THEN LOOKED BACK AT THE ACFT X AND ACFT Y SITUATION AND ANALYZED THAT. IT WAS APPARENT NOW THAT THE PH WAS NOT GOING TO WORK, SO I ISSUED A 20 DEG R TURN TO ACFT Y. TO WHICH HE RESPONDED AND ACCEPTED. I THEN TURNED ACFT X AN ADDITIONAL 15 DEGS R, TO WHICH HE ACCEPTED AND TURNED. NOTICING THAT THE ACFT Y HAD NOT BEGAN HIS TURN, I ISSUED AN ADDITIONAL 20 DEGS R (TOTAL OF 40 DEGS) TO THE ACFT (41 SECONDS AFTER THE INITIAL VECTOR WAS ISSUED), TO WHICH HE ACCEPTED. I THEN RETURNED TO ACFT X AND TOLD HIM TO FLY A HDG OF 180 DEGS FOR TFC, TO WHICH HE RESPONDED, 'ROGER, WE ARE TURNING R, RESPONDING TO AN RA.' I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, AND TOLD HIM TO FLY A HDG OF 180 DEGS WHEN HE WAS FINISHED WITH HIS RA. AT THIS POINT, THE ACFT WERE ABOUT 5.2 MI APART FROM ONE ANOTHER, DIVERGING BY APPROX 130 DEGS. AS THE 2 ACFT CONTINUED THEIR TURNS. ACFT Y SNUCK INSIDE THE 5 MI HALO OF ACFT X AND ACFT Y BEGAN A CLB. A SECOND OR TWO LATER, ACFT X ADVISED THAT HE WAS CLBING TO FL330 IN RESPONSE TO THE RA HE RECEIVED. I IMMEDIATELY TOLD HIM, 'ROGER, TFC IMMEDIATELY OVERHEAD AT FL330 (AN ACR ACFT), DSND AND MAINTAIN FL320 ASAP.' HE ACKNOWLEDGED AND BEGAN HIS DSCNT BACK TO FL320. EVEN

THOUGH THERE WAS AN FL340 OVERFLT ON TOP OF THE FL330 OVERFLT, NEITHER OF THOSE ACFT RESPONDED TO ANY RA, THANKFULLY, AND CONTINUED THEIR FLTS. IN SHORT, THE TCAS SHOULD HAVE TOLD THE ACFT X TO DSND TO FL310, WHICH, UPON REVIEW, WAS OPEN AND AVAILABLE. INSTEAD, IT INSTRUCTED THE PLT TO CLB DIRECTLY INTO ANOTHER ACFT (THE WORST AND MOST UNSAFE OPTION AVAILABLE). FOLLOWING AIRLINE SOP'S, THE PLT RESPONDED TO THE RA ADVISORY, AND TO THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT HE WAS GIVEN BY ME. ACFT X AND ACFT Y WERE 4.7 MI AND AN ADDITIONAL 400 FT LATERALLY SEPARATED AT THE SAME ALT AND ACFT X AND ACFT Z WERE 1.2 MI LATERALLY AND 600 FT VERTICALLY SEPARATED.

Synopsis

ZTL CTLR DESCRIBED TCAS RA AT FL320, RESULTING IN CONFLICT WITH THIRD ACFT, CTLR QUESTIONING TCAS RA INSTRUCTIONS.

Time / Day

Date: 200708 Day: Fri

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: HPN.Airport

State Reference: NY

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 200

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: HPN.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Corporate Make Model Name: Gulfstream V Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach Flight Phase.Landing: Go Around

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities. Tower: HPN. Tower Operator. Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: BAe 146 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground: Taxi

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 116

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 6520 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 810

ASRS Report: 748441

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Local

Qualification.Controller: Non Radar

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Ground Critical Anomaly.Incursion: Runway

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Executed Go Around Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Miss Distance. Horizontal: 3000 Miss Distance. Vertical: 500

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

SHORT FINAL TO RWY 16 AT HPN. CAPT WAS PM FROM R SEAT. CAPT-QUALIFIED FO WAS PF FROM L SEAT. CAPT CONFIRMED LNDG CLRNC AT 700 FT AGL. AT 200 FT AGL AN AVRO RJ CROSSED THE RWY AT TXWY F. CREW SAW ACFT ENTER THE RWY SAFETY AREA AND WAS ABOUT TO INITIATE A GAR WHEN THE TWR ORDERED ONE. IT IS THE RECOLLECTION OF BOTH MYSELF AND THE FO THAT THE RJ WAS STOPPED AT THE HOLD SHORT LINE AND THEN BEGAN TO CROSS THE RWY. WE ASSUME THAT A MISCOM OCCURRED BTWN THE LCL AND GND CTLR. TWR CTLR APOLOGIZED PRIOR TO SWITCHING US TO DEP. HPN HAS A BUSY MIX OF CPR, AIRLINE AND GA ACTIVITY. ADDITIONALLY, LAHSO WAS IN EFFECT FOR ACFT LNDG RWY 11. WE ARE ALWAYS PREPARED FOR A GAR AT HPN IN THESE CONDITIONS.

Synopsis

GULFSTREAM 5 WAS ESTABLISHED SHORT FINAL WHEN AN ACFT CROSSED THE RWY MIDFIELD. FLT CREW EXECUTED GO-AROUND.

Time / Day

Date: 200707 Day: Wed

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

 $Locale\ Reference. Airport:\ SLC. Airport$

State Reference: UT

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 9000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: S56.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Corporate Make Model Name: Citation Excel Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach Route In Use.Approach: Visual

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: S56.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: Brasilia EMB-120 All Series

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 125 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 12000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 395

ASRS Report: 746053

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 110

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 18000

Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1200

ASRS Report: 746054

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe Anomaly.Non Adherence: Clearance Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE ON APCH TO SLC. APCH CTLR ISSUED A CLRNC TO TURN TO A HEADING OF 120 DEGS ADVISE ARPT IN SIGHT FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 17. WE ADVISED ARPT IN SIGHT. HE RESPONDED MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION FROM AN E120 CLRED FOR THE VISUAL. SO WE DESCENDED AND STARTED TURNING TO RWY 17 WHILE DESCENDING FOR THE ARPT. REACHING 8000 FT THE CTLR ISSUED TURN R IMMEDIATELY TO A HEADING OF 180 DEGS FOR RWY 16R. WE THEN ASKED WHAT ALTITUDE HE NEEDED. CLEARLY THERE WAS A MISCOM. HE THEN CLEARED US FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 16R AND STATED NO WORRIES, ALTITUDE YOUR DISCRETION.

Synopsis

C560XL FLT CREW RPTS MISUNDERSTANDING AND/OR CONFLICT WITH ANOTHER ACFT DURING VISUAL APCH TO RWY 17 AT SLC.

Time / Day

Date: 200705 Day: Thu

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: LAX. Airport

State Reference: CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 12000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: SCT.TRACON Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier Make Model Name: B767-300 and 300 ER

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope: 24R

Flight Phase.Descent: Approach Route In Use.Arrival.STAR: CIVET

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

ASRS Report: 741162

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC ASRS Report: 741163

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Approach

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2 Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Intended or Assigned Course

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

APCHING GRAMM INTXN, WE WERE CLRED TO DSND VIA THE CIVET 5 ARR, RWY 25L. AFTER PASSING RUSTT INTXN, THE CTLR QUERIED US IF OUR NAV SYSTEM WAS HAVING PROBS TRACKING RWY 24R APCH. I REPLIED WITH OUR CLRNC FOR RWY 25L. THE CTLR REPLIED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO INTERCEPT THE RWY 24R LOC AND WE COMPLIED. WE LANDED RWY 24R UNEVENTFULLY.

Synopsis

DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON WHICH RWY WAS ASSIGNED FOR AN ARR AT LAX.

Time / Day

Date: 200706 Day: Fri

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: TEB.Airport

State Reference : NJ

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: Citation X Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial

Route In Use.Departure.SID: TEB 5

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 120 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 10000

Experience.Flight Time.Type: 2500

ASRS Report: 740862

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 2
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1
Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Advisory

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Returned To Intended or Assigned Course

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE BRIEFED THE DEP AND HAD 1500 FT SET IN THE ALT ALERTER FOR THE TEB 5 DEP FROM RWY 24 IN TEB. THE CLRNC LIMIT FOR THIS DEP IS 2000 FT AFTER PASSING 4.5 DME FROM TEB. WHEN TEB TWR SWITCHED US OVER TO NY DEP, WE CHKED ON 'PASSING 1200 FT FOR 2000 FT,' AS THE CLRNC LIMIT STATED, HOWEVER, WE WERE GOING TO LEVEL OFF AT 1500 FT UNTIL THE 4.5 DME POINT. THE NY DEP CTLR, BELIEVING WE WERE CLBING TO 2000 FT, QUICKLY CORRECTED US BY INDICATING THAT WE SHOULD ONLY CLB TO 1500 FT UNTIL PASSING THE 4.5 DME POINT AND THEN HE BEGAN TO READ TO US THE ENTIRE TEXTUAL PROC FOR THE DEP OVER THE RADIO. DURING THIS LONG AND AGITATED SOUNDING DISSERTATION, I LEVELED OFF AT 1500 FT BUT DID NOT INITIATE THE REQUIRED TURN TO 280 DEGS AS SOON AS I REACHED 1500 FT. INSTEAD I REMEMBERED THE TURN AFTER THE CTLR FINISHED HIS DISSERTATION AT APPROX 4.0 DME FROM TEB. AT THIS POINT THE CTLR NOTICED THE DELAY IN THE TURN AND ASKED US OUR HEADING. MY FO SAID WE WERE IN THE TURN TO 280 DEGS, TO WHICH WE GOT ANOTHER COMPLETE REREAD OF THE DEP PROC, ALONG WITH A STERN REMARK ADVISING US TO SIT DOWN AND LEARN THE PROC BEFORE OUR NEXT VISIT TO TEB. I BELIEVE THIS CHAIN OF EVENTS BEGAN WITH A PHRASEOLOGY AMBIGUITY BETWEEN WHAT WE WERE CLBING TO AND WHAT WE WERE CLRED TO IN THE ATC CLRNC. THE CTLR, EXPECTING AN ERROR, PICKED THE WRONG TIME TO DISTRACT ME FROM MY DUTIES WITH HIS LONG WINDED, EDUCATIONAL SPEECH WHICH CAUSED ME TO FORGET THE TURN TO 280 DEGS. IF OUR DEP FROM THE SID PUT US IN HARM'S WAY, A CLRNC COMMAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO KEEP US SAFE. NOT A LENGTHY LECTURE WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD UNTIL WE REACHED A SAFE ALT. THIS FLT DEPARTED AFTER 7.5 HOURS OF DUTY AND LATE AT NIGHT, WHICH MAY ALSO HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE HEADING DEV. THE TEB 5 DEP IS A LITTLE AMBIGUOUS WHEN CHKING ON WITH DEP. IF THEY ARE EXPECTING US TO CHK IN STATING WE ARE CLBING TO 1500 FT INSTEAD OF 2000 FT, THEN A NOTE SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE SID OR THE PROC CHANGED.

Synopsis

CE750 FLT CREW MAKES IMPROPER INITIAL CONTACT WITH N90 WITH THE CTLR READING THE TEB 5 OVER THE RADIO, CAUSING THE RPTR TO MISS THE TURN TO 280 DEGS AT 1500 FT.

Time / Day

Date: 200706 Day: Tue

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: DFW.Airport

State Reference: TX

Person: 1

Affiliation.Government: FAA
Function.Controller: Radar
Qualification.Controller: Radar
Experience.Controller.Radar: 19.4

ASRS Report: 740766

Events

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas: FAA

Situations

Chart.SID: TRISS

Narrative

THE ATC SYS USES A VARIETY OF SID, WHICH CARRY A NAME AND NUMBER DESIGNATOR, SUCH AS DALL8 AND HUBB5. 4 OF THE SIDS FROM THE DFW AREA ARE: NOBLY2, TRISS2, SOLDO2, CLARE2. WE RECENTLY HAD A PLT CLRED 'TRISS 2 TXK.' THE PLT QUESTIONED THIS CLRNC BY SAYING 'VERIFY TRISS DIRECT TO TXK.' THE CONFUSION IS OVER 'TWO' VERSUS 'TO.' WE HAVE HAD NUMEROUS PLTDEVS ASSOCIATED WITH THESE RNAV DEPS, AND I WONDER IF THE DISTR BTWN 'TO' AND 'TWO' COULD BE THE CAUSE. I ALSO WONDER HOW MANY OTHER SITUATIONS AROUND THE COUNTRY HAVE OCCURRED BECAUSE OF THIS CONFUSION, AND WHETHER ELIMINATING THE NUMBER 'TWO' FROM SID AND STAR NUMBERING COULD RESOLVE THAT CONFUSION.

Synopsis

ZFW CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING SID NAMES/NUMBERS POSSIBLY CAUSING CONFUSION BETWEEN THE NUMBER TWO AND ROUTING TO.

