ASRS Database Report Set

Commuter and Corporate Flight Crew Fatigue Reports

Report Set Description	A sampling of reports referencing Commuter and Corporate flight crew fatigue issues and duty periods.
Update Number	13.0
Date of Update	May 13, 2008
Number of Records in Report Set	50
Number of New Records in Report Set	26
Type of Records in Report Set	a. For each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the reporting of a specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de- identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.

Linda J. Connell, Director

Aviation Safety Reporting System

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CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area "A" than area "B" simply because the airmen who operate in area "A" are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

One thing that can be known from ASRS statistics is that they represent the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 1999 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 1999. Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS lies in the **report narratives**. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. The values of these narrative reports lie in their qualitative nature. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.



ACN: 766736 (1 of 50)

Synopsis

A FALCON 20 CAPT RPTS A TRACK DEV ON THE TEB 5 DEP.

ACN: 764388 (2 of 50)

Synopsis

A C650 PILOT DEPARTED ON THE TEB 5 AND AFTER MISREADING DME CLBED TO 2000 FT 3 MILES EARLY.

ACN: 762643 (3 of 50)

Synopsis

A CORPORATE JET CAPT FAILED TO OBSERVE THE 1500 FT ALT RESTR ON THE TEB 5 PROC.

ACN: 753763 (4 of 50)

Synopsis

C208 RECEIVES SLIGHT DAMAGE TO TAIL WHEN PERFORMING A REJECTED TKOF TO AVOID AN ACFT DEPARTING AN INTERSECTING RWY.

ACN: 753418 (5 of 50)

Synopsis

CE550 FLT CREW DESCENDS BELOW ASSIGNED ALTITUDE WHILE BOTH PILOTS ARE SCANNING OUTSIDE LOOKING FOR THE FIELD. FATIGUE IS CITED AS A FACTOR.

ACN: 749847 (6 of 50)

Synopsis

A FLIGHT INTO SKRG DEVIATED FROM THE CHARTED APPROACH PROCEDURE, CROSSING RNG AT 10000 FT VICE 12000 FT.

ACN: 748135 (7 of 50)

Synopsis

BELL 430 INSTRUCTOR RPTS ROTOR DAMAGE AFTER SIMULATED ENG OUT LNDG WHEN CYCLIC IS RELEASED WITH AUTOPLT ENGAGED.

ACN: 746959 (8 of 50)

Synopsis

PLT FALLS ASLEEP AT CTLS AFTER LONG DUTY NIGHT AND OVERFLIES DEST BEFORE WAKING UP.

ACN: 742938 (9 of 50)

Synopsis

C182 PLT INTENTIONALLY LANDED LONG, BUT TOUCHED DOWN WITH INSUFFICIENT RWY REMAINING AND STRUCK RWY THRESHOLD LIGHT.

ACN: 741063 (10 of 50)

Synopsis

A FAIRCHILD SA227 METRO ACFT HAD ONE 'RETURN' TO FIELD DUE TO CAPT HSI NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY AND ONE COMPLETED FLIGHT WITH ALL NAV #2 INDICATIONS LOST.

ACN: 740530 (11 of 50)

Synopsis

A G IV PILOT REPORTS FATIGUE LEADING TO AN UNSTABILIZED APCH TO LFMN.

ACN: 740461 (12 of 50)

Synopsis

CL60 FAILS TO COMPLY WITH ALT RESTRICTIONS ON THE TEB SID FROM TEB.

ACN: 740166 (13 of 50)

Synopsis

FALCON FLT CREW ENCOUNTERED TCAS RA DURING DESCENT AFTER SETTING INCORRECT ALT IN ALT ALERT WINDOW.

ACN: 738205 (14 of 50)

Synopsis

A FALCON 20'S AILERON CTL LEVERS IN THE ACFT'S FUSELAGE BECAME FROZEN WITH MELTED GALLEY ICE APPARENTLY UNABLE TO DRAIN FROM A FROZEN DRAIN MAST.

ACN: 731820 (15 of 50)

Synopsis

B727 CREW CUTS CORNER DURING TURN ONTO TAXIWAY E FROM TXWY B AND GETS STUCK IN THE WET GRASS.

ACN: 731531 (16 of 50)

Synopsis

PILATUS PC12 PLT LINES UP WITH RWY EDGE LIGHTS AND DAMAGES ACFT DURING TKOF ROLL.

ACN: 728781 (17 of 50)

Synopsis

AN A320 FLT CREW DEVIATED FROM CHARTED TRACK DURING APCH TO RWY 12 AT BZN WHEN THEY FOLLOWED FMS GUIDANCE THAT TOOK THEM BEYOND THE 10 MI LIMIT DURING PROC TURN MANEUVER.

ACN: 726038 (18 of 50)

Synopsis

LATE RWY ASSIGNMENT ON STAR TO LAX RESULTS IN COCKPIT DISTRACTION AND MISSED CROSSING ALT.

ACN: 726022 (19 of 50)

Synopsis

BE40 FLT CREW HAS RWY INCURSION UPON MISREADING OF EFB ARPT DIAGRAM.

ACN: 726000 (20 of 50)

Synopsis

HSV TRACON CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 8000 WHEN ENTERING ADJACENT CENTER'S AIRSPACE DURING SKILLS CHECK.

ACN: 724269 (21 of 50)

Synopsis

FOLLOWING A HASTY PREFLT A C402 DEPARTED ONLY TO HAVE THE CARGO DOOR OPEN AFTER TKOF REQUIRING A CLOSE IN RETURN TO LAND.

ACN: 723793 (22 of 50)

Synopsis

FLT CREW ON THE ONT.POM 7 CLBED ABOVE 7000 FT PRIOR TO THE POM 7000 FT RESTR.

ACN: 721633 (23 of 50)

Synopsis

BE40 CREW BECOMES DISORIENTED ON VISUAL APCH TO SBA AND DSNDS BELOW MSA.

ACN: 720771 (24 of 50)

Synopsis

A G200 DEPARTING ON THE TEB5 EXCEEDED THE INITIAL 1500 FT LEVELOFF ALT BY 250 FT THEN DSNDED BACK TO 1500 FT.

ACN: 719224 (25 of 50)

Synopsis

A CE560XL DEVIATED FROM ASSIGNED TRACK BECAUSE OF IMPROPERLY PROGRAMMED FMC, AND CLBED THROUGH ASSIGNED ALT BECAUSE OF CREW ERROR.

ACN: 719003 (26 of 50)

Synopsis

CITATION CE680 SOVEREIGN FLT CREW HAS AN ALTDEV DEPART MDW.

ACN: 718678 (27 of 50)

Synopsis

A C560XL DEPARTING TEB ON THE TEB DEP CLBED BEFORE CHARTED POINT TO 2000 FT.

ACN: 718049 (28 of 50)

Synopsis

LATE AMENDMENT OF CLRED ALT RESULTS IN LOSS OF SEPARATION BTWN C560 CLRED TO FL370 AND XING TFC AT FL360.

ACN: 717721 (29 of 50)

Synopsis

ZMA CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 20700 FT WHEN LEADING DEP ACFT SLOWED AND WAS OVERTAKEN BY A SUCCEEDING DEP ACFT.

ACN: 716043 (30 of 50)

Synopsis

FLT CREW OF CL60 EXPERIENCE ALTDEV ON SID FROM EGGW.

ACN: 715542 (31 of 50)

Synopsis

A CE560 FLT CREW MISSED SETTING 29.92 CLBING THROUGH FL180. WHEN THEY LEVELED AT CRUISE ALT, ATC ADVISED THEY WERE 400 FT LOW.

ACN: 715134 (32 of 50)

Synopsis

LEAR 45 CREW RPTS PROBS WITH RWY HOLD SHORT MARKINGS AT LAS RWY 1L/7L JUNCTION.

ACN: 714672 (33 of 50)

Synopsis

A FALCON 20 ON WYLYY DEP FROM BOS DEVIATE FROM THE CHARTED TRACK.

ACN: 713679 (34 of 50)

Synopsis

LEAR 60 CREW GOES OFF COURSE ON THE BOACH DEP DEPARTING LAS.

ACN: 713552 (35 of 50)

Synopsis

A HAWKER HS125 DEPARTING TEB ON THE TEB DEP FAILED TO LEVEL OFF AT THE CHARTED 1500 FT RESTR, CLBING TO 1800 FT, AT LEAST PARTLY BECAUSE OF A TCAS TA.

ACN: 713390 (36 of 50)

Synopsis

À LR35 CAPT RPTS DECLARING AN EMER AND DIVERTING TO A NEARBY ARPT FOLLOWING A LOW OIL PRESSURE WARNING. FATIGUE PLAYED A PART.

ACN: 713094 (37 of 50)

Synopsis

BE1900 CREW LANDS LONG AND PROP STRIKES A LIGHT AT THE END OF RWY.

ACN: 712627 (38 of 50)

Synopsis

FLT CREW TAXIES ONTO WRONG RWY AT HNL AFTER LONG PACIFIC FLT.

ACN: 710292 (39 of 50)

Synopsis

BE40 FLIES MUSTANG VICE RENO SID AS CLRED FROM RNO. CITE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH ELECTRONIC FLT BAG.

ACN: 703471 (40 of 50)

Synopsis

MD11 FLT CREW HAS AN ENRTE ALTDEV.

ACN: 703037 (41 of 50)

Synopsis

FALCON 50EX FLT CREW HAS AN ALTDEV RESULTING IN LOSS OF SEPARATION DURING DEP FROM IPT.

ACN: 701751 (42 of 50)

Synopsis

KINGAIR 90 FLT CREW HAS A RWY EXCURSION AT HLG.

ACN: 699031 (43 of 50)

Synopsis

C210 PLT APCHS WRONG RWY AT MSY.

ACN: 699025 (44 of 50)

Synopsis

LEAR 60 FLT CREW NEGLECTS TO TURN CABIN AIR SWITCH ON PRIOR TO DEP.

ACN: 694046 (45 of 50)

Synopsis

CE550 FLT CREW HAS A TRACK HDG DEV AT FL320.

ACN: 685667 (46 of 50)

Synopsis

HS-125 FLT CREW ON A NON PRECISION APCH TO EGE, THEIR SECOND ALTERNATE, HAS AN ALTDEV.

ACN: 684203 (47 of 50)

Synopsis

SINGLE PLT IN NIGHT IMC OPS APPEARED TO FALL ASLEEP DURING CRUISE FLT. ATC CTLR EVENTUALLY CONTACTS THE PLT AND VECTORS THE ACFT TO ITS DEST.

ACN: 676984 (48 of 50)

Synopsis

L30 CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 7000 FT IN CLASS B AIRSPACE WITH IFR DEP AND VFR ACFT AFTER FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT ADJACENT CTLR DID NOT CLB IFR ACFT.

ACN: 669354 (49 of 50)


Synopsis

AN HS800 PLT LANDED ON A CLOSED SHR RWY 14 AFTER MISTAKING SLC RWY 14-32 CLOSURE NOTAM WITH SHR. LANDED DESPITE SEEING CONES BUT NO RWY X BECAUSE OF TERRAIN AND IFR CANCELLATION.

ACN: 654927 (50 of 50)

Synopsis

LR45 PLTS SELECT THE INCORRECT PARALLEL RWY ILS APCH ON A LAPTOP COMPUTER IN TURB AND ARE VECTORED BY APCH CTL.



Time / Day

Date: 200712

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: TEB.Airport

State Reference: NJ

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Falcon 20FJF/20C/20D/20E/20F

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial Route In Use.Departure.SID: TEB

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Qualification.Pilot: ATP Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 40 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 5000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1600

ASRS Report: 766736

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 2

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas: Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DIDN'T FOLLOW THE RWY 24 SID TEB 5 DEP CORRECTLY. WE BRIEFED THE DEP ON THE SIC'S, EFB. THE EFB DID NOT SHOW THE ENTIRE DEP ON ZOOM MODE. WE ONLY HAD HALF THE DEP PROC. THE DEP WAS TO 'CLB RWY FIX TO 1500 FT THE R TO 280 DEG HDG, AT 4.5 DME FROM TEB CLB TO 2000 FT.' WE CLBED RWY HDG TO 1500 FT THEN DID NOT TURN AT 280 DEG HDG AND STAYED ON RWY HDG TILL 4.5 DME. THEN BEFORE WE REACHED THE 435 DME ATC CLRED US TO A 310 HDG AND CLB TO 6000 FT. NO OTHER DEVS WERE NECESSARY. 1) PROBLEM AROSE FROM TRUSTING THE SIC TO READ THE DEP CORRECTLY. 2) BOTH PLTS SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THEIR OWN EFB'S OUT AND SEPARATELY LOOK AT THE DEP. 3) SIC NOT PAYING ATTENTION TO DETAIL. 4) FATIGUE OR DISTRACTED INDIVIDUALS.

Synopsis

A FALCON 20 CAPT RPTS A TRACK DEV ON THE TEB 5 DEP.

Time / Day

Date: 200712

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: TEB. Airport

State Reference: NJ

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 1500 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Corporate Make Model Name: Citation III, VI, VII Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial

Route In Use.Departure.SID: TEB

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot : ATP Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 70 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 5000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 600

ASRS Report: 764388

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Crossing Restriction Not Met Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas: Airport

Problem Areas: Airspace Structure

Problem Areas: Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING THE TEB 5 DEP I LEVELED AT THE INITIAL ALT OF 1500 FT, MADE THE TURN THEN MISREAD THE DME AND CLBED TO 2000 FT APPROX 3 MILES EARLY. LACK OF SLEEP THE NIGHT BEFORE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A FACTOR, BUT I WOULD NOT SWEAR TO THAT.

Synopsis

A C650 PILOT DEPARTED ON THE TEB 5 AND AFTER MISREADING DME CLBED TO 2000 FT 3 MILES EARLY.

Time / Day

Date: 200711

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: TEB.Airport

State Reference: NJ

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 1500 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 1800

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Weather Elements: Windshear

Light: Dusk

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Charter Make Model Name: HS 125 Series Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135

Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial Route In Use.Departure.SID: TEB

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Charter Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 280 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 18000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 40

ASRS Report: 762643

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Overshoot Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON DEP WE WERE CLRED FOR THE TEB 5 DEP. THE DEP FOR RWY 19 IS ON ONE SIDE OF THE PAGE AND THE DEP FOR RWY 24 IS ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE SAME PAGE. THE FMS WAS SET FOR THE PROPER DEP. THE PF EXCEEDED THE 1500 FT RESTR AS DEPICTED ON THE TEB 5 DEP FOR RWY 24. THE CONFUSION WAS THAT THE TEB 5 BEING PRINTED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE PAGE MADE IT EASY TO CONFUSE THE VARIOUS RWYS' DEP SPECIFICS. THIS COUPLED WITH A 2.5 HR DELAY IN THE AIRPLANE FOR TFC CONGESTION CAUSED US TO BE TIRED AND INATTENTIVE. THE DEP SPECIFICS ARE ALSO PRINTED ON A LARGE PAGE REQUIRING 3 FOLDS TO MAKE IT FIT THE BINDER FORMAT, SO WHEN LOOKING AT ONE DEP SOME OF THE OTHER CAN SHOW.

Synopsis

A CORPORATE JET CAPT FAILED TO OBSERVE THE 1500 FT ALT RESTR ON THE TEB 5 PROC.

Time / Day

Date: 200709

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LBB.Airport

State Reference: TX

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: LBB.Tower Operator.Common Carrier: Air Taxi Make Model Name: Caravan 1 208A Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135 Flight Phase.Ground: Takeoff Roll

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Taxi Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 156

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 7000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 320

ASRS Report: 753763

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Ground Critical Anomaly.Ground Encounters.Other Anomaly.Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Required Legal Separation

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Rejected Takeoff

Consequence.Other: Aircraft Damaged

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Airport

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS PIC OF A C208 CARAVAN. I REQUESTED IFR CLRNC TO ROW AND THEN TAXI INSTRUCTION. I WAS GIVEN TAXI TO RWY 17R INTXN S. UPON ARR AT INTXN I ANNOUNCED MY ACFT READY FOR DEP. I WAS CLRED FOR TKOF. I PROCEEDED TO CROSS THE RWY HOLD SHORT LINE. THERE WAS THEN COM FROM LBB TWR AND ANOTHER ACFT. IT APPEARED THAT ANOTHER ACFT HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND. I MOVED MY THROTTLE TO BETA RANGE AND APPLIED HARD BRAKING. MY ACFT CAME TO A HALT ON THE RWY EDGE LINE JUST AS A PIPER PASSED THROUGH THE INTXN. I HAD BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF IN ERROR PROBABLY BECAUSE OF CTLR FATIGUE OR RUSH. I BELIEVE AN ACCIDENT WAS ONLY NARROWLY AVOIDED BECAUSE OF COMMERCIAL PRESSURE AND I BELIEVE BECAUSE OF COMMERCIAL PRESSURE I MAY HAVE FAILED TO DOUBLE-CHK THE CTLR ACTION BY A CHK UP LOOK OF THE FINAL APCH. BECAUSE I CONTINUED TO APPLY REVERSE PWR WITH BRAKING BY INSTINCT THIS CAUSED MY ACFT TO DROP ON ITS TAIL AND BE DAMAGED REQUIRING MAINT INSPECTION.

Synopsis

C208 RECEIVES SLIGHT DAMAGE TO TAIL WHEN PERFORMING A REJECTED TKOF TO AVOID AN ACFT DEPARTING AN INTERSECTING RWY.

Time / Day

Date: 200709

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 5500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC Weather Elements.Other

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation: Corporate
Make Model Name: Citation II S2/Bravo
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Navigation In Use.Other.NDB

Flight Phase.Descent: Intermediate Altitude

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: FMS/FMC

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 99 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 9474 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 6796

ASRS Report: 753418

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot : ATP Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 108

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 2872

Experience.Flight Time.Type: 748

ASRS Report: 753599

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3Mode C

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Alert

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE CREW HAD STARTED THEIR DUTY DAY AT XA00 LCL AND COMPLETED THE DAY WITH 12 HRS ON DUTY AND FLEW 8.7 HRS. ON THE LAST OF 4 LEGS THE FMS LOCKED UP AND WAS UNUSABLE FOR THE DURATION. AFTER COMPLETING THE FLT USING VOR TO VOR NAV, WE PASSED ZZZ VOR AND WERE TRYING TO GET TO THE FIELD USING AN NDB JUST N OF ZZZ. THE INDICATION FROM THE NDB WAS NOT MATCHING UP WITH VISUAL NAVAIDS (CITIES AND HWYS) SO WE PROCEEDED IN THE DIRECTION OF THE FIELD. AT THAT TIME WE WERE BOTH LOOKING OUTSIDE THE ACFT TO NAV TO THE ARPT AND ATC NOTIFIED US WE WERE 500 FT BELOW OUR ASSIGNED ALT. THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AND DID NOT CAPTURE THE ALT. WE DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND CLBED TO 6000 FT. I BELIEVE BOTH PLTS FOCUSING THEIR ATTN OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT AND NOT MONITORING THE INSTS LED TO THE PROB. ADDITIONAL FACTORS WERE FATIGUE AND THE FACT THAT IT WAS THE LAST LEG OF THE DAY AND WERE IN THE LCL AREA.

