ASRS Database Report Set

Fuel Management Issues

Report Set Description	A sampling of reports referencing incidents of fuel mismanagement, and operational concerns for fuel planning.
Update Number	13.0
Date of Update	May 13, 2008
Number of Records in Report Set	50
Number of New Records in Report Set	50
Type of Records in Report Set	displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the reporting of a specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de- identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.

Linda J. Connell, Director

Aviation Safety Reporting System

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CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area "A" than area "B" simply because the airmen who operate in area "A" are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

One thing that can be known from ASRS statistics is that they represent the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 1999 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 1999. Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS lies in the **report narratives**. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. The values of these narrative reports lie in their qualitative nature. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.



ACN: 777360 (1 of 50)

Synopsis

DISPATCHED TO A DESTINATION WITH BAD WEATHER, FLT CREW OF MLG DISCOVERS THAT THERE ARE NO APPROACH PLATES ABOARD FOR ANY OF THE THREE ALTERNATES ASSIGNED BY DISPATCH.

ACN: 774661 (2 of 50)

Synopsis

EMB 145 FLT CREW DECLARED EMER FUEL ON FINAL APCH WHEN FUEL ONBOARD DROPPED BELOW RESERVE FUEL REQUIREMENTS.

ACN: 774563 (3 of 50)

Synopsis

CRJ900 EXECUTED A GAR DUE TO WINDSHEAR WARNING. DIVERSION TO ANOTHER ARPT WAS CONSIDERED THE SAFER COURSE OF ACTION, AND FLT CREW DECLARED EMER FUEL TO OBTAIN CLRNC DIRECT TO THE ARPT.

ACN: 767118 (4 of 50)

Synopsis

A319 FLT CREW DISCOVERED SHORTLY AFTER TKOF THAT DEST ARPT WX FORECAST REQUIRED AN ALTERNATE. CLRED DISPATCH FUEL DID NOT INCLUDE AN ALTERNATE, SO FLT CREW DIVERTED.

ACN: 764647 (5 of 50)

Synopsis

AN EMB145 PLT DISCUSSES DIVERSIONS WHEN FLYING INTO ZZZ, ZZZ1, AND ZZZ2 WITH MINIMUM FUEL AND NO DESIGNATED ALTERNATE.

ACN: 764199 (6 of 50)

Synopsis

LEAR FO REPORTS DUAL ENGINE FLAME OUT AFTER MAX EFFORT STOP. FUEL STARVATION IS SUSPECTED.

ACN: 763802 (7 of 50)

Synopsis

E135 CAPTAIN REPORTS THAT, AFTER PREVIOUSLY CUTTING STANDARD FUEL RESERVES FOR HOLDING IN HALF, COMPANY NOW PRESSURES DISPATCHERS AND FLT CREWS TO NOT INCREASE DISPATCH FUEL FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS.

ACN: 762768 (8 of 50)

Synopsis

EMB 145 ENCOUNTERED HEADWINDS GREATER THAN FORECAST, AND THE REDUCED FUEL SITUATION RESULTED IN THEIR INABILITY TO ACCEPT AN EARLY DESCENT TO ACCOMMODATE ATC.

ACN: 760315 (9 of 50)

Synopsis

AN A319 CAPT DECLARED MIN FUEL WHEN TURB AT HIGHER ALTS FORCED A LOWER CRUISE ALT AND INCREASED THEIR FUEL BURN.

ACN: 757453 (10 of 50)

Synopsis

B737 CAPTAIN FEELS ACR FLT PLANS FAIL TO REFLECT REAL WORLD FUEL REQUIREMENTS.

ACN: 756558 (11 of 50)

Synopsis

SF340 FLT CREW REPORTS WEATHER DIVERSION AFTER TWO ATTEMPTS TO LAND AT DESTINATION AND DIVERSION TO SECOND ALTERNATE AFTER LOC FAILURE AT FIRST ALTERNATE. LOW FUEL EMERGENCY IS DECLARED.

ACN: 754929 (12 of 50)

Synopsis

AN RJ135 WAS GIVEN HOLDING ENRTE TO ZZZ WITH MIN FUEL, NO ALTERNATE, AND NO DELAY FUEL. CREW DECLARED AN EMER FOR EXPEDITED FLT TO ZZZ.

ACN: 754118 (13 of 50)

Synopsis

AN MD80 FLIGHT CREW NOTICED FUEL NOT FEEDING PROPERLY FROM CENTER TANK. TWO AFT CENTER PUMP CIRCUIT BREAKERS TRIPPED. EMERGENCY DECLARED.

ACN: 753552 (14 of 50)

Synopsis

AN EXPERIMENTAL EXPERIENCED FUEL EXHAUSTION AFTER A 25 YR OLD PLASTIC FUEL PUMP INLET CONNECTOR FAILED.

ACN: 750285 (15 of 50)

A B737 FLT CREW OPERATING AS A PASSENGER FLIGHT WITH THE LANDING GEAR INOP IN THE EXTENDED POSITION FOUND THE FUEL FLOW TO EXCEED THE BOOK VALUES, AND DECLARED A FUEL EMERGENCY TO EXPEDITE THEIR ARRIVAL HANDLING AT DESTINATION.

ACN: 749544 (16 of 50)

Synopsis

LANCAIR 295 EXPERIENCED ENG FAILURE SHORTLY AFTER LIFTOFF. EMER GEAR UP LNDG WAS EXECUTED, AND INVESTIGATION REVEALED FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE NOT FULLY OPEN.

ACN: 748833 (17 of 50)

Synopsis

EMB-145 FLT WAS GIVEN REROUTE DURING FLT. AFTER ENTERING ROUTE INTO FMS, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT FLT WOULD LAND WITH INSUFFICIENT FUEL, SO THE FLT CREW DECLARED EMER FUEL AND RECEIVED PRIORITY HANDLING.

ACN: 748787 (18 of 50)

Synopsis

AN UNPLANNED LANDING FOR FUEL ENROUTE RESULTS IN CONFRONTATIONS WITH AND AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATE ACTION BY AN FAA OFFICER.

ACN: 747621 (19 of 50)

Synopsis

AN EMJ PILOT DECLARED MIN FUEL AFTER FLT ROUTE CHANGES LOWERED DESTINATION ARR FUEL TO NEAR AN EMERGENCY DECLARATION LEVEL.

ACN: 746450 (20 of 50)

Synopsis

AN EXPERIMENTAL BIPLANE PILOT EXPERIENCED ENGINE FAILURE DUE TO A CLOGGED GASCOLATOR FILTER. THE PILOT MADE A SUCCESSFUL FORCED LANDING IN AN OPEN FIELD WITH NO DAMAGE OR INJURIES.

ACN: 744444 (21 of 50)

Synopsis

A B757-200 PILOT REPORTS THAT HIS ACR IS DISPATCHING ACFT WITH UNREALISTIC MIN FUEL LOADS.

ACN: 744226 (22 of 50)

EXTRA 300 PILOT REPORTS SUCCESSFUL OFF ARPT LANDING DUE TO FUEL STARVATION AND INACCURATE FUEL GAGES.

ACN: 742092 (23 of 50)

Synopsis

À B767 CAPT ON AN OVER WATER FLT RECEIVED A RE-RELEASE MESSAGE FROM DISPATCHER THAT WAS NOT ACCURATE, REQUIRED, OR DESIRED.

ACN: 741637 (24 of 50)

Synopsis

A HUSKY A-1B ACFT FACTORY FUEL CAPS WERE REMOVED/REPLACED WITH NON STANDARD CAPS. RUDDER AND ELEVATOR STOPS ALSO RE-ADJUSTED.

ACN: 741373 (25 of 50)

Synopsis

A DISPATCHER REPORTS AN A320 LNDG WITH 2.9 FUEL REMAINING AFTER DECLARING A FUEL EMER. DEST ARPT CLOSED AND TSTMS AT ALT CAUSED DEV TO UNSCHEDULED ARPT.

ACN: 740822 (26 of 50)

Synopsis

A CRJ200 FLT GIVEN A REROUTE DECLARED MIN FUEL. ATC THEN DECLARED A FUEL EMER, RESTORED THE ORIGINAL ROUTING, AND ASK THE FLT CREW FOR WHY AN EMER.

ACN: 740773 (27 of 50)

Synopsis

AN INSTRUCTOR REPORTS A C152 STUDENT PILOT LANDED OFF ARPT WITH A ROUGH RUNNING ENG CAUSED BY FUEL STARVATION. PILOT WAS UNAWARE OF FUEL STATE.

ACN: 740299 (28 of 50)

Synopsis

A PA31 PILOT CONDUCTING A POST ENGINE CHANGE TEST FLT UPLOADED TOO LITTLE FUEL FOR THE TEST MANEUVERS AND FUEL STARVED ONE ENGINE ON APCH.

ACN: 740068 (29 of 50)

PA28 PILOT EXPERIENCES FUEL EXHAUSTION DURING VECTORS FOR APPROACH AND MANAGES TO LAND SAFELY AT A SMALL AIRPORT SHORT OF DESTINATION.

ACN: 739488 (30 of 50)

Synopsis

PILOT OF CT FLIGHT DESIGN EXPERIENCES PARTIAL ENGINE FAILURE AT 9000 FEET. AFTER SETTING UP FOR A PRECAUTIONARY EMERGENCY LANDING AND CLOSING THE THROTTLE THE ENGINE STOPS COMPLETELY.

ACN: 739220 (31 of 50)

Synopsis

MD11 FLT CREW AT FL350 RPTS #3 FUEL TANK PUMP FAILURE AND FUEL SYS ANOMALIES WITH THE SYS IN AUTO. SYS IS SWITCHED TO MANUAL FOR REMAINDER OF FLT.

ACN: 739072 (32 of 50)

Synopsis

C152 EXPERIENCES LOSS OF POWER AND LANDS ON ROAD SHORT OF DESTINATION.

ACN: 738901 (33 of 50)

Synopsis

DC9 FLT CREW IS UNABLE TO MAKE CROSSING RESTRICTION AT AN ASSIGNED AIRSPEED AND ALTITUDE DUE TO INEXPERIENCE WITH NON-FMC ACFT.

ACN: 736120 (34 of 50)

Synopsis

C150 PILOT REPORTS ENGINE FAILURE DURING DESCENT FOR LANDING. OFF ARPT LNDG ENSUES AND A COLLISION WITH A TREE.

ACN: 734632 (35 of 50)

Synopsis

A B737 ARRIVES AT DEST SHORT OF FUEL DUE TO A MISCALCULATION IN THE PAYLOAD AT DEP STATION.

ACN: 734092 (36 of 50)

Synopsis

AN MD11 PLT RPTS AMBIGUITY ABOUT TANKERING 25000 LBS OF #2 TANK FUEL FOR PUMP COOLING DURING BOTH TKOF AND LNDG.

ACN: 733691 (37 of 50)

Synopsis

ARRIVAL REPOUTE RESULTS IN LESS THAN DESIRED FUEL AT DESTINATION FOR E145 FLT CREW.

ACN: 733500 (38 of 50)

Synopsis

B757-200 CREW RECEIVES TCAS RA JUST OUTSIDE JETSA ON THE ILS 24R AT LAX AND GOES AROUND FOLLOWING TCAS GUIDANCE.

ACN: 731312 (39 of 50)

Synopsis

EMB140 FLT CREW HAS A LOW FUEL STATE AND AN ANTI ICE MALFUNCTION, DECLARES EMER AND DIVERTS FOR LNDG.

ACN: 730855 (40 of 50)

Synopsis

A DC-9 ACFT DIVERTED DUE TO LOW FUEL AND FUEL QUANTITY INDICATION PROBLEMS.

ACN: 730528 (41 of 50)

Synopsis

FLT CREW OF A320 EXPERIENCE FUEL LEAK ENROUTE. DIVERT TO NEARER SUITABLE ARPT FOR INSPECTION.

ACN: 728618 (42 of 50)

Synopsis

C421 PILOT REPORTS RIGHT ENGINE FUEL STARVATION DURING APPROACH.

ACN: 727362 (43 of 50)

Synopsis

PA28 PILOT STUDENT RUNS LEFT TANK DRY IN TRAFFIC PATTERN AND MAKES EMERGENCY LANDING.

ACN: 726776 (44 of 50)

UN-FORECAST BAD WX, MINIMUM FUEL AND FLAP ANOMALY CHALLENGE A319 FLT CREW.

ACN: 725772 (45 of 50)

Synopsis

B737-700 CAPT BELIEVES ARR AT SNA -- NEARLY COMPROMISED BY CONVECTIVE WX -- WITHOUT A PLANNED ALTERNATE, INDICATES COMPANY FUEL POLICY MAY NOT BE COST EFFECTIVE.

ACN: 725618 (46 of 50)

Synopsis

B757-200 FLT CREW DECLARES MINIMUM FUEL AFTER TRANSCON FLT TO SFO ENCOUNTERS MODEST DELAYS.

ACN: 725232 (47 of 50)

Synopsis

A PA23-250 ON ITS FIRST FLT OUT OF AN OVERHAUL MADE AN OFF ARPT LANDING FOLLOWING FUEL STARVATION BECAUSE OF LEAKING FUEL TANK CAPS.

ACN: 724998 (48 of 50)

Synopsis

B757 CREW DECLARES MIN FUEL DURING CROSS COUNTRY FLT TO JFK.

ACN: 724197 (49 of 50)


Synopsis

MD80 FLT CREW DIVERTS FOR FUEL CONSIDERATION.

ACN: 722641 (50 of 50)

Synopsis

CESSNA 310K EXPERIENCES FUEL EXHAUSTION ON APCH TO ZZZ.



Time / Day

Date: 200803

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: RDU.Airport

State Reference: NC

Environment

Flight Conditions: IMC

Weather Elements : Thunderstorm Weather Elements : Turbulence Weather Elements : Windshear

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: RDU.Tower Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Flight Phase.Landing: Missed Approach

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Aircraft Documentation

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot: ATP ASRS Report: 777360

Events

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Weather

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Weather

Situations

Narrative

WE WERE DISPATCHED TO RDU WITH 2 DESTINATION ALTERNATES, ORF AND RIC. RDU WAS FORECAST WITH RAIN INCREASING TO HEAVY RAIN AT ARRIVAL TIME. BOTH ORF AND RIC WERE HOLDING IMC CONDITIONS AROUND 300 TO 500 FOOT OVERCAST. ENRTE TO RDU, DISPATCH SENT US AN ACARS MESSAGE CHANGING 1ST ALTERNATE TO GSO WITH FUEL BURN OF 2080 LBS, 2ND ALTERNATE REMAINED RIC WITH FUEL BURN 2554 LBS. GSO AND WEATHER WAS HOLDING AT 300 FT OVERCAST WITH RAIN AND RIC WAS BETWEEN 300 FT AND 500 FT OVERCAST WITH RAIN. AT THIS TIME OUR FOB WAS AT 7200 LBS. PLANNING AHEAD, I ASKED FO TO GET THE ALTERNATE BOOK OUT FOR GSO. THERE WERE NO APPROACH PLATES FOR ANY OF THE THREE DESTINATION ALTERNATES GIVEN IN THE PILOT RTE MANUALS OR ALTERNATE AIRPORT MANUAL. I SENT ACARS MESSAGE TO DISPATCH ADVISING OF OUR SITUATION AND ASK FOR CALCULATION OF HOLD AND DIVERSION FUEL TO GSO. DISPATCH NEVER REPLIED TO THIS MESSAGE! WITH MENTAL MATH, I QUICKLY DETERMINED WE HAD SUFFICIENT FUEL FOR ONE MORE QUICK APPROACH ATTEMPT AT RDU AND THEN MUST DIVERT TO GSO (FOB 7200 LBS -1500 LBS FOR THE RDU ILS RWY 23R TO MISSED APPROACH = 5800 LBS DIVERSION FUEL). PLANNING TO DIVERT AT 5800 LBS WITH BURN TO GSO AT 2080 LBS, WE WOULD HAVE TO FLY AN EMERGENCY ILS WITH VERBAL DESCRIPTION. WE WOULD LAND WITH MINIMUM FUEL OF 3800 LBS WITHOUT ANY AIRPORT INFORMATION OR APPROACH PLATES! ON FINAL APPROACH INTO RDU, THERE WERE MANY ISOLATED THUNDERSTORM SQUALL LINES MOVING QUICKLY ACROSS THE FIELD. AROUND 500 FT AGL RDU ILS RWY 05L TOWER ISSUED NEW ATIS CHANGING RUNWAY IN USE TO ILS RWY 23R. WE EXECUTED A MISSED APPROACH EXPECTING RADAR VECTORS TO RDU ILS RWY 23R. ON FINAL APPROACH ILS RWY 23R THE AIRCRAFT AHEAD OF US REPORTED WINDSHEAR PLUS 20 KNOTS. AT 800 FT AGL WE EXECUTED A SECOND MISSED APPROACH. AFTER THE GO AROUND TOWER ADVISED US THAT THE SQUALLS WERE MOVING QUICKLY ACROSS THE FIELD. WE AGREED TO TAKE 5-MINUTE DELAY VECTORS TO REGROUP AND LET THE SQUALL LINE PASS THE FIELD. WITH THESE NUMBERS IN MIND, WE DECLARED 'MINIMUM FUEL' AND RECEIVED PRIORITY HANDLING BACK TO THE RDU ILS RWY 23R APPROACH TO LANDING. IF WE HAD TO DIVERT IN THIS SCENARIO, WE WOULD HAVE TO LAND IN GSO WITHOUT ANY AIRPORT PLATES. I FIND THIS METHOD OF DISPATCHING IS PUSHED THE BOUNDARIES OF SAFETY AND LEGALITY! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER ADVISED THAT HIS CARRIER -- RECENTLY PURCHASED BY AND MERGED INTO ANOTHER -- PROVIDED EACH PILOT WITH A LIST OF OPSPEC APPROVED ARPTS. THE SURVIVING CARRIER DOES NOT DO SO. SUBSEQUENT CHECKS OF ALTERNATE BINDERS ON OTHER ACFT BY THE REPORTER DISCOVERED THAT ONLY ONE HAD ANY IAP'S FOR THE ALTERNATE ARPTS AND THAT ONE ONLY FOR ORF. NONE OF THE BINDERS CHECKED INCLUDED IAP'S FOR ANY OF THE OTHER ALTERNATES ASSIGNED TO THE FLT IN QUESTION. REPORTER FURTHER STATED THAT HE BELIEVES ONLY GSO IAP'S WERE INCLUDED IN THE ACFT FMS DATABASE. THERE IS ALSO A COMPANY BULLETIN ADVISING THAT SOME ARPTS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE DATABASE AND THAT APCHES TO THOSE ARPTS WOULD REQUIRE MANUAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE APPROPRIATE IAP. THE BULLETIN DID NOT ADDRESS HOW TO BUILD THE MISSING DATABASE APCH IF THE APCH WAS ALSO ONE OF THOSE FOR WHICH NO PLATE WAS AVAILABLE.

Synopsis

DISPATCHED TO A DESTINATION WITH BAD WEATHER, FLT CREW OF MLG DISCOVERS THAT THERE ARE NO APPROACH PLATES ABOARD FOR ANY OF THE THREE ALTERNATES ASSIGNED BY DISPATCH.

Time / Day

Date: 200802

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: ZZZ.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer Qualification.Pilot: Commercial

ASRS Report: 774661

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

ASRS Report: 774662

Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Assessments

Problem Areas: Company

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHEN WE DEPARTED WE WERE A FEW HUNDRED POUNDS ABOVE MIN FUEL. AFTER DEPARTING WE SPENT APPROXIMATELY 6-7 MINUTES AT 9000 FT TRYING TO GET IN TOUCH WITH CENTER. AFTER GETTING IN TOUCH WITH CENTER WE

EVENTUALLY GOT TO OUR FILED ALTITUDE AFTER COMPLETING MANY LEVEL OFFS AT DIFFERENT ALTITUDES. WE ALSO ENCOUNTERED A STRONG HEADWIND DURING OUR ENTIRE TRIP TO ZZZ, APPROXIMATELY 110 KTS HEADWIND THE ENTIRE WAY. THROUGHOUT OUR CRUISE WE ALSO RECEIVED MANY VECTORS FROM ATC DUE TO TRAFFIC AND FLOW CONTROL INTO ZZZ. WHILE WE WERE PROCEEDING DIRECT TO XXX, WE RECEIVED ANOTHER VECTOR OFF COURSE, WHICH WE THEN DECIDED TO CALL MINIMUM FUEL SINCE OUR CALCULATIONS SHOWED THAT WE WOULD ARRIVE AT WITH 1800 LBS. FINALLY, ON FINAL WE WERE FORCED TO EXECUTE S-TURNS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE ENOUGH SPACING WITH TRAFFIC IN FRONT OF US. ON FINAL WE FINALLY DROPPED BELOW 1800 LBS TOTAL FUEL, SO THE CAPTAIN DECIDED TO CALL A PRECAUTIONARY FUEL EMERGENCY, SINCE WE HAD 45 MINUTES OF FUEL, BUT BELOW OUR RESERVES. WHEN LANDED WE HAD AROUND 1700 LBS TOTAL FUEL APPROXIMATELY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 774662: I CALLED DISPATCH TO ADVISE THEM OF THE SITUATION, THEY ADVISED ME FUEL EMER WAS AT 1200 LBS NOT WHEN BURNING INTO YOUR RESERVE. I LANDED WITH APPROX 1700 LBS.

Synopsis

EMB 145 FLT CREW DECLARED EMER FUEL ON FINAL APCH WHEN FUEL ONBOARD DROPPED BELOW RESERVE FUEL REQUIREMENTS.

Time / Day

Date: 200802

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude. AGL. Single Value: 500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Weather Elements : Turbulence Weather Elements : Windshear

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: ZZZ. Tower Operator. Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase. Descent: Approach

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 230

Experience. Flight Time. Total: 9245 Experience. Flight Time. Type: 7440

ASRS Report: 774563

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

ASRS Report: 774564

Events

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Turbulence Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Weather

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector. Aircraft Equipment. Other Aircraft Equipment: EICAS

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

AFTER OUR CLRNC WAS RECEIVED FOR OUR FLT TO ZZZ1, IT BECAME KNOWN THAT ATC HAD CHANGED THE RTE TO THE WELL KNOWN PREFERRED FLT PLAN TO ZZZ1. OUR DISPATCHERS HAVE BEEN INFORMED FOR QUITE SOME TIME THAT, IN THE CRJ 900 SERIES ACFT, WHICH ARE RNAV EQUIPPED, ARE TO BE FILED RNAV DEPS AND ARRS INTO ALL CITIES THAT PROVIDE THEM. IN SOME CASES RNAV DEPS, COUPLED WITH RNAV ARRS, CAN REQUIRE AS MUCH AS 1000 LBS OF ADDITIONAL FUEL TO COMPLY WITH THE BASIC FAR'S. ATTEMPTS TO CORRECT THIS PROBLEM BY CAPTS APPEAR TO BE UNSUCCESSFUL AS THIS PROBLEM CONTINUES. ALSO, THERE WERE SOME CONCERNS ABOUT THE EXTREMELY GUSTY CONDITIONS THAT WERE APPARENTLY OVERLOOKED BY DISPATCH, WHICH WERE TO BE EXPECTED. THE DISPATCHER WAS INFORMED OF THE FLT'S CHANGED ROUTING, ANTICIPATED ADDITIONAL FUEL REQUIREMENTS, AND WX IN ZZZ1. AUTHORIZATION WAS GIVEN TO INCREASE THE FUEL ON BOARD TO A SAFER LEVEL. SINCE THE WX (CLOUD COVER AND VISIBILITY) AT ZZZ1 DID NOT REQUIRE THE USE OF A LNDG ALTERNATE, EXTRA FUEL WAS ADDED FOR CONTINGENCIES. THE DISPATCH RELEASE REQUIRED APPROX 6200 LBS OF FUEL AND WAS INCREASED TO 9000 LBS PRIOR TO FLT. UPON ARR IN THE ZZZ1 AREA, THE RPTED WX AROSE CONCERNS ABOUT THE ABILITY TO SAFELY LAND THE ACFT DUE TO THE WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION AND THE WINDSHEAR ADVISORIES IN EFFECT. WHILE ON APCH, AND AT APPROX 300 FT, A WINDSHEAR WARNING WAS HEARD FROM THE ACFT'S EICAS AND A MISSED APCH WAS EXECUTED. AFTER THE MISSED APCH, TOWER RPTED WIND AT 340/45 GUSTING 56 WHICH RAISED CONCERNS OF SAFELY LNDG THE ACFT. FUEL CONCERNS TO MAKE ANOTHER UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT, AND THEN FLY TO SAFETY BECAME OUR MAIN CONCERN. CLRNC TO DEPART THE ZZZ1 AREA AND HEAD FOR AN ALTERNATE WAS REQUESTED. INITIAL HEADING AND ALTITUDE CHANGES WERE GIVEN WHILE MY FO AND I CALCULATED THE BEST DIVERSIONARY ARPT CONSIDERING FUEL PRESENTLY ON BOARD. INITIALLY DEP GAVE US A HEADING DIRECT AS REQUESTED TO ZZZ WHICH HAD AN ACCEPTABLE FORECASTED ARR FUEL OF APPROX 2800 LBS (APPROX 45 MINUTES). A HANDOFF TO CENTER WAS GIVEN AND A NOTIFICATION WAS MADE THAT WE WERE 'MINIMUM FUEL.' ATC THEN ISSUED A FLY DIRECT TO THE VOR AND THE RNAV ARR. A CHK WAS MADE OF THE ADDITIONAL FUEL REQUIRED TO FLY AS INSTRUCTED, DETERMINING IT WOULD PUT US LNDG WITH AN UNSAFE FUEL AMOUNT OF 25 MINUTES REMAINING. WE ANNOUNCED AGAIN TO ATC OF OUR FUEL STATUS AND THAT A DIRECT FLT TO ZZZ WAS NEEDED DUE TO MINIMUM FUEL. ATC ACKNOWLEDGED BY SAYING THAT THAT WAS NOT POSSIBLE DUE TO FLT THROUGH RESTR AIRSPACE. AT THAT TIME WE DECLARED AN EMER AND ONCE AGAIN REQUESTED DIRECT FLT TO ZZZ. THE ACFT WAS GIVEN DIRECT ROUTING AND ARRIVED IN ZZZ SAFELY WITH APPROX 2700 LBS OF FUEL ON BOARD. PREVENTATIVE ACTIONS: THERE IS A SYSTEM IN PLACE AT MOST AIRLINES OF CHECKS AND BALANCES. THE CAPT AND THE DISPATCHER ARE BOTH RESPONSIBLE TO CHECK THE SAFE PLANNING AND IN EFFECT, OPERATION OF THE ACFT. IN THE PLANNING PHASE OF THIS FLT, THE DISPATCHER'S IMPROPER RTE FILING AND FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY INTERPRET

THE WX IN ZZZ1, IN MY OPINION, CAUSED A TOTAL LACK OF FUEL CONSIDERATION FOR SAFE FLT. IT WAS ONLY AFTER A CALL FROM THE CREW PROMPTED A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CONDITIONS, THAT MEASURES WERE TAKEN PRIOR TO FLT. GONE UNCHECKED, AS IT DIDN'T IN THIS CASE, THE ACFT COULD HAVE BEEN LEFT WITH A DANGEROUS FUEL CRITICAL SITUATION. THANKFULLY, THERE WAS ENOUGH FUEL ON BOARD TO HAVE A SAFE OPTION AND TAKE THE AIRPLANE OUT OF DANGER WITH A POSITIVE OUTCOME. IT IS UNKNOWN TO ME WHY THE DISPATCHER DIDN'T INTERPRET THE FORECASTED WX BETTER AND PLAN THE FLT MORE CAREFULLY. AS FUEL ON BOARD OUR ACFT BECOMES MICROMANAGED DOWN TO THE LAST POUND, IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT IN THE PLANNING PHASE THAT RTES ARE ACCURATE FOR CORRECT FUEL PLANNING. ALSO, DISPATCHER WORKLOADS MAY NEED TO BE CHECKED AND BE REDUCED, ALLOWING MORE TIME TO CAREFULLY ANALYZE ALL PERTINENT DATA RELATING TO ANY GIVEN FLT.

