

ASRS Database Report Set

Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) Issues

Report Set Description.....Crew Resource Management (CRM) inflight situations
(conflicts, NMACs, and emergencies).

Update Number.....12.0

Date of UpdateJanuary 31, 2008

Number of Records in Report Set.....50

Number of New Records in Report Set40

Type of Records in Report Set.....For each update, new records received at ASRS will
displace a like number of the oldest records in the
Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty
most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records
within this Report Set have been screened to assure
their relevance to the topic.

TH: 262-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the reporting of a specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de- identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.



Linda J. Connell, Director
Aviation Safety Reporting System

CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

One thing that can be known from ASRS statistics is that they represent the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 1999 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 1999. Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS lies in the **report narratives**. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. The values of these narrative reports lie in their qualitative nature. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

Report Synopses

ACN: 750993 (1 of 50)

Synopsis

BOTH GENERATORS OF LR 24 TRIPPED OFF LINE CAUSING THE IAS, THE AFDS, AND ALT HOLD TO FAIL. AN ALT DEVIATION RESULTED AS THE ACFT CLBED UNNOTICED BY CREW DURING TROUBLESHOOTING.

ACN: 745449 (2 of 50)

Synopsis

A PLT RPTS TAXIING ONTO SJC RWY 11/29 AT TXWY F AFTER LEAVING THE FBO RAMP IMMEDIATELY SE OF THE SJC TWR.

ACN: 737582 (3 of 50)

Synopsis

DURING TAXI IN TO THE FBO A CE525 FLT CREW HAS THE RIGHT WING TIP CONTACT THE PROPELLER SPINNER OF A C172 PARKED ALONG THE TXWY.

ACN: 736051 (4 of 50)

Synopsis

A320 ENG #1 AND #2 OIL PRESSURE INDICATION FAILURE DURING TKOF ROLL AND ELECTS TO CONTINUE. AFTER TROUBLESHOOTING WITHOUT SUCCESS CREW RETURNS TO DEP ARPT.

ACN: 736028 (5 of 50)

Synopsis

FLT CREW REPORTS NMAC WITH ULTRALIGHT ACFT 10 NM NE OF RIC AT 3000 FEET.

ACN: 734002 (6 of 50)

Synopsis

CREW ELECTS TO REJECT THE TAKEOFF AFTER ROTATING AT GCN DUE TO WINDSHEAR ENCOUNTER THAT CAUSES ACFT TO SETTLE BACK ON THE RWY.

ACN: 732207 (7 of 50)

Synopsis

CL65 CREW DOES NOT USE BEFORE START CHECKLIST AND ATTEMPTS TO TAXI WITH THE HYDRAULIC PUMPS OFF. STEERING AND BRAKES ARE INOPERATIVE AND THE ACFT GOES OFF THE TAXIWAY.

ACN: 730780 (8 of 50)

Synopsis

B737-800 FLT CREW EXPERIENCES PRESSURIZATION FAILURE LIKELY RELATED TO WATER SPILL IN AFT CABIN OVER PRESSURIZATION OUTFLOW VALVES DURING PREFLT IN VERY COLD CONDITIONS. CRM AND SOP ISSUES ARE MAGNIFIED DURING PERFORMANCE OF CHECKLISTS AND EMERGENCY DESCENT.

ACN: 729594 *(9 of 50)*

Synopsis

A CL60 CREW USING AN ELECTRONIC FLT BAG WAS CONFUSED ABOUT AN LAS RNAV CROSSING ALT. A LOW TIME FO AND NEW EFB CONTRIBUTING TO THE HIGH WORKLOAD.

ACN: 728727 *(10 of 50)*

Synopsis

WW24 CREW ENCOUNTERS SEVERE TURB AND ICING AT 14000 FT.

ACN: 727937 *(11 of 50)*

Synopsis

BEECH 1900D FLT CREW OPERATED ABOVE MTGW.

ACN: 727239 *(12 of 50)*

Synopsis

A B757 CAPT REPORTS HAVING VERTIGO DURING A RAPID POST TKOF TURNING CLB WITH A LOW ALT LEVEL OFF. POOR CRM CITED ON AN EARLY MORNING FATIGUED FLT.

ACN: 726381 *(13 of 50)*

Synopsis

A B737-800 MISSED AN ALT CONSTRAINT ON THE LAX CIVET STAR FOLLOWING A LATE RWY CHANGE AND THE ACFT FMA INDICATING VNAV PATH WITHOUT HOLDING THE PATH.

ACN: 720853 *(14 of 50)*

Synopsis

UNNOTICED BY THE CREW, A B737-800'S FMS REVERTED TO VERT SPD FROM VNAV AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE ACFT MISSED A STAR ALT CONSTRAINT. CRM WAS AN ISSUE.

ACN: 720362 *(15 of 50)*

Synopsis

A LR45 ON THE TEB5 SID LEVELED AT 2000 FT WHEN THE AUTOPLT FAILED TO CAPTURE 1500 FT.

ACN: 716365 (16 of 50)

Synopsis

CRJ200 FLT CREW HAS HYD SYS FAILURE.

ACN: 716153 (17 of 50)

Synopsis

A CE560XL DEPARTING TEB ON THE TEB DEP FAILED TO LEVEL AT 1500 FT. ATC PROVIDED A NEW CLRNC.

ACN: 714718 (18 of 50)

Synopsis

A FLT ATTENDANT FINDS OUT FROM CRASH RESCUE PERSONNEL THAT THE ACFT WAS MET ON ARR BECAUSE AN ENG WAS ON FIRE.

ACN: 712350 (19 of 50)

Synopsis

H25A FLT CREW HAS ALTDEV ON TEB SID DUE TO DME NOT DISPLAYED.

ACN: 712048 (20 of 50)

Synopsis

BE300 KINGAIR FLT CREW ENCOUNTERS WX DURING DEP FROM CHA AND DEVIATES FROM ATC ASSIGNED HDG.

ACN: 709857 (21 of 50)

Synopsis

CRJ200 CREW TURNS L WHEN THEY SHOULD HAVE TURNED R ON TXWY N AT ATL.

ACN: 708911 (22 of 50)

Synopsis

C182 PLT HAS A HDG TRACK DEV DURING THE TEB 5 DEP.

ACN: 707428 (23 of 50)

Synopsis

DA20 CREW RPTS ALT OVERSHOOT IN ZNY AIRSPACE.

ACN: 706099 (24 of 50)

Synopsis

A B757 FLT CREW TOOK OFF FROM LAS WITHOUT ATC RTE CLRNC.

ACN: 704848 (25 of 50)

Synopsis

A FLT CREW TAXIED ACROSS AN ACTIVE RWY AT SFO WITHOUT CLRNC BECAUSE OF LACK OF POSITIONAL AWARENESS.

ACN: 703801 (26 of 50)

Synopsis

A319 CREW RECEIVES INACCURATE WT AND BAL NUMBERS AND DISCOVERS THE ERROR IN CRUISE.

ACN: 703409 (27 of 50)

Synopsis

GLF4 FLT CREW FAILS MULTIPLE OPPORTUNITIES TO EXERCISE CRM.

ACN: 702079 (28 of 50)

Synopsis

L29 FLT CREW HAS THE CANOPY DEPART THE ACFT INFLT.

ACN: 702016 (29 of 50)

Synopsis

A CL600 CAPT RPTS AN ALT OVERSHOOT WHILE CLBING NEAR TSTMS WHEN HIS NEW FO SELECTED AUTOPLT VERT SPD, BECAME DISTR, AND MISSED THE LEVELOFF ALT.

ACN: 701555 (30 of 50)

Synopsis

A CL65 FO ANALYZES HIS PERFORMANCE THROUGHOUT AN APCH TO ATL THAT INCLUDED HOLDING, CHANGING WX, DIVERSION ISSUES CONCLUDING WITH A NOT WELL FLOWN MISSED APCH AND AN EGPWS WARNING.

ACN: 701247 (31 of 50)

Synopsis

B737-300 FLT CREW HAS A HDG TRACK DEV DURING APCH TO DEN, RECEIVES A TCAS RA, EXECUTES A GAR AND RETURNS FOR LNDG.

ACN: 700088 (32 of 50)

Synopsis

B737-400 FLT CREW HAS MCP (MODE CTL PANEL) FAIL DURING CRUISE AND DECLARES NON-RVSM CAPABLE.

ACN: 698887 (33 of 50)

Synopsis

B737-700 FLT CREW EXCEEDS FLAP EXTENSION SPD ON APCH.

ACN: 698598 (34 of 50)

Synopsis

BELLANCA PLT ENTERS UNFORECAST IMC, BECOMES OVERWHELMED AND DISORIENTED.

ACN: 698514 (35 of 50)

Synopsis

A B17G PILOT REPORTS A COURSE DEVIATION AFTER THE CREW BECAME DISTRACTED BY A POST TAKEOFF LANDING GEAR RETRACTION MALFUNCTION.

ACN: 696700 (36 of 50)

Synopsis

B767-300 FLT CREW HAS SMOKE AND FUMES IN AFT GALLEY DURING DEP, EMER DECLARED. SOURCE OF SMOKE AND FUMES IDENTED AND CONTINUED FLT CONTINUES TO DEST.

ACN: 692435 (37 of 50)

Synopsis

BREAKDOWN IN COCKPIT SOP AND CRM RESULTS IN B777-200 TRACK DEV ON TKOF FROM LAX.

ACN: 692038 (38 of 50)

Synopsis

SHORTLY AFTER TKOF ON AN IFR TRAINING FLT, THE PA28 SUFFERS A PARTIAL LOSS OF PWR. WHEN THE STUDENT TRIES TO ADVISE ATC THE INSTRUCTOR DISABLES THE XMISSION AND TELLS THE STUDENT SUCH A XMISSION WAS NOT NECESSARY.

ACN: 690542 (39 of 50)

Synopsis

DHC8 FO RELATES DIFFICULTY IN ADDRESSING SOP AND CRM ISSUES WITH A CAPT WHOSE FLYING TECHNIQUES ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH COMPANY POLICY. RESULTS IN CONFIGURING ACFT LATE ON FINAL.

ACN: 690264 (40 of 50)

Synopsis

CITATION CE560XL FLT CREW WHILE MANEUVERING FOR LNDG TO PARALLEL RWYS, OVERSHOOTS THE CTRLINE, CAUSING ANOTHER ACFT TO GO AROUND.

ACN: 676221 (41 of 50)

Synopsis

E145 FLT CREW DSNDS EARLY ON ILS RWY 17C AT DFW.

ACN: 675629 (42 of 50)

Synopsis

A B737-700 FO, AS PNF, OVERRODE A PF CAPT WHEN THE CAPT INCORRECTLY ACTED OPPOSITE A TCASII RA AND CONTINUED A CLB WHEN LEVELOFF WAS COMMANDED.

ACN: 675132 (43 of 50)

Synopsis

B737 CAPT BELIEVES COMPANY POLICY OF CONTACTING RESERVE PLTS FOR ADDITIONAL ASSIGNMENTS WHILE STILL AIRBORNE ON THE CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS A DISTR.

ACN: 673937 (44 of 50)

Synopsis

AFTER LONG GND DELAY, CAPT REFUSES TO BRING JETWAY BACK TO ACFT TO OFFLOAD PAX WHOSE TRAVEL PLANS WERE NOW MOOT, DUE TO FEAR FLT ATTENDANTS WOULD BE ILLEGAL TO CONTINUE AND THE FLT WOULD BE CANCELED.

ACN: 673686 (45 of 50)

Synopsis

POOR COM BTWN CABIN AND COCKPIT CAUSES A BREAKDOWN IN COORD AND TEAMWORK NECESSARY TO RESOLVE A CABIN DISRUPTION.

ACN: 673131 (46 of 50)

Synopsis

CAPT OF B747 CONTINUES APCH AND LNDG IN WINDSHEAR CONDITIONS DESPITE ADVOCACY FROM FE TO GO AROUND.

ACN: 670909 (47 of 50)

Synopsis

FLT CREW OF B737-300 RELATE HARROWING TALE OF EVAC FLT.

ACN: 670827 (48 of 50)

Synopsis

FLT CREW OF SA227 EXPERIENCE RWY EXCURSION WHEN XFERRING CTL FROM FO TO CAPT DUE TO REJECTION OF TKOF.

ACN: 669556 (49 of 50)

Synopsis

FLT CREW OF DHC8, UNTRAINED AND UNFAMILIAR WITH MAINT ENG RUN-UPS, ARE DIRECTED TO DO SO WITH CONTRACT MAINT PERSONNEL. LACKING ANY GUIDANCE, THEY RUN UP THE #2 ENG TO TKOF THRUST AT THE TERMINAL WITH THE #1 ENG, THE USUAL SOURCE OF HYD PRESSURE TO THE BRAKES, NOT RUNNING.

ACN: 668455 (50 of 50)

Synopsis

INSTRUCTOR PLT MAKES A PRECAUTIONARY LNDG AFTER DETECTING SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT. SOURCE OF THE SMOKE WAS THE STUDENT PLT SMOKING A CIGARETTE.

Report Narratives

ACN: 750993

Time / Day

Date : 200708
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : ZZZ.BCSTN
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 33000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation : Personal
Make Model Name : Learjet 24
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : AC Generation

Person : 1

Affiliation.Other : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 45
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8520
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3480
ASRS Report : 750993

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

FLT ORIGINATED IN ZZZ ON AN IFR CLRNC AND FLT PLAN TO ZZZ2. ACFT WAS CLRED BY CTR TO FL330. ACFT WAS FLOWN BY USAGE OF ITS AUTOPLT AND THE CAPT HAD LEVELLED OFF AT TARGET ALT AND ENGAGED THE ALT HOLD WHEN THE L/H GENERATOR DROPPED OFF-LINE. IMMEDIATE RESET PROC OF THE FAILED GENERATOR TRIPPED THE R/H GENERATOR OFF-LINE AS WELL AND THE CREW NOTICED THE ELECTRONIC DISPLAYS OF BOTH DIGITAL ALTIMETERS FLICKERING WITH THE #1 ALTIMETER INDICATING A RAPID DESCENT AND THE #2 ALTIMETER SHOWING A RAPID CLB. CAPT ADDRESSED THE ELECTRICAL POWER LOSS AND THE SIC WAS INVESTIGATING THE CB PANELS AND SWITCHES FOR THE ADC ON HIS SIDE. MOMENTS LATER THE CAPT ADVISED THE SIC TO WATCH THE ACFT AND STOP THE TROUBLESHOOTING ON HIS SIDE. THE 3RD STBY ALTIMETER ALSO HAD WANDERED AND FLUCTUATED BETWEEN GOING UP AND DOWN DURING THE PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED SEQUENCE. WHILE THE CAPT SUCCESSFULLY RESTORED ELECTRICAL POWER AND GOT BOTH GENERATORS BACK ON LINE, THE SIC NOTICED AND RPTED THAT THE AUTOPLT HAD TRIPPED OFF-LINE (POTENTIALLY AS A RESULT OF THE ELECTRIC SPIKES IN THE SYSTEM FROM RESET ATTEMPTS OF THE GENERATORS). CROSS CHECKS OF BOTH VSI'S CONFIRMED A CLB AND THE PLANE SEEMED TO HAVE DEPARTED FROM THE LEVEL ALT DURING THE TROUBLESHOOTING AND SYSTEM RECOVERY PROC. THE CAPT ARRESTED THE CLB AND STARTED A SHALLOW DSCNT WITH REFERENCE TO THE STBY ALTIMETER THAT HAD STARTED TO STABILIZE AND SHOWED A FEW HUNDRED FEET ABOVE THE ASSIGNED FL330. AT OR ABOUT THAT TIME ATC CALLED AND ASKED FOR ALTITUDE VERIFICATION. WITH POWER RESTORED, BOTH DIGITAL ALTIMETERS ALSO WENT BACK TO NORMAL INDICATION AND SHOWED THE SAME VALUES. CAPT LEVELLED OFF AT FL330, RE-ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND ALT HOLD AND VERIFIED THAT BOTH GENERATORS WERE PUTTING OUT THE REQUIRED ELECTRICAL POWER. BOTH DIGITAL ALTIMETERS AND THE STBY ALTIMETERS SEEMED TO BE IN AGREEMENT AND STABLE. A FEW MINS LATER THE SIC RECEIVED A CALL FROM ATC AND A PHONE NUMBER TO CONTACT AFTER LNDG. SUBSEQUENT PHONE CONVERSATION WITH ATC AFTER LNDG REVEALED THAT THE PLANE HAD CLBED ABOVE THE ASSIGNED ALT BY SEVERAL HUNDRED FEET DURING THE TIME WHERE THE CREW WAS BUSY WITH TROUBLESHOOTING AND SYSTEM RESTORATION EFFORTS. REASONS FOR THE DEVIATION AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: ELECTRICAL FAILURE OF BOTH GENERATORS IN SHORT SUCCESSION AND A POTENTIAL ELECTRICAL SPIKE IN THE SYSTEM THAT TRIPPED THE AUTOPLT AND CAUSED THE ELECTRONIC ALTIMETRY SYSTEM AND THE ADC'S TO BECOME TEMPORARILY UNRELIABLE. CREW WAS DISTRACTED FOR A MOMENT AND FOCUSED TOO MUCH ON SYSTEMS RECOVERY AND DID NOT IMMEDIATELY NOTICE THE TRIPPED AUTOPLT AND THE DISENGAGED ALT HOLD BUTTON. BOTH CREW MEMBERS CHKED AND TROUBLESHOT THEIR RESPECTIVE SIDES OF THE COCKPIT AND CB BANKS (LOWER SIDE PANELS/HEAD DOWN) WITHOUT NOTICING THE PLANE'S DEPARTURE FROM THE ASSIGNED ALT QUICKLY ENOUGH. BOTH PLTS SUB-CONSCIOUSLY ASSUMED THE PLANE ON ALT HOLD AND STABLE WHICH WAS A MISTAKE SINCE IT DOES NOT TAKE LONG FOR A LEAR JET TO CLIMB A FEW HUNDRED FEET. LESSONS LEARNED FROM INCIDENT: STRICT ADHERENCE TO CRM PROCS WILL AVOID SIMILAR SITUATIONS. WITH ONE PLT FLYING AND MONITORING ATTITUDE, ASSIGNED ALTITUDE AND HEADING AND THE OTHER PLT ENGAGING IN TROUBLESHOOTING WILL PREVENT ANY DEVIATION FROM HAPPENING. HISTORY HAS SHOWN OVER AND OVER AGAIN THAT NOTHING

IS HELPED IF BOTH PLTS TRY TO CURE A PROBLEM AND NOBODY WATCHES THE PLANE. BOTH CREW MEMBERS REGRET THIS INCIDENT AND WILL WORK ON PROPER CRM TO AVOID ANY SUCH FUTURE SITUATION. MECHANICAL FINDINGS: MECHANICS FOUND THE FIELD/COIL WIRES OF BOTH GENERATORS AS HAVING INTERMITTENT CONTACT. THE ACFT HAD UNDERGONE AN LH ENGINE SWAP AND SEVERAL COMPONENTS OF THE OTHER ENGINE WERE REMOVED, TESTED AND REINSTALLED PRIOR TO THE FLT. A TEST RUN AND FLIGHT HAD SHOWN NO PROBLEMS BUT SOME WIRES WERE CHAFING ON THE SUBSEQUENT FLT. THE FAULTY WIRES WERE IDENTIFIED AND REPAIRED AND THE PROBS HAVE BEEN CORRECTED.

Synopsis

BOTH GENERATORS OF LR 24 TRIPPED OFF LINE CAUSING THE IAS, THE AFDS, AND ALT HOLD TO FAIL. AN ALT DEVIATION RESULTED AS THE ACFT CLBED UNNOTICED BY CREW DURING TROUBLESHOOTING.

ACN: 745449

Time / Day

Date : 200707
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SJC.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : SJC.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 110
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6200
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 900
ASRS Report : 745449

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Ground
Qualification.Controller : Radar
ASRS Report : 744538

Events

Anomaly.Excursion : Taxiway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Consequence.FAA : Assigned Or Threatened Penalties

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Airport.Markings : SJC.Airport
Airport.Signage : SJC.Airport

Narrative

I HAD COMPLETED THE 'COCKPIT INSPECTION' ITEMS ON OUR CHKLIST AND OBTAINED ATIS AND OUR CLRNC FROM SJC CLRNC DELIVERY AND ENTERED IN THE CLRNC DATA IN OUR FLT MGMNT SYSTEM. AFTER BRIEFING OUR PAX, MY FO JOINED ME IN THE COCKPIT AND OCCUPIED THE R SEAT. I PROVIDED HIM WITH ATIS AND THE CLRNC INFO. WE THEN WENT THROUGH OUR 'BEFORE STARTING' CHKLIST ITEMS, STARTED THE ENGINES AND THEN COMPLETED OUR 'BEFORE TAXIING' CHKLIST ITEMS. AT THAT POINT, MY FO CALLED SJC GND CTL AND INFORMED THEM WE HAD ATIS AND THAT WE WERE READY TO TAXI FROM THE FBO. THE GND CTLR CLRED US TO TAXI TO RWY 30L AND DIRECTED US TO OBTAIN NEW ATIS AND ADVISE HIM WHEN WE HAD IT. THE FO STATED THAT WE SHOULD TURN L OFF THE RAMP TO TAXI TO RWY 30L AND I CONCURRED. I THEN THROTTLED UP OUR ENGINES TO BEGIN TAXIING AND THE FBO MARSHALER VIGOROUSLY DIRECTED US TO TURN TO OUR R TO EXIT THEIR RAMP. THE FO COMMENTED THAT HE HAD HOPED THE MARSHALER WOULD DIRECT US TO TURN TO OUR L, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN A MORE DIRECT TAXI TO RWY 30L. AS WE STARTED TO TAXI THE FO SWITCHED TO THE ATIS FREQ TO OBTAIN THE NEW ATIS. UNFORTUNATELY, HE DID NOT HAVE GND CTL FREQ PROGRAMMED INTO OUR OTHER RADIO AND NEITHER OF US WAS MONITORING GND CTL. AT THE TIME, I WAS NOT AWARE THAT NEITHER OF US WERE MONITORING GND CTL AND THIS WAS NOT COMMUNICATED BETWEEN US, WHICH WAS A FLAW IN OUR CRM PROC. WHILE WE WERE TAXIING, MY FO WAS OBTAINING NEW ATIS AND I WAS GOING THROUGH THE 'TAXIING' CHKLIST ITEMS. WHEN WE CAME TO THE ENTRANCE TO WHAT I THOUGHT TO BE TXWY V (BUT IN FACT IT WAS THE ENTRANCE TO RWY 11/29), I ASKED THE FO (WHO HAD THE ARPT DIAGRAM) IF THIS WAS WHERE WE TURNED R (TO TAXI TO RWY 30L) AND HE RESPONDED 'YES.' AS WE TAXIED UP TO THE ENTRANCE TO WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS TXWY V (NEITHER OF US NOTICED ANY RUNWAY SIGNS OR DISTINCT MARKINGS), I LOOKED L AND VISUALLY CLRED THE INTXN AND AIRSPACE ABOVE IT AND STATED 'CLR L' AND THE FO LOOKED TO THE R AND VISUALLY CLRED THE INTXN AND AIRSPACE ABOVE IT AND STATED 'CLR R.' AFTER CONFIRMING THAT THERE WERE NO POTENTIAL CONFLICTS TO THE L AND R, WE ENTERED THE INTXN AND TURNED R ONTO WHAT WE THOUGH WAS TXWY V (HEADING SE), BUT UNFORTUNATELY, WE HAD MISTAKENLY ENTERED ONTO RWY 11/29. AT THAT TIME THE FO SWITCHED FROM THE ATIS FREQ BACK TO GND CTL FREQ TO ADVISE HIM WE HAD THE NEW ATIS, AND THE CTLR IMMEDIATELY ADVISED THAT WE HAD TURNED ONTO RWY 29 AND HAD COMMITTED A 'PLT DEV.' AS I RECALL THE FO IMMEDIATELY APOLOGIZED TO THE GND CTLR AND ASKED FOR INSTRUCTIONS, TO WHICH THE CTLR ADVISED US TO CONTINUE TAXIING (SE) DOWN RWY 11/29 AND EXIT AT THE END AND THEN CONTINUE OUR TAXI TO RWY 30L. WE TAXIED TO RWY 30L AND UPON ARRIVING AND SWITCHING TO THE TWR FREQ, WE WERE ADVISED TO CALL THE SJC TWR MGR UPON OUR ARRIVAL. WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR TKOF FROM RWY 30L AND FLEW FROM SJC TO ZZZ WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVING AT ZZZ WE CALLED

THE SAN JOSE TWR MGR (WHILE IN MY PRESENCE, BUT I COULD ONLY HEAR MY FO'S SIDE THE CONVERSATION). THE TWR MGR ADVISED OF THE DEV RPT. THE FO TOLD ME THAT DURING HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE TWR MGR, HE WAS TOLD THAT THERE HAD BEEN 5 TO 6 SIMILAR 'PLT DEVS' ON THIS RWY IN RECENT MONTHS AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN PROBS WITH THE FBO MARSHALERS AND RAMP PERSONNEL IN OTHER INCIDENTS, AS WELL. I SPOKE WITH A SAN JOSE FSDO OPS INSPECTOR WHO CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN MANY SIMILAR INCIDENTS IN THE LAST YEAR ON RWY 29 FROM ACFT DEPARTING THE FBO. THIS WAS ONLY THE SECOND TIME THAT EITHER OF US HAS FLOWN INTO OR OUT OF SJC AND WE WERE NOT VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT. FINALLY, THE TWR MGR ADVISED THAT 1) THERE WAS NO CONFLICTING TFC DURING THE 'PLT DEV,' 2) WE DID NOT PLACE ANY OTHER ACFT IN DANGER, 3) NO INBOUND ACFT WAS REQUIRED TO EXECUTE A 'GAR,' AND 4) THE INCIDENT DID NOT COST ANYONE ANY MONEY. IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE FAA TO LOOK AT WHAT MAY BE POSSIBLE SHORTCOMINGS IN THE ARPT INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE RAMP AREA NEAR THE FBO AND THE ADJACENT TXWY AREA. BETTER SIGNAGE AND MARKINGS COULD REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW 'PLT DEVS.' FURTHERMORE, THE COMMERCIAL ARPT DIAGRAM IS NOT VERY CLR IN DEPICTING THIS AREA OF THE ARPT, THE FBO RAMP AND HOW IT INTEGRATES WITH TXWY V. ALSO, PROVIDING PLTS WHO ARE DEPARTING FROM THE FBO RAMP A HANDOUT BRINGING ATTENTION TO THIS PROB AND BETTER TRAINING OF MARSHALERS WITH EMPHASIS ON WHICH DIRECTION THEY DIRECT ACFT TO TURN OUT OF THE RAMP COULD REDUCE CONFUSION AND INCREASE SAFETY WHEN TAXIING AWAY FROM THE FBO. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 744538: C560 REQUESTED TAXI CLRNC FROM FBO FOR IFR DEP AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO TAXI TO RWY 30L, WHICH ACFT ACKNOWLEDGED. CTLR NOTICED ACFT TURN WRONG DIRECTION ON TXWY V, WHICH IS ADJACENT TO FBO. CTLR ATTEMPTED BUT WAS UNABLE TO RAISE PLT ON FREQUENCY AFTER INITIAL CONTACT. CTLR THEN NOTICED ACFT TURN TOWARDS RWY 29 AT TXWY G, STILL UNABLE TO RAISE PLT ON FREQUENCY. CTLR OBSERVED ACFT TURN ONTO RWY 29, AND ALERTED THE TOWER CTLR. EVENTUALLY ABLE TO RAISE PLT WHO STATED HE WAS GETTING THE CURRENT ATIS. THE INTXN OF RWY 29 TXWY G IS CLRLY MARKED WITH SIGNS AND GROUND MARKINGS IN RED DENOTING A RWY. THERE ARE NO RWY GUARD LIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS RWY AS IT IS PRIMARILY USED FOR LIGHT GA ACFT. SJC HAS HAD SEVERAL PLT DEVS OF A SIMILAR NATURE IN THE SAME EXACT MANNER, WHEREAS CORPORATE TYPE ACFT TURN THE WRONG WAY OUT OF THE FBO AND TURN ONTO RWY 29 AT TXWY G. IT SEEMS INEXPLICABLE TO TRY TO UNDERSTAND HOW TO PREVENT THIS TYPE OF ERROR, EXCEPT TO SAY IT PROBABLY HAS TO DO WITH SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ON BEHALF OF THE FLT CREWS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT IN RETROSPECT THE VIGOROUS MARSHALER TAXI SIGNALS WERE INTENDED TO KEEP THE ACFT TURNING R ONTO TXWY V. THE RAMP WAS NOT WELL MARKED IN THE AREA THE ACFT WAS EXITING AND SO THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A TXWY (V) AND RWY WAS NOT CLEAR. THE AREA THE ACFT WAS EXITING APPEARED TO BE RAMP AND BECAUSE A MORE NARROW TXWY (F) WAS IMMEDIATELY IN FRONT OF THEM LEADING ONTO WHAT APPEARED TO BE A LONG WIDE TXWY (IN FACT RWY 11/29) THAT PATH APPEARED THE MORE OBVIOUS TAXI DIRECTION. COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM WAS THE FACT THAT THE FO WAS GETTING ATIS LEAVING THE CAPT SOLO DURING THE INITIAL CRITICAL TAXI EVOLUTION. THE RPTR SUGGESTS MORE SIGNAGE TO IDENTIFY THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE FBO RAMP AND THE TXWY AND ADDITIONALLY

UPRIGHT SIGNS FOR RWY 11/29 AT TXWY F. THE RPTR DOES NOT REMEMBER SEEING ANY SIGNS.

Synopsis

A PLT RPTS TAXIING ONTO SJC RWY 11/29 AT TXWY F AFTER LEAVING THE FBO RAMP IMMEDIATELY SE OF THE SJC TWR.