Time / Day

Date: 200706 Day: Tue

Local Time Of Day: 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: SBKP. Airport

State Reference: FO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 7000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: SBGR.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial Route In Use.Departure.SID : AGLO

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC ASRS Report: 740740

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : Foreign Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE ON THE GROUND IN CAMPINAS, WE WERE CLRED FOR THE FILED (AND NORMAL) AGLO DEP BETEL TRANSITION MAINTAIN FLO70 CALL SAO PAULO DEP LEAVING 6000 FT (TRANSITION ALTITUDE 6000 FT). OUT OF 6000 FT THE COPILOT CALLED SAO PAULO (FREQUENCY 120.25) AND REQUESTED HIGHER ALT. SAO PAULO RESPONDED, 'CLEARED TO PUBLISHED ALT.' NOT SURE OF THE MEANING OF THIS RESPONSE, A RESPONSE I HAD NEVER HEARD BEFORE, I ASKED THE COPILOT TO AGAIN ASK FOR A HIGHER ALT. AGAIN THE DEP CTLR SAID, 'CLEARED TO PUBLISHED ALTITUDE.' I LEVELED THE AIRPLANE AT FLO70 AND ASKED THE COPILOT IF HE KNEW WHAT THE CTLR WAS TALKING ABOUT. HE SAID HE HAD NO IDEA AND THAT HE HAD NEVER HEARD SUCH A THING BEFORE. TWO MORE REQUESTS LEFT US WITH THE SAME PROBLEM AND STILL AT FLO70 AS THIS WAS THE LAST ALT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO AND UNDERSTOOD. WE ENGAGED THE AUTOPILOT AND I ASSUMED THE PNF ROLE OF TALKING ON THE RADIO. I ASKED THE CTLR FOR A CLRNC TO A HIGHER ALT. HE AGAIN SAID, 'CLEARED TO PUBLISHED ALT'. I ADVISED HIM WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THAT MEANS, AND HE RESPONDED, 'YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT ALTITUDE YOU ARE FILED FOR?' SUCH SNIDE REMARKS HAVE NO BUSINESS IN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL. AFTER SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO RECEIVE A PROPER CLRNC I NOW DEMANDED HE CLR US TO A NUMERICAL ALT. RELUCTANTLY, HE CLRED US TO FL320, OUR PLANNED ALT. I FELT IT EXTREMELY IRRESPONSIBLE FOR THE CTLR TO PLAY GAMES WITH A FLIGHT CREW THAT OBVIOUSLY DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE CLRNC, STATED SUCH, AND REPEATEDLY REQUESTED AN UNDERSTANDABLE CLRNC BE GIVEN. FURTHERMORE, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE IRRESPONSIBLE FOR ME AS THE CAPT OF THIS FLT TO ACCEPT A CLRNC THAT WAS NOT IN ANY FORM I COULD EASILY RECOGNIZE. I HAVE FLOWN INTERNATIONAL FLTS FOR 17 YEARS AND THIS IS THE FIRST ENCOUNTER I HAVE HAD WITH AN AIR TRAFFIC CTLR THAT DISPLAYED SUCH ARROGANCE. THE LEVEL OF DISRESPECT FOR NOT ONLY HIS DUTY OF SEPARATING ACFT, BUT THAT OF A FLIGHT CREW CLEARLY ASKING FOR CLARIFICATION OF A CLRNC, THE BASIC TENET OF IFR FLT, IS SOMETHING I HAVE NEVER ENCOUNTERED ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD! THERE HAVE BEEN AND THERE ALWAYS WILL BE THE PROBLEM WITH LANGUAGE DIFFERENCES BUT THAT WAS NOT THE CASE HERE. THE CTLR SPOKE VERY CLR AND UNDERSTANDABLE ENGLISH. IF NOTHING CAN BE DONE TO EDUCATE THE CTLR IN BRAZIL HOW ATC WORKS IN THE REST OF THE WORLD, COULD YOU AT LEAST MAKE THIS INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO OTHER CREWS FLYING INTO BRAZIL? I FEEL THE POTENTIAL FOR PROBLEMS EXIST BEYOND WHAT WE ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT WILL BE FORTHCOMING, IF THIS ATTITUDE IS EITHER ALLOWED TO CONTINUE OR NOT EXPOSED TO THOSE WHO USE THE SYSTEM.

Synopsis

B767 FLT CREW RECEIVES CLRNC TO CLB FROM SBGR CTLR, USING NONSTANDARD TERMINOLOGY THAT THE CREW DOESN'T UNDERSTAND.

Time / Day

Date: 200705 Day: Thu

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: TEB.Airport

State Reference: NJ

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 1300 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 1700

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Corporate Make Model Name: Caravan 1 208A Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Climbout: Takeoff

Route In Use.Departure.SID: DALTON

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 90 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 7700 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 2500

ASRS Report: 740437

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly Altitude Deviation: Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 2 Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Advisory

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas: Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

JUST PRIOR TO TAXI AND TAKEOFF FROM TEB, I REVIEWED AND FAMILIARIZED MYSELF WITH THE 'DALTON' DEP, FOR WHICH I WAS CLRED. I PUT THE DEP CHART ON THE YOKE CLIP AND PROCEEDED TO TAXI AND TAKE OFF. I MADE FREQUENT REFERENCE GLANCES AT THE PLATE DURING TAKEOFF AND CLB OUT, SINCE I WAS VERY UNFAMILIAR WITH TEB PROCS AND THE AREA IN GENERAL. AS I FLEW THE PROC AS DEPICTED, THE DEP CTLR QUESTIONED MY ALT AS I CLBED OUT OF 1700 FT FOR 2000 FT. HE INSTRUCTED ME TO DESCEND TO 1300 FT IMMEDIATELY AS DEPICTED ON THE SID. INITIALLY I WAS BAFFLED, BUT COMPLIED IMMEDIATELY. EVENTUALLY, I FIGURED OUT THAT THE APPROPRIATE PLATE HAD ROTATED AS I CLAMPED IT TO THE YOKE PRIOR TO TAKEOFF, AND I WAS ACTUALLY REFERRING TO THE TEB5 SID, WHICH HAS NEARLY IDENTICAL GRAPHIC DEPICTION AND ROUTING. THE CLB TO ALT INSTRUCTIONS ARE DIFFERENT. CAUSE: HUMAN ERROR ON MY PART. SOLUTION: PAY MORE ATTENTION TO ORGANIZATIONAL DETAIL, ESPECIALLY WITHOUT A SIC TO CROSS CHK THE CAPT!

Synopsis

C208 PLT FLIES TEB SID ALTS VICE DALTON OFF RWY 19 AT TEB.

Time / Day

Date: 200705 Day: Wed

Local Time Of Day: 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference. Airport : EGLL. Airport

State Reference: FO

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: EGLL.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B777-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer Only: 27L

Flight Phase Descent: Approach

Route In Use.Approach: Instrument Precision

Route In Use.Arrival.STAR: N/S

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 200

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 17000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1500

ASRS Report: 740433

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government : Foreign Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

BRIEFLY, BEFORE TOD BRIEFED AND SET UP RWY 27R APPROACH. BEFORE XA00 LOCAL, IT IS THE NOISE ABATEMENT PREFERRED RWY AND THE RWY INDICATED BY ATIS CLRNC: DIRECT OCK DEPART OCK 075 VECTORS RWY 27L. WE RE-

BRIEFED FOR 27L. CLRNC: RT TURN 270 NOW EXPECT RWY 27R, CONTACT DIRECTOR WITH CALL SIGN ONLY. RE-INSTALLED RWY 27R CLRNC: LEFT TO 180 THEN 300, INTERCEPT LOC, NO RWY INDICATED AT THAT TIME. CLRNC. REPORT ESTABLISHED ON LOC. AS WE INTERCEPTED RWY 27R LOC, APPROACH ADVISED WE HAD OVERSHOT LOC, TURN LEFT 220 INTERCEPT RWY 27L LOC. WE COMPLIED, SHORT DISCUSSION ON MIX-UP ON ASSIGNED RWY. LANDING RWY 27L UNEVENTFUL, NO FURTHER REFERENCE TO IT FROM TOWER OR GROUND CONTROL. ALL THREE CREW PRESENT CONCURRED THE MISTAKE WAS NOT IN THE COCKPIT.

Synopsis

AIR CARRIER ARRIVING IN EGLL FINDS WORKLOAD INCREASED BY RWY ASSIGNMENT CONFUSION.

Time / Day

Date: 200705

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZSPD.Airport

State Reference: FO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 16000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZSHA.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: MD-11

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach Route In Use.Arrival.STAR: VMBIZA

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZSHA.ARTCC

Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 200 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 15500 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1000

ASRS Report: 739995

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 160

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 17000

Experience.Flight Time.Type: 4710

ASRS Report: 740075

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : Foreign Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Anomaly Non Adherence: Required Legal Separation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3 Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Alert

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Miss Distance. Horizontal: 20000 Miss Distance. Vertical: 800

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

CLRED FOR THE VMB12A ARR INTO SHANGHAI. WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO 4800 M AFTER LEVELING AT 4800 M WE WERE SLOWED TO 250 KTS. (APPROX 60 MI FROM ARPT) WE WERE CLRED FLY THE VMB12A ARR.' WE ASKED ATC IF WE WERE TO FOLLOW ALTS ON THE ARR. ATC RESPONSE NO ALT RESTRS.' WE INTREPID THAT TO MEAN WE SHOULD FOLLOW THE HARD ALTS DEPICTED ON THE ARR PLATE. WE BEGAN DSCNT TO 2900 M (7880 FT). AT 4200 M ATC INSTRUCTED AN IMMEDIATE TURN TO 080 DEG AND STOP DSCNT. WE LEVELED AT 4200 M AND ON HDG 080 DEGS. WE IDENTED TFC AT 2 O'CLOCK POS. APPROX 4 MI AND SLIGHTLY LOWER, VISUALLY AND ON TCAS. THERE WERE NO TA OR PA BUT TCAS HAD HIGHLIGHTED THE TARGET. ATC ASKED WHY WE HAD DSNDED AND WE REPLIED THAT WE WERE FOLLOWING THE ARR, INCLUDING THE HARD ALTS AS DEPICTED. HIS RESPONSE WAS NO, I GIVE YOU DSCNT.' WE LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. LANGUAGE DIFFERENCES ARE AT THE HEART OF THIS INCIDENT. WE DID NOT PHRASE OUR QUESTION IN ICAO ENGLISH, AND THE CTLR DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT WE WERE ASKING. HIS REPLY WAS AMBIGUOUS AND WE THOUGHT WE HAD A GOOD ANSWER. DUE TO FREQ CONGESTION, WE DID NOT ANNOUNCE AN ALT CHANGE, AND THAT ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT. (THE CTLR'S ENGLISH WAS EXCELLENT, WITH LITTLE ACCENT. HOWEVER, HIS VOCABULARY WAS LIMITED TO ICAO PHRASEOLOGY, AND WE DID NOT PHRASE OUR QUESTION WITHIN ICAO PHRASEOLOGY. I'M STILL NOT SURE JUST WHAT PHRASE COULD HAVE BEEN ICAO STANDARD.) IN POST FLT DISCUSSION WITH ATC, THE TWR CHIEF TOLD THE CAPT THAT THE ALTS ON THE ARR PLATE WERE FOR FMS ONLY. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT STATEMENT TO MEAN FOR PLANNING ONLY. THERE WERE NO NOTES ON THE ARR PLATE TO INDICATE THIS. ALL ALTS WERE DEPICTED AS HARD ALTS AND THERE WAS NO NOTE 'ALTS TO BE ASSIGNED BY ATC.'

Synopsis

LANGUAGE BARRIER WITH ZSPD CONTROL LEADS MD11 FLT CREW TO FOLLOW ALTS AS SHOWN ON THE VMB STAR VICE AWAITING CLRNC TO LOWER ALTS. SEPARATION PROBLEM RESULTS.

Time / Day

Date: 200705 Day: Tue

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: JFK.Airport

State Reference: NY

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 10000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Route In Use.Departure: On Vectors

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: FMS/FMC

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 180 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 14000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 3000

ASRS Report: 739173

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Relief Pilot

Person: 4

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 5
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1
Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Advisory

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Intended or Assigned Course

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE DEPARTING JFK. I WAS THE PF. WE ALSO HAD A THIRD PLT IN THE JUMPSEAT WHO WOULD LATER ACT AS INTL RELIEF PLT. ORIGINAL SID WAS MERIT 3, PUT TRANSITION ALLEX AS FILED. DURING TAXI, THE DEP RTE TO MERIT WAS CLOSED DUE TO WX. WE WERE SENT TO CLRNC DELIVERY TO GET A NEW ROUTING. THE NEW ROUTING WAS GIVEN AS 'RWY HDG FOR RADAR VECTORS, BETTE, NANTUCKET, ALLEX AS FILED. MAINTAIN 5000 FT ON THE BETTE 3.' I TYPED IN THE FIXES AS RECEIVED ON THE FMS. I DID NOT START BY SELECTING THE BETTE 3 BECAUSE I ENTERED THE FIXES AS THE CTLR READ THEM TO US. AFTER TKOF WE WERE GIVEN SEVERAL VECTORS AND THEN TOLD 'DIRECT BETTE.' THE PLT MONITORING SELECTED THE FIX IN THE FMS AND LNAV AS THE MODE. THIS GAVE US A TURN TO THE N, CONSISTENT WITH OUR ORIGINAL RTE. DURING THE TURN, THE PLT MONITORING NOTICED THAT HE COULD NOT DISPLAY BETTE ON HIS MAP. I THEN NOTICED THAT THE HDG DID NOT MAKE SENSE WITH WHERE I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE LOCATION OF BETTE, 110 DEGS AT 39 NM FROM JFK. I STARTED AN IMMEDIATE TURN BACK TO THE SE. THE CTLR THEN CALLED US AND REAFFIRMED OUR CLRNC TO BETTE. I NOTICED AT THIS POINT THE DISTANCE TO BETTE WAS 6789 NM ON THE FMS. WE RE-ENTERED BETTE AND WENT DIRECT TO THE CORRECT WAYPOINT. I BELIEVE THAT I ENTERED BETTY INSTEAD OF BETTE. WHEN THIS IS DONE, 2 SEPARATE FIXES COME UP THAT ARE APPARENTLY ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE GLOBE. ALTHOUGH WE USED NEW PROCS FOR CONFIRMING RWY, WAYPOINT AND SID BEFORE TKOF, WE DID NOT CONFIRM THE FIX AGAINST ANY LOGIC CHK. I SHOULD HAVE NOTICED THE INCORRECT SPELLING OF 'BETTY.' ALSO, WE DID NOT CONFIRM THE NAME OF THE SID IN THE FMS. HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT ALWAYS WORK AT JFK, BECAUSE MINOR MODIFICATION OF THE SID (REMOVAL OF JFK AND INTERCEPTING THE INBOUND RADIAL TO A FIX) WILL DROP THE SID FROM THE FMS. HAD THE CTLR USED THE PHRASEOLOGY, 'CLRED THE BETTE 3 BETTE 3 DEP, ACK TRANSITION, DIRECT ALLEX,' I WOULD LIKELY HAVE SELECTED THE SID FIRST IN THE FMS AND PREVENTED MY MISTAKE. THE NEW YORK CTLR WANTED TO KNOW HOW WE ENDED UP OFF COURSE AS HE WAS INFORMED BY CTR THAT THIS IS A COMMON OCCURRENCE ON THIS DEP.

Synopsis

CAPTAIN OF B767 MISSPELLS WAYPOINT BETTE ON RE-CLEARANCE DUE TO WX OUT OF JFK. SUBSEQUENT DIRECT CLRNC RESULTS IN HEADING TOWARD BETTY, ENGLAND VICE BETTE AS PLANNED.