Synopsis

CRJ900 EXECUTED A GAR DUE TO WINDSHEAR WARNING. DIVERSION TO ANOTHER ARPT WAS CONSIDERED THE SAFER COURSE OF ACTION, AND FLT CREW DECLARED EMER FUEL TO OBTAIN CLRNC DIRECT TO THE ARPT.

Time / Day

Date: 200712

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: ZZZ. Tower Operator. Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A319

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground: Taxi

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 250 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 12300 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1200

ASRS Report: 767118

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed As Precaution

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

NORMAL FLT PLANNED TODAY ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2. WX AT ZZZ2 WAS POOR, 1/4 NM VIS BUT FORECAST TO IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY PRIOR TO OUR ARR (WX IMPROVES BY FORECAST AT XA00 WITH ARR AT XA30). SMALL FUEL INCREASE FOR IRREGULARITIES POSSIBLE AT ZZZ1 BY CREW BUT NO ALTERNATE WAS PLANNED. AREA WX AROUND ZZZ2 WAS ALSO VERY POOR. CLBING OUT FO CHECKS THE ZZZ2 FORECAST AND NOTED THAT IT HAD BEEN REVISED WITH THE POOR VISIBILITY PERIOD EXTENDED SIGNIFICANTLY. THIS WAS SIGNIFICANT TO THE CREW AS THE ARR WX WAS NOW REQUIRING AN ALTERNATE BY ANY

STANDARD. DISPATCH QUERY MET WITH RESPONSE THAT DISPATCHER HAD INDEED NOTED NEW FORECAST BUT SAW WE HAD PUSHED BACK SO HE DID NOT WANT TO TROUBLE US WITH THE INFO AS WE MIGHT BE IN THE TAKE-OFF PHASE. WE WERE NOT, ACTUALLY WE WERE SIX MINUTES FROM TAKE-OFF WHEN DISPATCH SAID HE GOT THE NEW FORECAST. THIS INFORMATION WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL PRIOR TO TAKE-OFF SINCE THE DISPATCH POINT IS THE TAKE-OFF POWER-UP. IF IT HAD JUST BEEN MISSED, FINE, BUT IT WAS VITAL SAFETY INFORMATION THAT WAS WITHHELD FROM THE CREW. A SHORT TRIP BACK TO THE GATE WOULD HAVE BEEN EASIER THAN THE ENSUING DIVERT TO ZZZ FOR MORE FUEL, AGAINST THE DISPATCHER'S ADVICE. WHEN QUERIED, THE DISPATCHER SUGGESTED CARRYING ON TO ZZZ2 SINCE THE FIELD HAD CATII/III APCH CAPABILITY. THE DIVERT WAS EXECUTED BY THE CREW BECAUSE WE BELIEVED AN APCH INTO MINIMUM WX IS A POOR OPTION WHEN YOU HAVE NO FUEL PLANNED FOR A POSSIBLE DIVERSION. OBVIOUSLY THE SAFEST OPTION WAS TO CARRY MORE FUEL TO INCREASE THE OPTIONS IF A MISSED APCH WAS EXECUTED. I FELT THE DISPATCHER WAS NOT INTERESTED IN THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION, ONLY THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS. ONCE THE DIVERT WAS CALLED BY THE CREW, DISPATCHER WAS VERY HELPFUL IN MINIMIZING THE IMPACT TO THE FLIGHT. THE DISMAL QUALITY OF OUR OUT-SOURCED WX FORECASTING IS PROBABLY COSTING MORE IN ADDED GAS AND DIVERTS THAN THE WHOLE LAID-OFF WX DEPARTMENT COMBINED.

Synopsis

A319 FLT CREW DISCOVERED SHORTLY AFTER TKOF THAT DEST ARPT WX FORECAST REQUIRED AN ALTERNATE. CLRED DISPATCH FUEL DID NOT INCLUDE AN ALTERNATE, SO FLT CREW DIVERTED.

Time / Day

Date: 200712

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment

Light : Dawn

Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Ground: Preflight

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

ASRS Report: 764647

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector. Other. Flight Crew A: 1
Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas: Company

Situations

Narrative

DURING MY PREFLT REVIEW OF THE FLT PLAN I NOTED A PLANNED ARR FUEL OF 2700 LBS. THE FUEL PLANNING ONLY INCLUDED 500 LBS OF ADD FUEL AND 500 LBS OF HOLD FUEL. THIS WAS NOT ENOUGH FUEL TO GET TO ZZZ1 DURING RUSH HOUR. I HAD ALREADY DIVERTED SEVERAL OTHER TIMES IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS FOR THE SAME PERFECT WORLD FUELING THAT DISPATCH INSISTS ON PLACING ON BOARD OUR ACFT. I CALLED UP DISPATCH AND REQUESTED MORE FUEL. THEY AGREED AND PLACED UNDER CAPT ADD OF 700 LBS AND STATED IN THE REMARKS THAT THE CAPT REQUESTED MORE FUEL. I HAVE BEEN FORCED TO CALL DISPATCH TIME AND TIME AGAIN INSISTING ON MORE FUEL AND WHEN I

ASK WHY THEY ARE MIN RUNNING OUR FUEL LOADS THEY STATE THAT IT IS THE COMPANY DISPATCH FUELING POLICY THAT THEY MUST COMPLY WITH OR THEY WILL BE QUESTIONED ON THE REASON BEHIND THE ADDITIONAL FUEL. THE FACT THAT WHEN WE GOT WITHIN 100 MILES OF ZZZ1 THAT DAY WE HAD TO HOLD 30 MINUTES AND HAD I NOT INSISTED ON THE ADDITIONAL 700 LBS OF FUEL WE WOULD HAVE BEEN PLACED IN AN IMMEDIATE DIVERSION SITUATION THAT WOULD HAVE HAD US ARRIVE AT OUR ALTERNATE WITH MIN FUEL, THAT WAS NOT SELECTED BECAUSE OF THE ASSUMPTION BY OUR DISPATCH THAT BECAUSE THE WEATHER IS VMC THAT YOU DO NOT HAVE TO HOLD NOR DO YOU NEED AN ALTERNATE. THE FACT THAT I HAD TO HOLD 30 MINUTES ON A CLR AND A MILLION VFR DAY VALIDATES MY DISAGREEMENT WITH OUR CARRIER'S PERFECT WORLD DISPATCH FUEL LOAD POLICY. MY FELLOW COLLEAGUES ARE DIVERTING FOR THE SAME REASONS, ALL CAUSED BY THE MIN FUEL POLICY WHICH IS CLRLY BEING MOTIVATED BY ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, NOT COMMON SENSE AND EXPERIENCE. THIS EVENT OCCURRED BECAUSE OF THE UNREALISTIC FUELING POLICY OF MY ACR. IT IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE REALITIES OF THE PERPETUALLY CONGESTED AIRSPACE SYSTEM. IT ALSO OCCURRED BECAUSE WHETHER THE AIRLINES ARE WILLING TO ADMIT IT OR NOT THEIR DECISIONS AND POLICIES ON ACFT FUEL LOADS ARE BASED ON THE ECONOMICS OF THE INDUSTRY, NOT THE REALITIES OF THE ANTIQUATED ATC SYSTEM THAT DEMANDS MORE FUEL AS A RESULT OF THE AIRSPACE SATURATION CAUSING EXTENSIVE HOLDS AND DELAYS. MANDATE THAT ALL FLIGHTS GOING INTO ZZZ, ZZZ1, AND ZZZ2 BE GIVEN A DESIGNATED ALTERNATE REGARDLESS OF THE WEATHER CONDITIONS, PLUS ADDITIONAL HOLD FUEL. THIS WILL ADDRESS THE CONSISTENT HOLDING REQUIRED IN ORDER TO GAIN ACCESS TO THESE ARPTS. IN THE EVENT THAT THE HOLD TIMES ARE IN EXCESS OF OUR HOLD FUEL LOAD THEN DIVERT AS REQUIRED TO THE PLANNED DESIGNATED ARPT. THIS WAY YOU'RE NOT FLYING AROUND HOPING YOU DO NOT HAVE TO DECLARE EMER FUEL BECAUSE OF POOR FLT AND FUEL PLANNING.

Synopsis

AN EMB145 PLT DISCUSSES DIVERSIONS WHEN FLYING INTO ZZZ, ZZZ1, AND ZZZ2 WITH MINIMUM FUEL AND NO DESIGNATED ALTERNATE.

Time / Day

Date: 200710

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower Operator.Common Carrier: Charter Make Model Name: Learjet 55 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135

Operating Under FAR Part 1

Flight Phase.Landing: Roll

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Fuel System

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 50 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 3001 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 196

ASRS Report: 764199

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical Independent Detector. Other. Flight Crew A: 1

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE DEP, ENRTE AND DSCNT SEGMENTS OF THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ATC HOLDING US AT ALT LONGER THAN NORMAL WHICH REQUIRED A STEEP DSCNT TO THE TERMINAL AREA. DURING THE INITIAL APCH TO THE ARPT I PERFORMED THE APCH CHKLIST WHICH INCLUDES A FUEL CHK AND I NOTED THAT THERE WAS 500 LBS OF FUEL PER WING TANK AND THAT

THERE WAS APPROX 1400 LBS IN THE FUSELAGE TANK. THE GRAVITY FLOW LINE WAS NOT OPEN AND I CALLED THIS TO THE ATTN OF THE CAPT AND AT THAT TIME I OBSERVED THE CAPT MOVE THE GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH TO THE FORWARD POS (XFER) AND I VISUALLY CONFIRMED THAT THE VALVE OPENED (DISAGREEMENT LIGHT) AND NOTED THAT THE CHKLIST ITEM WAS COMPLETE AND PROCEEDED TO COMPLETE THE REMAINDER OF THE APCH CHKLIST. WE WERE CLRED BY ATC TO CONDUCT A VISUAL APCH WITH A SPD RESTR OF 170 KIAS AND HANDED OFF TO THE CTL TWR. WE WERE CLRED TO LAND AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO LAND AND EXIT MIDFIELD AT TXWY X. WE CONFIRMED THE CLRNC AND PROCEEDED TO LAND. AFTER LNDG THE CAPT APPLIED SPOILERS, MAX BRAKING AND THRUST REVERSERS BUT THAT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO STOP IN TIME TO MAKE A SAFE TURNOFF ON TXWY X. THE TWR IMMEDIATELY ISSUED AN INSTRUCTION TO MAKE A 180 DEG TURN AND EXPEDITE EXITING THE RWY AT TXWY X. AS WE WERE PROCEEDING TO ENTER A L TURN THE TWR CTLR INFORMED US THAT HE OBSERVED SMOKE COMING FROM THE R ENG. I LOOKED OUT MY R WINDOW AND OBSERVED WHITE SMOKE MOVING FORWARD ON THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT AS WE WERE PREPARING TO EXECUTE A L 180 DEG TURN. WE HAD NO INDICATION OF AN ENG FIRE ON THE FLT DECK. AS WE PROCEEDED INTO THE L 180 DEG TURN ON THE RWY THE CAPT ANNOUNCED THAT 'WE JUST LOST BOTH ENGS...' I LOOKED AT THE ENG GAUGES AND NOTED THE TURBINES WERE INDEED SPOOLING DOWN. THE TWR CTLR REPEATED HIS INSTRUCTION TO EXPEDITE OUR EXIT AND I INFORMED THE TWR THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO COMPLY. HE ASKED US TO CONFIRM UNABLE AND I CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE UNABLE. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO COMMUNICATE OUR STATUS AND THE TWR CTLR ASKED US IF WE NEEDED ASSISTANCE AND WE REPLIED THAT WE HAD NO INDICATION OF FIRE AND THAT WE WERE GOING TO TRY AND RESTART ONE OF THE ENGS SO AS TO EXIT ASAP. AT THAT TIME THE CAPT WAS ATTEMPTING TO RESTART THE R ENG. I MONITORED THE START AND CONFIRMED STAGNATION AND THE START WAS ABORTED. WE DISCUSSED WAITING BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO RESTART THE L ENG. THE ATTEMPT TO RESTART THE L ENG WAS ABORTED AS WELL. I INFORMED THE TWR THAT WE WOULD NEED A TOW OFF OF THE RWY. THE TWR TOLD US THAT HELP WAS ON THE WAY. THE TUG ARRIVED AND WE WERE OFF OF THE RWY IN 5-10 MINS. POSTFLT: AT THE TIME THE PAX WERE BEING ACCOMMODATED I WAS APCHED BY A LEAR MECH AND WE DISCUSSED WHAT COULD CAUSE BOTH ENGS TO FLAME OUT AT THE SAME TIME DURING A LNDG ROLL. I EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD USED MAX BRAKING AND THRUST REVERSE AND THAT WE HAD APPROX 250 LBS IN EACH MAIN FUEL TANK. I ASKED HIM IF IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE FUEL TO UNPORT UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS AND BRIEFLY DISCUSSED SCAVENGE PUMPS INSTALLED IN THE WING TANKS OF THE LEAR AND HOW THEY SHOULD PREVENT THAT. SOON THEREAFTER THE MECH ENTERED THE ACFT AND EXAMINED THE THRUST LEVERS. HE SAID IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE THRUST LEVERS TO MOVE PAST THE IDLE DETENT AND INTO CUTOFF IF THEY WERE NOT RIGGED PROPERLY. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE COMPANY IT WAS DETERMINED THAT POOR CRM AND FUEL MGMNT HAD LED TO A LOWER THAN NORMAL FUEL CONDITION WITH A RESULTING UNPORTING OF WING TANK FUEL UNDER HVY DECELERATION AND THAT WAS THE CAUSE OF THE ENG FLAMEOUTS. THE FACT THAT WE ACCEPTED A LAND SHORT INSTRUCTION FROM THE TWR THAT REQUIRED A MAX DECELERATION EFFORT WAS DISCUSSED AT LENGTH. ANALYSIS: IN THE AFTERMATH OF THIS INCIDENT I COULD NOT HELP FEEL THAT I WAS NOT GETTING A STRAIGHT ANSWER TO THE OBVIOUS QUESTION. HOW COULD BOTH ENGS FLAME OUT AT THE SAME TIME? ACCORDING TO THE CAPT THERE WAS 250 LBS OF FUEL IN EACH WING TANK AND EVEN WITH HARD DECELERATION AND SCAVENGE PUMPS SHOULD HAVE

TRIGGERED AND KICKED IN AT A LOW FUEL WARNING CONDITION. ACCORDING TO THE MECHS THAT EXAMINED THE ACFT THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE INSPECTION. IT WAS NOT UNTIL I WAS ON A SUBSEQUENT ROAD TRIP WITH ANOTHER CAPT THAT I STARTED TO GAIN INSIGHT INTO WHAT PROBABLY HAPPENED. HE SAID THAT OF THE 3 SWITCHES ON THE FUEL CTL PANEL THAT ARE USED TO MOVE FUEL TO AND FROM THE AFT FUSELAGE TANK THAT ONLY 1 HAS A DUAL FUNCTION. THIS WOULD BE THE FUSELAGE FUEL XFER/FILL AND IT HAS 3 POS. 1) CTR (CLOSED) -- VALVE XFER LINE IS CLOSED. 2) FORWARD (XFER) -- SEND FUEL FORWARD FROM THE FUSELAGE TANK TO THE WING TANKS. 3) REAR POS (FILL) -- XFER FUEL FROM THE WINGS TO THE FUSELAGE TANK. THE FUSELAGE XFER SWITCH IS RIGHT NEXT TO THE GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH AND TO TURN OFF THE GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH YOU HAVE TO MOVE IT TO THE REARWARD POS. IF SOMEONE WERE TO INADVERTENTLY MOVE THE SWITCH NEXT TO THE GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH TO THE REAR POS WITHOUT CONFIRMING THAT IT WAS INDEED THE GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH THEY WOULD BE IN EFFECT MOVING FUEL FROM THE MAIN TANKS AND TO THE REAR FUSELAGE TANK. THIS MIGHT EXPLAIN WHAT HAPPENED TO FUEL THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN LEFT IN THE WING TANKS AS A RESULT OF NOT BEING BURNED BY THE ENGS. CONCLUSION: OUR ULTIMATE CONCLUSION WAS THAT ONE OF US HAD INADVERTENTLY MOVED THE FUSELAGE FUEL XFER SWITCH TO THE REAR POS THINKING THAT IT WAS THE FUEL GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT IS WELL KNOWN AMONG LEARJET DRIVERS THAT THIS WAS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN INHERENT IN THE DESIGN OF AND DUAL FUNCTION BUILT INTO THIS SWITCH. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IT MATTERS NOT WHO DID WHAT BUT WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED AND HOW CAN THIS BE PREVENTED IN THE FUTURE OP OF THE LEARJET. RECOMMENDATION: THE FUEL CTL PANEL IN THE LEARJET ONLY HAS 1 SWITCH THAT PROVIDES AN ANNUNCIATION ON THE CAP (CENTRAL ANNUNCIATOR PANEL) WHEN IT IS OPENED. THAT SWITCH CTLS THE CROSS FLOW VALVE. WHEN THE CROSS FLOW VALVE IS OPENED IT TURNS ON A GREEN LIGHT ON THE CAP (CENTRAL ANNUNCIATOR PANEL). I RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ITEMS BE ROLLED INTO 1 MANDATORY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE FOR THE LEARJET MODEL 35/55. 1) MODIFY THE LEAR TO INDICATE ON THE CAP WHEN THE FUSELAGE TANK XFER LINE VALVE IS IN THE FILL POS. THE LIGHT SHOULD BE AMBER. 2) THE SAME AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE SHOULD REQUIRE THE VALVE TO CLOSE WHEN ANY ENG IS IN OP AND THE FUEL LEVEL IN ANY 1 WING TANK FALLS BELOW A CERTAIN LEVEL (FUEL LOW THRESHOLD QUANTITY?) 3) THE AMBER FUEL LOW WARNING LIGHT ON THE CAP SHOULD TRIGGER THE MWS (MAIN WARNING SYS) TO ALERT BOTH PLTS OF A LOW FUEL CONDITION AND IT SHOULD BE RED, NOT AMBER. (THE LEAR 35 HAS A RED CAP LIGHT DURING A LOW FUEL CONDITION AND FOR SOME REASON THE LEAR 55 DOES NOT.) CURRENTLY ON THE LEAR 55 THE AMBER LOW FUEL WARNING LIGHT IS LOCATED ON THE UPPER L POS OF THE CAP AND IS CLOSER TO THE CAPT'S SCAN THAN THAT OF THE PLT IN THE R SEAT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER BELIEVES THAT FUEL WAS BEING TRANSFERRED FROM THE WINGS TO THE FUSELAGE DURING THE LAST FEW MINUTES OF THE APPROACH AND MAY HAVE LED TO FUEL EXHAUSTION DURING THE QUICK STOP. THESE TWO SWITCHES LOOK ALIKE AND WORK IN THE SAME WAY, MAKING THEM EASY TO MIX UP.

Synopsis

LEAR FO REPORTS DUAL ENGINE FLAME OUT AFTER MAX EFFORT STOP. FUEL STARVATION IS SUSPECTED.

Time / Day

Date: 200711

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 135 ER&LR Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Ground: Preflight

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

ASRS Report: 763802

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Company Policies Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken: Unable

Assessments

Problem Areas: Company

Situations

Narrative

THE DISPATCHER ADVISED ME THAT 'MGMNT' HAS DIRECTED ALL DISPATCHERS NOT TO MAKE ANY CHANGES TO THE PREPLANNED AND GREATLY REDUCED HOLDING FUEL. THIS NEW HOLDING FUEL POLICY WAS RECENTLY INITIATED TO REDUCE HOLDING FUEL TO HALF THAT WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY USED --WITHOUT THE ADVICE OF THE FLT CREWS. THIS IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN AS MANY ARE UNAWARE OF THE SHORTING OF HOLD FUEL IN THEIR RELEASE. RELEASE FOR FLT PULLED BY GATE AGENTS AND BROUGHT TO ACFT FOR QUICK TURN. NOTICED HOLDING FUEL LIMITED TO 10 MINS. UNWILLING TO ACCEPT ONLY 10 MINS OF HOLD FUEL ON FLTS IN AND OUT OF THIS AREA DUE

TO REGULAR ATC DELAYS ON FLT IN PREVIOUS WKS. CONTACTED DISPATCHER AND ASKED FOR 20 MINS OF HOLD FUEL. DISPATCHER AGREED AND RELEASE WAS REPRINTED BY GATE FOLKS. WHEN REVIEWED IN COCKPIT, FOUND THAT DISPATCHER ADDED FUEL NOT IN HOLDING ROW BUT IN A 'CAPT ADD FUEL' ROW. AS THIS DID NOT REFLECT THE PLT/DISPATCHER AGREEMENT NOR THE PROPER COLUMN FOR THE NEED AS AGREED, I CONTACTED DISPATCH AND REFUSED THE RELEASE UNTIL THE FLT PAPERWORK WAS DISPATCHED PROPERLY TO REFLECT THE FUEL IN THE NEEDED COLUMN. COMPANY MGMNT MUST NOT INTERFERE IN CAPT'S AUTH NOR DRASTICALLY CHANGE THE PROFILE COMPANY HOLDING FUEL WITHOUT WIDELY PUBLICIZING THEIR INTENTIONS. DISPATCHERS MUST BE FREE TO DOCUMENT FUEL NEEDS IN THE APPROPRIATE COLUMNS WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM MGMNT.

Synopsis

E135 CAPTAIN REPORTS THAT, AFTER PREVIOUSLY CUTTING STANDARD FUEL RESERVES FOR HOLDING IN HALF, COMPANY NOW PRESSURES DISPATCHERS AND FLT CREWS TO NOT INCREASE DISPATCH FUEL FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS.

Time / Day

Date: 200711

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZID.ARTCC

State Reference: IN

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 36000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZID.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer Qualification.Pilot: Commercial

ASRS Report: 762768

Events

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Weather

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas: Environmental Factor

Problem Areas: Weather

Narrative

CRUISING ALONG TO ORD WITH INDIANAPOLIS ARTCC, THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO DSND FROM FL360 TO FL320. AFTER WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEW CLRNC BOTH THE CAPT AND I AGREED, IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY, THAT THE NEW CLRNC WOULD JEOPARDIZE CONSIDERABLY OUR FUEL RESERVES INTO THE DEST ARPT SINCE IT (ORD) WAS STILL 415 NM AWAY (HALFWAY ON THE RTE). AT THAT MOMENT THE FMS WAS SHOWING APPROXIMATELY 45 MINUTES OF FUEL OVERHEAD OUR DESTINATION AT FL360/MACH 73. A DSCNT WITH SPEED

CHANGES AND POSSIBLE VECTORING WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. WE TOLD THE CTLR WE WERE UNABLE TO ACCEPT FL320 BECAUSE THAT ALTITUDE AT THIS DISTANCE, WITH THE STRONGER THAN FORECAST HEADWINDS, WOULD BURN OUR FUEL RESERVE. WE EXPLAINED THE SITUATION TO HER, THAT THIS WAS TOO EARLY FOR US TO START DOWN DUE TO THE STRONG HEADWINDS, TO WHICH SHE REPLIED THAT THEY ALWAYS DID THIS KIND OF DSCNT THIS FAR AWAY EVERY DAY FOR THE RTE OF FLT INTO ORD AND THAT OUR REQUEST WOULD REQUIRE A LOT COORD BETWEEN HER AND THE NEXT SECTORS ALONG OUR ROUTE. SHE THEN AMENDED OUR CLRNC TO STAY UP AT FL360 AND TO SWITCH OUR FREQ TO THE NEXT CTLR. AFTER WE SWITCHED AND CHECKED-IN THE NEW CTLR GAVE US A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL THE ARTCC QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPT. IN ALL HONESTY WE WERE SHOCKED BY THIS AND QUERIED HER IF THAT WAS REALLY NECESSARY: SHE REPLIED THAT HER SUPERVISOR WANTED TO TALK TO US BUT SHE DIDN'T HAVE A PROBLEM WITH US FROM HER END. WE COPIED THE CLRNC AND CONTINUED ON OUR WAY TO ORD. WE NEVER DECLARED MIN FUEL STATUS BUT IF WE HAD TAKEN THE NEW ALTITUDE WE WOULD HAVE BEEN FORCED TO DECLARE IT AND WE MAY HAVE ENDED UP SOMEWHERE ELSE INSTEAD OF OUR DEST. THE OTHER SUBSEQUENT CTLRS (IN CHICAGO ARTCC) WERE VERY HELPFUL AND ACCOMMODATED OUR REQUEST HELPING US OUT A LOT AND KEEPING SAFETY IN MIND. WE DECIDED TO STAY UP AT ALTITUDE TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE FUEL RESERVE IN ACCORDANCE WITH FAR'S. WE UNDERSTAND THERE ARE LETTERS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN ARTCC FACILITIES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE EXPEDITIOUS FLOW OF TFC INTO MAJOR ARPTS AND HELP CTLR WORKLOAD, BUT THE EFFICIENCY OF THESE AGREEMENTS ARE QUESTIONABLE (AT BEST) IN HELPING USER ACFT CONSERVE FUEL. THE DECISION WAS MADE IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY, SINCE THE FUEL WAS ADEQUATE TO DISPATCH BUT THE UNUSUALLY STRONG HEADWINDS CHANGED OUR FUEL SITUATION FORCING THE CAPT TO MAKE A COMMAND DECISION TO KEEP THE SAFETY OF OUR PAX AHEAD OF ANYTHING ELSE. I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH CTLRS, THEY DO AN OUTSTANDING JOB. IN OUR CASE THE CHANGE OF 'ROUTINE' THAT OUR SITUATION PRESENTED GAVE US THE IMPRESSION THAT IT ANNOYED THE CTLR SINCE SHE HAD TO COORDINATE WITH THE SUBSEQUENT SECTORS IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE US. OUR CLRNC WAS ISSUED 415 NM AWAY FROM ORD!!! THIS IS FLYING OUR RTE WITHOUT ANY SHORTCUTS. FLYING AROUND WITH 50 PAX THAT FAR AWAY IN THE LOW 30'S TO HIGH 20'S BURNS A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF FUEL AND ON TOP OF THAT THE STRONG HEADWINDS COMPLICATE THE SITUATION FURTHER. MAYBE THE ARR NEEDS TO BE REVISED OR ALTERNATE MEANS OF ARR DEVISED WHEN AN ACFT FALLS INTO THIS SITUATION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT THE FORECAST CRUISE WINDS WERE IN ERROR, AND THE ACTUAL HEADWIND COMPONENT ENCOUNTERED WAS AT LEAST 30 KTS GREATER THAN FORECAST. NO ALTERNATE FUEL WAS REQUIRED OR BOARDED. RPTR STATED THAT ON SOME OCCASIONS, ADDITIONAL FUEL FOR CONTINGENCIES ONLY ALLOWS FOR AS LITTLE AS 5 MINS ADDITIONAL FLT TIME OVER THE 45 MIN FAR REQUIRED RESERVE FUEL. APPARENTLY, IT IS NOT UNCOMMON FOR THE FLT DISPATCHER TO QUESTION THE CAPT IF HE FEELS IT NECESSARY TO ADD FUEL.