ACN: 737582

Time / Day

Date : 200704
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Citationjet, C525/C526
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Aircraft : 2

Operator.General Aviation : Instructional
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 30
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 40
ASRS Report : 737582

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Ground Encounters.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolutive Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE GOT OFF OF THE END OF THE RWY, AND ASKED ATC (GND CTL) FOR PROGRESSIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE FBO. THEY SAID TO MAKE A R TURN ON TXWY B THEN WE WILL SEE THE FBO HANGARS. WE PROCEED TO MAKE THE R TURN AS TOLD, THEN WE BOTH SAW HANGARS ON THE L, AS DESCRIBED BY THE TWR. AFTER WE TURNED, WE BOTH DISCUSSED HOW IT DID NOT LOOK RIGHT. I CALLED THE TWR ONCE AGAIN TO CONFIRM THAT WE WERE IN THE RIGHT AREA. THE TWR THEN STATED THAT HE COULD NO LONGER SEE US. THE CAPT STOPPED BRIEFLY AT THIS TIME OR SLOWED DOWN TO AN ALMOST STOP, WHEN HE SAID, 'I THINK THERE'S THE FOLLOW ME VEHICLE,' AND I AGREED. THE CAPT THEN JUST TURNED R TOWARDS THE VEHICLE, DOWN A VERY TIGHT ROW OF SMALLER PROP ACFT. I WAS VERY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THIS DECISION, BUT IT WAS NEVER DISCUSSED AT THAT TIME THAT HE WAS JUST GOING TO TURN R TOWARDS THE TRUCK. THE CAPT SLOWED DOWN, KNOWING THAT THIS WAS A REALLY TIGHT PLACE TO BE. WE SHOULD HAVE JUST STOPPED THERE. HE REQUESTED FOR ME TO WATCH MY WING AND HE WOULD WATCH HIS, AND I AGREED TO. AS WE GOT CLOSER TO THE AIRPLANE THAT WE STRUCK, I STARTED TO SAY THAT WE WERE REALLY, REALLY, REALLY CLOSE, AND BEFORE I COULD SAY ANYTHING, IT SEEMED THAT WE PICKED UP A LITTLE SPD AND IT WAS TOO LATE. I COULDN'T GET OUT ANOTHER WORD BEFORE WE STRUCK THE NOSE CONE OF A C172 WITH OUR R WING TIP. AFTER THAT, THE CAPT JUST CONTINUED DOWN THE ROW, FOLLOWING THE TRUCK TO THE FBO. WHAT I SHOULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENT AND LEARNED FROM THIS: EVEN AS SIC, I NEED TO BE MORE DECLARATIVE WHEN I AM NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE DECISION AND IF NEED BE, DO WHAT I NEED TO. AS THE CAPT MADE THE TURN DOWN THE ROW, I SHOULD HAVE STATED AT THAT TIME, THAT I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE, AND THAT I COULDN'T BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WING. LET'S STOP RIGHT HERE. MORE CRM SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE. IF YOUR GUT TELLS YOU IT'S WRONG, IT IS TOO CLOSE, THEN IT IS. DON'T TAKE CHANCES!

Synopsis

DURING TAXI IN TO THE FBO A CE525 FLT CREW HAS THE RIGHT WING TIP CONTACT THE PROPELLER SPINNER OF A C172 PARKED ALONG THE TXWY.

ACN: 736051

Time / Day

Date : 200704
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Bound Lower : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZ.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Ground : Takeoff Roll
Route In Use.Departure.SID : zzz

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Oil Pressure Indication

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 11000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3800
ASRS Report : 736051

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician

Person : 4

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : oil pressure ind.
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

OUR FLT PUSHED BACK FROM THE GATE A FEW MINS LATE DUE TO LATE ARRIVING BAGS. I WAS PF, AND MY FO WAS PLT MONITORING. BOTH ENGS STARTED NORMALLY AND PROVIDED NORMAL N1, N2, OIL QUANTITY, AND OIL PRESSURE INDICATIONS AFTER ENG START AND THROUGHOUT OUR TAXI. WE INITIATED OUR TKOF AT XA41Z, AND DURING THE TKOF ROLL AT APPROX 100 KTS, WE OBSERVED AMBER 'XX'S' SPONTANEOUSLY APPEAR ON BOTH ENGS' OIL INDICATORS ON THE ENG ECAM PAGE THAT IS DISPLAYED DURING TKOF. IN 9 YRS OF AIRLINE FLYING, WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN TRAINED TO BE 'GO-ORIENTED' DURING EACH TKOF, AND TO ABORT FOR ONLY THE MOST SERIOUS ACFT SYS FAILURES. SINCE WE HAD NORMAL N1, N2, ENG OIL QUANTITY, AIRSPD, AND NO ABNORMAL VIBRATIONS OR ANY LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CTL, I ELECTED NOT TO ABORT THE TKOF. I DID NOT WANT TO OVERREACT AND CREATE THE DANGEROUS POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN UNWARRANTED ABORTED TKOF. IN THAT MOMENT, I ALSO REMEMBER FROM MY LAST SIMULATOR CHK RIDE THAT THE MOST DECISIVE INDICATOR OF ENG DAMAGE OR MALFUNCTION IN OUR HIGH BYPASS CFM56 ENGS IS OIL QUANTITY, NOT OIL PRESSURE. BECAUSE ALL OUR OTHER ENG INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL, MY DECISION WAS TO CONTINUE A NORMAL TKOF, STABILIZE OUR ACFT CONFIGN AND GET CLR OF NEARBY TFC BEFORE ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN ANY FURTHER DEPTH. WE RECEIVED NO ECAM WARNINGS AT ANY TIME DURING OUR TKOF (OR AFTER CLBING ABOVE THE TKOF INHIBIT PHASE ALT), NOR DURING ANY OTHER PORTION OF OUR FLT UNTIL LATER DURING OUR ROLLOUT PHASE UPON LNDG. WE BEGAN OUR INITIAL CLB, RETRACTED LNDG GEAR AND FLAPS, AND QUICKLY BUT METHODICALLY PERFORMED OUR AFTER TKOF CHKLISTS, WHILE CONTINUOUSLY MONITORING OUR ENG PAGE FOR ANY FURTHER ABNORMAL SYMPTOMS. WE WERE PREPARED AT THE FIRST SIGN OF ANY ADDITIONAL ABNORMALITY TO DECLARE AN EMER AND LAND IMMEDIATELY, BUT WE WERE CONFIDENT THAT WE WERE OBSERVING ONLY AN ABSENCE OF INDICATIONS, NOT A GENUINE OIL PRESSURE LOSS. THE REASON WE BELIEVED THIS IS BECAUSE IN THE AIRBUS, WE SEE THESE TYPES OF INDICATION FAILURES ALL THE TIME, WHERE 'XX'S' APPEAR TO TELL US THAT A SENSOR HAS FAILED. ALL ENG INDICATIONS CONTINUED TO BE NORMAL THROUGHOUT OUR INITIAL CLB, AND AS WE WERE VECTORED BY ATC, WE BECAME CLR ENOUGH OF NEARBY TFC TO ASSESS OUR SITUATION IN GREATER DEPTH. I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND RADIO COMS, AND ASKED MY FO TO

REVIEW ALL OUR ACFT ECAM SYS PAGES (WHICH WERE ALL NORMAL, EXCEPT FOR THE AMBER 'XX'S' DISPLAYED ON THE ENG OIL PRESSURE PORTION OF OUR ENG PAGE), AND I ALSO ASKED HIM TO CHK THE WHOLE COCKPIT FOR ANY POPPED CIRCUIT BREAKERS, AND TO CONSULT OUR VOLUME 2 FOR ANY ABNORMAL PROCS RELATED TO 'LOSS OF OIL PRESSURE INDICATIONS.' WE FOUND NO POPPED CIRCUIT BREAKERS, AND WE FOUND NO EMER CHKLISTS OR DIRECTLY PERTINENT GUIDANCE IN OUR VOLUME 2 MANUAL RELATING TO A LOSS OF ENG OIL PRESSURE INDICATIONS. THE ONLY PROC SLIGHTLY SIMILAR TO OUR CONDITION WAS IN THE ECAM ANNUNCIATED ABNORMALS SECTION FOR ENG 1(2) OIL LOW PRESSURE. THIS SECTION ADVISES SHUTTING DOWN THE AFFECTED ENG(S) IF OIL PRESSURE IS BELOW 13 PSI AND ACCOMPANIED WITH AN ENG OIL LOW PRESSURE WARNING. SINCE WE HAD SEEN NO ECAM WARNINGS, NONE OF THESE PROCS SEEMED APPLICABLE. THERE SIMPLY WAS NO EMER OR ABNORMAL CHKLIST PROC FOR OUR CURRENT ACFT CONDITION, EITHER IN THE ECAM EMERS, NON-ECAM EMERS, OR ABNORMALS SECTION OF OUR MANUALS, SO WE HAD TO RELY ON OUR JUDGEMENT OF THE ACFT'S STATE AND THE ADVICE OF OUR AIRLINE'S MAINT CTL EXPERT. I HAD MY FO CONTACT MAINT CTL TO DETERMINE ANY ADDITIONAL MEASURES WE MIGHT TAKE TO FURTHER UNDERSTAND OUR SITUATION. MAINT CTL INSTRUCTED US TO CHK FOR POPPED CIRCUIT BREAKERS, WHICH WE THEN DID AN ADDITIONAL TIME. AGAIN, WE FOUND NO CIRCUIT BREAKERS POPPED ANYWHERE IN THE COCKPIT. WE MAINTAINED A FLT PATH AND ALT THAT PERMITTED US TO HAVE BOTH ZZZ, AND ZZZ2 AVAILABLE IF ANY FURTHER ENG ISSUES DEVELOPED. I TALKED DIRECTLY WITH MAINT CTL ON THE RADIO AND TOLD THEM WE NEEDED A DECISION FROM THEM ON WHETHER TO RETURN TO ZZZ, FOR FURTHER ACFT INSPECTION OR MAINT. MAINT CTL REQUESTED WE RETURN TO ZZZ. WE HAD ACTUALLY ALREADY DECIDED TO RETURN, BUT I WANTED TO ENSURE THAT OUR MAINT CTL DEPT PARTICIPATED IN THIS DECISION. I RELAYED THIS MESSAGE TO MY FO, TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AS PF AGAIN, AND ASKED MY FO TO TELL ATC WE NEEDED TO RETURN FOR A PRECAUTIONARY LNDG BUT THAT WE WERE NOT DECLARING AN EMER AT THIS TIME. IN RETROSPECT, I NOW THINK IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO HAVE DECLARED THE EMER AS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE WAY OF HANDLING THE UNKNOWN FACTORS IN THIS SITUATION. I BRIEFED OUR FLT ATTENDANTS AND THEN OUR PAX THAT WE WERE RETURNING TO ZZZ AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE BECAUSE OF A LOSS OF ANCILLARY ENG INDICATIONS, AND EMPHASIZED THAT WE WERE EXPERIENCING TOTALLY NORMAL ENG AND OTHER ACFT SYS INDICATIONS AND WERE CONFIDENT OF A SAFE AND UNEVENTFUL ARR. AS WE WERE HANDED OFF TO APCH CTL, THEY ASKED US AGAIN WHETHER WE WERE DECLARING AN EMER, AND WE STATED AGAIN, 'NOT AT THIS TIME,' BUT AFTER HEARING THE NATURE OF OUR ABNORMAL INDICATIONS APCH CTL INSISTED ON DECLARING IT AS AN EMER, AND ADVISED US THAT ARPT CRASH FIRE AND RESCUE TRUCKS AND EQUIP WOULD BE STANDING BY FOR OUR LNDG. OUR ILS APCH AND LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL, EXCEPT FOR THE FACT THAT DURING THE LNDG ROLLOUT WE EXPERIENCED SIMULTANEOUS L/R THRUST REVERSER FAULT ON BOTH ENGS. WE SUSPECTED THAT THIS WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE LACK OF OIL PRESSURE INDICATIONS FROM BOTH ENGS. MAINT CTL LATER CONFIRMED THIS WHEN WE DISCUSSED THIS WITH THEM AT THE GATE. AS A LEARNING POINT, WE FELT LATER THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL TO HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY OUR AIRLINE'S MAINT CTL DEPT TO EXPECT OUR THRUST REVERSERS TO NOT FUNCTION, ESPECIALLY IF WE HAD BEEN RETURNING OUT OF NECESSITY TO AN ARPT WITH SHORT RWYS. WE RETURNED TO THE GATE AT XB15Z, COMPLETED ALL OUR NORMAL PARKING CHKLISTS, COMPLETED THE AIR TURN BACK ENTRY

INTO THE ACFT LOGBOOK, ALONG WITH PERTINENT FLT TIMES. WE INFORMED MECHS MEETING THE ACFT EXACTLY WHAT WE OBSERVED AND INFORMED THEM THAT OUR LNDG WT OF 110000 LBS DID NOT REQUIRE AN OVERWT LNDG LOGBOOK ENTRY OR INSPECTION. (SIDE NOTE: OUR MAINT CTL MECHS THAT MET THE AIRPLANE UPON OUR ARR AT THE GATE STATED THEY FOUND 2 CIRCUIT BREAKERS RELATED TO OIL PRESSURE POPPED, BUT I AM ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN THEY WERE NOT POPPED AT EACH OF THE 3 TIMES WHEN WE EXAMINED OUR CIRCUIT BREAKERS THAT DAY: ONCE DURING OUR FIRST FLT OF THE DAY PREFLT INSPECTION, ONCE IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF AS WE ATTEMPTED TO DIAGNOSE OUR ACFT'S CONDITION OURSELVES, AND ONCE AGAIN WHEN WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CHK THEM BY OUR MAINT CTL EXPERTS DURING FLT. WE CAN ONLY SURMISE THAT SOME EVENT -- POSSIBLY THE ACFT HYD SYS THRUST REVERSER SHUTOFF VALVE, RECEIVING NO INPUTS FROM THE ENG OIL PRESSURE SENSORS -- CAUSED AN AMPERAGE THAT POPPED THESE CIRCUIT BREAKERS WHEN WE TRIED TO USE OUR THRUST REVERSERS ON LNDG.) MAINT CTL MECHS RAN SEVERAL DIAGNOSTIC TESTS AND ENG RUN-UPS, AND AFTER APPROX 30 MINS THEY SIGNED OFF OUR ACFT LOGBOOK AND WE WERE ABLE TO BEGIN OUR FLT AGAIN. THIS EVENT WAS MANAGED WITH CALM AND EFFICIENCY. WE STRIVED TO MAINTAIN A METHODOICAL PROB SOLVING APCH TO OUR SITUATION, IN A MANNER THAT AT ALL TIMES MAINTAINED FAR'S AND COMPANY POLICIES, AND FOCUSED CRM, STANDARD OPERATING PROCS, COMMON SENSE, AND GOOD JUDGEMENT TOWARDS THE SAFEST POSSIBLE OUTCOME. WE WERE CONSCIOUSLY TRYING TO NOT OVERREACT TO THE SITUATION (SUCH AS ABORTING THE TKOF OR IMPULSIVELY DECLARING AN EMER AND DIVING FOR ANY AVAILABLE RWY, THEREBY ENDANGERING OTHER ACFT IN A VERY CONGESTED ARPT TERMINAL AREA), AND TO METHODOCALLY RESPOND TO THE CONDITIONS WE SAW AT THAT TIME, AND MAKE DECISIONS THAT WOULD LEAD TO THE SAFEST POSSIBLE OUTCOME. BUT THIS EXPERIENCE DID TEACH ME AN IMPORTANT LESSON. IN THE FUTURE, WHERE ENG INSTS ARE CONCERNED IT IS PROBABLY WISER TO DECLARE AN EMER AND RETURN FOR LNDG IMMEDIATELY, EVEN IF THE ANOMALY SEEMS INNOCUOUS AND THE ACFT APPEARS TO BE PERFORMING NORMALLY.

Synopsis

A320 ENG #1 AND #2 OIL PRESSURE INDICATION FAILURE DURING TKOF ROLL AND ELECTS TO CONTINUE. AFTER TROUBLESHOOTING WITHOUT SUCCESS CREW RETURNS TO DEP ARPT.

ACN: 736028

Time / Day

Date : 200704
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : RIC.Airport
State Reference : VA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : PCT.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Canadair/Bombardier Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual
Route In Use.Arrival : On Vectors

Aircraft : 2

Make Model Name : Ultralight
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Aircraft : 3

Make Model Name : Ultralight
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4000
ASRS Report : 736028

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1000
ASRS Report : 736028

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 200
Miss Distance.Vertical : 200

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 20 AT RIC. ATC GAVE US A HDG OF 270 DEGS AT 3000 FT. APPROX 10 MI NE OF THE ARPT THE FO SPOTTED AN ULTRALIGHT AT OUR ALT R OF OUR COURSE. A COUPLE OF SECONDS LATER I SPOTTED ANOTHER ULTRALIGHT AT OUR ALT ON OUR COURSE. I TURNED OFF THE AUTOPLT, TURNED R AND BEGAN A DSCNT. WE MISSED THE ULTRALIGHT BY APPROX 200 FT HORIZONTALLY AND 200 FT VERTICALLY. WE TOLD APCH WHAT WE DID AND WHY. I'M NOT SURE IF THE ULTRALIGHTS WERE IN THE CLASS C AIRSPACE OR NOT. ATC HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THEM. IF ACTION WAS NOT TAKEN THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A COLLISION. IT WAS HARD TO SEE TFC BECAUSE WE WERE LOOKING DIRECTLY INTO THE SUN. GOOD VISUAL SCANNING AND CRM HELPED US TO AVOID A CONFLICT. WE HAD ALSO ONLY BEEN ON DUTY FOR APPROX 6 HRS AFTER A GOOD NIGHT'S REST, WHICH I THINK HELPED THE QUICK REACTION TIME.

Synopsis

FLT CREW REPORTS NMAC WITH ULTRALIGHT ACFT 10 NM NE OF RIC AT 3000 FEET.

ACN: 734002

Time / Day

Date : 200704
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : GCN.Airport
State Reference : AZ
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements : Windshear
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : GCN.Tower
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Takeoff

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 148
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8015
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 925
ASRS Report : 734002

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 130
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2780
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 220
ASRS Report : 734393

Events

Anomaly.Excursion : Runway
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Rejected Takeoff
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 3 APPROX XA50. FO WAS AT THE CTLS. CURRENT METAR (NEARLY 1 HR OLD) AS FOLLOWS: DATE AND TIME 050/06KT 10 SM SCT110 19/M06 A3000. LIGHT WIND WAS CONFIRMED BY OBSERVATION OF WINDSOCK AND FLAGS. REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE CHARTS SHOWED COMFORTABLE MARGINS FOR ACCELERATION/STOP AND ACCELERATION/GO. BROKEN CLOUDS AND VIRGA WERE NOTED TO THE S, SCATTERED TO BROKEN CLOUDS WERE OBSERVED TO THE N. RWY WAS DRY AND CLEAN. ROTATION SPD WAS INCREASED BY 6 KTS OVER THAT REQUIRED FOR OUR TKOF WT TO ASSURE CLEAN UNSTICK. MAX PWR WAS SET BEFORE BRAKE RELEASE. ACCELERATION WAS NORMAL UNTIL AFTER 80 KT STATUS CHK AND CALLOUT. MOMENTARY HESITATION OF IAS INCREASE WAS NOTED AT APPROX 87 KTS, FOLLOWED BY RESUMPTION OF NORMAL ACCELERATION. NORMAL ROTATION TO TOGA V-BAR PITCH ATTITUDE RESULTED IN LIFT-OFF, BUT THE ACFT IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO SETTLE. IAS WAS DECREASING RAPIDLY IN SPITE OF SUBJECTIVE FEEL OF NORMAL ACCELERATION. SUBJECTIVELY, GND SPD WAS INCREASING RAPIDLY. MAIN WHEELS CONTACTED THE RWY 2-3 SECONDS AFTER LIFT-OFF. FO CORRECTED FOR A SLIGHT WX VANE YAW ON LIFT-OFF AND MAINTAINED TKOF PITCH ATTITUDE. WHEN THE MAINS TOUCHED DOWN, I TOOK THE CTLS AND APPLIED FULL REVERSE AND MODERATE BRAKING (TO AVOID WHEEL LOCKUP). APPROX 2500 FT OF RWY REMAINED. IAS WAS LESS THAN 100 KTS, GND SPD (SUBJECTIVELY) WAS AT LEAST 120 KTS. UPON REACHING THE END OF THE PAVEMENT, I STEERED 10 DEG L TO AVOID THE LOC ANTENNA BERM, CONTINUED FULL REVERSE, AND APPLIED MAX BRAKING ON SANDY SOIL. FO ASSISTED WITH BRAKING AND EXECUTED THE EMER SHUTDOWN PROC BEFORE THE ACFT CAME TO REST. THE ACFT STOPPED APPROX 500-600 FT PAST THE END OF THE RWY. AFTER ASSURING THAT EMER EGRESS WAS NOT REQUIRED, I EXITED THE ACFT AND FOUND ALL LNDG GEAR INTACT AND NO VISIBLE DAMAGE. BOTH MAINS DEFLATED WITHIN A FEW MINS WHEN THE FUSE PLUGS ACTIVATED FROM THE HEAT GENERATED BY THE MAX BRAKING EFFORT. I NOTED A STRONG, STEADY WIND, ESTIMATED TO BE IN EXCESS OF 20 KTS, COMING FROM THE DIRECTION OF THE RWY. THE NEW METAR AT XA54 LT SHOWS 340 DEGS 12 KTS GUSTING 23 KTS. RWY WAS CHANGED TO RWY 21 WHILE WE WERE WAITING FOR SVC VEHICLES TO ARRIVE. THIS EVENT IS THE RESULT OF A STRONG NEGATIVE WINDSHEAR AT ROTATION. MY DECISION TO ABORT WAS PROMPTED BY A FLASHBACK TO A SIMULATOR SCENARIO (CE560) A FEW YRS AGO. IF I HAD TO DO IT AGAIN, I WOULD DISCONTINUE THE TKOF AT THE POINT WHERE THE ASI HESITATED MOMENTARILY. OUR TRAINING DISCOURAGES ABORTING AFTER 80 KTS EXCEPT FOR FIRE, ENG FAILURE OR DIRECTIONAL CTL. THE FO AND I WERE PRIMED TO CONTINUE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ABNORMAL INDICATION PRIOR TO

80 KTS. IN THIS SITUATION, I DO NOT BELIEVE THE ACFT COULD HAVE REMAINED AIRBORNE AND CLBED TO AVOID A CFIT OUTCOME. CRM AND THE FO'S PERFORMANCE WERE EXCELLENT. NO INJURIES WERE SUSTAINED BY ANYONE, AND THE ACFT WAS RETURNED TO SVC AFTER REPLACEMENT OF BOTH MAIN WHEELS AND A THOROUGH BRAKE INSPECTION.

Synopsis

CREW ELECTS TO REJECT THE TAKEOFF AFTER ROTATING AT GCN DUE TO WINDSHEAR ENCOUNTER THAT CAUSES ACFT TO SETTLE BACK ON THE RWY.

ACN: 732207

Time / Day

Date : 200703
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : HPN.Airport
State Reference : NY
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : HPN.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 60
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9800
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 300
ASRS Report : 732207

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Excursion : Taxiway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Insufficient Time

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

CREW WAS REPOSITIONING ACFT FROM A REMOTE PARKING LOCATION TO THE TERMINAL AREA. DUE TO A BREAKDOWN IN CRM THE CAPT (ME) ALLOWED THE STANDARD PROCS, IE, CHKLIST COMPLETION (BEFORE START CHKLIST) TO BE

BYPASSED. WHILE BEGINNING TAXI PHASE TO REPOSITION ACFT I ATTEMPTED TO STEER ACFT WITH TILLER AND NOSEWHEEL STEERING WAS NOT RESPONSIVE. I APPLIED BRAKES AND CALLED FOR FO TO DO SO AS WELL. JUST AS THE ACFT ROLLED OFF OF TXWY ONTO SOFT GRASSY AREA I NOTICED THAT THE HYD PUMPS WERE NOT IN THE REQUIRED POS OF 'AUTO/ON.' CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE CREW FATIGUE (EARLY SHOW TIME, LAST DAY OF 4-DAY TRIP), CRM BREAKDOWN (IE, CAPT ALLOWED EXTERNAL ATC RADIO CALLS TO INTERFERE WITH COCKPIT DUTIES), TRYING TO RUSH TO MOVE ACFT TO BOARD PAX AT THE TERMINAL TO MAKE AN UPDATED 'ETDC' WINDOW. NOTE: ONLY FLT CREW PLUS 1 FLT ATTENDANT ON BOARD. NO PAX. NO INJURIES, NO DAMAGE TO ACFT WHATSOEVER.

Synopsis

CL65 CREW DOES NOT USE BEFORE START CHECKLIST AND ATTEMPTS TO TAXI WITH THE HYDRAULIC PUMPS OFF. STEERING AND BRAKES ARE INOPERATIVE AND THE ACFT GOES OFF THE TAXIWAY.

ACN: 730780

Time / Day

Date : 200703
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 35000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Make Model Name : B737-800
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Pressurization Outflow Valve

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 186
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6906
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 6906
ASRS Report : 730780

Person : 2

Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : Cabin Altitude
Indicator/Warning Horn
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency
Resolatory Action.Other
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

PREFLT IN ZZZ. WX VERY COLD AND CLR. OUTSIDE AIR TEMP 7 DEGS F. DURING WALKAROUND, I NOTED PRESSURIZATION OUTFLOW VALVE CLOSED PER COLD WX PROCS. IT WAS THE FIRST TIME I RECALL SEEING THAT CONDITION ON MY WALKAROUND. CAPT DID COCKPIT PREFLT, SETTING PRESSURIZATION SELECTOR TO AUTO AFTER I RETURNED FROM WALKAROUND. SHORTLY BEFORE PUSHBACK A WATER LINE IN AFT GALLEY SPLIT, GUSHING WATER IN AFT GALLEY AREA. MAINT SECURED LEAK AND DEFERRED THE FIX. WATER TO AFT GALLEY WAS SHUT OFF. CLEANERS CLEANED UP WATER IN AFT GALLEY AREA. FLT ATTENDANTS INDICATED WE HAD OVER 1 INCH OF WATER IN THE REAR OF THE ACFT. WE DEPARTED THE GATE 2 MINS LATE. I WAS THE PF. CLB WAS NORMAL. AT LEVELOFF, FL350, CAPT NOTICED CABIN RATE OF CHANGE FLUXING +/-800-1000 FT, CABIN ALT AT 8000 FT. THE CABIN OUTFLOW VALVE WAS APPROX AT THE FIRST TIC MARK ABOVE FULL CLOSED. ALL SWITCHES WERE CHKED AND INDICATIONS APPEARED NORMAL. CAPT DIRECTED ME TO SWITCH CABIN CONTROLLER TO ALTERNATE CABIN, RATE OF CHANGE CONTINUED TO FLUX AND BEGAN TO SHOW A VERY SLOW CLB. NEXT, HE DIRECTED ME TO SWITCH CONTROLLER TO MANUAL, ATTEMPTED TO GAIN CTL OF CABIN ALT AT 9000 FT OUTFLOW VALVE WOULD NOT INDICATE FULL CLOSED. OUTFLOW VALVE WOULD STOP APPROX AT THE SAME SPOT AS IN AUTO AND ALTERNATE MODE. THE CABIN CONTINUED TO A SLOW CLB. I TOLD THE CAPT TO GET CLRNC TO 10000 FT AND I DONNED MY OXYGEN MASK. LET HIM WORK IMPENDING EMER. THAT PRETTY MUCH COVERED THE AUTO FAIL/UNSCHEDULED PRESSURIZATION CHKLIST. CAPT REQUESTED FL290, AND I STARTED DOWN WITH THE PWR UP, HOPING TO KEEP CABIN PRESSURE BELOW 10000 FT AND WONDERING WHY WE WERE DSNDRG TO ONLY FL290. CAPT WAS STILL ON RADIO DISCUSSING RADAR COVERAGE AND FREQS IN CASE ATC CONTACT WAS LOST. AT APPROX FL300 CABIN ALT WARNING HORN WENT OFF. CAPT DONNED HIS MASK, EXTINGUISHED THE HORN, GOT CLRNC TO 10000 FT, A TURN TO ZZZ, AND BEGAN WORKING CHKLISTS WHILE STILL COORDINATING FREQS AND RADAR CONTACT WITH ATC, AS WE WERE OVER THE WATER AND ABOUT TO EXIT ATC COVERAGE. RADIOS WERE NEVER RELINQUISHED TO ME. DURING THE TURN I SWITCHED OFF THE AUTOPLT. CAPT DIRECTED THE AUTOPLT BE ENGAGED AND THEN HE SELECTED LEVEL CHANGE DSCNT (PWR AT IDLE) ON THE MCP, APPARENTLY, ABANDONING THE PWR ON DSCNT. SHORTLY AFTER LEVEL CHANGED WAS ENGAGED, THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED. I NOTED PAX OXYGEN LIGHT ILLUMINATED INDICATING WE HAD FAILED TO KEEP THE CABIN ALT BELOW 14000 FT AND THE LEVEL CHANGE DSCNT HAD APPARENTLY ACCELERATED OUR DEPRESSURIZATION WITH THE PWR BACK. PASSING THROUGH APPROX FL180, I NOTED THE SPD BRAKE WAS NOT DEPLOYED INDICATING WE HAD NEVER REALLY ACCOMPLISHED THE EMER DSCNT CHKLIST. NOR DO I RECALL THE COMPLETION OF THE CABIN ALT WARNING HORN OR RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION CHKLIST. ALTHOUGH THE CAPT INDICATED HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED THE CHKLISTS. AT 10000 FT, I NOTED THE PRESSURIZATION CONTROLLER IN AUTO AND OUTFLOW VALVE FULL OPEN. I SWITCHED THE CONTROLLER TO MANUAL AND CLOSED OUTFLOW VALVE TO MAINTAIN 7000 FT (APPROX FIRST TIC). I DID NOT ATTEMPT TO SEE IF OUTFLOW VALVE WOULD FULLY CLOSE. DSNDRG OUT OF 10000 FT THE CAPT POSITIONED THE CONTROLLER BACK TO AUTO. THE CAPT CHKED WITH THE BACK TO ENSURE EVERYONE WAS OK AND HAD EVERYONE REMOVE THEIR MASKS AT 10000 FT. THE FLT ATTENDANTS INDICATED SOME OF THE MASKS DID NOT WORK AND I HAD A

DISCUSSION ABOUT IT WITH THEM. LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. MAINT RPTED SEEING SOME ICE AROUND THE OUTFLOW VALVE AT THE GATE AND SUGGESTED THAT POSSIBLY WATER FROM THE EARLIER LEAK HAD FLOWED BACK DOWN AND FROZE DURING CLBOUT NOT ALLOWING FULL CLOSURE OF THE OUTFLOW VALVE AT ALT. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: PF SHOULD DO ATC COM, FREEING UP PNF TO FOCUS ON CHKLISTS. IF AUTOPLT IS WORKING FINE, DO NOT SHUT IT OFF -- IT FREES ONE UP ENOUGH TO STAY IN THE LOOP BETTER. ALT WARNING HORN IS TOO LOUD AND DISTRACTING, THEY SHOULD BE CHANGED TO A VOICE TELLING YOU TO DON OXYGEN MASK (LIKE MANY OTHER WARNINGS), IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH IT GOING OFF. IN HINDSIGHT IT APPEARS FULL COMPLETION OF THE CHKLIST MAY HAVE TAKEN BACK SEAT TO ACT/CABIN COM, IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING ENVIRONMENT WITH COM HAMPERED BY THE FULL FACE OXYGEN MASKS. ALSO THE TRANSITION FROM A PWR ON DSCNT TO AN EMER DSCNT WAS NOT REAL CLR CUT, ALTHOUGH IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ONCE THE CABIN REACHED 14000 FT. HAD WE FOCUSED MORE ON THE 3 EMER CHKLISTS, WE WOULD HAVE ENSURED ALL ITEMS WERE COMPLETED. HOWEVER, THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME I DO NOT BELIEVE WOULD HAVE BEEN ANY DIFFERENT.