Synopsis

CE550 FLT CREW DESCENDS BELOW ASSIGNED ALTITUDE WHILE BOTH PILOTS ARE SCANNING OUTSIDE LOOKING FOR THE FIELD. FATIGUE IS CITED AS A FACTOR.

Time / Day

Date: 200708

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SKRG.Airport

State Reference: FO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 10000

Environment

Flight Conditions: Mixed

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: SKRG.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Taxi

Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135

Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope: 36

Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Route In Use. Approach: Instrument Precision

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Taxi Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 200

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 8000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 2000

ASRS Report: 749847

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government : Foreign Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 2 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Assigned Altitude

Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

ATC Facility.Procedure Or Policy: SKRG.TRACON

Chart.Airport: SKRG.Airport Chart.Approach: SKRG ILS36

Narrative

DEPARTED SKCL (CALI, COLUMBIA). WE WERE ROUTED PALMA3 DEP UJC W3 TO SKRG (MEDELLIN COLUMBIA). THE FELIX3 ARR FIT THIS ROUTING BEST AND WE KEPT THE PLATE AVAILABLE. SKRG ARR (121.1) CLRED US DIRECT THE RNG (RIO NEGRO) VOR AND TO CROSS AT 10000 FT. HE THEN ALSO CLRED US FOR THE ILS APCH. DURING DSCNT IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT HIGH TERRAIN WOULD POSSIBLY EXIST IN BETWEEN OUR PRESENT POS AND RNG. OUR COURSE WAS APPROX THAT OF THE FELIX3 ARR (THIS WAS THE MOST RESTRICTIVE ARR). I UTILIZED THAT ARR TO KEEP CLR OF TERRAIN AS A DIRECT UNIMPEDED DSCNT WOULD HAVE US POSSIBLY FLYING INTO TERRAIN. WE ARRIVED AT RNG AT 10000 FT MOSTLY IN VMC CONDITIONS. WE PERFORMED THE CHARTED PROC ON THE ILS-Y RWY 36 APCH PLATE. DURING OUR TURN WE NOTED THAT TERRAIN WAS A LITTLE CLOSER THAN WOULD BE EXPECTED. QUICKLY REVIEWING THE PLATE WE FOUND THAT WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT 12000 FT OUTBOUND ON THE PROC TURN. WE CLBED BACK UP TO 12000 FT AND CONTINUED WITH THE APCH AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. UPON LNDG WE WERE CHASTISED BY TWR THAT WE DID NOT COMPLETE THE APCH PROC PROPERLY -- AND THEY REFERRED US TO THE MATROLA ARR. THIS ARR IS CLOSE AND SIMILAR TO THE FELIX3 WITH THE FELIX3 BEING MORE RESTRICTIVE. IN BOTH THESE CASES THE APCH ENDS AT 10000 FT. BOTH OF THESE ARRS COME IN FROM THE S FOR RWY 36. THE PROB, POINT OF CONFUSION AND DILEMMA IS THAT A DARK LINED OVAL PROC TURN IS SHOWN ON THE APCH PLATE. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THIS PROC TURN WOULD NOT BE USED WITH A NBOUND STRAIGHT IN APCH FOR RWY 36. THERE WAS AN UNRESOLVED CONVERSATION WITH TWR PERSONNEL REGARDING THIS ENTIRE ISSUE. I INFORMED THEM THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO CROSS RNG VOR AT 10000 FT. IT WAS UNCLR IF THIS MEANT WHEN PROC TURN INBOUND OR WHEN INITIALLY REACHING RNG VOR. FACTORING IN THAT THE 2 APPLICABLE ARR END AT RNG VOR AT 10000 FT THIS WOULD IMPLY THAT NO PROC TURN IS REQUIRED FOR A STRAIGHT-IN APCH FOR RWY. THIS IS A VERY DUBIOUS SITUATION WITH VERY DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES. THE ILS-Y RWY 36 COMMERCIAL APCH PLATE SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO SHOW 'NO PT' FOR STRAIGHT IN NBOUND APCHS. THIS SHOULD ALLEVIATE ANY DOUBT AS TO HOW THE APCH SHOULD BE FLOWN. BEING THAT WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO RNG VOR THIS REMOVES US FROM THE PROTECTION THAT EITHER OF THE ARRS WOULD HAVE AFFORDED US IN SPITE THAT THE DIRECT FROM PRESENT POS WAS VERY CLOSE TO THE ARR. WE UTILIZED EXTREME CAUTION AT ALL TIMES. UNTIL FURTHER CLARIFICATION BECOMES AVAILABLE SUBSEQUENT APCHS WILL BE PERFORMED XING RNG VOR INITIALLY AT 12000 FT AND FLYING THE PROC TURN. SOME OF THE FACTORS INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT ARE THAT WE WERE FATIGUED AFTER MAKING AN INITIAL ARR AND MISSED APCH AT SKRG. WE DIVERTED TO SKCL AND HAD TO WAIT A PROTRACTED AMOUNT OF TIME FOR THE WX TO LIFT AND TO ADDRESS A MYRIAD OF LOGISTICAL ISSUES. WE DO NOT HAVE A FORMAL TRAINING PROGRAM FOR OUR COMPANY'S OPS INTO SOUTH

AMERICA. THIS WAS MY FIRST TIME OPERATING IN COLUMBIA. THERE ARE ALSO THE EVER PRESENT COM DIFFICULTIES. WE SHOULD HAVE REFUSED THE DIRECT TO RNG CLRNC AND INSISTED ON STAYING ON THE ARR THOUGH WE STILL WOULD HAVE HAD TO DEAL WITH THE QUANDARY OF THE PROC TURN. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THERE WAS SOME GUIDE AVAILABLE THAT WOULD HELP IN DECIPHERING THE APCH PLATE PROCS/NOMENCLATURE AND DIFFERENCES FROM UNITED STATES DOMESTIC CHARTING PROCS FOR OPS IN/OUT OF SOUTH AMERICA AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD FOR THAT MATTER. I WILL BE CONSULTING THE CHART COMPANY IN AN EFFORT TO FIND MORE INFO.

Synopsis

A FLIGHT INTO SKRG DEVIATED FROM THE CHARTED APPROACH PROCEDURE, CROSSING RNG AT 10000 FT VICE 12000 FT.

Time / Day

Date: 200708

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

State Reference : NC

Altitude. AGL. Single Value: 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Dusk

Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Taxi

Make Model Name: Jet Ranger Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135

Flight Phase. Ground: Parked

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Taxi Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Instruction: Instructor

Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 80 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 8566 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 475

ASRS Report: 748135

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Taxi Function.Flight Crew: First Officer Function.Instruction: Trainee

Events

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other: Aircraft Damaged

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS TRAINING A PLT (CAPT) FOR A 2 PLT EMS HELI OP ON THE BELL 430. WE HAD JUST COMPLETED A SIMULATED SINGLE ENG LNDG AND HAD MOVED OFF

THE RWY TO THE GRASS JUST OFF A TXWY. THE CAPT TRAINEE WAS ON THE CTLS AND HE DID NOT CALL FOR THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST, NOR DID I AS THE TRAINING CAPT REMIND HIM TO DO SO. WHILE REPOSITIONING TO THE GRASS I GLANCED AT THE AUTOMATED FLT CTL SYS MODE SELECT PANEL TO SEE IF THE AUTOMATED FLT CTL SYS WAS IN STABILITY AUGMENTATION OR AUTOPLT. I SAW THE GREEN STABILITY AUGMENTATION LIGHT ON. WHILE I FUNCTIONED AS THE SIC THE CAPT DIRECTED ME TO SET UP THE RADIOS FOR OUR DEP AND NEXT ARR. WHILE DOING SO, HE (STILL IN COMMAND OF THE FLT CTLS) WAS VERIFYING WHAT I HAD DONE. HE MUST HAVE LET GO OF THE CTLS. NEXT THING I KNEW I HEARD LOUD POUNDING AND GRABBED FOR THE FLT CTLS. I FOUND THE CYCLIC CTL TO BE NEARLY FULL FORWARD. I SUSPECTED THE ROTOR SYS HAD COME IN CONTACT WITH THE UPPER WIRE CUTTER ASSEMBLY. UPON SHUTDOWN AND INSPECTION I CONFIRMED THIS. AS IS ALWAYS THE CASE. SEVERAL THINGS LED TO THIS INCIDENT: 1) WHEN I LOOKED AT THE AUTOMATED FLT CTL SYS MODE PANEL AND SAW THE GREEN STABILITY AUGMENTATION LIGHT ON, I ASSUMED THE PLT HAD TURNED THE AUTOPLT OFF AND ENGAGED STABILITY AUGMENTATION. HE HAD NOT. HE WAS HOLDING THE CYCLIC FORCE TRIM BUTTON DOWN. THIS CAUSES THE AUTOMATED FLT CTL SYS TO REVERT TO STABILITY AUGMENTATION FROM AUTOPLT ONLY WHILE THE BUTTON IS BEING HELD DOWN. 2) THE AUTOPLT, STILL BEING ENGAGED DROVE THE CYCLIC FORWARD IN AN ATTEMPT TO FOLLOW THE LAST ASSIGNED DUTY, A DSCNT. 3) I DIDN'T FOLLOW UP ON THE 'CAPT' TO ENSURE HE CALLED FOR THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST. 4) EVEN THOUGH WE HAD BRIEFED A 3-WAY FLT CTL EXCHANGE, THE CAPT LET GO OF THE CTLS WITHOUT TELLING ME. IN THE DARK COCKPIT, I DIDN'T NOTICE THIS. 5) THE HOSPITAL BASED EMS PROGRAM ACFT WAS OTS, SO I WAS UNDER (SELF-IMPOSED) PRESSURE TO TRAIN SEVERAL REPLACEMENTS TO GET THE PROGRAM BACK IN SVC QUICKLY. 6) UNDER THIS SELF-IMPOSED PRESSURE. I HAD BEEN WORKING 6 DAYS WITH EACH DAY BEING MORE THAN 11 HRS, AND IN SOME CASES, 14 HR DUTY DAYS WHILE CONDUCTING GND AND FLT TRAINING. BTWN THE 2 DAYS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT AND THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT, I HAD FLOWN 18.3 HRS. 7) TEMPS HAD BEEN MID 80'S TO MID 90'S WITH HIGH HUMIDITY. 8) THE NIGHT BEFORE THE INCIDENT, I HAD DEVELOPED A SORE THROAT AND SOUR STOMACH RESULTING IN A FITFUL NIGHT'S SLEEP. THERE ARE ENOUGH LINKS IN THIS CHAIN TO BUILD 2 MISHAPS MUCH LESS THE ONE THAT HAPPENED.

Synopsis

BELL 430 INSTRUCTOR RPTS ROTOR DAMAGE AFTER SIMULATED ENG OUT LNDG WHEN CYCLIC IS RELEASED WITH AUTOPLT ENGAGED.

Time / Day

Date: 200707

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 6000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: ZZZ.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Taxi Make Model Name: Small Transport Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Taxi Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 200

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 1680 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 150

ASRS Report: 746959

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Resolutory Action.None Taken: Detected After The Fact Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

AT THE END OF A 12 HR DUTY DAY ON THE LAST LEG OF THE FLT, I FELL ASLEEP WHILE ENRTE FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ. I STARTED DUTY AT XA30 LCL FROM ZZZ AND FLEW THROUGH THE NIGHT. TOTAL FLT TIME IS JUST OVER 6 HRS FOR THE NIGHT. ON THE LAST LEG AROUND XL30 LCL TIME NEAR ZZZ, I APPARENTLY FELL ASLEEP. I DO NOT REMEMBER FEELING SLEEPY OR THE NEED TO TRY TO DO ACTIVITY TO STAY ALERT. I HAD THE AUTOPLT ON AND WAS CRUISING AT 6000 FT MSL. WHEN I WOKE UP, I WAS APPROX 15 MI PAST THE ZZZ ARPT. I TURNED THE ACFT AROUND AND MADE CONTACT WITH ATC. I WAS THEN VECTORED FROM THE S FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 10. UPON LNDG I WAS GIVEN A PHONE NUMBER TO CONTACT APCH WITH. AFTER SHUTTING DOWN THE ENG AND UNLOADING THE CARGO, I PROCEEDED TO CALL APCH ON THE PHONE. I SPOKE WITH A CTLR AND EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT I HAD FALLEN ASLEEP WITH THE AUTOPLT ON AND OVERFLEW THE ARPT. HE THEN REQUESTED MY PHONE NUMBER IN CASE THERE WAS A NEED TO CONTACT ME SO I PROVIDED HIM WITH IT. HE THEN TOLD ME THAT BECAUSE I HAD NOT LEFT ZZZ AIRSPACE, HE DID NOT BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE AN ISSUE. THAT WAS ESSENTIALLY THE ENTIRE CONVERSATION THAT WE HAD. I BELIEVE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS OCCURRENCE ARE THAT I AM A RESERVE PLT WITH A CHANGING SCHEDULE. I HAD BEEN ON A DAY SCHEDULE 2 DAYS PRIOR TO THIS FLT AND SWITCHED TO THE NIGHT SCHEDULE 2 NIGHTS BEFORE. FATIGUE WAS PROBABLY A FACTOR IN THAT I WORK LONG HRS AND GET 5-7 HRS OF SLEEP A NIGHT. CONTRIBUTING TO MY FATIGUE IS THAT I HAD FLOWN THE PREVIOUS 6 DAYS CONSECUTIVELY. ALSO. MY FATHER IS HAVING SURGERY ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT AND MY WIFE IS 9 MONTHS PREGNANT WITH OUR FIRST CHILD.

Synopsis

PLT FALLS ASLEEP AT CTLS AFTER LONG DUTY NIGHT AND OVERFLIES DEST BEFORE WAKING UP.

Time / Day

Date : 200706 Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference : US Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Dawn

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Landing: Roll

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 35 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 3000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 800

ASRS Report: 742938

Events

Anomaly. Excursion: Runway Anomaly. Ground Encounters. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken: Insufficient Time

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS PIC OF A C182. TWR CLRED ME TO LAND ON RWY 5R (A 7500 FT RWY). THE TWR ALSO SUGGESTED A LONG LNDG TO REDUCE TAXI TIME, WHICH I ACCEPTED. I CONTINUED MY APCH TO RWY 5R, ADDED 10 DEG FLAPS, CAME DOWN INTO GND EFFECT AND MAINTAINED 5 FT (APPROX) ABOVE THE RWY. I CONTINUED DOWN THE RWY UNTIL WHAT I THOUGHT WAS AN APPROPRIATE POS TO PULL PWR TO IDLE AND TOUCHDOWN. AFTER TOUCHING DOWN, I APPLIED

THE BRAKES AND IN CONTINUING MY SCAN OUTSIDE AFTER THE NOSE TOUCHED THE RWY, REALIZED THE RWY END THRESHOLD LIGHTS WERE CLOSER THAN EXPECTED. I APPLIED HEAVIER BRAKING BUT WAS CAREFUL NOT TO LOCK THE BRAKES. I KNEW I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STOP BEFORE THE LIGHTS, SO I MAINTAINED ACFT CTL AND GUIDED THE ACFT NOSE BTWN 2 OF THE LIGHTS SO AS TO MINIMIZE ACFT DAMAGE, IE, PROP IMPACT AND SUBSEQUENT ENG TEARDOWN COSTS. AS I TRAVELED THROUGH THE LIGHTS I FELT THE ACFT HIT A LIGHT. THE ACFT CAME TO A STOP 10-15 FT BEYOND THE LIGHTS. I SHUT DOWN THE ACFT, MADE A QUICK INSPECTION AND FOUND I COULD TAXI SAFELY TO THE RAMP. WE GOT CLRNC FROM THE TWR TO TAXI TO THE RAMP WHERE WE WERE MET BY ARPT OPS. THEY INSPECTED THE ACFT AND FOUND NO DAMAGE TO THE ACFT. THE ONLY THING WE COULD FIGURE IS THAT THE L MAIN TIRE OR ONE OF THE TIRES MADE A DIRECT HIT ON THE LIGHT. NONE OF THE DEBRIS FROM THE IMPACT HIT THE ACFT. THE PROB AROSE BECAUSE I ACCEPTED A CLRNC TO LAND LONG AND I BELIEVE I MISJUDGED MY TOUCHDOWN POINT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS MAY HAVE BEEN FATIGUE, FOR I JUST COMPLETED A 2 HR FLT AT 1000 FT AGL DOING A LAKE PATROL FLT AND IT WAS HOT OUTSIDE. ALSO, I BELIEVE NOW THAT FLYING LOW OVER THE RWY LIKE I DID IS NOT ALWAYS A GOOD IDEA SINCE YOU MAY NOT HAVE A GOOD VIEW OF THE RWY END. I DO NOT PLAN ON LNDG LONG AGAIN. I WAS VERY FORTUNATE TO NOT HAVE CAUSED ANY ACFT DAMAGE AND THE BEST PART IS THAT THE FAA SAYS THERE WILL NOT BE ANY ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST ME, AT LEAST THAT IS WHY I AM SUBMITTING THIS NASA FORM. MY CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR THE FUTURE IS TO GET SOME DUAL INSTRUCTION AND I ALSO PLAN ON GIVING A PLT SAFETY SEMINAR FOR THE ORGANIZATION I AM WITH. THE OTHER ITEM I WOULD LIKE TO ADD IS THAT IS THAT AT NO TIME WAS THE SAFETY OF MY CREW AT RISK. I MAINTAINED POSITIVE CTL OF THE ACFT AT ALL TIMES DURING THE SIT. I WILL NOT LET THIS INCIDENT OCCUR AGAIN.

Synopsis

C182 PLT INTENTIONALLY LANDED LONG, BUT TOUCHED DOWN WITH INSUFFICIENT RWY REMAINING AND STRUCK RWY THRESHOLD LIGHT.