Synopsis

EMB 145 ENCOUNTERED HEADWINDS GREATER THAN FORECAST, AND THE REDUCED FUEL SITUATION RESULTED IN THEIR INABILITY TO ACCEPT AN EARLY DESCENT TO ACCOMMODATE ATC.

Time / Day

Date: 200711

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 31000

Environment

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A319

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 100 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 25000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 2000

ASRS Report: 760315

Events

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Turbulence

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action. Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

CLBING OUT ATC ADVISED US RIDES WERE MODERATE TURB TIL E OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER, AND WE SHOULD STAY AT FL310. I BRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO EXPECT TURBULENCE AS WE HAD TO CLB TO SAVE FUEL. BY THE TIME WE WERE AT FL390 WE DID NOT HAVE A COMFORTABLE FUEL RESERVE. I ADVISED ATC AND SENT DISPATCH AN ACARS MESSAGE TO THAT EFFECT AND ASKED DISPATCH TO SEE IF THEY COULD GET US DIRECT TO ZZZ1. THERE WAS QUITE SOME DELAY IN DISPATCH'S RESPONSE SO I TOLD ATC WE WERE 'MIN FUEL' AND NEEDED TO GO STRAIGHT TO ZZZ1 INSTEAD OF VOR AND THE ARRIVAL. THAT WAS APPROVED AND WE WERE HANDED OFF TO ANOTHER CTLR,

WHO SAID HE COULDN'T LET US GO DIRECT. HE ASKED FOR OUR INTENTIONS AND I SAID I'LL GET BACK TO YOU IN A MINUTE. I THEN SENT AN ACARS TO DISPATCH ASKING WHERE THEY WANTED ME TO DIVERT TO FOR FUEL. THERE WAS NO RESPONSE FROM DISPATCH FOR SOME TIME SO I MADE THE DECISION TO LAND AT ZZZ, AND SENT DISPATCH ANOTHER ACARS TO THAT EFFECT. WE WERE HANDED OFF TO ANOTHER CTLR WHO ASKED IF WE COULD GO TO ZZZ1 IF WE WENT ON A DIFFERENT ARRIVAL. I SAID YES AND WE WERE RECLRED. APPARENTLY SOMEONE DECLARED AN EMER ON MY BEHALF WITHOUT INFORMING ME, EVEN THOUGH I WAS VERY SPECIFIC THAT WE WERE MIN FUEL, NO EMER. WE LANDED AT ZZZ1 WITH 4000 LBS WHEREAS THE ORIGINAL ARRIVAL WOULD HAVE HAD US LAND WITH LESS THAN 3000 LBS.

Synopsis

AN A319 CAPT DECLARED MIN FUEL WHEN TURB AT HIGHER ALTS FORCED A LOWER CRUISE ALT AND INCREASED THEIR FUEL BURN.

Time / Day

Date: 200710

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 6500

Environment

Flight Conditions: IMC Weather Elements: Ice Weather Elements: Rain Weather Elements: Snow

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: ZZZ.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-700 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Function. Oversight: PIO ASRS Report: 757453

Events

Anomaly. Inflight Encounter: Weather

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action. Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : FAA

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Weather

Situations

Narrative

FLT PLANS ARE ISSUED, ACCORDING TO WRITTEN GUIDANCE, WITHOUT REGARD FOR THE REALITY OF THE DAY. FUEL PLANNING ALLOWS FOR MINIMUM CHANGE. FLT PLANS ARE NEVER FLOWN ACCORDING TO THE WRITTEN PLAN AS TO ALT,

RTE, SPD WHICH ALL CHANGE IN ACTUAL FLT. OTHER CARRIERS CONVINCE COMMERCIAL RADIO TO DEMAND AND FORCE CHANGES IN FLT WHICH THE FLT PLAN DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. A COMBINATION OF MINIMUM FUEL FLT PLANNING WITH UNREALISTIC FLT PLANS COMBINE TO CREATE HAZARDOUS FUEL SITUATIONS. ON THE FLT TO ZZZ THE ALTERNATE IS LISTED AS 'NIL' AND WHEN DISPATCH IS QUERIED STATES THAT THE PLAN IS BASED ON THE TAF AND THIS IS ALL THAT IS REQUIRED. I REQUESTED AND RECEIVED AN EXTRA 1000 LBS OF FUEL AND UPON ARR INTO THE ZZZ AREA WE WERE REQUIRED TO CONDUCT AN IFR LETDOWN TO AN ILS TO RWY 34 IN ICING CONDITIONS AND WHEN WE BROKE OUT AT 6500 FT FOUND OURSELVES IN A SNOW SHOWER SITUATION.

Synopsis

B737 CAPTAIN FEELS ACR FLT PLANS FAIL TO REFLECT REAL WORLD FUEL REQUIREMENTS.

Time / Day

Date: 200710

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Environment

Flight Conditions: IMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: SF 340B

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope: N/A

Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Route In Use. Approach: Instrument Precision

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer Qualification.Pilot: Commercial

ASRS Report: 756558

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot: ATP ASRS Report: 756557

Events

Anomaly. Inflight Encounter: Weather

Anomaly.Non Adherence.Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 2

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Executed Missed Approach Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Assessments

Problem Areas: Navigational Facility

Problem Areas: Weather

Narrative

WHILE ENRTE TO ZZZ, THE LCL ASOS WAS RPTING 200 FT OVCST AND 1 SM VISIBILITY. WE WERE VECTORED AND CLRED BY CTR FOR THE ILS XX. UPON REACHING DECISION ALT, THE CAPT ADVISED 'NO CONTACT, GAR' AND WE EXECUTED THE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH PROC. AFTER CONTACTING CTR AND ENTERING THE HOLD, THE CAPT CONTACTED DISPATCH, AND THEY DETERMINED THAT WE HAD ENOUGH FUEL TO ATTEMPT THE ILS XX AT ZZZ ONE MORE TIME AND THEN DIVERT TO THE FILED ALTERNATE OF ZZZ1. WE THEN ADVISED CTR THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO TRY THE APCH AGAIN, AT WHICH POINT WE WERE CLRED AGAIN FOR THE ILS AT ZZZ. AFTER REACHING DECISION ALT ON THE SECOND ATTEMPT, THE CAPT AGAIN ADVISED ME TO GO AROUND, AND WE EXECUTED THE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH AND HOLD. THE CAPT THEN CONTACTED DISPATCH AGAIN, AT WHICH POINT WE WERE ADVISED TO DIVERT TO ZZZ2. IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE REASON WE COULD NOT DIVERT TO ZZZ1 AS PLANNED, WAS BECAUSE NO STATION PERSONNEL WERE AVAILABLE TO MEET THE FLT. WHEN WE PICKED UP THE ASOS AT ZZZ2 WHILE ENRTE, THE CEILING WAS RPTED AS 400 FT OVCST. THE ONLY APCH AVAILABILITY WITH MINIMUMS BELOW 400 FT WAS THE ILS XX. AFTER BEING VECTORED AND CLRED FOR THE ILS XY AT ZZZ2 BY CTR, I NOTIFIED THE CAPT THAT WE WERE NOT YET PICKING UP THE LOC. WE BOTH CONFIRMED THAT WE HAD THE PROPER FREQ SET IN NAV #1 AND NAV #2. THE CAPT THEN NOTIFIED CTR OF THE PROB. THE CTLR THEN CHKED NOTAMS AND DID NOT FIND ANY NOTAM ABOUT THE ILS RWY XY BEING OTS. HE THEN TOLD US THAT HE MADE A NOTAM ABOUT THE ILS BEING OTS. THE CAPT THEN CONTACTED DISPATCH ONCE AGAIN, AS OUR FUEL WAS STARTING TO GET LOW, AND THE DISPATCHER NOTIFIED THE CAPT THAT WE SHOULD DIVERT TO ZZZ3 WHERE THE SKIES WERE RPTED TO BE CLR. CTR CLRED US DIRECT TO ZZZ3. WHILE ENRTE, WE PULLED THE PWR BACK TO MAINTAIN THE LONG RANGE CRUISE SPD INDICATED ON THE EADI, AND STARTED A SLOW CLB, BOTH TO CONSERVE FUEL. THE CAPT NOTIFIED CTR THAT WE WERE GOING TO BE LNDG WITH LESS THAN HALF AN HR OF FUEL ON BOARD, AND THE CTLR SAID THAT HE WOULD NOTIFY ATC SO THEY 'WON'T PUT YOU BEHIND SOMEBODY ELSE.' WHILE STILL ENRTE, THE 'R LOW LEVEL' LIGHT ILLUMINATED ON THE OVERHEAD PANEL. THE CAPT RAN THE QRH PROC FOR THE LIGHT. A FEW MINS LATER, THE 'L LOW LEVEL' LIGHT CAME ON, AS WELL. AFTER BEING HANDED OFF TO ZZZ3 APCH, THE CTLR ASKED US IF WE WERE AN EMER, AS ATC AT ZZZ3 WAS CLOSING IN ABOUT 3 MINS (BUT WOULD STAY OPEN IF WE WERE AN EMER). THE CAPT THEN INFORMED THE CTLR THAT WE WERE INDEED DECLARING AN EMER, AND THE CTLR CLRED US STRAIGHT IN. THE CTLR ALSO ADVISED US THAT HE WAS GOING TO ROLL THE TRUCKS AS STANDARD PROC. ONCE WE HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT, WE WERE CLRED TO LAND, AND THE FLT ENDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. AFTER SHUTTING DOWN THE ACFT, WE HAD APPROX 350-400 LBS TOTAL OF FUEL REMAINING IN THE FUEL TANKS. AFTER ABOUT AN HR ON THE GND AT ZZZ3, WE DEPARTED BACK TO ZZZ4 UNEVENTFULLY. THE LOW FUEL CONDITION AND SUBSEQUENT EMER LNDG WERE A DIRECT RESULT OF THE ILS AT ZZZ2 BEING UNKNOWINGLY OTS. UNTIL WE WERE VECTORED ONTO THE APCH, NOBODY (FLT CREW, DISPATCHER, ATC) KNEW THAT THE ILS WAS NOT OPERATING PROPERLY. HAD THE ILS BEEN OPERATING CORRECTLY WITH THE RPTED WX AT THE FIELD, THE FLT COULD HAVE LANDED AT ZZZ2 AS A NORMAL DIVERTED FLT.

Synopsis

SF340 FLT CREW REPORTS WEATHER DIVERSION AFTER TWO ATTEMPTS TO LAND AT DESTINATION AND DIVERSION TO SECOND ALTERNATE AFTER LOC FAILURE AT FIRST ALTERNATE. LOW FUEL EMERGENCY IS DECLARED.

Time / Day

Date : 200709 Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 135 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Descent: Holding

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot: ATP ASRS Report: 754929

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed As Precaution

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Company

Narrative

ONCE AGAIN DISPATCH SHORT CHANGING US ON FUEL ON A VFR DAY. DEPARTED WITH APPROX 6500 LBS. HAD STEP CLBS OUT DUE TO TFC ABOVE. LEVEL AT 8000 FT FOR A WHILE, THEN LEVEL AT 13000 FT FOR ANOTHER WHILE, THEN CLB TO 17000 FT AND LEVEL THERE FOR QUITE SOME TIME. THEN OUR FINAL CRUISE ALTITUDE WAS FL330 INSTEAD OF FL370, ONCE AGAIN DUE TO TFC. GOT INTO ZZZ1 AIRSPACE AND THEY GAVE US DIRECT. NEXT FREQ TOLD US TO EXPECT HOLDING. CALCULATED FUEL AND WE HAD APPROX ENOUGH TO HOLD FOR 10

MIN. TRIED TO GET SOME HELP FROM DISPATCH, AND IT TOOK ABOUT 10 MINS FOR THEM TO REPLY DUE TO SHIFT CHANGE. BY THAT TIME WE WERE HOLDING AND DECIDED TO DECLARE AN EMER. SINCE WE HAD NO ALTERNATE ON FILE WE DECIDED TO GO TO ZZZ, OUR FINAL DEST. LANDED UNEVENTFUL WITH APPROX 1300 LBS, SHORT TAXI TO GATE. FLT WAS PLANED WITH ONLY 15 MIN OF HOLD FUEL AND 400 LBS OF FUEL ADDED BY DISPATCH, VFR DAY BUT FLYING INTO ZZZ ON A SUNDAY AFTERNOON. THE HOLDING WAS DUE TO VOLUME AND NOT WX. I GUESS THIS IS AN UNEXPECTED DELAY! AFTER RECEIVING HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS WE DETERMINED WE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO HOLD AND THEN CONTINUE TO THE DEST. NO ALTERNATE WAS REQUIRED DUE TO CLR SKIES AT ZZZ. SO WE DECLARED MINIMUM FUEL, WHILE TRYING TO CONTACT DISPATCH TO SEE WERE THEY WANTED US TO GO, THAT TOOK A WHILE AND WE DECLARED AN EMER DUE TO LOW FUEL, AND WANTED TO CONTINUE TO ZZZ. WE DECLARED AN EMER AND PROCEEDED TO ZZZ AS AN EMER ACFT. LANDED UNEVENTFUL AND TAXIED TO GATE AFTER VACATING THE RWY, NO ASSISTANCE WAS REQUIRED FROM CFR PERSONNEL. THERE SHOULD BE A MINIMUM OF 30 MIN HOLD FUEL FOR EVERY FLT OPERATING INTO ZZZ. ANY MINOR HICCUP AND ZZZ TFC GOES INTO HOLDING, WX BEEN A FACTOR OR NOT.

Synopsis

AN RJ135 WAS GIVEN HOLDING ENRTE TO ZZZ WITH MIN FUEL, NO ALTERNATE, AND NO DELAY FUEL. CREW DECLARED AN EMER FOR EXPEDITED FLT TO ZZZ.

Time / Day

Date: 200709

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 20000

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Climbout: Intermediate Altitude

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Fuel Booster Pump

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC ASRS Report: 754118

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

ASRS Report: 754117

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical Independent Detector. Other. Flight Crew A : 1 Independent Detector. Other. Flight Crew B : 2

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action.Other Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Fault Isolation

Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Narrative

DURING CLBOUT CREW OBSERVED FUEL NOT FEEDING PROPERLY FROM CTR TANK. USING QRH FOR ABNORMAL PROC, CREW DETERMINED CTR FUEL WOULD BE UNUSABLE FOR THE REMAINDER OF FLT. CREW DECLARED EMER FOR OVERWT LNDG WITH ATC AND REQUESTED EMER EQUIP TO MONITOR LNDG. REQUESTED RWY 14R ALTHOUGH NOT CURRENTLY BEING USED FOR LNDGS. RETURNED TO ZZZ FOR UNEVENTFUL LNDG. DURING QRH PROC CREW NOTICED 2 AFT CTR PUMP CIRCUIT BREAKERS TRIPPED. FOLLOWING PROC WITH ALL MAIN TANK PUMPS OFF, INLET FUEL PRESSURE LIGHTS FLASHED. AS ALL MAIN FUEL PUMPS WERE TURNED BACK ON ACFT VIBRATED SLIGHTLY. FLT ATTENDANT LATER RPTED ABNORMAL NOISE OR BUMP SOUND FROM REAR OF ACFT, POSSIBLY L SIDE ENG AREA. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THIS SAME ACFT HAD PREVIOUS ISSUES WITH THE CENTER TANK FUEL PUMP CIRCUIT BREAKERS. HOWEVER, DURING THEIR CLIMBOUT, THEY DID NOTICE FUEL FEED PROBLEM AND THE TRIPPED CIRCUIT BREAKERS. THEY DID NOT TRY AND DID NOT WANT TO RESET THE CENTER PUMP C/B'S. AFTER DECLARING AN EMERGENCY AND RETURNING TO THE FIELD, REPORTER BELIEVES MAINT CHANGED ONE OF THE CENTER FUEL PUMPS. REPORTER ALSO STATED WHEN HIS CARRIER DE-ACTIVATED THE LOW FUEL LEVEL LIGHT INDICATION ON THE TANK GAUGES AND WITH THE ONGOING PROBLEMS OF INACCURATE FUEL QUANTITY, THE FLIGHT CREWS ARE NOT ALWAYS SURE WHAT THEY HAVE LEFT IN THE TANKS.

Synopsis

AN MD80 FLIGHT CREW NOTICED FUEL NOT FEEDING PROPERLY FROM CENTER TANK. TWO AFT CENTER PUMP CIRCUIT BREAKERS TRIPPED. EMERGENCY DECLARED.

Time / Day

Date: 200709 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1800

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Operator.General Aviation: Personal Make Model Name: Experimental Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Fuel Line, Fittings, & Connectors

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Qualification.Pilot : ATP Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 25 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 16000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 30

ASRS Report: 753552

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical Independent Detector. Other. Flight Crew A: 1

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Consequence.Other: Aircraft Damaged

Consequence. Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative

AFTER NORMAL PREFLT, TAXI, TAKEOFF, AND CLB TO 1800 FT MSL, APPROX 8 MILES FROM ARPT ENGINE BEGAN TO LOSE PWR. ONLY SUITABLE FIELD WAS A MATURE SOYBEAN FIELD APPROX 3 FEET DEEP. AFTER QUICK EMER CHK OF FUEL AND ELECTRIC, PLT MADE LNDG IN SAID FIELD CAUSING DAMAGE TO PROPELLER AND LNDG GEAR. INCIDENT, AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR PART 830-5, EXEMPTS THIS BEING RPTED. REASON FOR THIS RPT IS IN INTEREST OF SAFETY, IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT APPROX 3000 KITS FOR THIS AIRPLANE WAS SOLD IN THE LATE 70'S AND 80'S OF WHICH APPROX 300 WERE COMPLETED, AFTER INCIDENT. INVESTIGATION REVEALED PROBABLE CAUSE OF POWER FAILURE WAS DUE TO FUEL EXHAUSTION -- CAUSED BY A FORM FITTING AT THE FUEL INLET PORT (FUEL PUMP BODY CONSTRUCTION WAS OF BAKELITE PLASTIC). THE FUEL PUMP WAS MOUNTED DIRECTLY TO THE CARBURETOR MADE OF CAST ALUMINUM BOTH OF WHICH WERE PAINTED GRAY. FITTING FAILURE CAUSED BY AGE AND VIBRATION (25 YEARS OLD AT BEST ESTIMATE, 230 HRS FLT TIME). FUEL PUMP FITTING WAS FOUND TO BE VERY BRITTLE. OTHERS IN THE FIELD ARE PROBABLY IN THE SAME CONDITION. THIS PUMP WAS INSTALLED ON A CONVERTED ONAN STATIONARY GENERATOR ENGINE. IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY TO ANY LIGHT AIRPLANE FLOWN IN THE FALL, HARVEST TIME OF YEAR, A SAFETY CIRCULAR OR POSTER HIGHLIGHTING THE DIFFICULTY OF AN OFF ARPT LNDG, WOULD BE OF BENEFIT TO PLTS UNFAMILIAR WITH AGRICULTURAL CROPS (SOY BEANS 3 FT TALL STOP AN AIRPLANE IMMEDIATELY).

Synopsis

AN EXPERIMENTAL EXPERIENCED FUEL EXHAUSTION AFTER A 25 YR OLD PLASTIC FUEL PUMP INLET CONNECTOR FAILED.

Time / Day

Date: 200708

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-700 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Route In Use.Arrival.STAR: ZZZ

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Landing Gear

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function Oversight: RIC

Function.Oversight: PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 155

ASRS Report: 750285

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Company

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS THE CAPT OF FLT X TO ZZZ. FLT WAS BOOKED FULL, WITH MEL LNDG GEAR LOCKED IN THE DOWN POS. THIS WAS AN UNSCHEDULED ACFT CHANGE. UPON ARRIVING AT THE GATE THERE WAS CONFUSION AS TO WHETHER WE WOULD FERRY THE ACFT OR REVENUE THE ACFT TO ZZZ FOR FURTHER MAINT. AFTER

CONTACTING DISPATCH, WHO CONTACTED THE DUTY MGR, THE DECISION WAS MADE TO CARRY PAX AND FLY WITH THE GEAR DOWN PER THE MEL. THE FIRST DISPATCH RELEASE DID NOT HAVE THE MEL LISTED. DISPATCH WAS NOTIFIED AND A NEW RELEASE WAS ISSUED. ALTHOUGH FUEL WAS ADDED FOR THE MEL, THE FLT WAS FILED AT 340 KTS TAS. DISPATCH NOTIFIED AGAIN. DURING THIS CONVERSATION WITH THE DISPATCHERS I ASKED IF THEY HAD A 'GEAR DOWN' FLT PROFILE. NO PROFILE WAS FOUND, ALTHOUGH WE DID DISCUSS THE 'GEAR DOWN, LONG RANGE CRUISE' PROFILE CHARTS IN THE PERFORMANCE SECTION OF THE OPS MANUAL. THE FUEL FLOWS LISTED IN THIS SECTION CLOSELY MATCHED THE FUEL CONSUMPTION THAT DISPATCH HAD PLANNED. I VOICED MY CONCERN THAT ANY ATC DIRECTED DEVS FROM THE FLT PROFILE DUE TO THE SLOW CRUISE AIRSPD OF THE FLT WOULD VOID THE FUEL PLAN. DISPATCH STATED THEY WOULD CONTACT ATC AND NOTIFY THEM OF THE SITUATION. I THEN COMPARED THE FUEL FLOW FIGURES FROM THE FILED CRUISE ALT AND THE LOWEST LISTED ALT (17000 FT) AND NOTED THAT THERE WAS ONLY A SLIGHT INCREASE IN FUEL FLOW AT THE LOWER ALT, LEAVING ME TO BELIEVE THAT IF THE FLT WAS FORCED TO STAY AT A LOWER ALT (17000 FT) THE ENTIRE WAY TO ZZZ, THERE WOULD ONLY BE A CORRESPONDINGLY SLIGHT INCREASE IN TOTAL FUEL CONSUMPTION. PRIOR TO BOARDING I WENT TO THE GATE AREA AND USED THE PA SYS TO EXPLAIN THE SITUATION TO THE PAX AND THAT THE GEAR WOULD BE LOCKED DOWN THE ENTIRE FLT, RESULTING IN A NOISIER AND BUMPIER FLT THAN NORMAL. I THEN DISCUSSED THE FLT WITH THE FO REGARDING FUEL CONSUMPTION, PAX COMFORT AND PERFORMANCE ISSUES INCLUDING LOSS OF ENG WITH GEAR DOWN. THE FO NOTIFIED CLRNC DELIVERY OF OUR AIRSPD AND CLRNC DELIVERY SAID THEY WOULD PASS THE INFO ALONG. THE OPS AGENT HAD TO ADJUST THE PAX LOAD AND USE CHILD WTS TO BRING THE ACFT BELOW ATOG DUE TO THE INCREASED FUEL LOAD. THE GND TIME WAS HECTIC. TALKING WITH MAINT AND DISPATCH, DEALING WITH A NEEDY 'A' FLT ATTENDANT AND A SKITTISH OPS AGENT WAS TIME CONSUMING. ATC HANDLED THE TAXI, TKOF AND CLB PORTIONS OF THE FLT VERY EXPEDITIOUSLY. CTR CHANGED THE ARR TO SHORTEN THE RTE. THE FUEL BURN AT TOP OF CLB AND OVER AND ENRTE MATCHED THE FLT PLAN EXACTLY. PRIOR TO LEAVING THE AREA BEHIND, I WANTED TO BE SURE THAT THE FUEL CONSUMPTION WAS AS PLANNED. APPROX 200 NM FROM ZZZ ATC GAVE THE FLT A DSCNT CLRNC. THE FO REQUESTED THAT WE STAY AT ALT, BUT ATC MADE ALL THE REMAINING DSCNT CLRNCS MANDATORY. THE FUEL OVER THE NEXT VOR WAS 100 LBS LESS THAN WHAT THE FLT PLAN INDICATED SHOULD BE REMAINING. THEN A MANDATORY DSCNT TO 17000 FT WAS GIVEN. THE FUEL FLOW AT 17000 FT WAS MUCH HIGHER THAN AT ALT AND FAR EXCEEDED THE FUEL FLOWS LISTED IN THE OPS MANUAL PERFORMANCE SECTION. THE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT CALLED THE COCKPIT TWICE DURING DSCNT TO REQUEST GATE INFO. THE WINDS AT ZZZ HAD SHIFTED FROM EASTERLY TO WESTERLY AND WERE GUSTING TO 17 KTS, NECESSITATING A LNDG TO THE W. CONTACTED DISPATCH TO LET THEM KNOW ATC WAS FORCING THE FLT LOWER, WHICH WAS CONSUMING MORE FUEL. THEN WE GOT A CLRNC TO CROSS 15 NM W OF XXX INTXN AT 10000 FT. THE FO REQUESTED TO STAY AT ALT BUT THE REQUEST WAS DENIED. THE HIGHER THAN PLANNED FUEL CONSUMPTION AT THE LOWER ALTS AND FUEL CONSUMPTION REQUIRED AT 10000 FT WOULD HAVE MEANT AN UNACCEPTABLE ARR FUEL AT ZZZ. A FUEL EMER WAS DECLARED AND THE ACFT WAS LEVELED AT 16000 FT AND PROCEEDED DIRECT TO ZZZ. WITH ATIS WINDS NOW LIGHT AND VARIABLE, MADE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG AT ZZZ. FUEL AT THE GATE WAS 4200 LBS. I SHOULD HAVE ADDED MORE FUEL EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD HAVE MEANT PULLING MORE PAX. THE FUEL FIGURES ON THE FLT PLAN APPEARED TO BE

SOUND BUT HAVING NEVER FLOWN WITH THE GEAR DOWN, I DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO EXPECT AND SHOULD HAVE PLANNED FOR THE WORST CASE. GET MORE PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THIS ABNORMAL SITUATION. I WANTED TO TALK WITH SOMEONE THAT HAD FLOWN GEAR DOWN OR HAD KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT TO EXPECT. HAVE A BRIEFING FOR THIS SPECIAL FLT OP. DEVELOP A GEAR DOWN FLT PROFILE DETAILING CLB AND DSCNT SPDS AND RATES. PLAN THIS FLT FOR WORST CASE SCENARIO. AT AN AIRSPD BELOW 220 KTS, I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT VECTORS OFF COURSE AND THE INEVITABLE LOWER ALT. SHOULD WE HAVE KNOWN THE FLT WOULD BE GIVEN LOWER ALTS SO FAR FROM THE FIELD? LIST THE OPC, MEL GEAR DOWN CRUISE PAGE AS A REF TOOL, PERHAPS AS AN MEL STEP. CHK THE FUEL FLOW SPECS. THEY MATCHED THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ACFT AT FL230 EXACTLY, BUT AT THE LOWER ALTS THE REQUIRED FUEL FLOWS WERE HIGHER THAN PUBLISHED. IN THE QRH LNDG GEAR SECTION LIST THE OPC, MEL GEAR DOWN CRUISE PAGE AS A REF. GEAR LEVER WILL NOT MOVE UP AFTER TKOF IS ONE POSSIBLE LOCATION.