Time / Day

Date: 200704 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ATL.Airport

State Reference: GA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 16000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZTL.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A319

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach Route In Use.Arrival.STAR: ERLIN 2

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 240

Experience.Flight Time.Type: 3000

ASRS Report: 737406

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Crossing Restriction Not Met

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

AT CRUISE WE BRIEFED A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 26R AT ATL. IN THE MCDU RWY 26R WAS IN THE PRIMARY AND RWY 26L IN THE SECONDARY. ALL ALT CONSTRAINTS WERE IN AND VERIFIED BY BOTH CREW. WE WERE ON THE ERLIN ARR AND THERE IS A RESTR OF 14000 FT THAT WE WERE ASSIGNED. DSCNT WAS MADE IN THE MANAGED MODE AND THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY BOTH CREW. DURING DSCNT ALL PARAMETERS WERE NORMAL AND WE NEVER RECEIVED ANY MSG. AT ABOUT 19500 FT WE WERE SWITCHED TO APCH. THE FO CHKED IN AND WE WERE ASSIGNED RWY 27L, THE FO INSERTED THIS IN THE PRIMARY FLT PLAN. THIS WAS VERIFIED AND WE BRIEFED A VISUAL OF RWY 27L. THE APCH CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED. A FEW SECONDS LATER I OBSERVED THAT WE WERE WITHIN A MILE OR 2 OF THE CROSSING RESTR AND DSNDING THROUGH 16000 FT. V/S WAS THEN PULLED AND 4000 FPM DSCNT WAS SELECTED. WE CROSSED THE FIX JUST SLIGHTLY BELOW 16000 FT INSTEAD OF 14000 FT. ABOUT A MILE PAST THE FIX, APCH QUESTIONED OUR ALT AND ASSIGNED US TO EXPEDITE TO 11000 FT. I DID THIS AND WE WERE LEVEL SHORTLY AFTER. NO TFC WAS OBSERVED AND NO TCAS WARNINGS WERE RECEIVED. WE BOTH AGREED THAT 14000 FT WAS ON THE FCU AND THAT THE CROSSING RESTR WAS PROGRAMMED INTO THE MCDU. WE COULD NOT DISCERN ANY REASON FOR THE ACFT NOT TO MEET RESTR. WE FEEL THAT THE ALT CONSTRAINT LIKELY DROPPED OUT WHEN THE RWY CHANGE WAS MADE. DOUBLE CHK CROSSING RESTR WHEN RWY CHANGES ARE MADE.

Synopsis

A319 MISSES CROSSING RESTR AT DALAS ON THE ERLIN ARR INTO ATL AFTER ZTL CTLR CHANGES LNDG TO RWY 27L.

Time / Day

Date: 200704 Day: Wed

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: RNG.VOR

State Reference : FO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 12300

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: SKRG.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Flight Phase.Descent: Intermediate Altitude

Route In Use.Arrival.STAR: MEDAL1

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC ASRS Report: 737105

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Narrative

CLRED TO SKRG VIA MEDAL 1 ARR. APCHING RNG FROM N, WERE CLRED TO 13000 FT. APCHING RNG WE WERE RECLRED THE MEDAL 1 ARR. THE ARR ENTAILS XING THE 150 DEG RADIAL 7 DME FIX AT OR ABOVE 12000 FT TO START DSCNT INBOUND ON THE 180 DEG RADIAL TO CROSS THE RNG VOR AT 10000 FT AS A TRANSITION TO THE ILS RWY 36. EXPERIENCE HAS PROVEN THAT IT IS ALMOST A NECESSITY TO CROSS THE 150 DEG 7 DME FIX AT 12000 FT IN ORDER TO MAKE THE REST OF THE PROFILE AND HAVE AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO THE ILS. PREVIOUSLY WE HAD EXPERIENCED ATC ISSUING CLRNC FOR THE ILS AND THEN ISSUE NUMEROUS ALT RESTRS THAT BASICALLY PRECLUDED THE INTERCEPTION OF THE GS AND COMPLETION OF THE APCH. IN THAT CASE WE FORCEFULLY ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION AS TO WHETHER WE WERE IN FACT CLRED FOR THE APCH OR NOT. IT TOOK A MOMENT ON THAT OCCASION, BUT WE WERE THEN RECLRED FOR THE APCH JUST IN TIME TO CATCH THE GS. IN THIS CASE AS WE APCHED THE VOR FROM THE N WE RECEIVED THE CLRNC FOR THE MEDAL 1, CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 36. AS WE DEPARTED 13000 FT I NOTICED A TCAS TARGET IN OUR 10 O'CLOCK POS 1000 FT BELOW CONVERGING RANGE APPROX 4 MI. I GLANCED IN THAT DIRECTION AND SIGHTED A SET OF LNDG LIGHTS ON CONSTANT BEARING (CONVERGING). THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE THREAT BUT AS WE CONTINUED DSCNT, XING THE VOR WE RECEIVED SUDDEN FURTHER AMENDED CLRNC TO MAINTAIN 13000 FT. WE WERE AT 12300 FT AT THIS TIME, TRYING TO MAINTAIN THE DSCNT PROFILE. WE STATED THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR THE ARR AND APCH. THERE WAS THEN SOME INTERCHANGE OF COM IN SPANISH WITH WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN THE OTHER ACFT AND WE WERE RECLRED FOR THE ARR/APCH. THE OTHER ACFT CROSSED WELL CLR TO OUR REAR AND WAS NEVER HEARD FROM OR SEEN AGAIN. ALTHOUGH WE RECEIVED NO TCAS RA, IT CONCERNS US THAT WE WERE ABLE TO CLOSE WITHIN 300 FT VERTICALLY AND PROBABLY 2 MI OF THIS OTHER UNIDENTED CONVERGING TARGET. THE LIGHTS OF THE TFC MADE IT TO BE FIXED WING, PROBABLY A TRANSPORT. LANGUAGE COM WITH ATC FACILITY IS POOR AT BEST. PROCS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS. PLEASE CORRECT ME IF I AM IN ERROR, BUT IF ONE RECEIVES A CLRNC FOR AN APCH, ONE IS CLRED FOR THE ENTIRE APCH, BOTH HORIZ AND VERT TRACKS. THIS IS AS REFED BEFORE, THE SECOND TIME WE EXPERIENCED CONFUSING CLRNC AT THIS FACILITY. IT MAY BE THAT ATC IS CLRING US THE HORIZ TRACK ONLY WHEN CLRING US FOR THE MEDAL 1, HOWEVER, GIVEN THE PROX TO XING ALTS PUBLISHED ON THE ARR WHEN THE CLRNC IS ISSUED, THERE COULD BE NO EXPECTATION OF A SUCCESSFUL APCH IF ONE DID NOT FOLLOW THE VERT PROFILE AS WELL. IF ALT WAS TO BE RESTR, I WOULD EXPECT A CLRNC SUCH AS 'CLRED MEDAL 1, MAINTAIN 13000 FT.'

Synopsis

B737 CAPT ON APCH TO SKRG EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING ATC LANGUAGE AND ALT ASSIGNMENT CLARITY DURING MEDAL 1 ARR PROC.

Time / Day

Date: 200704 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: CZVR.ARTCC

State Reference: BC

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 30000

Environment

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: CZVR.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B747-400 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 180 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 18000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1400

ASRS Report: 737028

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Radar

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 2

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON INITIAL CHK-IN WITH CZVR CTR, WE REQUESTED CLB FROM FL300 TO FL310. WE WERE NOT GIVEN CLB CLRNC SO REMAINED AT FL300. APCHING ORNAI INTXN, CTLR ASKED OUR ALT AND I RPTED FL300. HE TOLD US TO CLB TO FL310.

IT WAS OBVIOUS FROM HIS TONE THAT HE EXPECTED US TO BE AT FL310. I DO NOT HAVE ANY RECOLLECTION OF BEING PREVIOUSLY CLRED TO FL310.

Synopsis

B747 FLT CREW REQUESTED FL310 FROM ATC WHICH WAS NOT GRANTED. THE NEXT CONTROLLER SEEMED TO BE UPSET THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT AT FL310.

Time / Day

Date: 200704 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: BHM. Airport

State Reference : AL

Altitude.AGL.Bound Lower: 300 Altitude.AGL.Bound Upper: 400

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: BHM.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-700

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer Only: 24

Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Route In Use. Approach: Instrument Non Precision

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 296

Experience.Flight Time.Type: 550

ASRS Report: 735013

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 252

Experience.Flight Time.Type: 7000

ASRS Report: 735014

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment: GPWS

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Became Reoriented

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airport

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING APCH TO BHM WE HAD FLOWN THROUGH QUITE A BIT OF WX AND WERE LEFT SOMEWHAT HIGH AS ZTL WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH COM PROBS WITH SOME ACR ACFT GOING INTO ATL THAN GETTING US LOWER. BEFORE STARTING OUR DSCNT I COPIED THE ATIS FROM BHM WHICH WAS STATING THAT THEY WERE CONDUCTING VISUAL APCHS TO RWY 24. THE WX WAS GUSTY WINDS OUT OF THE S. ALL RWYS WERE WET AND THE CEILING WAS AROUND 8500 FT BROKEN. I TOLD THE CAPT TO EXPECT A VISUAL TO RWY 24 AND GAVE HIM THE WX. WHEN WE FINALLY WERE HANDED OFF TO APCH WE WERE TOLD TO SLOW TO 160 KTS AND THE DSND TO 4000 FT. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A VECTOR BEHIND A HAWKER THAT WAS MUCH SLOWER THAN WE WERE AND TO GIVE US SOME SPACING. WE WERE ALSO VECTORED THROUGH FINAL AND THEN WERE GIVEN ANOTHER TURN BACK TO THE S TO FINALLY REJOIN. WHEN SPACING WAS GOOD WE WERE CLRED TO JOIN THE LOC FOR A VISUAL APCH AND WERE TOLD THAT THE GS WAS OTS. WE ALSO HAD TO MAKE SOME SPD CORRECTIONS BEFORE LNDG AFTER HEARING THAT THE HAWKER LOST CLOSE TO 20 KTS ON FINAL. SINCE I LIVE IN BHM AND LEARNED TO FLY THERE I KNOW THE ARPT QUITE WELL. WE HAD VERY BRIEFLY TALKED ABOUT THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD BUT HAD NOT REALLY DISCUSSED THE NEW CONSTRUCTION ON RWY 24. WHEN WE WERE ABOUT 3-4 MI OUT DUE TO THE RAIN WE COULD ONLY SEE THE PAVEMENT OF THE RWY AND NOTHING ELSE. NO PAINT MARKINGS, NO MARKINGS TO STOP US FROM LNDG ON THE CLOSED PORTION OF THE RWY, NOTHING. DUE TO THE RAIN THE PAINTED MARKINGS WERE OBSCURED DUE TO THE SHEEN FROM THE WATER. WHEN WE WERE ON SHORT FINAL TO THE RWY AND AT ABOUT 300-400 FT ABOVE THE RWY WE GOT A 'CAUTION TERRAIN' WARNING. THE CAPT CORRECTED SLIGHTLY AND IT WENT AWAY. WE THEN GOT ANOTHER ONE IN WHICH HE CORRECTED SLIGHTLY. I THEN HEARD HIM SAY THAT HE WAS ON A 3 DEG GLIDEPATH AND THAT HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS GOING ON. JUST THEN I COULD SEE THE MARKINGS (WHICH WERE INCREDIBLY SMALL) REMINDING US OF THE CLOSED PORTION OF THE RWY AND THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD. THE BARRIERS USED TO MARK THE CLOSED PORTION OF THE RWY WERE WAY TOO SMALL TO BE USED TO BLOCK OFF THAT PORTION OF THE RWY. I TOLD HIM TO BE CAREFUL AS HE WAS CLOSE TO LNDG ON THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD. HE THEN CORRECTED THE DSCNT RATE AGAIN AND MADE A NORMAL LNDG. AFTER GETTING TO THE GATE HE STATED THAT HE THOUGHT WE WERE FLYING AN ILS APCH. IT WAS THEN THAT I INFORMED HIM THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH RWY 24 ILS GS UNUSABLE. HE STATED TO ME THAT HE THOUGHT WE WERE CLRED FOR AN ILS APCH. HE NEVER HEARD APCH CTL STATE TO US THAT THE ILS GS UNUSABLE. TO PREVENT THIS EVENT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN, A FEW THINGS NEED TO HAPPEN: 1) APCH/TWR CTLRS NEED TO STOP USING THE TERMINOLOGY 'CLRED FOR ILS RWY 24 GS UNUSABLE.' IN A HIGH STRESS SITUATION, IT IS TOO EASY FOR THE PLT TO ONLY HEAR CLRED FOR ILS APCH AND NOT THE GS UNUSABLE PORTION. INSTEAD, I THINK CTLRS NEED TO GO BACK TO THE OLD PHRASEOLOGY OF LOC APCH. THAT WOULD HELP CLR UP THE CONFUSION. 2) MUCH BETTER MARKINGS ON THE CLOSED RWY. THE

BARRIERS USED WERE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE UNTIL WE WERE ABOUT 200 FT AGL. THE BARRIERS NEED TO BE MUCH BIGGER AND LIT UP IF THEY ARE GOING TO BE ANY USE TO THE PLTS. THE PAINT MARKINGS OF THE RWY WERE COMPLETELY OBSCURED SINCE THE PAVEMENT WAS WET. 3) IF THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD IS GOING TO BE AS LARGE AS IT IS AT RWY 24 IN BHM, THEN A VASI NEEDS TO BE INSTALLED. UNTIL SOMETHING LIKE THIS IS INSTALLED, ACFT ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO COME IN TOO LOW ON THIS RWY. WITH THE NEW ADDED LENGTH OF RWY 24, THE NATURAL INSTINCT IS TO LAND IN THE TOUCHDOWN AREA. WITHOUT A VASI OR A GS HELPING THE PLTS LAND PAST THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD MANY ACFT ARE GOING TO COME IN TOO LOW, POSSIBLY GET CAUTION TERRAIN MESSAGES AND MAYBE EVEN LAND ON THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD.

Synopsis

B737 FLT CREW REPORTS DIFFICULTIES DURING THE APPROACH TO RWY 24 AT BHM. CAPTAIN NOT AWARE GS OTS AND TEMPORARY DISPLACED THRESHOLD BARRIERS NOT VISIBLE UNTIL VERY CLOSE TO THE RWY.