Synopsis

B737-800 FLT CREW EXPERIENCES PRESSURIZATION FAILURE LIKELY RELATED TO WATER SPILL IN AFT CABIN OVER PRESSURIZATION OUTFLOW VALVES DURING PREFLT IN VERY COLD CONDITIONS. CRM AND SOP ISSUES ARE MAGNIFIED DURING PERFORMANCE OF CHECKLISTS AND EMERGENCY DESCENT.

ACN: 729594

Time / Day

Date : 200703
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Intersection : CEJAY
State Reference : AZ
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 23000
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 25000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZLA.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Challenger CL601
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : TYSSN

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 95
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6700
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000
ASRS Report : 729594

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS CAPT OF THE FLT, BUT I WAS IN THE R SEAT FOR THIS LEG ACTING AS THE PNF. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE TYSSN 1 RNAV ARR INTO LAS. I ASSUMED THAT WE WOULD FLY THE ARR UTILIZING THE VNAV PORTION OF THE FMS. I INITIALLY ENTERED 8000 FT IN THE ALT SELECTOR, BEING THAT WAS THE LOWEST ALT ON THE ARR. HOWEVER, I DID NOT CONFIRM THIS WITH THE PF, HE ELECTED TO USE THE VERTICAL SPEED (VS) MODE OF THE AUTOPILOT. THE ARR WOULD HAVE US CROSS THE CEJAY INTXN AT FL190. AS WE APCHED CEJAY APPROX 10-15 MILES E, AND AT AN ALT OF BETWEEN FL250-FL230, I LOOKED AT THE ALT SELECT WINDOW, WHICH READ 8000 FT, AND AT THE DISTANCE TO CEJAY, WHICH WAS BETWEEN 10-15 MILES AWAY, AND CONVINCED THE PF THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO MAKE OUR CROSSING RESTR. THIS WAS INCORRECT. BEFORE THIS TOOK PLACE, THE CTLR HAD RE-CLRED US TO CROSS THE KADDY INTXN AT 12000 FT. AS WE DSNDED THROUGH 12000 FT AND EVENTUALLY THROUGH 11000 FT, THE CTLR SAID THAT HE SHOWED US THROUGH 11000 FT. I ADMITTED OUR ERROR, AND WE BEGAN OUR CLIMB BACK TO 12000 FT. THERE WAS NO TCAS ALERT OR RA. WE CONTINUED TO LAS WITH ANY FURTHER INCIDENT. SOME CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) THE PF IS AT THE MOMENT, A CONTRACT PLT THAT WE (OUR COMPANY) USES ON A REGULAR BASIS. HE WILL BE HIRED TO FULL TIME STATUS AT A LATER DATE. THEREFORE, THERE WAS A CONTRACT PILOT FLYING THE AIRPLANE, AND A COMPANY PILOT IN THE R SEAT AS THE PNF WHO HAS MORE TIME AND EXPERIENCE IN THE AIRPLANE. 2) AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT, OUR COMPANY RECENTLY PURCHASED ELECTRONIC FLT BAGS (EFB'S) TO USE ON BOARD THE ACFT. BOTH PLTS HAVE AN EFB TO THEIR DISPOSAL. THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION IN THE COCKPIT DURING THE ARR BECAUSE WE WERE GIVEN A DIFFERENT ARR THAN WAS PLANNED. DURING THIS CONFUSION, THE PF HAD TROUBLE LOCATING THE TYSSN 1 ARR ON HIS EFB, AND HAD ASKED FOR THE PAPER COPY VERSION, WHICH HAD NOT BEEN PULLED FOR THAT TRIP. 3) THE DAY BEFORE OUR TRIP, ONE OF MY CLOSEST FRIENDS OF 20 YEARS WAS KILLED IN HIS HELI. SOME FIXES IMPLEMENTED: 1) WE ARE NOW PRINTING PAPER COPIES OF ARPT CHARTS FOR BOTH PLTS IN ADDITION TO USING THE EFB'S. 2) WE NOW ARE BRIEFING WHICH TYPE OF DESCENT WILL BE USED FOR ARRIVALS AND DEPS. VNAV OR VS. WE ARE A PROFESSIONAL FLT CREW USING CRM AT ITS FULLEST. THIS WAS AN INADVERTENT DEVIATION AND WAS NOT INTENTIONAL.

Synopsis

A CL60 CREW USING AN ELECTRONIC FLT BAG WAS CONFUSED ABOUT AN LAS RNAV CROSSING ALT. A LOW TIME FO AND NEW EFB CONTRIBUTING TO THE HIGH WORKLOAD.

ACN: 728727

Time / Day

Date : 200702
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 14000

Environment

Flight Conditions : Mixed
Weather Elements : Ice
Weather Elements : Turbulence
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter
Make Model Name : IAI1124/1124A/Westwind
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 75
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 450
ASRS Report : 728727

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Turbulence
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Intended or Assigned Course
Consequence.Other : Physical Injury

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

UPON LEVELING OFF THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT MAINTAINING THE 14000 FT AS SELECTED. AT 14100 FT I RESELECTED 14000 FT AND IT CORRECTED BACK DOWN. WITHIN SECONDS WE WERE AT 14400 FT WHEN I SAID TO THE CAPT 'WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE AUTOPLT, HOW COME IT WON'T HOLD ALT?' THE CAPT THEN DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND PITCHED DOWN TO CORRECT FOR THE UNCOMMANDED CLB. THE RIDE THEN WENT FROM SMOOTH TO VIOLENT. I PULLED BOTH THROTTLES TO IDLE AS SOON AS I WAS ABLE. IT WAS SO ROUGH THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO CTL YOUR ARMS AND LEGS AT TIMES. BOTH OF US HIT OUR HEADS ON THE BREAKER PANEL ABOVE, WHICH RUNG OUR BELL SO TO SPEAK. INITIALLY I HEARD A HISSING SOUND AND THOUGHT DECOMPRESSION AND MASK. THEN NO MASK WE ARE ONLY 14000 FT. THE HISSING WAS A BURST BEVERAGE CONTAINER OR MY MASK OUT OF ITS HOLSTER AND PURGING, I DON'T KNOW FOR SURE. THE CAPT HAD A SEVERE CUT ON HIS HEAD AND WAS BLEEDING. HE CONTINUED TO FLY AND CLAIMED TO BE OK. THE AIRFRAME WAS COVERED WITH ICE AND A GENERATOR WAS OFFLINE. WE RPTED OUR STATUS WITH CTR AND I BELIEVE THEY DECLARED US AN EMER ACFT. AS PNF I ACTIVATED THE ACFT'S ICE PROTECTION WHICH WORKED WELL. WE BEGAN LOAD REDUCTION. I RAN THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST FOR THE GENERATOR OFF AND IT WAS RESTORED. THE REMAINING FLT WAS UNREMARKABLE. I REVIEWED THE FLT LOG AND IT INDICATED A MAX ALT LOSS OF 2000 FT. THIS IS MY BIGGEST CONCERN. MAINTAINING WINGS LEVEL WAS A FULL TIME JOB DURING THIS EVENT WITH SEVERE TURB AND I COMMEND MY CAPT. I THINK GOOD CRM PROBABLY SAVED OUR LIVES. DURING THIS EVENT I FOUND MYSELF DOING ONLY THE THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN 'OVER-LEARNED.' IN THE FUTURE I WILL PIPE UP AND ASK FOR DEVS AROUND ALL CLOUDS WHEN POSSIBLE AND IF ANYONE IS EVER INJURED INFLT I WILL SUGGEST THE USE OF OXYGEN. WE MAY NEED ALL THE HELP WE CAN GET.

Synopsis

WW24 CREW ENCOUNTERS SEVERE TURB AND ICING AT 14000 FT.

ACN: 727937

Time / Day

Date : 200701
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Beech 1900
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 790
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 500
ASRS Report : 727937

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 220
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3750
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1030
ASRS Report : 728476

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING PREFLT PREPARATIONS THE CAPT ADVISED ME THAT THE FLT HAD AN ALTERNATE DUE TO WX AND REQUIRED EXTRA FUEL. WE HAD A FULL LOAD OF 19 PAX AND 20 CHECKED BAGS. I KNEW WE WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE SOME BAGS BEHIND AND WERE LEAVING LATE DUE TO RAMP CONGESTION. DURING ACFT BOARDING AND LOADING I WAS HELPING A MOTHER AND INFANT BOARD. I NOTICED THAT THE CAPT WAS COM WITH THE RAMP AGENT UP IN THE COCKPIT ABOUT HOW MANY BAGS WE WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE BEHIND. AFTER I HELPED THE PAX GET SEATED I WALK TO THE REAR OF THE ACFT TO CLOSE THE CARGO DOOR. I NOTICED THAT THERE WERE 2 CHKD BAGS ON THE FLOOR OUTSIDE OF THE ACFT WITH 18 CHKD BAGS IN THE FORWARD CARGO COMPARTMENT. I DID MY FINAL CHKS IN BACK WITH THE PAX AND THEN CLOSED THE CABIN DOOR. DURING OUR CLB AFTER TAKEOFF THE CAPT CALLED DISPATCH TO ADVISE THEM THE NUMBER OF BAGS LEFT AT ZZZ AND THE TIMES, SINCE THE CAPT WAS UNABLE TO REACH OPS. THE CAPT LOOKED AT ME AND SAID I FELT REALLY BAD ABOUT LEAVING ALL OF THOSE BAGS. I SAID THERE WERE 2 BAGS LEFT BEHIND. HE ASKED IF I WAS SURE AND SAID THERE SHOULD HAVE ONLY BEEN 1 BAG AND 4 GATE CHKD BAGS ON THE PLANE. I SAID THERE WERE A LOT MORE BAGS THAN THAT. WE FIGURED THAT WE HAD 18 CHKD BAGS PLUS THE 4 GATE CHKD BAGS. THE CAPT TOLD ME WE WERE APPROX 500 LBS ABOVE MAX RAMP AS WELL AS MAX TAKEOFF WEIGHT. HE CALLED DISPATCH TO ADVISE THEM THAT THERE WAS A MISCOM AND THERE COULD BE A LOT LESS BAGS AT ZZZ. WE CONTINUED TO DEST WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE CAPT VERIFIED THE LNDG WT AND LNDG SPEEDS AND ALSO VERIFIED THAT NO OTHER LIMITATIONS WERE EXCEEDED. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THAT BETTER CRM COULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS. OUR PRIORITY WAS TO GET THE FLT OUT ON TIME.

Synopsis

BEECH 1900D FLT CREW OPERATED ABOVE MTGW.

ACN: 727239

Time / Day

Date : 200702
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : FLL.Airport
State Reference : FL
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 3000
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 4800

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : MIA.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude
Route In Use.Departure : On Vectors

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 67
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7700
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4521
ASRS Report : 727239

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

I ALLOWED COMPLACENCY TO ENTER THE COCKPIT, THUS ALLOWING 5 OR 6 BENIGN EVENTS TO COMBINE AND ESCALATE INTO AN OPPORTUNITY FOR MYSELF TO GET BEHIND THE ACFT AND POSSIBLY GET VIOLATED. IT WAS THE LAST LEG OF A 3 LEGGED NIGHT. I DIDN'T FEEL OVERLY TIRED (THOUGH I HAD BEEN UP ABOUT 20 HRS) AND IT WAS JUST A 20 MIN FLT FROM PT A TO PT B. MY FO IS EXPERIENCED ON THE ACFT AND THE NIGHT HAD GONE SMOOTH. THE AIRPLANE WAS EMPTY. WE WERE BASICALLY A FERRY FLT. I WAS COMPLACENT IN MY TKOF BRIEF AND FORGOT TO BRIEF THE FO FOR A POSSIBLE LOW ALT CAPTURE. CLRNC WAS RWY HDG WITH A 3000 FT LEVELOFF. WE TOOK OFF ON RWY 9 AND AT ABOUT 800 FT WENT IMC. THOUGH IT WASN'T ANYTHING CONVECTIVE, THE CLOUDS WERE OF THE KIND THAT CAUSE QUITE A BIT OF CHOP. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A COURSE REVERSAL TO TURN TO A HDG OF 270 DEGS. AND THEN I GOT THAT LOW ALT CAPTURE...AT ABOUT 1400-1500 FT. I WAS LATE WITH THE VNAV CALL BECAUSE OF ALL THE THINGS GOING ON IN THE COCKPIT (ATC CALLS, MODERATE CHOP AND THE TURN), COUPLED WITH THE LIGHT ACFT. I DIDN'T THINK IT WAS A BIG DEAL AND CALLED FOR THE FO TO BUG ME CLEAN MANEUVERING. BUT I DIDN'T CALL FOR 'SPD' FIRST AND HE DIDN'T SELECT IT. I KEPT CALLING FOR SPD AND HE KEPT DIALING THE SPD KNOB UP. HE THEN REALIZED THAT WHAT I WANTED AND SELECTED 'SPD.' UNFORTUNATELY FOR ME, BECAUSE WE WERE LIGHT, I WAS IN A BIG TURN, IMC AND GETTING BOUNCED AROUND, I GOT A LITTLE VERTIGO. COUPLE ALL THAT WITH THE BIG ACCELERATION FROM THE AUTOTHROTTLERS ADVANCING AND MY INNER EAR AND BODY MADE IT FEEL LIKE THE PLANE WAS DSNDING AND FAST. AND THOUGH I COULD SEE THE VSI CLBING, THE ALTIMETER CLBING AND THE FLT DIRECTOR COMMANDING ME TO PUSH THE NOSE OVER, I COULDN'T SHAKE THE SENSATION OF A RAPID DSCNT. AND SO I WASN'T BEING VERY AGGRESSIVE IN HOLDING THE NOSE OF THE ACFT DOWN. AT THIS POINT I COULD SEE THAT WE WERE RAPIDLY CLBING THROUGH 3000 FT AND STILL CLBING. I ASK MY FO TO SELECT AUTOPLT, WHICH HE DID, BUT THE AUTOPLT WOULDN'T CONNECT AND TO ADD INSULT TO INJURY, THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECT WARNING HORN AND LIGHT STARTED GOING OFF. ANOTHER ADDED STRESSOR. I ASKED THE FO TO CALL ATC AND REQUEST A 4000 FT LEVELOFF WHICH HE DID AND THEY GRANTED. I STILL HAD THE VERTIGO AND SENSATION OF DSNDING. I FINALLY DECIDED TO ROLL WINGS LEVEL WHILE CLICKING OFF THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECT WARNING HORN. AT ABOUT THIS TIME, THE AIRPLANE IS REACHING 250 KTS, SO THE AUTOTHROTTLERS BEGIN TO RETARD ALSO HELPING DECREASE MY VERTIGO SENSATION. MY BODY BEGINS TO BELIEVE WHAT MY EYES HAVE BEEN TELLING IT ALL ALONG, THAT YES WE ARE CLBING AND EVERYTHING IS GOING TO BE OK. WE FINALLY GET THE AUTOPLT ON AND GET THE AIRPLANE UNDER CTL. UNFORTUNATELY, BY THIS TIME I'M AT 4700-4800 FT. FOR SOME REASON THOUGH, ATC COULDN'T READ OUR MODE C AND THE XPONDER WAS ON. I DSNDDED BACK TO 4000 FT AND LEVELED OFF, RECYCLED THE XPONDER AND HAD THE FO RPT LEVEL. ATC SAID THEY WERE NOW RECEIVING THE MODE C AND NOTHING ELSE WAS SAID. I WILL NOW ALWAYS GIVE A THOROUGH BRIEF. I WON'T ASSUME MY FO HAS THE SAME KNOWLEDGE AS I DO. BETTER TO BRIEF IT AND ENSURE THAT HE/SHE KNOWS WHAT TO EXPECT. NONE OF THESE EVENTS BY THEMSELVES WAS A PROB. EVEN A COMBINATION OF THEM WE HANDLE ALL THE TIME. BUT THE TOTAL COMBINED,

ALONG WITH THE TIMING PLACED ME IN A VERY PRECARIOUS SITUATION ALL CAUSED BY NOT BRIEFING LOW ALT CAPTURE.

Synopsis

A B757 CAPT REPORTS HAVING VERTIGO DURING A RAPID POST TKOF TURNING CLB WITH A LOW ALT LEVEL OFF. POOR CRM CITED ON AN EARLY MORNING FATIGUED FLT.

ACN: 726381

Time / Day

Date : 200702
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Intersection : CIVET
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 14000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SCT.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-800
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer Only : 25L/R
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : CIVET 5

Aircraft : 2

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 130
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9525
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1720
ASRS Report : 726381

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4700
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2200
ASRS Report : 726380

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

OUR FLT PLAN INCLUDED THE CIVET 5 ARRIVAL INTO LAX. WE NORMALLY RECEIVE CLRNC FOR AN ILS 25L/R SO WE SET UP THE FMS AND THOROUGHLY BRIEFED THE ARR AND APCH. NEAR GRAMM AT FL180 WE WERE SWITCHED TO SOCIAL APCH AND WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED TO DSND VIA CIVET 5 ARR RWY 24R TRANSITION. WE SET UP THE ACFT TO DSND VIA VNAV AND SET IN 7000 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW AS BRIEFED. WHILE I MONITORED THE ACFT MY FO CHANGED OUR EXPECTED TRANSITION/APCH TO RWY 24R. AS WE APCHED CIVET WE BOTH NOTICED THAT THE VNAV HAD A HIGHER RATE OF DSCNT THAN NORMAL PASSING THROUGH 15000 FT. WE BOTH VERIFIED THE PLANE WAS STILL IN VNAV AND FMC STILL SHOWED THE FMS WAS GOING TO PASS CIVET BETWEEN 14000 FT AND 15000 FT. AS THE ALT APCHED 14000 FT IT WAS VERY EVIDENT THE PLANE WAS NOT GOING TO LEVEL OFF AT 14000 FT SO I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND CLB BACK UP TO THE CROSSING ALT. ALT DEV WAS LESS THAN 500 FT IN THE CORRECTION MANEUVER. AFTER CIVET WE CONTINUED ON THE ARR AND APCH -- REENGAGING THE AUTOPLT AND VNAV AND THE SYSTEM WORKED JUST FINE. THERE WAS NO ACFT IN THE VICINITY AND ATC DID NOT MENTION ANYTHING DURING OUR DEV. DEBRIEFED THE EVENT, WE ARE NOT TOTALLY SURE WHAT CAUSED THE VNAV ANOMALY, EXCEPT THAT WHEN THE NEW TRANSITION AND APCH WERE PUT IN THE FMC SOMETHING HAPPENED WITH THE VNAV. IT WAS SUBTLE AS ALL INDICATIONS VNAV/VNAV PATH AND CORRECT CROSSING RESTR AT CIVET WERE ALL DISPLAYED IN FMS/FMC/GLARE SHIELD AND ADI. NEXT TIME IF AN APCH CHANGE OCCURS, I WILL TAKE ACFT OUT OF VNAV AND FLY VERTICAL SPEED, UNTIL ALL CHANGES IN FMC'S ARE COMPLETE. SECONDLY I WILL DISCONNECT AUTOPLT EARLIER IF VNAV APPEARS TO BE IN ERROR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 726380: WHILE THIS CASE RESULTED IN A MINOR (RELATIVELY) DEVIATION IN ALT, THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT ERROR EVEN THOUGH VNAV PATH IS ON THE FMA. GOOD CRM AND 'ONE GUY FLYING' AND 'ONE GUY TYPING' MINIMIZED THE IMPACT OF THE FMS/VNAV PATH ERROR. BOTTOM LINE: FLY THE AIRPLANE FIRST -- TYPE/REPROGRAM SECOND.

Synopsis

A B737-800 MISSED AN ALT CONSTRAINT ON THE LAX CIVET STAR FOLLOWING A LATE RWY CHANGE AND THE ACFT FMA INDICATING VNAV PATH WITHOUT HOLDING THE PATH.

ACN: 720853

Time / Day

Date : 200612
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Intersection : TRTLE
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 14500

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Weather Elements : Ice
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SCT.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-800
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : SEAVU1

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ATC CLRED US TO DSND VIA THE SEAVU, SEAVU1 ARR APPROX W OF THE KONZL FIX. THE NEXT ALT RESTR WAS AT THE TRTLE FIX BTWN 17000 FT AND 16000 FT. WE CROSSED TRTLE AT APPROX 14500 FT. WHILE SETTING UP THE ARR, I WAS UNAWARE THAT VNAV DROPPED AND REVERTED TO VERT SPD. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND MANEUVERED TO MAKE THE NEXT RESTR AT THE CATAW FIX. THE REST OF THE ARR AND APCH WERE FLOWN WITHOUT INCIDENT. 2 CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: 1) RELATIVE NEWNESS TO THE B737-800 (4 MONTHS) ON MY PART. THAT IS SOMETHING THAT SHOULD ALWAYS BE XCHKD ON A VNAV DSCNT AND THAT IS NOT YET IN MY HABIT PATTERN. MY PREVIOUS ACFT WAS THE B737-200 WHICH HAD NO VNAV CAPABILITY. 2) THERE WAS A DEFINITE PERSONALITY CLASH IN THE COCKPIT THAT SERVED AS A MAJOR DISTR FOR ME AND OBVIOUSLY MY COPLT SINCE HE WAS NOT BACKING ME UP AND DID NOT NOTICE THE ERROR UNTIL AFTER I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT.

Synopsis

UNNOTICED BY THE CREW, A B737-800'S FMS REVERTED TO VERT SPD FROM VNAV AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE ACFT MISSED A STAR ALT CONSTRAINT. CRM WAS AN ISSUE.

ACN: 720362

Time / Day

Date : 200612
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 1500
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Learjet 45
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB5

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Altitude Hold/Capture

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 700
ASRS Report : 720362

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 50
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7050

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 90
ASRS Report : 720359

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Chart.SID : TEB5

Narrative

WE HAD A MULTI LEG TRIP WITH ONE OF THE LEGS BEING FROM TEB TO ZZZ. WHILE ON THE GND AT TEB, WE HAD ENCOUNTERED ABOUT A 2 HOUR GND DELAY. WHILE WAITING FOR DEP CLRNC, THE COPLT AND MYSELF (ACTING AS CAPT) HAD AMPLE TIME TO SET UP AND REVIEW THE DEP SID WHICH WAS THE TEB5 DEP AS PER THE CLRNC RECEIVED. WHICH WAS AS FOLLOWS, RWY HDG TO 1500 FT -- RIGHT TURN TO 280 DEGS UNTIL 4.5 DME FROM THE TEB VOR THEN CLB TO 2000 FT. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AND IN THE ALT PRE-SELECT WE HAD 1500 FT SO WE COULD LEVEL OFF UNTIL THE TURN AND 4.5 DME FROM THE TEB VOR, THEN WE WOULD INITIATE A CLB TO 2000 FT. AFTER WE ROTATED AND IN THE CLB OUT ON THE SID I TURNED THE AUTOPLT ON AT AN ALT 500 FT MSL AND SELECTED HDG AND VERT SPD ON AUTOPLT CTL PANEL. AS THE ACFT APCHED 1500 FT I STARTED THE TURN WITH THE HDG SELECT KNOB TO 280 DEG HDG AS PER THE DEP AND BY THE TIME I LOOKED BACK AT THE PRIMARY FLT DISPLAY, I NOTICED THAT THE AUTOPLT NEVER CAPTURED THE 1500 FT ALT AND CONTINUED THE CLB. BY THE TIME I WAS ABLE TO TURN THE AUTOPLT OFF WE HAD CLBED UP TO 2000 FT BEFORE THE 4.5 DME FROM THE TEB VOR AS PER THE SID. THE CTRLR THEN ASKED OUR ALT AND WE TOLD HIM. HE THEN REPLIED THAT IT WAS AN 'OPERATIONAL DEV.' WE STAYED AT 2000 FT CAUSE PER THE SID WE WERE NOW SUPPOSED TO BE AT THAT ALT. WE CONTINUED THE FLT UNDER NORMAL OPERATIONS. IN THE DEBRIEF OF THE FLT THE COPLT AND MYSELF DISCUSSED THE SITUATION AND DEEMED THE CAUSE OF THE MISSED ALT WAS A FAILURE OF THE AUTOPLT ALT PRE-SELECT TO CAPTURE THE 1500 FT ALT (WHICH WE WROTE UP FOR MAINT), IN COMBINATION WITH OUR CRM CALLOUTS FOR APCHING ASSIGNED ALTS. WE DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT WE DID NOT HAVE ANY CALLOUTS FOR CLBING AND LEVELING OFF AT LOW LEVEL ALTS. OUR

STANDARD CALLOUTS WE HAVE FOR LEVELING OFF AT ALTS IS ONLY A 1000 FT PRIOR CALL BEFORE ARRIVING AT THE ASSIGNED ALT. IN THIS EVENT WE WERE CALLING FOR FLAPS UP 1000 FT PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNED ALT, SO THE 1000 FT PRIOR CALL NEVER HAPPENED. WE HAVE NOW IMPLEMENTED A 500 FT TO GO CALLOUT PRIOR TO ARRIVING AT PRE-SELECTED ASSIGNED ALTS, AND ALSO A CALLOUT OF APCHING ALT WHICH SIGNIFIES THAT WE HAVE 100 FT TO GO TIL THE PRE-SELECTED ASSIGNED ALT. SO EVEN WITH AN AUTOPLT SYSTEM FAILURE WE WOULD HAVE MUCH BETTER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IN REGARDS TO APCHING OUR ASSIGNED ALT, AND IN THIS INSTANCE WE WOULD HAVE CAUGHT THE ACFT NOT LEVELING OFF DUE TO THE MORE FREQUENT MANDATORY APCHING ALT CALLOUTS.

Synopsis

A LR45 ON THE TEB5 SID LEVELED AT 2000 FT WHEN THE AUTOPLT FAILED TO CAPTURE 1500 FT.

ACN: 716365

Time / Day

Date : 200610
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 29000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Hydraulic System

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 210
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 18100
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3600
ASRS Report : 716365

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EICAS
Warning
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE CRUISING AT FL290, A 'HYD PRESSURE #1 LOW' CAUTION ILLUMINATED, AND A CHIME SOUNDED. WE CHKED THE HYD SYNOPTIC PAGE AND FOUND THE #1 HYD SYS SHOWING EMPTY AND NO PRESSURE WAS INDICATED. WE EXECUTED THE QRH PROC. WE ALSO COORD WITH DISPATCH, MAINT CTL, AND ADVISED ATC OF OUR SITUATION AND DESIRE TO DIVERT TO ZZZ. IN THE DSCNT, THE PLTS BRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANT AND THE PAX. WE EXECUTED OUR CHKLISTS AND REPROGRAMMED THE FMS. WE DISCUSSED THE PROSPECT OF DECLARING AN EMER AND CHOSE NOT TO. ATC ADVISED THAT CFR EQUIP WOULD BE STANDING BY FOR US, WHICH WAS PRUDENT. THE APCH AND LNDG WERE NOMINAL. ON THE GND, THE PLTS, FLT ATTENDANT, AND RAMP LEADER DEBRIEFED THE SITUATION. THE PAX WERE GIVEN A THOROUGH UPDATE BY THE CAPT. A MECH INSPECTED THE ACFT AND FOUND COPIOUS HYD LEAKAGE. PAX, CREW, AND CARGO WERE XFERRED TO ANOTHER ACFT, AND THE FLT WAS COMPLETED UNEVENTFULLY. I WAS QUITE PLEASED WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF MY FO AND FLT ATTENDANT. EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING PAID OFF IN THIS ABNORMAL SITUATION. DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL WERE VERY HELPFUL. OUR FRIENDS AT CENTER, THE TRACON, AND TWR WERE IMMENSELY HELPFUL AS WELL. GOOD CRM WAS EMPLOYED AND SURELY GUIDED US WELL!

Synopsis

CRJ200 FLT CREW HAS HYD SYS FAILURE.