Synopsis

A B737 FLT CREW OPERATING AS A PASSENGER FLIGHT WITH THE LANDING GEAR INOP IN THE EXTENDED POSITION FOUND THE FUEL FLOW TO EXCEED THE BOOK VALUES, AND DECLARED A FUEL EMERGENCY TO EXPEDITE THEIR ARRIVAL HANDLING AT DESTINATION.

Time / Day

Date: 200708

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Climbout: Takeoff

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Powerplant Fuel Valve

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot Qualification.Pilot: Instrument Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine Qualification.Pilot: Private

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 20 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 30000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 400

ASRS Report: 749544

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action. Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance Problem Areas : Passenger Human Performance

Narrative

ACFT PREFLT CHKS WERE COMPLETED, INCLUDING VISUAL CONFIRMATION THAT THE MAIN FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE WAS IN THE OPEN POS. THE PLT AND PAX BOARDED THE ACFT FOR A PLEASURE FLT. THE PAX PARTIALLY EXITED THE ACFT TO RETRIEVE THE PLT'S FLYING GLASSES, BUT REMAINED IN THE ACFT WHILE THE PLT EXITED TO ATTEND TO THE GLASSES. THE PLT RE-BOARDED THE ACFT, AND ENG START WAS NORMAL. TAXI OPS AND ENG RUN-UP WERE NORMAL. ON TKOF, THE ENG LOST SIGNIFICANT PWR APPROX 10-15 SECONDS (AFTER APPLICATION OF FULL PWR) AT 15-20 FT ALT, AND APPROX 100 KTS AIRSPD WITH GEAR IN TRANSITION UP. THE RWY IS PAVED, 3000 FT IN LENGTH WITH A 1500 FT RUN-OUT, NESTLED IN A SMALL VALLEY WITH TREES AND PWR LINES AT BOTH ENDS. LOSS OF ENG PWR OCCURRED AT APPROX 1000 FT DOWN THE RWY. PLT ELECTED TO ABORT TKOF TO AVOID IMPACT WITH RISING TERRAIN/TREES, LANDED ON RWY WITH ENG AT IDLE PWR, GEAR UP. ACFT SLID ABOUT 1000 FT, CAME TO REST 10 FT TO THE L OF RWY CTRLINE APPROX 200 FT OVER THRESHOLD WITH ABOUT 1000 FT OF PAVED RUN-OUT REMAINING. ON EGRESS, THE MAIN FUEL SHUT-OFF VALVE, LOCATED IN THE R SIDE OF THE COCKPIT, WAS FOUND IN THE 2/3 SHUT OFF POS (LEVER MOVED AFT). THE ACFT WAS LIFTED WITH SLINGS AND HOISTS, AND THE LNDG GEAR EXTENDED NORMALLY. THE WOODEN PROP WAS DESTROYED, THE LOWER ACFT COWLING AND NOSE GEAR DOOR SUFFERED ABRASION DAMAGE, AND THE ACFT FUSELAGE BTWN THE MAIN GEARS HAD ABRASION DAMAGE WITHOUT COMPROMISE OF STRUCTURAL STRENGTH. THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO PROPERTY, NO FIRE, NO DAMAGE TO ACFT CTL SURFACES OR TO ACFT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. THERE WERE NO INJURIES, AND BY DEFINITION THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE TO THE ACFT. REF CFR 49 PART 830.2, THIS DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR AN ACCIDENT, AND THUS IS AN INCIDENT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THE MAIN FUEL VALVE WAS A POORLY DESIGNED CONFIGN IN THIS HOMEBUILT ACFT. IT IS POSSIBLE TO INADVERTENTLY MOVE THE HANDLE AFT TO THE OFF POS BY HITTING THE VALVE WITH ONE'S LEG WHILE EGRESSING THE R COCKPIT. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE PAX INADVERTENTLY MOVED THE VALVE TO THE 2/3 OFF POS DURING PARTIAL EGRESS PRIOR TO ENG START. THE PLT DID NOT CHK THE VALVE POS THEREAFTER. THE ENG, RECEIVING PARTIAL FUEL FLOW UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, OPERATED NORMALLY AT LOWER PWR SETTINGS (TAXI AND RUN-UP) BUT DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUEL FLOW TO OPERATE AT TKOF PWR BEYOND 10-15 SECONDS (EXHAUSTED FUEL VOLUME OF GASCOLATOR WITHOUT ENOUGH INFLOW FOR REPLENISHMENT). THIS NECESSITATED THE ABORTED TKOF AND RESULTANT GEAR UP LNDG. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: CLOSE INSPECTION OF FUEL AND FUEL SYS, AND APPROPRIATE INSPECTION OF ENG BY QUALIFIED ENG SHOP/IA TO RULE OUT OTHER ROOT CAUSES OF PWR LOSS AND TO RULE OUT ENG DAMAGE DUE TO WOODEN PROP STRIKE AND SUDDEN STOPPAGE. REDESIGN OF FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE CONFIGN TO ELIMINATE RISK OF INADVERTENT SHUTOFF BY PAX IN R SEAT OF ACFT. AMEND CHKLIST TO INCLUDE CONFIRMATION OF MAIN FUEL VALVE OPEN IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ENG START. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE ENG DID FAIL AS A RESULT OF FUEL STARVATION. THE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE WAS FOUND 2/3 OFF AFTER THE EVENT. THIS FUEL VALVE CANNOT BE SEEN FROM THE L SEAT IF A PAX IS OCCUPYING THE R SEAT. HE IS INVESTIGATING WHETHER OR NOT THE VALVE COULD BE RELOCATED TO PREVENT THIS MISHAP IN THE FUTURE. IN THE MEANTIME, HE WILL SAFETY-WIRE THE HANDLE. THE GEAR UP LNDG PRECLUDED A RWY EXCURSION OFF THE END OF THE RWY AND INTO TREES.

Synopsis

LANCAIR 295 EXPERIENCED ENG FAILURE SHORTLY AFTER LIFTOFF. EMER GEAR UP LNDG WAS EXECUTED, AND INVESTIGATION REVEALED FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE NOT FULLY OPEN.

Time / Day

Date: 200708

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Environment

Flight Conditions: IMC

Weather Elements: Thunderstorm

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Route In Use.Enroute: On Vectors

Aircraft: 2

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer Qualification.Pilot: Commercial

ASRS Report: 748833

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function. Observation: Company Check Pilot

Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP ASRS Report: 748834

Events

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Weather

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Assessments

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Weather

Narrative

WE WERE ON A TRIP TO ZZZ. WE HAD PLENTY OF FUEL PLUS EXTRA BEFORE WE LEFT. WE WERE VECTORED FOR WX, THEN REROUTED IN THE MIDDLE OF FLT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 748834: AFTER PUTTING THE NEW RTE IN THE FMS AND VERIFYING THE RTE THE FMS SAID WE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO GET TO ZZZ. I SPOKE WITH DISPATCH AND THEY GAVE ME A NEW BURN TO ZZZ. IT APPEARED THAT WE WOULD LAND IN ZZZ WITH 400 LBS OF FUEL ON BOARD. I MISTAKENLY INTERPED THE MINIMUM FUEL CALL AND A FUEL EMER AS THE SAME. I THEN DECLARED A FUEL EMER AND ATC CLRED US DIRECT ZZZ AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT WITH ENOUGH FUEL ON BOARD. IN THE EVENT OF TRYING TO PUT ALL THE INFO TOGETHER I HAD FORGOTTEN THAT A FUEL EMER IS WHEN YOU ONLY HAVE 30 MINS OF FUEL REMAINING, INSTEAD OF WHEN YOU PREDICT YOU ARE GOING TO LAND IN THAT SITUATION.

Synopsis

EMB-145 FLT WAS GIVEN REROUTE DURING FLT. AFTER ENTERING ROUTE INTO FMS, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT FLT WOULD LAND WITH INSUFFICIENT FUEL, SO THE FLT CREW DECLARED EMER FUEL AND RECEIVED PRIORITY HANDLING.

Time / Day

Date: 200707

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: Marginal

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: Viking

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Ground.Other

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Fuel Quantity-Pressure Indication

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Qualification.Pilot: Private

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 112

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 5000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 26

ASRS Report: 748787

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Other Personnel.Other

Events

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector. Aircraft Equipment. Other Aircraft Equipment: Fuel Quantity

Gauges

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed As Precaution Consequence.FAA: Assigned Or Threatened Penalties

Consequence.FAA: Investigated

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft Problem Areas : FAA

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I AND 3 OTHER PEOPLE, ALL PLTS, STARTED A TRIP TO OSHKOSH, WI. THIS TRIP WAS PLANNED NON-STOP SINCE THE PLANE HAD A 1000 MI RANGE. EACH TANK HOLDS 30 GALLONS USABLE FUEL. WE FLEW 30 PER TANK -- STARTING WITH THE R TANK WITH 15 GALLONS AUX WITH ONLY 7 GALLONS TO STAY IN CTR OF GRAVITY. APPROX 2 1/2 HRS INTO THE FLT AT 7500 FT, WE ENCOUNTERED MODERATE TURB. WHILE RUNNING ON THE R TANK, THE ENG STUMBLED. I IMMEDIATELY CHANGED TO THE L TANK, INCREASED PWR AND MOVED TO HIGHER ALT TO CLR CLOUDS AND TURB. I NOTICED THAT THE FUEL GAUGE ON THE R TANK WAS READING BTWN 1/4 - 1/2, NOT EMPTY. THIS AIRPLANE HAD NOT BEEN FLOWN THIS LOW OF FUEL BEFORE, SO I WAS UNAWARE OF THIS DISCREPANCY. AS WE REACHED RIPON, MOVING TO THE APCH ALT AND ON TO FISK, WE WERE NOW AT 1800 FT MSL AND HAD BEEN INFLT APPROX 4 HRS 10 MINS. WE HAD PASSED FISK AND WERE ONLY 4 MI FROM THE DEST WHEN WE WERE INFORMED THAT WE WERE TO ENTER A HOLDING PATTERN AT RUSH LAKE. IT WAS AFTER THE FIRST CIRCLE AROUND THE LAKE THAT I OBSERVED MY L GAUGE WAS NEARING THE SAME PLACE THAT THE ENG BEGAN TO STALL ON THE R TANK. KNOWING IN MY MIND THAT I HAD MORE THAN 30 MINS RESERVE, I STILL BECAME CONCERNED ABOUT BEING IN THE HOLDING PATTERN. I BROUGHT THIS GAUGE READING TO THE ATTN OF MY PAX. WE ALL AGREED THAT SINCE THE FAA HAD SO KINDLY PROVIDED A 2300 FT GRASS STRIP RIGHT IN FRONT OF US, WE SHOULD LAND AND MAKE A VISUAL FUEL CHK. SAFETY FIRST -- WE ALL AGREED. WE MADE A FLAWLESS SHORT FIELD LNDG -- ON WET GRASS I MIGHT ADD. BY THE TIME THE ACFT STOPPED AND THE DOORS OPENED. THE FAA WAS THERE OFFERING THEIR ASSISTANCE. THE GENTLEMAN WAS FROM THE FISK CTL TWR. HE WAS VERY KIND, POLITE, AND OFFERED TO TAKE ALL OF US IN TO TOWN. I EXPLAINED TO HIM WHY I HAD MADE THIS LNDG FOR A VISUAL FUEL CHK. HE AGREED THAT I HAD DONE THE RIGHT THING -- OF PUTTING SAFETY FIRST. HE TOOK US TO A CAR RENTAL COMPANY, WHERE WE RENTED A CAR, WE THOUGHT, FOR A HALF DAY. WE THEN DROVE TO PURCHASE 4 NEW 5 GALLON GAS CONTAINERS. WE THEN DROVE TO AN FBO. WE EXPLAINED OUR REASON FOR NEEDING THE GAS IN JUGS AND PRACTICALLY HAD TO BEG FOR THE ACCOMMODATION. WE THEN RETURNED TO THE ACFT TO PUT 10 GALLONS IN EACH TANK, AFTER ALL, WE HAD ALREADY LANDED, WHY NOT PUT FUEL IN. THE FAA WAS WAITING WHEN WE ARRIVED. NOT EVEN HAVING EXPERIENCED AN ENCOUNTER WITH THE FEDS BEFORE, I WAS UNPREPARED FOR THE INTERROGATION THAT ENSUED. AS I EXPLAINED MY REASON FOR LNDG, I COULD SEE THE SMILES OF DELIGHT COME ON THEIR FACES AS IF TO SAY, 'WE'VE GOT YOU NOW!' AFTER INSPECTING BOTH FUEL TANKS AND FINDING NO FUEL IN THE R TANK AND ONLY 1/2 - 1 INCH IN THE L TANK, THEY QUESTIONED MY FUEL MGMNT AND COMPETENCE AS A PLT. I TRIED TO EXPLAIN THAT THIS ACFT HAD A 3 TANK PER WING SYS, AND THEY ARE FILLED FROM THE OUTBOARD TANK, THEREFORE, YOU WOULDN'T SEE THE REMAINING FUEL SINCE IT RUNS TO THE INBOARD TANKS (JUST COMMON SENSE). AFTER SOME CALCULATIONS, WE DETERMINED WE HAD 20-30 MINS ON BOARD. MY PAPERWORK AND ACFT PAPERWORK WAS ALL IN ORDER. THEY THEN WANTED TO SEE WHAT WAS IN MY BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT. AT FIRST GLANCE, ONE ANNOUNCED 'THAT'S GOT TO BE OVER 200 LBS.' 'NOT SO,' I EXPLAINED, 'IT IS LESS THAN 150 LBS.' THEY DID NOT AGREE! I REPEATEDLY ASKED IF WE COULD MOVE ON TO OUR DEST. WITH

NO ANSWER UNTIL XA30, AND THEN IT WAS FAR TOO LATE, BECAUSE NOW THE ARPT WAS CLOSED FOR A SPECIAL EVENT. HE THEN ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS GOING TO GND THIS ACFT FOR THE ONE GAUGE THAT I ADMITTED WAS INCORRECT AND THAT I WOULD HAVE TO GET A FERRY PERMIT TO FLY IT HOME. I WOULD ALSO HAVE TO HIRE A MECH TO DETERMINE ITS AIRWORTHINESS. THIS IS WHERE THE FEDS JUST BECAME MEAN. I ASKED IF WE COULD FILL THE PLANE WITH FUEL AND MAKE 2 FUEL STOPS ON THE WAY HOME. HE REPLIED, 'IT IS NOW UNDER A FERRY PERMIT, AND YOU WILL NOT CARRY PAX OR BAGGAGE AND HOW YOUR PAX GET HOME IS NOT MY PROB!' NOT A VERY NICE MAN, BUT CERTAINLY A GOOD REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FAA HORROR STORIES I HAVE HEARD ABOUT FROM OTHER PLTS. SEVERAL GOOD LESSONS WERE LEARNED FROM THIS EXPERIENCE: 1) I WILL NEVER FLY A PLANE MORE THAN 1/2 OF ITS FUEL RANGE AGAIN. 2) NEVER, NEVER, NEVER USE ANY RWY THE FAA STATES IS THERE FOR YOU IN AM EMER -- IT IS A TRAP! 3) FLY BY THE BOOK WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

Synopsis

AN UNPLANNED LANDING FOR FUEL ENROUTE RESULTS IN CONFRONTATIONS WITH AND AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATE ACTION BY AN FAA OFFICER.

Time / Day

Date: 200706 Day: Wed

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: Embraer Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

ASRS Report: 747621

Events

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Company

Narrative

MINIMUM FUEL STATUS, IN MY EXPERIENCE, USUALLY RESULTS FROM A COMBINATION OF AN AIRLINE'S DESIRE TO BE FUEL EFFICIENT AND ATC'S REQUIREMENTS DUE TO TRAFFIC OR WEATHER PROBLEMS. UTILIZED STANDARD FUEL MANAGEMENT AND MONITORING PROCEDURES. DUE TO UNEXPECTED ATC VECTORS AND ALTITUDE ASSIGNMENTS PLUS REGIONAL WEATHER PROBLEMS, FUEL BURN EXCEEDED PLANNED EXPECTATIONS. I ADVISED ATC OUR STATUS WAS 'MINIMUM FUEL'. ALL DETAILS ARE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND RECOLLECTION. ACARS PROVIDES A PRINTOUT OF EXPECTED ENROUTE FUEL BURN. THE EMBRAER FMS, WHEN PROPERLY UPDATED, PROVIDES A RELIABLE

PROJECTION OF EXPECTED ARRIVAL FUEL +/- A COUPLE HUNDRED POUNDS DEPENDING ON TERMINAL ATC HANDLING. WHILE COMPARING THE ACARS PRINTOUT AGAINST ACTUAL FUEL BURN AND MONITORING FMS PROJECTED FUEL BURN, IT BECAME APPARENT WE COULD END UP DECLARING EMERGENCY FUEL IF ENCOUNTERING FURTHER DELAYS OR ATC INDUCED FUEL BURN WHICH EXCEEDED THAT ORIGINALLY PLANNED BY OUR DISPATCH. ARTCC WAS NOTIFIED OF MINIMUM FUEL STATUS IN ORDER TO AVOID A SITUATION REQUIRING A DIVERSION OR DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY FUEL DUE TO ATC VECTORS AND ALTITUDE RESTRICTIONS WHICH EXCEEDED FUEL PLANNING EXPECTATIONS. BETTER ATC COMPUTERS WHICH WILL AVOID SITUATIONS REQUIRING AIRCRAFT TO BE HELD DOWN FROM FILED ALTITUDES, INSTRUCTIONS TO SLOW DOWN THEN SPEED UP, VECTORS OFF FILED ROUTE AND OTHER ACTIONS WHICH CANNOT BE PLANNED FOR PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

Synopsis

AN EMJ PILOT DECLARED MIN FUEL AFTER FLT ROUTE CHANGES LOWERED DESTINATION ARR FUEL TO NEAR AN EMERGENCY DECLARATION LEVEL.

Time / Day

Date: 200707

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Operator.General Aviation: Personal Make Model Name: Experimental Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Aircraft: 2

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Component: 1

Aircraft Component : Fuel System

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot Qualification.Pilot: Instrument Qualification.Pilot: Private

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 32 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 3200 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 29

ASRS Report: 746450

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE CRUISING TO RUN OFF THE LAST 10 HRS OF TEST TIME FOR THE EL5 ACFT, THE ENG, A CONTINENTAL A75 ENG, QUIT. SWITCHING TANKS DIDN'T ASSIST IN RESTART. A FORCED LNDG WAS IN A HOUSING DEVELOPMENT UNDER CONSTRUCTION. THE LNDG WAS MADE ON A CLRED LOT THAT NO WORK WAS BEING DONE ON. NO DAMAGE TO THE ACFT OR TO ANYTHING ON THE GND OCCURRED. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INDICATED FUEL STARVATION WAS PROBABLY CAUSED BY A CLOGGED GASCOLATOR FILTER. FUEL ON BOARD AT TIME OF INCIDENT OVER 2 HRS REMAINING (12 GALS). THERE WAS NO INJURY IN THE LNDG. PROX TO HOMES ETC, ESTIMATED AT 500-1000 FT.

Synopsis

AN EXPERIMENTAL BIPLANE PILOT EXPERIENCED ENGINE FAILURE DUE TO A CLOGGED GASCOLATOR FILTER. THE PILOT MADE A SUCCESSFUL FORCED LANDING IN AN OPEN FIELD WITH NO DAMAGE OR INJURIES.

Time / Day

Date: 200707 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZOA.ARTCC

State Reference: CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 36000

Environment

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZOA.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B757-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Experience. Flight Time. Last 90 Days: 250 Experience. Flight Time. Total: 17000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 3000

ASRS Report: 744444

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas: Company

Situations

Narrative

DISPATCHED WITH CLEARED FUEL 13.1 -- BLOCKED OUT WITH 13.6. NORMAL S/E TAXI, NO TAKEOFF DELAY. MINIMAL DELAY IN CLIMB TO FL380. IN CRUISE, FO POINTED OUT THE FMC PLANNED FAT WAS 4.7, INSTEAD OF FPF PLANNED 6.3!! CHECKED FMC FOR OBVIOUS ERRORS -- NONE. ACARS DISPATCH WHO REPLIED THAT HOWGOWZIT NORMAL AND THAT IT WAS PROBABLY FMC DATA ENTRY ERROR! AS WE DON'T ENTER THE FOB ANYWHERE OTHER THAN ACARS, THIS SEEMED UNLIKELY. HOWGOZIT CONTAINED ONLY TWO FIXES, ORIGIN AND

DESTINATION, SO NO WAY TO CHECK AGAINST THAT. RAN SUSPECTED FUEL LEAK IRREGULAR PROCEDURE AND THIS DID NOT SHED ANY LIGHT ON THE PROBLEM. CALCULATED VS TOTALIZER VARIED FROM ZERO TO 500 LBS. ENDED UP LANDING WITH LOW FUEL EICAS MESSAGE ON ROLLOUT, L MAIN SHOWED 2.1, RIGHT MAIN 2.6, TOTAL 4.7. AT GATE, TOTALIZER STABILIZED TO 5.1. SENT ACARS MAINT LOG ITEM FOR SUSPECTED FUEL LEAK AND/OR FUEL GAUGE ERROR. MAINT CHECKED AND CLEARED THE ITEM OVERNIGHT, SAYING THAT THE TANK DRIPS AGREED WITH THE GAUGE FOB. MY SUSPICION NOW, IS THAT THE DISPATCH BURN FIGURE OF 6.8 IS TOTALLY UNREALISTIC FOR THIS SEGMENT. WE FLEW THE ROUTE EXACTLY AS FILED, AND LANDED SOUTH INTO ZZZ. WE JUST BURNED ABOUT 20% MORE THAN PLANNED, EVEN WITH THE S/E TAXI AND NO DELAYS. THIS WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TIME THE DISPATCH COMPUTER WAS OUT TO LUNCH -- A FEW MONTHS BACK THEY FILED ME A RTE AT FL410 WITH AN ATOG AROUND 190K, AND THE FMC STATED REPEATEDLY 'UNABLE CRUISE ALTITUDE!' WHEN I CALLED THE DISPATCHER THE NEXT DAY, HE WAS NON-PLUSSED AND SAID THE DISPATCH PERFORMANCE DATABASE IS 'NOT NECESSARILY THE SAME AS THE AIRCRAFT'S FMC DATABASE!' HELLO? I'M ALL FOR FUEL SAVINGS, BUT IF WE'RE GOING TO BE FLYING ALL OVER THE PLACE WITH NO ALTERNATES AND MIN FAT, WE DAMN WELL BETTER HAVE ACCURATE BURN/PERFORMANCE DATA PROGRAMMED INTO THE DISPATCH COMPUTERS, DON'TCHA THINK??

Synopsis

A B757-200 PILOT REPORTS THAT HIS ACR IS DISPATCHING ACFT WITH UNREALISTIC MIN FUEL LOADS.

Time / Day

Date: 200706 Day: Sun

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 5500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Fuel Quantity-Pressure Indication

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 44.5 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 7876.8 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 14.4

ASRS Report: 744226

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Resolutory Action. Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON ARR OF THE PREVIOUS FLT, I EVALUATED THE FUEL LOAD FOR THE NEXT FLT. THE WING TANKS INDICATED 1/8 AND THE FUSELAGE TANK INDICATED FULL.