Time / Day

Date: 200704 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: TPA.TRACON

State Reference: FL

Person: 1

Affiliation.Government: FAA
Function.Controller: Approach
Qualification.Controller: Radar
Experience.Controller.Military: 7
Experience.Controller.Non Radar: 3
Experience.Controller.Radar: 12

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1: 3

ASRS Report: 734878

Events

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas: Company

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

RATHER THAN A SPECIFIC OCCURRENCE, THIS RPT ADDRESSES AN ONGOING ISSUE THAT IS BECOMING MORE PREVALENT. PLTS OF HVY ACFT ARE NOT USING/REFUSING TO USE THE WORD 'HVY' IN THEIR CALL SIGNS WHEN COMMUNICATING WITH ATC. I'VE NOTICED THIS BECOMING MORE AND MORE COMMON AS OF LATE. THE MOST COMMON OFFENDERS OF THIS IN TPA AIRSPACE ARE THE KC135 PLTS BASED AT MACDILL AFB (MCF). IN OVER 90% OF ATC COMS WITH THEM, THEY HAVE FAILED TO USE THE WORD HVY IN THEIR CALL SIGN. ANOTHER CHRONIC OFFENDER ARE THE ACR X PLTS. WE HAVE REGULARLY SCHEDULED B767 FLTS IN/OUT OF TPA, AND MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, THE PLTS WILL NOT USE THE WORD HVY. IN BOTH CASES, WHEN WE, AS ATC, STRESS THE WORD HVY IN ATC COMS WITH THESE PLTS, THE ATTITUDE WE RECEIVE FROM THEM IS ONE OF DISMISSAL OR OUTRIGHT INDIGNANCE. I BELIEVE THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF THE WORD HVY IS REQUIRED FOR A REASON: IT CALLS SPECIFIC ATTN TO ALL PLTS ON THE FREQ THAT A HVY ACFT IS OPERATING IN NEARBY AIRSPACE. THIS COMES INTO PLAY ESPECIALLY AT TPA GIVEN THE SECTORIZATION OF OUR AIRSPACE AND THE MULTITUDE OF VFR GA ACFT OPERATING IN CLOSE PROX TO THE FINAL APCH COURSES OF BOTH MCF AND

TPA. THIS IS MOST DEFINITELY A SAFETY ISSUE AND THE TREND IS DEFINITELY RISING.

Synopsis

TPA CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING INCREASED FREQUENCY OF PLT'S FAILING TO USE HEAVY WHEN REQUIRED DURING COM.

Time / Day

Date: 200703 Day: Thu

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: DXO.VOR

State Reference: MI

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 16000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZOB.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A320

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Climbout: Intermediate Altitude

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZOB.ARTCC

Operator.Other: Military

Make Model Name : Fighting Falcon F16 Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 200

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 8000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1500

ASRS Report: 732958

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: NMAC

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment: TCAS Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action Miss Distance. Horizontal: 0 Miss Distance. Vertical: 200

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

LEVEL AT 16000 FT, ZOB ASKED IF WE WERE VMC ON TOP, THE FO ANSWERED WE WERE. (IT WAS ACTUALLY A VERY CLR NIGHT.) ATC THEN INFORMED US WE HAD 2 F16'S AT OUR 2 O'CLOCK POS APPROX 15 MI. (I DON'T RECALL THE ACTUAL PHRASEOLOGY ATC USED IN RELATION TO THEIR ALT OTHER THAN THAT THEY WERE ABOVE OUR ALT.) WE OBTAINED THE VISUAL ON THE TFC BTWN 10-12 MI AS WELL AS A TCAS INDICATION SHOWING THE TFC ABOUT 1000 FT ABOVE OUR ALT (17000 FT). I DIRECTED THE FO TO INFORM ATC WE HAD A VISUAL ON THE TFC, WHICH HE DID. ATC THEN CLRED US TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION WITH THAT TFC AND TO CLB AND MAINTAIN FL230. WITH MY CONCURRENCE THE FO ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC. I INSERTED FL230 INTO THE FCU, SELECTED 'OPEN' CLB. AS OUR ACFT STARTED TO CLB, THE TFC WAS ABOUT 6 MI AND APPEARED TO BEGIN A DSCNT. I RECEIVED A TCAS TA THAT ALMOST INSTANTLY CHANGED TO AN RA 'DSND, INCREASE DSCNT.' UPON RECEIVING THE RA, WE HAD ASCENDED ABOUT 200-300 FT AND WERE BTWN 167200-16300 FT. I IMMEDIATELY BEGAN A PUSHOVER TO DSND WHEN THE RA CHANGED TO 'CLB, CLB NOW' AND WAS INDICATING A MAX CLB RATE REQUIRED. I REVERSED MY DSCNT TO A CLB AND WITHIN A COUPLE SECONDS AN F16 PASSED DIRECTLY UNDER THE ACFT FROM R TO L. THE FO SAW IT AND SAID HE HEARD IT. I WAS MONITORING THE TCAS AND SAW THE ALT SEPARATION DECREASE TO 200 FT. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CLB FROM 16000 FT THROUGH THE RA MANEUVERS UNTIL PASSING THE F16, I DON'T BELIEVE WE ASCENDED OR DSNDED MORE THAN 300 FT DUE TO THE RAPID CHANGE IN DIRECTION OF THE RA FROM DSCNT TO CLB. THE F16 PASSED BELOW US AT ABOUT 16000 FT IS MY BEST GUESS. THE F16'S WERE ON ANOTHER FREQ OR ON UHF, WE DID NOT KNOW THE CLRNC RECEIVED BY THE F16'S. I BELIEVE A FEW ITEMS COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS OCCURRENCE: 1) THE FACT THAT BOTH ACFT WERE NOT ON THE SAME FREQ REDUCED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF THE INTENTIONS AND CLRNCS OF ALL ACFT INVOLVED. I ASSUME THE F16'S WERE ON UHF WITH US ON VHF WITH THE CTLR NOT SIMULCASTING ON BOTH RADIOS. 2) THERE WAS NO OPERATIONAL NECESSITY TO ASSUME VISUAL SEPARATION AT NIGHT WITH CONVERGING TFC. MAINTAINING IFR SEPARATION WITH ATC WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH SAFER, ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT NOT HAVING THE VISUAL REFS YOU WOULD DURING DAYLIGHT. 3) ONCE DECLARING WE HAD THE VISUAL WITH THE TFC (WE HAD THEIR LIGHTS AT BTWN 10-12 MI) FOR ATC TO GIVE US CLRNC AND US TO ACCEPT A CLRNC TO CLB AT NIGHT THROUGH THEIR ALT IS AN UNSAFE PROC WITH CONVERGING TFC THAT WILL MEET WITHIN 1 MIN. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY COMPOUNDED BY NOT HAVING THE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF THE RADIO XMISSIONS, CLRNCS AND INTENTIONS OF THE OTHER ACFT. 4) BOTTOM LINE: I DON'T SEE ANY OPERATIONAL NECESSITY FOR AN ACR TO ACCEPT VISUAL SEPARATION AT NIGHT FROM OTHER ACFT EXCEPT POSSIBLY IN THE ATA WHERE THE RTE OF FLT AND ALTS ARE KNOWN.

Synopsis

A320 CAPTAIN, WHILE MAINTAINING VISUAL SEPARATION, REPORTS NMAC WITH AN F16 AT 16000 FEET 30 NM WEST OF DTW.

Time / Day

Date: 200703 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Weather Elements : Ice Weather Elements : Snow

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Personal Make Model Name: Citationjet, C525/C526

Operation Under FAD Deat Deat 01

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Landing: Roll

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities. Tower: ZZZ. Tower

Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Phase.Ground: Takeoff Roll

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 75 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 3370 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 590

ASRS Report: 732580

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Local

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Ground Critical Anomaly.Incursion: Runway

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 2

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Resolutory Action. Other

Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE INCIDENT OCCURRED AS I WAS ROLLING TO A STOP AFTER LNDG ON RWY X AT ZZZ, WHICH IS AN ARPT I HAD NOT VISITED RECENTLY. AS I APCHED THE POINT WHERE RWY X CROSSES RWY Y, I AM ADVISED THAT I RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTION FROM ATC, 'CONTINUE THROUGH THE INTXN, SAY FBO.' I INTERPRETED THIS INSTRUCTION, AS I GAVE THE FBO NAME TO THE CTLR, TO MEAN, 'TAKE THE NEXT INTXN OFF THE RWY AND PROCEED TO THE FBO.' UNFORTUNATELY, THE NEXT INTXN, INTO WHICH I TURNED, WAS RWY Y ON WHICH AN ACFT HAD JUST BEEN CLRED TO TAKE OFF. THE CONFLICT THUS GENERATED CAUSED THE INCIDENT. I RECOLLECT HEARING THE CTLR TELLING THE OTHER ACFT TO ABORT BUT NOT THE XMISSION TELLING THE OTHER ACFT THAT IT WAS CLRED FOR TKOF. I WAS AWARE THAT BOTH RWYS X AND Y WERE IN USE. AS SOON AS I TURNED LOFF RWY X I REALIZED THAT I WAS ON RWY Y, BUT BY THIS TIME IT WAS TOO LATE TO TURN BACK AND, IN ANY EVENT, I THOUGHT MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO PROCEED IN THIS WAY, VACATING RWY X AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT WERE DIFFICULT WX CONDITIONS AT ZZZ. THE ARPT HAD BEEN CLOSED THE PREVIOUS DAY AS A RESULT OF HVY SNOW AND AS A RESULT IT WAS EXCEPTIONALLY BUSY. WHEN I ARRIVED, THERE WAS A GUSTY WIND WHICH MADE LNDG RELATIVELY AWKWARD, AS A RESULT OF WHICH I USED RATHER MORE OF RWY X FOR THE LNDG ROLL THAN I WOULD NORMALLY HAVE DONE. THERE WAS STILL A LARGE AMOUNT OF SNOW AND ICE ON THE GND, INCLUDING ON MANY OF THE TXWYS, MAKING IT HARDER THAN USUAL TO DISTINGUISH BTWN TXWYS AND RWYS. THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY ON THE FIELD AND NON-STOP USE OF THE TWR FREQ. ONCE I HAD TURNED OFF RWY X, THE TWR CTLR EVIDENTLY REALIZED PROMPTLY THAT THERE WAS A POTENTIAL CONFLICT AS A RESULT OF MY ACFT BEING ON RWY Y. I WAS TOLD BY THE CTLR TO VACATE THE RWY ASAP AND TO CONTACT THE TWR BY PHONE AS SOON AS I COULD DO SO TO DISCUSS WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND TO INITIATE ANY RPTING ACTION WHICH MIGHT BE NECESSARY. I SPOKE TO THE SUPVR WHO WAS EXCEPTIONALLY COURTEOUS AND HELPFUL. WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE BETTER TO AVOID THIS SIT OCCURRING? I APPRECIATE THAT THE TWR CTLR WAS VERY BUSY, BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT THE INSTRUCTION I WAS GIVEN WHICH LED TO MY TURNING ONTO RWY 1 WAS VERY AMBIGUOUS. THERE ARE 7 INTXNS ALTOGETHER ON RWY X, THE 5TH BEING RWY Y. IT WAS NOT AT ALL CLR THAT 'CONTINUE THROUGH THE INTXN,' THE INSTRUCTION WHICH I RECEIVED WHEN I WAS AT ABOUT INTXN L, REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE INTXN BTWN RWY X AND RWY Y AND NOT TO INTXNS GENERALLY, WHICH USUALLY INVOLVE TURNING OFF THE ACTIVE RWY. I AM SURE THAT THE INCIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED IF THE INSTRUCTION I HAD RECEIVED HAD BEEN 'CONTINUE TO THE END OF THE RWY' OR 'CROSS RWY Y BEFORE VACATING RWY X.' AGAIN, I UNDERSTAND THE PRESSURE WHICH EVERYONE WAS UNDER AT ZZZ AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, BUT IT ALSO SEEMS TO ME TO HAVE BEEN WRONG TO HAVE CLRED THE ACFT ON RWY Y FOR

TKOF BEFORE I WAS CLR OF THE NORTHERN END OF THIS RWY. A FEW MOMENTS' DELAY WOULD HAVE BEEN ENSURED THAT I WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ON RWY Y, EITHER AS A RESULT OF MY XING IT HAVING BEEN COMPLETED AS THE CTLR OBVIOUSLY INTENDED SHOULD HAPPEN, OR MY TAXIING OFF RWY Y ONTO TXWY B, WHICH WOULD HAVE TAKEN ONLY A FEW SECONDS LONGER.

Synopsis

A C525 CLEARED THE RUNWAY AFTER LANDING BY TURNING ONTO ANOTHER ACTIVE RUNWAY, CAUSING AN AIRCRAFT THAT WAS CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF TO ABORT.

Time / Day

Date: 200703 Day: Thu

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Environment

Flight Conditions: IMC

Light : Dusk

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-400 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP ASRS Report: 731922

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Local

Events

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed As Precaution

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

EVIDENTLY ATC UNDERSTOOD AND DECLARED EMERGENCY FOR US AS WE ONLY DECLARED MIN FUEL. HOLDING ENRTE TO ZZZ ON ARRIVAL, AFTER SEQUENCED HOLDS WAS GIVEN NEW ALTERNATE OF ZZZ1. EFC CHANGED NUMEROUS TIMES AND AFTER ACCEPTING NEW ALTERNATE FROM DISPATCH, DECLARED 'MIN FUEL' ON PLANNED LAST TURN IN HOLDING AND RELAYED NEW ALTERNATE WAS ZZZ1. APCH SAID STAND BY AND WOULD TRY TO WORK US IN ZZZ. SUBSEQUENTLY THEY WOULD HAVE TO GIVE FURTHER DELAY, SO AT THAT TIME APCH CLEARED US TO ZZZ1 AND THE GIVEN ARRIVAL. WHEN TURNED FOR INTERCEPT, APCH ASKED FOR FUEL AND PAX ON BOARD. WE CONCURRED AND QUERIED THAT WE DID NOT DECLARE AN EMERGENCY, ONLY MIN FUEL. WERE SWITCHED TO TWR AND TOWER STATED THEY DECLARED THE EMERGENCY.

Synopsis

B737-400 FLT CREW DECLARES MINIMUM FUEL, REQUESTS DIVERT TO ALTERNATE, EMER DECLARED BY TOWER AND FLT CREW LANDS.