ACN: 716153

Time / Day

Date : 200610
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Personal
Make Model Name : Citation Excel
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Flight Phase.Climbout : Takeoff
Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB

Person : 1

Affiliation.Other : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 30
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 30
ASRS Report : 716153

Person : 2

Affiliation.Other : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 170
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2600
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 400
ASRS Report : 715631

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE TO DEPART FROM TEB ARPT WITH INSTRUCTION BY CLRNC DELIVERY TO FLY TEB 5 DEP AS THE INITIAL DEP PROC. BEFORE TAKING THE ACTIVE RWY CAPT PF AND FO PNF DID ACCOMPLISH ALL NECESSARY REQUIREMENTS ON THE CHKLIST PRIOR TO 'POSITION AND HOLD' ON RWY 24. THIS INCLUDES ALL SYSTEMS DEP CHKS, DEP CROSS-CHKS, DEP NAV/COM FREQUENCIES PROGRAMMED ON RMU1, RMU2 AS WELL AS THE FLT PLAN PROGRAMMED IN UNS1 AND UNS2. BOTH PFD HSI'S WERE SELECTED TO ITS OWN FMS. ON THE MFD, ALT SELECT WAS SET FOR 1500 FT TO FOLLOW TEB 5 DEP. HEADING WAS SELECTED FOR THE FLT DIRECTOR AND BUGGED FOR RWY HEADING. ON DEP, STANDARD SOP CALL-OUTS WERE ADEQUATELY PERFORMED. AT APPROX 1100 FT THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AND THE AIRPLANE WAS FLYING RWY HEADING CLBING AT A RATE OF APPROX 3000 FT PER MINUTE WITH THE USE OF VERTICAL SPEED SELECT BUTTON. THE AUTOPLT WAS COUPLED AND PROGRAMMED TO LEVEL OFF AT THE PRE-SELECT ALT OF 1500 FT, BUT UNFORTUNATELY IT DID NOT CAPTURE AND CONTINUED TO CLB THROUGH 1500 FT. MY ATTENTION WAS MOMENTARILY DIVIDED AS I EXECUTED THE PUBLISHED R TURN TO THE 280 DEG HEADING. IMMEDIATELY AFTER REALIZING THE LEVEL OFF FAILED, I TOOK ACTION TO LOWER THE NOSE AND REGAIN AN ALT TO 1500 FT. AT THIS TIME ATC ADVISED OF THIS FAULT AND INSTRUCTED US TO CLB TO 6000 FT. AS WE STARTED TO CLB AGAIN, ATC INSTRUCTED TO CONTINUE R TURN TO HEADING 090 DEGS. FOLLOWING ATC VECTORS, ATC INSTRUCTED THE CREW TO CALL ONCE ON THE GND. ON THE CONCLUDING POST-FLT BRIEFING, CERTAIN MEASURES AND SPECIFIC CRM IMPROVEMENTS COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE ALT LOSS ON THIS TEB DEP. SINCE, WE HAVE RETRAINED HOW WE BRIEF PRE-TAKEOFF TO ENSURE MORE ACCURATE MONITORING OF ACFT PERFORMANCE. MY RESEARCH HAS INDICATED THAT THERE ARE MANY SIMILAR CASES WITH COMPLAINTS THAT HONEYWELL PRIMUS 1000 SYSTEM WILL NOT ALWAYS PROCESS AN ALT CAPTURE IF CAPTURE MODE IS SELECTED WITH LESS THAN 1000 FT FROM ALT PRESELECT. I THINK IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO ISSUE A WARNING BULLETIN TO CREWS OPERATING THIS SYSTEM TO EXERCISE CLOSE MONITORING UNDER THESE CONDITIONS.

Synopsis

A CE560XL DEPARTING TEB ON THE TEB DEP FAILED TO LEVEL AT 1500 FT. ATC PROVIDED A NEW CLRNC.

ACN: 714718

Time / Day

Date : 200607

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant : On Duty
ASRS Report : 714718

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant : On Duty
Function.Oversight : Flight Attendant In Charge

Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

UPON ARR ACFT WAS MET BY FIRE AND EMER VEHICLES. IT WAS NOT UNTIL I DEPLANED AND ASKED A FIREMAN WHAT WAS GOING ON THAT I WAS TOLD THAT OUR #1 ENG WAS ON FIRE AS WE TAXIED IN. WHY, AS FLT ATTENDANT, WERE WE NOT TOLD? WHY WERE WE NOT DEBRIEFED? WHY DID WE NOT STOP IMMEDIATELY AND EVAC? THIS IS POOR CRM AND DOES NOT REPRESENT THE SAFETY PROFESSIONAL IMAGE WE WERE TAUGHT. THE CAPT SPENT MORE TIME BERATING THE PURSER AS PAX DEPLANED THAN INFORMING AND ASSURING THE PAX AND FLT ATTENDANTS AS TO THE SITUATION.

Synopsis

A FLT ATTENDANT FINDS OUT FROM CRASH RESCUE PERSONNEL THAT THE ACFT WAS MET ON ARR BECAUSE AN ENG WAS ON FIRE.

ACN: 712350

Time / Day

Date : 200609
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 1500
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : HS 125 Series 1-600
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Navigation In Use.Other.VORTAC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : DME

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 900
ASRS Report : 712350

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

TEB 5 DEP, RWY 24. WE BRIEFED THE DEP PRIOR TO TKOF. SID READS CLB RWY HDG UNTIL LEAVING 800 FT THEN TURN R HDG 280 DEGS, DME EQUIPPED ACFT, MAINTAIN 1500 FT UNTIL PASSING 4.5 DME THEN CLB AND MAINTAIN 2000 FT. AFTER OUR INITIAL TURN AND LEVELING OFF AT 1500 FT PER THE SID, THE PNF SELECTED 2000 FT IN THE ALT PRESELECT. TWR ADVISED US TO CONTACT DEP. CHKING IN AND NOTICING THE AIRPLANE WAS CLBING OUT OF 1500 FT FOR 2000 FT WE WERE TOLD NEGATIVE, MAINTAIN 1500 FT PER THE SID. AS WE ARRESTED OUR ASCENT, WE WERE GIVEN ANOTHER HDG AND CLRED TO A HIGHER ALT. MY HEAD WAS DOWN TRYING TO TROUBLESHOOT WHY DME WAS NOT DISPLAYED AND DURING THE FREQ CHANGE AND AS THE ACFT WAS CLBING I CHKED IN 1500 FT FOR 2000 FT WE RECYCLED THE RADIOS AND THEN DME WAS THEN DISPLAYED. PNJ PATTERSON NDB WAS SELECTED AND IDENTED AS A BACKUP FOR NON DME ACFT BUT NEITHER RMI'S WERE SELECTED TO DISPLAY THE NDB RADIAL. TCAS WAS DISPLAYED DURING THE INCIDENT AND NO TA'S OR RA'S WERE OBSERVED. I BELIEVE CRM WAS AN ISSUE. PNF AND THE PF SHOULD HAVE VERIFIED THE DME WAS DISPLAYED PRIOR TO DEP AND THE NDB ALSO AS A BACKUP.

Synopsis

H25A FLT CREW HAS ALTDEV ON TEB SID DUE TO DME NOT DISPLAYED.

ACN: 712048

Time / Day

Date : 200609

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : CHA.Airport

State Reference : TN

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 6000

Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 10000

Environment

Flight Conditions : Mixed

Weather Elements : Rain

Weather Elements : Thunderstorm

Weather Elements : Turbulence

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : CHA.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation : Corporate

Make Model Name : Super King Air 300

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial

Route In Use.Departure.SID : CHA

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC

Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 50

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4500

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 700

ASRS Report : 712048

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Function.Other Personnel.Other

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA

Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Turbulence
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : RADAR
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Precautionary Avoidance Action
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

BE30 (KING AIR 300) CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 2 AT CHA. OUR CLRNC WAS TO FLY THE CHA5.CHA DEP, THEN AS FILED. EARLIER ON THAT DAY A COLD FRONT HAD PASSED, WHICH CREATED A STRONG LINE OF VERY INTENSE TSTMS, THEREFORE WE HAD DELAYED OUR DEP IN ORDER TO SEE IF THE LINE WOULD BREAK-UP, BECAUSE WE WOULD HAVE TO FLY THROUGH IT AT SOME POINT. WE DECIDED TO LAUNCH SINCE THERE WERE SEVERAL LARGE BREAKS IN THE LINE WHICH WE FELT WE COULD FLY THROUGH TO GET TO OUR DEST, GMU. OUR CLRNC WOULD ALLOW US TO INTERCEPT V54, AND THAT AIRWAY RAN RIGHT THROUGH ONE OF THE BREAKS IN THE LINE OF TSTMS, WHICH IS ONE OF THE REASONS WE DECIDED TO TAKE OFF AT THAT TIME. ON THIS LEG I WAS ACTING AS PF (L SEAT) AND OUR COMPANY CHIEF PLT WAS ACTING AS PNF AND RADIO OPERATOR. MY NAME WAS ON THE IFR FLT PLAN AS PIC. WE LIFTED OFF AND WERE HANDED OVER TO CHATTANOOGA DEP. THEY AMENDED OUR CLBOUT INSTRUCTIONS. WE WERE NOW INSTRUCTED TO TURN TO A NORTHERN HDG AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT, WHICH WE DID. THIS NEW ASSIGNED HDG WOULD RUN US STRAIGHT INTO HVY PRECIPITATION, AND LEVEL 2 OR 3 EMBEDDED TSTMS ACCORDING TO OUR ONBOARD RADAR, JUST 5 MI OFF OUR NOSE. THE PNF INFORMED DEP OF THIS FACT, AND WE WOULD NEED A 90 DEG TURN...NOW. CHATTANOOGA DEP CAME BACK WITH, 'TURN L TO A HDG OF 270,' WHICH WE LOOKED AT WITHOUT TURNING THE ACFT AND RESPONDED WITH, 'WE CANNOT ACCEPT THAT HDG DUE TO EXTREME WX IN THAT DIRECTION.' DEP CAME BACK IN A VERY TERSE MANNER WITH, 'THEN TURN R TO A HDG OF 050 (DEGS) AND CLB AND MAINTAIN 6000 FT.' THAT NEW HDG AND CLB INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT HELP OUR SITUATION. THE PNF, AGAIN WHO IS OUR COMPANY CHIEF PLT TOLD ME TO KEEP THE TURN GOING PAST 050 DEGS AND DISREGARD ATC'S INSTRUCTIONS, I ROLLED OUT ON A HDG OF 090 (DEGS) WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO CLB AND PENETRATE LIGHT TO MODERATE PRECIPITATION AND CUMULUS BUILDUPS (IMC). WE STARTED TO ENCOUNTER 'HVY'-MODERATE TURB, HVY RAIN AND HAIL. I SLOWED THE ACFT TO VA SPD. I WAS HAND-FLYING THE ACFT AND AT TIMES USING FULL CTL INPUTS TO KEEP THE ACFT IN A LEVEL, CLBING ATTITUDE. DEP QUERIED US ABOUT OUR DIRECTION OF FLT AND OUR RESPONSE WAS WE NEEDED THIS HDG DUE TO WX. THE RESPONSE FROM CHATTANOOGA DEP WAS, 'I NEED YOU TO FLY 050' (DEGS). THE PNF REPLIED WITH, 'SIR I UNDERSTAND THAT, BUT WE CANNOT ACCEPT THAT HDG DUE TO WX.' AT THIS

POINT WE ENTERED AN AREA OF EVEN HEAVIER PRECIPITATION AND SEVERE TURB. THIS IS WHAT CONCERNS ME THE MOST, 1) FLYING A HDG NOT ASSIGNED BY ATC. (WE DID NOT HAVE AN OPTION, AND I UNDERSTAND ATC NEEDS TO HAVE MINIMUM SEPARATION BTWN ACFT.) 2) THE TERSE COM BTWN OUR CHIEF PLT AND THEIR RESPONSE. 3) LACK OF CRM BTWN THE PF AND PNF. THE CTLR ALLOWED US TO STAY ON THE 090 DEG HDG FOR SEVERAL MI, THEN TURN US BACK TO THE 050 DEG HDG AND INSTRUCTED US TO CONTINUE OUR CLB TO 10000 FT. WE COULD ACCEPT THAT HDG THEN AND DID. UPON REACHING 10000 FT WE WERE ON TOP OF MOST OF THE BUILDUPS IN THE AREA. THEN WE WERE TURNED OVER TO ZTL AND THE FLT CONTINUED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

Synopsis

BE300 KINGAIR FLT CREW ENCOUNTERS WX DURING DEP FROM CHA AND DEVIATES FROM ATC ASSIGNED HDG.

ACN: 709857

Time / Day

Date : 200609
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ATL.Airport
State Reference : GA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Weather Elements : Rain
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ATL.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4700
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2800
ASRS Report : 709857

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Ground

Events

Anomaly.Incursion : Taxiway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I CROSSED RWY 9L AT TXWY T AS INSTRUCTED. I WAS TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 9R AT N2 WHICH WOULD HAVE REQUIRED A R-HAND TURN, BUT I TURNED L. GND CTL GAVE US ALTERNATE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AND IT TURNED INTO A NON-EVENT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED A MAINT PROB I HAD THE FO WORKING ON SO HE WASN'T HEADS UP, AS WELL AS INSTEAD OF HAVING ASKED GND FOR A PLACE TO STOP TO WORK ALL THIS OUT I THOUGHT I COULD PRESS ON AND HANDLE THE RADIOS AS WELL AS TAXI. IT WAS BAD CRM. ALSO CONTRIBUTING IS THE ATL ARPT STILL ADJUSTING TO THE NEW RWY WHICH AFFECTS WHICH RWY WE'LL BE DEPARTING DEPENDING ON WX CONDITIONS. PERHAPS STANDARD TAXI RTES WOULD HELP EASE BOTH PLT AND CTRLR WORKLOAD AND WOULD ALLOW A COMPLETE TAXI BRIEF TO BE CONDUCTED AT THE GATE INSTEAD OF A BEST GUESS OR 'WE'LL JUST SEE WHAT THEY GIVE US' ATTITUDE. ANOTHER HELP WOULD BE FOR THE ATC ARPT COMMERCIAL CHART'S DIAGRAM TO BE SPLIT ONTO 2 PAGES -- N SIDE ON ONE, S SIDE ON THE OTHER. THIS WOULD ALLEVIATE LOSING INFO IN THE FOLD AND HAVING BOTH HANDS BUSY WITH THE OTHER PERSON BUSY ANSWERING THE RADIO, WHICH IS WHAT HAPPENED IN MY CASE. ALSO HAVING IT SPLIT WOULD ALLOW FOR LARGER PRINT AND MORE DETAIL.

Synopsis

CRJ200 CREW TURNS L WHEN THEY SHOULD HAVE TURNED R ON TXWY N AT ATL.

ACN: 708911

Time / Day

Date : 200608
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1500

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Controlling Facilities.Tower : TEB.Tower
Operator.General Aviation : Personal
Make Model Name : Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB

Person : 1

Affiliation.Other : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Private
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 20
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 300
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 30
ASRS Report : 708911

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerB : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Intended or Assigned Course
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

SHORTLY AFTER TKOF, TURB IN THE COCKPIT (AND POOR CRM) RESULTED IN THE TEMPORARY MISPLACEMENT OF THE DEP PROC WHICH WAS TO BE USED FOR DEP FROM TEB. DURING AN ATTEMPT TO FIND THE WRITTEN DEP PROC, INTENDED COURSE OF FLT WAS DEVIATED FROM. THIS LED TO CONFUSION, AND TWR CONTACTED US AND ADVISED US WE WERE OFF COURSE. WE ADVISED THEM WE NEEDED HELP, AND REQUESTED VECTORS SO THAT WE COULD ATTEND TO FLYING THE ACFT. WE WERE TOLD WE WERE NEAR EWR'S AIRSPACE. VECTORS WERE GIVEN, AND A HDOF TO DEP WAS GIVEN. DEP AGAIN TOLD US WE WERE OFF COURSE, AND WE SOON RIGHTED THE SIT. CONDITIONS WERE IMC AND THIS ALL TRANSPIRED IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF INTO A LOW CLOUD LAYER. THE PLT'S LOW TIME IN IMC DID NOT HELP THE SIT. WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE PROB WAS A FAILURE ON OUR END TO UNDERSTAND THE DEP PROC AND HAVE IT AVAILABLE. IN THE FUTURE, THE DEP PROC WILL BE KEPT IN A VISIBLE PLACE, AND MAINTAINED UNDER POSITIVE CTL.

Synopsis

C182 PLT HAS A HDG TRACK DEV DURING THE TEB 5 DEP.

ACN: 707428

Time / Day

Date : 200608
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : HTO.VORTAC
State Reference : NY
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 8000
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 8500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZNY.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Falcon 20FJF/20C/20D/20E/20F
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout : Vacating Altitude
Route In Use.Departure : On Vectors

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Aileron Control System

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 120
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2100
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 900
ASRS Report : 707428

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude
Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Passenger Human Performance

Narrative

DURING CLBOUT FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2, A PAX CAME FORWARD TO ALERT THE CREW OF A NOISE COMING FROM THE ENGS DURING TKOF. THE PAX CAME FORWARD AT APPROX 2000 FT MSL AND ADDRESSED THE CREW. WE MONITORED THE INSTS FOR ABNORMAL INDICATIONS. ALL SYS CHKD NORMAL. AN ALT RESTR OF 8000 FT AND A HDG OF 300 DEGS WAS ISSUED BY ATC. DURING THE HDGF TO ANOTHER ATC I THOUGHT I HEARD FL180 GIVEN IN ADDITION TO THE 300 DEG HDG AND I CALLED OUT WHAT I THOUGHT I HEARD. THE CAPT WAS BUSY HANDLING THE PAX AND OUR CRM MUST HAVE SUFFERED. AS WE PASSED THROUGH 8500 FT MSL, ATC ALERTED US OF OUR OVERSHOOT AND WE CORRECTED THE ALT WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. UPON ARR AT ZZZ2, WE FOUND 2 N2 BLADES HAD BEEN DAMAGED DURING DEP FROM FCK.

Synopsis

DA20 CREW RPTS ALT OVERSHOOT IN ZNY AIRSPACE.

ACN: 706099

Time / Day

Date : 200608
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LAS.Airport
State Reference : NV
Altitude.AGL.Bound Lower : 0
Altitude.AGL.Bound Upper : 7000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : LAS.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Takeoff
Route In Use.Departure.SID : SHEADY

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 120
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000
ASRS Report : 706099

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 120
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8300

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000
ASRS Report : 706508

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE PREPARED ACFT FOR PUSHBACK, GOT ATIS AND SET UP DEP SID IN THE MCP OF AUTOPLT, FMC AND ALTIMETER. WE HAD A 'CANNED' RTE VIA A 'CANNED' SID FILED AND WE BRIEFED THIS SID, WHICH WAS AN RNAV SID. WE PUSHED BACK, STARTED ENGS, TAXIED TO RWY, GOT INTXN TKOF, HAD TO RE-DO TKOF DATA. FO WAS BUSY, I TAXIED THE JET. WE TOOK OFF, CLBED OUT AND CONTACTED DEP CTL. DEP TOLD US TO SQUAWK '1311' AND WHEN WE LOOKED DOWN, XPONDER WAS INCORRECTLY SET AT '1151.' DEP THEN TOLD US 'CLRED SHEAD 4 DEP, MAINTAIN 7000 FT.' WE BOTH THEN REALIZED WE HAD NOT PICKED UP OUR IFR ENRTE CLRNC. WE HAD THE PROPER (FILED) RTE SET UP IN FMC, ON AUTOPLT AND CORRECT HDGS, WHICH WE FLEW. WE HAD THE CORRECT ALT RESTR SET ALSO, FROM THE SID COMMERCIAL PLATE AND PRIOR EXPERIENCE. OUR XPONDER WAS ONLY INCORRECT BY 2 DIGITS. WE WERE RUSHED TO BLOCK OUT ON-TIME, TAXI OUT TO A DIFFERENT RWY THEN ANTICIPATE AND THEN WAS ASSIGNED AN INTXN FOR DEP. WE WERE BOTH TASK SATURATED AND MERELY FORGOT TO GET CLRNC. CONTRIBUTING WAS THE PREVIOUS 6 LEGS I HAD FLOWN WERE ALL IN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST, WHERE IFR/ENRTE CLRNC'S ARE GIVEN ON TAXI OUT OR EVEN HOLDING SHORT OF RWY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 706508: THIS OCCURRED BECAUSE OF BAD CRM. CAPT BIG EGO. I AM THE CAPT. REFUSAL TO LISTEN TO FO'S REPEATEDLY PLEAD TO HELP OUT. CAPT'S FAILURE TO REALIZE THAT FO WAS OVERLOADED AND UNDER TREMENDOUS STRESS TO ACCOMPLISH BOTH WORKLOADS AND GET THE ACFT OUT ON TIME.

Synopsis

A B757 FLT CREW TOOK OFF FROM LAS WITHOUT ATC RTE CLRNC.

ACN: 704848

Time / Day

Date : 200607
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SFO.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : SFO.Tower
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 90
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4000
ASRS Report : 704848

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 35
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8350
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1078
ASRS Report : 704646

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Ground

Events

Anomaly.Incursion : Runway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.FAA : Assigned Or Threatened Penalties

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS SERVING AS THE SIC IN THE L SEAT ON AN IFR FLT FROM SFO. THE PIC HAD FILED THE FLT PLAN AND WAS IN THE R SEAT. I WAS PERFORMING PAX DUTIES AND WAS NOT IN THE SEAT WHEN THE ATIS AND CLRNC WERE OBTAINED BY THE PIC BUT WAS BRIEFED THAT INFO BY HIM. I STARTED THE R ENG AND ASKED THE R SEAT PLT PIC TO CALL FOR TAXI AS I WAS REVIEWING THE RATHER COMPLICATED SFO DEP PROC WE WERE CLRED TO FLY. I DID NOT FULLY HEAR OR UNDERSTAND THE TAXI INSTRUCTION OVER THE COCKPIT SPEAKER AS I WAS ADDITIONALLY TRANSITIONING TO MY HEADSET BUT UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WOULD HAVE AN INTXN TKOF ON RWY 28R. I FELT CONFIDENT THAT THE R SEAT PIC UNDERSTOOD THE FULL TAXI INSTRUCTIONS SINCE HE HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THE INSTRUCTIONS AND ASSUMED THAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY REFERRED TO THE TAXI DIAGRAM IN THE BOOK ON HIS SIDE OF THE COCKPIT AND WOULD ADVISE ME OF ANY TAXI DEVS AS IS SOP'S. I PWRED UP THE R ENG AND TAXIED OUT OF THE FBO RAMP. I HAD STARTED ONLY 1 ENG BECAUSE I WAS EXPECTING A LONG TAXI AND POSSIBLE TKOF DELAYS BECAUSE I THOUGHT THE STRONG WESTERLY WINDS I HAD FELT WHILE PREFLTING THE ACFT WOULD CAUSE TOO MUCH XWIND FOR USE OF ANY OTHER RWYS AND IDLE PWR WITH BOTH ENGS RUNNING WOULD CAUSE EXCESSIVE DOWNWIND TAXI SPD. AS I TAXIED EBOUND ON TXWY C, I LOOKED TOWARDS THE DEP END OF RWYS 28R AND 28L AND SAW SEVERAL INTL AIRLINERS WAITING FOR TKOF. MY THOUGHTS WERE THAT WE WOULD BE GIVEN ONE OF THE INTXNS FOR TKOF PRIOR TO THE END OF RWY 28R SO AS TO NOT BE IN THE WAY OF THE AIRLINERS WAITING AT THE END. AS I APCHED RWY 1L AND 1R ON TXWY C, I ASKED THE PIC IN THE R SEAT IF WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS THOSE RWYS. HE TOLD ME THAT WE WERE. I INSTINCTIVELY AND DILIGENTLY LOOKED DOWN BOTH RWYS AND SAW NO ACFT EITHER ON THE RWYS OR APCHING FROM THE AIR. I FELT THAT EVERYTHING SEEMED SAFE AND NORMAL AND CROSSED RWY 1L. SFO GND IMMEDIATELY CALLED US AND ASKED WHAT WE WERE DOING AND NOTIFIED US THAT WE WERE NOT CLRED TO CROSS THAT RWY AND HAD TAXIED PAST OUR INTENDED INTXN FOR DEP WHICH WAS TO BE RWY 28R AT TXWY E. OUR HEARTS SANK WHEN WE BOTH REALIZED THAT WE HAD PROBABLY DONE A RWY INCURSION AND HAD NOT STRICTLY FOLLOWED ATC TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. WE APOLOGIZED FOR OUR MISTAKE BUT WERE ADVISED TO CALL BACK THE TWR ASAP. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO CROSS RWY 1R, STARTED THE OTHER ENG, COMPLETED ALL APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS, CONTACTED TWR AND DEPARTED RWY 28R AT TXWY L. AFTER LNDG AT DEST, WE CALLED THE SFO TWR SUPVR AND THE PIC GAVE HIM WHAT INFO HE REQUESTED. BOTH THE PIC AND MYSELF HAVE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WHAT WE EACH THOUGHT WERE THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS FOR OUR MISTAKE AND WHAT WE EACH SHOULD HAVE DONE IN ORDER TO PREVENT IT. WE DID NOT ENGAGE IN THE CLASSIC 'BLAME GAME' BUT RATHER ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM

IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY THE PROBABLE EVENTS WE EACH INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A CREW CONTRIBUTED TO THE RWY INCURSION. I BELIEVE THE RWY INCURSION OCCURRED BECAUSE WE AS A FLT CREW DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THE ATC TAXI CLRNC AND HAD A BREAKDOWN IN BASIC CRM AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF 'WHERE ARE WE AND WHERE ARE WE GOING?' CONTRIBUTING CAUSES ARE: 1) MY ASSUMPTION THAT THE STRONG WINDS WERE PREVENTING THE USE OF RWYS 1R/L. 2) MY ASSUMPTION THAT WE WOULD BE GIVEN MORE RWY LENGTH AND HAVE A LONGER TAXI. 3) MY MISTAKE THAT AS THE SIC TAXIING I WAS NOT READY TO INDEPENDENTLY HEAR AND VERIFY THE TAXI CLRNC WITH THE TAXI DIAGRAM. 4) MY DISTOR OF UNDERSTANDING, SETTING UP AND BRIEFING THE DEP PROC. 5) MY ASKING THE PIC IF WE WERE CLEARED TO CROSS RWYS 1R/L RATHER THAN ASKING HIM TO CALL GND AND CONFIRM THAT WE WERE CLEARED TO CROSS. DURING OUR COMBINED OVER 55 YRS OF AVIATION EXPERIENCE, NEITHER PLT HAS EVER HAD AN ACFT ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, RWY INCURSION OR FAA VIOLATION. WE BOTH UNDERSTAND THE SERIOUSNESS OF RWY INCURSIONS AND ARE WELL AWARE OF THE EMPHASIS THE FAA AND ITS ATC CTLRS PLACE ON THIS MATTER AS EVIDENCED BY THE WEALTH OF ADVISORY CIRCULARS AND OTHER INFORMATIONAL PAMPHLETS ON THIS SUBJECT. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION THAT WE AS A PROFESSIONAL FLT CREW ARE GOING TO UNDERTAKE INDEPENDENTLY OF WHAT THE FAA MAY DETERMINE ARE THE FOLLOWING: 1) REVIEW, EMPHASIS AND RETRAIN IN CRM AND SOP'S ON PREDEP AND TAXI PROCS. 2) OBTAIN, READ AND DISCUSS AS MUCH AVAILABLE INFO ON RWY INCURSIONS INCLUDING FAA ADVISORY CIRCULARS, PAMPHLETS, NASA CALLBACK RPTS, NTSB ACCIDENT RPTS, ETC. 3) ATTEND A RWY INCURSION COURSE. 4) AT THE NEXT RECURRENT TRAINING COURSE, COORD WITH THE INSTRUCTORS TO EMPHASIZE PREDEP AND TAXI PROCS AT HIGH DENSITY ARPTS AND IF POSSIBLE A SIMULATOR SESSION BASED ON THE DEPICTION OF SAN FRANCISCO INTL ARPT AND A RECREATION OF THIS EVENT.

Synopsis

A FLT CREW TAXIED ACROSS AN ACTIVE RWY AT SFO WITHOUT CLRNC BECAUSE OF LACK OF POSITIONAL AWARENESS.

ACN: 703801

Time / Day

Date : 200607
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : MDW.Airport
State Reference : IL
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Weather Elements : Rain
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A319
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 240
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1500
ASRS Report : 703801

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Other Personnel.Other

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : FMGC
Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE PAST OUR SCHEDULED DEP TIME WHEN THE FINAL WT AND BAL WAS BROUGHT TO THE ACFT. THE CAPT REVIEWED THE DOCUMENTS AND RELATED TO ME THE STABILIZER SETTING FOR INPUT TO THE FMGC. THE CAPT INPUT THE GIVEN ZFW TO THE FMGC AND RELATED TO ME WHAT THE TKOF WT WAS. THIS NUMBER WAS SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN THE PLANNED DATA. I QUESTIONED THE CAPT AS TO THE ACCURACY OF THE ZFW. HE SAID THAT THE NUMBERS WERE CORRECT. I SAID WE WERE GOING TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY LIGHTER THAN PLANNED. WE BOTH AGREED THAT WAS THE CASE AND I ADJUSTED THE V-SPDS FOR THE LIGHTER WT. I FAILED TO LOOK AT THE WT/BAL FORM MYSELF TO VERIFY THE NUMBERS WERE CORRECT. BECAUSE WE WERE RUNNING LATE, I SIMPLY BELIEVED THE DATA WAS CORRECT AFTER CHALLENGING THE INFO THAT WAS ORIGINALLY PRESENTED. UPON LEVELING OFF AT CRUISE A CHK GROSS WT MESSAGE APPEARED ON THE FMGC SCRATCHPAD. IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT WE REVIEWED THE WT AND BAL ONCE AGAIN AND DISCOVERED THE PAX WTS FIGURES WERE MISSING ON THE WT AND BAL SHEET. THE TOTAL PAX NUMBER WAS CORRECT BUT CORRESPONDING NUMERIC FIGURES USED TO CALCULATE THE TOTAL WT WAS OMITTED. WE OVERLOOKED UPON OUR PREFLT PREPARATION. WE WENT TO THE FUEL PAGE AND CALCULATED THE CORRECT ZFW AND MADE THE INPUT TO THE FMGC. WE CONTINUED WITHOUT INCIDENT. VERIFY THE DOCUMENTATION WITH EACH OTHER. SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BTWN PRELIMINARY NUMBERS AND FINAL NUMBERS SHOULD BE RED FLAG ITEMS, AND BE CHALLENGED AND FOLLOWED UP BY BOTH CREWMEMBERS DESPITE THE TIME OR OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS THAT MAY EXIST AT THE TIME. I CHALLENGED THE CAPT ABOUT THE DISPARITY IN THE DATA, BUT I SHOULD HAVE ASKED TO SEE THE PAPERWORK MYSELF. HAVING FLOWN WITH THIS CAPT ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, AND HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF HIS COMPETENCY AND EXPERIENCE AS A CAPT, I ALLOWED THE TIME CRUNCH TO GET TO ME. I WAS NOT THOROUGH ENOUGH TO FOLLOW UP ON WHAT WAS A RED FLAG ITEM IN MY MIND. HAD I SAID TO MY COHORT -- SOMETHING IS NOT RIGHT HERE, LET'S STOP AND TAKE A MIN TO LOOK AT THIS SITUATION BEFORE WE GO ANY FURTHER. I BELIEVE HE WOULD IN FACT NOT FAULT ME FOR DOING SO. IN THIS SENSE, I FEEL I LET MY CAPT, OUR PAX, AND MY COMPANY DOWN, IN NOT DOING THE RIGHT THING. OUR CRM TRAINING TELLS US TO FOLLOW UP, COMMUNICATE, AND SHARE INFO AND PERCEPTIONS ABOUT OUR WORK ENVIRONMENT IN AND AROUND THE ACFT AT ALL TIMES. I FAILED TO DO THIS IN THIS CASE. I WILL ENDEAVOR TO BE MORE PROACTIVE IN THE FUTURE.