NOTE: THE WING TANKS GRAVITY FEED INTO THE FUSELAGE SO WHEN THE WING TANKS ARE EMPTY, THE FUSELAGE TANK BEGINS DEPLETING. SINCE THE FLT WAS TO BE AEROBATIC. THE WING TANKS CANNOT CONTAIN ANY FUEL. THE INDICATED QUANTITY WAS 'THE PERFECT LOAD' FOR AN AEROBATIC FLT FROM THE FIELD TO THE AEROBATIC AREA. MY PAX ENTERED THE PLANE AND WE DEPARTED TO THE AEROBATIC AREA. DURING THE AEROBATIC SESSION, MY PAX ASKED, 'HOW IS THE FUEL?' I REPLIED 'FUEL IS GOOD.' AFTER 5-7 MINS OF AEROBATICS. WE HEADED BACK TO THE FIELD. DURING THE RETURN. THE FUEL GAUGES WERE STILL INDICATING APPROX 1/16 FULL WINGS AND FULL FUSELAGE. THIS DID NOT SEEM ALARMING SINCE GAUGES READ DIFFERENTLY IN DIFFERENT ALTS. ABOUT 12 NM NW OF THE FIELD, THE ENG QUIT. I ASSUMED THE ENG QUIT DUE TO THE MIXTURE BEING TOO LEAN. I CHKED AND IT WAS PROPERLY SET. I PUSHED IT TO FULL RICH WITH NO RESPONSE. I MOVED THE THROTTLE WITH NO RESPONSE. I DID AN EMER LNDG IN A FIELD WITH NO INJURIES OR DAMAGE TO THE AIRPLANE. WHILE ON THE GND, I TURNED THE MASTER SWITCH ON 5-8 TIMES TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE CHP ACFT. EACH TIME, THE FUSELAGE TANK INDICATED FULL. I DRAINED THE UNUSABLE FUEL OUT OF THE AIRPLANE TO VERIFY THAT IT WAS A FUEL STARVATION PROB. I PUT 10 GALS OF FUEL IN THE AIRPLANE AND FLEW IT BACK. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) NEW AIRPLANE. UNFAMILIAR WITH WING TANK NOT INDICATING ZERO. 2) HAD A DIPSTICK BUT HAD NOT CALIBRATED IT YET. SHOULD HAVE CALIBRATED IT SINCE I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE FUEL GAUGING SYS. 3) SHOULD HAVE MORE CLOSELY CALCULATED FUEL QUANTITY DESPITE WHAT THE GAUGES INDICATED. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) CALIBRATE DIPSTICK. 2) TAKE OFF WITH MORE FUEL EVEN THOUGH I WILL HAVE TO FLY AWHILE TO BURN DOWN TO AEROBATIC WT. 3) DON'T BELIEVE GAUGES. 4) PLACE RED GAUGE MARKING TAPE ON WING GAUGES TO SHOW ACTUAL ZERO UNTIL QUANTITY INDICATOR CAN BE CALIBRATED.

Synopsis

EXTRA 300 PILOT REPORTS SUCCESSFUL OFF ARPT LANDING DUE TO FUEL STARVATION AND INACCURATE FUEL GAGES.

Time / Day

Date: 200706 Day: Sat

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 35000

Environment

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

ASRS Report: 742092

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Other Personnel: Dispatcher

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Company Policies

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action. Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company

Narrative

FLT PLAN FUEL RELEASE WAS HNL TO ZZZ WITHOUT A RE-RELEASE POINT. ONCE WE WERE OVER THE WESTERN US, WE RECEIVED AN UNSOLICITED MSG FROM DISPATCH WHICH CONTAINED A RE-RELEASE...EVEN THOUGH WE WERE NOT ORIGINALLY DISPATCHED WITH A RE-RELEASE POINT. AS CAPT I REFUSED THIS NEW RE-RELEASE FOR SEVERAL REASONS: 1) I'M UNCERTAIN THAT THIS CHANGE, AFTER 4 PLUS HOURS OF FLT, IS EVEN LEGAL PER FAA. 2) I WAS NOT GOING TO ACCEPT A RE-RELEASE POINT WHICH WAS PAST MY ENRTE DEST WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A 180 DEG TURN. HOW DOES THAT SAVE ANY FUEL? 3)

CLEARLY DISPATCH IS PLAYING GAMES WITH THE FUEL FIGURES. DISPATCH DELETED MY ALTERNATE AND RE-COMPUTED MY ENRTE FUEL WITHOUT THE 5% ADDITIONAL RESERVE FOR THAT PORTION OVER THE US. CLEARLY, AN ALTERNATE WAS NOT REQUIRED THIS MORNING. AS CAPT, I AM ABLE TO MAKE THAT DETERMINATION...OR WE COULD HAVE MADE IT TOGETHER, BUT I MUST AGREE TO IT. SENDING A RE-RELEASE FUEL PLAN AFTER 4 HOURS OF FLT IS NOT THE WAY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. WHAT IF I HAD BEEN ON BREAK AND MY FO'S MADE THE DECISION TO ACCEPT IT ON THEIR OWN? 4) DISPATCH WAS ATTEMPTING TO 'MAKE FUEL' WHEN THERE WASN'T ANY. HE WAS SIMPLY RE-LABELING FUEL FIGURES...TAKING FUEL FROM MY L HAND AND PUTTING IT IN MY R HAND. CLEARLY, MY FUEL REMAINING WAS NOT GOING TO CHANGE, REGARDLESS OF THE TRICKS. THESE 'FUEL GAMES' DO NOT CREATE ANY CONFIDENCE IN THE FUEL PROGRAM AT ACR. THIS IS CLRLY A FLT SAFETY ISSUE. ROBBING PETER TO PAY PAUL ON FUEL FIGURES MUST STOP.

Synopsis

A B767 CAPT ON AN OVER WATER FLT RECEIVED A RE-RELEASE MESSAGE FROM DISPATCHER THAT WAS NOT ACCURATE, REQUIRED, OR DESIRED.

Time / Day

Date: 200701

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Aircraft: 1

Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: Ag Wagon 188/Ag Truck/Ag Husky

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Component: 1

Aircraft Component : Fuel Tank Cap Aircraft Component : Fuel Tank Cap

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot Qualification.Pilot: Instrument Qualification.Pilot: Private

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 30

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 920 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 310

ASRS Report: 741637

Events

Anomaly. Maintenance Problem: Improper Maintenance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Consequence. Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Maintenance Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

FACTORY FUEL CAPS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NON-STANDARD CAPS WHICH ARE VENTED AND CONTAIN A CHK VALVE. FACTORY CAPS ARE NOT VENTED. FUEL VENT SYS IS PRONE TO PLUGGING LEADING TO A FUEL

STARVATION PROB. RUDDER STOPS WERE READJUSTED TO PROVIDE FULL RUDDER DEFLECTION. 3 SPRINGS ON RUDDER CTL SYS WERE REMOVED TO REESTABLISH 'FEEL' IN THE RUDDER PEDALS. ELEVATOR STOP READJUSTED TO PROVIDE FULL NOSE UP DEFLECTION IN ELEVATOR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATES THIS ACFT IS CERTIFIED TO BE 'SPIN PROOF' AND THESE RUDDER SPRINGS WILL CENTER THE RUDDER IN A SPIN AND HELP TO CONTROL THE ACFT. HOWEVER, THIS TAIL DRAGGER TYPE ACFT HAD BETTER 'FEEL' IN THE RUDDER PEDALS AFTER THE THREE RUDDER SPRINGS WERE REMOVED. THE ELEVATOR AND RUDDER STOPS WERE 'RE-ADJUSTED' TO ALLOW FOR BETTER 3-POINT LANDINGS OF THIS TAIL DRAGGER ACFT.

Synopsis

A HUSKY A-1B ACFT FACTORY FUEL CAPS WERE REMOVED/REPLACED WITH NON STANDARD CAPS. RUDDER AND ELEVATOR STOPS ALSO RE-ADJUSTED.

Time / Day

Date: 200706 Day: Fri

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Environment

Weather Elements: Thunderstorm

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: ZZZ.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A320

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Other Personnel: Dispatcher

Qualification.Other: Dispatcher

ASRS Report: 741373

Events

Anomaly. Inflight Encounter: Weather

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter.Other

Resolutory Action Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Exited Adverse Environment

Assessments

Problem Areas: Airport Problem Areas: Weather

Narrative

ACR FLT RPTED ZZZ IS CLOSED FOR EMER. I TOLD HIM TO HOLD UNTIL FUEL REQUIRED HIM TO DIVERT TO CLOSEST ARPT. HE DECLARED HE WAS ESTIMATED ZZZ2 IN 15 MINS. TSTMS BUILT IN HIS PATH TO ZZZ2 AND HE IS VECTORED AROUND UNTIL HE DECLARED FUEL EMER AND DIVERTED TO ZZZ3. LANDED WITH 2.9 FUEL REMAINING.

Synopsis

A DISPATCHER REPORTS AN A320 LNDG WITH 2.9 FUEL REMAINING AFTER DECLARING A FUEL EMER. DEST ARPT CLOSED AND TSTMS AT ALT CAUSED DEV TO UNSCHEDULED ARPT.

Time / Day

Date: 200705 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 20000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier Make Model Name: Regional Jet 200 ER&LR

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 260

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 7000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 5200

ASRS Report: 740822

Events

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Original Clearance

Resolutory Action.Other

Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Weather

Narrative

WHEN ENRTE, CTR ISSUED A RERTE TO AVOID A 20-25 MIN HOLD. THE RERTE INCREASED THE FLT TIME BY 45 MINS AND REDUCING OUR LNDG FUEL TO 1640 LBS. RESERVE FUEL FOR THIS FLT WAS 2140 LBS. AT THIS POINT I INFORMED

ATC THAT WITH THE NEW RERTE I HAD TO DECLARE MINIMUM FUEL. UPON HDOF TO CTR, I WAS INSTRUCTED TO INFORM THEM THAT I WAS MINIMUM FUEL, WHICH I DID UPON CHKING IN WITH THEM. I WAS GIVEN BACK OUR ORIGINAL ROUTING. I WAS ASKED WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE MINIMUM FUEL STATUS AND I INFORMED THEM ABOUT THE LENGTH OF THE RERTE. THEN I WAS XFERRED TO APCH AND INFORMED THEM AS WELL OF THE MINIMUM FUEL STATUS. THEIR RESPONSE WAS INQUIRY OF THE NUMBER OF SOULS ON BOARD AND HOW MANY MINS OF FUEL ON BOARD. I TOLD THEM 50 PAX AND 50 MINS OF FUEL ON BOARD. AT THIS TIME. THEIR RESPONSE WAS THAT THEY WERE DECLARING US AS A FUEL EMER AND GAVE US PRIORITY TO THE ARPT WITH EMER EQUIP STANDING BY. LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND NO FURTHER ACTIONS. BEFORE CTR HANDED US OFF TO APCH, I WAS GIVEN A PHONE NUMBER OF THE HEAD SUPVR OF CTR AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO CALL HIM AFTER LNDG. I CALLED AND EXPLAINED THE SITUATION TO HIM AND ANSWERED HIS QUESTIONS. HE AGREED WITH THE MINIMUM FUEL CALL AND WAS NOT GOING TO TAKE ACTION. HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THE PREVIOUS CTR'S REASONING FOR THE RERTE AND WAS GOING TO WRITE A LETTER TO THAT SUPVR AND GET THEIR EXPLANATION.

Synopsis

A CRJ200 FLT GIVEN A REROUTE DECLARED MIN FUEL. ATC THEN DECLARED A FUEL EMER, RESTORED THE ORIGINAL ROUTING, AND ASK THE FLT CREW FOR WHY AN EMER.

Time / Day

Date: 200706 Day: Tue

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: ZZZ.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Function.Instruction: Instructor Function.Other Personnel.Other

Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 110

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 550

ASRS Report: 740773

Person: 2

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Consequence.Other: Company Review

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I AM CHIEF FLT INSTRUCTOR AT AN INTL FLT SCHOOL RPTING AN INCIDENT CONCERNING A RENTER WITH A FOREIGN COMMERCIAL PLT'S LICENSE AND A PROVISIONAL FAA PVT PLT'S LICENSE. HE WAS FLYING FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIME BUILDING. HE RPTED A ROUGH-RUNNING ENG TO APCH CTL, AFTER WHICH THE ENG STOPPED RUNNING NEAR A PVT GRASS STRIP. HE MADE A SAFE LNDG IN A LARGE FIELD APPROX 1/2 MI SW. WHEN I ARRIVED ON SITE, THE AIRPLANE WAS SITTING NEAR THE NORTHERNMOST TREE LINE WITH NO VISIBLE DAMAGE. THE PLT WAS SAFE AND WITHOUT INJURY. THE FIELD ITSELF WAS BUMPY AND ROUGH, BUT SUITABLE ENOUGH FOR A SOFT FIELD LNDG. THE ACFT'S GND ROLL APPEARED TO BE ABOUT 1/2 MI LONG, JUDGING FROM THE TRACKS. THE PLT CLAIMED HE WAS AWARE THE ACFT WAS LOW ON FUEL, BUT BELIEVED HE COULD MAKE IT TO ZZZ SAFELY. VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE FUEL QUANTITY REVEALED. THE L TANK'S FUEL QUANTITY TO BE VERY LOW (POSSIBLY UNUSABLE), WITH THE R TANK COMPLETELY DRY. UPON TURNING ON THE MASTER SWITCH, THE FUEL INDICATORS ON BOARD READ 'EMPTY' ON BOTH SIDES. OUR FLT DEPT ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT THE FSDO NUMEROUS TIMES THROUGHOUT THE DAY, BUT WERE UNABLE TO SPEAK WITH ANYONE UNTIL SOME TIME LATER. OUR FSDO CONTACT INFORMED US THAT THEY WERE INVOLVED IN A MEETING AND WERE UNAVAILABLE UNTIL THAT TIME. THE STUDENT BRIEFLY EXPLAINED THIS MORNING'S EVENTS TO ME AT THE SITE. WE CANNOT SAY WITH CERTAINTY WHAT CAUSED THE ENG FAILURE WITHOUT A PROPER INSPECTION, BUT WITHOUT ANY VISIBLE LEAKS OR OTHER ACFT DAMAGE, PLT ERROR IS THE PRESUMED CAUSE FOR FUEL STARVATION AND SUBSEQUENT ENG FAILURE.

Synopsis

AN INSTRUCTOR REPORTS A C152 STUDENT PILOT LANDED OFF ARPT WITH A ROUGH RUNNING ENG CAUSED BY FUEL STARVATION. PILOT WAS UNAWARE OF FUEL STATE.

Time / Day

Date: 200705 Day: Thu

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 8600

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: ZZZ. Tower Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: PA-31 Navajo Chieftan/Mojave/Navajo T1020

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Navigation In Use.Other: GPS Flight Phase.Descent: Approach Route In Use. Approach: Visual

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot Qualification.Pilot: Instrument Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Qualification.Pilot: Private

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 30 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 1100 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 370

ASRS Report: 740299

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

CHAIN OF EVENTS: SECOND TEST FLT AFTER ANNUAL AND INSTALL OF 1 'NEW' ENG IN TWIN. FUEL LOAD KEPT TO A MINIMUM AS A PRECAUTION. FLTS DONE IN VICINITY OF ARPT. UPON RETURN TO ARPT, REQUEST FOR PRACTICE GPS APCH GRANTED BY TWR. ON APCH AND DSCNT, LOST PWR TO 1 ENG, FEATHERED PROP, RESTART FAILED, LANDED UNEVENTFULLY (ON 1 ENG). HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: FUEL CALCULATION DONE BASED ON OUR USUAL 16 GPH PER ENG, HOWEVER, FUEL CONSUMPTION WAS TO BE AT 24 GPH FOR ENG BREAK IN. STUPID ME. FUEL STARVATION WAS LIKELY CAUSE OF PWR LOSS AS MECH FOUND NO ISSUES AFTER LNDG. I WON'T MAKE THAT MISTAKE AGAIN!

Synopsis

A PA31 PILOT CONDUCTING A POST ENGINE CHANGE TEST FLT UPLOADED TOO LITTLE FUEL FOR THE TEST MANEUVERS AND FUEL STARVED ONE ENGINE ON APCH.

Time / Day

Date: 200705 Day: Tue

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: ZZZ.VOR

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2600

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: ZZZ.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: PA-28 Cherokee Arrow IV

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Navigation In Use.Other.VORTAC Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Qualification.Pilot: Private

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 18

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 140 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 121

ASRS Report: 740068

Events

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Consequence.FAA: Investigated

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE FLT WAS PLANNED FOR 3.50 HRS OF FLT TIME. THE FIRST LEG WAS FLOWN FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2 TO PICK UP A SINGLE PAX. FROM ZZZ2 THE FLT CONTINUED

TO ZZZ3. THE PAX WAS DROPPED OFF AND THE FLT WAS CONTINUED AS A RETURN LEG TO ZZZ1. ACFT WAS PREFLTED BY ME, AND FOUND TO HAVE FULL FUEL IN THE L WING TANK AND FULL FUEL IN THE R WING TANK. INSPECTION SHOWED 48 GALS USEABLE FUEL ONBOARD AT THE START OF THE FLT. PREFLT PLANNING ESTIMATED FUEL USE FOR THE OUTBOUND LEG WOULD TOTAL 16.0 GALS, AND FUEL USE FOR THE RETURN LEG WOULD TOTAL 16.0 GALS, WITH AN ESTIMATED RESERVE REMAINING OF 16 GALS (APPROX 1.50 HRS OF FUEL IN THIS ACFT). I REMOVED THE FUEL CAPS FROM BOTH TANKS AFTER LNDG AND TAXI AT ZZZ2 AND OBSERVED BOTH TANKS WERE NEARLY FULL. I TOOK ON MY PAX AND WE FLEW TO ZZZ3. I SWITCHED FUEL TANKS SHORTLY AFTER DEP FROM ZZZ2 AND FLEW FOR APPROX 1 MORE HR ON THE SECOND TANK. I REMOVED THE FUEL CAPS FROM BOTH TANKS AFTER LNDG AT ZZZ3 AND OBSERVED THE FUEL LEVEL IN BOTH TANKS WAS ABOUT EQUAL, AND APPEARED TO BE A SMALL DISTANCE BELOW THE TABS (LESS THAN 17 GALS USABLE IN EACH TANK). I DEPARTED ZZZ3 IN VFR CONDITIONS, WITH ATC TA'S. I SWITCHED FUEL TANKS APPROX 1 HR INTO THE FLT. I NOTED A HESITATION AND DROP IN ENG RPM. I IMMEDIATELY PERFORMED A CHK OF ENG CTLS AND ALSO CHANGED FUEL TANKS. THE ENG BEGAN TO PERFORM NORMALLY ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. I CONTINUED THE FLT BUT RATHER THAN CONTINUE ON TO ZZZ1 I REQUESTED A LNDG AT ZZZ2 AND STATED TO THE CTLR I WAS LOW ON FUEL. I WAS VECTORED TO THE S AND THEN VECTORED BACK TOWARD ZZZ2 ARPT BY THE TRACON CTLR. AS I CONTINUED OVERWATER TOWARD THE FIELD, THE ENG LOST PWR. I PERFORMED AN EMER CHK OF ALL CTLS AND SWITCHED FUEL TANKS (BACK TO THE TANK THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN EXHAUSTED). I BEGAN A GLIDE TOWARD THE LAND, AND DECLARED AN EMER FOR FUEL EXHAUSTION TO THE CTLR THAT I WAS STILL ASSIGNED TO. I REQUESTED VECTORS TO ZZZ WHICH I KNEW WAS IN THE VICINITY, AND WHICH I BELIEVED I HAD IN SIGHT. THE CTLR CONFIRMED THAT THE FIELD WAS ON MY CURRENT HDG. I WAS LOSING ALT AND TOLD THE CTLR THAT IT DID NOT APPEAR THAT I WOULD BE ABLE TO REACH THE FIELD. THE PROP WAS WINDMILLING AND EVENTUALLY THE ENG RESTARTED, AND CONTINUED RUNNING, AS I SWITCHED BTWN TANKS REPEATEDLY. I WAS ABLE TO MAKE A NORMAL LNDG ON THE GRASS FIELD AT ZZZ AND EXITED THE RWY AS SOON AS MY GND SPD WAS REDUCED. I WAS ABLE TO TAXI THE ACFT TO AN OPEN AREA CLR OF THE TXWY AND RWY. I SECURED THE ACFT, AND USED A CELL PHONE TO CALL THE TWR AT ZZZ2 TO ADVISE THEM THAT I HAD LANDED SAFELY AND NORMALLY. INSPECTION REVEALED NO USEABLE FUEL IN EITHER WING FUEL TANK. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME I HAVE FLOWN THIS ACFT. I BELIEVE THAT THE FUEL BURN RATE FOR THIS ACFT IS HIGHER THAN I WAS ADVISED.

Synopsis

PA28 PILOT EXPERIENCES FUEL EXHAUSTION DURING VECTORS FOR APPROACH AND MANAGES TO LAND SAFELY AT A SMALL AIRPORT SHORT OF DESTINATION.

Time / Day

Date: 200705 Day: Mon

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 9000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: ZZZ.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Personal Make Model Name: Light Sport Aircraft Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach Route In Use.Approach: Visual

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Fuel System

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 60

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 750 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 40

ASRS Report: 739488

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical Independent Detector. Other. Flight Crew A: 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Provided Flight Assist Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ABOUT 15 MI S OF ZZZ I HAD EXPERIENCED A LOSS OF ENG PWR. AT THE SAME TIME ZZZ APCH ASKED IF I HAD SOME LCL TFC IN SIGHT. I RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT I DIDN'T HAVE TFC IN SIGHT AND THAT I WAS EXPERIENCING A LOSS OF ENG PWR. THEY ASKED IF I WOULD LIKE TO DECLARE AN EMER AND IF THERE WAS ANYTHING THEY COULD DO TO HELP. I INFORMED THEM THAT I WOULD NOT LIKE TO DECLARE AN EMER. AT THIS POINT THE PWR WAS IN AND OUT. GOING FROM WHAT WOULD SEEM LIKE IDLE TO ABOUT HALF THROTTLE. AS ALL OF THIS WAS HAPPENING I DOUBLE-CHK WHAT FUEL/AIR/SPARK VARIABLES INSIDE THE COCKPIT THAT MAY HELP AID THIS SITUATION. ONLY THINGS THAT WERE AVAILABLE WERE FULL SHUT OFF 'VALVE' WHICH WAS ON, THROTTLE ABOUT HALF TO FULL, CHOKE WHICH I LEFT ALONE, AND MAGNETOS ON BOTH. AT THIS POINT I HAD LOST ENOUGH ALT AND HAD PICKED NUMEROUS OFF ARPT LNDG SPOTS. I WAS 50 FT FROM MY OFF FIELD LNDG (ABOUT 8-10 MI S NOW) AND THE THROTTLE KICKED FROM IDLE BACK UP TO ABOUT 80-90%. I PROCEEDED TO CLB BACK UP STILL KEEPING OFF FIELD LNDG AHEAD IN CASE IT WERE TO QUIT AGAIN. APCH PICKED ME BACK UP ON RADAR. THEY SAID THEY THOUGHT THEY LOST ME AND THAT THEY HAD DECLARED AN EMER FOR ME. I WAS CLRED TO LAND ANY RWY AT ZZZ AND WAS ASKED IF I HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. I INFORMED THEM THAT I HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT. I KEPT CLBING UNTIL I KNEW I WAS PWR OFF GLIDING DISTANCE FROM THE RWY. AT THAT POINT I CLOSED THE THROTTLE AGAIN AND THE ENG NOT ONLY LOST PWR BUT CAME TO A COMPLETE STOP. (NOT WIND-MILLING ANYMORE.) I PROCEEDED TO LAND, GOT OFF AT THE FIRST TXWY WHERE I WAS GREETED BY 4 FIRE TRUCKS AND 2 AMBULANCES. I THEN TRIED TO START THE ACFT AFTER I LANDED AND GOT IT STARTED AFTER ABOUT 2 OR 3 CRANKS. I TAXIED UP TO THE HANGAR. WE IMMEDIATELY CHKED THE FUEL TANKS TO BEGIN OUR TROUBLESHOOTING. L TANK OF THE FLT DESIGN WAS EMPTY. R TANK HAD 8 GALS. THIS IS A 31.5 GAL SYS SO WE ARE SAYING THAT ONE QUARTER OF THE TOTAL FUEL WAS STILL ON BOARD THE ACFT. THE CT FLT DESIGN BURNS 4-5 GPH. SO I SHOULD HAVE BEEN GOOD FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER HR AND A HALF. ALSO THERE IS NO OPTION FOR SWITCHING TANKS WITH A FUEL SELECTOR AND THERE IS NO AUX FUEL PUMP LIKE YOU HAVE ON MOST OTHER GA ACFT. THE ONLY CONCLUSION WE COULD COME UP WITH LOGICALLY WAS FUEL STARVATION IN THE L TANK AND NO OPTIONS TO ACCESS THE FUEL IN THE R TANK. MAYBE AS I WAS BANKING TO LAND OFF FIELD IT HELPED SOME OF THE FUEL FROM THE OTHER TANK GET TO THE ENG. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER DID NOTICE THAT ONE TANK WAS BEING USED MORE RAPIDLY THAN THE OTHER BY LOOKING AT THE FUEL SIGHT GAUGES ON EACH SIDE OF THE ACFT BUT DIDN'T THINK MUCH OF IT UNTIL THE ENGINE BEGIN TO RUN ROUGH. IN HINDSIGHT HE WOULD NOW ASSUME THAT THERE IS A PROBLEM IF THE TANKS DO NOT REMAIN NEARLY EVEN. IT IS THE NATURE OF ROTAX 912 ENGINE TO STOP TURNING IN FLIGHT WHEN THE FUEL OR IGNITION IS CUT OFF. THE REPORTER LEFT THE COMPANY BEFORE ANY DEFINITIVE CAUSE FOR THIS INCIDENT WAS FOUND.

Synopsis

PILOT OF CT FLIGHT DESIGN EXPERIENCES PARTIAL ENGINE FAILURE AT 9000 FEET. AFTER SETTING UP FOR A PRECAUTIONARY EMERGENCY LANDING AND CLOSING THE THROTTLE THE ENGINE STOPS COMPLETELY.