Time / Day

Date: 200703 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ELM. Airport

State Reference: NY

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 4000 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 3300

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ELM.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope: 24

Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Route In Use.Approach: Instrument Precision

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ELM.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Phase.Descent : Approach Route In Use.Arrival : On Vectors

Person: 1

Affiliation.Government: FAA

Function.Controller: Clearance Delivery

Function.Controller: Ground
Function.Controller: Local
Qualification.Controller: Radar
Experience.Controller.Non Radar: 16
Experience.Controller.Radar: 16
Experience.Flight Time.Total: 10

ASRS Report: 731716

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Required Legal Separation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Consequence.FAA: Investigated Miss Distance.Horizontal: 12000 Miss Distance.Vertical: 700

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Narrative

ACFT #1 ON APCH (ILS RWY 24) AT ELM DSNDING OUT OF 3300 FT MSL. ACFT #2 ON A VECTOR (HDG UNKNOWN). I BROUGHT IT TO THE ATTN OF THE RADAR CTLR THAT IT LOOKED CLOSE AND HE TURNED THE #2 ACFT TO A 90 DEG HDG. THE TRAINING HERE AT ELM IS THE WORST I HAVE EVER SEEN IN THE FAA. CTLRS' PHRASEOLOGY IS ATROCIOUS, AND UNCORRECTED BY MGMNT. WE NEED UNANNOUNCED EVALS OF PEOPLE WORKING POS TO CURB THE APATHETIC BEHAVIOR.

Synopsis

ELM LCL CTLR WITNESSED PROBABLE OPERROR AT APPROX 4000 WHEN RADAR CTLR ISSUED QUESTIONABLE VECTOR.

Time / Day

Date: 200703 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: FXE. Airport

State Reference: FL

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: MIA.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Citation X Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Route In Use. Approach: Instrument Non Precision

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 45 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 6800 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 2500

ASRS Report: 730106

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 45 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 11900 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 2800

ASRS Report: 730344

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Approach

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Intended or Assigned Course

Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON THE RNAV (GPS) RWY 26 APCH TO FT LAUDERDALE EXECUTIVE ARPT, WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO PROCEED TO FORSU (IF/IAF) MAINTAIN 2000 FT. AS WE GOT CLOSER TO FORSU, APCHING FROM THE NE, THE CTLR ISSUED OUR NEXT CLRNC WHICH WAS TO CROSS FORSU AT 2000 FT CLRED FOR THE APCH, CONTACT EXECUTIVE TWR. NOT BEING ON A VECTOR OUTSIDE OF FORSU, WE CROSSED FORSU AT 2000 FT AND STARTED OUR PROC TURN. AS WE STARTED OUR PROC TURN, THE TWR CTLR ASKED WHY WE WERE TURNING TO THE N. WE REPLIED THAT WE WERE XING FORSU AND STARTING OUR PROC TURN OUTBOUND. THE TWR CTLR THEN TOLD US TO CONTACT MIAMI APCH. WE SWITCHED BACK AND CALLED MIAMI APCH AND THE CTLR ASKED WHY WE WERE TURNING N. WE REPLIED THAT WE WERE TURNING OUTBOUND ON THE PROC TURN. AS WE WERE ON THE OUTBOUND PROC TURN, THE CTLR TOLD US THAT WE SHOULD HAVE ASKED FOR THE CLRNC TO DO THE PROC TURN, SAYING FURTHER THAT WHAT WE HAD DONE COULD BE DANGEROUS IF THERE WAS OTHER TFC. WE STATED THAT WE WERE DOING PART OF THE PROC WE THOUGHT WAS REQUIRED. IN LOOKING AT THE APCH CHART, THE PROC TURN IN HOLDING IS IN BOLD, AND NOWHERE ON THE CHART DOES IT SHOW ANY SYMBOL OF A PIE SHAPE AND A 'NOPT,' AND WE WERE NOT ON ANY VECTORS TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL COURSE OUTSIDE OF FORSU. AS WE TURNED INBOUND, THE APCH CTLR ONCE AGAIN CLRED US FOR THE APCH. WE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED THE APCH AND LANDED. AS WE TAXIED IN, GND CTL ASKED US TO CALL MIAMI APCH, AND GAVE US THE TELEPHONE NUMBER. THE OTHER PLT CALLED THE MIAMI TRACON, SPOKE TO THE SUPVR, AND EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE ONLY DOING WHAT WE THOUGHT WE SHOULD HAVE DONE IN THAT WE CROSSED FORSU AND STARTED THE PROC TURN OUTBOUND AS WE THOUGHT WE SHOULD HAVE DONE, BECAUSE WE WERE NOT ON VECTORS TO THE FINAL APCH, AND THE PROC TURN IS IN BOLD ON THE CHART. THE SUPVR EXPLAINED THAT BECAUSE WE WERE APCHING FORSU FROM THE NE, AT A 45 DEG OR LESS ANGLE FROM FORSU, WE DID NOT NEED TO DO THE PROC TURN, REFERRING US TO THE AIM THAT EXPLAINED THIS. AS THE OTHER PLT AND I RESEARCHED THE AIM, WE DISCOVERED THAT WHAT WE HAD DONE WAS, IN FACT, NOT CORRECT. WE NOW BETTER UNDERSTAND THAT WHEN APCHING THE (IF/IAF) ON AN APCH AT LESS THAN A 45 DEG ANGLE, YOU CAN MAKE A STRAIGHT IN APCH AND THAT IF YOU NEED TO EXECUTE A PROC TURN. YOU NEED TO REQUEST AND RECEIVE ATC CLRNC TO DO THE PROC TURN. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION BTWN THE OTHER PLT AND THE MIAMI TRACON SUPVR, THE SUPVR SUGGESTED THAT MISCOM COULD HAVE BEEN A FACTOR IN THIS EVENT, AND THAT THEY SHOULD LOOK AT HOW BOTH PLTS AND CTLRS CAN AVOID THIS MISCOM IN THE FUTURE BY ISSUING A CLRNC SUCH AS 'NXXX, CROSS FORSU AT 2000 FT CLRED FOR THE STRAIGHT IN GPS RWY 26 APCH CONTACT EXECUTIVE TWR 120.9.' IN THE FUTURE BOTH MYSELF AND THE OTHER PLT WILL ADOPT A SOP TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO MISCOM OR MISINTERP OF THE SAID INST APCH PROC. WHEN A SITUATION WARRANTS A STRAIGHT IN APCH, WE WILL VERIFY WITH APCH CTL THAT WE ARE CLRED FOR THE STRAIGHT IN APCH TO SAID RWY.

Synopsis

A CE750 FLT CREW WAS CLEARED FOR THE RNAV RWY 26 APPROACH TO FXE FROM THE NORTHEAST. THEY FLEW TO THE IAF (FORSU) AND EXECUTED A PROCEDURE TURN, WHICH WAS NOT EXPECTED BY THE CONTROLLER.

Time / Day

Date: 200702 Day: Wed

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: TTN.Airport

State Reference : NJ

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 Flight Phase.Ground : Takeoff Roll

Aircraft: 2

Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Ground: Taxi

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Qualification.Pilot: Private

Experience. Flight Time. Last 90 Days: 23

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 188 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 102

ASRS Report: 729932

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Local

Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 2

Resolutory Action.None Taken: Detected After The Fact Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas: Airport

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE PROB AROSE BECAUSE OF A MISCOM ERROR ON MY PART (PIC). THE ARPT WHERE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED WAS ON RWY 24 AT TTN. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS THAT LED TO THE INCIDENT WERE A C152 WHO WAS TURNING FROM THE BASE LEG TO THE FINAL LEG OF THE TFC PATTERN AND AN ACFT WHICH LANDED PRIOR TO MY INITIAL RADIO CALL TO THE AIR TFC CTLR ON TTN TWR FREQ. AFTER MY STANDARD CHKLIST RUN-UP I CALLED THE AIR TFC CTLR ON THE TWR FREQ AND TOLD HIM THAT I WAS READY FOR MY DEP TO THE W. THE AIR TFC CTLR REPLIED AND TOLD ME THAT THERE WAS A CESSNA ON FINAL AND TO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 24. HOWEVER, I THOUGHT THAT THE TFC CTLR SAID THERE WAS TFC ON FINAL AND I WAS CLRED TO TAKE OFF. SO I READ BACK THE COMMAND AND SAID 'CESSNA XX DEP APPROVED.' I PROCEEDED ONTO THE RWY SET MY COMPASS TO THE RWY HDG AND STARTED TO BEGIN MY TKOF ROLL. THE WAY THE PROB WAS DISCOVERED ON MY PART WAS WHILE I BEGAN CLBING TO DEPART THE ARPT TO THE W THE AIR TFC CTLR CALLED ME ON THE RADIO AND TOLD ME THAT I WAS SUPPOSED TO BE IN A POS AND HOLD AND I WAS NOT CLRED TO TKOF. HE THEN TOLD ME THAT THERE WAS AN ACFT ON THE RWY THAT I DID NOT SEE WHEN I BEGAN MY TKOF ROLL, SO I DIPPED MY WING AND SAW THE ACFT ON TXWY A. THE ACFT WAS DOWN AND CLR, OFF OF THE RWY BUT JUST XING THE RWY HOLD SHORT LINE. THE AIR TFC CTLR THEN SAID TO PROCEED ON MY COURSE TO THE W SINCE IT WAS TOO LATE TO STOP ON THE RWY AND I WAS CLR OF ANY OTHER TFC ON THE FIELD. THE FACTORS AFFECTING MY QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE WAS BEING TOO HASTY IN MY ACTIONS, TRYING TO MULTI-TASK BY FIXING MY COMPASS TO THE HDG OF THE RWY, AND NOT ASKING THE CTL TWR TO READ BACK HIS INSTRUCTIONS. MY PERCEPTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT WAS THAT THE ACFT WAS DOWN AND CLR OF RWY 24 AND WAS ALREADY ON TXWY A.

Synopsis

A CESSNA PILOT DEPARTED TTN WITHOUT TKOF CLRNC AFTER MISINTERPRETING THE LOCAL CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS.

Time / Day

Date: 200702 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: TEB. Airport

State Reference: NJ

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions: IMC Weather Elements: Ice Weather Elements: Snow

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON Operator. General Aviation: Corporate Make Model Name: Challenger CL603/603a

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope: ils rwy 06

Flight Phase. Descent: Approach

Route In Use. Approach: Instrument Precision

Route In Use.Arrival: On Vectors

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience. Flight Time. Last 90 Days: 150

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 4000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 500

ASRS Report: 729099

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Approach

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE BEING VECTORED BY NY APCH TO THE ILS RWY 6 AT TEB. CTLR ASKED US TO 'MAINTAIN 2000 FT, INTERCEPT LOC.' WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH AND HANDED OFF TO TWR APPROX 1 MI OUTSIDE OF DANDY INTXN. THIS WAS TOO LATE TO COMPLY WITH A MANDATORY XING OF DANDY AT 1500 FT. TWR QUESTIONED US ABOUT MISSING THE RESTR AND SCOLDED US. WHILE MONITORING APCH CTL, ALL PRECEDING ACFT WERE TOLD TO CROSS DANDY AT 1500 FT AND THEN CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 6. WE WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN 2000 FT. DUE TO EXTREMELY CONGESTED FREQ, WE WERE NOT ABLE TO QUESTION APCH ABOUT THIS CONFLICT IN INSTRUCTIONS. THIS SITUATION COULD EASILY BE RESOLVED BY HAVING APCH CTL DSND ALL ACFT TO 1500 FT BEFORE CLRING THEM FOR APCH AND HANDING THEM OFF TO THE TWR FREQ. AS A SIDE NOTE, I CALLED TEB TWR ON A LAND LINE AND SPOKE WITH THE CTLR IN CHARGE. I EXPLAINED THE SITUATION AND HIS ADVICE WAS TO QUESTION THE APCH CTLR ABOUT THE CONFLICTING ALTS. HE SAYS THE 1500 FT XING AT DANDY IS MANDATORY 'NO MATTER WHAT.'

Synopsis

CL60 PLT DESCRIBED INCIDENT ON APCH TO TEB WHEN N90 CTLR ISSUED CLRNC THAT PREVENTED COMPLIANCE WITH DANDY XING ALT ON THE ILS RWY 6.

Time / Day

Date: 200701 Day: Fri

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: IAD.Airport

State Reference : DC

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 6500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Weather Elements: Turbulence

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: PCT.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Charter Make Model Name: Citation III, VI, VII Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC Flight Phase.Descent: Approach Route In Use.Arrival.STAR: BARIN

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Charter Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Function. Oversight: PIC Qualification. Pilot: ATP Qualification. Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 200

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 4000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 500

ASRS Report: 727766

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company : Charter Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Approach

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Resolutory Action.None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas: Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS FLYING ON AUTOPLT IN THE L SEAT WITH A HIGH-EXPERIENCE FO CONTRACT PLT WITH WHOM I HAD NOT FLOWN BEFORE THIS TRIP (THIRD LEG OF TRIP). WE BRIEFED THE BARIN1 ARR AND VERIFIED THAT THE FMS CONTAINED THE VALID ALTS FOR RNAV DSCNT. OVER THE FALKO FIX ON THE BARIN1 STAR INTO IAD, ZDC CLRED US TO 'DSND TO 9000 FT, BARIN1 ARR.' AFTER PASSING BKV THE FO ADVISED NEXT ALT AS 6000 FT AND HE SET IT INTO THE PRESELECT WINDOW. I BEGAN A 1500 FPM DSCNT TO CROSS BARIN AT 6000 FT. AT 6500 FT, ATC ASKED US FOR OUR ALT. WE RPTED 6500 FT AND WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN THAT ALT FOR TFC 1500 FT BELOW US. AFTER THE FLT UPON REVIEWING THE STAR, I SAW THE NOTE TO MAINTAIN ALT UNTIL ADVISED BY ATC TO 'DSND VIA THE BARIN1 ARR.' I HAD NOT NOTICED THE NOTE DURING THE ARR, WHICH WAS THE FIRST TIME I HAD USED IT. I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN SAFER IF 1) THE NOTE SHOULD HAVE AN ARROW OR BE SITUATED SUCH THAT IT IS ADJACENT TO THE FIRST DEPICTED DSCNT ALT. 1) ATC SHOULD USE CLRER PHRASEOLOGY, SUCH AS 'DSND TO AND MAINTAIN 9000 FT UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED' OR 'DO NOT DSND VIA THE BARIN1 ARR INSTRUCTIONS.' THIS IS THE SECOND ARR THAT I HAVE SEEN WITH AUTO XING ALTS. THE FIRST TIME I SAW ONE WAS THE GRNPA1 AT LAS. IT IS EVEN WORSE WITH MANDATORY XING ALTS AND NO NOTES OR INSTRUCTIONS. I HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY TRAINING PERTAINING TO THESE NEW VERT STARS, NOT ANY NOTIFICATION OF ANY SORT THAT THEY EXISTED (UNTIL I BEGAN THE STAR AND SAW HARD ALTS DEPICTED). I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT THESE NEW PROCS HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED WITH NO NOTIFICATION TO THE FLYING PUBLIC AND NO TRAINING OR MENTION OF THEM HAS BEEN MADE, DESPITE THE THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS WE SPEND EVERY YEAR FOR EXTENSIVE RECURRENT TRAINING.