Synopsis

A319 CREW RECEIVES INACCURATE WT AND BAL NUMBERS AND DISCOVERS THE ERROR IN CRUISE.

ACN: 703409

Time / Day

Date : 200606
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Weather Elements : Thunderstorm
Weather Elements : Turbulence
Light : Dusk

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ACY.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Gulfstream IV
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : AC Generator/Alternator

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10200
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000
ASRS Report : 703409

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Non Adherence.Other
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted
Consequence.Other : Company Review

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

ON A DEADHEAD FLT FROM ZZZ1-ZZZ. LINE OF LEVEL 4+5+6 TSTMS IN THE AREA. ATC GAVE US A REROUTE. MANY TSTMS IN THE AREA. ABOUT 10 MINS OUT FROM THE ARPT WE LOST THE #1 GENERATOR. I STARTED THE APU SO WE COULD GET THE BACKUP GENERATOR. THE CAPT WAS UPSET WITH ME STARTING THE APU WITHOUT HIS PERMISSION (I HAVE 10 YRS IN THE G4, HE HAS 1 YR). FROM THE POINT OF 20 MINS OUT FROM THE ARPT THE CAPT WAS IN A VERY UPSET MOOD. HE WAS YELLING AT EVERYTHING I DID. I ASKED IF HE WOULD LIKE THE GPS APCH TO ZZZ ABOUT 15 MINS OUT. THE ONLY APCH TO RWYXX. ABOUT 8 MINS OUT THE CAPT ASKED FOR GPS APCH TO RWY XX. THE CAPT LIKES TO BE IN CHARGE. I CAN'T SUGGEST AN APCH. WE WERE NOW WITH APCH CTL. WE WERE GETTING VECTORS TO THE GPS RWY XX. NO DELAYS AT ALL. AT ABOUT 5 MINS OUT IN TOTAL IMC CONDITIONS THE CAPT GOT ON THE RADIO AND CANCELED IFR. WE GOT OUT OF THE CLOUDS IN ABOUT 30 SECONDS AFTER THAT. IT WAS CLR ON OUR L AND IMC ON OUR R. THE CAPT CLUNG TO THE CLOUDS ON OUR R. WHEN I LOOKED DOWN AT THE FMS OUR GPS RWY XX APCH WAS GONE. ONLY THE ARPT FIX WAS THERE. I PUT IN THE RWY XX AGAIN. THIS MADE THE CAPT VERY MAD AND HE TOOK IT OUT. WE WERE LNDG RWY XX. AT RWY YY MOVING E WAS A LEVEL 5+6 TSTM. THE INTENSE RAIN WAS ALREADY OVER THE FAR END OF THE RWY. WHEN THE CAPT TURNED FOR THE RWY WE WERE TO THE NE OF THE ARPT, NOT E. HE ALWAYS LIKES TO OVERFLY HIS HOUSE N OF THE ARPT. SO I THINK HE DROPPED THE GPS RWY XX BECAUSE HE WANTED TO FLY OVER HIS HOME IN A LINE OF LEVEL 5+6 TSTMS. THE LINE OF WX WAS TOO BAD FOR THE TURN TO THE N (HIS HOME). AFTER LNDG AT MIDPOINT ON RWY XX WE HIT THE RAIN FROM THE TSTM. WE HAD LOST ALMOST ALL VISIBILITY. GOOD THING WE WERE ALREADY ON THE RWY. ALSO THE MAN AT ZZZ RADIO SAID HE HAD SPECIAL TAXI INSTRUCTIONS BECAUSE OF A WEEKEND SPECIAL EVENT. I STARTED TO CALL ZZZ RADIO, THE CAPT STARTED YELLING 'I FORBID YOU TO TALK ON THE RADIO.' THE NEXT DAY I CALLED OUR CHIEF PLT. HE TOLD ME TO PUT IT ALL IN AN E-MAIL.

Synopsis

GLF4 FLT CREW FAILS MULTIPLE OPPORTUNITIES TO EXERCISE CRM.

ACN: 702079

Time / Day

Date : 200607
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Other : Military
Make Model Name : Military Trainer
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Flight Phase.Descent : Holding

Aircraft : 2

Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Cockpit Canopy Window

Person : 1

Affiliation.Government : Military
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 10
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 20
ASRS Report : 702079

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : Military
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 30
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5600
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 800
ASRS Report : 702649

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

10 MINS AFTER TKOF, WHILE CLBING THROUGH 5000 FT, COCKPIT PRESSURE LIGHT ILLUMINATED. I THEN NOTICED THE FRONT L CANOPY LATCH WAS NOT IN PLACE. CANOPY HANDLE WAS LOCKED AND CANOPY AJAR LIGHT WAS OUT. I THEN ATTEMPTED TO MOVE THE CANOPY INTO THE LOCKING MECHANISM AND THE CANOPY DEPARTED THE ACFT. I SHOULD HAVE RETURNED FOR LNDG AND ADJUSTED THE CANOPY ON DECK. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE TIME LINE NEEDED TO JOIN 3 OTHER ACFT FOR FORMATION TRAINING. WHILE I VISUALLY CHKED THE CANOPY LEVER FULL FORWARD AND LOCKED, AND THE CANOPY AJAR LIGHT OUT, I DO NOT RECALL VISUALLY CHKING THE FRONT L CANOPY LOCK IN PLACE. THE UNDERLYING LESSON LEARNED WAS THAT IF THE CANOPY WERE IN PLACE, IT WOULD LIKELY STAY IN PLACE FOR A SLOW SPD RETURN TO THE AIRFIELD TO RE-LOCK THE CANOPY. 702649: CABIN PRESSURE WAS NOT AN ISSUE. THE LIGHT INDICATED THAT THERE WAS A POOR SEAL BTWN THE CANOPY AND THE FUSELAGE. AT LOW ALT, SUCH A CONDITION PRESENTS NO HAZARD TO FLT. BETTER CRM WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE OCCURRENCE.

Synopsis

L29 FLT CREW HAS THE CANOPY DEPART THE ACFT INFLT.

ACN: 702016

Time / Day

Date : 200606
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : SRQ.VORTAC
State Reference : FL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 12000

Environment

Weather Elements : Thunderstorm
Light : Dusk

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : TPA.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Challenger CL600
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude
Route In Use.Departure : On Vectors

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 13800
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 120
ASRS Report : 702016

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

ON CLBOUT FROM SRQ WE WERE ON VECTORS FOR DEP. WE WERE ALSO IN THE PROCESS OF PROCEEDING WBOUND AND TRYING TO PICK OUR WAY AROUND SOME RAPIDLY GROWING TSTMS. THE CTLR WAS PRESSING US HARD TO TAKE A TURN TO THE N, THE FREQ WAS CONGESTED AND STRESSFUL BASED ON EVERYONE'S VOICE INFLECTION. WE WERE GIVEN A TURN TO 020 DEGS AS SOON AS FEASIBLE AND EVERY 10 SECONDS THE CTLR WAS ASKING US WHEN WE COULD MAKE THE TURN. WE WERE GRADUALLY MAKING A TURN FROM THE W TO THE N. I WAS LOOKING OUTSIDE AND THE FO WAS FLYING, AS WE PICKED OUR WAY THROUGH THE DEVELOPING LINE I GLANCED INSIDE THE FLIGHT-DECK TO SEE THE ALT ALERTER FLASHING. WE WERE AT 12700 FT. I DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND 'HURRIED BACK TO OUR ASSIGNED ALT.' THIS WAS THE FO'S FIRST TRIP OFF IOE. HE WAS NEW TO AIRLINE AND JET OPS. MODE AWARENESS, LACK OF AUTOMATION KNOWLEDGE. I DIDN'T SEE THIS, BUT AS WE DEBRIEFED THIS INCIDENT THE FO SAID HE WAS CLBING IN IAS MODE AND ABOUT 11000 FT (RIGHT ABOUT THE TIME THE AUTOPLT CAPTURED THE ALT) HE SWITCHED TO THE VERT SPD MODE. APPARENTLY THE AUTOPLT CONTINUED CLBING IN THE VERT SPD MODE AND DID NOT CAPTURE THE ALT. MOST OF MY ATTN WAS OUTSIDE TRYING TO LOOK FOR A GOOD HOLE IN THE LINE. I FAILED TO PROPERLY MONITOR THE FLT PATH. EVEN LEGITIMATE THINGS CAN (WX AVOIDANCE) BECOME DISTR. THINGS I WOULD DO DIFFERENT: 1) THE HECK WITH ATC, I WOULD HAVE CONTINUED WBOUND UNTIL PAST THE LINE (ABOUT 5 MORE MINS) AND TOOK THE TURN TO THE N WHEN I WAS COMFORTABLE. 2) STAY INSIDE DURING THE LAST 1000 FT TILL LEVELOFF. I USUALLY HAVE THIS HABIT. TODAY'S CONGESTED AIRSPACE AND FREQS IS LIMITING OPTIONS FOR WX AVOIDANCE AND ADDING COM AND WORKLOAD MGMNT COMPLICATIONS. I THINK CTLRS ISSUE MULTIPLE INSTRUCTIONS WITH LITTLE REGARD FOR PLT WORKLOAD. THEY NEED TO SIT IN ON JOINT CRM CLASSES. WE DO JOINT CRM WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS, DISPATCHERS AND MECHS, BUT NOT THE CTLRS.

Synopsis

A CL600 CAPT RPTS AN ALT OVERSHOOT WHILE CLBING NEAR TSTMS WHEN HIS NEW FO SELECTED AUTOPLT VERT SPD, BECAME DISTR, AND MISSED THE LEVELOFF ALT.

ACN: 701555

Time / Day

Date : 200606
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ATL.Airport
State Reference : GA
Altitude.AGL.Bound Lower : 500
Altitude.AGL.Bound Upper : 3500

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Weather Elements : Rain
Weather Elements : Thunderstorm
Weather Elements : Turbulence
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ATL.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Climbout : Takeoff
Flight Phase.Landing : Missed Approach
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : ERLIN.TWO

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 192
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3703
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1320
ASRS Report : 701555

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Turbulence
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Alternate
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Executed Missed Approach
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

UPON ARR INTO THE ATLANTA AREA THROUGH THE ERLIN 2 ARR, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD OVER ROME VOR WITH AN EFC 35 MINS LATER. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED OUR FUEL SITUATION AS THE RADAR PAINTED A STRONG LINE OF TSTMS BTWN US AND THE ARPT. THE CAPT'S MENTAL MATH LEFT HIM COMFORTABLE (HE SEEMED COMFORTABLE) WITH THE SITUATION ASSUMING WE GOT TO OUR EFC TIME AND WERE THEN VECTORED IN TO LAND IN ATLANTA. I WAS NOT SO COMFORTABLE AND WAS STARTING TO THINK WE MIGHT BE BETTER OFF JUST GOING TO CHATTANOOGA (WE COULD HEAR ON THE RADIO THAT OTHER ACFT WERE SPENDING A GOOD AMOUNT OF THEIR EFC IN THE HOLDING PATTERN AS OPPOSED TO THE HALF-TURN-AND-YOU'RE-OUT KIND OF HOLD). HOWEVER, THE WX (ATIS) IN ATLANTA DID NOT SEEM TO BE AN ISSUE AS THE SURFACE WINDS WERE FAVORING AN EASTERN APCH TO RWY 8L AND THE LOWEST CLOUD LAYER WAS AT 5000 FT. WITH THAT WX IN MIND, I AGREED WITH HIS REASONING. THE FUEL SITUATION BECAME A MOOT POINT AS ONLY 20 MINS INTO THE HOLD WE WERE CLRED TO ATLANTA VIA RADAR VECTORS FOR THE ILS RWY 8L. WE WERE APPROX 15 MI IN TRAIL OF ANOTHER ACFT WHO WAS ALREADY PENETRATING THE LINE OF WX. APCH ASKED HIM FOR HIS RIDE CONDITIONS AND THEY RPTED LIGHT TO MODERATE TURB THROUGH THE LINE BTWN THE DALAS AND STUTZ WAYPOINT. WE EXPERIENCED THE SAME IN ADDITION TO HVY RAIN AS WE WERE VECTORED S TOWARDS THE APCH. JOINING THE FINAL OUTSIDE OF BAHRR, WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH AND 180 KTS TO SCHEL. THE RADAR WAS NOT PROVIDING USEFUL INFO AS THE SAME IMAGE WAS PAINTING AT BOTH UPPER AND LOWER TILT LIMITATIONS. I ASSUMED THE RADOME WAS SATURATED WITH WATER FROM THE HVY RAIN SHOWERS. REGARDLESS, JOINING THE FINAL, WE WERE IN THE CLR WITH ABOUT 4-5 MI VISIBILITY. COMING UP ON A 10 MI FINAL, WE WERE QUERIED BY ATL APCH. I RESPONDED WITH OUR CALL SIGN AND WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT TWR. THE APCH CTLR'S INTONATION MADE IT SOUND LIKE I HAD MISSED AN EARLIER HDOF. I ASKED THE CAPT AND HE AGREED THAT I HADN'T. SWITCHING TO TWR, WE WERE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED OF SURFACE WINDS OF 290 DEGS AT 21 KTS GUSTING TO 29 KTS AND ASKED FOR OUR INTENTIONS. I LOOKED TO THE CAPT FOR A RESPONSE, KNOWING FULL WELL THAT WE COULD NOT LEGALLY LAND THE ACFT IN MORE THAN A 10 KT TAILWIND. I THEN STATED THAT 'THAT'S TOO MUCH.' PERHAPS DUE TO THE FACT THAT ANOTHER ACFT HAD

JUST LANDED IN FRONT OF US, THE CAPT DECIDED TO CONTINUE ON. I MUST HAVE XMITTED THIS INTENTION TO THE TWR. I'M NOT SURE OF THE EXACT VERBIAGE, BUT I AM SURE THAT WE RECEIVED A CLRNC TO LAND AND ANOTHER WIND ADVISORY OF 330 DEGS AT 21 KTS -- A 40 DEG DIRECTION SHIFT. OVER THE INTERCOM, I AGAIN STATED TO THE CAPT THAT THE WIND WAS TOO STRONG. HE THEN INSTRUCTED ME TO CHK THE WIND COMPONENT CHART IN THE SPD CARD. UNNECESSARILY I GRABBED THE CARD EVEN THOUGH I KNEW (I WAS SURE) THAT THE WIND STILL EXCEEDED THE LIMITATION SET ON THE ACT. I HAD HOPED THAT SHOWING HIM THE OUT-OF-LIMITS TAILWIND COMPONENT WOULD CAUSE HIM TO CHANGE HIS MIND, NOW SET ON LNDG AND LED HIM TO GO AROUND. I NEVER GOT THE SPD CARD OPEN TO THE CORRECT PAGE AS THERE WERE MORE PRESSING ISSUES. I TOLD HIM AT APPROX 1500 FT AGL THAT WE WERE NOT CONFIGURED FOR LNDG. FLAPS WERE AT 20 DEGS AND THE GEAR WAS STILL UP. HE THEN CALLED FOR 'GEAR DOWN, FLAPS 30 DEGS, LNDG CHK TO THE LINE.' NOW BACK IN IMC AND HVY RAIN, MY ATTN WAS AWAY FROM THE INSTS AND, THEREFORE, THE APCH AS I CONFIGURED THE ACFT. 'FLAPS 45 DEGS AND BELOW.' INSIDE THE OM, I FINISH CONFIGURED THE ACFT AND THE CAPT BEGINS TELLING ME TO GET A 'WIND CHK.' MY FIRST REQUEST TO ATL TWR GOES UNANSWERED. NOW, MORE FORCEFULLY, THE CAPT REPEATS, 'WIND CHK! WIND CHK!' I CANNOT SAY ANYTHING OVER THE RADIO AS TWR IS IN THE MIDDLE OF A XMISSION TO ANOTHER ACFT AND WE GET AN UPDATED WIND CHK. AT APPROX 500 FT AGL I STATE, 'SIR, I RECOMMEND WE GO AROUND.' WITHOUT MUCH HESITATION, HE AGREES BY PUSHING THE TOGA BUTTON INCREASING PWR AND PITCHING UP. 'SET GAR PWR, SPOILERS IN, FLAPS 8 DEGS.' WHEN I REACH FOR THE THRUST LEVERS, I SEE THAT THE N1 FANS ARE ALREADY AT APPROX 88%. I PUSH THE PWR UP TO 94.8% TO MATCH THE GA N1 BUGS, CHK THAT THE SPOILER HANDLE IS FORWARD AND RESET FLAPS TO 8 DEGS. WHILE MY HEAD IS DOWN SETTING THE PWR AND RECONFIGURING THE ACFT, MY ATTN IS AGAIN AWAY FROM THE INSTS. I CUE THE MIKE AND STATED, 'ACR X IS GOING AROUND.' 'ACR X TURN L HDG 060 DEGS, CLB AND MAINTAIN 3500 FT.' I RESPOND TO THE INSTRUCTIONS AND AS MY ATTN RETURNS TO THE PFD, I SEE THAT THE CAPT IS IN A CLBING R TURN AWAY FROM THE COMMAND BARS. IN DISBELIEF, I XCHK HIS PFD, CONFIRM THAT THEY ARE THE SAME THEN SAY, 'L TURN! L TURN!' THERE IS NO RESPONSE FROM THE CAPT WHO IS STILL IN A 20 DEG R BANK (CLBING) ATTITUDE. TWR 'ACR X TURN L HDG 040 DEGS, CLB AND MAINTAIN 3500 FT. DID YOU TURN R?!?' I RESPOND ON THE RADIO FIRST, 'L TURN 040 DEGS,' THEN ON THE INTERCOM, 'IMMEDIATE L TURN!' THE CAPT THEN BEGINS THE L TURN TO THE 040 DEG HDG. THE APPROPRIATE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH PROC IS TO CLB STRAIGHT AHEAD TO 1500 FT THEN A CLBING L TURN OUT TO THE MISSED APCH FIX. THE TWR'S MODIFIED INSTRUCTIONS ALONG WITH THE PUBLISHED INSTRUCTIONS ARE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO GET THE ACFT AWAY FROM DEPS AND A POSSIBLE GAR FROM THE OTHER RWYS. CLBING OUT, 'POSITIVE RATE.' 'GEAR UP, SPD MODE, HDG MODE.' I HAD ALREADY SET THE HDG BUG AND HE BEGAN A TURN TOWARDS IT. A MOMENT LATER, WE RECEIVE AN OVERSPD CLACKER AND HE ORDERS, 'FLAPS UP, AFTER TKOF, AUTOPLT ON.' I COMPLIED WITH ALL. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT -- THE DIVERSION TO CHATTANOOGA -- WENT WITHOUT ISSUE. SAFELY ON THE GND IN CHATTANOOGA, THE CAPT AND I BRIEFLY DISCUSSED WHAT HAD HAPPENED. I WAS CONCERNED WITH THE IMPLICATIONS AND DISAPPOINTED IN HOW WE LET THE SITUATION GET SO FAR OUT OF HAND, YET THERE WAS 1 THING I NEEDED CLARIFICATION ON. IN MY MEMORY, IN THE BACK OF MY HEAD, I KNEW THAT THE EGPWS WAS ACTIVATED DURING THIS EVENT, BUT I CANNOT PLACE WHERE OR WHEN (PERHAPS I WAS ACTIVELY TALKING TO THE TWR AT THE TIME).

REGARDLESS, I ASKED THE CAPT. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE EGPWS HAD ACTIVATED BRIEFLY DURING THE GAR. HE BELIEVED THAT THE TRANSITION FROM APCH/GS (APCH) MODE TO GAR/GAR MUST HAVE CHANGED THE THRESHOLD LIMITS CAUSING THE EGPWS EVENT AND THAT THIS WAS A NON EVENT. SINCE I CANNOT PLACE THE EGPWS EVENT IN THE TIMELINE, I FEEL IT IS POSSIBLE THAT OUR EXCESSIVE DSCNT RATE REQUIRED WITH THE ACCELERATED GND SPD AND CONSTANT ILS GS MAY HAVE CAUSED THE ACTIVATION DURING THE GAR ROUNDOUT. POSSIBLE FACTORS: 1) STRESS ABOUT THE EARLIER POTENTIAL FUEL SITUATION, THE LINE OF TSTMS AND THE THREAT THEY COULD HAVE POSED, AND THE LOSS OF THE ABILITY TO SEE THEM (RADAR). 2) THE EXCESSIVE TAILWIND. 3) THE LATE GEAR AND FLAP CONFIG. 4) THE INCORRECT HAND-FLOWN MISSED APCH PROC. FAULTS I FIND IN MY BEHAVIOR: 1) MY INABILITY TO UNAMBIGUOUSLY STATE MY CONCERNS ABOUT THE EXCESSIVE TAILWIND. 2) NOT RECOMMENDING THE GAR AT A MUCH EARLIER POINT. 3) MY DISTR FROM THE FLT INSTS. 4) MY APPARENT DISTR FROM THE GPWS WARNING. I SHOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP WHEN TWR INITIALLY GAVE US A WIND RPT WITH A 20 KT TAILWIND. GOING ALONG WITH THE APCH AND ASSUMING THAT THE CAPT KNOWS WHAT HE IS DOING AND WILL ULTIMATELY MAKE THE CORRECT DECISION WAS THE WRONG DECISION. CRM TRAINING EMPHASIZES THIS, BUT FOR ME IT TOOK A SERIOUS INCIDENT TO DRIVE THAT FACT HOME. MY VOICE MUST BE LOUDER WHEN I SEE SOMETHING WRONG AND IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS POINT OUT THE PROB. SAYING

Synopsis

A CL65 FO ANALYZES HIS PERFORMANCE THROUGHOUT AN APCH TO ATL THAT INCLUDED HOLDING, CHANGING WX, DIVERSION ISSUES CONCLUDING WITH A NOT WELL FLOWN MISSED APCH AND AN EGPWS WARNING.

ACN: 701247

Time / Day

Date : 200606
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DEN.Airport
State Reference : CO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 8000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : DEN.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-300
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Aircraft : 2

Controlling Facilities.Tower : DEN.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : McDonnell Douglas Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Aircraft : 3

Controlling Facilities.Tower : DEN.Tower
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Observation : Observer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000
ASRS Report : 701247

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 230
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 16000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 11000
ASRS Report : 701160

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 4

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Person : 5

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 6

Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : TCAS
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 3
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Intended or Assigned Course
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Precautionary Avoidance Action
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

RWY 35L, CLRED FOR VISUAL APCH. RIGHT ABOUT THE TIME WE SHOULD HAVE STARTED THE TURN TO FINAL, THERE WAS A TA AT OUR 8 O'CLOCK POS, NO FACTOR, PROBABLY GOING TO RWY 34, BUT WE DID NOT SEE THE TFC. DISTR BY THE TA, TURN TO FINAL NOT INITIATED, AND THE AUTOPLT DID NOT CAPTURE. I DON'T KNOW WHAT AUTOPLT MODE THE CAPT HAD SELECTED, BUT I KNOW THE ILS FREQ WAS DIALED IN, NAV MODE VOR/ILS, VOR/LOC ARMED, AND FLT DIRECTOR OFF. HAVEN'T FLOWN THE -300 IN 5 YRS, SO I'M A LITTLE RUSTY ON SOME OF THE PROBS, BUT I REMEMBER THE CAPT AND FO SETTING UP THE FLT AND NAV INSTS FOR THE APCH AND ARMING VOR/LOC. I SAW THE OVERSHOOT DEVELOP, BUT HELD MY TONGUE FOR A SECOND. WE THEN GOT A 'DSND' RA,

LOOKED OUT THE FRONT WINDOW AND SAW AN MD-XX AHEAD, ON FINAL TO RWY 35R. I LOOKED L, SAW OUR OVERSHOOT, AND TOLD THE CAPT TO TURN TO FINAL. AS HE INITIATED THE TURN, WE GOT A CALL FROM TWR ABOUT THE SITUATION. WE PASSED DIRECTLY AT 6 O'CLOCK POS TO THE MD, PROBABLY AT 1/2 MI AND SLIGHTLY BELOW. WE CORRECT TO FINAL AND CONTINUED THE APCH. WENT AROUND DUE TO LNDG WT AFTER ALL THIS, AND LANDED ON SECOND ATTEMPT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) COMPANY QUICK TURN POLICY. QUICK TURN LNDG WT CALCULATIONS AND FUEL CONCERNS WERE INITIAL DISTR DURING CRUISE AND DSCNT. WE GOT A LOWER ALT, FLEW WITH SB EXTENDED, LOWERED GEAR EARLY, ETC, TO BURN FUEL. STILL HAD TO GO AROUND SO THEY COULD QUICK TURN THE AIRPLANE. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE FO HAD MIXED UP 2 LINES ON THEIR NOTEPAD PERFORMANCE COMPUTER, MISTAKING LNDG RWY 34R FOR RWY 35R. I CAUGHT THIS AFTER THE GAR AS WE WERE NEGOTIATING FOR A NEW LNDG RWY, STILL BASED ON THE QUICK TURN WT. NOT A DIRECT FACTOR IN THE TA/RA, BUT THE LNDG WT ISSUE DID USE UP A FEW EXTRA BRAIN CELLS. 2) UNFAMILIARITY OF CREW WITH DEN ALSO SEEMED TO BE A PLAYER. 3) DISTR FROM THE TA AT A CRITICAL MOMENT CAUSED THE INITIAL OVERSHOOT. 4) CRM WITH JUMPSEATER. I WAS THE FIRST TO CATCH THE OVERSHOOT AND ANOTHER DISTR, AND IT WAS TOO LATE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 701160: THE TFC ALERT IMMEDIATELY BECAME A TCAS DSND AND WE COMPLIED. AFTER WE ACQUIRED THE ACFT WE CORRECTED BACK TO FINAL RWY 35L. NEITHER OF THESE ACFT HAD BEEN CALLED TO OUR ATTN BY APCH CTL. THE 2 TFC ALERTS JUST AS WE WERE AT THE TURN TO INTERCEPT FINAL, WITHOUT KNOWING WHERE THE ACFT WERE GOING, WAS DISCONCERTING.

Synopsis

B737-300 FLT CREW HAS A HDG TRACK DEV DURING APCH TO DEN, RECEIVES A TCAS RA, EXECUTES A GAR AND RETURNS FOR LNDG.

ACN: 700088

Time / Day

Date : 200606
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : CYPR.Airport
State Reference : BC
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 35000

Environment

Weather Elements.Other
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : CZVR.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-400
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : MCP

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
ASRS Report : 700088

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : MCP Failure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING CRUISE AT FL350 IN MOSTLY CLR SKIES DURING DAYLIGHT HRS THE B AUTOPLT TRIPPED OFF. WE BOTH NOTICED THAT THE MCP PANEL WAS COMPLETELY BLANK. WE TRIED TO ESTABLISH EITHER AUTOPLT TO NO AVAIL. WE RECYCLED THE FLT DIRECTORS BUT HAD NO AUTOPLT AND NO MCP. I AS THE PNF WENT TO THE QRH AND THE MCP LOCKUP ABNORMAL PROC. AFTER REVIEWING THE PROC AND DECIDING THAT IT TAKES AWHILE I NOTIFIED ATC THAT WE WERE UNABLE RVSM. THE VANCOUVER CTR CTLR SAID NO PROB MAINTAIN FL350. I THEN RAN THE QRH PROC PULLING AND RESETTING 2 CIRCUIT BREAKERS AS DIRECTED. THE MCP PANEL DID NOT RESPOND AND AS PER THE QRH WE CONSIDERED LNDG AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. SINCE THE QRH ALLOWS THE USE OF VOR, NDB, OR VISUAL APCHS AND SINCE WE WERE DAYLIGHT VFR AT THE TIME AND NAV, AND ACFT CTL WAS NOT A PROB WE DECIDED TO CONFER WITH MAINT CTL AND DISPATCH PRIOR TO REACHING A DECISION. THE MAINT TECH WAS UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE PROB AND WE WERE HANDED OFF TO DISPATCH. THEY CONFERRED WITH OPS AND THEY AGREED WITH US THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF BASIC VFR WX AT SEA A VOR RWY 16R OR VISUAL WAS ACCEPTABLE. WE BOTH FELT COMFORTABLE THAT WE COULD EXECUTE AN APCH TO BASIC VFR CONDITIONS WITH THE EQUIP AVAILABLE TO US AND THAT IT WAS A LEGAL COURSE OF ACTION. WE BRIEFED THE VOR RWY 16R APCH TO VFR CONDITIONS AND THEN ACCEPTED RADAR VECTORS TO A VISUAL AT SEA AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. BOTH OF US DECIDED TO FILE A RPT BECAUSE OF OUR DECISION NOT TO LAND AT A NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. WE BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS ONLY A CONSIDERATION AND NOT A DIRECTIVE TO LAND PERIOD. IN ADDITION, AFTER HAVING CONFERRED WITH THE ABOVE MENTIONED PEOPLE AND REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THEM THAT OUR COURSE OF ACTION WAS PRUDENT AND LEGAL WE DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO OUR DEST. I FELT THAT WE HANDLED THIS EVENT CORRECTLY AND USED APPROPRIATE CRM AND TEAM BUILDING AND THAT OUR COURSE OF ACTION WAS SAFE AND LEGALLY COMPLIANT WITH FAR'S AND COMPANY PROCS.

Synopsis

B737-400 FLT CREW HAS MCP (MODE CTL PANEL) FAIL DURING CRUISE AND DECLARES NON-RVSM CAPABLE.