Time / Day

Date: 200705 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 35000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: MD-11

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Fuel Booster Pump

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 90 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 10000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 300

ASRS Report: 739220

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe

Independent Detector. Aircraft Equipment. Other Aircraft Equipment: EAD

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Other Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative

THIS ACFT HAS HAD A HISTORY OF FUEL SYS PROBS. THIS DAY AN MEL ITEM FOR TANK 2 FILL VALVE INOP WAS IN THE LOGBOOK. LOOKING BACK THERE WERE

MANY FUEL SYS RELATED PROBS WITH ALL THE TANKS. ABOUT 1+55 INTO THE FLT THE TANK #3 PUMP INOP NON ALERT WAS DISPLAYED ON THE EAD. WE FOLLOWED THE AOM PROC AND PULLED THE ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKER. ABOUT AN HR LATER THE TANK #3 PUMPS INOP CAME ON AND THEN EXTINGUISHED. IT WAS FOLLOWED BY THE TANK #3 XFEED VALVE OPENING. THE FUEL SYS WAS IN AUTO. THE TANK #3 PUMPS INOP WAS INTERMITTENT SO WE REVIEWED THE AOM AND MONITORED THE FUEL SYS. ABOUT AN HR FROM ZZZ THE ENG #3 SUCK FEED LEVEL ONE ALERT CAME ON. WE REVIEWED THE AOM WHICH SAID IF THE FUEL SYS WAS IN NORMAL TO MONITOR. ON THE FUEL SYNOPTIC THERE WAS NOTHING GREEN FEEDING THE #3 ENG, NOTHING GREEN. I CONFERRED WITH THE FO AND STATED THAT I FELT MORE COMFORTABLE HAVING PRESSURIZED FUEL TO THE ENG IN LIGHT OF ALL THE ASSOCIATED FUEL PROBS WITH THE ACFT AND THIS TANK/ENG. I ELECTED TO PUT THE FUEL SYS IN MANUAL AND OPERATE TANK TO ENG FUEL PRESSURE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. I DID NOT WANT TO INDUCE A CRUISE LEVEL ENG FAILURE DUE TO FUEL STARVATION. THE FUEL LEVELS WERE BASICALLY EVEN IN TANKS #1, #2 AND #3. WE BOTH FELT MORE COMFORTABLE LOOKING AT THE DSCNT AND LNDG WITH THE FUEL SYS IN MANUAL AND HAVING POSITIVE PRESSURE TO THAT ENG. THIS IS NOT THE PROC OUTLINED IN THE AOM, BUT THE AOM DOESN'T ADDRESS IF THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER FUEL SYS PROBS ASSOCIATED WITH THAT TANK OR ENG. I FELT IT WAS EXERCISING GOOD JUDGEMENT TO PUT THE FUEL SYS IN MANUAL AND MONITOR IT FOR THE DURATION OF THE FLT. WE BRIEFED THE MECHS AFTER LNDG AND THEY WERE BOTH SURPRISED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING GREEN IN THE FUEL SYNOPTIC TO ENG #3 AT THE TIME AND AGREED AND APPLAUDED MY DECISION TO GO TO MANUAL AS I DID. MY MAIN FEAR WAS AN ENG #3 FLAMEOUT DUE TO FUEL STARVATION.

Synopsis

MD11 FLT CREW AT FL350 RPTS #3 FUEL TANK PUMP FAILURE AND FUEL SYS ANOMALIES WITH THE SYS IN AUTO. SYS IS SWITCHED TO MANUAL FOR REMAINDER OF FLT.

Time / Day

Date: 200705

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Personal Make Model Name: Cessna 152 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Descent: Intermediate Altitude

Component: 1

Aircraft Component : Engine

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot Qualification.Pilot: Commercial Qualification.Pilot: Instrument

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 40 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 665

Experience.Flight Time.Type: 35

ASRS Report: 739072

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative

I PREFLTED MY C152 JUST AS THE PREFLT CHKLIST STATES. AFTER TOPPING OFF BOTH L AND R TANKS, I TOOK A FUEL SAMPLE FROM THE R TANK. IN THAT FUEL

SAMPLE, I FOUND THAT THERE WAS A SLIGHT TRACE OF WATER. AFTER DISPOSING OF THAT FUEL SAMPLE, I TOOK 2 ADDITIONAL FUEL SAMPLES FROM THE R TANK, FINDING THAT THE FUEL WAS CLR AND BRIGHT, AND FREE OF WATER. THE PREFLT ON THE REST OF THE ACFT WAS SATISFACTORY. I FILED A VFR FLT PLAN AND I DEPARTED WITH MYSELF AND A PAX. I DEPARTED WITH 4 HRS AND 20 MINS, OR 26 GALS (24.5 GALS USEABLE) OF FUEL ON BOARD. I CALCULATED THAT THE FLT WOULD TAKE 2 HRS AND 50 MINS OF FLT TIME, OR 18 GALS OF FUEL BEING USED DURING THE FLT. THIS WOULD BE ENOUGH FUEL TO COMPLETE THE FLT, AND STILL HAVE THE REQUIRED 45 MIN RESERVE REMAINING. AT APPROX 2 HRS 50 MINS INTO THE FLT, I WAS ABOUT 11 MI SE OF ZZZ DSNDING, AND ADJUSTING MY MIXTURE FOR THE DSCNT. WHEN I WAS PASSING THROUGH 4800 FT MSL MY ENG LOST PWR, AND THE ENG WAS SPUTTERING ON AND OFF. I COMPLETED MY EMER CHKLIST, WHICH INCLUDED CHKING THE MAGNETOS, THE FUEL SELECTOR VALVE TO BE ON, CARB HEAT ON, MIXTURE RICH, AND THROTTLE. THEN I LOOKED FOR A PLACE TO PUT THE AIRPLANE DOWN ON. I HAD ZZZ TWR ON THE RADIO, SO I CALLED THE TWR UP AND DECLARED AN EMER. TWR CLRED ME TO LAND ON RWY 24, BUT I REALIZED THAT I WASN'T GOING TO MAKE IT TO THE ARPT. I FOUND A ROAD THAT I FELT WAS A GOOD PLACE TO PUT THE AIRPLANE DOWN. WITH THE LNDG SPOT IN SIGHT, I SET MYSELF UP ON A L DOWNWIND. AFTER TURNING ONTO THE FINAL LEG FOR THE ROAD, I SAW THAT THERE WAS A PALM TREE IN THE MEDIAN, BUT THE ROAD WAS CLR BEYOND THAT POINT, SO I EXTENDED MY LNDG POINT BY A COUPLE HUNDRED FEET IN ORDER TO MISS THE PALM TREE. THE ACFT TOUCHED DOWN AT NORMAL TOUCHDOWN SPD, AND I STARTED TO FLASH MY LNDG/TAXI LIGHTS AT A CAR AHEAD OF ME IN HOPE THAT IT WOULD CLR THE ROAD AHEAD. AFTER COMING TO A STOP, I GOT OUT AND MOVED THE PLANE OFF THE ROAD, AND PARKED IT IN A PARKING LOT SO THAT TFC WASN'T BLOCKED UP. THE AIRPLANE WAS PERFECTLY FINE, AND NEITHER I NOR MY PAX WAS INJURED. AT THIS POINT I CONTACTED THE POLICE. IN ORDER TO GET THE ACFT OFF OF ROAD, THE WINGS WERE NEEDED TO BE REMOVED. WHEN THE A&P REMOVED. THE WINGS, HE FOUND THAT THERE WAS 6 GALS OF FUEL REMAINING. AFTER TAKING OUT THE UNUSEABLE AMOUNT, WE HAD 4.5 GALS OF FUEL LEFT. I FEEL THAT THERE WAS A FUEL STARVATION PROB, EVEN THOUGH I SHOULD HAVE HAD AN HR WORTH OF FUEL LEFT.

Synopsis

C152 EXPERIENCES LOSS OF POWER AND LANDS ON ROAD SHORT OF DESTINATION.

Time / Day

Date: 200705 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: MSP.Airport

State Reference: MN

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 20000

Environment

Flight Conditions: Mixed

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZMP.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: DC-9 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Descent: Intermediate Altitude

Route In Use.Arrival.STAR: GOPHER

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 66 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 14000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 66

ASRS Report: 738901

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Crossing Restriction Not Met

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

BASICALLY CLRED ON GOPHER 5 ARR TO MSP TO CROSS OLLEE INTXN AT 11000 FT. LATER GIVEN SPD REDUCTION FROM NORMAL OF 300 KIAS TO 270 KIAS. DETERMINED AFTER A FEW MINS DELAY WE COULD NOT MAKE THE XING RESTR

GIVEN THIS SPD AND WIND CONDITIONS. ATC (ZMP) OFFERED A TURN OFF COURSE TO 'S' BACK FOR DSCNT AS A FASTER SPD COULD NOT BE APPROVED. EVENTUALLY ISSUED 'DSND TO 11000' RATHER THAN 'CROSS OLLEE AT 11000.' WITH NO WIND READOUT AND '/W' EQUIPPED ACFT, COUPLED WITH MY INEXPERIENCE IN THE ACFT HAVING COME FROM 'GLASS,' I LET THE FO GET HIGH. NO CONFLICT OCCURRED WITH OTHER ACFT AND ZMP VOICED NO CONCERNS. STILL, THESE SITUATIONS CAN SNEAK UP ON PLTS IN THESE OLDER GENERATION ACFT, AFTER TRANSITIONING FROM FMS ACFT. ONE CAN BE ULTRA CONSERVATIVE AND DSND EARLY, HOWEVER, WITH FUEL COSTS AS THEY ARE, OFTEN CONTINGENCY FUEL IS SPARSE AND EARLY DSCNTS/LOW ALT CRUISE CAN PUT ONE IN A FUEL RESERVE CORNER.

Synopsis

DC9 FLT CREW IS UNABLE TO MAKE CROSSING RESTRICTION AT AN ASSIGNED AIRSPEED AND ALTITUDE DUE TO INEXPERIENCE WITH NON-FMC ACFT.

Time / Day

Date: 200704

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2300

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Operator.General Aviation: Personal Make Model Name: Cessna 150 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Reciprocating Engine Assembly

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 29

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 265

ASRS Report: 736120

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical

Anomaly. Maintenance Problem: Improper Maintenance

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Consequence.Other: Aircraft Damaged

Consequence. Other

Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

ON APR/XA/O7, I PICKED UP MY ACFT AFTER HAVING THE ANNUAL SVCED ON IT. AFTER ARR IN ZZZ, I NOTICED THAT I WAS HAVING A PROB WITH THE LNDG GEAR AND WAS UNABLE TO PUSH THE ACFT BACK IN MY HANGAR. LATER ON

THAT SAME DAY, AFTER EXAMINING THE ENTIRE AIRPLANE, I NOTICED ONE OF THE NEW STROBE LIGHTS DID NOT WORK. IMMEDIATELY, I MADE A PHONE CALL TO MY MECH BASED ON THE PROB THAT I HAD. I WAS ADVISED TO BRING THE ACFT BACK. I TOOK IT BACK ON APR/XC/07, AND WAS REQUESTED TO BRING IT BACK ON APR/XD/07. ON THE WAY BACK HOME, I WENT TO ZZZ1 TO DROP OFF MY PAX, AND IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO ZZZ. I WAS FLYING WITH ZZZ2 APCH AT 4500 FT AT APPROX XA30. AT APPROX 8 MI TO ZZZ, I WAS RELEASED FROM APCH AND BEGAN DSNDING. AT APPROX 2300 FT AND APPROX 4.5 MI TO ZZZ. I TOTALLY LOST ENG PWR. I BEGAN GLIDING TOWARDS THE RWY. APPROX 1.75 MI FROM THE RWY MY ALT HAD BECAME EXTREMELY LOW. DUE TO THE TFC ON THE INTERSTATE AND THE HWY, AND STRUCTURAL HOUSING, I CHOSE TO LOOK FOR THE SAFEST FIELD IN WHICH TO LAND. AFTER LNDG, I NOTICED THAT I WAS HEADING FOR A POND. I DECIDED TO MAKE A L TURN TO AVOID THE POND, AND STRUCK A TREE WITH MY L WING. AFTER STRIKING THE TREE WITH THE L WING, MY AIRPLANE SPUN AROUND FACING NNE AND CAME TOTALLY TO A STOP. THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF HRS FLOWN SINCE THE ANNUAL WAS APPROX 1.7 HRS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THAT HE BROUGHT HIS ACFT TO THE MECHANIC FOR AN ANNUAL INSPECTION AND TO REPAIR THREE ITEMS THAT HAD BEEN MALFUNCTIONING, ONE OF WHICH WAS THE RIGHT FUEL GAUGE. UPON RETRIEVING THE ACFT WITH ALL ITEMS COMPLETE, THE REPORTER FOUND THAT THE STROBE STILL DID NOT WORK AND THE NOSE STRUT HAD BEEN OVER SERVICED WITH AIR MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO STEER WITH DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING. THE ACFT WAS RETURNED TO THE MECHANIC AND ON THE WAY BACK FROM THIS APPOINTMENT THE ACFT RAN OUT OF FUEL. THE REPORTER PUT 16 GALLONS OF FUEL IN THE ACFT 2 DAYS EARLIER AND RAN OUT OF FUEL AFTER FLYING 2 HOURS AND 15 MINUTES.

Synopsis

C150 PILOT REPORTS ENGINE FAILURE DURING DESCENT FOR LANDING. OFF ARPT LNDG ENSUES AND A COLLISION WITH A TREE.

Time / Day

Date: 200704 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZZ. Airport

State Reference : FO Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase. Ground: Preflight

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Other Personnel: Dispatcher Qualification.Other: Dispatcher

ASRS Report: 734632

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Company Policies

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Assessments

Problem Areas: Company

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

FLT PLAN FOR RTE MISCALCULATION, PAYLOAD INFLT WAS 'ZERO KGS', AND ACTUAL PAYLOAD WAS '13000 KGS.' THIS RESULTED IN FLT WAS NOT CAPABLE OF COMPLYING WITH ATC REQUEST FOR HOLDING BEFORE APCH TO DEST. FLT STATED AN EMER LNDG FUEL ADVISORY, FLT LANDED WITHOUT ANY OTHER PROB. WILL EXTREME ATTN FOR DISPATCHERS TO PERFORMANCE AND FUEL CALCULATION IN FLT PLAN. WILL INSIST IN ORDER THAT PIC AND DISPATCHER

AGREE COMPLETELY AND BE ABSOLUTELY AWARE OF RELEVANT DATAS ON FLT PLAN.

Synopsis

A B737 ARRIVES AT DEST SHORT OF FUEL DUE TO A MISCALCULATION IN THE PAYLOAD AT DEP STATION.

Time / Day

Date: 200704 Day: Fri

Local Time Of Day: 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZZ. Airport

State Reference : FO Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: MD-11

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground: Parked Flight Phase.Ground: Preflight

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Fuel Storage System

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 40 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 9000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 400

ASRS Report: 734092

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Relief Pilot

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 310

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 7623 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1100

ASRS Report: 734078

Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 50 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 8000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 300

ASRS Report: 734093

Person: 4

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Other Personnel: Dispatcher

Person: 5

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier

Function. Observation: Company Check Pilot

Function.Oversight: Supervisor

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector. Other. Flight Crew A: 1 Independent Detector. Other. Flight Crew B: 2 Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Consequence.Other: Company Review

Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Company

Situations

Narrative

THE COMPANY ISSUED A BULLETIN. THIS DOCUMENT REFERS TO AN EO THAT WAS SCHEDULED BE EFFECTIVE ON APRIL XA. THE AOM BULLETIN DESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE WAS NOT MADE AVAILABLE TO ME WHEN DEPARTING THE DOMICILE FOR THIS TRIP ON APRIL XC. SOME OF THE INFORMATION WITHIN IN THE AOM BULLETIN WAS FIRST MADE AVAILABLE TO THE OPERATING CREWMEMBERS IN THE FLEET BULLETIN. WE OPERATED FLIGHT FROM ZZZZ TO ZZZZ1 TO ZZZ2 ON APRIL XD. WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT WE OPERATED OUTSIDE THE FAR'S ON THE SECOND SEGMENT. TWO PLACARDS ON THE FORWARD INSTRUMENT PANEL STATE 'TANK 2 BALLAST REQUIRED IF USEABLE (SIC) FUEL IN TANKS 1/2/3 IS LESS THAN 145,000 LBS.' THE PLACARDS DO NOT SPECIFY A TIME WHEN THIS RESTRICTION IS NOT APPLICABLE. WE CONCLUDE THEN, THAT IT IS APPLICABLE TO ALL PHASES OF FLIGHT AND ALL OPERATIONS. 1) WE DID NOT BLOCK BALLAST FUEL IN THE FMS PER THE PROCEDURE. WE AUTOMATICALLY AND MANUALLY MAINTAINED THE FUEL IN EXCESS OF THE BALLAST REQUIRED PER PLACARD, EXCEPT THAT DURING CRUISE FLIGHT WE INADVERTENTLY ALLOWED THE #2 TANK TO GET SLIGHTLY BELOW 25K FOR A SHORT PERIOD. 2) WE DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE MANUAL PROCEDURE TO MAINTAIN A MINIMUM OF 25K LBS IN TANK 2 THROUGHOUT THE FLIGHT. WE DID MANUALLY MANAGE THE FUEL TO ASSURE MORE THAN 25K LBS AT LANDING. 3) WE DEPARTED ZZZZ1 PLANNING TO USE MANUAL FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR A SEGMENT OF THE FLIGHT WITHOUT WRITTEN, FLIGHT PLAN CALCULATIONS FOR THE LACK OF TAIL FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR THAT PORTION OF THE FLIGHT WHEN MANUAL FUEL PROCEDURES WERE IMPLEMENTED. WE REASONED THAT THE 17000 POUNDS WE ADDED TO BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTENT OF THE BULLETIN WERE WELL MORE THAN THE PUBLISHED 2.7% PENALTY (LESS THAN 4000 LBS) WE WOULD HAVE INCURRED BY NOT USING TAIL FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR THE ENTIRE FLIGHT. WE PLANNED ON OPERATING

WITHOUT TAIL FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR ONLY (APPROX) THE DESCENT AND LANDING PHASE OF FLIGHT FURTHER REDUCING THE ACTUAL FUEL BURN FROM THE 2.7% PENALTY LEVEL. RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW INDICATES THAT WE SHOULD HAVE QUERIED DISPATCH IF SUCH CALCULATIONS CAPABILITY EXISTED WITHIN COMMERCIAL PLANNING SOFTWARE SO AS TO PUBLISH SAID NUMBERS ON THE RELEASE. EXPLANATION AND CONCERNS: ON APRIL XD, WE ARRIVED AT THE GATEWAY IN ZZZZ UNAWARE OF ANY NEW ISSUES WITH THE FUEL SYSTEM OF THE MD-11. AS INDICATED BY HIS ADVANCED ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE REQUIRED REPETITIVE INSPECTION AT THE AIRCRAFT, THE MECHANIC KNEW OF THE ISSUE ABOUT TO UNFOLD, AND BRIEFED US ON IT EVEN PRIOR TO BOARDING. THE GATEWAY'S FUEL LOAD ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT DID NOT CONTAIN ANY BALLAST FUEL; THEREFORE, IT APPEARS THAT GATEWAY OPERATIONS PERSONNEL WERE NOT AWARE OF THE BULLETIN(S). DURING THE PREFLIGHT, I CONTACTED THE DISPATCHER AND SPOKE OF SEVERAL SEEMINGLY IMPORTANT ISSUES. I ASKED IF THERE WAS SOME TYPE OF BULLETIN ISSUED TO AFFORD MY CREW AND ME SOME INSIGHT OF THE NEW PROCEDURES. IT WAS STATED THAT INFORMATION WAS CONTAINED WITHIN THE DEPARTURE PAPERS AND LATER IN THE PREFLIGHT; THIS INDEED WAS FOUND TO BE THE CASE. THERE WAS SOME INFORMATION PRESENTED IN THE PAPERWORK. I REQUESTED THAT THE RELEASE REFLECT THE NECESSARY FUELING SCHEDULE TO INCLUDE BALLAST CONTROL FUEL, AND THAT WAS LATER ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF A SECOND, CORRECTED RELEASE, DELIVERED TO THE AIRCRAFT SOMEWHAT LATER. ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETELY AND FULLY UNDERSTAND THE SPECIFIC FUELING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DUTY DAY'S TWO FLIGHTS, I ALSO REQUESTED A COPY OF ANY BULLETIN, AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE, OR ANY OTHER BULLETINS THAT WOULD BE APPLICABLE, AND THE DISPATCHER NOTED THE REQUEST. I WAS TOLD THAT THESE ITEMS WOULD NOT EVEN BE AVAILABLE TO THE DISPATCHER. I RELAYED THE PLACARDED INFORMATION TO THE DISPATCHER, AND INDICATED THAT THE SECOND LEG MIGHT CAUSE PAYLOAD ISSUES. THE DISPATCHER SAID THAT BASED ON INFORMATION HE HAD AVAILABLE, HE BELIEVED THAT BALLAST FUEL WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED FOR THE SECOND LEG BUT THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERNS, FOUND THEM TO BE OF GREAT INTEREST, AND HE WOULD 'CHECK ON IT.' LATER, AFTER AIRCRAFT LOGBOOK REVIEW, WE NOTED OUR AIRCRAFT WAS PLACARDED FOR THE EO ON APRIL XB. IN AN EFFORT TO MAKE A SAFE, ON-TIME DEPARTURE, SEVERAL REQUESTS WERE MADE TO THE SUPERVISOR AT THE AIRPLANE (EVEN PRIOR TO COMPLETING THE LESS-THAN-IDEAL IN-COCKPIT FLIGHT PLANNING AND PAPERWORK PREFLIGHT DUTIES). EVENTUALLY THE FUEL WAS UP-LOADED AS REQUIRED BY THE DEFERRAL, AND AFTER REVIEWING EACH OF THE GATEWAY'S THREE SEPARATE ATTEMPTS OF PROVIDING A CORRECT WEIGHT AND BALANCE FORM, AND WE DEPARTED SOMEWHAT LATE FOR ZZZZ1. UPON ARRIVAL IN ZZZZ1, WE WERE GIVEN A FAXED DIRECTIVE TO OPERATE WITHOUT 'BALLAST' FUEL FROM OPS. WHILE THE INTENT OF THE DIRECTIVE TO OPERATE (THAT WE DID NOT NEED BALLAST FUEL ONBOARD FOR LANDING) WAS CLEAR, THE IMPROPER GRAMMAR MADE THE ACTUAL MEANING UNDECIPHERABLE AND MEANINGLESS IF READ PRECISELY. THE LOAD PLAN ZZZZ1-ZZZ2 DID NOT INCLUDE SUFFICIENT FUEL TO ALLOW BLOCKING 25K LBS OF BALLAST AS WE BELIEVE IS REQUIRED BY THE PLACARD AND FLIGHT BRIEFING PACKAGE VERBIAGE. I CALLED OPS FOR YET ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE. WHILE THIS DISCUSSION WAS ONGOING, A MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR CALLED US AND I ASKED HIM TO PROVIDE A FAX OF THE AOM BULLETIN OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION HE HAD AVAILABLE REGARDING THIS NEW PROCEDURE. THE STATION MECHANIC THEN RETRIEVED THE FAX COPY OF THE BULLETIN AND

BROUGHT IT ONBOARD. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME ANYONE ON THE CREW HAD SEEN THE AOM BULLETIN. READING THE BULLETIN DID NOT CLEAR UP OUR CONCERN. AS WE EXPECTED THERE WAS MUCH CONFUSION BETWEEN THE BULLETIN AND THE OTHER VERBAL AND WRITTEN GUIDANCE ISSUED TO US. JUST AS MY CREW DISCUSSED (SUPPOSED) EARLIER IN THE DAY, AS EXPRESSED TO BOTH THE DISPATCHER AND TO MAINTENANCE, THE BULLETIN INDEED ADDRESSES THE ELECTRICAL ARCING POTENTIAL AS A FUNCTION OF TANK FUEL LEVELS. THE BULLETIN VERY CLEARLY SPELLS OUT THE INTENT OF THE BULLETIN AS THIS: KEEP THE FUEL PUMPS SUBMERGED FOR ALL PHASES OF AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS. IN MY MIND, THIS STATEMENT INCLUDES LANDING AND GO-AROUND, AND BLOCK-IN; IN FACT ALL PHASES AND OPERATIONS, NOT JUST TAKEOFF. THIS SEEMS TO BE IN CONCERT WITH THE AIRCRAFT'S TWO PLACARDS. THE COMPANY, THROUGH LESS FORMAL VERBAL AND WRITTEN DIRECTIVES, SEEMED TO BE SAYING SOMETHING COMPLETELY DIFFERENT TO US. OPS STATED SPECIFICALLY THAT THE FUEL LOADING CHANGES MADE EFFECTIVE BY THIS 'DEFERRAL' APPLIED ONLY TO TAKE-OFF FUEL LOADS AND WAS A FUNCTION OF SOME PRESUMED FUEL TEMPERATURE AT ARRIVAL OR ENROUTE. THAT IF THE AIRCRAFT DEPARTED WITH A BOEING SPECIFIED 'SAFE' FUEL QUANTITY OF 'FULL' TANKS 1/2/3 POUNDS (NO 'BALLAST REQUIRED'), THAT THE AIRCRAFT'S PUMPS WOULD SOMEHOW REMAIN SAFELY COVERED FOR THE DURATION OF THE FLIGHT, REGARDLESS OF THE PLANNED BLOCK-IN FUEL LOAD. AND BASED ON A PRESUMED FUEL TEMPERATURE TO BE EXPERIENCED FOR SOME PORTION OF THE FLIGHT, NO ARCING WOULD OCCUR. INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US, EVEN PRIOR TO THIS EVENT, COUNTERED THAT PHILOSOPHY AND WE SEARCHED AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO RECEIVE ADDITIONAL CONCISE, NON-CONFLICTING INFORMATION ON THIS DAY. MAINTENANCE AND FLIGHT OPS ARE MANDATING THE DISPATCH OF FLIGHTS WITH EXTREMELY DIFFERENT BLOCK-IN FUEL LOAD/LEVEL REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATIONS: LARGER BLOCK-IN FUEL LOAD PLANNING WHERE MAX. GROSS TAKEOFF WEIGHTS (PAYLOAD PLUS FUEL) ARE NOT AN ISSUE OF OPERATIONAL CONCERN, AND MINIMUM (FAR?) BLOCK IN FUEL LOADS WHEN ANY ADDITIONAL 'BALLAST CONTROL' FUEL WOULD NEGATIVELY AFFECT PAYLOADS. OPS IS APPARENTLY ISOLATING AND INTERPRETING THE WORD 'LOADING' (IN THE AOM BULLETIN'S DESCRIPTIVE NOTE SHOWING REASON FOR IMPLEMENTATION) TO MEAN THAT ONLY DURING FUEL 'LOADING?' DOES THE MINIMUM OF 'FULL' OR 'BALLAST UP TO 25,000 POUNDS' APPLY. BARRING FURTHER DETAILS, WE CANNOT COMPREHEND THAT PLAN'S LOGIC, AS IT SEEMS CONTRARY TO THE PLACARDS, OTHER PASSAGES OF THE AOM BULLETIN, AND EXPERIENCES. IN WHAT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY UNDERSTOOD AS A CAPTAIN/DISPATCHER OBLIGATION, CREWS ARE NOW INSTRUCTED VIA WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS TO 'CHECK WITH THE GATEWAY' FOR FUELING REQUIREMENTS (REGARDING THIS ITEM). AGAIN, THE NOTE IN THE AOM BULLETIN STATING THE PURPOSE OF THE PROCEDURE EXACERBATED OUR CONCERN. THE BULLETIN STATES, 'NOTE: THE INTENT OF THE GUIDANCE IS TO ASSURE LOADING OF SUFFICIENT FUEL IN TANK 2 SO THAT ALL TANK PUMPS REMAIN SUBMERGED IN FUEL AT FLIGHT TERMINATION.' WHILE TRYING TO CONVINCE THE CREW THAT THE BALLAST FUEL WAS NOT NEEDED FOR THE FLIGHT ZZZZ1-ZZZZ, SEVERAL OF THE MANAGER'S VERBAL EXPLANATIONS, IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN THEIR INTERPRETATION OF THE ISSUE, CENTERED ON THE TEMPERATURE OF THE TANK AND THE LENGTH OF THE FLIGHT SEGMENT. THESE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE ISSUE BY THE MANAGERS AT OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE WERE LATER RESCINDED BY SOME, AND THOSE REASONS SEEMED TO BE REPLACED WITH VERBIAGE MORE PRECISELY IN LINE WITH THE AOM BULLETIN. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WAS MADE OF THE PRESENTATIONS AVAILABLE