Synopsis

CE650 CREW DESCENDS ON THE BARIN1 RNAV ARRIVAL TO IAD WITHOUT RECEIVING CLEARANCE TO 'DESCEND VIA THE BARIN1.'

Time / Day

Date: 200702 Day: Thu

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: JFK.Airport

State Reference: NY

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 500

Environment

Weather Elements : Fog Weather Elements : Rain

Light: Dusk

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope: 4R

Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Route In Use. Approach: Instrument Precision

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Relief Pilot

ASRS Report: 726595

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC ASRS Report: 726596

Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Relief Pilot

ASRS Report: 726597

Person: 4

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 5

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Local

Events

Anomaly. Incursion: Landing Without Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON A 4 PLT FLT FROM ZZZZ-JFK, WE WERE GIVEN VECTORS AROUND JFK FOR A CHANGE OF APCH FROM ILS RWY 31R TO ILS RWY 4R IN IMC CONDITIONS. THE CAPT WAS PM AND THE FO WAS PF. THE ATIS CALLED FOR 6 SM WITH HAZE, 1200 FT BROKEN, WINDS 130 DEGS/3 KTS. THE LAST CLRNC WAS FROM JFK APCH 'TURN TO 020 DEGS, MAINTAIN 1500 FT, CLRED ILS RWY 4R APCH.' THE CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED PRIOR TO 1000 FT MSL. THE APCH WAS CONTINUED AS I WAS WATCHING FOR THE LIGHTS ON THE GND. I HAD A SIGHTING AT 800 FT, THEN OBSCURED UNTIL AROUND 550 FT MSL. THE VISIBILITY WAS AROUND 4 SM. AS THE LITANY FOR 500 FT WAS ANNOUNCED, I ASKED IF WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND. THE CAPT ASKED AND WE WERE GIVEN 'CONTACT TWR ON 118.1,' HEARD BY ALL 4 PLTS. AS THE CAPT (PNF) WAS TRYING TO GET LNDG CLRNC, THE FO (PF) WAS IN THE FLAIR, TOUCHED DOWN, AND CAME TO A STOP. ON THE RWY, WE DECIDED THE CORRECT FREQ WAS 119.1. TWR ASKED IF WE COULD HEAR HIM, WE REPLIED AFFIRMATIVE, AND THEY GAVE US TAXI INSTRUCTIONS OFF THE RWY, TURNED US OVER TO GND AND WE PROCEEDED TO TAXI TO OUR GATE WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENT. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION FROM THE TWR ABOUT THE LNDG AND WE DID NOT BRING IT UP. THERE WAS NO ONE IN FRONT OF US ON THE RWY AND NO ONE CLOSE TO US BEHIND. IT WAS A DECISION TO LAND INSTEAD OF GOING AROUND SINCE WE HAD BEEN FLYING A LONG TIME, THE WX WAS BAD, THE VISIBILITY AND CLOUD COVERAGE WAS LOWER THAN RPTED, AND THERE WAS NO APPARENT CONFLICT ON THE RWY. IN RETROSPECT, WE ALL HAD KEYS TO CHK FOR LNDG CLRNC BUT WERE FOCUSED. ON THE WX. IN OUR DEBRIEF, WE ALL DECIDED THAT WE MUST STICK TO OUR HABITS, BACK EACH OTHER UP AS IF WE WERE EACH ACTIVELY FLYING, AND DON'T ASSUME THINGS WERE DONE WITHOUT QUESTIONING. THERE WAS GOOD INTERACTION BTWN US AND NO PROB WITH POINTING OUT MISCOMS OR RTE/DIRECTION CHANGES.

Synopsis

B777 LANDS AT JFK WITHOUT A CLRNC.

Time / Day

Date: 200702 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: PGS.VORTAC

State Reference : AZ

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 36000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZLA.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot: ATP Qualification.Pilot: Flight Engineer

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 48 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 4667 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1168

ASRS Report: 726367

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Intended or Assigned Course

Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE APCHING PGS VOR FOR THE CIVET FIVE ARR INTO LAX WHEN WE GOT DISTR BY A GENERATOR FAIL LIGHT. WE ACCOMPLISHED OUR QRH PROC AND DISCONNECTED THE GENERATOR. AT THAT TIME I QUICKLY BRIEFED THE CHART STAR CIVET FIVE. THE PLATE SHOWS A PGS 248 DEG HDG FROM RUSTT INTXN WHICH I MISINTERPED AS THE PGS OUTBOUND COURSE. PASSING PGS I SET THE OUTBOUND COURSE AS 248 DEGS. THIS WAS INCORRECT AS SHOWN ON THE STAR CIVET FIVE TRANSITION PAGE. IN OUR RUSH TO GET CAUGHT BACK UP FOR THE ARR WE DID NOT COVER THE TRANSITION PROPERLY AND WERE QUERIED BY ZLA WHAT OUR PGS OUTBOUND COURSE WAS. THEY GAVE US THE CORRECT COURSE OF 229 DEGS TO RUSTT WHICH WE CONFIRMED ON OUR FLT PLAN AND WE PROCEEDED INBOUND TO LAX WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. LESSONS LEARNED AND DEBRIEFED WITH THE CREW: FOLLOW ALL FLT PLAN HDGS UNTIL ESTABLISHED ON A PORTION OF THE ARR, REVIEW ALL APPLICABLE CHART PLATES SINCE SOME ARR INFO IS ONLY AVAILABLE FROM SEPARATE PAGES, AND WHEN OPERATING A NON-INS EQUIPPED ACFT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT BOTH PLTS MONITOR ALL FLT GUIDANCE NAV INPUTS.

Synopsis

DC10 FLT CREW HAS A TRACK DEV DURING THE CIVET 5 ARR TO LAX.

Time / Day

Date: 200701 Day: Tue

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A319

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground: Taxi

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground: Taxi

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 260 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 16000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 3000

ASRS Report: 725315

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 4

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Ground

Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1
Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Company

Situations

ATC Facility. Procedure Or Policy: ZZZ. Tower

Narrative

ON TAXI OUT TODAY, WE NOTICED AGAIN FOR THE THIRD WK IN A ROW, THAT AN ACR (REGISTRATION NUMBER ONLY) WITH A DIFFERENT PAINT JOB WAS USING THE ACR'S CALL SIGN. THERE WAS NO CONFUSION THIS WEEK, BUT THERE WAS CONFUSION 2 WKS AGO. WE CALLED FOR TAXI AND WERE TOLD TO WAIT AND FOLLOW AN ACR. A DIFFERENT ACR PAINT JOB TAXIED BY US AND WE SAT THERE WAITING FOR THE ORIGINAL ACR. AFTER A FEW MINS, WITH NO ACR PAINT JOB IN SIGHT, WE QUESTIONED GND CTL. THEY IN FACT SAID IT WAS THE PLANE WITH THE OTHER PAINT JOB. NO HARM, NO FOUL DURING THESE LAST FEW WKS, BUT IF WE ARE TRYING TO MINIMIZE GND CONFUSION/INCURSIONS THEN CALL SIGNS SHOULD MATCH THE PAINT JOB.

Synopsis

ACR FLT CREW EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING ACR CALL SIGN NOT MATCHING ACFT PAINT JOB CREATING A POTENTIAL SAFETY PROBLEM.

Time / Day

Date: 200701 Day: Wed

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: J3 Cub

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Ground: Taxi

Person: 1

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Local

Experience.Controller.Non Radar: 10 Experience.Controller.Radar: 9

ASRS Report: 724226

Person: 2

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

A CUB LANDED AND UPON EXITING THE RWY DID NOT PULL UP PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE. THE GND CTLR TOLD THE CUB TO PULL PAST THE HOLD BARS AND ASKED THE ACFT THEIR DEST. THE CUB WAS TOLD TO TAXI TO HIS RAMP VIA SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO PREVENT HIM FROM XING A 'HOT SPOT,' THE DEP

END OF RWY XXR. THE GND CTLR WAS WATCHING THE CUB AND THE CUB TURNED AT THE WRONG TXWY (THE ONE THAT CROSSES A RWY) AND THE GND CTLR TOLD THE CUB TO 'STOP.' THE CUB STOPPED SO HARD THAT THE NOSE WENT INTO THE PAVEMENT AND HIT HIS PROP.

Synopsis

CTLR DESCRIBED INCIDENT WHEN ACFT WAS ISSUED STOP INSTRUCTIONS TO AVOID A RWY INCURSION RESULTING IN A PROP STRIKE.

Time / Day

Date: 200701 Day: Thu

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: AIR.VOR

State Reference : OH

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 26000 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 27000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZOB.ARTCC Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: Conquest I/Conquest II

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZOB.ARTCC Make Model Name: Regional Jet 200 ER&LR

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Government: FAA
Function.Controller: Radar
Qualification.Controller: Radar
Qualification.Pilot: Instrument
Experience.Controller.Radar: 25

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1: 20

Experience Flight Time Total: 1500

ASRS Report: 723079

Person: 2

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Person: 3

Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : Conflict Alert

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Consequence.FAA: Investigated Miss Distance.Horizontal: 22800 Miss Distance.Vertical: 600

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS ON THE RADAR ASSOCIATE POS DURING A MODERATE TO HVY SESSION. THE RADAR CTLR WAS WAITING TO DSND A WBOUND REGIONAL JET AS A TWIN CESSNA WAS XING SBOUND. I ANSWERED A HDOF LINE FOR COORD. WHILE I WAS OFF FREQ, THE RADAR CTLR GAVE TFC TO THE REGIONAL JET. THE RADAR CTLR ONLY USED THE LAST 3 DIGITS OF EACH CALL SIGN (BOTH CALL SIGNS ENDED WITH THE SAME DIGITS). THE RADAR CTLR TOLD THE WBOUND REGIONAL JET TO MAINTAIN FL270 AND THERE WAS TFC SBOUND -- A TWIN CESSNA AT FL260. WHEN I CAME BACK ON FREQ, 2 ACFT WERE TALKING. THE RADAR CTLR IMMEDIATELY TOLD THE TWIN CESSNA TO MAINTAIN FL260 AND HIS TFC WAS WBOUND AT FL270. THE TWIN CESSNA SAID THAT HE WAS GOING BACK DOWN. THE RADAR CTLR TOLD HIM TO RPT LEVEL. THE TWIN CESSNA DID, BUT SEPARATION WAS LOST DURING HIS SHORT CLB. THE RADAR CTLR SHOULD HAVE DONE 2 THINGS TO AVOID THE CONFUSION: 1) ADVISE BOTH ACFT THAT SIMILAR CALL SIGNS WERE ON FREQ, 2) USED FULL CALL SIGNS ON EITHER OF THOSE 2 ACFT ON ANY XMISSION TO THEM. I COULD HAVE ADVISED THE RADAR CTLR TO ADVISE THE 2 ACFT OF SIMILAR SOUNDING CALL SIGNS. ANY OR ALL 3 OF THESE POSSIBILITIES MIGHT HAVE AVOIDED THE ERROR.

Synopsis

ZOB ASSOCIATE CTLR DESCRIBED OPERROR AT APPROX FL260 WHEN CTLR ISSUED CTL CLRNCS TO ACFT WITH SIMILAR CALL SIGNS RESULTING IN A CONFLICT.

Time / Day

Date: 200701 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: JFK.Airport

State Reference: NY

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier Make Model Name: Regional Jet 200 ER&LR

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Navigation In Use.Other.VORTAC Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial

Route In Use. Departure. SID: Kennedy 1

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON

Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Experience. Flight Time. Last 90 Days: 240

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 5891 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 3295

ASRS Report: 723012

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

ASRS Report: 723011

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Departure Qualification.Controller: Radar

Person: 4

Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe Anomaly.Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3
Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Advisory
Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance
Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas: Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

AT JFK THE SID GIVEN BY DEPARTURE CLEARANCE WAS 'KENNEDY 1 DEP (RWY 31L) CANARSIE CLIMB, 5000 FT.' THE CAPTAIN BRIEFED THE DEPARTURE AT THE GATE. I HAD WHITE DATA DISPLAYED ON MY PFD AND THE CAPTAIN HAD GREEN DATA WITH JFK VOR 115.4 FREQUENCY TUNED IN #1 NAV RADIO (FOR SPECIAL ENGINE OUT DEPARTURE PROCEDURE) AND CRI VOR 112.3 IN STANDBY AND HE INSTRUCTED ME TO SWITCH CRI FROM STANDBY TO ACTIVE MODE AFTER TAKEOFF. ON RECEIVING TAKEOFF CLEARANCE, THE TOWER INSTRUCTED US TO CLIMB TO 4000 FT ONLY. AFTER TAKEOFF AND 400 FT THE CAPTAIN INITIATED A LEFT TURN TOWARDS CRI. I SWITCHED FREQUENCIES IN #1 RADIO AND CENTERED THE CAPTAIN VOR NEEDLE. I SHOULD HAVE DOUBLE CHECKED THAT THE FREQUENCIES DID INDEED SWITCH, AND THE CAPTAIN NOTICED THAT THE COURSE NEEDLE WAS POINTING BEHIND US AND IMMEDIATELY REALIZED THAT JFK VOR FREQUENCY WAS STILL IN THE ACTIVE MODE. HE SWITCHED THE FREQUENCY TO 112.3 AND RE-CENTERED THE VOR COURSE NEEDLE AND FLEW DIRECTLY TO CRI. AT THIS POINT, WE RECEIVED A SINGLE CHIME AND AN 'EFIS COMP MON' CAUTION MESSAGE FOR HEADING MISCOMPARE. WE FLEW TO CRI AND THE CAPTAIN CONFIRMED WITH ME THAT THE OB RADIAL TO BE FLOWN FROM CRI WAS 176 DEGS. I RE-CHECKED THE DEPARTURE PLATE AND CONFIRMED 176 DEG RADIAL. WE RECEIVED STATION PASSAGE AND TURNED LEFT TO INTERCEPT 176 DEG RADIAL (WE DID NOT LEAD THE TURN PRIOR TO REACHING THE CRI VOR). THE CONTROLLER TOLD US WE HAD TO REVIEW THE DEPARTURE PROCEDURE AS WE HAD FLOWN IT INCORRECTLY AND GAVE US A 'TIGHT LEFT TURN TO 090 DEGS' AND INSTRUCTED US TO CLIMB TO 5000 FT AND HE CALLED TRAFFIC AT 10 O'CLOCK BELOW US. BOTH THE CAPTAIN AND I HAD THE TRAFFIC IN SIGHT AND I CALLED IT (WE NEVER RECEIVED A 'TRAFFIC, TRAFFIC' AURAL TA). THE CLIMB WAS INITIATED TO 5000 FT AND AGAIN WE RECEIVED A SINGLE CHIME AND EFIS COMP MON CAUTION MESSAGE. AT THIS POINT I BELIEVED THAT THE CONTROLLER GAVE US A FREQUENCY CHANGE TO 124.75, WHICH I ACCEPTED AND READ BACK TO HIM AND I SWITCHED FREQUENCIES. THE CONTROLLER THERE TOLD US TO RETURN TO THE LAST ASSIGNED FREQUENCY. I RETURNED AND THE CONTROLLER GAVE US A FURTHER LEFT TURN TO 050 DEGS. WE COMPLIED AND THE CONTROLLER TOLD US THERE HAD BEEN A POSSIBLE PILOT DEVIATION AND THE NEXT CONTROLLER WOULD