ACN: 698887

Time / Day

Date : 200606
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Flight Phase.Landing : Go Around
Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Non Precision

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 270
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1450
ASRS Report : 698887

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 690
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9200
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4800
ASRS Report : 698888

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Speed Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolutive Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

AS WE WERE VECTORED FOR THE ILS, WE ENCOUNTERED A 30 KT TAILWIND THAT PUSHED US HIGH ON THE APCH. THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND WAS TRYING TO SLOW THE ACFT USING SPD BRAKES WITH LNDG GEAR DOWN. AT 200 KTS, HE STOWED THE SPD BRAKES AND CALLED FOR FLAPS 1 DEG AND THEN FLAPS 5 DEGS. THE GS WAS CAPTURED ON THE AUTOPLT AND THE APCH CONTINUED BELOW 4000 FT. WITH THE STRONG TAILWIND, THE ACFT WAS NOT SLOWING, SO THE CAPT DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND REDUCED THE DSCNT AND CALLED FOR FLAPS 15 DEGS. WE WERE NOW HIGH ON THE GLIDE PATH AND THE APCH WAS NOT LOOKING GOOD. PASSING ABOUT 2000 FT THE ACFT WAS HOLDING AT 175 KTS AS THE CAPT CALLED FOR FLAPS 30 DEGS. I RESPONDED BY SAYING WE NEEDED TO SLOW FURTHER BEFORE I COULD DO THAT. THE CAPT THEN INFORMED ME THE SPD WAS OK AND HE WOULD EXPLAIN WHY AFTER THE APCH. I HAD CONFIRMED THE FLAP SPDs ON THE PLACARD AND KNEW THE FLAPS 30 DEG MAX SPD WAS 165 KTS, BUT WITH TIME SHORT, TRUSTED THE CAPT WITH THE DECISION. I SELECTED FLAPS 30 DEGS WITH SOME HESITATION. SOON AFTERWARD IT WAS VERY APPARENT THAT THIS APCH WAS NOT GOING TO WORK AND THE CAPT INITIATED A GAR AT ABOUT 1500 FT AGL. WE HAD HELD 175 KTS WITH FLAPS 30 DEGS FOR ABOUT 30 SECONDS. WE CLEANED UP ACCORDING TO THE FOM AND PROCEEDED WITH THE GAR. ON DOWNWIND, I QUERIED THE CAPT ABOUT THE FLAP SPDs AND POINTED OUT THE FLAP LIMIT PLACARD. AT THIS POINT HE REALIZED HIS ERROR. THE FOLLOWING APCH AND LNDG WAS NORMAL. WE TALKED ABOUT OUR ERRORS ON THE GND. WE CALLED MAINT CTL AND LOGGED THE INCIDENT IN THE LOGBOOK. AS THE OVERSPD WAS ONLY 10 KTS, THEY SAID IT JUST REQUIRED A MAINT NOTE AND WOULD BE INSPECTED DOWN THE LINE. OBVIOUSLY, I SHOULD NOT HAVE SELECTED FLAPS 30 DEGS ABOVE THE MAX SPD FOR THAT CONFIG. MY PERCEPTION WAS THAT THE CAPT HAD SOME ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE THAT I DID NOT KNOW ABOUT BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENCE IN HIS VOICE. HE MADE ME DOUBT MY KNOWLEDGE IN THAT TIME COMPRESSED SIT. IN RETROSPECT, I SHOULD HAVE PERSISTED WITH MY STATEMENT THAT WE WERE TOO FAST FOR FLAPS 30 DEGS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 698888: CALLED FOR FLAPS 30 DEGS AT ABOUT 175 KTS. THE FO QUESTIONED WHETHER WE WERE TOO FAST AND I REASSURED HIM WITH GREAT CONFIDENCE THAT WE WERE OK AND I WOULD EXPLAIN LATER. DURING RADAR VECTORS TO FINAL, I REALIZED WHAT I HAD DONE. POOR CRM ON MY PART SINCE MY FO QUESTIONED ME ON IT AND I DID NOT ADDRESS HIS CONCERNS. ALSO (AND OBVIOUS) POOR SYS KNOWLEDGE ON MY PART. RECOMMENDED CONSIDERING MAKING FLAP PLACARD SPD MEMORY ITEM.

Synopsis

B737-700 FLT CREW EXCEEDS FLAP EXTENSION SPD ON APCH.

ACN: 698598

Time / Day

Date : 200605
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 2000
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 6000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Weather Elements : Rain
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZ.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Personal
Make Model Name : Viking
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Arrival : On Vectors

Person : 1

Affiliation.Other : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 21
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 315
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 21
ASRS Report : 698598

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

I CHOSE A DAY OF FORECAST VMC WX FOR MY FIRST SOLO XCOUNTRY IN A NEW ACFT WHILE UNDER AN INST FLT PLAN. ALTHOUGH THE WX WAS CLR, I THOUGHT THE EXPERIENCE WOULD HELP ME DEVELOP THE SKILL SET REQUIRED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE COMS, TERMINOLOGY, VARIABLES AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE REAL SYS. UPON REACHING THE FINAL HR OF FLT, ATC ADVISED ME OF A RTE CHANGE AND I ATTEMPTED TO COPY THE CHANGE WHILE RAPIDLY ENTERING IMC. THE IMC WAS NOT FORECAST AND CONSISTED OF A LAYER OF CUMULUS AT 4000 FT WITH RAIN AND VISIBILITY OF LESS THAN 1/4 MI. IT WAS CLR BELOW 2000 FT. IN AN ATTEMPT TO ENTER NEW ROUTING, OBEY VECTORS AND DSCNTS, I WAS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN COURSE HDGS WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED VALUES AND REGULARLY FLEW EITHER ABOVE OR BELOW THE ASSIGNED ALT. DURING FINAL VECTORS TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE I WAS ULTIMATELY SATURATED MENTALLY THAT I FLEW THROUGH THE APCH COURSE AND HAD TO BE VECTORED BACK FOR A SECOND ATTEMPT. I BELIEVE I WAS PREPARED FOR LESS OF AN INTRODUCTORY FLT, AND WOULD HAVE PERFORMED WELL IF THE DSCNT HAD BEEN A SIMPLE STRAIGHT IN THROUGH THE LAYER. MY INABILITY TO FIND THE INTXNS ON THE CHART QUICKLY, CORRECTING FOR ALT AND HDG EXCURSIONS AND CONSTANTLY REASSURING ATC THAT I WAS AWARE OF MY ERRORS AND NOT FULLY IGNORANT QUICKLY PUT ME BEHIND THE ACFT. THIS WAS AGAIN COMPOUNDED BY THE LITTLE TIME I'VE HAD TO MASTER THE EQUIP ON BOARD AND PROPERLY DEVELOP A SOPHISTICATED CRM PROGRAM. I FEEL ADDITIONAL TIME ON TRAINING, CHART STUDY, CRM AND EQUIP FAMILIARITY WILL SOON PROVIDE THE EASE AND UNDERSTANDING REQUIRED TO AVOID THE SITUATION FROM RECURRING.

Synopsis

BELLANCA PLT ENTERS UNFORECAST IMC, BECOMES OVERWHELMED AND DISORIENTED.

ACN: 698514

Time / Day

Date : 200605
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ADW.Airport
State Reference : MD
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : PCT.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Main Gear

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Qualification.Pilot : Private
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 10
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2600
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 210
ASRS Report : 698514

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE DEPARTED ANDREWS AFB. OUR CLRNC WAS: AFTER TKOF, ON COURSE TO KRANT AT OR BELOW 3000 FT MSL. WHEN THE GEAR HANDLE WAS RAISED WE EXPERIENCED A MALFUNCTION WHICH RESULTED IN ONE MAIN LNDG GEAR NOT RETRACTING FULLY. WHILE WORKING THROUGH THE MALFUNCTION AND DETERMINING WHETHER TO CONTINUE AS PLANNED, THE ACFT DEVIATED L OF THE ON COURSE HDG OF 320 DEGS. PLT FLYING MAY HAVE MISSED ONE OR TWO RADIO CALLS WHILE ATTENDING TO THE MALFUNCTION. WHEN THE PROB HAD BEEN RESOLVED THE PLT FLYING RECEIVED AN URGENT CALL FROM ATC TO RETURN TO COURSE WHICH WAS DONE IMMEDIATELY. THE CAUSE OF THE DEV FROM COURSE WAS A LACK OF COORDINATED CRM. THE BEFORE TKOF CHECKLIST HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO INCLUDE SPECIFIC DISCUSSION OF PF AND PNF DUTIES IN THE EVENT OF AN UNEXPECTED SITUATION OR EMER.

Synopsis

A B17G PILOT REPORTS A COURSE DEVIATION AFTER THE CREW BECAME DISTRACTED BY A POST TAKEOFF LANDING GEAR RETRACTION MALFUNCTION.

ACN: 696700

Time / Day

Date : 200605

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 11000

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZ.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial

Route In Use.Departure.SID : N/S

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Galley Furnishing

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 240

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 19750

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 8600

ASRS Report : 696700

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Attendant : On Duty

Function.Oversight : Flight Attendant In Charge

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Fumes

Anomaly.Other Anomaly

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 3

Resolatory Action.Aircraft : Equipment Problem Dissipated

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING CLB ON DEP AT APPROX 11000 FT MSL THE PURSER CALLED THE COCKPIT FROM THE AFT GALLEY INDICATING TO THE RELIEF FO THAT THERE WAS STRONG ODOR/SMOKE IN THE AREA. AS THE PF, I ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ATC CONTACT WHILE DIRECTING THE PNF TO ACCOMPLISH THE QRC FOR GALLEY SMOKE/FIRE. AT APPROX 3-4 MINS INTO THE EVENT, THE RELIEF FO STATED THAT CONDITIONS IN THE AFT GALLEY WERE WORSENING AND THE CABIN CREW WERE 'VERY EXCITED.' AT THIS POINT, I DECLARED AN EMER WITH ATC AND REQUESTED AN IMMEDIATE RETURN TO THE ARPT FOR LNDG. A TURN WAS EXECUTED TO PLACE THE ACFT ON AN EXTENDED DOWNWIND LEG IN CLEAN CONFIG, 240 KIAS, 11000 FT MSL. DURING THIS ACTIVITY, DISPATCH AND MAINT WERE NOTIFIED. AT APPROX 8 MINS INTO THE EVENT, THE PURSER INFORMED US THAT HE HAD POSITIVELY IDENTED THE SOURCE OF SMOKE/ODORS AS A GALLEY CART ELECTRICAL PIGTAIL CONNECTOR. FURTHER, HE STATED THAT CONDITIONS WERE RAPIDLY IMPROVING. UPON EXTENSIVE CONSULTATION WITH MAINT, DISPATCH, THE PURSER AND MY COCKPIT CREW, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE SOURCE OF THE PROB WAS IDENTED, UNDERSTOOD AND CORRECTED. A JOINT DECISION WAS MADE THAT THE FLT COULD SAFELY PROCEED TO DEST WHICH IT DID WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. A MAINT ENTRY WAS MADE IN THE LOG AND PERSONNEL WERE DEBRIEFED AT DEST. CRM BTWN THE CABIN AND COCKPIT WERE INSTRUMENTAL AND HIGHLY EFFECTIVE THROUGHOUT.

Synopsis

B767-300 FLT CREW HAS SMOKE AND FUMES IN AFT GALLEY DURING DEP, EMER DECLARED. SOURCE OF SMOKE AND FUMES IDENTED AND CONTINUED FLT CONTINUES TO DEST.

ACN: 692435

Time / Day

Date : 200604
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LAX.Airport
State Reference : CA

Environment

Flight Conditions : Marginal

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : LAX.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B777-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : Unknown

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 25000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2050
ASRS Report : 692435

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING PREFLT DUTIES, CAPT HAD SET MCP HDG TO 055 DEGS PER INITIAL HDG AS SHOWN ON THE SID AT THE 3 DME OF LAX AND DURING THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST READ BACK HDG 055 DEGS ON THE MCP. SHORTLY AFTER THAT, WE RECEIVED OUR TKOF CLRNC FROM LAX TWR AND AS CAPT LINED UP ACFT ON RWY, FO CHANGED THE MCP HDG TO 070 DEGS WITHOUT MAKING THIS CHANGE KNOWN TO THE CAPT OR THE REASON WHY HE WAS CHANGING IT. AFTER THE CAPT GAVE THE ACFT TO THE FO AS THE PF, CAPT QUERIED THE FO IF WE HAD BEEN ISSUED A RWY HDG OF 070 DEGS AS CAPT NOTICED THE MCP HDG. FO SAID NO, AND IN THE CONFUSION THIS CAUSED, CAPT WAS NOT SURE AT THAT POINT WHETHER WE HAD RECEIVED TKOF CLRNC SO ASKED THE FO IF WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF OR JUST POS AND HOLD. THE FO THEN SAID HE THOUGHT WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF BUT WAS NOT SURE EITHER. THAT WAS A SCARY MOMENT FOR SURE. THE TWR FREQ WAS VERY BUSY SO PASSING 100 KTS CAPT COULD NOT CONFIRM WITH THE TWR THAT WE IN FACT HAD BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF BUT LOOKING DOWN THE RWY THERE WAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT AN ABORT AT THIS POINT WOULD BE THE SAFER COURSE OF ACTION SO WE CONTINUED THE TKOF. AFTER LIFTOFF PER THE SID, A L TURN TO 055 DEGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE AT THE LAX 3 DME, BUT BECAUSE THE FO HAD PUT 070 DEGS IN THE HDG DISPLAY WE BEGAN THE TURN LATE JUST AS ATC WAS ISSUING US A NEW HDG OF 040 DEGS TO CORRECT. CAPT PUT 040 DEGS IN THE MCP DISPLAY BUT HAD NOT NOTICED THE FO HAD SINCE PUNCHED LNAV JUST AFTER TKOF BECAUSE FO THOUGHT THAT WOULD ALLOW HIM TO COMPLY WITH THE SID TURNS AS REQUIRED. CAPT DID NOT NOTICE THE FO DOING THIS AND AFTER THE NEW HDG OF 040 DEGS WAS IN THE MCP THE COMMAND BARS DID NOT COMMAND A TURN TO THE L SINCE WE WERE IN LNAV. ATC THEN REISSUED THE L TURN TO 040 DEGS AND TO CONTINUE CLB TO A HIGHER ALT. FINALLY THE CAPT NOTICED THE MCP WAS NOT IN HDG SELECT AND PUTTING IT THERE WE FINALLY BEGAN THE DESIRED TURN. THERE WAS TFC ON THE PARALLEL RWY ALSO DEPARTING OFF TO OUR R AT ABOUT OUR ALT SO A TURN TO THE L WAS CERTAINLY DESIRABLE AS CALLED FOR IN THE SID. IT WAS A CHAIN OF ERRORS THAT ALL STARTED WITH A DEV OF SOP MADE BY CHANGING MCP VALUES AND MODES WITHOUT THE AWARENESS OF THE OTHER PLT, ESPECIALLY WHILE HAND FLYING. ATC DID NOT INDICATE ANY PARTICULAR PROB OR THAT THEY HAD LOST SEPARATION BUT WE KNEW WE HAD GOTTEN BEHIND THE AIRPLANE FOR A BRIEF PERIOD AT A VERY BUSY TIME WHEN MAX ALERTNESS IS ESSENTIAL. AND DUE TO THE LATE TURN TO THE L, SEPARATION MINIMUMS MIGHT EASILY HAVE BEEN BREACHED DURING THE HEAT OF THE BATTLE. IT WAS REALLY A GOOD THING THAT ATC NOTICED OUR LATE TURN AND ACTED APPROPRIATELY TO GET THE TURN INITIATED BEFORE A MORE SERIOUS CONDITION DEVELOPED.

Synopsis

BREAKDOWN IN COCKPIT SOP AND CRM RESULTS IN B777-200 TRACK DEV ON TKOF FROM LAX.

ACN: 692038

Time / Day

Date : 200603
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : ZZZ.VOR
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 900

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZ.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Instructional
Make Model Name : PA-28 Cherokee/Archer II/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other.VORTAC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Engine

Person : 1

Affiliation.Other : Instructional
Function.Instruction : Instructor
Qualification.Pilot : Private
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 100
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 92
ASRS Report : 692038

Person : 2

Affiliation.Other : Instructional
Function.Instruction : Instructor

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

MY CFII AND I DEPARTED ON AN IFR FLT PLAN TRAINING FLT. WE RECEIVED OUR CLRNC AND WERE TOLD TO CONTACT DEP WHEN AIRBORNE. AT 350 FT AGL, I CONTACTED DEP AND THEY GOT US ON RADAR. AT ABOUT 900 FT MSL, THE ENG STARTED TO SPATTER AND TO ME, ENG FAILURE SEEMED IMMINENT. I IMMEDIATELY TURNED BACK TO THE ARPT ON THE PWR WE HAD LEFT. THE ENG WAS STILL RUNNING, BUT GIVEN OUR ALT AND DISTANCE FROM THE ARPT, I THOUGHT IT WAS NECESSARY TO NOTIFY ATC OF THE PROB AND WHY WE WERE DEVIATING. I STARTED MY RADIO CALL SAYING 'WARRIOR XXX EXPERIENCING ENG TR...' AND THAT'S ALL MY INSTRUCTOR LET ME DO, SWITCHING FREQ RIGHT AWAY SO THAT THE REST OF MY CALL WOULDN'T BE HEARD. HE STATED THAT THE CALL WAS NOT NECESSARY SINCE THE ARPT WOULD BE MADE AND WE WOULDN'T CRASH (WHICH I WAS STILL UNSURE OF). WE LANDED, TAXIED ON THE LITTLE PWR WE HAD AND ONLY THEN WAS I TOLD TO CONTACT CLRNC AND TELL THEM WE WERE OK. THE CTLR INFORMED ME THAT SINCE THEY LOST COMS WITH US, SAW A RAPID DSCNT, AND IMMEDIATE SHARP TURN, THEY THOUGHT WE CRASHED AND HAD RESCUE SQUADS ON ALERT. AFTER ALL WAS EXPLAINED, I APOLOGIZED AND THE CTLR SAID GOOD-BYE. AT THIS POINT, I AM STILL UNSURE OF WHY A RADIO CALL SHOULD NOT BE MADE SINCE WE DEVIATED FROM OUR CLRNC AND WERE EXPERIENCING ENG TROUBLE. IN MY OPINION, IT IS FAR BETTER TO TELL SOMEONE AND LAND SAFELY WITH RESCUE SQUADS ON ALERT THAN TO STAY QUIET AND BE IN THE TREES. WANTED TO HAVE THIS ON RECORD BECAUSE THERE IS A RADIO CALL THAT HAS THE BEGINNING OF MY XMISSION. IN THE FUTURE, BETTER CRM AND CREW COM WOULD LEAD TO BETTER DECISION MAKING.

Synopsis

SHORTLY AFTER TKOF ON AN IFR TRAINING FLT, THE PA28 SUFFERS A PARTIAL LOSS OF PWR. WHEN THE STUDENT TRIES TO ADVISE ATC THE INSTRUCTOR DISABLES THE XMISSION AND TELLS THE STUDENT SUCH A XMISSION WAS NOT NECESSARY.

ACN: 690542

Time / Day

Date : 200603
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Bound Lower : 0
Altitude.AGL.Bound Upper : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZ.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Dash 8-400
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2900
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1800
ASRS Report : 690542

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant : On Duty

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Unstabilized Approach

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted
Consequence.Other : Emotional Trauma

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

I WAS FLYING WITH AN EXTREMELY FRIENDLY BUT SLIGHTLY NONSTANDARD CAPT. HE JUST DOESN'T ADHERE TO SOME OF OUR COMPANY APCH PROFILES. I HAD BEEN GIVING HIM SUBTLE HINTS ABOUT 'FIXING' SOME OF HIS PROCS ON PREVIOUS LEGS. ON ONE LEG, WE WERE HAVING A DISCUSSION ON THE DETAILS OF OUR ACFT'S LNDG GEAR WARNING SYS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE GEAR HORN WOULD SOUND WHEN THE RADAR ALTIMETER INDICATED 1000 FT AGL. I DIDN'T THINK IT DID. WE CONTINUED TALKING ABOUT OTHER SUBJECTS SUCH AS WX AND THE LIKE. WE STARTED OUR DSCNT AND APCH. ON FINAL, I FELT LIKE WE WERE GETTING A LITTLE TOO LOW NOT TO BE CONFIGURED (EVEN FOR THE NONSTANDARD CAPT). I PUT MY HAND ON THE GEAR HANDLE AS A 'SUBTLE HINT.' I LOOKED OVER AT THE CAPT AND SAW THAT HE WAS INTENTLY WATCHING THE RADAR ALTIMETER! I SUDDENLY REALIZED THAT HE WAS TRYING TO SEE IF HIS THEORY ON THE GEAR HORN WAS RIGHT! I SAID SOMETHING INDICATING THAT WE NEED TO CONFIGURE FAST, AND WE DROPPED THE GEAR AND PUT IN FLAPS. THE REST OF THE LNDG WAS FAIRLY NORMAL EXCEPT FOR MY BLOOD PRESSURE! AS WE TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY, I TOLD HIM THAT I DIDN'T KNOW OR THINK THAT HE WAS GOING TO BECOME A TEST PLT FROM OUR DISCUSSION. FURTHERMORE, THE FLT ATTENDANTS SAID THEY DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO SIT DOWN BEFORE WE LANDED! I THINK ONE OF THE MORE DISTURBING ELEMENTS OF THIS SITUATION WAS THE BREAKDOWN OF CRM. I AM THE FO, THE CAPT IS 25+ YRS MY SENIOR AND HE IS A VERY LIKABLE GUY. I FELT AS IF SPEAKING UP WOULD RUIN THE GREAT 'ATMOSPHERE' IN THE FLT DECK. I HAD NUMEROUS OPPORTUNITIES TO CALL FOR A MISSED APCH (GAR) SINCE WE WEREN'T CONFIGURED AT THE PROPER TIME. I FELT JUST AWFUL WHEN THE FLT ATTENDANTS TOLD US THAT THEY DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO SIT DOWN. I SHOULD'VE SPOKEN UP. I KICKED MYSELF THAT ENTIRE NIGHT AND SPOKE UP QUITE A BIT MORE THE REST OF THE TRIP. SITTING THROUGH CRM COURSES IN A CLASSROOM DOESN'T HOLD A CANDLE TO ACTUALLY FACING A SITUATION REQUIRING THE PROPER ACTION WHEN THERE ARE NUMEROUS OUTSIDE PRESSURES. TOOK A GOOD LOOK AT MYSELF AFTER THIS TRIP AND I KNOW THAT I WILL NOT BE SO 'SUBTLE' IN THE FUTURE. OH, JUST IN CASE YOU'RE CURIOUS, THE GEAR HORN DOESN'T SOUND AT 1000 FT AGL ON THE RADAR ALTIMETER.

Synopsis

DHC8 FO RELATES DIFFICULTY IN ADDRESSING SOP AND CRM ISSUES WITH A CAPT WHOSE FLYING TECHNIQUES ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH COMPANY POLICY. RESULTS IN CONFIGURING ACFT LATE ON FINAL.

ACN: 690264

Time / Day

Date : 200603
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : CLT.Airport
State Reference : NC
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 1000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : CLT.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Personal
Make Model Name : Citation Excel
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer Only : 18L
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Aircraft : 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : CLT.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Person : 1

Affiliation.Other : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 75
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 75
ASRS Report : 690264

Person : 2

Affiliation.Other : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 75

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 200
ASRS Report : 690213

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach

Person : 4

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Original Clearance
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 6600
Miss Distance.Vertical : 100

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE PNF SET UP THE FMS AND NAV FREQS FOR AN ILS APCH TO RWY 23 AS A BACKUP TO A VISUAL LNDG. THE APCH WAS BRIEFED AND RWY 23 ENVIRONMENT WAS TALKED ABOUT TO INCLUDE THE LENGTH, DIRECTION OF TURNOFF AND POSSIBLE TXWY. ON DOWNWIND, THE APCH CTLR CALLED OUR TFC THAT WE WOULD BE FOLLOWING AT OUR 10 O' CLOCK POS APPROX 2 MI. BOTH MYSELF AND THE PNF PICKED UP OUR TFC VISUALLY AND TOLD THE CTLR WE HAD OUR TFC IN SIGHT. WE WERE CLRED FOR A L-HAND, DSNDING TURN TO FOLLOW OUR TFC WITH INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO GO BELOW 4000 FT BEFORE 11 MI FROM THE FIELD AND ASKED TO SLOW TURN. I LINED UP ON RWY 23 USING MY ILS INFO AS BACKUP AND CONFIGURED THE ACFT WITH FLAPS APCH AND GEAR DOWN TO SLOW TO APPROX 160 KTS FOR SPACING. AT APPROX 7-8 MI OUT WE WERE ASKED BY APCH IF WE WOULD LIKE A RWY CHANGE TO RWY 18L. AFTER DISCUSSING IT WITH MY COPLT, WE DECIDED TO ACCEPT THE RWY CHANGE BECAUSE THE TAXI TO THE FBO WOULD BE LESS COMPLICATED. WE ACCEPTED THE CHANGE AND I MADE A R-HAND TURN TO APPROX 270 DEGS TO SET UP FOR A L BASE TO RWY 18L. WE WERE ALSO TOLD THAT THERE WOULD BE 1 ACFT DEPARTING FROM RWY 18L PRIOR TO OUR LNDG. WHEN I ROLLED OUT OF MY TURN AND LOOKED UP, I IMMEDIATELY SAW A WHITE CONCRETE RWY THAT I IDENTED AS RWY 18L. I ALSO SAW AN ACFT TAXIING ONTO THE RWY WHICH IS WHAT I EXPECTED GIVEN WHAT I HAD BEEN TOLD BY APCH. WE WERE SWITCHED TO TWR AND I CONTINUED MY L BASE FOR THE RWY. AS I CONTINUED MY APCH, I NOTICED IN MY PERIPHERAL VISION AS I LOOKED INSIDE AT THE INST PANEL

THAT THE PNF WAS HEADS DOWN CHANGING THE APCH IN THE FMS FROM THE ILS TO RWY 23 TO THE ILS TO RWY 18L TO PROVIDE ME ADDED BACKUP GUIDANCE FOR MY LNDG. AT APPROX 500-700 FT AND 3 MI FROM THE RWY ON THE L BASE RWY, TWR CALLED AND TOLD ME TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE L-HAND TURN. MY REACTION WAS TO LOOK L AND AS I DID I REALIZED I HAD JUST PASSED RWY 18L AND WAS ON A L BASE FOR RWY 18R. WHEN THE CALL WAS MADE, THE PNF LOOKED UP FROM THE FMS AND IMMEDIATELY CALLED 'WE'RE CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 18L, 18L.' I CONTINUED MY L-HAND TURN AND MADE A NORMAL LNDG ON RWY 18L. ON TAXI TO THE FBO WE WERE ASKED TO CALL TRACON WHEN WE SHUT DOWN. I MADE THE PHONE CALL AND EXPLAINED MY MISTAKE. THE CTLR SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED ME BACK AND SAID THAT HE WAS GOING TO FILE AN INCIDENT RPT BECAUSE WE HAD COME WITHIN 1.1 MI LATERAL SEPARATION AND 100 FT VERT SEPARATION OF A REGIONAL AIRLINER AND THAT THE AIRLINER WAS ASKED TO BREAK OUT TO HELP MAINTAIN LATERAL SEPARATION AS I TURNED L BACK TO RWY 18L. DOMINOES -- LET ME SAY UP FRONT THAT I WAS CLRLY WRONG IN MY ACTIONS. I ACCEPTED THE RWY CHANGE TO RWY 18L AND MISIDENTED RWY 18R FOR RWY 18L. THE FOLLOWING IS MY BEST ANALYSIS OF THE EVENTS THAT OCCURRED THAT PUT MYSELF AND ANOTHER EXPERIENCED PLT IN A POS TO BE PREPARING TO LAND ON THE WRONG RWY. 1) WHEN THE INITIAL RWY CHANGE WAS GIVEN, I MADE AN IMMEDIATE R TURN TO SET MYSELF UP FOR A BASE TO RWY 18. DURING THIS TURN, I LOOKED AT MY INSTS TO MONITOR ANGLE OF BANK AND RATE OF DSCNT IN THE TURN. WHEN I LOOKED BACK OUT TO WHERE I EXPECTED TO SEE THE RWY, I IMMEDIATELY SAW A RWY IN FRONT OF ME THAT I ASSUMED WAS RWY 18L. A RWY DIAGRAM SHOWS THAT RWY 18R EXTENDS APPROX 1400 FT BEYOND RWY 18L AT THE APCH END OF THE RWYS. 2) THE SECOND VISUAL CUE THAT HELPED ME TO PICK UP RWY 18R FIRST WAS THE FACT THAT IT IS A WHITE CONCRETE WHEREAS RWY 18L IS A BLACK ASPHALT. WITH THE VMC CONDITIONS AT THE TIME, RWY 18R STOOD OUT AND WAS THE FIRST THING I PICKED UP WHEN I LOOKED OUT. I OBVIOUSLY MADE THE WRONG ASSUMPTION THAT BOTH RWYS WOULD BE THE SAME COLOR AND THAT I WOULD PICK UP THE OTHER RWY AS I GOT CLOSER. 3) THE LAST VISUAL CUE THAT CONVINCED ME THAT I HAD THE CORRECT RWY WAS THE ACFT TAKING THE RWY WHEN I FIRST ACQUIRED IT VISUALLY. SINCE I HAD BEEN TOLD THERE WAS ONE TO DEPART BEFORE I ARRIVED, THAT VISUAL PICTURE MADE SENSE TO ME AND FURTHER CONVINCED ME I WAS GOING TO THE CORRECT RWY. AT THAT POINT MY FOCUS BECAME THE END OF THAT RWY AND THE ACFT DEPARTING. THE REST OF THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT FADED TO THE BACKGND OF MY FOCUS. 4) THE LAST DOMINO WAS MY NOT REQUIRING THE PNF TO RE-BRIEF THE LNDG SINCE THE RWY HAD CHANGED AND TO VISUALLY VERIFY MY INTENT TO LAND ON THE RWY I HAD IDENTED AS RWY 18L. INSTEAD, I ALLOWED HIM TO CONTINUE TO WORK ON PUTTING IN AN APCH I DIDN'T NEED BECAUSE OF THE VISUAL CONDITIONS THUS RENDERING HIM INEFFECTIVE IN IDENTING THE MISTAKE I HAD MADE IN MISIDENTING RWY 18R AS RWY 18L AND AS MY INTENDED POINT OF LNDG. ROOT CAUSE: POOR CRM ON MY PART. AFTER 30 YRS OF FLYING, TO INCLUDE 22 IN THE MIL, I WOULD LOVE NOTHING MORE THAN TO SAY THIS WAS CAUSED BY SOMETHING OTHER THAN MYSELF. IT IS HARD TO ADMIT THAT WITH MY EXPERIENCE LEVEL, THE SOPHISTICATION OF THE ACFT I WAS FLYING, AND THE EXISTING VMC CONDITIONS, I COULD MAKE SO BASIC AN ERROR. HOWEVER, NO MATTER HOW I SLICE THE APPLE IT COMES DOWN TO MY NOT RUNNING THE COCKPIT CORRECTLY WHEN THE RWY CHANGE WAS MADE. I SHOULD HAVE REQUIRED THE PNF TO RE-BRIEF THE RWY ENVIRONMENT I WAS GOING TO SEE FOR LNDG AND TO VISUALLY VERIFY THE CORRECT RWY AS WE NORMALLY DO AS

A MATTER OF ROUTINE. BECAUSE OF MY MISGUIDED COMFORT LEVEL IN HAVING IDENTIFIED THE CORRECT RWY FOR LNDG, I ALLOWED THE PNF TO CONTINUE TO WORK ON PUTTING AN APCH IN THE FMS THAT I DIDN'T NEED WHEN HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN HEADS UP AND EYES OUT DURING THIS CRITICAL PHASE OF THE FLT. HAD I REQUIRED MY COPLT TO RE-BRIEF THE LNDG ENVIRONMENT OR MERELY TOLD HIM TO NOT WORRY ABOUT PUTTING IN AN APCH THAT I DIDN'T NEED AND TO STAY OUTSIDE THE ACFT, I AM CONVINCED HE WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY PICKED UP MY ERROR AND WE WOULD HAVE CORRECTED IT LONG BEFORE I CROSSED THE EXTENDED CTRLINE FOR RWY 18L. THIS IS ESPECIALLY FRUSTRATING GIVEN THE FACT THAT I RECENTLY GOT MY TYPE RATING IN THIS ACFT AND WAS SHOWN AN EXCELLENT FILM ON CRM THAT ADDRESSED THIS EXACT ISSUE. HEADS DOWN ACTIVITY WORKING ON LOADING APCHS INTO AN FMS IN THE CLOSE-IN RWY ENVIRONMENT INSTEAD OF REMAINING HEADS UP AND WORKING AS A CREW TO ENSURE THE ACFT IS LANDED SAFELY WHERE IT WAS CLRED TO LAND. RECOMMENDATIONS: I WISH THIS WERE A UNIQUE PROB THAT HAD A NEW AND UNIQUE SOLUTION. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT. IT IS THE AGE OLD PROB OF NOT RUNNING A COCKPIT CORRECTLY AND ALLOWING THINGS TO TRANSPIRE THAT ARE NOT HELPFUL TO THE SAFETY OF THE ACFT. I WOULD RECOMMEND CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON WHEN TO PROGRAM THE FMS AND WHEN NOT TO. THE PNF AND I HAD DISCUSSED IT ON MANY OCCASIONS AND BOTH CONCLUDED UNNECESSARY USE OF THE 'BOX' CLOSE IN SHOULDN'T HAPPEN. HOWEVER, IT DID. AND IT DID BECAUSE I ALLOWED IT TO HAPPEN AND THE PNF WAS CONFIDENT IN MY ABILITIES TO PROPERLY IDENT A RWY UNDER VMC CONDITIONS.