Time / Day

Date : 200706 Day : Fri

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Taxi Make Model Name: SA-227 AC Metro III Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135 Flight Phase.Ground: Maintenance

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: AHRS/ND

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Taxi

Function.Maintenance : Lead Technician Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician: FCC

Qualification. Technician: Inspection Authority

Qualification. Technician: Powerplant Qualification. Technician: Repairman Experience. Maintenance. Avionics: 18

Experience.Maintenance.Lead Technician: 10 Experience.Maintenance.Technician: 20

ASRS Report: 741063

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical

Anomaly. Maintenance Problem: Improper Maintenance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Independent Detector. Aircraft Equipment. Other Aircraft Equipment: HSI And Nav

#2 Inon

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Resolutory Action.Other Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor: Briefing

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Fault Isolation Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Installation Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Logbook Entry

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas: Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

ACFT X HAD THE #2 HSI BACKLIGHTING ON MEL. I HAD WORKED THE ACFT IN JUNE TROUBLESHOOTING A VOR SPLIT OF 5 DEGS BTWN THE #1 AND #2 SYS. DURING THAT EVENT I HAD REMOVED THE RADIOS FROM THE RACK TO RECORD THE SERIAL NUMBER AND PART NUMBER DATA FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES. THE RADIOS WERE KX165'S NAV/COM'S WITH A FRONT MOUNTED HEX SCREW THAT IS USED TO SECURE THE RADIO IN THE RACK. I HAD CLEANED THE CONNECTORS AND INSTALLED THE RADIOS BACK IN THE RACK. I STOPPED BACK AT THE HANGAR ON MY WAY HOME FROM MY OTHER JOB ON THE MORNING 3 DAYS LATER TO WORK ANOTHER ACFT. I HAD WORKED MY NORMAL SHIFT AT ANOTHER AVIATION COMPANY (13 HRS) AND STOPPED ON MY WAY HOME TO SEE WHAT THE STATUS OF THE FLEET WAS. I CLOCKED IN BEFORE XA00. ACFT X HAD LAUNCHED EARLIER IN THE DAY AND I INITIALLY WORKED ON ANOTHER TYPE OF ACFT IN THE FLEET WITH A DIFFERENT NAV PROB. I LEFT AFTER 2 HRS (XC00) TO GO HOME AND SLEEP. ON MY WAY HOME I GOT A CALL THAT ACFT X HAD RETURNED AND THE CAPT'S HSI WAS NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. I WAS TOO TIRED TO RETURN TO THE HANGAR SO I SAID I WOULD RETURN AT XT30 TO TROUBLESHOOT THE SYS. I GOT HOME AT XEOO AFTER HAVING TO RUN SEVERAL OTHER SMALL ERRANDS. I WOKE BACK UP AT XIOO AND RETURNED TO THE HANGAR. I TESTED THE SYS AND FOUND THAT THE CAPT'S HSI WAS DEFECTIVE AND NEEDED REPLACED DUE TO AN INTERNAL FAILURE. WE HAD THE PART IN STOCK TO FIX THE BACKLIGHTING ON THE OTHER SIDE SO I SIMPLY INSTALLED THAT PART TO FIX THE CAPT'S SIDE. I HAD TO RESEARCH THROUGH SEVERAL INSTALLATION MANUALS TO FIND OUT EXACTLY WHICH NUMBERS WERE EFFECTIVE FOR THIS ACFT. ACFT X USES A 5 VOLT LIGHT SYS THAT IS DIFFERENT THAN THE OTHER METROS THAT WE HAVE HERE. THE OTHER METROS USE THE 28 VOLT LIGHTING IN THE INST AND USE A DIFFERENT DASH NUMBER DISPLAY. I QUICKLY CHKED THE SYS OUT WITH OUR TEST EQUIP AND ESTABLISHED THAT THE HSI WAS OPERATIONAL ON THE PLT'S SIDE. I HAD SWAPPED THE POS OF THE RADIOS SOME TIME DURING THIS VISIT TO MAKE SURE THAT THE DATA WAS GOOD FROM BOTH OF THEM TO BOTH SIDES. I CHKED VOR/LOC/GS OP AND ALL THE PLT'S SIDE INSTS WERE RESPONDING. DURING THESE CHKS I HAD TO STOP SEVERAL TIMES TO LOOK UP INFO FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES AND TO SEE HOW LONG I HAD DUE TO THE ACFT WAS NEEDED TO BE BACK IN SVC ASAP AND HAD ANOTHER SQUAWK IN WORK. I WAS NOT USING A WRITTEN WORK IN PROGRESS CHKLIST, JUST THE COMPANY CHKLIST PROVIDED FOR THE RAMP CHK (AVIONICS RAMP CHKLIST). I SIGNED THE ACFT BACK INTO SVC AND QUICKLY HAD TO LEAVE IN ORDER TO GET TO MY OTHER JOB. I LEFT THE HANGAR AFTER XK30 AND THE ACFT WAS BEING RUN TO CHK OUT ANOTHER PROB UNRELATED TO THE NAV SYS. THE ACFT WAS ASSIGNED A FLT ON THE NEXT DAY AND THE PLT RPTED INFLT THAT ALL THE NAV #2 INDICATIONS WERE LOST ON HIS INST PANEL. HE COMPLETED THE FLT AND MADE A LOGBOOK ENTRY. A LCL REPAIR SHOP WAS CALLED OUT TO EVALUATE THE ACFT. THE #2 RADIO WAS FOUND TO BE LOOSE OR IMPROPERLY SECURED IN THE RACK. THE CONTRACT MAINT COMPANY

VERIFIED THE PROB AND CORRECTLY INSTALLED THE RADIO AND OP WAS RETURNED TO NORMAL. I WAS TIRED FROM WORKING SPLIT SHIFTS AND HAD NOT PLANNED ON WORKING THE ACFT ON THE DAY THAT IT RETURNED. I HAD NOT TAKEN THE TIME TO RESEARCH AND DOCUMENT THE SPECIFIC STATUS OF THIS ACFT AND WAS USING TRIBAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE OTHER FLEET ACFT TO GUIDE MY TROUBLESHOOTING. I FAILED TO PERFORM AN AFTER MAINT SECURITY CHK OF ALL THE COMPONENTS I HAD WORKED WITH DURING THAT VISIT AND THE PREVIOUS VISIT. I FAILED TO VERIFY THE SECURITY OF THE RADIO IN THE RACK BECAUSE I WAS DISTR AT SEVERAL KEY POINTS DURING MY CHKS BY RELATED AND UNRELATED TASKS AND REQUESTS. I ALSO WAS NOT USING A MEMORY AID OR WRITTEN CHKLIST TO MAKE SURE I DIDN'T SKIP ANY TASKS. I ALSO DID NOT ATTACH A STREAMER AS A VISUAL REMINDER THAT THE RADIO WAS LOOSE.

Synopsis

A FAIRCHILD SA227 METRO ACFT HAD ONE 'RETURN' TO FIELD DUE TO CAPT HSI NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY AND ONE COMPLETED FLIGHT WITH ALL NAV #2 INDICATIONS LOST.

Time / Day

Date: 200705 Day: Thu

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: LFMN. Airport

State Reference: FO

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 500 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 3000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: LFMN.Tower Operator.Common Carrier: Charter Make Model Name: Gulfstream IV Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Charter Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Qualification.Pilot: Instrument Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 125 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 15600 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 4200

ASRS Report: 740530

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Overshoot

Anomaly. Other Anomaly: Unstabilized Approach

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airport Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VOR/DME CGS RIVIERA CIRCLE-TO-LAND APCH FOR RWY 4L AT LFMN. WE BRIEFED THE APCH WELL AND FLEW THE APCH WELL --THAT IS, UNTIL THE D5.0 CGS FIX AT WHICH POINT WE WERE TO EITHER FLY VISUALLY TO THE RWY OR EXECUTE A MISSED APCH. AT THE 35.0 FIX WE TOOK OVER VISUALLY AND HEADED TO THE ARPT. VISIBILITY WAS, I BELIEVE, 6 MI (10K) WITH NO CEILING. I WAS THE PF AND STARTED A DSCNT FROM 3000 FT AND BEGAN A TURN TO THE ARPT. THE PNF IN THE R SEAT WAS IN A BETTER POS TO SEE THE RWYS AND BECAUSE OF MY POS (L SEAT, IN A TURN, DSNDING) I HAD TROUBLE KEEPING MY EYE ON THE RWY. I BEGAN TO LINE UP ON RWY 4R INSTEAD OF RWY 4L AND BEGAN A DSCNT FOR RWY 4R. THE PNF POINTED OUT RWY 4L FOR ME. I WAS LOW FOR RWY 4L AND ROLLED OUT OF THE TURN, THEN OVERSHOT RWY 4L AND HAD TO TURN TO THE R TO GET BACK ON THE CTRLINE FOR RWY 4L. STILL LOW, I ADDED PWR TO GET BACK ON THE PROPER GLIDE PATH AND SPD FOR THE RWY. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED ON ABOUT A 2 MI FINAL. WE LANDED SAFELY AND ATC (LCL) DID NOT MENTION EITHER MY ALT OR COURSE EXCURSIONS ON THE VISUAL PORTION OF THE APCH. THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT. I WAS DISAPPOINTED IN THE APCH BECAUSE WE HAD BRIEFED IT SO WELL. THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS INVOLVED: 1) VISIBILITY WAS NOT GREAT AND WHEN WE REACHED THE D5.0 WE HAD THE ARPT AND RWYS IN SIGHT BUT IT WASN'T VERY SHARP. I BEGAN TURNING TOWARDS THE WRONG RWY UNTIL CORRECTED BY THE PNF. 2) AN ACFT WAS TAKING OFF FROM RWY 4R. I MISTAKENLY THOUGHT THAT WAS THE ACFT WE WERE FOLLOWING FOR LNDG ON RWY 4L AND THAT HE WAS ON THE LNDG ROLL. 3) WHILE WE BRIEFED THE APCH WELL, OUR BRIEFING STOPPED AT THE D5.0 FIX. NO TALK AMONG US ABOUT WHAT WE SHOULD DO AFTER REACHING THAT POINT. I DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ASK THE PNF TO POINT TO THE ARPT OR THE RWY. VISIBILITY WAS SUCH THAT SEEING THE ARPT WAS NOT GOING TO BE A PROB. I WAS INSIDE FLYING THE PRESCRIBED APCH AND I DISREGARDED WHAT WAS OUTSIDE UNTIL THE FINAL MOMENT AND THEN HAD TROUBLE PUTTING MY EYE ON THE ARPT. THE PNF WHO SAW THE ARPT AND RWY DID NOT OFFER ANY EARLY CORRECTIONS FOR THE FINAL APCH COURSE AND NOW I WAS BUSY LOOKING OUTSIDE AND DISREGARDED THE CTRLINE EXTENSION I BUILD IN THE FMS FOR RWY 4. 4) FATIGUE. WE HAD DEPARTED ZZZ1 (US) 2 DAYS BEFORE AT AROUND XA15 LNDG AT LFMN IN THE AFTERNOON OF THE NEXT DAY. BEFORE OUR DEP WE LEARNED THAT WE WOULD BE PICKING UP SOME OTHER PAX IMMEDIATELY UPON ARR TO FLY FROM LFMN TO ZZZZ2. SLEEP BEFORE OUR ZZZ1 (US) DEP WAS SPORADIC DURING THE DAY. THE EXTRA LEG WOULD STILL PUT US WELL WITHIN FLT AND DUTY TIME LIMITS BUT I KNEW THE NEXT WOULD BE A LONG DAY. THAT DAY WE WERE TO DEPART ZZZZ2 FOR LFMN WITH PAX. WE WOULD BE OFF DUTY FOR ABOUT 21 HRS. SLEEP WOULDN'T COME FOR ME THAT NIGHT, BUT I WAS NOT CONCERNED -- WE WOULD NOT HAVE TO LEAVE THE HOTEL FOR THE ARPT UNTIL THE AFTERNOON FOR OUR FLT TO LFMN. I FELL ASLEEP ABOUT XF30 ON THAT DAY. PRETTY GOOD. BECAUSE THAT WOULD GIVE ME A FULL NIGHT'S SLEEP. THE PHONE RANG TWO HOURS LATER. IT WAS OUR DISPATCH SAYING THAT THE DEP TIME WAS NOW XQ00. THE PAX WANTED XQ30 BUT THE ONLY SLOT AVAILABLE WAS XQ00. I CALLED THE ARPT TO CHANGE OUR HOTEL PICK-UP TIME AND THEN CALLED OUR HANDLER TO CHANGE OUR DEP AND LFMN ARR TIMES. I FELL ASLEEP AGAIN AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER. DISPATCH CALLED AGAIN SAYING THE PAX WANTED TO LEAVE AT XS30, THE ORIGINAL TIME. I AGAIN MADE ALL THE PHONE CALLS TO GET THINGS CHANGED BACK TO THE WAY THEY WERE. DISPATCH, I BELIEVE, CONFUSED TIME ZONES, GMT AND LCL TIME, AND INDEED HAD NO IDEA WHAT TIME IT WAS IN ZZZZ2 AND FOR SOME REASON THOUGHT THAT THE PAX WANTED TO LEAVE AT XQ30 INSTEAD OF XS30. I COULD NOT GET BACK TO SLEEP AND THE PNF DIDN'T SLEEP WELL EITHER. WE WERE BOTH EXHAUSTED BY THE TIME WE ARRIVED AT THE ARPT FOR DEP. THE ONE THING WE, AS A CREW, COULD HAVE DONE MUCH BETTER WOULD BE TO COMPLETE THE APCH BRIEFING ALL THE WAY TO THE CIRCLING RWY. IT WAS A CIRCLING APCH WITH A 90 DEG TURN TO THE R. AFTER REACHING THE D5.0 FIX, CRM SEEMED TO HAVE BROKEN DOWN AND BOTH PLTS, LOOKING BACK, SEEMED TO BE LISTLESS AND NOT INVOLVED.

Synopsis

A G IV PILOT REPORTS FATIGUE LEADING TO AN UNSTABILIZED APCH TO LFMN.

Time / Day

Date: 200706 Day: Fri

Local Time Of Day: 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: TEB.Airport

State Reference: NJ

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 1500 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Charter Make Model Name: Challenger CL601 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB5

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Charter Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Function. Oversight: PIC Qualification. Pilot: ATP Qualification. Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 100 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 17600 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 520

ASRS Report: 740461

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company : Charter Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

TEB5 DEP. I READ (MEMORIZED) THE DEP PROC AT LEAST 4 TIMES. CLBED ON RWY HDG TO 1500 FT. TURNED 280 DEGS AND CONTINUED TO 2000 FT BEFORE 4.5 NM. COMPLETELY BLEW THE DEP. NO TFC CONFLICT. FATIGUE AND HOUR OF THE DAY LIKELY CAUSE OF MY ERROR.

Synopsis

CL60 FAILS TO COMPLY WITH ALT RESTRICTIONS ON THE TEB SID FROM TEB.

Time / Day

Date: 200705 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: PVD.VORTAC

State Reference: RI

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 9500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZBW.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Taxi

Make Model Name: Falcon 2000 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135 Navigation In Use.Other.VORTAC Flight Phase.Descent: Approach Route In Use.Arrival.STAR: INNDY

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Taxi Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 74 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 15000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 2150

ASRS Report: 740166

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 60

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 8310 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 2390

ASRS Report: 740165

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation: Overshoot Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Critical Anomaly.Non Adherence: Clearance

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment: TCAS
Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance
Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action
Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Miss Distance. Horizontal: 6000 Miss Distance. Vertical: 500

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

PROCEEDING INBOUND ON THE ARR IN VMC. APPROX 40 MI E OF PVD I MENTIONED TO THE FO (WHO WAS FLYING FROM THE L SEAT) 'CTR NEEDS TO GET US DOWN TO 11000 FT, IF WE ARE TO MAKE PVD AT 11000 FT.' THE CTLR WAS BUSY, SO I DIDN'T INTERRUPT. FINALLY THE CTLR ASKED US IF HE HAD 'GIVEN US 11000 FT AT PVD.' I REPLIED 'NEGATIVE THIS IS THE FIRST MENTION OF THAT.' THE ZBW CTLR APOLOGIZED FOR THE LATE DSCNT AND CLRED US TO CROSS 5 MI E OF PVD AT 11000 FT INSTEAD OF 11000 FT. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE I SET 11000 FT IN THE ALT ALERT DEVICE, AND WE BOTH SAID '11000 SEEN.' HOWEVER. AFTER PASSING 10000 FT WE BOTH SAW 6000 SET IN THE ALERTER. I DON'T KNOW HOW 6000 WAS SET, NOR DO I RECALL SETTING SUCH A NUMBER IN THE ALERTER. THE ONLY 'SIX' IN OUR CLRNC WAS 'ALTIMETER OF 30.06.' THE ONLY POSSIBILITY THAT I CAN THINK OF, IS THAT SOMEHOW, IN THE HASTE TO ACCOMMODATE THE LATE DSCNT NOTICE, POSSIBLY I TRANSPOSED THE 30.06 INTO THE 6 IN THE ALT ALERTER. DURING THE DSCNT IT WAS NECESSARY TO ATTAIN 4000 FPM IN ORDER TO MEET THE NOW IMPOSED RESTR. AIRBRAKE ONE POS WAS USED. I MENTIONED TO THE FO THAT 'IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO SLOW TO 250 KIAS BY PVD SINCE THAT RESTR WAS NOT ISSUED.' SHORTLY BEFORE THAT I SAW THE 6000 FT IN THE ALT ALERT DEVICE. PASSING THROUGH 10000 FT WE GOT AN 'RA' WITH THE TFC IN SIGHT, WHEN THE CTLR QUERIED OUR ALT, THEN CLRED US TO 9000 FT WE THEN CONTINUED TO BOSTON LOGAN UNEVENTFULLY. I ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL ACTIONS. IN RETROSPECT, I BELIEVE THAT I ERRED IN JUDGEMENT, MOST LIKELY DUE TO FATIGUE. THE FOLLOWING APPLIES: I WAS ABLE TO SLEEP ONLY ABOUT 4-4.5 HRS LAST NIGHT. NORMALLY I SLEEP ABOUT 8 HRS PER NIGHT. ON THIS NIGHT WE HAD THE MINIMUM LEGAL REST. I IMMEDIATELY WENT TO MY HOTEL ROOM TO GET SLEEP. UPON ARRIVING AT MY ROOM I DISCOVERED THAT THE ROOM'S OUTSIDE DOOR CONNECTING TO A COMMON OUTDOOR DECK WOULD NOT LOCK OR CLOSE. SINCE ANYONE HAD ACCESS TO THE AREA. I FELT UNSAFE TRYING TO SLEEP WITH THE PEDESTRIAN TFC NEARBY

WITH THE WIND BLOWING THE DOOR OPEN. THEREFORE, I ASKED FOR ANOTHER ROOM, WHICH TOOK ABOUT 45 MINS TO ARRANGE. UNFORTUNATELY THE ONLY REPLACEMENT ROOM WAS NEAR AN ELEVATOR ON THE THIRD FLOOR. THIS ELEVATOR WAS IN USE FREQUENTLY THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT WITH NOISY TOURISTS, PASSING IN AND ABOUT, WHO REPEATEDLY WOKE ME UP. THE NEXT DAY, I DID NOT REALIZE MY FATIGUE STATE. IN THE FUTURE, I SHOULD DECLINE THE TRIP SHOULD SUCH A LACK OF SLEEP OCCUR.