HAVE A PHONE NUMBER FOR US TO CALL. THE NEXT SECTOR DID NOT GIVE US A NUMBER SO THE CAPTAIN ASKED HIM FOR IT. HE SAID HE WAS NOT AWARE OF THE SITUATION BUT WOULD CHECK INTO IT. A FEW MINUTES LATER HE CAME BACK WITH THE NUMBER TO CALL. ON LANDING, THE CAPTAIN CALLED THE CENTER AND SPOKE TO ONE OF THE CONTROLLERS. IN RETROSPECT, A FEW THINGS COULD HAVE BEEN DONE DIFFERENTLY TO AVOID THIS SITUATION. PERHAPS HAVING CRI VOR IN ACTIVE MODE, WITH JFK VOR IN BACK-UP. I SHOULD HAVE VERIFIED THAT THE FREQUENCIES FLIPPED WHEN I HIT THE BUTTON. ALSO, I HAVE RECEIVED THE EFIS COMP MON CAUTION MESSAGE MANY TIMES DEPARTING JFK --USING DG MODE WOULD PREVENT HEADING DISCREPANCIES. ALSO LEADING THE TURN TO INTERCEPT THE 176 DEG RADIAL BEFORE CRI STATION PASSAGE WOULD HAVE KEPT US EAST OF CRI VOR AT ALL TIMES, ALTHOUGH THE SID DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCT US TO TURN TO INTERCEPT PRIOR TO REACHING THE VOR. THE SCRIPT ON THE PLATE GIVES THE IMPRESSION WE SHOULD FLY TO THE VOR, OVER IT, THEN MAKE THE LEFT TURN TO INTERCEPT THE 176 DEG RADIAL OB. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 723011: AS WE APPROACHED THE VOR THE 176 DEG RADIAL WAS DIALED IN SO UPON STATION PASSAGE WE COULD MAKE THE TURN. AS WE PASSED THE STATION. DEPARTURE SAID WE HAD 'BLOWN THE TURN' AND NEEDED TO TURN SHARPLY TO A 090 DEG HEADING. WE BEGAN THE TURN AND WERE CLEARED TO 5000 FT AND TOLD TO EXPEDITE THE CLIMB. WHILE IN THE TURN WE WERE AGAIN TOLD TO TIGHTEN THE TURN AND CLIMB TO 5000 FT. WE WERE COMPLYING, CLIMBING ABOUT 300-400 FPM, AND THEN INCREASING THE CLIMB RATE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 723012 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE COMPANY POLICY IS TO USE GREEN DATA (RAW DATA) TO FLY THE DEP. THE USE OF THE FMS IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY COMPANY POLICY AND BUILDING A PSEUDO DEP IN THE FMS IS NOT PERMITTED. HE INDICATED THAT THIS IS THE SECOND TIME HE HAS DEP ON THE KENNEDY 1 DEP AND HAD THE CTLR ALERT HIM TO A DEV. HE FELT THAT THE DEP PLATE SHOULD INDICATE THAT BY OVERFLYING THE FIX IT WILL CAUSE A CONFLICT. IT IS CONFUSING TO READ THE PRINTED DESCRIPTION WHICH INDICATES THAT YOU FLY DIRECT TO CRI. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 723011 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR INDICATED THAT THE KENNEDY 1 DEP DOES NOT HAVE THE DIFFERENT DEP LEGS DEPICTED IN THE FMS AND ONLY SHOWS THE BASIC DEP TO CRI IN THE FMS. THIS IS WHY THE COMPANY REQUIRES RAW DATA TO BE USED.

Synopsis

CRJ200 FLT CREW HAS A TRACK/HEADING DEVIATION DURING KENNEDY 1 DEP.

Time / Day

Date: 200612 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: TKI.Tower

State Reference : TX

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 150

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: TKI.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities. Tower: TKI. Tower

Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Phase.Landing: Roll

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Qualification.Pilot: Private

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 3 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 159 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 20

ASRS Report: 720554

Person: 2

Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE INCIDENT OCCURRED ON DURING A PLEASURE FLT ON DEC/XA/06. I WAS ORIGINALLY CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 17 AND I MADE 3 UNEVENTFUL 'TOUCH AND GO' LNDGS. AFTER COMPLETING THE THIRD 'TOUCH AND GO' LNDG I WAS ADVISED TO EXIT THE PATTERN ON THE SOUTHEASTERLY HDG UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED. I WAS SHORTLY ADVISED TO ENTER A L BASE AND CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 35. I MADE 2 UNEVENTFUL 'TOUCH AND GO' LNDGS. SOMETIME DURING MY SECOND APCH TO RWY 35 I OVERHEARD COM BTWN THE CTLR AND A PLT OF A JET. I CONTINUED IN A NORMAL R TFC PATTERN FOR RWY 35. I WAS GIVEN CLRNC TO LAND ON RWY 35. ON MY MID/SHORT FINAL APCH THE CTLR GAVE ME THE INSTRUCTION, 'CESSNA GO AROUND TURN R.' AT THE SAME MOMENT THE CTLR GAVE ME THE INSTRUCTION I OBSERVED A JET MIDFIELD AND ROLLING ON A HDG OF RWY 17. I DID NOT KNOW IF THE JET WAS DEPARTING THE RWY OR ARRIVING BUT HE WAS CLRLY ROLLING. I TURNED MY ACFT R (HDG OF 90 DEGS) AND I WAS IMMEDIATELY CHASTISED BY THE CTLR. THE CTLR SAID, 'I SAID GO AROUND TURN R BUT GO AHEAD AND CONTINUE ON THE EASTERLY HDG.' ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A SECOND ACFT IN THE PATTERN (C172) THERE WAS NO CONFLICT. THE OTHER ACFT WAS JUST TURNING XWIND TO DOWNWIND FOR RWY 35. IT TURNED OUT THAT THE JET WAS NOT TAKING OFF BUT WAS IN FACT LNDG ON THE OPPOSITE HDG RWY 17. MY ASSERTION IS THAT NON STANDARD RADIO COM RESULTED IN A MISCOM THAT DID NOT ACHIEVE THE SAFEST RESULT. I BELIEVE A BETTER INSTRUCTION MAY HAVE BEEN, 'CESSNA FULL GAR MAKE R-HAND TFC FOR RWY 35.' I DISCUSSED THE ISSUE WITH MY CLUB SAFETY OFFICER AND I ALSO CONTACTED MY PERSONAL FLT INSTRUCTOR TO GET ADVICE ON HOW TO DEAL WITH NON STANDARD RADIO COM IN THE FUTURE. BOTH INDIVIDUALS SHARED WITH ME THAT IN THE EVENT OF AN IMMINENT SAFETY CONCERN IN CTLED AIRSPACE THE PLT IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF HIS ACFT AND OCCUPANTS, KEEPING IN MIND THAT IN ALL CASES THE PLT SHOULD COMMUNICATE CLRLY AND CONCISELY HIS ACTIONS TO THE CTLR. IN THE EVENT THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE SAFETY CONCERN A PLT SHOULD ASK FOR CLARIFICATION. I WILL FOLLOW THIS ADVICE UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED.

Synopsis

C172 PLT DESCRIBED INCIDENT WHEN TKI TWR CTLR USED UNCLR VERBIAGE TO ISSUE A GAR EXPECTING THE ACFT TO ENTER R TFC FROM THE GAR.

Time / Day

Date: 200612 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: SEG.VORTAC

State Reference : PA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 12000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZNY.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: DHC-7

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Navigation In Use. Other. VORTAC

Flight Phase.Descent: Intermediate Altitude

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZNY.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: DHC-7

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Enroute Altitude Change

Person: 1

Affiliation.Government: FAA

Function.Controller: Handoff Position

Function.Controller: Radar Qualification.Controller: Radar

Experience.Controller.Limited Radar: 23
Experience.Controller.Non Radar: 24
Experience.Controller.Radar: 22
Experience.Flight Time.Total: 12

ASRS Report: 720078

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function Oversight: DIC

Function.Oversight: PIC

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: FAA

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

ATC Facility.Communication Equipment: ZNY.ARTCC

Narrative

WHEN THE FAA BOUGHT OUR COM SYS, THE VOICE SWITCHING AND COM SYS (VSCS) A FEATURE ADVERTISED BY THE VENDOR WOULD PERMIT DISCRETE FREQS TO BE 'LINKED' TO ALLOW ACFT ON ONE FREQ TO HEAR THE XMISSIONS ON ANOTHER AND AVOID BLOCKING OR GARBLING. I DON'T KNOW IF ANY OF THE ENRTE CTRS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES THAT HAVE LARGE SECTORS REQUIRING MULTIPLE FREQS HAVE THIS FEATURE. NY ARTCC DOES NOT HAVE THIS FEATURE. NORMAL OPS AT ZNY SECTOR 91 REQUIRE THE CTLR TO MONITOR 123.62, 124.9 AND 134.8 ENRTE SECTOR FREQS, 118.55 CLRNC DELIVERY FREQ AT UNV AND 121.5/243.0 EMER FREQS. COMMUNICATING ON THIS MANY FREQS. OFTEN PRESENTS A PROB AS ACFT ON ONE FREQ CANNOT HEAR ACFT ON A DIFFERENT FREQ. THIS OFTEN RESULTS IN GARBLED XMISSIONS AND POSES A THREAT OF MISCOM THAT COULD RESULT IN AN ACCIDENT. ADDITIONALLY, WHEN SECTORS COMBINE, THE NEW FREQS COME WITH THEM. ON THIS PARTICULAR EVENING, SECTOR 92 HAD COMBINED WITH SECTOR 91 AND 124.62 WAS NOW ALSO IN OP. TFC LEVEL WAS MODERATE TO HVY WITH ACFT OPERATING ON ALL FREQS EXCEPT 123.62. ACFT #1 WAS ENRTE FROM PHL TO UNV AT 12000 FT ON 124.62. ACFT #2 WAS ENRTE FROM PIT TO AVP AT 17000 FT. AS ACFT #2 NEARED AVF I DSNDED HIM TO 9000 FT. THE READBACK WAS INITIALLY GARBLED WITH MULTIPLE ACFT TALKING. I DECIPHERED BOTH ACFT #2, READING BACK HIS DSCNT CLRNC AND ANOTHER ACFT CALLING FOR CLRNC ON 118.55. I FELT THAT THERE WAS POSSIBLY A THIRD ACFT INVOLVED AS WELL, BUT COULDN'T IDENT IT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, BOTH ACR #1 AND ACR #2 WERE OBSERVED DSNDING. THANKFULLY, THERE WAS NO TFC BELOW ACR #1 OR SEPARATION ERROR WOULD HAVE OCCURRED. THE SIMILARITY OF THESE 2 CALL SIGNS CONTRIBUTED TO THE MISCOM.

Synopsis

ZNY CTLR DESCRIBED POTENTIAL SEPARATION LOSS AT 12000 FT BTWN 2 ACFT BECAUSE OF SIMULTANEOUS USE OF MULTIPLE FREQS.

Time / Day

Date: 200612 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Intersection: BRAND

State Reference: NJ

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 10600 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 11000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZNY.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B757-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Descent : Approach Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : Korry

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 175 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 14000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 5500