TO MECHANICS ABOUT THE ISSUE OF ARCING WITHIN THE FUEL TANKS. STILL, MANAGEMENT STATED THAT WE DID NOT NEED BALLAST FUEL FOR THIS SEGMENT. PERHAPS WE DID NOT. THE FLIGHT CREW LATER DETERMINED FROM THE WEIGHT AND BALANCE (WITH THE ACTUAL PAYLOAD SHOWN), THAT WE HAD FUEL TANK CAPACITY AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY FOR ENOUGH FUEL TO ENSURE THAT AT LEAST THE MINIMUM 25,000 LBS OF FUEL REQUIRED IN THE #2 TANK (BY OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION), FLIGHT BRIEFING PACKAGE, AND PLACARD, COULD BE PLACED ONBOARD. WE ASKED FOR, AND EVENTUALLY GIVEN AN ADDITIONAL 17,000 POUNDS OF FUEL. THIS BROUGHT OUR T/O GROSS WEIGHT UP TO THE ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO GW. NO PAYLOAD WAS LOST. THE DISPATCHER PROVIDED AN UPDATED FUEL BURN. SINCE WE WERE NEARING OUR DROP-DEAD TIME FOR EXTENDED DUTY, WE SOON COMPLETED THE PRE-BLOCK-OUT PROCEDURES AND DISCUSSED HOW TO USE MANUAL FUEL MANAGEMENT TO PRESERVE THE 25K IN THE CENTER TANK. WE DEPARTED ZZZZ1. WE OPERATED THE SYSTEM IN AUTO MODE TO ALLOW TAIL FUEL MANAGEMENT TO SAVE US AS MUCH FUEL AS POSSIBLE AND THEN USING MANUAL FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR THE LAST HOUR OR SO OF THE FLIGHT AS WE DESCENDED ALLOWING US TO LAND IN ZZZ2 WITH MORE THAN 25K LBS IN THE #2 TANK. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT OUR ACTIONS ASSURED THE PUMPS WERE SUBMERGED THROUGHOUT THE FLIGHT. THIS ENTIRE ORDEAL WAS MORE THAN FATIGUING AND IN MY OPINION IT HAD A SERIOUS NEGATIVE IMPACT ON OPERATIONS THAT DAY. WE ARE YET UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE REQUIREMENT FOR 25K LBS OF BALLAST FOR THE LANDING AFTER A SHORT DURATION FLIGHT (ONE THAT STARTED WITH LESS THAN 120K OF FUEL) BUT NOT THE SAME REQUIREMENT FOR THE SAME QUANTITY TO ASSURE SUBMERSION AFTER A LONGER FLIGHT. OUR REASONING IS THAT THE POTENTIAL TO EXPOSE A PUMP (OR ITS CONNECTIONS) ON A GO-AROUND (OR ELSEWHERE) SEEMS THE SAME ON BOTH FLIGHTS. BASICALLY, WE ARE QUESTIONING, 'WHAT DOES STAGE LENGTH HAVE TO DO WITH THE MINIMUM FUEL LEVEL REQUIREMENTS TO ACCOMPLISH SUBMERSION OF THE (POSSIBLY) FAULTY PART(S)?' WE CHOSE TO ERR TO A MORE CONSERVATIVE SIDE OF THE EQUATION BY PROVIDING WHAT WE REASONED WAS A SAFER OPERATION THAN HAD BEEN VERBALLY DIRECTED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER ACN 734078 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HIS ACR DID NOT FEEL IT WAS NECESSARY TO CARRY FUEL IN THE CENTER TANK FOR LNDG, ONLY TKOF, AND THEREFORE THE FUEL WAS BALLAST ONLY FOR TKOF. THE CREW, INCLUDING THE CAPT AND AN ON BOARD CHECK CAPT DISAGREED AND AFTER TALKING WITH DISPATCH THEY CARRIED THE EXTRA FUEL. THE ACR'S DISPATCH STATED THAT SINCE THE FUEL TANKS WERE COLD SOAKED FROM CRUISE, COOLING FUEL IN THE TANK WAS NOT NECESSARY.

Synopsis

AN MD11 PLT RPTS AMBIGUITY ABOUT TANKERING 25000 LBS OF #2 TANK FUEL FOR PUMP COOLING DURING BOTH TKOF AND LNDG.

Time / Day

Date: 200704 Day: Sun

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: MCO.Airport

State Reference: FL

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: MCO.Tower Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 200

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 2900 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 700

ASRS Report: 733691

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Events

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas: Company

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ENRTE WE WERE ASSIGNED A RERTE BY ATC THAT CHANGED OUR ARR INTO MCO FROM THE LEESE.OTK TO THE MINEE.PIE. ACCORDING TO THE FMS OUR FUEL WOULD BE 2000 LBS UPON LNDG WITH THIS RERTE SO WE ACCEPTED IT. ON FINAL APCH, THE FUEL QUANTITY INDICATORS TURNED AMBER, AND WE LANDED WITH 1700 LBS. IT WAS AN UNCOMFORTABLE SIT TO BE IN, AND THE FIRST TIME IN A YR OF BEING CAPT THAT THIS HAPPENED TO ME. USUALLY, MY GOAL IS TO LAND WITH AT LEAST 3000 LBS, HOWEVER, THIS TIME I DIDN'T ADD FUEL AT THE GATE LIKE I USUALLY DO FOR ANY FLT. I TYPICALLY TAKE ABOUT 500 LBS OF EXTRA GAS BECAUSE I AM CONCERNED THAT OUR DISPATCHERS ARE NOT PLANNING US WITH ENOUGH FUEL. THEY DO THIS BY FILING US AT UNREASONABLE FLT LEVELS. FOR INSTANCE, FILING US AT FL340 FOR A 40 MIN LEG. MY THEORY IS THAT THEY THINK BY DOING THIS THEY CAN HAVE A LIGHTER FUEL LOAD AND GET MORE PAX ON BOARD. OTHER CONCERNS ARE THAT OUR CODE-SHARE'S POLICY IS NOT TO HAVE HOLD FUEL WHEN THERE IS A PLANNED ALTERNATE. I DO NOT THINK THIS IS A SAFE POLICY. SO, I USUALLY TRY TO TAKE EXTRA GAS. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF DISTRS OR TIME CONSTRAINTS, SOMETIMES I FORGET TO TAKE EXTRA. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL RE-PRIORITIZE MY PREFLT DUTIES TO HAVE FUEL CONCERNS AT THE TOP OF MY LIST. THE ONGOING BATTLE WILL BE TO AVOID DISTRS THAT DIVERT MY ATTN FROM FUEL PLANNING. OF COURSE, I ALSO MUST BE ABLE TO DIVIDE MY ATTN AND NOT FIXATE ON FUEL CONCERNS TO THE DETRIMENT OF OTHER PREFLT DUTIES.

Synopsis

ARRIVAL REROUTE RESULTS IN LESS THAN DESIRED FUEL AT DESTINATION FOR E145 FLT CREW.

Time / Day

Date: 200704 Day: Wed

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LAX.Airport

State Reference : CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : Marginal

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: SCT.TRACON Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B757-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope: 24R

Flight Phase.Landing: Go Around Route In Use.Arrival.STAR: N/S

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 240 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 15500 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 8700

ASRS Report: 733500

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment: TCAS Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Advisory

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Executed Go Around

Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Narrative

WE WERE LEVEL AT 2200 FT MSL OUTSIDE OF JETSA WHEN WE GOT A 'TFC, TFC' AUDIO/YELLOW POP-UP ON THE HSI. WE THEN GOT A RED RA/AUDIO 'CLB, CLB' WARNING. MY EXCELLENT FO BEGAN TO FOLLOW THE RA GUIDANCE BARS AND I SAW THAT THE RA ALT WAS 1900 FT MSL AND WE WERE 2000 FT MSL. MY FO CLBED FASTER AND THE RA SYMBOL STAYED WITH US AT 100 FT BELOW OUR ALT. I TOLD LAX TWR THAT WE HAD AN RA ALERT AND WE WERE CLBING/GOING AROUND. LAX TWR TOLD US TO CLB TO 3000 FT AND TO FOLLOW THE LOC. I ASKED IF WE COULD FLY RWY HDG INSTEAD. HE SAID OK. THE RA DISAPPEARED AT 2900 FT MSL. I DO NOT REMEMBER HEARING THE TCAS CLR OF CONFLICT AUDIO ANNOUNCEMENT. AT THIS POINT WE GOT THE LOW FUEL EICAS MESSAGE ALONG WITH THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHTS AND THE BEEPER. I GOT OUT THE HANDBOOK AND FOLLOWED THE SOP BY OPENING THE XFEED VALVE AND TURNING ON THE CTR FUEL PUMPS. WE TURNED DOWNWIND NORTH AND TOLD SOCAL THAT WE HAD LOW FUEL AND 5500 LBS OF FUEL REMAINING. WE TURNED BASE 3 MI E OF JETSA AND HAD NO FURTHER INCIDENT. WE LANDED WITH 5100 LBS OF FUEL. ON THE GND OUR CTLR TOLD US THAT THERE WAS NO TFC IN OUR IMMEDIATE AREA AND THAT A HELI WAS 3 MI BEHIND US AND OFFSET AT LOW ALT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE WARNING WAS A FALSE INDICATION. HOWEVER, WE FOLLOWED SOP. HUMAN FACTORS AT HAND WERE: WE WERE VERY TIRED AS OUR FLT THE NIGHT PRIOR WAS LATE AND TURNED INTO A LATE NIGHT FLT WHICH ARRIVED IN THE EARLY MORNING. OUR FLT OUTBOUND WAS DELAYED DUE TO UNKNOWN REASONS AND WE ARRIVED INTO LAX AT XA55 WHICH WAS EXACTLY 2 HRS LATE. THE RA WARNING OCCURRED AT A CRITICAL TIME, RIGHT AT GS INTERCEPT AND THINGS GOT VERY BUSY. SINCE WE WERE CLBING QUICKLY WE NEVER REALLY ACCELERATED MUCH ABOVE THE BUG. WE PERFORMED A GAR TO CLEAN CONFIGN AND RETURNED TO LAND ON RWY 24R. ATC SAID THAT NO FURTHER INFO WAS REQUIRED AND TO HAVE A GOOD NIGHT. I CALLED DISPATCH AND ADVISED OF THE SITUATION. MY FO WROTE UP THE TCAS AND CALLED MAINT.

Synopsis

B757-200 CREW RECEIVES TCAS RA JUST OUTSIDE JETSA ON THE ILS 24R AT LAX AND GOES AROUND FOLLOWING TCAS GUIDANCE.

Time / Day

Date : 200703 Day : Fri

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 10000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC Weather Elements : Ice

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: EMB ERJ 140 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent: Holding

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

ASRS Report : 731312

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Radar

Person: 4

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Other Personnel: Dispatcher

Events

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2

Resolutory Action.Controller: Provided Flight Assist Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Landed As Precaution

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Aircraft Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS THE CAPT AND THE PF ON A FLT FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2. DURING OUR DSCNT ON A STAR ARR INTO ZZZZ WE WERE INFORMED THAT TRACON HAD SUFFERED A COMPLETE RADAR OUTAGE, AND WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD AT AN INTXN, WHICH WE HAD JUST PASSED. WE TURNED BACK AND HELD AT THE INTXN AT 10000 FT, IN THE CLOUDS AND IN ICING CONDITIONS. AT THIS TIME, ALL ACFT SYSTEMS WERE OPERATING NORMALLY, INCLUDING ANTI-ICING SYSTEMS, WHICH HAD BEEN ACTIVATED BY THE ICE DETECTORS. MY FO AND I QUICKLY ASCERTAINED OUR FUEL STATUS, AND I INSTRUCTED FO TO ASSUME THE ROLE OF PF WHILE I CONTACTED DISPATCH TO LOOK AT OUR OPTIONS. I SPOKE QUICKLY WITH OUR DISPATCHER, LETTING HIM KNOW OF OUR FUEL STATE, WHICH WAS AT 3000 LBS. HE QUICKLY DETERMINED THAT OUR EFC TIME OF 30 MINS PAST THE HOUR WOULD LEAVE US WITH FUEL TO DIVERT TO ZZZ3 AND HAVE ONLY 800 LBS REMAINING UPON LNDG IN ZZZ3. I FOUND THAT VERY UNSATISFACTORY, AND WE DISCUSSED OUR LEAVING THE HOLD IN APPROX 5 MINS TO DIVERT TO ZZZ3 AND GET MORE FUEL AND AWAIT FOR ZZZ2 TO RESUME ACCEPTING ARRIVALS. I TOLD MY FO OF MY INTENTIONS, RESUMED PF DUTIES, AND ALSO TOLD CTR THAT WE WERE DECLARING MINIMUM FUEL STATUS AND WERE DIVERTING. AS WE WERE PULLED OUT OF THE HOLD AND GIVEN A VECTOR WE RECEIVED AN EICAS MSG THAT SAID OUR #1 ENG ANTI-ICE VALVE HAD FAILED. I HAD FO PERFORM THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST AS I ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND ASSUMED COMS WITH ATC. I DECLARED AN EMER, REQUESTING HIGHER TO GET US OUT OF THE ICING CONDITIONS, ALL THE WHILE VERY COGNIZANT OF OUR LOW FUEL STATUS AND NEED TO CONSERVE FUEL. CTR RECEIVED A TOPS RPT AT FL180, AND WE WERE CLRED TO FL200 IN ORDER TO TOP THE ICING CONDITIONS. AS I LEVELED OFF AT FL200, I PULLED POWER BACK TO LRC POWER SETTING AND DETERMINED A DSCNT POINT OF 60 MILES FROM ZZZ3 IN ORDER TO HAVE A FLT IDLE DSCNT TO THE FAF FOR THE ILS. WE WERE GIVEN DIRECT ROUTING, WITH CTR ASKING FUEL AMOUNT AND SOULS ON BOARD. WE ALSO CONFIRMED WITH THEM OUR NEED TO REMAIN CLR OF ICING CONDITIONS DUE TO THE FAILURE OF OUR ANTI-ICING SYSTEM. THE WX WAS MUCH IMPROVED AS WE HEADED TO ZZZ3 AND WE DSNDED AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT WITH OUR LOW FUEL WARNINGS GOING OFF DURING THE DSCNT. WE LANDED WITH 1200 LBS USABLE FUEL.

Synopsis

EMB140 FLT CREW HAS A LOW FUEL STATE AND AN ANTI ICE MALFUNCTION, DECLARES EMER AND DIVERTS FOR LNDG.

Time / Day

Date: 200703 Day: Wed

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: MD-88

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Powerplant Fuel Indication

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier
Function.Oversight: Coordinator
Qualification.Technician: Airframe
Qualification.Technician: Powerplant
Experience.Maintenance.Avionics: 10
Experience.Maintenance.Supervisor: 7
Experience.Maintenance.Technician: 10

ASRS Report: 730855

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Maintenance: Technician Qualification.Technician: Airframe Qualification.Technician: FCC

Qualification. Technician: Powerplant Experience. Maintenance. Technician: 5

ASRS Report: 732035

Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Events

Anomaly Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 3

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Fault Isolation Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Inspection Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Logbook Entry

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Repair Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Testing Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Training

Assessments

Problem Areas: Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

FLT WAS ENRTE APPROX 2:45 HRS INTO THE FLT. A RADIO CALL CAME IN FROM THE FLT CREW RPTING A POSSIBLE FUEL LEAK AND THAT THEY WERE DIVERTING TO ZZZ2. RPT CONTINUED AS R MAIN WAS SHOWING APPROX 2500 LBS BELOW L AND CTR TANK WAS EMPTY. BOTH ENG FUEL FLOWS WERE EVEN THROUGH ENTIRE FLT AND THAT THERE WAS NO SIGNS OF MIGRATION. REVIEWING THE HISTORY SHOWS 1 PREVIOUS FOR A FUEL QUANTITY INDICATION PROB WHICH WAS CLRED IN ZZZ1 DURING THE PREVIOUS NIGHT MAINT, NOTHING REFING FUEL LEAK PROBS. SINCE THE CREW HAD ALREADY MADE THE DECISION TO DIVERT. I ASKED HIM TO RECALCULATE AND SEE IF HE HAD THE FUEL TO MAKE ZZZ. HE RESPONDED THAT HE WAS 'OK FOR ZZZ.' AT THIS POINT THE RADIO PATCH BECAME UNSTABLE AND IT WAS NECESSARY TO DISCONNECT. I NEXT SENT HIM AN ACARS MESSAGE ASKING IF IT WAS NECESSARY TO ADD TRIM TO MAINTAIN LEVEL FLT. HIS RESPONSE BACK TO THE DISPATCHER, VIA ACARS, WAS 'NONE AT THIS TIME.' AFTER ARR ZZZ IT WAS REVEALED THAT ON APCH, AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO START THE APU WHICH HAD FAILED FOLLOWED SHORTLY AFTER BY THE R ENG SHUTTING DOWN DUE TO FUEL STARVATION. THE ACFT WAS APPROX 10000 FT AGL. ZZZ FUELING STUCK THE TANKS AND FOUND ZERO FUEL IN TANK WITH 1900 ON FUEL GAUGE. AFTER APPROX 2 HRS THE FQIS (FUEL QUANTITY INDICATING SYS) BEGAN WORKING AND INDICATION WAS 850 AND STICKS AGREED. REVIEW OF THE ZZZ1 DEP FUEL SLIP SHOWED ZZZ1 ARR FUEL OF L-5450/C-700/R-9400 AND THAT NO FUEL WAS ADDED TO THE R TANK. FUEL AFTER FUELING IN ZZZ1 WAS L-9400/C-8000/R-9400. THE TANKS WERE NEVER STUCK TO CONFIRM THE ORIGINAL IMBAL. ONCE WE SPOKE TO THE CREW WE WERE ABLE TO ASCERTAIN THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A FUEL LEVEL LOW ANNUNCIATION EARLIER IN THE FLT BUT NEVER REVEALED THIS TO MAINT CTL OR LCL MAINT UNTIL QUESTIONED ON THE GND. THE ACFT PERFORMED SINGLE ENG LNDG IN ZZZ WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THIS ACFT ARRIVED WITH A PREVIOUSLY DEFERRED AND CLEARED MEL FOR A FUEL QUANTITY INDICATION PROBLEM. THIS FLEET TYPE ACFT UTILIZES A SINGLE 'STANDARD ELECTRONIC MODULE' (SEM) FOR FUEL QUANTITY INDICATION. THE QUANTITY SIGNALS TO THE WING FUELING PANEL AND COCKPIT GAUGES ARE SENT VIA PARALLEL OUTPUTS FROM THE SEM. SO, IF ONE OF THE FUEL INDICATORS GOES OUT, THEN THE OTHER PARALLEL CIRCUIT IS SEPARATE AND FUNCTIONAL. HOWEVER, IN THIS CASE, MAINTENANCE TROUBLESHOOTING AFTER THE FLIGHT DIVERTED FOUND THE FAULTY FUEL TANK COMPENSATOR SIGNAL TO THE 'SEM' ACTUALLY IS UPSTREAM OF THE 'SEM' OUTPUT TO THE PARALLEL CIRCUITS. IN

EFFECT, BOTH WING AND COCKPIT GAUGES SHOWED THE SAME INCORRECT QUANTITY READINGS WITHOUT ANY NOTICEABLE DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THEM THAT WOULD NORMALLY INDICATE A PROBLEM. THIS REPORTER DOES QUESTION WHY A MAGNETIC FUEL DRIP STICK CHECK OF THE WING TANKS WAS NOT PREVIOUSLY ACCOMPLISHED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 732035: I WAS ASSIGNED TO WORK ACFT R FUEL QUANTITY INDICATION. I FOLLOW THE PROC TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY. THE FUEL QUANTITY WAS CHKED AND RECHKED. I CLRED THE ITEM AND RELEASED THE ACFT. THESE ARE SOME OF THE FACTORS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROB. 1) THE ACFT MAY BE IMPROPERLY FUELED PRIOR TO DEP OR THE FUEL MAY NOT HAVE DISTRIBUTED PROPERLY BY THE FUELER. 2) I WAS NOT TRAINED ON MD88 WHICH MAY HAVE LED TO A POOR INTERP OF THE ITEM. 3) I WAS WORKING ALONE AND DID NOT HAVE SOMEONE TO XCHK MY WORK. THINGS THAT I COULD HAVE DONE TO PREVENT THIS OCCURRENCE. 1) SPEAK TO MY LEAD ABOUT THE CORRECTIVE ACTION USED TO CLR THE ITEM. 2) GET TRAINING ON THE ACFT AND GET MORE KNOWLEDGE OF THE FUEL QUANTITY SYS ON MD88.

Synopsis

A DC-9 ACFT DIVERTED DUE TO LOW FUEL AND FUEL QUANTITY INDICATION PROBLEMS.

Time / Day

Date: 200703 Day: Fri

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 37000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A320

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Fuel Storage System

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Qualification.Pilot: Flight Engineer

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 150 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 12500 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 720

ASRS Report: 730528

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 3

Function.Other Personnel.Other

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical

Independent Detector. Aircraft Equipment. Other Aircraft Equipment: Fuel Quat

Gauges

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING ROUTINE SCHEDULED ACR FLT TO ZZZ, IT WAS DISCOVERED AFTER 4 HRS OF FLT, THAT THERE MAY BE A FUEL LEAK IN THE R FUEL SYS. DEP WAS UNEVENTFUL EXCEPT FOR BEING HELD TO A LOWER CRUISE ALT INITIALLY FOR TFC. LOOKING AT FUEL USAGE AFTER THE FIRST HR, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE L FUEL TANK WAS OUT OF BAL BY 500 LBS LOWER THAN THE R TANK AND THE TOTAL BURN WAS 400 LBS OVER FLT PLAN BURN. FOR THE NEXT 2 HRS EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL WITH EACH HRLY CHK OF THE FUEL AND OTHER SYS. WHILE CONDUCTING HR #4 FUEL CHK IT WAS NOTICED THAT THERE WAS NOW A PROB WITH THE FUEL SYS, SPECIFICALLY THE R SIDE, 1000 LBS LESS THAN THE L SIDE. WHILE THERE WAS ENOUGH FUEL TO CONTINUE TO THE DEST WITH NO DELAY, 1500 LBS OF FUEL WAS UNACCOUNTED FOR. THE CAPT CONTACTED THE DISPATCHER VIA COMPANY RADIO AND IT WAS DECIDED TO DIVERT INTO ZZZ2, SINCE WE WERE 20 MI AND CLOSING AT THAT TIME. AN EMER WAS DECLARED WITH CTR AND THE CAPT RAN THE QRH FUEL LEAK PROC AND WE DIVERTED UNEVENTFULLY TO ZZZ2 COMPLYING WITH ALL COMPANY AND ACFT PROCS. THE FIRE CREW WAS STANDING BY ON THE GND AND DID A THOROUGH CHK OF THE ACFT ON THE RWY AND ESCORTED US TO THE GATE WHEN IT WAS DETERMINED SAFE TO DO SO. IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THERE WAS A FUEL LEAK COMING FROM THE R ENG NACELLE. A MAINT LOGBOOK ENTRY WAS MADE AT THE GATE, PAX DEPLANED AND SWITCHED TO A NEW ACFT FOR THE TRIP TO ZZZ.

Synopsis

FLT CREW OF A320 EXPERIENCE FUEL LEAK ENROUTE. DIVERT TO NEARER SUITABLE ARPT FOR INSPECTION.

Time / Day

Date: 200702 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: ZZZ.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Personal Make Model Name: Golden Eagle 421 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot: Commercial Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 35 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 20000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1800

ASRS Report: 728618

Person: 2

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THIS WAS A 3.2 HR FLT. FULL FUEL ON BOARD, EQUALS 196 GALLONS USABLE. ON APCH TO LAND (ILS, GEAR DOWN) R ENG SPUTTERED AS IN FUEL STARVATION. WE FOLLOWED EMER CHKLIST AND WHEN NO PWR WAS ACHIEVED ON R ENG WITH MIXTURES RICH, PROPS FORWARD, FULL THROTTLES, I TOOK OVER THE CTLS FROM PLT (WHO WAS UNDER HOOD PRACTICING APCH) AND FEATHERED R ENG. L ENG RAN OK, BUT WE ELECTED TO DECLARE EMER AND LAND AT CLOSER ARPT 2 MI AWAY (ZZZ). UPON LNDG, WE REALIZED THE R MAIN TANK HAD LITTLE FUEL, AND FUEL STARVATION LIKELY. WE WERE USING MAINS ON APCH BUT WE HAD EXTRA FUEL IN AUX TANKS. COULD HAVE SWITCHED TO R AUX, BUT DID NOT DUE TO CHKLIST, WHICH SAYS LAND ON MAIN TANK AND FEATHER IF ON APCH TO LAND. WE HAD 4.35 HRS FUEL AT NORMAL ENDURANCE. THE LESSON HERE: ENGS USE LOTS OF FUEL AT FL180-FL250 AT HIGH RPM TO KEEP CABIN PRESSURIZED. PLUS, 20 GALLONS ON FUEL GAUGES MAY NOT EQUAL 20 GALLONS IN TANKS!