Synopsis

FALCON FLT CREW ENCOUNTERED TCAS RA DURING DESCENT AFTER SETTING INCORRECT ALT IN ALT ALERT WINDOW.

Time / Day

Date: 200705 Day: Wed

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZZ. Airport

State Reference : FO

Altitude. AGL. Single Value: 5000

Environment

Flight Conditions: Mixed

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZZ.ARTCC Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Falcon 20FJF/20C/20D/20E/20F

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC Flight Phase.Descent: Approach Route In Use.Arrival: On Vectors

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Waste Water Disposal System

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 50 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 7600 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 2000

ASRS Report: 738205

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical

Anomaly. Other Anomaly

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Consequence. Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas: Environmental Factor

Narrative

ON A TRANS OCEANIC FLT OUR AILERON CONTROLS FROZE UP. DURING CRUISE THE AILERON TRIM ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT KEPT COMING ON. TOWARDS THE END OF THE CROSSING AND DURING THE DSCNT AUTOPILOT TRACKING BECAME UNRELIABLE WITHOUT AILERON TRIM ASSISTANCE. IT WAS DURING VECTORS TO APCH THAT A LEFT HAND TURN EXCEEDED 30 DEGS BANK WHEREUPON I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPILOT AND REALIZED THAT WE HAD FROZEN AILERONS. THE BANK ANGLE AT THE TIME OF DISCONNECT WAS ABOUT 45 DEGS AND REQUIRED WINGS LEVEL RECOVERY WITH RUDDER. BOTH PILOTS WORKING TOGETHER COULD NOT ACHIEVE ANY AILERON AUTHORITY. AN EMER WAS DECLARED AT THIS POINT. ALL REMAINING TURNS WERE ACCOMPLISHED USING RUDDER ONLY INCLUDING ILS INTERCEPT AND LNDG. NO DAMAGE TO ACFT, PAX, OR CREW. CAUSE SEEMS TO BE A QUANTITY OF WATER ACCUMULATING DURING THE FLT AND FREEZING IN THE BELLY, EVENTUALLY BUILDING UP TO THE POINT OF BINDING THE AILERON CONTROL SYSTEM. I BELIEVE THAT THE SHORT DURATION OF THE TWO STOPS WERE NOT LONG OR WARM ENOUGH TO ALLOW THAWING OF THE ACCUMULATED ICE INSIDE THE ACFT, WHICH KEPT BUILDING UP AS WE FLEW. THE ACTUAL SOURCE OF THE WATER IS STILL BEING INVESTIGATED. ALSO APPARENTLY WE HAD A FAILURE OF THE AUTOMATIC DRAIN ON THE BELLY. DURING THE DESCENT WE THOUGHT THE AUTOPILOT SERVO OR AILERON TRIM TO BE THE PROBLEM, POSSIBLY FREEZING OR STICKING, AS WE COULD ASSIST WITH TRIM INPUTS TO HELP WITH TRACKING. I DID DISCONNECT ONCE AT ALTITUDE AND THE AILERON CONTROLS FELT STIFF BUT FREE. THINKING IT WAS STILL AN ICING VALVE OR STICKY ACTUATOR I TURNED ON THE BLEED AIR WING HEAT FOR THE DESCENT HOPING TO HELP THAW WHATEVER THE PROBLEM WAS. IT MADE NO NOTICEABLE IMPROVEMENT. THIS OCCURRENCE WAS AT THE END OF A LONG DAY FOR THE CREW. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT AN ICE BLOCK WAS FOUND ON AN AILERON CTL ARM COMMON TO BOTH THE HYDRAULICALLY BOOSTED AND MANUAL REVERSION CTL OF THE AILERONS. THE ACFT HAD MADE TWO PREVIOUS STOPS DURING THE LONG INTERNATIONAL FLT AND AT EACH STOP ICE IN THE 2 REFRESHMENT COOLING DRAWERS WAS REPLENISHED. BECAUSE THE UNDER FUSELAGE DRAIN MAST USUALLY ALLOWS THAWED LIQUID TO DRAIN FROM THE REFRESHMENT DRAWER AREA, THERE WAS NOTHING UNUSUAL NOTED AT EITHER STOP, HOWEVER, IT IS NOW SUSPECTED THAT THE DRAIN MAST HAD BECOME CLOGGED WITH FROZEN MATERIAL. DURING THE FINAL FLT ENOUGH FLUID HAD ACCUMULATED AROUND THE AILERON CTL ROD BECAUSE OF THE ACFT'S NORMAL 5 DEG NOSE UP FLT ATTITUDE, THAT UPON FREEZING AND BEING UNABLE TO DRAIN IN THE FROZEN DRAIN MAST, THE ICE LOCKED THE AILERONS.

Synopsis

A FALCON 20'S AILERON CTL LEVERS IN THE ACFT'S FUSELAGE BECAME FROZEN WITH MELTED GALLEY ICE APPARENTLY UNABLE TO DRAIN FROM A FROZEN DRAIN MAST.

Time / Day

Date: 200703 Day: Thu

Local Time Of Day: 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference : US Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Weather Elements: Rain

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower Operator.Common Carrier: Charter Make Model Name: B727-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135

Flight Phase.Ground: Taxi

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Charter Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 102

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 6406 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 800

ASRS Report: 731820

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Charter Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

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Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly. Excursion: Taxiway

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Airport Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE CAPT OF THE PLANE TAXIED THE ACFT THROUGH A 90 DEG TURN AND CUT THE CORNER TOO SHORT PUTTING THE R MAIN WHEEL IN THE GRASS. THE WHEEL STUCK IN THE WET GRASS AND WE WERE UNABLE TO TAXI ANY FURTHER. WE LANDED AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO TURN OFF AT THE END OF RWY. WE TURNED R AT THE END OF RWY AS INSTRUCTED. THE CTLR GAVE US INSTRUCTIONS TO TAXI ON TXWY B AND TURN R ON TXWY E TO FBO. THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US THAT THE TXWY WAS 50 FT WIDE. WHEN WE GOT CLOSE TO TXWY E, THE FE AND MYSELF (THE FO) ADVISED THE CAPT NOT TO PROCEED. HOWEVER THE CAPT CONTINUED THE TAXI CUTTING TOO SHORT. AFTER FURTHER REVIEW OF THE ARPT DIAGRAM. I NOTICED THAT THE TXWY E IS NOT STRESSED FOR OUR WT AND WE SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED THOSE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. ALSO, OUR DISPATCHERS SHOULD NOT HAVE HAD US HANDLED BY THAT FBO BECAUSE OF THE TXWYS THAT YOU HAVE TO TRAVEL TO GET THERE. IN CONCLUSION, XAOO IN THE MORNING, RAIN, TIRED, BAD TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, AND CAPT ERROR.

Synopsis

B727 CREW CUTS CORNER DURING TURN ONTO TAXIWAY E FROM TXWY B AND GETS STUCK IN THE WET GRASS.

Time / Day

Date : 200703 Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference : US Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier Make Model Name: Pilatus Undifferentiated

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135 Flight Phase.Ground: Takeoff Roll

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Qualification.Pilot : ATP Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 65 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 6904 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 2340

ASRS Report: 731531

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Local

Events

Anomaly. Excursion: Runway Anomaly. Ground Encounters. Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other: Aircraft Damaged

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE DEPARTING AT NIGHT I ROLLED DIRECTLY ONTO THE RWY FROM INTXN AFTER TKOF CLRNC FROM TWR. AS I MADE MY TURN ONTO THE RWY I ALIGNED THE ACFT WITH WHAT I BELIEVED WAS THE RWY CTRLINE LIGHTING SYS. I APPLIED TKOF PWR AND UTILIZED AN INSIDE/OUTSIDE SCAN IN ORDER TO CHK MY GAUGES FOR ENG PERFORMANCE/LIMITS AND TO MONITOR MY TKOF OUTSIDE THE ACFT. PRIOR TO LIFT-OFF I HEARD/FELT 2 SMALL THUMPS. I WAS CONCERNED BUT NOT ALARMED AND CONTINUED MY TKOF DUE TO THE FACT THAT I WAS CLOSE TO ROTATION SPD AND THAT THERE WERE NO OTHER INDICATIONS OF A PROB. ONCE AIRBORNE I ASKED ATC FOR A DOWNWIND TURN IN ORDER TO RETURN TO THE FIELD FOR LNDG. I WAS CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH. THE APCH, LNDG, ROLLOUT, TAXI, AND SHUTDOWN WERE ALL NORMAL. POSTFLT INSPECTION REVEALED DAMAGE TO THE L MAIN LNDG GEAR DOOR AND THE L FLAP. I CALLED THE TWR FROM OUR OFFICE AND ADVISED THEM OF THE INCIDENT AND REQUESTED A RWY CHK BY OPS. AN OPS REPRESENTATIVE CAME TO MY HANGAR AND RPTED 3 RWY LIGHTS DAMAGED. THIS CONFIRMED MY SUSPICION THAT I HAD NOT PROPERLY ALIGNED MYSELF WITH THE RWY CTRLINE BUT RATHER THE L SIDE EDGE. I LEARNED FROM TWR THAT THE RWY CTRLINE LIGHTS WERE NOT ILLUMINATED. THE INTXN OF RWYS XX AND YY PLUS THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD ON RWY XX LEADS TO A CONFUSING SITUATION AS ONE TAKES THE RWY FOR TKOF AT NIGHT (AND DAY!). I BELIEVE I FOLLOWED THE TXWY STRIPE LEADING TO RWY YY AND THEN ALIGNED THE TKOF TRACK WITH THE L EDGE LIGHTS BELIEVING THAT I WAS ON THE RWY XX CTRLINE. THERE IS SIGNIFICANT RWY MATERIAL L OF THE EDGE LIGHTS. IT APPEARED TO BE A NORMAL TKOF. I RECOMMEND THAT THE CTRLINE LIGHTS ALWAYS BE UTILIZED AT NIGHT FOR ALL OPS IN ORDER TO AVOID THE SITUATION I WAS INVOLVED IN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE HAS OPERATED FROM THE ARPT FOR OVER 8 YRS WITH THE SAME COMPANY AND IS FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT. HE STATED THAT IT WAS LATE NIGHT/EARLY MORNING AND FATIGUE MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR IN THE INCIDENT. HE FELT THAT HE HAD A FALSE SENSE OF POSITIONAL AWARENESS WHEN HE TOOK THE RWY AND THE LEAD IN LINE HE FOLLOWED WAS FOR RWY YY VICE RWY XX WHICH CAUSED HIM TO LINE UP ON THE EDGE LIGHTS FOR RWY XX. WITHOUT THE CTRLINE LIGHTING BEING ILLUMINATED HE LOST POSITIONAL AWARENESS. HE NOTED THAT THE ARPT AUTH HAD INDICATED THAT ONE OTHER ACFT HAD A SIMILAR EVENT SEVERAL YRS AGO. WHEN QUESTIONED, THE RPTR INDICATED THAT HE FELT IT WAS HIS MISTAKE AND THAT SAFETY OF FLT WAS NOT AN ISSUE.

Synopsis

PILATUS PC12 PLT LINES UP WITH RWY EDGE LIGHTS AND DAMAGES ACFT DURING TKOF ROLL.

Time / Day

Date: 200702 Day: Mon

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: TEB.Airport

State Reference: NJ

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

 $Controlling\ Facilities. TRACON:\ N90. TRACON$

Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Falcon 20FJF/20C/20D/20E/20F

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial Route In Use.Departure.SID: TEB

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot: ATP Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 150

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 1500 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 500

ASRS Report: 728032

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Overshoot Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas: Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DEPARTED MSP-BZN ON FLT XXA, BZN WX SHOWED GOOD VMC WITH CALM WIND AND FORECASTED FOR VMC. IT HAD BEEN 2+ YRS SINCE I HAD LAST FLOWN INTO BZN SO WE THOROUGHLY REVIEWED THE BZN COMMERCIAL CHART INFO ENRTE ON THE PREVIOUS LEG AND HAD QUERIED DISPATCH REGARDING SNOWFALL AND WIND CONDITIONS DUE TO LNDG RESTRS. ENRTE TO BZN WE AGAIN REVIEWED BZN COMMERCIAL CHART PAGES, DISCUSSED HOW WE WOULD EXECUTE THE FULL APCH USING MANAGED NAV AND REGULARLY UPDATED BZN, GTF, AND SEA (LISTED ALTERNATES) WX WHICH ALL INDICATED VMC. I LOADED THE ILS RWY 12 VIA BZN INTO THE FMS FLT PLAN, AND WE ARMED OUR TERR ON NAV DISPLAY (EGPWS) SWITCHES. ON DSCNT I ATTEMPTED TO COPY THE BZN ATIS BUT WAS UNABLE AS THE LISTED ATIS FREQ WAS ERRONEOUS. SO WE RECEIVED THE LATEST 'SA' RPT WHICH STILL SHOWED VMC. APPROX 40 NM OUT ZLC ADVISED US THAT BZN WAS SUDDENLY 1/4 MI VISIBILITY WITH FZFG AND ASKED OUR INTENTIONS. WE RECEIVED HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS AT MANNI AND CONSULTED WITH DISPATCH. WE COLLECTIVELY AGREED TO DIVERT TO GTF IF NEEDED AND CALCULATED BINGO FUEL. AFTER ABOUT 1.5 TURNS IN HOLDING SLC ADVISED US THAT THE BZN VISIBILITY WAS 1/2 MI AND ASKED IF WE WANTED APCH CLRNC FOR THE ILS RWY 12. WE ACCEPTED THE APCH CLRNC AND WERE HANDED OFF TO BZN TWR WHO REQUESTED THAT WE RPT MANNI INBOUND. ONCE ESTABLISHED WE DSNDED TO THE 'PT' ALT. WE WONDERED WHY THE OUTBOUND SEGMENT SEEMED LONGER THAN EXPECTED BUT DECIDED TO CONTINUE ON THE FMS COURSE WITH CAUTION (NAV DISPLAY SHOWED A 30 KT HEADWIND ON THE OUTBOUND LEG). AS WE STARTED OUR 'PT' OUTBOUND BZN TWR INSTRUCTED US TO CONTACT ZLC WHO IMMEDIATELY TOLD US TO CLB TO 11000 FT DUE TO A LOW ALT WARNING AND TO PROCEED DIRECT TO BZN VOR, WE HAD FLOWN BEYOND 10 NM FROM MANNI BY FOLLOWING THE FMS APCH PATH. WE COMPLIED WITH THE CLB AND ROUTING. APCHING THE VOR THE BZN ARPT WAS NOW VMC, AND WE COULD EASILY SEE THE RWY. SLC ISSUED US CLRNC FOR THE VISUAL APCH WHICH WAS COMPLETED TO A LNDG AFTER WHICH WE CONTACTED SLC BY PHONE. CAUSE: LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS BY THIS CREW WITH REGARD TO OUR DISTANCE FROM MANNI. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR OUR FMS TO BUILD AN ELONGATED APCH COURSE. I ASSUMED THAT FMS APCHS WERE BUILT WITH 'HARD' (GEOGRAPHICALLY DEFINED) POINTS IN SPACE AND NOT SUBJECT TO KNOWN HOLDING PATTERN ANOMALIES. 2) FATIGUE DUE TO A SCHEDULED 12 HR DUTY DAY BECOMING ALMOST 13 HRS. 3) LONG TIME LAPSE SINCE LAST EXECUTING A FULL APCH. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) MONITOR DISTANCE FROM 'ANCHOR' FIXES USING THE PROG PAGE, THE NAV DISPLAY ON THE NAV DISPLAY, AND TIMING. 2) EMPHASIZE THE DISTANCE RESTR ON THE APCH BRIEFING. 3) AGGRESSIVELY AND IMMEDIATELY INVESTIGATE ANY GUT FEELINGS THAT SOMETHING IS AMISS.

Synopsis

AN A320 FLT CREW DEVIATED FROM CHARTED TRACK DURING APCH TO RWY 12 AT BZN WHEN THEY FOLLOWED FMS GUIDANCE THAT TOOK THEM BEYOND THE 10 MI LIMIT DURING PROC TURN MANEUVER.

Time / Day

Date: 200701 Day: Tue

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: PDZ.VORTAC

State Reference: CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 17000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: SCT.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Citation V Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Flight Phase.Descent: Intermediate Altitude

Route In Use.Arrival.STAR: CIVET

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: FMS/FMC

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot : ATP Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Instrument

Experience. Flight Time. Last 90 Days: 150

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 6550 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1000

ASRS Report: 726038

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Crossing Restriction Not Met

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I LEARNED A VERY GOOD LESSON REGARDING STARS SERVING MULTIPLE RWYS WITH A DIFFERENT SEGMENT FOR EACH RWY. IN THIS CASE IT WAS EITHER THE CIVET OR MITTS ARR INTO LAX -- I REALLY CAN'T RECALL. I HAD NEVER DONE EITHER ONE AND NEVER ANY SIMILAR ONE EITHER. SINCE THE TWO ARRS ARE SO SIMILAR, THE LESSON LEARNED CAN APPLY TO BOTH. I WAS PF IN THE LEFT SEAT ON A MORNING FLT. THERE WERE CLOUDS AROUND BUT WE WERE VFR. 20 OR 25 MILES ON HEC TRANSITION BEFORE CIVET (ON BOTH STARS) I ASKED THE PNF TO GET OUR RWY ASSIGNMENT FROM CTR AS I HAD NOT PROGRAMMED ONE IN THE FMS YET AND WE WERE UNDEFINED AFTER CIVET. LOTS OF RADIO CHATTER AND BEFORE WE COULD CALL WE WERE HANDED OFF TO SOCAL APCH. UPON CHKING IN WE WERE GIVEN RWY 25R BUT NOW I ONLY HAD 5 MILES TO REPROGRAM THE FMS SO IT WOULD MAKE THE PROPER TURNS. I HAD TO ENTER A RWY BUT WHEN I DID THE STAR DISAPPEARED SO I HAD TO ENTER THAT AND A TRANSITION AND THEN RESEQUENCE THE FLT PLAN SO WE WERE ON THE CORRECT LEG. I DID THIS IN BARELY ENOUGH TIME SO THAT WE MADE OUR TURN AT THE NEXT FIX (EITHER CIVET OR RUSTT) LOSING ONLY ABOUT 1/4 DEFLECTION ON THE HSI NEEDLE. JUST THEN THE PNF SAID WE WERE SUPPOSED TO CROSS THE FIX AT (15000 FT?) AND WE WERE AT 12000 FT. I WAS FEELING DUMB AND BEFORE I COULD SAY ANYTHING, THE CTLR GAVE US A DSCNT TO 10000 FT AND A HDG OF 260 DEGS TO INTERCEPT ILS RWY 25R. I WAS GLAD TO HEAR THAT! THE REST OF THE FLT WENT WELL, THOUGH I WAS EMBARRASSED. I WAS TIRED (LITTLE SLEEP) AND SHOULD HAVE HAD THE PNF DO THE FMS PROGRAMMING SO I COULD KEEP SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. I SHOULD HAVE ALSO READ THE NOTE TO SET UP FOR RWY 25L UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED EVEN THOUGH RWY 25L WAS CLOSED, THIS WOULD HAVE SAVED US OR GIVEN ENOUGH TIME TO GET THINGS RIGHT. I COULD HAVE HAD THE PNF DETERMINE OUR RWY EARLIER, TOO. AND I COULD HAVE READ THE ARR MORE CAREFULLY ON SEGMENTS FROM CIVET TO LAX SO I'D KNOW WHAT TO EXPECT BUT I WAS GOING TO DO THAT AFTER RWY ASSIGNMENT. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL SET UP A SEGMENT OF MOST LIKELY RWY OR AS INSTRUCTED ON STAR. I WILL READ STAR MORE CAREFULLY AND WILL GET RWY ASSIGNMENT EARLIER.