Synopsis

CITATION CE560XL FLT CREW WHILE MANEUVERING FOR LNDG TO PARALLEL RWYS, OVERSHOOTS THE CTRLINE, CAUSING ANOTHER ACFT TO GO AROUND.

ACN: 676221

Time / Day

Date : 200510
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DFW.Airport
State Reference : TX
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 3000
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions : Mixed
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : D10.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope : 17C
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Precision

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Altitude Alert

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 19000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4200
ASRS Report : 676221

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2500
ASRS Report : 676521

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

OUR ACR X WAS CLRED TO 4000 FT, INTERCEPTED THE LOC AND WAS CLRED FOR THE APCH RWY 17C AT DFW. I WAS THE PNF HANDLING THE RADIO CALLS AND RUNNING THE CHKLISTS. AS I WAS COMPLETING THE APCH CHKLIST, FINAL MONITOR CAME ON THE RADIO AND STATED ACR X HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN 4000 FT UNTIL PENNY INTXN. AT THAT MOMENT I LOOKED UP FROM THE CHKLIST TO SEE THAT WE WERE INSIDE PENNY, COMING UPON ZINGG, AT AN ALT OF 3300 FT WITH 3000 FT SET IN THE ALT SELECTOR. THE FO WHO WAS FLYING HAD SELECTED 3000 FT AND WAS IN THE PROCESS FO SELECTING 2500 FT IN THE ALT SELECTOR. WE WERE BELOW GS. ALTHOUGH I DO NOT RECALL ANY INSTRUCTION TO MAINTAIN 4000 FT UNTIL PENNY INTXN, THE APCH PLATE SHOWED 4000 FT. IMMEDIATELY, I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO CLB TO GS. WE WERE AT 4000 FT WHEN I BEGAN THE CHKLIST. SINCE THE FO CHANGED THE ALT SELECTOR WITHOUT NOTIFYING ME, THERE WAS NO CHIME FOR THE ALTDEV. AT WHAT MOMENT THE FO LEFT 4000 FT I AM NOT CERTAIN. HOWEVER, IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN VERY FAR FROM PENNY INTXN. UPON MY INSTRUCTION, THE FO PROCEEDED TO CLB TO GS AND PROCEEDED WITH NORMAL ILS. ONCE WE HAD BLOCKED IN AT THE GATE, I DISCUSSED THE APCH WITH THE FO. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS THINKING LOC APCH WITH DSCNT TO VISUAL CONDITIONS. RWY 17C AT DFW HAS BEEN UNDER CONSTRUCTION FOR SOME TIME WITH THE ILS RWY 17C DECOMMISSIONED. WE HAVE BEEN FLYING THE LOC TO VISUAL FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. THE NEW ILS WAS COMMISSIONED JUST RECENTLY WITH THE OPENING OF FULL LENGTH RWY 17C. ALTHOUGH WE HAD DISCUSSED THIS IN OUR APCH BRIEFING, THE FO WAS STILL THINKING VISUAL APCH. AT 4000 FT, WE WERE IN THE BASE OF SCATTERED CLOUDS. BASES WERE AT 3800 FT WITH 7 MI VISIBILITY. IN THE FO'S MIND, ONCE HE WAS CLRED FOR THE APCH, HE WAS CLRED TO START HIS DSCNT TO VFR CONDITIONS. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE NEW ILS RWY 17C AS WAS PROGRAMMED INTO THE RADIOS. WE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL THE PROB CREATED WHEN THE FO CHANGED THE ALT SELECTOR WITHOUT TELLING ME. WE DISCUSSED HOW THE FO'S ACTIONS REMOVED ME FROM THE LOOP MAKING ME UNAWARE OF THE SITUATION UNTIL THE CTLR CAME ON THE RADIO. WE FURTHER DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CRM. IN HINDSIGHT, ALTHOUGH WE WERE WELL OUT ON THE APCH AND THE FO WAS SENIOR WITH 2500 HRS IN TYPE, I WILL STRIVE TO ENSURE THAT CHKLISTS ARE COMPLETED SOONER TO ALLOW ME TO BE IN A POS TO FULLY MONITOR THE

ACTIONS OF THE FO ANYWHERE NEAR THE ARPT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 676715: INBOUND TO DFW, APCH TOLD US TO 'EXPECT RWY 17C' WITHOUT ANY MENTION OF THE TYPE OF APCH IN USE. THE CURRENT DFW ARR ATIS WAS FOR VMC (2200 FT SCATTERED). I BRIEFED A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 17C. OUR PLTS AND DFW APCH CTLRS CONDUCT SO MANY APCHS TOGETHER THAT CTLRS DON'T WORRY ABOUT US DOING WHAT THEY EXPECT, LIKE THEY WOULD A LESS FREQUENT VISITOR TO DFW. 99% OF THE TIME THIS IS NO PROB AND THE OP RUNS VERY SMOOTHLY. BUT THIS ALSO LEADS TO COMPLACENCY. THE FACT THAT RWY 17C CONSTRUCTION IS DONE AND THE ILS IS OPERATIONAL IS A CHANGE TO THE STATUS QUO. WHEN A PLT IS NOT AWARE OF SUCH A CHANGE AND IS WORKING WITH OLD ASSUMPTIONS, MISCOM BTWN THE PLTS AND ATC CAN EASILY HAPPEN. WHENEVER THERE IS A CHANGE LIKE THIS, CTLRS SHOULD USE EXTRA CARE IN THEIR COMS, MAKING SURE THAT CLRNCs ARE PROPERLY STATED AND READ BACK BY PLTS, ESPECIALLY WITH THOSE WHO FREQUENT DFW AND MAY MAKE WRONG ASSUMPTIONS.

Synopsis

E145 FLT CREW DSNDS EARLY ON ILS RWY 17C AT DFW.

ACN: 675629

Time / Day

Date : 200510
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SNA.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 5000
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 6200

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : SNA.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : N/S

Aircraft : 2

Controlling Facilities.Tower : SNA.Tower
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 675629

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 549
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8567
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2986
ASRS Report : 675626

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Person : 4

Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 5

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Observation : Air Carrier Inspector

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : TCAS
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING CLBOUT FROM SNA BTWN 5000-6000 FT, APCHING LEVELOFF AT 6000 FT, WE RECEIVED A TCAS RA THAT SAID 'MONITOR CLB.' AT THAT POINT THE INDICATION ON THE PDF TURNED RED. I MISUNDERSTOOD THE APPROPRIATE ACTION AND THOUGHT I NEEDED TO INCREASE RATE OF CLB. BECAUSE I THOUGHT WE NEEDED TO GO UP, I IGNORED THE ALT CLRNC. MY FO CALLED OUT 'LEVEL AT 6000 FT.' I SAID 'NO' AND CONTINUED UP. AT APPROX 6200 FT, I REALIZED MY ERROR, BEGAN TO LEVEL OFF, AND THEN ATC CLRED ME TO 7000 FT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 675626: I PERFORMED OUTSIDE AND INSIDE PREFLT DUTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMPANY REGS AND WAS INFORMED BY CAPT THAT WE WOULD HAVE AN FAA INSPECTOR RIDING ALONG AS A COCKPIT OBSERVER. AT APPROX 5500 FT WE RECEIVED A TA CALLOUT WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE CONTACT AT THE 10 O'CLOCK POS. I GAVE AN ADVISEMENT CALLOUT THAT WE WERE 'APCHING LEVELOFF ALT' AND THEN ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THE TA BECAME AN RA WARNING. I ALSO SAW WE WERE RAPIDLY APCHING OUR LEVELOFF ALT. I EMPHATICALLY DIRECTED CAPT 'WE NEED TO LEVEL OFF!' HE RESPONDED 'NO! I AM FLYING THE RA MANEUVER.' I IMMEDIATELY CHKED THE NAV DISPLAY TO CONFIRM MY OBSERVATIONS AND SAW WE WERE CLBING INTO THE RA AREA VERSUS AWAY FROM IT, AND THEN PLACED PRESSURE ON THE YOKE IN THE REQUIRED DIRECTION AND NOTICED OUR REDUCED CLB RATE WHICH PLACED US AT 6100-6200 FT MSL, BUT STILL CLBING. ONCE AT ALT, CAPT AND THE COCKPIT CREW (PNF, FAA INSPECTOR) REVIEWED THE INCIDENT AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT 2 CRITICAL ERRORS WERE COMMITTED. 1) THE RA EVASIVE MANEUVER WAS PERFORMED INCORRECTLY. 2) THE CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED HIS RELUCTANCE AND DECISION TO DISREGARD THE PNF'S LEVELOFF CALLOUTS. THE FLT THEN CONTINUED TO DEST AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. IN REVIEWING THE EVENTS AND FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH CAPT, I FEEL SEVERAL HUMAN FACTOR ELEMENTS MAY HAVE EXACERBATED

THIS INCIDENT: COM: WHILE IT WAS MY PERCEPTION THAT CRM COM BTWN MYSELF AND CAPT WAS EXCELLENT DURING THIS TRIP SERIES, THERE WAS AN OBVIOUS ELEMENT OF CONFUSION THAT WAS INDUCED BY THE RA ALERT DISPLAY. THE NAV DISPLAY RA WARNING DISPLAY, BECAUSE OF ITS NATURE, REQUIRES IMMEDIATE ACTION, BUT ALSO REQUIRES THE PF TO CORRECTLY ASCERTAIN THAT THE REMEDY IS TO FLY AWAY FROM THE AREA. DUE TO THE FACT THAT THIS MANEUVER IS USUALLY CONDUCTED ONCE DURING ANNUAL RECURRENT TRAINING, IT IS EASY TO SEE WHERE IT MIGHT TAKE A PF A FEW SECONDS TO OBSERVE/ANALYZE THE DATA AND THEN CORRECTLY EXECUTE THE EVASIVE MANEUVER. THE PNF HAS TO BE THE VOICE OF REASON AND, IF NOT SEEING A PROPER RESPONSE TO HIS CHALLENGES, BE PREPARED TO PERFORM A MORE AGGRESSIVE RESPONSE. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS/WORKLOAD MGMNT: LEVEL 2 AUTOMATION (ACFT FLOWN WITH FLT DIRECTOR GUIDANCE ONLY) DEP. 'LEVEL III (AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLE ENGAGED) SHOULD BE USED WHEN RESPONDING TO ATC INSTRUCTIONS IN DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS SUCH AS TERMINAL OPS....' IN OUR DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE FLT, CAPT FELT THAT HIS DECISION TO EXECUTE A LEVEL II DEP VERSUS A LEVEL III DEP CLRLY HAMPERED HIS SITUATIONAL AWARENESS/WORKLOAD MGMNT. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE ADDED STRESS OF HAVING AN FAA INSPECTOR ON BOARD, HIGH DENSITY TFC ENVIRONMENT, AND EARLY MORNING OPS, WE FELT ALL CONTRIBUTED TO DETRACTING FROM HIS OPTIMUM EFFICIENCY IN EXECUTING THE DEP PHASE. CORRECTIVE ACTION: 1) HAVE INSTRUCTOR PLTS SET UP SIMULATED SCENARIOS WHERE THE PNF IS UNAWARE THAT THE PF HAS BEEN PRE-BRIEFED TO FLY THE RA EVASIVE MANEUVER IN ERROR THEREBY EXERCISING THE PNF'S ADVOCACY POS. 2) WHILE IT IS CLRLY THE PREROGATIVE OF THE PF TO CHOOSE HIS SELECTED LEVEL OF AUTOMATION FOR ALL PHASES OF FLT, HIGHLY RECOMMEND THAT LEVEL II AUTOMATION DEPS BE HIGHLY DISCOURAGED FROM HIGH DENSITY TFC AREAS.

Synopsis

A B737-700 FO, AS PNF, OVERRODE A PF CAPT WHEN THE CAPT INCORRECTLY ACTED OPPOSITE A TCASII RA AND CONTINUED A CLB WHEN LEVELOFF WAS COMMANDED.

ACN: 675132

Time / Day

Date : 200510
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZOA.ARTCC
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 40000

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZOA.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4100
ASRS Report : 675132

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

INBOUND ON THE LAST LEG OF A 2-DAY RESERVE TRIP, WE RECEIVED AN ACARS FROM DISPATCH INSTRUCTING US TO CALL CREW SCHEDULING WHEN WE GOT ON THE GND. THIS IS A COMMON EVENT IN THE LIFE OF A RESERVE PLT AND I BELIEVE IT IS A HUGE DISTR AND A SAFETY OF FLT ISSUE. PLEASE LET ME EXPLAIN BY FIRST PROVIDING BACKGND INFO. I AM A CAPT ON THE B737. WE

ARE OFTEN SHORT OF RESERVE PLTS. IT'S NOT UNCOMMON TO FLY 90 HRS IN A MONTH. DUE TO DEADHEADING AND OFTEN LOW-TIME TRIPS BEING ASSIGNED TO RESERVE PLTS, A 90 HR MONTH CAN SOMETIMES BE THE EQUIVALENT OF A 100 HR LINE HOLDER'S MONTH. IT CAN BE A STRESSFUL SCHEDULE. THE MAJORITY OF THE PLTS NOW ON RESERVE HAVE BEEN ON RESERVE FOR AT LEAST SEVERAL YRS. MY OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT FOR THE FIRST FEW YRS I DIDN'T MIND IT SO MUCH, BUT THE LONG-TERM 'GRIND' IS STARTING TO WEAR ON ME. DUE TO WORK RULE CHANGES AND CHANGES THAT CREW SCHEDULING HAS UNILATERALLY MADE, BEING ON RESERVE IS ERODING OUR QUALITY OF LIFE MORE AND MORE. THE ACARS MESSAGE TO CALL CREW SCHEDULING IS SO COMMON THAT WHEN FLYING WITH ANOTHER RESERVE PLT, ONE OF THE PLTS USUALLY BRINGS THE TOPIC UP BEFORE WE'VE EVEN LEFT THE GND ON THE LAST LEG OF THE TRIP. WHEN THE ACARS IS RECEIVED, IT BECOMES A DISTR. TOO MUCH 'BRAIN PWR' IS THEN FOCUSED ON WONDERING WHAT IT IS THAT CREW SCHEDULING WANTS, RATHER THAN ON FLYING THE JET. EVEN THOUGH I TRY TO 'COMPARTMENTALIZE' IT, MY MIND KEEPS DRIFTING BACK TO THE INEVITABLE QUESTION, 'WHAT DO THEY WANT?' WHAT THEY WANT IS GENERALLY EITHER TO CHANGE YOU FROM A 4 HR TO A 2 HR CALLOUT FOR THE NEXT DAY, TO ASSIGN YOU A TRIP FOR THE NEXT DAY THAT THEY OTHERWISE COULDN'T ASSIGN YOU IF THEY DON'T CONTACT YOU BEFORE YOU GO OFF DUTY, OR TO ASSIGN YOU ADDITIONAL FLYING THAT WILL EXTEND YOUR TRIP. ENVISION YOURSELF AS A RESERVE PLT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. WOULD YOU BE DISTR NOT KNOWING WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN NEXT IN YOUR LIFE? MY OWN EXPERIENCE IS NOT UNIQUE. I BELIEVE THAT MOST OF THE RESERVE PLTS SHARE MY POINT OF VIEW. I BASE THIS OBSERVATION ON THE FOLLOWING FACTS: 1) WHEN I'VE FLOWN WITH NON-RESERVE FO'S AND HAVE RECEIVED AN ACARS TO CALL CREW SCHEDULING, MANY OF THEM HAVE MADE UNSOLICITED COMMENTS ON THE NEGATIVE REACTIONS OF OTHER RESERVE CAPTS THEY WERE FLYING WITH AT THE TIME THEY RECEIVED THE SAME ACARS MESSAGE. 2) THE MAJORITY OF THE RESERVE FO'S I'VE DISCUSSED THE ACARS ISSUE WITH FEEL THE SAME WAY. 3) OTHER RESERVE CAPTS I SPOKE TO HAVE VOICED SIMILAR OPINIONS. 4) COMMENTS FROM RESERVE PLTS I'VE READ ON THE PLT GROUP WEB BOARD. TO PUT THE ACARS CALL INTO CRM TERMS, IT COULD BE CONSIDERED A THREAT, BECAUSE IT CAUSES A DISTR. I WORK HARD TO TRY AND MINIMIZE DISTRS ON THE FLT DECK. TO PURPOSELY INTRODUCE A THREAT IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO THE SAFETY OF THE FLT. THE ACARS MESSAGE CAN ALSO BE RECEIVED AT INOPPORTUNE TIMES, CAUSING ADDITIONAL DISTR. I'VE RECEIVED THE CREW SCHEDULING ACARS WHILE IN THE DSCNT, AND ONE RESERVE PLT TOLD ME HE RECEIVED THE ACARS MESSAGE WHILE ON SHORT FINAL. I REALIZE THAT CREW SCHEDULING HAS A JOB TO DO, AND THAT WE AS PLTS HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO HONOR THEIR REQUESTS. I SUGGEST THAT INSTEAD OF UTILIZING THE ACARS, THEY DEVELOP AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF CONTACT. A GATE AGENT MEETS THE FLT EVERY SINGLE TIME WE ARRIVE. I SUGGEST THAT CREW SCHEDULING CONTACT THE AGENT MEETING THE FLT AND HAVE THEM INFORM US TO CONTACT THEM.

Synopsis

B737 CAPT BELIEVES COMPANY POLICY OF CONTACTING RESERVE PLTS FOR ADDITIONAL ASSIGNMENTS WHILE STILL AIRBORNE ON THE CURRENT ASSIGNMENT IS A DISTR.

ACN: 673937

Time / Day

Date : 200510
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : MSP.Airport
State Reference : MN
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-500
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant : On Duty
ASRS Report : 673937

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 4

Function.Observation : Passenger

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

Assessments

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Passenger Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

THERE WERE SEVERE STORMS IN MSP LAST NIGHT. WHEN WE ARRIVED, I ASKED THE CAPT TO CHK TO SEE IF WE WERE GOING TO BE DELAYED AT ALL BEFORE WE STARTED THE BOARDING PROCESS. I WAS INFORMED THAT WE WOULD BOARD AS NORMAL. BOARDING STATED AT XA40. WE SAT AT THE GATE WITH THE JETWAY ATTACHED TO THE ACFT FOR 2 HRS. AT XC25, THE JETWAY WAS PULLED. WE CONTINUED TO SIT AT THE GATE. WE HAD MULTIPLE CONNECTIONS DOWNLINE IN ORD AND THE PAX KNEW THAT THEY WOULD NOT MAKE IT. PAX ASKED THAT THE JETWAY BE BROUGHT BACK AS THEY WOULD LIKE TO DEPLANE AND GO HOME. WE WERE TOLD THAT THIS WAS GOING TO HAPPEN. 1 HR LATER, WE WERE TOLD THAT THE JETWAY WOULD NOT BE COMING BACK. AFTER INSISTING TO THE CAPT THAT THE JETWAY COME BACK, I WAS TOLD 'THERE IS A RAMP CLOSURE AND WE WOULD NOT GET THE JETWAY UNTIL THE RAMP OPENS.' WE SAT THERE FOR YET ANOTHER HR. BY THIS TIME THE PAX STARTED BECOMING IRATE AND WANTED OFF THE ACFT. I WAS ASKED BY THE CAPT, 'IF WE BRING THE JETWAY BACK, WILL YOU FLT ATTENDANTS BE WALKING, BECAUSE WE KNOW YOU ARE ILLEGAL TO WORK THIS TRIP?' I ASKED HIM, 'WHAT KIND OF QUESTION IS THAT?' HE THEN SAID, 'THE JETWAY WILL NOT BE COMING BACK UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES BECAUSE ONCE IT DOES, YOU ARE ILLEGAL TO WORK THIS TRIP.' THE STATION OPS ALONG WITH THE CAPT DECIDED TO PUT 4000 LBS MORE FUEL ON THE ACFT AND WE WERE GOING TO ORD. WE BROUGHT PEOPLE TO ORD WHO DIDN'T WANT TO COME TO ORD AND LEFT THEM STRANDED WITH NO RECOURSE. I UNDERSTAND THAT WE WOULD HAVE BEEN ILLEGAL TO WORK IF THEY BROUGHT THE JETWAY BACK, BUT WHY BRING PEOPLE TO A CITY THAT THEY DON'T WANT TO BE IN? FLT ATTENDANTS WERE BACKED INTO A CORNER WITH OUR HANDS TIED BEHIND OUR BACKS WITH NO SAY IN WHAT WE WANTED TO DO. THE PAX ATTITUDES STARTED TO ESCALATE INTO THREAT LEVELS, NONE WAS DECLARED, AND WE AS FLT ATTENDANTS HAD TO DEAL WITH ALL THE RECOURSE AS THE PLTS REFUSED TO COME OUT OF THE COCKPIT OR EVEN TRULY EXPLAIN TO THE PAX WHAT THE TRUE STORY WAS (CREW LEGALITIES). THERE WAS A MAJOR LACK IN SUPPORT FOR THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND THE CRM CHAIN BROKE DOWN TO NOTHING -- ALL TO SAVE A FLT FROM CANCELING. WE ARRIVED IN ORD WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

Synopsis

AFTER LONG GND DELAY, CAPT REFUSES TO BRING JETWAY BACK TO ACFT TO OFFLOAD PAX WHOSE TRAVEL PLANS WERE NOW MOOT, DUE TO FEAR FLT ATTENDANTS WOULD BE ILLEGAL TO CONTINUE AND THE FLT WOULD BE CANCELED.

ACN: 673686

Time / Day

Date : 200508

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC

State Reference : US

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Attendant : On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant : Currently Qualified

ASRS Report : 673686

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Attendant : On Duty

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 4

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 5

Function.Observation : Passenger

Function.Other Personnel.Other

Events

Anomaly.Cabin Event : Passenger Misconduct

Anomaly.Cabin Event.Other

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Consequence.Other : Emotional Trauma

Assessments

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Passenger Human Performance

Narrative

DUE TO A VERBAL ALTERCATION WITH A COACH PAX, ONE OF MY AFT FLT ATTENDANTS CALLED THE CAPT AND ASKED THAT THE SEATBELT SIGN BE TURNED ON. THE CAPT REFUSED, AND THEN CALLED ME AT 1L TO GET DETAILS, WHICH I GAVE, SAYING WE WANTED THE SIGN ON TO DIFFUSE A SITUATION IN THE AFT GALLEY BTWN A PAX AND FLT ATTENDANT. CAPT SAID HE DIDN'T WANT TO USE THE SEATBELT SIGN FOR 'CROWD CTL.' I RELAYED THIS INFO TO MY FLYING PARTNERS IN THE FORWARD GALLEY. FLT ATTENDANT X, WHO HAD BEEN WORKING IN COACH, HEARD THE EXCHANGE AND GRABBED THE INTERPHONE AT THE JUMPSEAT BY THE FORWARD CROSS AISLE, CALLED THE COCKPIT AND SAID 'THIS IS FLT ATTENDANT X, PUT THE SEATBELT SIGN ON NOW!' THE FO TOOK THE CALL AND SEATBELT SIGN WENT ON IMMEDIATELY, AND THE PAX SAT DOWN SHORTLY THEREAFTER. THE CAPT THEN CALLED ME AT 1L AND WANTED CLARIFICATION. I APOLOGIZED FOR FLT ATTENDANT X'S TONE OF VOICE, ETC, AND WENT UP TO THE COCKPIT TO EXPLAIN THE SITUATION SHORTLY THEREAFTER. THERE WAS A BREAKDOWN IN CRM WITH THE CAPT REFUSING TO PUT ON THE SEATBELT SIGN WHEN ASKED BY THE COACH FLT ATTENDANT AND THEN BY ME, AS WELL AS WHEN FLT ATTENDANT X TOOK MATTERS INTO HER OWN HANDS, CALLING AND ALARMING THE PLTS, BYPASSING CHAIN OF COMMAND. THIS COULD HAVE BROKEN DOWN COMS FURTHER BECAUSE IT SOUNDED LIKE I PUT HER UP TO CALLING WHEN I DIDN'T LIKE HIS REASONING. THE NEXT DAY, WHEN I HAD CALMED DOWN ENOUGH TO TALK TO HER, I EXPLAINED THAT HER ACTIONS HAD PUT US ALL AT JEOPARDY, UNDERMINED MY ROLE AS PURSER, ANTAGONIZED THE CAPT AND FO, AND BY GIVING HER NAME IN SUCH AN ABRUPT MANNER, ALERTED THE COCKPIT THAT SOMETHING DIRE WAS TAKING PLACE, WHEN ALL WE WANTED TO DO WAS TO DE-ESCALATE A MINOR SITUATION IN THE COACH CABIN. I ALSO HAD TO SPEAK TO HER ABOUT USING LOUD, FOUL LANGUAGE WHEN SHE WAS SETTING UP THE FIRST CLASS GALLEY WHILE PAX WERE BOARDING. WE DISCUSSED HER CHALLENGE WITH SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND REPERCUSSIONS.

Synopsis

POOR COM BTWN CABIN AND COCKPIT CAUSES A BREAKDOWN IN COORD AND TEAMWORK NECESSARY TO RESOLVE A CABIN DISRUPTION.