Synopsis

C421 PILOT REPORTS RIGHT ENGINE FUEL STARVATION DURING APPROACH.

Time / Day

Date: 200702 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Personal

Make Model Name: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer II/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Route In Use. Approach: Traffic Pattern

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Qualification.Pilot: Student

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 18

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 127 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 118

ASRS Report: 727362

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE STUDENT PLT SOLO FLT WAS PLANNED FOR 2.50 HRS OF PRACTICE MANEUVERING AND PATTERN WORK. ACFT WAS PREFLTED BY ME, AND FOUND TO HAVE MORE THAN 17 GALS IN THE L WING TANK (ABOVE THE TAB) AND LESS THAN 17 GALS IN THE R WING TANK (BELOW THE TAB). DUE TO THE UNEQUAL

LOAD IN THE TANKS I PLANNED TO RUN THE TANK WITH MORE THAN 2 HRS FUEL IN IT FIRST, FOR 2 HRS. THEN I INTENDED TO RUN THE LOWER TANK WHILE RETURNING TO THE PATTERN FOR LESS THAN 1 HR. DURING MANEUVERING IN THE PRACTICE AREA I SWITCHED FROM THE FULLER TANK TO THE LOWER TANK AT ABOUT 110 MINS INTO THE FLT. I EXPERIENCED SOME ENG ROUGHNESS WHICH WAS NOT CORRECTED BY MIXTURE CHANGES, SO I APPLIED CARB HEAT. I SWITCHED BACK TO THE ORIGINAL TANK AS A PRECAUTION. I RETURNED TO THE ARPT FOR SEVERAL TOUCH AND GO LNDGS AND TKOFS. I WAS ON L DOWNWIND FOR THE ACTIVE RWY BEHIND 2 OTHER ACFT. AS I REACHED MIDFIELD ON THE DOWNWIND LEG, I FELT A DROP IN ENG PWR AND HEARD A DROP IN ENG RPM AND ALSO FELT ENG ROUGHNESS. I RECALLED MY FAILURE TO USE THE SECOND FUEL TANK, SUSPECTED FUEL EXHAUSTION, AND IMMEDIATELY TURNED TOWARD THE AIRFIELD. AS I WAS WELL OUT OVER THE WATER. AS I TURNED I PERFORMED AN EMER PROC CHK OF ALL CTLS. THE ELECTRIC FUEL PUMP WAS ALREADY TURNED ON AND MIXTURE WAS FULL RICH AS I HAD SET THEM FOR REPEATED PATTERN WORK. I MOVED THE FUEL SELECTOR TO THE R TANK. I MADE A CALL TO THE TWR SAYING AS BEST I CAN RECALL: ACFT X REQUEST IMMEDIATE LNDG ENG TROUBLE. THE PROP WAS WIND-MILLING BUT I DID NOT HAVE FULL PWR. I HAD ESTABLISHED AN APCH TO RWY 29 BY THIS TIME AND MADE A CALL SAYING AS BEST I CAN RECALL: ACFT X EMER LNDG. I CONTINUED INBOUND AND ESTABLISHED A STABLE APCH, AND LANDED WITHIN THE FIRST THIRD OF THE RWY. I TAXIED THE ACFT BACK TO THE FBO UNDER THE ACFT'S OWN PWR. INSPECTION REVEALED NO FUEL IN THE L WING TANK.

Synopsis

PA28 PILOT STUDENT RUNS LEFT TANK DRY IN TRAFFIC PATTERN AND MAKES EMERGENCY LANDING.

Time / Day

Date : 2007 Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 10000

Environment

Flight Conditions: IMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: ZZZ.TRACON Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A319

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121 Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Flap/Slat Control System

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 100

Experience.Flight Time.Type: 2500

ASRS Report: 726776

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Weather

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector. Aircraft Equipment. Other Aircraft Equipment: ECAM

Warning, Flap/Slat Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : FAA
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

DEPARTED ZZZ1 FOR ZZZ WITH VFR WX RPTED AND FORECAST FOR ZZZ. NO. ALTERNATE REQUIRED AND FUEL PLANNED AT DEST WAS 6400 LBS. PRIOR TO DESCENT ATIS STILL INDICATED VFR, HOWEVER, DISPATCH SENT AN ACARS TO ALL INBOUND FLTS ADVISING OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATING WX CONDITIONS. WX WENT BELOW CAT I MINIMUMS SO WE PLANNED AND BRIEFED A CAT III APCH. I SENT DISPATCH A MESSAGE INDICATING THAT I WOULD PLAN ZZZ2 AS MY VFR ALTERNATE. ONCE CLRED FOR THE APCH BY ZZZ APCH CTL, I BEGAN TO CONFIGURE THE ACFT. WHEN WE SELECTED FLAPS 1 WE RECEIVED AN ECAM: FLT CTL FLAP/SLAT FAULT AND THE FLAPS AND SLATS REMAINED UP. WE FOLLOWED THE ECAM PROC AND TRIED TO RESET THE FLAP HANDLE SEVERAL TIMES TO NO AVAIL. WE THEN DISCONTINUED THE APCH AND BEGAN PREPARATIONS TO PROCEED TO ZZZ3 SINCE IT WAS VFR FOR A FLAP 0 LNDG. I CONTACTED MAINT CTL AND DISPATCH DURING THIS PROCESS. WHILE RUNNING THE CHECKLISTS FOR OUR SITUATION I DECIDED TO TRY THE FLAP PROC ONE LAST TIME AND IT FINALLY WORKED. I MADE THE DECISION TO PROCEED TO THE CLOSEST ARPT WHICH WAS ZZZ (APPROX 30 MILES AWAY) AND CONDUCT A NORMAL CAT III APCH. THE APCH WAS NORMAL AND A SAFE AUTOLAND WAS ACCOMPLISHED. WE LANDED WITH 3000 LBS FUEL REMAINING AND BLOCKED IN WITH 2800 LBS OF FUEL. I BELIEVE WE SUCCESSFULLY AVERTED A WHOLE HOST OF THREATS IN A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME AND BROUGHT THE SITUATION TO A SAFE AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. BOY, IF WE COULD ONLY PREDICT THE WX WE COULD HAVE TANKERED A LOT MORE GAS, BUT THIS NIGHT WAS A TRUE ANOMALY IN TERMS OF WX. THE FLAPS 0 CHKLIST AND PROC IS PAINFULLY LABORIOUS AND DOESN'T FLOW AT ALL, HOWEVER, I DON'T KNOW IF THERE IS A WAY TO FIX THAT. MAINT CTL IS NOT ALLOWED TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS BECAUSE THE FAA SEES THAT AS 'TROUBLESHOOTING' WHICH I THINK IS A BIG MISTAKE ON THE FAA'S PART. IT TAKES OUR MOST VALUABLE RESOURCE OUT OF THE GAME.

Synopsis

UN-FORECAST BAD WX, MINIMUM FUEL AND FLAP ANOMALY CHALLENGE A319 FLT CREW.

Time / Day

Date: 200701 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: SNA. Airport

State Reference : CA Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: Mixed

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-700

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Ground.Other

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 200

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 13000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 8000

ASRS Report: 725772

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Events

Anomaly. Inflight Encounter: Weather

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Consequence.Other: Company Review

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft Problem Areas : Company Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Weather

Narrative

FILED TO SNA WITH NO ALTERNATE ON FILE WITH SNA FORECAST SHOWING 2000 FT SCAT, 5 NM. DEPARTED WITH 10500 FUEL ONBOARD. WITH 10400 REQUIRED. ARRIVED IN SNA WITH 4460 (APU OFF FOR ENTIRE FLT) DESPITE SHAVING OFF MILES AND TIME WITH SHORTCUTS AND DIRECTS. ON ARR, SURFACE VISIBILITY WAS VARIABLE FROM 1 TO 5 NM DUE TO THE SUN AND HAZE LAYER. A THUNDERSTORM 20 MILES S OF SNA WAS SHOWING HEAVY RAIN AT THE TIME OF OUR LNDG AND WAS ONLY 5 NM AWAY ON DEP ONE HOUR LATER. ANY GAR IN SNA OR DIVERSION DUE TO WX WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN DECLARING A FUEL EMER. MY ESTIMATED SAVING BY REDUCING FUEL LOAD WITH NO ALTERNATE IS ABOUT \$25 DOLLARS PER LEG. SEEMS LIKE ONE DIVERSION TO REFUEL WOULD CANCEL OUT ANY SAVINGS FOR THE YEAR. IT IS WORTH THE 'SAVINGS?' I WILL BE HARD PRESSED TO ACCEPT THIS TRIP WITHOUT AN ALTERNATE EVER AGAIN.

Synopsis

B737-700 CAPT BELIEVES ARR AT SNA -- NEARLY COMPROMISED BY CONVECTIVE WX -- WITHOUT A PLANNED ALTERNATE, INDICATES COMPANY FUEL POLICY MAY NOT BE COST EFFECTIVE.

Time / Day

Date: 200701 Day: Wed

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Intersection: CEDES

State Reference: CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 12000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: NCT.TRACON Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B757-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach Route In Use.Arrival.STAR: N/S

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 300 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 13000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 3000

ASRS Report: 725618

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector. Aircraft Equipment. Other Aircraft Equipment: EICAS 'Low

Fuel' Warning

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Aircraft Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

PRIOR TO ARRIVING IN THE SFO AREA, OAK CENTER GAVE US LOWER FOR TURBULENCE FROM FL380 TO FL360. PRIOR TO OAL, THEN DELAY VECTORS INTO SFO BEGAN. I STARTED TO CLOSELY WATCH THE FUEL SITUATION, AS THE PLANNED LANDING FUEL ON THE FLIGHT PLAN WAS FOR 6000 LBS. AFTER NUMEROUS VECTORS AND FINALLY WITHIN 30 MILES OF THE AIRPORT, I DISCUSSED WITH MY FO THAT WE NEED TO ADVISE ATC OF OUR FUEL STATE. WE DECLARED 'MINIMUM FUEL' TO THE CONTROLLER. AFTER SEVERAL MORE VECTORS, WE ADVISED HIM WE NEED TO HEAD FOR THE AIRPORT NOW. MY PLAN WAS TO EITHER BEGIN THE APPROACH NOW OR DECLARE A FUEL EMERGENCY IF NEEDED. WE WERE FINALLY TURNED ONTO THE APPROACH FOR AN ILS RWY 28R AND HAD TO SLOW BACK TO 160 KNOTS. DURING THIS SPEED REDUCTION AT 17 MILES ON FINAL, WE RECEIVED A 'LOW FUEL' EICAS. THIS WAS CONFIRMED WITH THE 'FUEL CONFIG' LIGHT ON THE OVERHEAD PANEL. CURRENT FUEL WAS 5500 LBS. APPROACH AND LANDING WERE NORMAL, YET WE TOUCHED DOWN WITH 4700 LBS OF FUEL. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD, THAT EVERYTHING WE DID AS A CREW WAS TO EVALUATE THE FLIGHT PLAN AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DAY AND REFUSED A REQUEST TO TAKE FUEL OFF FOR A LAST MINUTE ZERO FUEL PAYLOAD INCREASE. I ASKED THAT THE FUEL BE ADDED. WE FLEW THE PLAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL SOP AND AT THE PLANNED ALTITUDE, YET I ALMOST HAD TO DIVERT, AND PUT ME IN A POSITION THAT I DID NOT LIKE. ATC NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND WHEN WE CALL MINIMUM FUEL IT MEANS THAT AND STOP THE EXTRA VECTORS. IT IS SOMETHING THAT WE DON'T NORMALLY USE THE TERM AND WHEN USED, MEANS HELP US OUT. FURTHER, DISPATCH SHOULD ADD A LITTLE MORE FUEL FOR UNKNOWN CONTINGENCIES, ESPECIALLY ON A TRANSCON FLIGHT. I WON'T GET PLACED IN THIS SITUATION AGAIN.

Synopsis

B757-200 FLT CREW DECLARES MINIMUM FUEL AFTER TRANSCON FLT TO SFO ENCOUNTERS MODEST DELAYS.

Time / Day

Date: 200701 Day: Fri

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: ZZZ.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Personal Make Model Name: PA-23-250 Aztec Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Component: 1

Aircraft Component : Fuel Tank Cap Aircraft Component : Fuel Tank Cap

Person: 1

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot Qualification.Pilot: Commercial Qualification.Pilot: Instrument Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience. Flight Time. Last 90 Days: 14

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 615 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 319

ASRS Report: 725232

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical Independent Detector. Other. Flight Crew A: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas: Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

THE AIRPLANE HAD JUST COME OUT OF MAJOR OVERHAUL AT ZZZ. 2 NEW ENGS. AND 4 NEW FUEL BLADDERS HAD JUST BEEN INSTALLED. AFTER A CAREFUL PREFLT WHICH INCLUDED VISUALLY CHKING ALL 4 TANKS. WE DEPARTED AT XA50 FOR ZZZ1 TO PICK UP MY COUSIN'S WIFE AND DROP HER IN ZZZ2 TO PICK UP HER HUSBAND FROM THE HOSPITAL. IN ORDER TO PERFORM A PROPER BREAK IN OF THE ENGS, THE NORMALLY 30 MIN FLT WAS EXTENDED TO 80 MINS. 20 MINS WERE SPENT ON THE INBOARD TANKS AND 60 MINS ON THE OUTBOARDS. DEP FROM ZZZ1 AT XC30 WAS ON THE INBOARDS FOR APPROX 10 MINS WHEN WE SWITCHED TO THE OUTBOARDS. AT THE INCIDENT POINT 60 MINS INTO THE FLT AND 1:50 MINS INTO THE USAGE OF THE OUTBOARDS THE R ENG SURGED AND QUIT. THIS WAS DURING OUR DSCNT AT APPROX 1900 FT. RESTART PROCS WERE BEGUN WHEN SUDDENLY THE LENG QUIT. AT THIS POINT RESTART PROCS WERE QUICKLY ATTEMPTED, BUT WHEN UNSUCCESSFUL, IT WAS DECIDED TO LAND ON THE INTERSTATE AS THE TFC WAS LIGHT AND THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT TIME TO CONTINUE TROUBLESHOOTING. A SAFE EMER LNDG WAS EXECUTED AND THE PLANE WAS BROUGHT TO REST ON THE MEDIAN. UPON EGRESS FROM THE PLANE IT WAS NOTED THAT THE OUTBOARD TANKS WERE DRY. THERE WAS BLUE STAINING TRAILING BACK FROM THE FILLER CAPS, BUT NOTHING WAS MADE OF IT. THE NEXT MORNING THE PLANE WAS TOWED TO THE ZZZ3 ARPT WHERE IT STARTED ON THE INBOARDS AND RAN FOR 2 MINS ON THE OUTBOARDS, FULL FUELING WAS DONE WHICH TOOK 83 GALS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO ALSO NOTE THAT THE L FUEL GAUGE DIDN'T READ EMPTY EVEN THOUGH ONE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT IT SHOULD. FOR 2:20 OF FLT. THE PLANE SHOULD HAVE BURNED 70 GALS, AS IT USUALLY BURNS 30 GPH (THE FLT WAS DONE AT 3000 FT USING MINIMAL FUEL TO CLB). IT TOOK 13 GALS MORE. EACH TANK HAS 34 GALS USABLE OR 2:15 OF TIME. IF YOU ASSUME 6-7 GAL DISCREPANCY PER SIDE, IT WOULD EXPLAIN THE 25 MIN SHORTENED ENDURANCE OF THE OUTBOARDS. ON JAN/TUE/07 I FLEW THE PLANE OUT OF ITS HOME BASE OF ZZZ4. 25 MINS INTO THE FLT I NOTICED GAS LEAKING/STREAKING OUT OF THE TOP OF THE FUEL CAPS OF EACH OUTBOARD TANK. UPON LNDG, PICTURES WERE TAKEN AND THE MECH NOTIFIED. HE STATED THAT PROBABLY SINCE THE AIRPLANE HADN'T FLOWN IN 2 MONTHS, GASKETS IN THE CAPS HAD PROBABLY DRIED OUT. THIS WOULDN'T BE NOTICED UNTIL FLT AS THE PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL WOULD ONLY THEN BE STRONG ENOUGH TO SUCK GAS OUT OF THE TANKS. OVER 2:20 IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME 6 GALS PER SIDE WERE LOST, THUS EXPLAINING THIS INCIDENT. I BELIEVE THE CONFLUENCE OF THE MAJOR MAINT WHICH NECESSITATED A PROLONGED FIRST LEG OF THE FLT, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF FUEL FROM THE OUTBOARD TANKS, WITH THE FUEL STARVATION HAPPENING AT LOW ALT ALL CAME TOGETHER TO CAUSE THIS INCIDENT.

Synopsis

A PA23-250 ON ITS FIRST FLT OUT OF AN OVERHAUL MADE AN OFF ARPT LANDING FOLLOWING FUEL STARVATION BECAUSE OF LEAKING FUEL TANK CAPS.

Time / Day

Date: 200701 Day: Tue

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZOB.ARTCC

State Reference: OH

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 37000

Environment

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZOB.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B757-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 210 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 15000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 6000

ASRS Report: 724998

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 250 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 17850 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1550

ASRS Report: 725019

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Approach Function.Controller: Radar

Events

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Turbulence

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Weather

Narrative

PRIOR TO DEP FROM WE RECEIVED OUR FLT PAPERS AND THE PLAN WAS TO ARR JFK WITH 6000 LBS OF FUEL. HAVING FLOWN IN FROM JFK THE PREVIOUS DAY WE REALIZED THERE MAY BE A NEED FOR ALT DEVIATIONS ENRIE DUE TO TURB. THEREFORE, THE CAPT ELECTED TO ADD APPROX 1200 LBS OF FUEL FOR THE FLT (UPPING THE ARR FUEL TO 7200 LBS). FOLLOWING AN UNEVENTFUL EARLY DEP/TAXI AND TKOF, THE FIRST THIRD OF THE FLT WAS FLOWN AS PER THE FLT PLAN. PASSING THE ROCKIES, REPORTS STATED THE AIRSPACE AHEAD HAD MODERATE CHOP/TURB FROM FL300-400. WE ELECTED TO DSND TO FL290 TO AVOID THE CHOP. DURING THE DSCNT WE HAD TO SEAT THE FLT ATTENDANTS DUE TO THE RIDE AND KEPT THEM SEATED APPROX 20 MINUTES. BY DSNDING, WE LOST A 75 KNOT TAILWIND AND INSTEAD HAD A 55 KNOT (APPROX) HEADWIND. BY APPROX STL, WE REALIZED WE NEEDED TO CLB TO FLT PLAN ALT DUE TO FUEL CONSIDERATIONS AND BEGAN A CLB. AT FL370, WE NOTIFIED DISPATCH WE WERE NOW PLANNING ON ARRIVING JFK APPROX 5000 LBS REMAINING. APCHING VHP, WITH WX GOOD AT JFK, WE CONTINUED AND WATCHED THE FUEL CLOSELY, UPDATING THE HOWGOZIT. AROUND ROD, WE NOTIFIED THE CTR WE WERE TIGHT ON FUEL AND THEN WHEN WE CHECKED IN WITH CLE CTR TOLD THEM WE WERE DECLARING MIN FUEL. CLE CTR GAVE US SOME DIRECT ROUTING AND UPON ENTERING NY AIRSPACE WE REITERATED OUR MIN FUEL STATUS. WHEN WE WERE HANDED OVER TO NY APCH CTL, AND AFTER BEING VECTORED SLIGHTLY FOR SPACING, WE TOLD THEM WE COULD NOT TAKE ANY MORE DELAYS AND THEY ASKED US FOR TOTAL TIME REMAINING/SOBS. AT APPROX 5000 LBS, WE TOLD THEM WE HAD 45 MINUTES REMAINING. THEY SUBSEQUENTLY VECTORED US FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 31L (THE DEP RWY) TO EXPEDITE. UPON LNDG WE GOT THE LOW FUEL WARNING AT APPROX 4700 LBS.

Synopsis

B757 CREW DECLARES MIN FUEL DURING CROSS COUNTRY FLT TO JFK.

Time / Day

Date : 200701 Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZKC.ARTCC

State Reference: KS

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 37000

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZKC.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

ASRS Report: 724197

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Company Policies Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed As Precaution

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

BEFORE DEP I NOTICED WE WERE FLT PLANNED AT APPROX 25000 LBS OF FUEL FOR OUR ALL-NIGHTER TO ORD. THIS SEEMED LIKE A VERY LOW FUEL LOAD AND I EXPRESSED MY CONCERN TO THE CAPT. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WAS A REASONABLE LOAD, ALTHOUGH I DISAGREED. FOR THIS FUEL LOAD TO WORK WE WOULD HAVE NEEDED OPTIMUM CONDITIONS, IE BEING ABLE TO CLB TO FL370 IMMEDIATELY AFTER DEP, HAVING THE FORECASTED WINDS, AND BEING ABLE TO STAY AT FL370 FOR THE ENTIRE FLT. ON TAXI-OUT OUR CLOSEOUT INDICATED WE HAD PICKED UP AN ADDITIONAL 10 TO 15 PAX, AND OUR GROSS WT

INCREASED APPROX 3000 LBS. AFTER DEP WE WERE NOT ABLE TO CLB TO FL370 BECAUSE OF OUR INCREASED GROSS WT. WE WERE NOT ABLE TO CLB TO FL370 FOR ABOUT 45 MINS TO 1 HOUR AFTER DEP. FOR SOME INEXPLICABLE REASON, THE CAPT CHOSE TO FLY AT .760 MACH INSTEAD OF THE FLT PLAN .740 MACH. I ASKED HIM WHY HE WAS CRUISING AT LESS THAN OPTIMUM SPD, AND HE BACKED IT OFF TO .75. I AGAIN EXPRESSED MY CONCERN THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO MAKE IT TO ORD. HE SAID HE WOULD WATCH IT. THE FORECASTED WINDS NEVER MATERIALIZED, AND RATHER THAN HAVE 90 TO 100 KTS TAIL WINDS, OUR ACTUAL TAIL WINDS AVERAGED ABOUT 68 KTS. AS WE PASSED EACH FIX, WE WERE DOWN ABOUT 100 LBS, AND IT BECAME EVIDENT ABEAM ICT THAT AT THAT POINT WE WERE DOWN 1300 LBS AND AT THE CURRENT RATE, WOULD LAND ORD AROUND 4000 TO 4500 LBS. AT THIS POINT THE CAPT ELECTED TO DIVERT TO MCI TO GET MORE FUEL. ALL OF THIS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY PUTTING ON AN ADDITIONAL 2000 LBS. THERE WEREN'T ANY WT RESTRS, SO ADDING FUEL WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A PROB.

Synopsis

MD80 FLT CREW DIVERTS FOR FUEL CONSIDERATION.

Time / Day

Date : 200612 Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day: 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 500

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC Weather Elements : Fog

Light: Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower Operator.Common Carrier: Charter Make Model Name: Cessna 310/T310C Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135 Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer Only: N/S

Flight Phase. Descent: Approach

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Indicating and Warning - Fuel System

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Charter Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 250 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 15000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 5000

ASRS Report: 722641

Events

Anomaly.Ground Encounters.Other Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken: Unable

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas: Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I DEPARTED APPROX XA30 FOR ZZZ1. THE ACFT WAS TOPPED OFF WITH 183 GALS. I USED ONLY THE TIP TANKS ON MY TRIP TO ZZZ AND TOPPED OFF THERE WITH 75 GALS. AT MY PWR SETTING OF '23 IN' MAP AND 2300 RPM, THIS ACFT BURNS 30 GPH, 15 GPH PER SIDE IF LEANED TO PEAK PLUS 50 DEGS. I HAD USED THIS FUEL FLOW ON THE R ENG BUT HAD FOUND THE L ENG RAN SMOOTHER AT 95 LBS PER HR OR 15.8 GPH. AT ANY RATE THE 75 GAL REQUIRED FOR TOP OFF WAS CLOSE ENOUGH TO NORMAL THAT NO RED FLAGS WERE RAISED IN MY MIND. MY TRIP TO ZZZ2 REQUIRED 3.7 HRS. DURING THIS LEG, I XFERRED ALL FUEL (20 GALS) FROM THE WING LOCKER AND BALANCED THE FUEL BTWN THE 2 TIP TANKS. I ALSO RAN THE AUX TANKS DRY. WITH 183 GALS, AT 30.8 GPH, I HAD ENOUGH FUEL TO FLY 5.8 HRS MINIMUM. MY TRIP FROM ZZZ2 BACK TO ZZZ WAS 1.3 HRS. THIS SHOULD HAVE LEFT ME WITH AT LEAST 48 MINS OF FUEL. AS WE NOW KNOW, THE FUEL WAS EXHAUSTED 1 MIN FROM TOUCHDOWN AT ZZZ AFTER A TOTAL COMBINED FLT TIME OF 5.0 HRS. THE REASON FOR THIS IS NOT CLR AT THIS TIME. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE FACT THAT THE LOW FUEL LIGHTS DID NOT ILLUMINATE AT ANY TIME DURING THE FLT. THEY SHOULD ILLUMINATE WHEN 10 GALS OF FUEL REMAIN IN THE TIP TANK, WARNING THAT APPROX 45 MINS OF FUEL REMAINS. THESE LIGHTS WERE CHKED TWICE DURING THE FLT AND DID ILLUMINATE WHEN PRESSED. THE WX AT ZZZ WAS 400 FT AND 2 MI. I LOST PWR IN BOTH ENGS VIRTUALLY SIMULTANEOUSLY AT 500 FT WHILE ON THE ILS.

Synopsis

CESSNA 310K EXPERIENCES FUEL EXHAUSTION ON APCH TO ZZZ.