Synopsis

LATE RWY ASSIGNMENT ON STAR TO LAX RESULTS IN COCKPIT DISTRACTION AND MISSED CROSSING ALT.

Time / Day

Date: 200607 Day: Tue

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ROC.Airport

State Reference : NY

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Dusk

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ROC.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Corporate Make Model Name: Beechjet 400 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Ground: Taxi

Component: 1

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot: Instrument Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience. Flight Time. Last 90 Days: 100

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 5100 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1100

ASRS Report: 726022

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe

Anomaly.Incursion: Runway

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3

Resolutory Action.None Taken: Detected After The Fact Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHEN TAXI CLEARANCE WAS CALLED FOR, ATC ASKED WHICH RWY WE WOULD PREFER TO USE, RWY 22 OR RWY 28. I RESPONDED RWY 28 MISTAKENLY AFTER MISREADING THE AIRPORT DIAGRAM CHART. TAXI CLEARANCE WAS GIVEN TO RWY 28. TAXI WAS INITIATED WITH MY MISTAKEN THINKING WE WERE ACTUALLY CLEARED FOR RWY 22. TAXI PROCEEDED WITHOUT INCIDENT INCLUDING CROSSING RWY 28. THE SITUATION WAS REVEALED WHEN WE CALLED FOR TAKEOFF CLEARANCE AT RWY 22. THE TOWER ASKED US OUR LOCATION AND WE ANSWERED AT RWY 22. THE TOWER CONTROLLER SOUNDED CONFUSED AND THEN ADVISED US THAT TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE ACTUALLY FOR RWY 28. I IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED MY ERROR AND ADVISED THE TOWER OF THIS. NO INCIDENT WAS NOTED BY ATC AND WE PROCEEDED WITH OUR FLIGHT. I BELIEVE THIS INCIDENT WAS CLEARLY BASED ON MY MISREADING THE AIRPORT CHART. MY COMPANY USES EFB'S EXCLUSIVELY FOR OUR APPROACH AND AIRPORT DIAGRAMS. THESE HAVE PROVEN TO BE DIFFICULT TO READ UNDER CERTAIN LIGHTING CONDITIONS. WE ALSO HAD A PASSENGER ONBOARD THAT WAS LATE. THIS WAS CAUSING US TO EXTEND AN ALREADY LONG DUTY DAY. WE HAD BEEN ON DUTY FOR 10.5 HOURS AT THIS POINT. I THINK THAT THE COMBINATION OF RUSHING, AND POOR VISIBILITY OF THE AIRPORT DIAGRAM CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ERROR. FATIGUE MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR ALTHOUGH WE DID HAVE 13 HOURS OF REST PRIOR TO THIS DUTY DAY.

Synopsis

BE40 FLT CREW HAS RWY INCURSION UPON MISREADING OF EFB ARPT DIAGRAM.

Time / Day

Date : 200701 Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: RQZ.VORTAC

State Reference : AL

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 8000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: HSV.TRACON Operator.General Aviation: Corporate Make Model Name: Citation II S2/Bravo Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude

Route In Use.Departure: On Vectors

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: HSV.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Corporate Make Model Name: Gulfstream V Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Cruise: Enroute Altitude Change

Person: 1

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Approach Function.Controller : Radar

Qualification.Controller : Developmental Experience.Controller.Radar : 17.40

ASRS Report: 726000

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Critical

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : Conflict Alert

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1 Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Alert

Resolutory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance Resolutory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Consequence.FAA: Investigated Miss Distance.Horizontal: 6000 Miss Distance.Vertical: 200

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS HAVING A SKILL CHK BY MY SUPVR. I WAS WORKING ALL RADAR POS COMBINED (W RADAR, E RADAR, AND E/W ASSOCIATE POS). THE ONLY OTHER PERSON IN THE ROOM WAS ANOTHER SUPVR SITTING BEHIND THE SUPVR'S DESK. I HAD A COORD NIGHTMARE. I HAD TO COORDINATE WITH BIRMINGHAM APCH AND ZTL ALONG WITH WORKING OTHER AIRPLANES. I WAS WORKING A C550 THAT TURNED SEBOUND INTO ZTL'S AIRSPACE AND GOT TOO CLOSE WITH ANOTHER ACFT AT 8000 FT. IF THERE HAD BEEN ANOTHER PERSON DOING THE COORDINATING THEN THE INCIDENT MAY NOT HAVE HAPPENED. THE FACILITY IS SHORT STAFFED, THE CTLRS ARE TIRED, THERE IS LITTLE TO NO LEAVE AVAILABLE AND MGMNT ENJOYS SHOVING FAA POLICY DOWN OUR THROATS.

Synopsis

HSV TRACON CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 8000 WHEN ENTERING ADJACENT CENTER'S AIRSPACE DURING SKILLS CHECK.

Time / Day

Date: 200601 Day: Wed

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference : US Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: IMC Weather Elements: Ice Weather Elements: Snow

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Taxi

Make Model Name: Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135 Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Cargo Door

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Taxi Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Qualification.Pilot: ATP Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Experience. Flight Time. Last 90 Days: 170

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 2400 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 230

ASRS Report: 724269

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolutory Action.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Weather

Narrative

I WAS AWOKEN FROM A SOUND SLEEP BY DISPATCH AND TOLD THAT I NEEDED TO REPOSITION ASAP TO ZZZ1 FROM ZZZ2 AS WX APPEARED TO BE GOING DOWN AT ZZZ1. GND ICING CONDITIONS WERE PRESENT AT ZZZ2 IN THE FORM OF SNOW (STICKING TO THE ACFT) AND FREEZING FOG. IT TOOK OVER AN HR TO PREPARE THE ACFT FOR FLT WHICH ADDED TO THE URGENCY TO GET OFF THE GND. I HAD TO GET INTO THE NOSE BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT TO ACCESS A BRUSH THAT'S USED IN THE DEICING PROCESS. I DIDN'T DO A WALKAROUND BEFORE STARTING THE ENGS FOR TAXI AND TKOF, WHICH RESULTED IN NOT CATCHING THE NOSE BAGGAGE DOOR STILL UNLATCHED. JUST AFTER TKOF, THE BAGGAGE DOOR CAME OPEN AND I REQUESTED FROM TWR TO COME AROUND AND LAND. I WAS ASKED IF I COULD DO SO IN VFR CONDITIONS TO WHICH I REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. (AT THE TIME, I TOOK THIS TO MEAN 'COULD I LAND VISUALLY?' WITHOUT LOSING SIGHT OF THE RWY.) I WAS CLRED TO MAKE L CLOSED TFC AND DID SO WITHOUT INCIDENT. I SUPPOSE I COULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER IF I'D BEEN DENIED TO MAKE CLOSED TFC DUE TO THE LOW VISIBILITY, BUT THE SITUATION WAS UNDER CTL AND I WAS BUSY ENOUGH KEEPING TRACK OF THE ARPT AND MY AIRSPD, ETC. IT WAS MY BEST JUDGEMENT TO NOT FLY OFF INTO THE CLOUDS AND MAKE AN APCH WITH THE BAGGAGE DOOR OPEN FOR FEAR OF WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN DURING THE FLT WITH THE DOOR OPEN AT THE HIGHER SPDS THAT MIGHT BE OBTAINED DURING MANEUVERING AND THE APCH, NOT TO MENTION THE DURATION OF THE FLT WITH THE DOOR OPEN. BEING IN A HURRY IN ANY AVIATION SITUATION CAN LEAD TO DANGEROUS PERFORMANCE AND CRITICAL ITEMS BEING OVERLOOKED AS WAS THE CASE HERE. A WALK AROUND THE PLANE WOULD HAVE CORRECTED THIS SITUATION. I WAS LUCKY IN THAT THE WX WAS NOT WORSE THAN IT WAS AND THAT THE C402 IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED IN FLT AT RELATIVELY LOW AIRSPDS WITH THE NOSE COMPARTMENT BAGGAGE DOOR OPEN. ON ANOTHER DAY, IN A DIFFERENT PLANE, THINGS MIGHT NOT HAVE TURNED OUT SO WELL.

Synopsis

FOLLOWING A HASTY PREFLT A C402 DEPARTED ONLY TO HAVE THE CARGO DOOR OPEN AFTER TKOF REQUIRING A CLOSE IN RETURN TO LAND.

Time / Day

Date: 200701 Day: Wed

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: POM.VORTAC

State Reference: CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 8000

Environment

Flight Conditions: IMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: SCT.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude Route In Use.Departure.SID : POMONA7

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 125

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 10000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 3000

ASRS Report: 723793

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Crossing Restriction Not Met

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Overshoot Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly. Non Adherence . FAR

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

MY ACFT X WAS CLRED FOR AN IFR TKOF FROM ONT, DEPARTING ON THE POMONA 7 DEP. THE DEP CALLS FOR A LEVELOFF AT 7000 FT AT THE POM VOR AND THEN A REQUIREMENT TO BE AT OR ABOVE 14000 FT AT BUCCK INTXN 10 MI FURTHER ON THE SID. MY ORIGINAL CLRNC WAS THE SID, MAINTAIN 14000 FT. I WROTE DOWN 14000 FT AND WAS THINKING OF THAT ALT WHEN I SET THE LEVELOFF ALT IN MY EFIS. I CONTINUED THROUGH THE 7000 FT RESTR, FORGETTING ABOUT THE 7000 FT SID REQUIREMENT. DEP CALLED AND ASKED ME ABOUT MY ALT. I TOLD HIM OF MY MISTAKE AND HE GAVE ME A NEW HDG. IT WAS AN EARLY MORNING DEP AT THE BEGINNING OF MY DAY AND EVEN THOUGH CREW REST WAS NOT A FACTOR AND I SHOULD HAVE HAD SUFFICIENT REST, I'M SURE THAT MY TIRED MIND WAS NOT THINKING ABOUT THE ISSUE PROPERLY. IN THE FUTURE, I REALIZE THAT I NEED TO AGAIN REVIEW THE SID AND MY EFIS SETTINGS PRIOR TO TKOF, AND MAKE SURE THAT I COMPLY WITH ALL SID ALTS. REGARDLESS OF MY CLRNC ON THE GND, I MUST MAKE SURE THAT MY EFIS SETUP COMPLIES WITH THE SID.

Synopsis

FLT CREW ON THE ONT.POM 7 CLBED ABOVE 7000 FT PRIOR TO THE POM 7000 FT RESTR.

Time / Day

Date: 200612 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference. Navaid: GVO. VORTAC

State Reference: CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 3500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: SBA.TRACON

Make Model Name: Beechjet 400 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach Route In Use.Approach: Visual

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 150

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 6980 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1900

ASRS Report: 721633

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Approach

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : MSAW Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3 Resolutory Action.Controller : Issued Alert

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Became Reoriented

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Assigned Altitude Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Original Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING DSCNT INTO SBA FROM THE N, WE WERE CLRED TO HABUT XC, WHICH IS 11.7 NM E OF THE ARPT. OUR FLT PATH TOOK US OVER IZA. WE MISTAKENLY IDENT THE BCN AT IZA AS SBA, AND WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH. AT ABOUT 3500 FT CTLR QUERIED US AND INFORMED US HIS MVA WAS 7000 FT. I BEGAN AN IMMEDIATE CLB, AND WITHIN 15 SECONDS ACQUIRED THE APCH LIGHTS FOR RWY 7 AT SBA. THE MAIN CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THIS BREAKDOWN IN JUDGEMENT WAS FATIGUE. OTHERS WERE DISTR FROM TRYING TO DOCUMENT AN INTERMITTENT PROB CAUSING VARIOUS TAWS RELATED ANNUNCIATORS TO COME ON THEN OFF, MY FAILURE TO MAINTAIN SPATIAL AWARENESS (IE, WE WERE FLYING TOWARD A POINT 11.7 NM E OF SBA NOT TOWARD THE ARPT, A WEAK SIC WHO ALSO DID NOT REGISTER THE MISTAKE, AND TENDED NOT TO 'SPEAK UP' WHEN SOMETHING DID NOT SEEM RIGHT. PRIMARILY THOUGH THIS WAS CAUSED BY FATIGUE LEADING TO MY POOR JUDGEMENT.

Synopsis

BE40 CREW BECOMES DISORIENTED ON VISUAL APCH TO SBA AND DSNDS BELOW MSA.

Time / Day

Date: 200612 Day: Thu

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: TEB. Airport

State Reference: NJ

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 1500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Gulfstream 200 [G200] (IAI 1126 Galaxy)

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial Route In Use.Departure.SID: TEB5

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 70 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 26000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 500

ASRS Report: 720771

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 40 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 6990 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 800

ASRS Report: 720770

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Overshoot Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2 Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Advisory

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Chart.SID: TEB5

Narrative

WE WERE SCHEDULED FOR A XJ00 LOCAL DEP OUT OF TEB AFTER BEING UP SINCE XA00. THE PAX FINALLY ARRIVED AT XJ45 JUST IN TIME TO HIT 'RUSH HOUR' TRYING TO DEP TEB FOR ZZZ1. WHEN WE CALLED FOR ENG START WE WERE TOLD WE WOULD BE PLACED IN THE 'QUEUE.' AFTER 30 PLUS MINS OUR STARTUP CLRNC CAME THROUGH. AS WE TAXIED TO THE ACTIVE RWY (RWY 24) WE WERE ADVISED A 'STOP' WAS PLACED ON WESTBOUND DEPS. THIS RESULTED IN ANOTHER DELAY. AT XLOO LOCAL WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF ON THE TEB5 DEP, WHICH CALLS FOR A CLB TO 800 FT THEN A RIGHT TURN HDG 280 DEGS TO MAINTAIN 1500 FT. THIS IS WHAT THE CAPT BRIEFED PRIOR TO DEP. ALL WENT AS BRIEFED, HOWEVER, THE CAPT OVERSHOT 1500 FT, I SAID 1500 FT, 1500 FT SEVERAL TIMES AND HE CORRECTED FROM 1750 FT BACK DOWN TO 1500 FT. ZNY CAME ON AT THE SAME TIME AND SAID, 'ACR X, YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO BE LEVEL AT 1500 FT.' WE TOLD HIM WE HAD CORRECTED AND WERE, IN FACT, LEVEL AT 1500 FT. THAT WAS THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION WITH HIM AND WE WERE HANDED OFF TO THE NEXT CTLR. I BELIEVE THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED FOR 3 REASONS: 1) WE WERE WORN DOWN BY THE ROLLING DELAYS. 2) WE HAD BEEN UP ALL DAY PRIOR TO THE FLT, AND 3) THE CAPT HAD NOT FLOWN THIS ACFT AS PIC IN MORE THAN 2 MONTHS AND WAS SLOW TO PULL THE POWER BACK FOR LEVELOFF AT 1500 FT WHICH RESULTED IN THE OVERSHOOT. AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR WAS THE WT OF THE ACFT. WE GENERALLY LEAVE TEB WITH A FUEL LOAD OF FUEL FOR THE TRIP TO THE WEST COAST (WINDS PERMITTING). THIS FLT HAD A VERY LIGHT FUEL LOAD SINCE WE WERE STOPPING IN ZZZ, A ONE HOUR FLT.

Synopsis

A G200 DEPARTING ON THE TEB5 EXCEEDED THE INITIAL 1500 FT LEVELOFF ALT BY 250 FT THEN DSNDED BACK TO 1500 FT.

Time / Day

Date: 200612

Day: Fri

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: TNP.VORTAC

State Reference: CA

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 21000 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 22000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZLA.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation: Corporate
Make Model Name: Citation Excel
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC
Navigation In Use.Other.VORTAC

Flight Phase.Climbout: Intermediate Altitude

Route In Use.Departure.SID: KEPEC

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: FMS/FMC

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience. Flight Time. Last 90 Days: 150

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 4000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 300

ASRS Report: 719224

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 110

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 8200 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 400

ASRS Report: 719889

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Radar

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Overshoot Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Assigned Altitude

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Returned To Intended or Assigned Course

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DEPARTED TRM VER WITH XPONDER CODE ISSUED BY PAI'M SPRINGS APCH. FMS. ORIGINALLY SET UP WITH FILED RTE 'DAG, KEPEC 1 LAS.' ONCE AIRBORNE ATC ISSUED 'DIRECT TNP THEN KEPEC 1 TO LAS.' MY FO ASSURED ME FMS WAS SET UP PROPERLY. UPON ARR AT TNP VOR ACFT MADE THE TURN TOWARDS DAG VOR. SHORTLY THEREAFTER ATC ASKED WHAT WAS OUR FILED RTE. FO READ BACK CLRNC TO ATC. SHE ASKED US TO TURN N AND THAT WE WERE OFF COURSE. I THEN REVIEWED THE FMS AND NOTICED IT WAS NOT PROPERLY PROGRAMMED. AS I WAS MAKING CHANGES TO THE FMS ATC CLRED US TO FL210. I DID NOT HEAR THE ALT CLRNC FROM ATC. ACCORDING TO MY FO, ATC ASSIGNED FL220, THEN CORRECTED HERSELF AND ASSIGNED FL210. MY FO HAD SET FL220, BUT DID NOT RESET ALT ALERTER TO FL210. ATC QUERIED US AS TO OUR ALT. THE FO SAID FL220. SHE STATED FL210 WAS ASSIGNED. WE DSNDED TO FL210. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. FATIGUE MAY HAVE PLAYED A PART. POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO PREVENT ANOTHER OCCURRENCE. 1) PUSH ATC FOR A FULL CLRNC PRIOR TO DEP. 2) PERSONALLY REVIEW ALL FMS INPUTS TO FMS BY FO. 3) FO SHOULD HAVE READ BACK ASSIGNED ALT FOR MY VERIFICATION.