ACN: 673131

Time / Day

Date : 200509
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Bound Lower : 0
Altitude.AGL.Bound Upper : 100

Environment

Weather Elements : Rain
Weather Elements : Turbulence
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : SDF.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Flight Phase.Landing : Roll

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 94
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2654
ASRS Report : 673131

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 174
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10800
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 5600
ASRS Report : 673132

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Second Officer

Events

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter.Other
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Unstabilized Approach
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

THIS RPT IS SUBMITTED AS A RESULT OF THE FAILURE OF FUNDAMENTAL CRM ISSUES THAT MAY HAVE BEGUN DURING THE PREFLT PHASE AND CONTINUED TO AFFECT CREW PERFORMANCE THROUGHOUT THE APCH AND LNDG PHASE. DURING PREFLT PREPARATION AND WX BRIEFING, THE CREW WAS AWARE OF POSSIBLE TURB AND FRONTAL ACTIVITY ENRTE. THERE WERE SMALL ISSUES WITHIN THE CREW OF FUEL LOADING, FLT PLANNING, AND COMS WITH DISPATCH. ISSUES WERE RESOLVED BUT PERHAPS THE BEGINNING OF CRM BREAKDOWN. ENRTE, THERE WAS ALSO A DISCUSSION OF TKOF PERFORMANCE AND PROCS ISSUES THAT HAD OCCURRED. DURING THE DISCUSSION, THE CAPT PROVIDED DOCUMENTATION FROM THE OPS MANUAL WHICH SUPPORTED THIS THEORY OF CORRECT PROC AND SUGGESTED THAT IF THERE WERE ANY QUESTIONS THEN PERHAPS THEY BOTH COULD RESOLVE THEM WITH HELP OF A CHK PLT. THE CAPT'S EXPLANATION WAS NOT INTRUSIVE, WAS MORE THAN ADEQUATE, AND WAS SUPPORTED BY THE OPS MANUAL. THE CREW STAYED ABREAST OF THE FRONTAL MOVEMENT WITH CONTINUAL UPDATES VIA ACARS AND PLOTTED THE MOVEMENT ON CHARTS. ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH CTL TWR, WE WERE ADVISED OF POSSIBLE WINDSHEAR WHICH WAS RPTED BY A PREVIOUS ACFT THAT INITIATED A GAR. THE CAPT REVISED HIS INITIAL APCH BRIEFING TO INCLUDE ADDITIVE TO REF SPD. WE CONTINUED THE APCH. THROUGHOUT THE APCH, WE RECEIVED WIND DATA FROM THE INS AS WELL AS ADVISORIES FROM THE TWR. DURING THE LNDG FLARE, THE TWR ADVISED OF A WINDSHEAR ALERT AT THE DEP END OF THE RWY. AT THIS TIME THE SO STATED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE LNDG. AT NO POINT WAS THERE A CALL OUT OF 'GAR INITIATED.' DUE TO WIND GUSTS AND REF ADDITIVES, THE ACFT TOUCHED DOWN APPROX 2600-3000 FT DOWN THE RWY. I BELIEVE THE PF MAINTAINED CTL OF THE ACFT THROUGHOUT THE APCH AND FLARE AND MADE THE CORRECT DECISION TO LAND THE ACFT PAST THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE. SAFETY WAS NOT COMPROMISED IN HIS DECISION TO LAND NOR WAS IT QUESTIONED. WHILE IN THE FLARE AND WITH A WINDSHEAR ALERT AT THE DEP END OF THE RWY, I BELIEVE THAT LNDG THE ACFT WAS THE CORRECT DECISION. SUBSEQUENTLY, AN ACFT IN TRAIL ALSO LANDED ON SAME RWY. KEEPING IN MIND THE CHAIN OF EVENTS, I BELIEVE THE MAIN PROB WAS BREAKDOWN OF EFFICIENT COM, OR CRM SKILLS BTWN ALL CREW MEMBERS. IT WAS APPARENT WHEN UPON LNDG AT DEST WHERE WINDSHEAR HAD BEEN RPTED AND SO WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE APCH. HAD THERE NOT BEEN A BREAKDOWN OF COM EARLIER IN THE FLT, THEN PERHAPS THE SO MAY HAVE COMMUNICATED MORE EFFECTIVELY AND THE PF AND PNF MAY HAVE INITIATED A MISSED APCH EARLIER AND AVOIDED ANY

MISREPRESENTATION OR COM CONFLICTS BTWN CREW MEMBERS. THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IN THIS CASE WOULD HAVE BEEN TO RESOLVE THE COM BARRIERS EARLY ON AND INITIATED A 'NO FAULT GAR' WHEN IT FIRST BECAME APPARENT THAT A CREW MEMBER WAS UNEASY WITH THE APCH ENVIRONMENT. THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS WERE: PERCEPTIONS AND JUDGMENTS -- THE VISUAL PERCEPTIONS, CUES AND JUDGEMENTS DIFFER FROM THE PF'S SEAT AS COMPARED TO THE FE'S SEAT. DECISIONS -- THE DECISIONS THAT WERE MADE WERE BASED ON WX EVALUATION, INTERP, COMFORT, ABILITY, AND EXPERIENCE. ACTIONS AND INACTIONS -- ACTIONS THAT MAY HAVE AFFECTED THE CRM WERE PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS OF ACFT PERFORMANCE AND POSSIBLY THE INACTION TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT AND OPEN THE LINE OF COMS. THESE FACTORS ALL PLAYED A ROLE IN THE BREAKDOWN OF COM IN AN IMPORTANT SEGMENT OF THE FLT. TO PREVENT THIS RECURRENCE, THE FAILURE OF CRM SHOULD HAVE BEEN RECOGNIZED. IN THIS INSTANCE, PERHAPS THE SO FELT DISCREDITED AND WAS NOT ABLE TO CLRLY COMMUNICATE HIS APPREHENSIONS EARLY ON IN THE APCH. THE FLYING CREW MEMBERS MAY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO INTERP ANY DOUBT AND INITIATED A 'NO FAULT GAR' IN AN EARLIER SEGMENT OF THE APCH. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 673132: THIS IS A LNDG THAT I AM NOT PROUD OF AND SHOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. I HAD A PERSONAL RULE THAT IF ANY CREW MEMBER WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH AN APCH OR LNDG, I WOULD GO AROUND. THE FE WAS CLR ABOUT THIS, BUT I LANDED ANYWAY.

Synopsis

CAPT OF B747 CONTINUES APCH AND LNDG IN WINDSHEAR CONDITIONS DESPITE ADVOCACY FROM FE TO GO AROUND.

ACN: 670909

Time / Day

Date : 200509

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : MSY.Airport
State Reference : LA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : MSY.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-300
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Holding
Flight Phase.Ground : Position And Hold

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 30
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1500
ASRS Report : 670909

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 36
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 12600
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 550
ASRS Report : 670910

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Other Personnel.Other

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Less Severe
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Passenger Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

EVAC FLT. I WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS ASSIGNMENT AT AROUND XA30. THE INITIAL PLAN WAS AN XK25 DEADHEAD TO AUS AND THEN 2 MSY TURNS THAT EVENING. I MET THE CAPT ON THE BUS AND WE WENT OVER THE SIT IN MSY ENRTE TO THE ARPT. WE PULLED UP FLT PAPERS AND AN ACFT PERFORMANCE MESSAGE FOR MSY AS WE WERE ADVISED ACARS WAS OTS. WE WERE DELAYED ABOUT 30 MINS WAITING FOR MECHS. UPON ARR AT AUS, WE LEARNED OUR TURNS TO MSY WERE CANCELED FOR THE EVENING AND THAT WE WOULD GO THE FOLLOWING MORNING AT XA00. WE MADE HOTEL ARRANGEMENTS, WHICH WERE CHANGED AGAIN AND LEFT WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS FOR THE LAYOVER HOTEL. I GOT TO MY ROOM SOME TIME AFTER X000. THERE WAS A GROUP OF PEOPLE AND A CONVENTION AT MY END OF THE HALL. UNABLE TO SLEEP, I GOT UP AROUND XQ00 AND PUT IN EARPLUGS IN ORDER TO GET SOME SLEEP. I WOKE UP AT XV00 FOR AN XW00 PICK-UP. WE WENT TO AUS OPS AND PULLED UP PAPERWORK FOR OUR FLT TO MSY. WE WERE INITIALLY PLANNING ON RETURNING TO AUS BUT WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD TO PLAN ON CRP. DISPATCH FAXED US CHARTS FOR CRP AND NAVY CORPUS (NGP), WHICH WE REVIEWED. WE WERE TOLD AT THAT TIME THAT MSY OPS WAS OPEN AND ACARS WAS UP. OUR FLT LEFT FROM THE HARD STAND WITH A MIX OF COMPANY PERSONNEL IN THE BACK AND WAS UNEVENTFUL. WE LANDED AT MSY AND AFTER ABOUT A 30 MIN DELAY, BLOCKED IN AT XH03. THE NEXT 4 HRS CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS SURREAL. I THINK I MADE MORE DECISIONS IN THOSE 4 HRS THAN IN THE LAST 4 YRS AT ACR. AFTER SECURING THE AIRPLANE AND HEADING TO MSY OPS, IT WAS CLR THAT WE WOULD BE THERE FOR A WHILE. THE COMPUTER WAS UNAVAILABLE, THERE WERE NO PHONES WORKING IN OPS, AND OPS HAD NO VHF RADIO. WE WERE TOLD ACR WANTED US TO USE OUR ONBOARD FUEL TO RETURN FROM CRP TO AUS IF POSSIBLE. I ASKED IF FLYING OVERWATER TO SHORTEN THE DISTANCE TO CRP WAS AN OPTION UNDER PART 91 WITH MY CAPT AND WITH THE FLT MGR. HE APPROVED THIS FOR OUR SPECIFIC FLT. HE TOLD US TO DO WHAT MADE SENSE, AS WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO BE FLEXIBLE GIVEN THE SIT. WE HEADED BACK TO THE JET PLANNING ON GOING TO CRP. OUR DEST SOON CHANGED TO NAVY CORPUS CHRISTI, THEN TO AUS, THEN TO ELP, THEN TO ELP WITH A FUEL STOP IN LUBBOCK. AT SOME POINT, FUEL BECAME AVAILABLE AND OUR DEST CHANGED TO ELP WITH NO FUEL STOP, THIS CHANGED TO LAUNCH AND GO TO ELP BUT BE READY TO DIVERT TO BIF. EACH CHANGE CREATED THE NEED TO RETURN TO OPS AND GET AS MUCH INFO AS POSSIBLE. WE EVENTUALLY ENDED UP DIVERTING TO BIF ONCE AIRBORNE. BTWN FLT PLANS, WE LOST PWR TO THE JET AT LEAST ONCE, RESULTING IN A NEW ALIGNMENT AND FMC LOAD. WE HAD A STEADY STREAM OF COMPANY AND GOV PEOPLE COMING ON BOARD TO ASK QUESTIONS. WE PICKED UP 4 FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS WHO GAVE ME AN EXTENSIVE BRIEF ON WHAT HAD OCCURRED AT THE ARPT TO THAT POINT AND

THE FACT THAT THEY WOULD RIDE ALONG. (THEY HAD CONFISCATED OVER 300 GUNS IN THE PRECEDING 24 HRS, THERE HAD BEEN SOME STABBINGS OUTSIDE THE TERMINAL AND SOME BEATINGS.) TSA SOMEHOW GOT INVOLVED IN WHERE THE FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS WOULD SIT IN THE JET. THIS CONFLICTED WITH FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL SOP AND I NEEDED TO GET INVOLVED TO SORT THAT OUT. EACH TRIP TO MEET SOMEONE NEW, OR INTO OPS TO CALL DISPATCH RESULTED IN A TRIP TO THE LAVATORY TO WASH OUR HANDS PER OUR BRIEFINGS. WHILE MOST OF THIS WAS GOING ON, THE CAPT WAS TRYING TO TALK TO DISPATCH ON THE SOMETIMES WORKING BLACKBERRY OR GET PEOPLE FROM THE TSA GIVE US SOME PAX TO EVAC BEFORE OUR APU BURN FURTHER LIMITED OUR DEST OPTIONS. WE FINALLY GOT SOME FUEL, BUT TSA ONLY WANTED TO GIVE US 50 PAX DESPITE HAVING ROOM FOR 123. THE CAPT LITERALLY NEGOTIATED FOR THE REST. SOMEWHERE IN THIS PROCESS, IT CAME TO OUR ATTN THAT WE HAD A PAX WITH 5 KIDS AND A 6TH IN THE HOSPITAL IN SAT. THE CAPT BEGAN WORKING WITH HEADQUARTERS FOR PERMISSION TO TAKE THIS FAMILY BACK TO AUS ON OUR RETURN FROM ELP/BIF. MY CELL PHONE WAS INTERMITTENT, BUT THE SYS WAS SO BUSY I ONLY GOT 1 CALL THROUGH TO DISPATCH BEFORE BEING CUT OFF. THE CAPT'S BLACKBERRY WAS INTERMITTENT. ACARS COULD RECEIVE BUT NOT SEND. WE KEPT GETTING QUESTIONS THAT WE COULDN'T ANSWER, SO I WAS OFF TO TRY AND FIND MY CAPT OR SOMEONE WITH A PHONE TO RELAY ANSWERS BACK TO DISPATCH. AT SOME POINT (I'VE LOST TRACK OF TIME BY NOW) WE GOT SOME PAX AND A DEST CONFIRMED AND BEGAN BOARDING. THE FMC WAS LOADED AND READY, SO I ASSISTED WITH BOARDING AND HELPING TO TRACK THE NUMBER OF OPEN SEATS AND THE NUMBER OF WHEELCHAIRS WE WOULD NEED IN ELP/BIF. THE PHYSICAL STATE OF THE PAX WAS SHOCKING. THERE WERE FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS, TSA'S, ARPT, EMER TEAM, 2 INFLT SUPVRS, AND MECHS IN THE BOARDING AREA. EVERYONE WAS TRYING TO TELL THE FLT ATTENDANTS HOW TO BOARD AND THEY NEEDED SOMEONE TO KEEP THE MANY 'CHIEFS' AT BAY. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THIS WAS NOT A STANDARD BOARDING. BEFORE WE WERE FULLY LOADED, TSA TOLD US WE HAD TO LEAVE THE ARPT AS OTHER AIRPLANES NEEDED TO GET TO THE GATE. WE LEFT, A BIT RUSHED, WITH 8 OPEN SEATS. WHEN WE BRIEFED, WE WERE ON RELEASE #5. WE DISCUSSED FATIGUE AND THE IRREGULAR OPS AS CRM ISSUES FOR THE FLT. WE HAD A NORMAL START AND TAXI. GND OPS LOOKED LIKE SOMETHING OUT OF APOCALYPSE NOW. THERE WAS A NON-STOP FLOW OF HELIS ON THE ARPT. SOME FLYING, SOME TAXIING, MANY PASSING LOW ENOUGH OVER OUR ACFT TO MAKE THE JET PHYSICALLY SHUDDER. IT WAS A BIT UNNERVING TO HAVE THE AIRPLANE SHUDDER AND SUDDENLY SEE A SHADOW OUT OF THE CORNER OF YOUR EYE. THE FIRST COUPLE OF TIMES I THOUGHT WE'D BEEN HIT BY SOMETHING, IT WAS JUST A SHADOW OF THE ROTORS OVER THE GND AND ROTOR WASH. TRYING TO GET A WORD IN TO GND FREQ WAS WORSE THAN TRYING TO TALK TO ORD GND. ON THE TAXI OUT, WE LOST ALL ACARS COM. WE HAD NO RADIO COMS WITH OPS, AND KNEW THEIR PHONE WAS DOWN. IT WAS CLR WE WEREN'T GOING TO GET FINAL WTS FROM THE COMPANY, THERE JUST WASN'T A COMS LINK. OUR COUNT WAS BELOW OUR PLANNED WT MANIFEST BY 8. WE HAD PERFORMANCE DATA FOR RWYS 1 AND 28. RWY 28 WOULD BE LEGAL BASED ON THE PREFLT DATA. WE CONSERVATIVELY PLANNED ON 200 LBS PER PAX AND ESTIMATED OUR TKOF WT AT 124200 LBS. 2000 LBS BELOW OUR PERFORMANCE LIMIT WT, AND WELL ABOVE OUR PLANNED WT. OUR PAX ONLY HAD A FEW TRASH BAGS OF CLOTHES IN THE PITS SO WE KNEW WE HAD NO CARGO TO SPEAK OF. (ACTUAL TKOF WT CAME UP ON ACARS RIGHT AFTER TKOF AT 119000 LBS.) BASED ON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF PART 91 RULES (WE THOUGHT WE COULD GO IN THIS

CASE), AND THE NEED TO EVAC THE PEOPLE ON BOARD, WE ELECTED TO TAKE OFF WITHOUT FINAL WTS. WE FELT OUR WT WOULD ONLY HAVE CHANGED SLIGHTLY FROM THE PLAN SINCE WE WERE SUPPOSED TO COME IN AND PICK UP JUST PEOPLE. WE USED OUR PLANNED TRIM SETTING AND USED MAX THRUST WITH THE CAPT FLYING. THE TKOF WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. IN RETROSPECT, IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN BETTER FOR US TO COORD WITH ANOTHER AGENCY TO MAKE A PHONE CALL TO DISPATCH FOR US, BUT THE 'WHO' WAS LOST ON ME. I WAS PRETTY OVERWHELMED BY EVERYTHING THAT I'D SEEN THERE. WE REALLY COULDN'T GET A WORD IN WITH GND BECAUSE OF THE HELP OPS AND TWR WAS EQUALLY BUSY. THIS SIT PROVIDES AN EXAMPLE, ALBEIT RARE, OF THE NEED TO PUT ADDITIONAL PERFORMANCE DATA IN THE FLT MANUAL SO THE CREW CAN CALCULATE WT AND BAL INFO. IT ALSO HIGHLIGHTS THE NEED FOR RELIABLE COMS BTWN THE COMPANY AND ITS ACFT GIVEN THE WAY WE NORMALLY OPERATE OUR JETS. WE RELY ON AN INFRASTRUCTURE THAT IS NOT PRESENT IN AN OP LIKE THIS.

Synopsis

FLT CREW OF B737-300 RELATE HARROWING TALE OF EVAC FLT.

ACN: 670827

Time / Day

Date : 200509

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : BRO.Airport
State Reference : TX
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : BRO.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : SA-227 AC Metro III
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Ground : Takeoff Roll

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Turbine Engine

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 20501
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1750
ASRS Report : 670827

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 75.1
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 642.6
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 75.1
ASRS Report : 670967

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Excursion : Runway
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Precautionary Avoidance Action
Consequence.Other
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS PIC. THE ACFT FLOWN IS AN SA-227AC, OPERATING UNDER FAR PART 91. I HAD RECEIVED MY IFR CLRNC DEPARTING BRO ENRTE TO ELP. PROCEDURALLY, AFTER RECEIVING TKOF CLRNC, I TAXIED THE ACFT ONTO RWY 13R. WE FINISHED ALL BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS AND PLT BRIEFINGS. I THEN GAVE CTL OF THE ACFT TO MY FO, IT WAS HIS LEG. AFTER BEING CLRED FOR TKOF, THE FO ADVANCED THE PWR LEVERS TOWARD MAX PWR. AS WE ROLLED DOWN THE RWY, I NOTED A DIFFERENTIAL PWR INDICATION. THERE WAS LOW PWR ON THE L ENG. I CALLED FOR 'MY AIRPLANE,' AS I DID, THE FO RELEASED CTL OF THE ACFT TO ME. AS I TOOK CTL, THE ACFT IMMEDIATELY STARTED HARD TO THE L, I SIMULTANEOUSLY AND IMMEDIATELY ABORTED THE TKOF! DIRECTIONAL CTL WAS A CHALLENGE. THE ACFT MOMENTARILY WENT OFF THE HARD SURFACE OF THE RWY. I WAS ABLE TO KEEP THE ACFT UNDER CTL AND RETURNED IT TO THE RWY. I THEN TAXIED TO THE RAMP VIA THE NORMAL TXWYS. I DID NOT HIT OR DAMAGE ANYTHING (IE, SIGNS OR LIGHTS, ETC). I CALLED OUR COMPANY OPS AND PERSONALLY VISUALLY INSPECTED THE ACFT. NO DAMAGE OR ABNORMALITIES WERE NOTED BY ME. OUR OPS COORDINATED WITH OUR MAINT TO HAVE THE ACFT INSPECTOR BY A LICENSED ACFT MECH THE NEXT MORNING. FOLLOWING THE AIRPLANE INSPECTION BY THE MECHANIC AT BROWNSVILLE AIRPORT THERE WAS NO DAMAGE, DEFECTS OR ABNORMALITIES NOTED. THE ACFT WAS RETURNED TO SVC. FROM THIS EVENT I HAVE LEARNED HOW IMPORTANT IT IS FOR ME NOT TO BECOME COMPLACENT AND TO MORE AGGRESSIVELY USE CRM. THE COMPANY IMMEDIATELY PROVIDED ADDITIONAL TRAINING -- GND AND FLT. I COMPLETED THE TRAINING WITH GOOD MARKS. I FEEL I AM A GOOD PLT THAT ALLOWED MYSELF TO BECOME COMPLACENT. I'VE LEARNED AN IMPORTANT LESSON AND WILL NOT ALLOW THIS SIT TO OCCUR AGAIN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 670967: AS WE ROLLED DOWN THE RWY, THE CAPT NOTICED A DIFFERENTIAL PWR INDICATION COMING FROM THE L ENG. HE CALLED FOR 'HIS FLT CTLS.' I IMMEDIATELY THEN RELEASED MY HAND FROM THE PWR LEVERS. THE REMOVAL OF MY HAND LED TO THE DISENGAGEMENT OF THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING DUE TO THE BUTTON'S PLACEMENT ON THE L PWR LEVER. THIS CAUSED THE ACFT TO YAW TO THE L. AS THE SPD DECREASED, THE CAPT WAS THEN ABLE TO BRING THE ACFT UNDER CTL AND GET BACK ONTO THE RWY. I ALSO HAVE LEARNED THE IMPORTANCE OF, WITHOUT HESITATION, IMPLEMENTING THE PROCS DISCUSSED IN A TKOF BRIEFING: 'BELOW 80 KTS WE WILL ABORT FOR ENG FIRE, ENG FAILURE, OR LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CTL.'

Synopsis

FLT CREW OF SA227 EXPERIENCE RWY EXCURSION WHEN XFERRING CTL FROM
FO TO CAPT DUE TO REJECTION OF TKOF.

ACN: 669556

Time / Day

Date : 200508
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Dash 8-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked
Flight Phase.Ground.Other

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Parking Brake

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5300
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3800
ASRS Report : 669556

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Other Personnel.Other

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable
Consequence.Other : Company Review
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

CONTRACT MAINT HAD JUST REPLACED THE #2 OIL PRESSURE XMITTER TO FIX A LOW OIL PRESSURE INDICATION ENRTE. MAINT CTL REQUESTED 2 SEPARATE RUN-UPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY AN OIL LEAK CHK AFTER EACH SHUTDOWN. MAINT CTL DEFINED EACH RUN-UP TO BE AT 80% NH AND TKOF PWR RESPECTIVELY. DURING THE SECOND RUN-UP WE HEARD THE TKOF WARNING HORN. IT WAS LOUD AND DISTRACTING. IN AN ATTEMPT TO SILENCE IT WHILE HOLDING TOE BRAKES, WE RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKE. THIS CAUSED THE PLANE TO CASTER L APPROX 85 DEGS. USING CRM, WE (I) IMMEDIATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY APPLIED TOE BRAKES HARDER, PULLED PWR BACK AND RE-ENGAGED THE PARKING BRAKE. THE ACFT PUSHED THE CHOCK AND HAD MOVED APPROX 2 1/2 - 3 FT TO THE L (THE TERMINAL WAS APPROX 30 FT IN FRONT OF US). WE DECIDED THAT FOR THIS TYPE OF TEST WE HAD NO CHOICE, BUT TO LISTEN TO THE HORN. THE RUN-UP WAS COMPLETED. UPON SHUTDOWN, WE WENT OUT TO INSPECT AND DEBRIEF, THE GND AGENT INCLUDED. THROUGH MAINT CTL AND CONTRACT MAINT, THE INSPECTION REVEALED NO ACFT DAMAGE. AS PER THEIR INSTRUCTION, WE PULLED THE NOSEWHEEL BACK CTR AND TAXIED THE ACFT OUT AND BACK WATCHING FOR ANY SIGNS OF A PROB WITH THE NOSEWHEEL ASSEMBLY. THERE WERE NO PROBS SO WE RETURNED TO THE GATE AND CONTINUED THE OP. IN CONCLUSION, THE IMPRESSION AND DISCUSSING REVEAL THAT THE DIRECT AND MOST OBVIOUS CAUSE OF THIS WAS THAT BOTH PLTS AND MAINT OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE #1 ENG WAS NOT ON AND THEREFORE THE TOE BRAKES WOULD NOT HAVE ENOUGH RESIDUAL OR ANY HYD PRESSURE IN THEM TO HOLD THE ACFT. IN ADDITION, THE FOLLOWING IS CONSIDERED AS WELL. I FELT PRESSURE FROM THE COMPANY AND FOUND IT DIFFICULT (A CONFLICT OF INTEREST) WHEN MAKING THE DECISIONS SURROUNDING THE EVENT. WHEN THE SITUATION FIRST PRESENTED ITSELF I WANTED TO DO THE EMER CHECKLIST AS ALWAYS TRAINED AND RETURN TO ZZZ1. ASKING MAINT ENRTE ABOUT IT THEY DID NOT TELL ME ABOUT THE PROC TO DO A RUN-UP FOR REPAIR. I HAVE ONLY OBSERVED RUN-UPS -- THIS WAS OUR FIRST ONE, LEFT FOR US TO DECIDE HOW TO DO IT. THE IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE PLANE'S MAINT WAS NOT COMPLETE AND COULD NOT BE MOVED UNDER OWN POWER. WE LATER DECIDED WE SHOULD HAVE CONDUCTED THIS RUN-UP AWAY FROM THE TERMINAL ON A TXWY AT LEAST. SHOULD WE PULL THE TKOF WARNING CIRCUIT BREAKER THE SAME AS MAINT AND CROSS REF THE MAINT MANUAL FOR PLTS TO DO THIS. THERE ARE MANY TYPES OF ENG RUN-UPS

AND PROCS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED FOR EACH OF THEM, AS WELL AS NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS TO TAKE.

Synopsis

FLT CREW OF DHC8, UNTRAINED AND UNFAMILIAR WITH MAINT ENG RUN-UPS, ARE DIRECTED TO DO SO WITH CONTRACT MAINT PERSONNEL. LACKING ANY GUIDANCE, THEY RUN UP THE #2 ENG TO TKOF THRUST AT THE TERMINAL WITH THE #1 ENG, THE USUAL SOURCE OF HYD PRESSURE TO THE BRAKES, NOT RUNNING.

ACN: 668455

Time / Day

Date : 200508
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Operator.General Aviation : Instructional
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Traffic Pattern

Person : 1

Affiliation.Other : Instructional
Function.Instruction : Instructor
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 123
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 758
ASRS Report : 668455

Person : 2

Affiliation.Other : Instructional
Function.Instruction : Trainee

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution

Assessments

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS FLYING WITH MY STUDENT FOR HIS PVT PLT PRACTICAL EXAM WHEN THE SIT OCCURRED. WE ARRIVED AT THE ARPT EARLY, SO I DECIDED TO GO OVER POSSIBLE PITFALLS THAT HIS DESIGNATED EXAMINER MAY INTRODUCE DURING THE FLYING PORTION OF THE PRACTICAL EXAM. ONE OF THESE PITFALLS WOULD BE AN ACCIDENTAL APCH INTO A NEARBY CLOSED ARPT. 1 MI W OF ZZZ IS THE OLD ZZZ ARPT, WHICH IS CLOSED. THE 2 ARPTS ARE CLOSE TOGETHER AND BOTH HAVE THE SAME RWY HDGS OF 18 AND 36. I SHOWED MY STUDENT THE CLOSED ARPT AND THEN TURNED N TO SHOW HIM ANOTHER ARPT HE WOULD LIKELY BE ASKED TO DIVERT TO DURING THE NAV PART OF THE PRACTICAL EXAM. I TOLD MY NERVOUS STUDENT TO RELAX WHILE I FLEW US THERE. I TOOK THE FLT CTLs AND HE SLID HIS SEAT BACK TO RELAX. I LOOKED OUT THE R WINDOW FOR POSSIBLE TFC AT THE NEW ZZZ. I WAS ABOUT TO ANNOUNCE MY NBOUND DEP FROM THE AREA WHEN SUDDENLY I SMELLED SMOKE. MY REACTION TO THE SMELL OF SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT WAS TO LAND IMMEDIATELY. THE QUICKEST WAY TO LAND WOULD BE TO ENTER A R BASE FOR RWY 18 AT ZZZ. I IMMEDIATELY ANNOUNCED MY INTENTIONS. I THEN ASKED MY STUDENT IF HE SMELLED THE SMOKE. I GOT NO RESPONSE FROM MY STUDENT. A SECOND LATER, I HEARD SOMEONE ON THE FREQ SAY, 'BE ADVISED ZZZ L TFC.' I HAD BEEN MONITORING THE ZZZ FREQ AND WAS KEEPING TRACK OF THE ARPT'S TFC IN MY HEAD. I THOUGHT ALL OF THE TFC WAS ON THE GND! WHEN I HEARD 'BE ADVISED L TFC,' I THOUGHT THAT I MUST HAVE HEARD PART OF A XMISSION AND MAYBE SOMEONE WAS IN THE PATTERN MAKING L TFC. I ANNOUNCED THAT I WAS TURNING R BASE. NO RESPONSE! I VIGILANTLY BEGAN LOOKING FOR THE POTENTIAL TFC. I CONTINUED TO SCAN FOR THE TFC. UNABLE TO SEE ANYTHING, I ASKED MY STUDENT IF HE SAW ANY TFC. AGAIN, I GOT NO RESPONSE FROM MY STUDENT. ONCE I HAD THE RWY MADE, I LOOKED INSIDE THE COCKPIT TO GLANCE AT THE ENG GAUGES. SHOULD I PULL THE MIXTURE? DOES THE SMOKE SMELL LIKE AN ELECTRICAL FIRE OR GAS? MAYBE I SHOULD TURN OFF THE MASTER SWITCH! I GLANCED AT MY STUDENT TO SEE WHY HE WASN'T REACTING TO THE SIT. AFTER ALL, IT WAS HIS AIRPLANE THAT WAS POTENTIALLY ON FIRE. THAT WAS WHEN I REALIZED WHERE THE SMOKE WAS COMING FROM. THERE, TO MY L, SAT MY STUDENT -- HEADSET AROUND HIS NECK -- SMOKING A CIGARETTE! THIS TOOK ME BY SURPRISE FOR A COUPLE OF REASONS: 1) I DIDN'T KNOW MY STUDENT SMOKED, 2) I'VE NEVER SEEN ANYONE SMOKE IN AN AIRPLANE BEFORE. I FELT AMAZINGLY DUMB AT THAT PARTICULAR MOMENT. I LOOKED AT THE APCH END OF THE RWY AND NOTICED 3 CONFUSED CESSNA PLTS HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 18, WHERE I THOUGHT THEY SHOULD BE, PROBABLY WONDERING WHY I WAS MAKING R TFC. I BELIEVE THAT THIS SIT OCCURRED BECAUSE OF LACK OF COM BTWN MY STUDENT AND ME. I BELIEVE THAT THIS SIT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF I HAD ASSESSED THE SIT A LITTLE LONGER INSTEAD OF JUMPING ON MY FIRST REACTION. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT IN THE EVENT OF AN EMER, CRM SHOULD BE HIGHER ON MY LIST OF PRIORITIES.

Synopsis

INSTRUCTOR PLT MAKES A PRECAUTIONARY LNDG AFTER DETECTING SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT. SOURCE OF THE SMOKE WAS THE STUDENT PLT SMOKING A CIGARETTE.