ASRS Report: 719698

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation: Overshoot Anomaly.Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS THE PLT MONITORING ON A FLT TO LGA. WE WERE INBOUND ON THE KORRY 3 ARR AND BEGAN TO RECEIVE NUMEROUS CLRNCS TO CHANGE THE ARR IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. AFTER PASSING ENO WE WERE GIVEN THE ATC CLRNC TO 'DSND VIA THE KORRY ARR AND TO ALSO CROSS SKIPY AT OR BELOW FL220.' THE FO INITIALLY SELECTED FLT LEVEL CHANGE TO EXPEDITE OUR DSCNT TO GET BELOW FL220 WHILE HE INPUTTED THIS CHANGE TO THE ARR, AND AFTER WE DSNDED BELOW FL220 HE WENT BACK TO VNAV. WE COMPLIED WITH ALL OF THESE CLRNCS. A SHORT TIME AFTER THIS WE WERE GIVEN ANTHER CLRNC TO CROSS BRAND AT 250 KTS. MY FO MADE THE NECESSARY INPUT TO THE FMS. THE ATC CTLR INFORMED US HE WOULD HAVE HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS IN A MOMENT. SOMETIME AROUND THE TIME OF ISSUING HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS AT RBV TO US, HE ALSO RESTATED THE CLRNC TO DSND VIA THE KORRY ARR, HOWEVER, TO NOW CROSS BRAND AT 11000 FT. THE PRINTED ARR HAS BRAND LISTED AT 11000 FT OR ABOVE. I REMEMBER CHKING TO SEE THAT MY FO HAD CORRECTLY CHANGED THE FMS TO REFLECT THAT WE NOW NEEDED TO CROSS BRAND AT 250 KTS AND AT 11000 FT. THE FMS REFLECTED THIS AND I REMEMBER THAT OUR ALT SELECT WINDOW ON THE MCP REFLECTED 10000 FT AS THAT WAS THE FINAL ALT ON THE ARR. I HAD MONITORED THE XING OF ALL OF THE PREVIOUS FIXES AND WAS BUSY CHKING THE ARR PAGE TO VERIFY THAT WE HAD ALSO CORRECTLY ENTERED THE HOLDING INFO AT RBV WHEN WE RECEIVED A CLRNC TO CLB TO 11000 FT AS THERE WAS AN ACFT HOLDING AT 10000 FT. WE WERE JUST PASSING 10600 FT AND MY FO IMMEDIATELY SELECTED VERT SPD AND ROLLED IN A CLB OF 1500 FPM. I QUERIED THE CTLR TO VERIFY THAT WE WERE CLRED TO 'DSND VIA THE KORRY ARR,' AND HE RESPONDED THAT WE WERE BUT WE WERE TO CROSS BRAND AT 11000 FT. SINCE I WAS BUSY XCHKING THE HOLDING INFO ON THE ARR PLATE, BRAND WAS THE ONE FIX THAT I DID NOT ACTUALLY VERIFY THE PASSING OF AS WE WERE DOING IT. THE SEEMINGLY CONTINUAL CHANGES THAT WERE GIVEN TO US FOR THE KORRY ARR CAUSED A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF CONFUSION, INTO WHAT IS ALREADY A VERY BUSY STAR. IF THE CTLR'S REAL INTENT WAS FOR US TO NEVER DSND BELOW 11000 FT, THEN THAT CLRNC WAS NEVER RECEIVED OR ACKNOWLEDGED BY US. IF HE WANTED US TO CROSS BRAND AT 11000 FT AND THEN DSND TO 10000 FT, I HAVE TO BELIEVE THAT WE COMPLIED WITH THAT AS I HAD PREVIOUSLY SEEN THAT CLRNC LOADED INTO THE LEGS PAGE OF THE FMS. HOWEVER, I CANNOT BE 100% SURE AS I DID NOT VISUALLY CONFIRM THE PASSING OF THAT PARTICULAR FIX AS I WAS CHKING THE ARR PLATE TO SEE THAT THE HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS WERE ALSO CORRECTLY IN THE FMS. I THINK IT WOULD HELP TO EITHER HAVE THE CLRNC TO DSND VIA OR TO BE GIVEN REGULAR ATC CLRNCS TO DSND. USING A COMBINATION OF THE TWO ALONG WITH HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS IS POTENTIALLY CREATING A SITUATION FOR

MISCOM OR CONFUSION, AND MOST DEFINITELY ADDING A GREAT DEAL TO THE PLT'S WORKLOAD.

Synopsis

A B757 CREW ON THE LGA KORRY 3 STAR DSNDED BELOW THEIR CLRED ALT WHEN TASK SATURATED WITH HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS AND DSCNT CLRNC.

Time / Day

Date: 200611 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: PRC.Airport

State Reference : AZ

Altitude. AGL. Single Value: 5500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: PRC.Tower Operator.Common Carrier: Air Taxi

Make Model Name: Piper Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135

Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.Tower: PRC.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Instructional

Make Model Name: PA-44 Seminole Turbo Seminole

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Taxi Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot Qualification.Pilot: Commercial Qualification.Pilot: Instrument

Experience. Flight Time. Last 90 Days: 100

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 1100 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 500

ASRS Report: 719184

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Local

Person: 3

Affiliation.Other: Instructional Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: NMAC

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 3
Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Miss Distance. Horizontal: 0 Miss Distance. Vertical: 100

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS ON A LIFEGUARD FLT. ARPT WAS SEVERELY BACKED UP -- ABOUT 20 PLANES WAITING BTWN 2 PARALLEL RWYS. TWR GAVE ME PRIORITY DEP AS A LIFEGUARD FLT AS I HAD PATIENT ON BOARD. AFTER TKOF ON RWY 21 I WAS TOLD BY TWR 'START YOUR R TURN WBOUND AND PROCEED ON COURSE, THE SEMINOLE WILL OFFSET FOR YOU.' I WAS JUST OFF RWY 21L AND THE SEMINOLE WAS JUST OFF RWY 21R AND STAYING IN THAT PATTERN. I HAD ALSO HEARD THE CTLR TELL THE SEMINOLE WHO HAD JUST TAKEN OFF AND WAS A LITTLE BIT AHEAD OF ME TO MY R IN THE PATTERN FOR THE R RWY, TO OFFSET FOR TFC BEHIND HIM, A LIFEGUARD FLT NEEDING TO DEPART TO THE W. I STARTED MY R. TURN TO 270 DEGS AND WOULD HAVE CROSSED BEHIND THE SEMINOLE. I SUSPECT THE CTLR MEANT TO TELL THE SEMINOLE TO 'EXTEND' FOR A LIFEGUARD FLT TURNING BEHIND HIM BUT HE SAID OFFSET. AFTER I MADE THE R TURN TO 270 DEGS, THE SEMINOLE MADE ESSENTIALLY A 'U' TURN AND WAS NOW HEADED RIGHT FOR ME. HE WOULD HAVE BEEN HDG ABOUT 360 DEGS. I WAS ABOVE HIM AT THIS POINT BUT HE WAS RAPIDLY CLBING. I HAD HIM IN SIGHT AT ALL TIMES AND WAS WAITING FOR HIM TO ARREST HIS ASCENT. IF NOT I WOULD HAVE STARTED EVASIVE MANEUVERS. IT WAS APPARENT HE STOPPED ASCENDING WITHIN ABOUT A HUNDRED FEET OF ME SO I CONTINUED ON COURSE. THE SEMINOLE THEN CALLED THE TWR AND SAID THEY HAD TO MAKE EVASIVE MANEUVERS TO AVOID HITTING AN AIRPLANE. THE CTLR CALLED ME AND ASKED IF I HAD SEEN THE SEMINOLE. I REPLIED I HAD MY EYE ON HIM THE ENTIRE TIME AND THOUGHT HE WAS 'OFFSETTING' FOR ME BECAUSE HE HAD INSTRUCTED ME TO START MY WBOUND TURN. THE CTLR REPLIED VERY QUICKLY 'I THOUGHT YOU WERE GOING TO TURN OUTSIDE OF HIM, FREQ CHANGE APPROVED GOOD DAY.' A RELATIVE OF MINE IS AN AIR TFC CTLR. I TOLD HIM THE ABOVE INFO AND HE SAID WHAT DOES OFFSET MEAN, IT'S NOT IN THE CTLR'S DICTIONARY. I HAVE HEARD THE WORD OFFSET USED MANY TIMES OVER THE LAST 20 YRS BUT WAS NOT AWARE IT WAS UNOFFICIAL. TO ME, WHEN THE CTLR TOLD THE SEMINOLE TO OFFSET FOR THE ACFT BEHIND HIM IT MEANT HE WAS TELLING THE SEMINOLE TO KEEP GOING STRAIGHT AND STAY S FOR THE ACFT TURNING WBOUND BEHIND HIM. IT WOULD APPEAR THE SEMINOLE PLT THOUGHT IT MEANT SOMETHING ELSE HENCE THERE WAS A CONFUSION AS TO WHAT THE WORD OFFSET MEANT WHEN THE CTLR USED IT. I DID NOT FEEL IN DANGER AT ANY TIME BUT DID FEEL AS THOUGH I WAS GOING TO HAVE TO USE EVASIVE MANEUVERS TO AVOID DANGER HAD THE SEMINOLE PLT NOT SEEN ME. WE WERE BOTH CLBING SO THE VERT CLOSURE RATE WAS NOT ALL THAT GREAT BUT THE HORIZ WAS.

Synopsis

PLT RPTS AN NMAC WITH A SEMINOLE AFTER DEPARTING PARALLEL RWYS WITH A CONFUSING ATC CLRNC.

Time / Day

Date: 200611 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZMP.ARTCC

State Reference: MN

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 5100

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZMP.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 135 ER&LR Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZMP.ARTCC Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: SR20

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Radar Qualification.Controller: Radar Experience.Controller.Radar: 15

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position2: 9

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 800

ASRS Report: 718579

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 3

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Anomaly.Non Adherence: Required Legal Separation Independent Detector.ATC Equipment: Conflict Alert

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Consequence.FAA: Investigated Miss Distance.Horizontal: 10000 Miss Distance.Vertical: 700

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Narrative

THE SR20 WAS OVERFLYING LSE FROM THE SE. THE E135 HAD DEPARTED LSE TO THE SE. AFTER DEP, THE E135 WAS STOPPED AT 5000 FT AS THE SR20 PASSED OVER AT 6000 FT. THE SR20 RPTED THE E135 IN SIGHT. I ASKED THE SR20, 'CAN YOU MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION FROM THE E135?' THE SR20 REPLIED, 'YES.' I CLBED THE E135 THROUGH THE SR20'S ALT, AND WAS LATER INFORMED THAT I'D USED INCORRECT PHRASEOLOGY.

Synopsis

ZMP CTLR DESCRIBES LEGAL LOSS OF SEPARATION AT 5100 FT WHEN INCORRECT PHRASEOLOGY WAS USED CLBING ACFT THROUGH OCCUPIED ALT.

Time / Day

Date: 200611 Day: Sun

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: SCT.TRACON

State Reference: CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: SCT.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: Citation I Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Cockpit/Cabin Communication

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 100

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 1700 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 100

ASRS Report: 717709

Person: 2

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2
Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Advisory

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF, WE (1) LOST COM AT THE COPLT STATION AND (2) OBSERVED AN IRREGULAR INDICATION ON THE CABIN PRESSURIZATION GAUGE. WE WERE HANDED OFF TO SOCAL APCH, BUT BECAME DISTR WITH DIAGNOSIS, LEADING TO MISSED CALLS AND HDGS. WE EXPLAINED THE MISCOM AND PRESSURIZATION ISSUES TO THE FIRST CTLR, WHO ACKNOWLEDGED, BUT THEN HANDED US OFF TO A SECOND CTLR. THE SECOND CTLR BEGAN BERATING US ALMOST IMMEDIATELY, INTERRUPTING OUR ATTEMPTS TO CATCH UP WITH DISTRACTING AND UNHELPFUL COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS (ARE YOU INST RATED? ARE YOU A TRAINING FLT?) AND BERATING THE FLT CREW. HE CONTINUED BY ADDRESSING OTHER ACFT ON THE FREQ WITH COMMENTS LIKE 'SORRY I AM DISTR WITH A HIGH-PERFORMANCE THAT DOESN'T KNOW WHAT HE'S DOING' AND THE LIKE. WE UNFORTUNATELY PERMITTED THIS TO CREATE SOME CONFUSION IN THE COCKPIT. WE WERE SEVERE CLR AND VMC AND SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED COMMAND AUTH BY EITHER CANCELING IFR OR ASKING FOR A VECTOR TO PERMIT US TO SORT THE ISSUES OUT WITHOUT DISTR. TO PREVENT A REOCCURRENCE, WE HAVE INSTITUTED NEW COMPANY COCKPIT PROCS AND REMEDIAL TRAINING.

Synopsis

CITATION CE500 FLT CREW HAS TRACK-HDG DEV DURING DEP FROM CNO.

Time / Day

Date: 200610 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: APC. Airport

State Reference : CA

Altitude. AGL. Single Value: 300

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: APC.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Bell Helicopter Textron Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Climbout: Takeoff

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities. Tower: APC. Tower Operator. General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Qualification.Pilot: ATP Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 60 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 7600 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 275

ASRS Report: 716351

Person: 2

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Local

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: NMAC

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Required Legal Separation

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken: Insufficient Time

Miss Distance. Horizontal: 0 Miss Distance. Vertical: 300

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE DEPARTING APC IN A HELI, I WAS GIVEN A CLRNC TO DEPART AS REQUESTED WITH NO TA'S. THE CLRNC WAS TO DEPART OFF TXWY A, WITH AN EBOUND TURNOUT. WHILE FLYING OVER THE RWY NUMBERS OF RWY 24, I NOTICED A SMALL CESSNA TOUCHING DOWN DIRECTLY BELOW ME. I WAS NOT TOLD ABOUT THE TFC BEFORE THAT POINT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE BELL PLT BELIEVES THAT HE ADHERED TO HIS CLRNC. NO TA'S WERE GIVEN AND NO INSTRUCTIONS TO AVOID OVERFLYING RWY 24. THE CTLR BECAME VERBALLY ABUSIVE AND A SHOUTING MATCH ENSUED, WHICH DIDN'T ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT WHY THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED.

Synopsis

BELL DEPARTING APC HAS MISCOM WITH TWR CTLR, AND OVERFLIES LNDG ACFT.

Time / Day

Date: 200610 Day: Mon

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: PHL.TRACON

State Reference: PA

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: PHL.TRACON

Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Person: 1

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Approach Experience.Controller.Radar: 16

ASRS Report: 712743

Person: 2

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken: Unable

Assessments

Problem Areas: Airport

Problem Areas: Airspace Structure

Problem Areas: FAA

Narrative

WE NOW HAVE TO INSTRUCT ALL ACFT WHEN THEY LEAVE AND RE-ENTER CLASS B AIRSPACE. THE ATIS BROADCAST APPARENTLY DOES NOT RELIEVE US FROM THIS RESPONSIBILITY. OUR CLASS B AIRSPACE IS POORLY DESIGNED AND MOST ACFT VECTORED FROM SOUTH ARR TO FINAL VECTOR WILL EXIT AND RE-ENTER WITHIN A FEW MI. DOES THIS PHRASEOLOGY REALLY AFFECT FINAL VECTORS ABILITY TO SEQUENCE ACFT TO RWY 27R EFFECTIVELY? VERY MUCH SO! FINAL'S JOB DEALS WITH BEING IN A 'ZONE,' SLOWING, TURNING, DSNDING, AND ISSUING TFC AND CLRNCS. NOW, WE HAVE ADDED AN ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT TO TELL ACFT WHEN THEY CROSS AN IMAGINARY LINE. FINAL NOW LOSES THE FOCUS OF THEIR MOST IMPORTANT JOB, THE SEQUENCE AND SAFETY OF ACFT. I HAVE PERSONALLY DISCUSSED THIS SITUATION WITH OUR MGR. I TOLD HIM, IF I WAS THE MGR, I WOULD IMMEDIATELY OBTAIN A WAIVER OR REDESIGN THE CLASS B AIRSPACE. I DON'T THINK EITHER WILL HAPPEN SOON OR IN THE FUTURE.

Synopsis

A RPTR STATES THAT APCH CTLRS MUST ADVISE PLTS THAT ARE MAKING APCHS TO RWY 27R WHEN ACFT EXIT AND REENTER THE CLASS B AIRSPACE, THEREBY CREATING ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD FOR THE CTLRS.