Synopsis

A CE560XL DEVIATED FROM ASSIGNED TRACK BECAUSE OF IMPROPERLY PROGRAMMED FMC, AND CLBED THROUGH ASSIGNED ALT BECAUSE OF CREW ERROR.

Time / Day

Date: 200611 Day: Wed

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: C90.TRACON

State Reference: IL

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions: IMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: C90.TRACON

Operator. General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Sovereign Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial

Route In Use.Departure.SID: MDW4

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 100

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 8200 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 200

ASRS Report: 719003

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 90 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 6000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 130

ASRS Report: 719004

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3 Resolutory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DEPARTING MDW ON MIDWAY 4 DEP, CREW PUT 4000 FT IN ALT WINDOW WHEN CLRNC HAD BEEN TO 3000 FT. WE CLBED TO 4000 FT AND WERE THEN INFORMED WE SHOULD BE AT 3000 FT BUT TO STAY AT 4000 FT. WE HAD AN XA30 SHOW THIS MORNING AND IT WAS MY 4TH BEFORE XC00 IN A ROW. I BELIEVE THE LOOP ERROR IN THE COCKPIT WAS CAUSED BY FATIGUE.

Synopsis

CITATION CE680 SOVEREIGN FLT CREW HAS AN ALTDEV DEPART MDW.

Time / Day

Date: 200612

Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: TEB.Airport

State Reference: NJ

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions: IMC
Weather Elements: Rain
Weather Elements: Turbulence

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Corporate Make Model Name: Citation Excel Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Navigation In Use.Other: Pilotage Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial

Route In Use.Departure.SID: TEB 5

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 110 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 10900 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 775

ASRS Report: 718678

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot : ATP Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Qualification.Pilot: Instrument Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 125

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 300 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 750

ASRS Report: 718672

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Crossing Restriction Not Met

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Overshoot Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON CLIMB OUT FROM TEB FLYING THE TEB 5 DEP THE FINAL CLIMB FROM 1500 FT MSL TO 2000 FT MSL WAS INITIATED EARLY. THE FMS WAS BEING UTILIZED AND THE AUTOPILOT WAS ENGAGED AT 400 FT. THE AIRCRAFT PROCEEDED ON THE DEP AS PUBLISHED TO 1500 FT MSL AND BEGAN THE RIGHT TURN TO A 280 DEG HEADING AS CALLED FOR BUT SHOULD HAVE LEVELED OFF AT 1500 FT TO THE 4.5 DME OF TEB BEFORE CLIMBING TO 2000 FT. INSTEAD OF HAVING SET THE INITIAL ALTITUDE OF 1500 FT AND THE RESETTING TO 2000 FT AT THE 4.5 NM FIX THE ALTITUDE PRESET WAS MISTAKENLY SET TO 2000 FT AT TAKEOFF THEREFORE THE AIRCRAFT CONTINUE THE CLIMB TO 2000 FT PRIOR TO THE 4.5 NM FIX. THE PNF DID NOT DETECT TO ERROR EITHER AND NO CALL OUT WAS MADE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WAS A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE CREW PRIOR TO TAKEOFF ABOUT PAX HANDLING CREATING A DISTRACTION FROM A PROPER TAKEOFF BRIEF. THE AIRCRAFT WAS FOURTH IN LINE BUT WAS GIVEN A CLRNC TO THE RWY FOLLOWED QUICKLY BY TAKEOFF CLRNC. IT WAS UNEXPECTED TO RECEIVE THE CLRNC SO QUICKLY AND THIS HELPED CREATE A HURRY UP SITUATION AND VOIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACCOMPLISH A FINAL REVIEW OF THE TAKEOFF PROC. IN ADDITION, FATIGUE WAS ALSO A FACTOR AS THE DAY BEFORE WAS A 13 HRS DUTY DAY PRECEDED BY A 12.5 HOUR DAY. FURTHERMORE, MUCH ATTENTION BY BOTH CREW MEMBERS IS BEING PAID TO THE AIRCRAFT BEING RELOCATED TO A NEW AIRPORT AND THE TASKS REQUIRED. TO ACCOMPLISH IT. THE AIRCRAFT HAS FLOWN 400 HOURS YEAR-TO-DATE WHICH IS A VERY BUSY SCHEDULE FOR JUST TWO PILOTS.

Synopsis

A C560XL DEPARTING TEB ON THE TEB DEP CLBED BEFORE CHARTED POINT TO 2000 FT.

Time / Day

Date: 200611 Day: Tue

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: TAY.VORTAC

State Reference: FL

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 35300

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Dusk

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZJX.ARTCC Operator.General Aviation: Corporate Make Model Name: Citation Excel Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Climbout: Intermediate Altitude

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZJX.ARTCC

Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 100

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 5500 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 700

ASRS Report: 718049

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 90 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 5000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 250

ASRS Report: 718050

Person: 3

Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 4

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Critical

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Required Legal Separation Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment: TCAS Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 4

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Took Precautionary Avoidance Action

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE CLRED TO FL370. UPON PASSING FL352, CTR SAID 'AMEND ALT, MAINTAIN FL350.' PF ARRESTED THE CLB AND BEGAN A DSCNT TO FL350 WHEN THE TCAS GAVE A TA CALL. TFC WAS AT 1:30 O'CLOCK POS, AND 2 MI. I ACQUIRED SAID TARGET VISUALLY AND READ BACK 'DSNDING TO FL350.' CTL REPLIED 'VERIFY YOU'RE LEVEL AT 350?' AND I EXPLAINED WE WERE TRYING, BUT HE HAD ORIGINALLY CLRED US TO 370 AND ONLY CHANGED IT TO 350 ONCE WE WERE AT FL352. HE REPLIED 'ROGER.' ABOUT 2 MINS LATER HE ASKED, 'ARE YOU IN THE TURN?' I RE-VERIFIED EVERYTHING AGAIN, FLT LEVEL, HDG, ETC. THE CTLR WAS NOTICEABLY CONFUSED, MISSED RADIO CALLS, GAVE US A BAD ALT. SOMETHING DID NOT SEEM RIGHT WITH THE CTLR. SOME OF HIS REPLIES, SOUNDED SLURRED LIKE HE MAY HAVE BEEN OVERLY TIRED OR SOMETHING.

Synopsis

LATE AMENDMENT OF CLRED ALT RESULTS IN LOSS OF SEPARATION BTWN C560 CLRED TO FL370 AND XING TFC AT FL360.

Time / Day

Date: 200611

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Intersection: EONNS

State Reference : FL

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 20700

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZMA.ARTCC Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Learjet 35 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Climbout: Intermediate Altitude

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZMA.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B767-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Climbout: Intermediate Altitude

Person: 1

Affiliation.Government: FAA
Function.Controller: Radar
Qualification.Controller: Radar
Experience.Controller.Radar: 24

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1: 15.75

ASRS Report: 717721

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : Conflict Alert

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1
Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Alert

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Consequence.FAA: Investigated

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING A VERY BUSY PERIOD OF HVY TFC, I WAS WORKING RADAR SECTORS 41/42 COMBINED FOR MORE THAN 2 HRS ON POS, WHICH INCLUDED METERING FOR FLL (N RWY) AND MULTIPLE ARRS FOR BOTH MIA AND FLL AND SATELLITE ARPTS. THE MAJORITY OF THE COMPLEX TFC WAS IN SECTOR 42 AND I DID NOT ASK FOR THE SECTOR TO BE SPLIT BECAUSE IT WAS ALREADY TOO BUSY TO DECOMBINE. THE ERROR OCCURRED IN SECTOR 41. MIAMI WAS OPERATING ON A W OP, WHICH ADDS TO THE COMPLEXITY AT BOTH JUNUR/FLIPR AND DEKAL. I WAS WORKING APPROX 16 ACFT AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. BOTH THE LJ35 AND THE B762 DEPARTED MIA ON THE EONNS TRANSITION AND CAME TO ME CLBING TO 16000 FT AT 6-7 MI APART AT COMPARABLE SPDS. I ISSUED CLB CLRNC TO BOTH ACFT TO FL230 AND OBSERVED DURING THEIR CLBS THAT THEY MAINTAINED THEIR SEPARATION AND WERE BOTH INDICATING AT 370-380 KTS GS. I WAS SATISFIED THEY WOULD REMAIN SEPARATED, AND THEN FOCUSED MY ATTN ON THE TFC IN SECTOR 42. AT THE TIME CONFLICT ALERT ACTIVATED, THE LJ35'S GS DROPPED TO 330 KTS, AND SEPARATION WAS LOST AT AROUND FL207. I IMMEDIATELY ISSUED A VECTOR TO THE B762 (HE WAS THE FOLLOWING ACFT) TO A HDG OF 090 DEGS AND STOPPED HIM AT FL220. DURING THE REPLAY ON THE FALCON SYS AT THE ZMA WATCH DESK, I SAW THE GND SPD OF THE LJ35 DECREASE BY ALMOST 50 KTS, AND CONFLICT ALERT DID NOT ACTIVATE UNTIL SEPARATION WAS ALREADY LOST. I FEEL THAT THE SECTOR WAS TOO BUSY TO REMAIN COMBINED, ALTHOUGH I DID NOT ASK FOR SECTOR 42 TO BE SPLIT BECAUSE IT WAS ALREADY TOO BUSY, I DID NOT ANTICIPATE THE RAPID DETERIORATION OF SEPARATION ON THE SUBJECT ACFT. AT NO TIME DURING MY MORE THAN 2 HRS ON POS DURING THIS HVY TFC DID THE SUPVR COME OVER TO ASSESS THE SITUATION, NOR EVALUATE THE TSD FOR POSSIBLE SECTOR DECOMBINATION. AT CTR IT IS TYPICAL FOR US TO BE VERY BUSY DURING THE HOLIDAY TFC PERIODS, AND AS USUAL, WE WERE SHORT STAFFED AND MOST CTLRS ROUTINELY GO OVER 2 HRS ON POS. THIS CAN CAUSE FATIGUE VERY QUICKLY, AND THAT WAS THE SITUATION IN MY CASE. HAD THE SECTORS BEEN SPLIT IN A TIMELY MANNER, I WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FOCUS MY ATTN TO ALL AREAS OF MY SECTOR, AND I WOULD HAVE MOST LIKELY NOTICED THE DEVELOPING SITUATION IN TIME TO ENSURE SEPARATION.

Synopsis

ZMA CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 20700 FT WHEN LEADING DEP ACFT SLOWED AND WAS OVERTAKEN BY A SUCCEEDING DEP ACFT.

Time / Day

Date: 200611 Day: Wed

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: BPK.VORTAC

State Reference: FO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: EGLL.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Corporate Make Model Name: Challenger CL604 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC Route In Use.Departure.SID: DETLING

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: FMS/FMC

Component: 2

Aircraft Component : Altimeter

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 210

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 8750 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 975

ASRS Report: 716043

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : Foreign Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly.Other Anomaly: Speed Deviation Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DEPARTED EGGW. SID ASSIGNED WAS THE DETLING 4C. AS THE MONITORING PLT AND THE ONE WHO SET UP THE DEP I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE TURNS AND ALT RESTRS THAT WERE PUBLISHED. I DID SET THE ALT SELECTOR KNOB TO THE HIGHEST ALT ON THE SID, KNOWING THAT THERE WERE LOWER 'HARD' ALTS THAT NEEDED TO BE ADHERED TO. THE CAPT HAD REVIEWED THE DEP AND WAS FALSELY COMFORTABLE SINCE HE HAD BEEN IN AND OUT OF THE ARPT MANY TIMES. COMPANY OPS HAS THE CAPT OUT OF THE COCKPIT 30 MINS PRIOR GREETING AND MEETING PAX AND BASICALLY LEAVES THEM OUT OF THE LOOP FOR SETTING UP THE ENTIRE FLT, INCLUDING THE CLRNC (WITH EXCEPTION OF EUROPE). I FEEL THAT THIS IS A VERY LARGE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WITH THE ALT EXCURSION, SINCE HE WASN'T FAMILIAR WITH IT ENOUGH TO DISREGARD THE FLT DIRECTOR BARS AND JUST FLY THE DEP. DURING TAXI OUT THE 'FLT INSTS/NAV' WAS BRIEFED, BUT WHAT HE MISSED IN HIS SCAN WAS THE NEEDLE ON HIS HSI THAT WAS MISSING. THERE WAS NOTHING THERE, NO WHITE NEEDLE FOR THE FMS, NOR GREEN FOR VOR, OR YELLOW FOR X-SIDE REF. NOTHING. TO ADD TO CONFUSION, HIS RADAR WAS PAINTING A HORRIBLE BRIGHT RED AND YELLOW PICTURE FROM THE ACFT POS OUT OVER 50% OF THE SCREEN. THE DISTANCE SELECTED WAS NOT USEABLE FOR DEP, I THINK, 25 NM, WHICH MADE IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO READ THE INFO ON THE SCREEN. THE CAPT IS ALSO THE DIRECTOR OF AVIATION WHO HAS TENS OF THOUSANDS OF HRS AND WAS GIVING ME THE EUROPE CHK OUT. HE FREQUENTLY UNDER-UTILIZES THE RESOURCES IN THE FMS, AND HAS HIS SCREENS SET OUT OF RANGE FOR ARRS AND DEPS, AS WELL AS LOOKS THROUGH A LOT OF NONSENSE WITH THE RADAR. THE RED AND YELLOW HE WAS PAINTING THIS NIGHT, ALL GND CLUTTER. NO NEED FOR RADAR. AFTER TKOF WHEN HE WENT TO ARM THE NAV MODE OF THE FMS AND FLY THE BARS, IT DIDN'T FOLLOW ANYTHING. IT STAYED ON HDG MODE. HE BEGAN TO PANIC AS HE CLBED RAPIDLY THROUGH 3000 FT. I SAID HE NEEDED TO STOP AT 4000 FT UNTIL PASSING BPK VOR. AT THIS POINT, THE FLYING HAS DETERIORATED, WITH BANK ANGLES OF 45 DEGS AT ONE POINT, AIRSPD FLUCTUATIONS IN EXCESS OF 40 KTS. I COULD SEE IT ALL SO CLR ON MY SIDE, AND YET HE COULDN'T PROCESS OR SEE THROUGH THE 'JUNK' TO INTERPRET ANYTHING. AS WE LEVELED AT 5000 FT, CONFUSED AND EXTREMELY FRUSTRATED (AN ICE LIGHT CHIMED AS WELL), ATC STARTED GIVING US HDG AND RECLRED US TO 4000 FT. I DID EXACERBATE THE PROB BY GOING TO FLT LEVEL TOO EARLY ON THE CLB. THE APPROPRIATE TRANSITION LEVEL WAS 6000 FT, AND I HIT THE 29.92 AROUND 4500 FT. AFTER MUCH CONFUSION AND TENSION IN THE COCKPIT, WE LEVELED AT THE REQUESTED ALT ASSIGNED BY ATC. THE CTLING SECTOR DID ASK US WHY WE HAD CONTINUED TO CLB WHEN IT WAS DEPICTED 4000 FT FOR SEVERAL MI AND THEN A CLB TO 5000 FT,

AND TO VERIFY WE HAD THE SID. WE DIDN'T EXPLAIN NOR MAKE ANY FURTHER COMMENT REGARDING THE DEP. I LEARNED A LOT! VIGILANCE, VIGILANCE! EVEN AFTER MANY TIME ZONE CHANGES, LENGTHY DUTY DAYS AND JUST BEING TIRED, YOU MUST RISE TO THE OCCASION AND DO IT RIGHT EVERY TIME! I WON'T LET A PF DEPART WITH INFO THAT IS USELESS OR DISTRACTING. IT MUST BE PERTINENT AND HELPFUL OTHERWISE IT'S NO GOOD AND CAN ACTUALLY MAKE THINGS MUCH WORSE. I WILL ALSO BE SURE THAT HE OR SHE IS VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE DEP AND CAN RECITE THE CRITICAL AREAS THAT THEY SHOULD REMEMBER IN THE EVENT THE FMS NAV BARS DON'T WORK.

Synopsis

FLT CREW OF CL60 EXPERIENCE ALTDEV ON SID FROM EGGW.

Time / Day

Date: 200611 Day: Wed

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: DDC.Airport

State Reference: KS

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 30000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZKC.ARTCC Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name : Citation V Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 120 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 17000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1800

ASRS Report: 715542

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer Qualification.Pilot: Commercial Qualification.Pilot: Instrument Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 50 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 2000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1000

ASRS Report: 715543

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Radar

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Undershoot Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE IN CRUISE FLT AT FL300 WE WERE ASKED TO VERIFY LEVEL AT FL300. AS I CHKED BOTH ALTIMETERS THE PNF RESPONDED THAT WE WERE LEVEL AT FL300. INSTANTLY IT CAUGHT MY ATTN THAT WE FORGOT TO SET OUR ALTIMETERS TO 29.92 AT TRANSITION ALT FL180. I IMMEDIATELY TOOK ACTION TO SET MY ALTIMETER TO STANDARD AND CLBED THE 400 FT TO FL300. THE PNF PROCEEDED TO SET HIS ALTIMETER AND CALLED ZKC BACK TO RELAY WHAT WE HAD DONE AND THAT WE WERE CORRECTING. SHE RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NOT A PROB. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO US MISSING OUR ALTIMETER SETTING WERE: 1) WE WERE IN THE 10TH HR OF A LONG DAY OF FLYING. FATIGUE WAS PLAYING A FACTOR. 2) ALSO LACK OF FINISHING THE CLB CHKLIST WHICH PROMPTS US TO SET ALTIMETERS AT FL180. AFTER THE PNF AND I DISCUSSED WHAT WE DID WRONG AND THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO IT, WE CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT NO MATTER HOW LONG THE DAY HAD BEEN, WE NEED TO BE DILIGENT IN USING THE CHKLIST WHICH WOULD HAVE KEPT US FROM MAKING THIS MISTAKE.

Synopsis

A CE560 FLT CREW MISSED SETTING 29.92 CLBING THROUGH FL180. WHEN THEY LEVELED AT CRUISE ALT, ATC ADVISED THEY WERE 400 FT LOW.

Time / Day

Date: 200610 Day: Wed

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: LAS. Airport

State Reference : NV Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: LAS. Tower Operator. General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name : Learjet 45 Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase.Ground: Taxi

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 80 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 5640 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1160

ASRS Report: 715134

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot : ATP Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Qualification.Technician: Airframe Qualification.Technician: Powerplant Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 65 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 16000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1200

ASRS Report: 715135

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Ground

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Ground Less Severe

Anomaly.Incursion: Runway

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas: Airport

Problem Areas: Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : FAA

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Airport.Markings: LAS.Airport Chart.Airport: LAS.Airport

Narrative

WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI FROM FBO TO RWY 1L VIA TXWY H AND TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 7L. THE NIGHT WAS VERY DARK BUT CLR. AS WE APCHED TXWY B, I COMMENTED TO THE COPLT THAT I COULD NOT SEE A HOLD LINE AND WOULD STOP OPPOSITE THE TXWY B SIGN. THIS WAS AN AREA WHERE THE THRESHOLDS OF RWY 7L AND 1L CAME TOGETHER. THE COPLT CONTACTED THE TWR WHO THEN CLRED US TO CROSS RWY 7L AND TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1L. THIS AREA OF THE ARPT WAS ALSO VERY DARK AND THE TXWY LINES WERE FADED AND DIFFICULT TO SEE. I TAXIED ON THE GREEN LIGHTED TXWY CTRLINE THAT I THOUGHT LED TO RWY 1L. THE COPLT, WHO HAD THE TAXI CHART IN HAND, WAS HELPING ME WITH DIRECTIONS AND SEEMED OK WITH THIS ACTION. AS I MADE THE LEFT TURN ALONG THE CTRLINE. I REALIZED THAT I TURNED ONTO RWY 7L. I IMMEDIATELY TURNED BACK TO THE RIGHT TO GET OFF THE RWY AND TO WHAT I THOUGHT TO BE THE TXWY TOWARD RWY 1L. I HEARD THE TWR ISSUE A GO AROUND TO AN ACFT ON FINAL FOR RWY 1L AND I IMMEDIATELY STOPPED AND TOLD THE COPLT TO TELL THE TWR WE WERE NOT SURE WHERE WE WERE AND TO ASK FOR DIRECTIONS. I NEVER DID SEE A HOLD SHORT LINE FOR ANY RWY. APPARENTLY, WE ENDED UP BETWEEN RWY 1L EDGE LINE AND THE HOLD SHORT LINE WHEN I MADE THE RIGHT TURN AWAY FROM RWY 7L BACK TO RWY 1L. WE WERE BOTH CONFUSED AT THIS POINT AS TO HOW WE GOT TO WHERE WE WERE AND WHERE TO GO NEXT. TWR THEN TOLD US TO FLASH OUR TAXI LIGHTS. HE THEN ISSUED CLRNC TO TAXI STRAIGHT AHEAD TO RWY 1R AND PUT US IN POSITION AND HOLD ON RWY 1R. WE NOW HAD OUR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS BACK AND EVERYTHING PROCEEDED NORMALLY FROM HERE ON. I ALWAYS CARRY AND REVIEW GOV TAXI CHART FOR EACH ARPT I FLY INTO. I DOWNLOAD THESE FROM THE WEB PRIOR TO EACH FLT SO THAT I HAVE AN UP-TO-DATE CHART. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS VERY LITTLE DETAIL ON THE CHART FOR THE LAS TAXI AREA FOR RWY 7L AND RWY 1L. AFTER THIS INCIDENT, I ALSO REVIEWED THE LAS CHART THAT COMMERCIAL CHART COMPANY PROVIDES. WHILE IT ALSO SHOWS LITTLE DETAIL OF THE TAXI AREA FOR RWY 7L AND RWY 1L, IT DOES, HOWEVER, IDENTIFY THIS AREA AS A RWY INCURSION 'HOT SPOT.' THE GOV CHART DOES NOT HAVE THIS FEATURE. SUPPLEMENTAL

INFO FROM ACN 715135: IT WAS DAY 4 OF A VERY LONG DUTY DAY. IT WAS NIGHT, BUT WX WAS NOT A FACTOR. NEITHER PLT HAD EVER FLOWN TO LAS BEFORE, AS PNF, I WAS RUNNING THE RADIOS, UPON THE CALL TO GND CTL WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 1L, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 7L. AS WE DEPARTED THE FBO RAMP, THE CAPT COMMENTED THAT THE TXWY CTRLINE WAS FADED. WE PROCEEDED S ON TXWY H AND HELD JUST BEYOND TXWY B. AFTER A FEW MINUTES OF HOLDING, I CALLED GND TO ADVISE, 'HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 7L.' THE CTLR TOLD US TO SWITCH TO TWR. AFTER CALLING TWR. HE INSTRUCTED US TO, 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 7L.' THIS WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY ME. WE DID NOT MOVE AT THAT POINT. A VERY SHORT TIME LATER (APPROX 20 SECONDS), HE CALLED US AND TOLD US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1L. THIS WAS ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED. AS WE STARTED TO MOVE, I GLANCED DOWN AT THE TAXI CHART. WHEN I LOOKED BACK OUT, I WAS MOMENTARILY DISORIENTED BUT THE CAPT AND I SIMULTANEOUSLY REALIZED WE WERE LINED UP WITH RWY 7L. I SUGGESTED A HARD RIGHT TURN TO GET BACK OVER TO RWY 1L. AT ABOUT THIS TIME THE CTLR ORDERED AN AIR CARRIER TO GO AROUND. THE CAPT DID MAKE A HARD RIGHT TURN TO MANEUVER BACK OVER TO RWY 1L. HE TAXIED SLOWLY LOOKING FOR THE HOLD SHORT LINE. NEITHER OF US EVER SAW ANY HOLD SHORT MARKINGS FOR EITHER RWY. AS WE APPROACHED THE RWY EDGE LINE FOR RWY 1L, I ADVISED THE CAPT TO STOP. TWR CALLED US BEFORE WE COULD CALL HIM AND HE INSTRUCTED US TO EXPEDITE ACROSS RWY 1L AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1R. WE COMPLIED, AND AFTER A PERIOD OF TIME WE WERE CLRED TO DEPART RWY 1R. CONCLUSIONS: IF I HAD TO DO IT ALL OVER AGAIN, I WOULD REQUEST A RWY 1L AT TXWY B DEPARTURE AND NOT DEAL WITH THE POORLY MARKED CORNER OF THE AIRFIELD. CREW FATIGUE WAS PROBABLY A FACTOR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 715134 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE INTXN IS EXTREMELY CONFUSING AND THEY NEVER DID SEE THE HOLD LINE.

Synopsis

LEAR 45 CREW RPTS PROBS WITH RWY HOLD SHORT MARKINGS AT LAS RWY 1L/7L JUNCTION.

Time / Day

Date: 200610 Day: Thu

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: BOS.Airport

State Reference : MA

Altitude. AGL. Single Value: 1000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: A90.TRACON

Operator. General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Falcon 20FJF/20C/20D/20E/20F

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial

Route In Use.Departure.SID: WYLYY.5

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: FMS/FMC

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 80 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 8000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 700

ASRS Report: 714672

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON A DEADHEAD LEG BACK TO BASE WITH THE FO IN THE L SEAT, WE FLEW RWY HDG OFF OF RWY 27 ON THE WYLYY 5 RNAV DEP THAT CALLS FOR A L TURN SWBOUND TOWARDS THE FIRST FIX. THE END OF A LONG DAY, A SEAT SWAP, AND NIGHTTIME CONDITIONS WITH THE CAPT RUNNING AFTER TKOF CHKLISTS, RESULTED IN BEING QUERIED BY BOS DEP CTL OF OUR HDG. UPON REALIZING WE NEGLECTED TO FOLLOW THE SID, WE NOTIFIED THE CTLR OF OUR 270 DEG HDG AND WERE GIVEN ALTERNATE VECTORS AND COMPLIED. OUR PART 135 OP ARE NOT APPROVED FOR RNAV SIDS AND STARS. OUR FIRST MISTAKE WAS ACCEPTING THE SID, EVEN AS A 91 REPOS. OUR NON COMPLIANCE WOULD HAVE BEEN ALLEVIATED HAD BOTH PLTS BEEN ATTENTIVE TO THE IMPROPER FLT PATH AS WELL AS THE SELECTION OF THE FMS AS GUIDANCE BY THE PF. A MORE IN DEPTH BRIEFING OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN RNAV DEP AND STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH COMPANY SOP'S WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE.

Synopsis

A FALCON 20 ON WYLYY DEP FROM BOS DEVIATE FROM THE CHARTED TRACK.

Time / Day

Date: 200610 Day: Fri

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: LAS.Airport

State Reference: NV

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 10000 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 19000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: L30.TRACON Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name : Learjet 60

Make Model Name: LearJet 60
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude Route In Use.Departure.SID : BOACH2

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot: Flight Engineer

Experience. Flight Time. Last 90 Days: 162

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 6000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 162

ASRS Report: 713679

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE TOOK OFF FROM LAS ON RWY 19R AT XA43Z. THE FO WAS THE PF AND THE CLRNC WAS TO FLY THE BOACH TWO RNAV DEP. THE FO WAS HAND FLYING THE ACFT ON THE RNAV DEP USING THE FLT DIRECTOR. AS THIS WAS A POS LEG WITHOUT PAX HE WAS CLBING AT A RAPID RATE OF APPROX 4000-6000 FPM. AFTER I COMPLETED THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST I NOTICED THAT WE APPEARED TO BE SLIGHTLY OFF COURSE. I MENTIONED THIS TO THE FO AND HE BEGAN TO CORRECT TOWARD THE PROPER COURSE. WE WERE BOTH PUZZLED AS TO THE REASON FOR THE COURSE DEV BECAUSE THE RNAV DEP WAS CORRECTLY DISPLAYED ON BOTH OUR PFD'S. BEFORE WE WERE ABLE TO CONTINUE ANALYZING THE CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND OUR DEV THE DEP CTLR CALLED AND SAID THAT WE WERE NOT ON THE RNAV DEP. I STATED THAT WE HAD GONE OFF THE COURSE BUT THAT WE WERE CORRECTING TO GET BACK ON IT. THE CTLR THEN GAVE US DIRECTIONS TO FLY OUR PRESENT HDG TO INTERCEPT AND TRACK INBOUND ON THE 213 DEG RADIAL TO HEC. WE WERE THEN IMMEDIATELY PASSED ON TO ANOTHER FREQ. DUE TO THE NEW CLRNC AND ITS ASSOCIATED WORKLOAD ALONG WITH THE RAPID HDOF WE WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE EXACT REASON FOR OUR DEV. I BELIEVE THIS ALL OCCURRED BTWN THE ROPPR-RODDD FIXES ON THE DEP. I ESTIMATE WE STRAYED OFF COURSE 2-4 NM. POSSIBLE CAUSES/CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR MALFUNCTION -- LATER IN THE FLT WHILE ON DSCNT WITH THE AUTOPLT FLYING WE INEXPLICABLY BEGAN TO CLB. AS WE WERE ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AUTOPLT PROB EARLIER WE WERE BOTH CLOSELY MONITORING OUR FLT PATH AND THE FO IMMEDIATELY BEGAN HAND FLYING THE ACFT. AFTER DSCNT WAS AGAIN STABILIZED THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AND NO OTHER PROBS WERE NOTED. 2) LEAR 60 FLT DIRECTOR OP -- BECAUSE OUR LR60 NORMALLY OPERATES WITH A 'SPLIT' FMS AND FLT DIRECTOR IT IS DIFFICULT TO QUICKLY DETERMINE WHAT COURSE THE OTHER PLT'S FLT DIRECTOR IS FOLLOWING. EACH PLT HAS AN INDIVIDUAL FLT CTL PANEL WHERE THEY MAY CHOOSE DIFFERENT FLT DIRECTOR INPUTS. ALTHOUGH SOP IS TO HAVE BOTH FLT DIRECTORS MATCH, DURING A HIGH WORKLOAD PERIOD THIS IS NOT ALWAYS POSSIBLE. 3) AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR SELECTED TO HDG NOT NAV MODE -- THE FO MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY SELECTED HDG ON THE FCP WHILE I WAS COMPLETING THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST AND COMMUNICATING ON THE RADIO. THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT FOR ME TO SEE IMMEDIATELY SINCE MY FLT DIRECTOR WAS IN NAV MODE. WHEN WE REALIZED THAT WE HAD DEVIATED FROM COURSE THE AUTOPLT WAS IMMEDIATELY DISCONNECTED AND THE FO BEGAN PUSHING VARIOUS BUTTONS ON THE FCP IN AN EFFORT TO RESELECT THE RNAV DEP. I WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHAT THE EXACT AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR CONFIGN WAS ON HIS SIDE AT THE TIME OF OUR DEV. 4) FATIGUE --BOTH THE FO AND I HAD BEEN ON MINIMUM REST THE PREVIOUS NIGHT. WE ALSO ENCOUNTERED NUMEROUS PROBS BEFORE BEGINNING OUR SEQUENCE OF TRIPS IN THE MORNING (GND TRANSPORTATION FAILED TO SHOW, 2 BROKEN

GPU'S, DIFFICULTY STARTING ACFT). OUR TRIP FROM LAS WAS THE 3RD AND FINAL LEG OF THE DAY. I BELIEVE ALL THESE FACTORS MAY HAVE COMPOUNDED OUR FATIGUE AND DIMINISHED OUR CONCENTRATION AND LED TO A STATE OF COMPLACENCY LATER IN THE DAY. WE CLRLY DID NOT MONITOR THE ACFT FLT PATH AS CLOSELY AS WE SHOULD HAVE.

Synopsis

LEAR 60 CREW GOES OFF COURSE ON THE BOACH DEP DEPARTING LAS.

Time / Day

Date: 200610 Day: Fri

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: TEB. Airport

State Reference: NJ

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 1500 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 1800

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Corporate Make Model Name: BAe 125 Series 800 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: N90.TRACON

Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 120 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 15800 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 5500

ASRS Report: 713552

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 45 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 7100

Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1200

ASRS Report: 713550

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Person: 4

Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Crossing Restriction Not Met

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Overshoot Anomaly. Conflict: Airborne Less Severe Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment: TCAS Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Assigned Altitude

Miss Distance. Vertical: 1000

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE DEPARTING TEB AT THE START OF RUSH HOUR ON RWY 24 ASSIGNED THE TEB 5 DEP. THE TEXTUAL DESCRIPTION SAYS TO FLY RWY HEADING UNTIL REACHING 1500 FT THEN FLY HEADING 280. MAINTAIN 1500 FT UNTIL 4.5 DME FROM TEB THEN CLB TO 2000 FT. WE HAD AMPLE TIME TO DISCUSS THE DEP SINCE WE WERE ABOUT NUMBER 7 FOR DEP AND ELECTED TO SET 2000 FT IN THE ALT ALERTER. TKOF WAS NORMAL WITH A NOISE ABATEMENT CLB EXECUTED. JUST AFTER GEAR AND FLAPS WERE RETRACTED, CLBING THROUGH ABOUT 1000 FT, WE GOT A TFC ALERT FROM THE TCAS. BOTH CREWMEMBERS LOOKED OUTSIDE FOR THE TFC. I MADE THE HEADING CHANGE TO 280 DEGS, BUT DID NOT LEVEL AT 1500 FT DUE TO THE TFC DISTRACTION. I NOTICED MY ERROR AT 1800 FT AND PUSHED OVER TO DESCEND JUST AS DEP CTL CALLED TO TELL US TO WATCH OUR ALT. WE LEVELED AT 1500 FT AND RESUMED THE DEP AS REQUESTED. I WAS GIVEN A TELEPHONE NUMBER TO CALL UPON ARR AT DEST. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) HIGH TFC, HIGH WORKLOAD ENVIRONMENT. THIS DEP REQUIRES A NOISE ABATEMENT CLB WITH A TURN AND LEVEL OFF AT 1500 FT MSL. 2) PART TIME FO WHOM I FLY WITH ON A SPORADIC BASIS. 3) WE HAD EXPERIENCED A RESOLUTION ADVISORY (RA) FROM THE TCAS ON THE ARR 3 HOURS EARLIER AND HAD TAKEN EVASIVE ACTION TO AVOID A COLLISION WITH AN ACFT ATC WAS NOT TALKING TO. WE WERE 'SPRING LOADED' TO TCAS ALERTS FROM THE CLOSE CALL A FEW HOURS EARLIER. BOTH OF US SHOULD NOT HAVE LOOKED OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT AT THE SAME TIME DURING THIS HIGH WORKLOAD PHASE OF FLT. THE INITIAL ALT OF 1500 FT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET IN THE ALT ALERTER INSTEAD OF 2000 FT. BOTH CREW MEMBERS

SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE DILIGENT IN ALT MONITORING. WE WERE NOT FATIGUED FROM A LONG DAY, BUT HAD BEEN IN A HIGH STRESS, HIGH WORKLOAD ENVIRONMENT ALL DAY HAVING COME FROM THE WASHINGTON, DC, AREA TO THE NEW YORK AREA.

Synopsis

A HAWKER HS125 DEPARTING TEB ON THE TEB DEP FAILED TO LEVEL OFF AT THE CHARTED 1500 FT RESTR, CLBING TO 1800 FT, AT LEAST PARTLY BECAUSE OF A TCAS TA.

Time / Day

Date: 200610 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 34000

Environment

Flight Conditions : Mixed Weather Elements : Ice

Light: Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier: Charter
Make Model Name: Learjet 35
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Powerplant Lubrication System

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Charter Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 110

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 6285 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 4600

ASRS Report: 713390

Person: 2 Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Charter Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 4

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Weather

Independent Detector. Aircraft Equipment. Other Aircraft Equipment: Low Oil

Pressure Light

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

ON OCT/XA/06, I WAS PIC OF A LEARJET 35 ON A ROUTINE FAR 135 CHARTER. THIS FLT ORIGINATED AND WAS SUPPOSED TO END IN ZZZ1, WITH A LAYOVER IN ZZZ2. ALTHOUGH WE LEFT ZZZ1 AT XAOOL AND ZZZ2 AT XP45L ON THE SAME DAY, BOTH THE SIC AND I COMPLETED THE NECESSARY 10 HRS REST PERIOD IN A HOTEL BTWN FLTS. THE PROB OUR FLT INCURRED DID NOT HAPPEN UNTIL REACHING FL340 WHILE CLBING ENRTE BACK TO ZZZ1 (ABOUT XQ15L). UPON CLBING THROUGH FL340, I NOTICED A LOW OIL PRESSURE LIGHT FOR THE L ENG. I THEN LOOKED OVER TO THE ASSOCIATED ENG GAUGES AND ALL THREE LOOKED NORMAL. NO INCREASE IN ITT, N1, OR N2. I THEN LOOKED OVER TO THE L ENG OIL PRESSURE GAUGE AND SAW IT SLOWLY DECREASING. LOOKING TOWARDS THE SIC, I ASKED HIM TO PULL OUT THE CHKLIST FOR THE LOW OIL PRESSURE LIGHT, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY PULLING THE L ENG THROTTLE TO IDLE. AT THE TIME, WE WERE FLYING IN HIGH LEVEL ICING CONDITIONS WITH NACELLE, WING, AND STABILIZER ANTI-ICING DEVICES ON. I THEN ASKED ATC TO LEVEL AT FL350, BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT FL360 WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE. AFTER COMPLETING THE SHORT CHKLIST, THE SIC HANDED ME THE CHKLIST AS I WANTED TO CONFIRM ITS COMPLETION. BY THIS TIME, OUR ACFT WAS STABLE AND LEVEL AT FL360. I SHUT DOWN THE L ENG AS THE CHKLIST CALLED FOR, TRYING TO PREVENT ANY ACFT DAMAGE THAT COULD HAVE FOLLOWED. I THEN ASKED ATC TO DSND AND INFORMED HIM OF THE SITUATION. I DID DECLARE AN EMER AND I SOON AFTER ASKED ATC IF HE COULD SUGGEST AN ARPT NEARBY WITH A RELATIVELY LONG RWY AND GOOD WX. HE CAME BACK WITH ZZZ. I SAID FINE AND ATC GAVE US CLRNC TO FLY DIRECTLY TO ZZZ. DURING OUR DSCNT TO ZZZ, WE COMPLETED SEVERAL MORE CHKLISTS, INCLUDING ABNORMAL SINGLE-ENG LNDG. AS PIC, I ALSO DECIDED THAT ZZZ WAS NOT THE BEST PLACE FOR US TO DIVERT. 1) IT WAS AN AIR FORCE BASE. 2) ATC INFORMED US THAT THE CEILINGS WERE 1500 FT OVCST. 3) I WAS UNSURE THE LOCATION COULD ACCOMMODATE ANY MAINT FOR THE ACFT. AND 4) OUR PAX WOULD NOT HAVE AN IDEAL WAY TO CONTINUE THEIR TRIP HOME FROM ZZZ, I CHOSE TO DIVERT TO ZZZ3, HAVING PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE OF ITS CHARACTERISTICS AND DEEMING IT A SAFE PLACE TO LAND. WE COMPLETED OUR APCH AND LNDG INTO ZZZ3, WITHOUT ANY PROBS, EXCEPT FOR OUR INABILITY TO TURN ON THE RWY LIGHTS USING THE PLT CTLED LIGHTING. IT TOOK OVER 10 'CLICKS' TO ACTIVATE THE LIGHTS. HAVING SPENT THE BETTER HALF OF THE DAY TRYING TO REST FOR OUR LATE TRIP BACK TO ZZZ1, I FOUND THAT BOTH OUR EARLY AND LATE HRS DURING THE TRIP WAS STILL A FACTOR IN MY DECISION MAKING ABILITIES. MY PERFORMANCE IN SHUTTING DOWN THE

ENG COULD HAVE BEEN EXPEDITED. OUR DECISION TO LAND AT AN ARPT WITHOUT AN OPEN TWR COULD BE QUESTIONED. I CAN ONLY SAY THAT I DEALT WITH THE SITUATION AS CALMLY AS POSSIBLE, TAKING FULL USE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE AREA AND TRYING TO PREVENT A POSSIBLE ACCIDENT. I DID NOT KNOW FOR SURE WHAT OTHER PROBS COULD HAVE OCCURRED IN RELATION TO THE LOW OIL PRESSURE IN THE L ENG. LACK OF OIL WAS AN OBVIOUS REASON, BUT COULD IT HAVE BEEN SOMETHING ELSE. COULD OUR PREFLT HAVE MISSED SOMETHING? THIS WAS MY REASONING FOR NOT LOOKING LONGER FOR A MORE SUITABLE ARPT. I CAN SAY THIS EXPERIENCE CHANGED THE WAY I LOOK AT AVIATION, SINCE IT WAS MY FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH A POTENTIALLY FATAL SITUATION. ALL MY TRAINING, WHETHER IT BE IN AN ACTUAL ACFT OR A SIMULATOR, DID PREPARE ME FOR THIS SITUATION. HOWEVER, ONE'S PHYSICAL CONDITION ALWAYS HAVE A TREMENDOUS EFFECT.

Synopsis

A LR35 CAPT RPTS DECLARING AN EMER AND DIVERTING TO A NEARBY ARPT FOLLOWING A LOW OIL PRESSURE WARNING. FATIGUE PLAYED A PART.

Time / Day

Date: 200610 Day: Fri

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Taxi Make Model Name: Beech 1900 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135

Flight Phase.Landing: Roll

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Taxi Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot : ATP Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Qualification.Pilot: Flight Engineer

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 195

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 6075 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 275

ASRS Report: 713094

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Taxi Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Events

Anomaly. Excursion: Runway

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence: FAR

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Consequence.Other: Aircraft Damaged

Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WITH THE ARPT IN SIGHT WE CANCELED IFR AND THE CAPT CHOSE A STRAIGHT-IN LNDG. WINDS WERE RPTED AT 180 DEGS 5 KTS SCATTERED, CLR CONDITIONS. SLIGHTLY HIGH ON A 2 MI FINAL WE WERE VREF +15 KTS AND CROSSED OVER THE NUMBERS AT VREF +10 KTS. VREF SPDS WERE CALLED OUT THROUGHOUT THE APCH. WE EXCESSIVELY FLOATED OVER THE RWY AT WHICH TIME I CALLED OUT THAT WE WERE TOO LONG. THE CAPT SAID I KNOW AND PROCEEDED TO LAND THE AIRPLANE. HE APPLIED REVERSE IMMEDIATELY AND AS I SAW THE END OF THE RWY APCHING I GOT ON THE BRAKES AS WELL WITH MAX BRAKING. WE CAME TO A STOP AT THE VERY END OF RWY AND TOOK OUT A LIGHT AT THE END OF RWY. AFTER TAXIING IN TO THE TERMINAL AND OPENING THE DOOR WE REALIZED WE HAD A PROP STRIKE BELIEVED TO BE FROM THE LIGHT. PAX WERE ALL FINE, NO COMPLAINTS AND PROBABLY DID NOT REALIZE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION. I BELIEVE THIS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY BEING ON VREF OVER THE NUMBERS AND GETTING IT DOWN OVER THE RWY PWR IDLE AND TOUCHING DOWN, LOOKING BACK, I COULD HAVE BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE THROUGHOUT THE APCH. THE CAPT HAD 1200+ HRS IN TYPE. WE HAD FLOWN 2 DAYS TOGETHER WITHOUT A PROB. POOR JUDGEMENT. AND A BAD DECISION TO LAND THE AIRPLANE BY THE CAPT MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED SOMEWHAT BY FATIGUE. THIS WAS OUR 5TH LEG APCHING A 10 HR DUTY DAY. IT WAS JUST AFTER XAOO AND FELT LATER. PERCEPTIONS. JUDGEMENTS, AND DECISION I BELIEVE CAN ALL BE AFFECTED AT NIGHT (OR ANY TIME) AFTER A LONG DAY.

Synopsis

BE1900 CREW LANDS LONG AND PROP STRIKES A LIGHT AT THE END OF RWY.

Time / Day

Date: 200609 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: HNL. Airport

State Reference: HI

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: HNL.Tower Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Ground: Taxi

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 178.6

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 12500 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 520

ASRS Report: 712627

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA

Function.Controller: Combined Local

Events

Anomaly.Incursion: Runway

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3

Resolutory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance Resolutory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE TRIP ON WHICH THE PROB AROSE WAS A CPR TRIP TO HNL. PRIOR TO LNDG IN HNL. WE RECEIVED THE CURRENT ATIS AND DID A COMPLETE BRIEF ON THE TYPE OF APCH, LNDG RWY AND THE LOCATION OF THE FBO. THE FO WAS A NEW HIRE BUT WITH APPROX 7000 HRS AND 5000 HRS JET EXPERIENCE. AND EXPERIENCE AT THIS ARPT. I HAD BRIEFED THAT WE WOULD LAND RWY 4R AND THAT IT WOULD BE A L TURN OFF THE RWY FOR THE FBO. THE FO DID NOT DISAGREE NOR DID HE ADD ANYTHING TO THE BRIEFING. THE PROPER EXIT WOULD HAVE BEEN TO THE R (S) AND NOT THE L. ALL APCH PLATES WERE READY ON OUR ELECTRONIC FLT BAGS. AFTER LNDG RWY 4R I EXITED TO THE L (N) AS BRIEFED. THE ATC CTLR THEN INFORMED US WE SHOULD HAVE TURNED R AND GAVE US A LENGTHY TAXI CLRNC TO THE FBO ALL THE WAY TO DEST. MY FO REPLIED, 'ROGER' AND DID NOT GIVE A COMPLETE READBACK OF THE TAXI CLRNC. I QUERIED IF HE GAVE A READBACK AND HE SAID NO. THE CTLR WAS WORKING BOTH GND AND TWR FREQS AND SEEMED TOO BUSY FOR FURTHER QUESTIONS OR A PROGRESSIVE AS I WOULD HAVE LIKED AS WE WERE TIRED AT THE TIME ALSO. I BEGAN TO TAXI AS WHAT I BELIEVED WAS THE CORRECT DIRECTION ALTHOUGH THAT AREA WAS POORLY MARKED AND DIMLY LIT. THE CTLR INFORMED US WE HAD TAXIED ON THE WRONG RWY AND I THEN INSISTED ON A PROGRESSIVE AS IT WAS OBVIOUS WE WERE DISORIENTED. ONCE REACHING THE FBO AREA I APOLOGIZED FOR THE CONFUSION AND NOTHING FURTHER WAS INDICATED FROM THE CTLR AS THERE HAVING BEEN A PROB. TO MY KNOWLEDGE THERE WAS NO EVASIVE ACTION OR INCONVENIENCE TO ANY OTHER ACFT. IN REVIEW OF THE CHAIN OF EVENTS MY EVALUATION IS SUCH THAT FIRSTLY I SHOULD HAVE INSISTED THAT MY FO GIVE A COMPLETE READBACK OF THE CLRNC. I SHOULD NOT HAVE BEGUN TO TAXI UNTIL WE POSITIVELY WERE ORIENTED ON THE CHART AND UNDERSTOOD THE DIRECTIONS. THE CTLR ALSO SOUNDED DISPLEASED AND DID NOT LEND HIMSELF TO FURTHER INQUIRIES. THE CTLR WORKING 2 FREQS AT THE TIME MAY HAVE ADDED TO HIS ABILITY TO DISCERN THAT WE WERE NOT SURE OF OUR LOCATION NOR DID HE INSIST ON A FULL READBACK. THE DUTY DAY WAS AT LEAST 12 HRS PRIOR TO THE SITUATION OCCURRING WITH THE CREW BEING AWAKE AN ADDITIONAL 4-5 HRS PRIOR TO THIS. FATIGUE DEFINITELY WAS A FACTOR. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE HNL FLT I EVALUATED THE SITUATION AND IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENTED SOME NEW PROCS AND REINFORCED OTHERS THAT I HAVE UTILIZED MOST OF MY FLYING CAREER. THESE PROCS I BELIEVE WILL ELIMINATE ANOTHER SITUATION LIKE THIS OCCURRING AGAIN IN OUR DEPT. I ALSO FELT THERE WAS A PROB WITH MY FO'S PROCS AND REVIEWED EVERYTHING WITH HIM AGAIN. FIRSTLY, ALL TAXI CLRNCS WILL BE FULLY READ BACK AND COPIED DOWN. (THIS IS A PROC I HAVE ADHERED TO IN THE PAST). SECONDLY, I HAVE REITERATED THAT NO CHKLISTS WILL BE COMMENCED UNTIL A) THE ACFT IS CLR OF THE RWY, B) TAXI CLRNCS ARE COPIED, READ BACK AND UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH PLTS, C) THE PF IS ORIENTED AND COMFORTABLE WITH THE TAXI CLRNC. THIRDLY, SHOULD THERE BE ANY CONFUSION OR QUESTION AS TO THE TAXI CLRNC THE ACFT WILL STOP UNTIL IT IS RECTIFIED. I ALSO FEEL THAT THERE ARE SOME PROBS WITH THE ELECTRONIC FLT BGS IN THAT THEY ARE DIFFICULT TO SWITCH PAGES AS WELL AS MAGNIFICATION FOR THE AREA

THAT YOU ARE WORKING. WE ARE NOW PRINTING THE CHARTS WHENEVER POSSIBLE AND FEEL PAPER IS STILL MUCH MORE MANAGEABLE AND EFFICIENT.

Synopsis

FLT CREW TAXIES ONTO WRONG RWY AT HNL AFTER LONG PACIFIC FLT.

Time / Day

Date: 200609 Day: Thu

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: RNO. Airport

State Reference: NV

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: RNO.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Taxi Make Model Name: Beechjet 400 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial

Route In Use.Departure.SID: mustang

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: FMS/FMC

Component: 2

Aircraft Component: Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Taxi Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 75 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 11000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 2000

ASRS Report: 710292

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Taxi Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

VERY SIMPLY, THE FO RECEIVED A DEP CLRNC FOR THE RENO 3 DEP AND LOADED THE MUSTANG 6 DEP IN THE FMS. DURING THE TAXI CHK I ASKED HIM TO BRIEF THE DEP. I BELIEVE HE STATED THAT WE HAD THE RENO 3, BUT HE READ THE DEP FROM THE MUSTANG DEP. I'VE ASKED MYSELF HOW THIS COULD HAPPEN AND HOW I MISSED IT. THE THINGS THAT I FEEL CONTRIBUTED TO US FLYING THE WRONG DEP WERE: 1) WE WERE ON DAY 7 OF A BUSY 8 DAY TOUR. WE WERE ALSO ON THE 5TH LEG OF A VERY BUSY DAY WITH SHORT TURNS. OUR DAY HAD STARTED EARLY AND COMBINED WITH OUR CUMULATIVE FATIGUE, WE WERE VERY TIRED. 2) THE ELECTRONIC CHARTS WE USE ARE A CONTINUING SOURCE OF FRUSTRATION TO ME. WE NOW HAVE A MOUNTING BRACKET ON THE COPLT'S SIDE, WHICH PUTS THE UNIT DIRECTLY IN THE SUN. THE PLT IN THE R SEAT HAS TROUBLE READING IT AND THE PLT IN THE L CAN'T SEE IT AT ALL. HAD I HAD A CHART THAT I COULD SEE, I MAY HAVE CAUGHT THIS MISTAKE.

Synopsis

BE40 FLIES MUSTANG VICE RENO SID AS CLRED FROM RNO. CITE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH ELECTRONIC FLT BAG.

Time / Day

Date: 200607 Day: Fri

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: LTAA.ARTCC

State Reference: FO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 40000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: LTAA.ARTCC

Operator.Common Carrier: Charter

Make Model Name: MD-11

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Charter Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot : ATP Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 150

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 7000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1500

ASRS Report: 703471

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Charter Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Overshoot Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON CLBOUT FROM OKBK WE RECEIVED MULTIPLE HDG AND ALT CHANGES AND DID NOT ACCOMPLISH RESETTING THE ALTIMETER AT TRANSITION ALT. THIS WAS ALSO AT APPROX XA00 AND 10+ HRS INTO OUR DUTY DAY. WE PROCEEDED THROUGH IRAQ AIRSPACE AND WHEN XING INTO EURO RVSM ANKARA SAW THE ALTDEV OF 400 FT. WE IMMEDIATE RESET TO 1013 MILLIBARS AND DSNDED TO OUR CORRECT LEVEL. 3 PLTS WATCHED THIS HAPPEN AND NONE NOTICED IT. I HAVE TO BELIEVE FATIGUE WAS A LARGE CONTRIBUTOR. I ALSO MISSED THE ITEM ON THE ENRTE CLB CHKLIST. PERHAPS WE SHOULD BE DOING THE CHKLIST AT TA RATHER THAN FL180.

Synopsis

MD11 FLT CREW HAS AN ENRTE ALTDEV.

Time / Day

Date: 200607 Day: Tue

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: IPT.Airport

State Reference: PA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 6000

Environment

Flight Conditions: IMC

Weather Elements: Turbulence

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZNY.ARTCC Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Falcon 50 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Cruise: Enroute Altitude Change

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZNY.ARTCC

Make Model Name: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer II/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 45 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 15200 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 3500

ASRS Report: 703037

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 150

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 14000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 5000

ASRS Report: 703156

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Radar

Person: 4

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Function.Oversight: PIC

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : Conflict Alert

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 2
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Assigned Altitude

Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Weather

Narrative

LOSS OF ACFT SEPARATION OCCURRED DUE TO CONVECTIVE TURB CAUSING MOMENTARY ALTDEV OF 150-200 FT FROM THE ASSIGNED ALT OF 6000 FT MSL. OTHER ACFT WAS AT AN ASSIGNED ALT OF 7000 FT MSL. THE PF WAS HAND FLYING THE ACFT, THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT ENGAGED. THE ALT CAPTURE FUNCTION OF THE ALT PRESELECT FEATURE WAS NOT FUNCTIONING CORRECTLY. IT WAS NOTICED ON THE PREVIOUS LEG, AND WAS INTERMITTENTLY INOP. CREW CORRECTED TO 6000 FT IMMEDIATELY, AND THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. CREW WAS NOTIFIED ON THE LOSS OF SEPARATION AFTER LNDG AT FRG ARPT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 703156: WE DID OBSERVE A SLIGHT DEV ABOVE 6000 FT AS OUR ALT SELECT DID NOT CAPTURE AT EXACTLY 6000 FT. I DO REMEMBER MAKING THE OBSERVATION TO MY FO THAT THE ALT HOLD DID NOT ENGAGE AT 6000 FT. THIS HAPPENED AT THE END OF A 13 HR DUTY DAY IN CUMULUS CLOUDS IN AN AREA OF CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY.

Synopsis

FALCON 50EX FLT CREW HAS AN ALTDEV RESULTING IN LOSS OF SEPARATION DURING DEP FROM IPT.

Time / Day

Date: 200606 Day: Sat

Local Time Of Day: 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: HLG. Airport

State Reference : WV Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : Marginal

Light : Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: PIT.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Taxi Make Model Name: King Air C90 E90 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135

Flight Phase.Landing: Roll

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Main Gear Tire

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Taxi Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Qualification.Pilot: Flight Engineer Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 94 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 10360 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 582

ASRS Report: 701751

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Taxi Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 40 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 1600 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 720

ASRS Report: 701973

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe

Anomaly. Excursion: Runway Anomaly. Other Anomaly

Anomaly.Other Anomaly: Unstabilized Approach Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2 Resolutory Action.None Taken: Insufficient Time

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft Problem Areas : Airport

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE EXITED THE RWY AT HLF WITH A BLOWN TIRE. THERE WAS NO OTHER DAMAGE (NEITHER ACFT, PERSONAL NOR PROPERTY). THE EVENT WAS A RESULT OF FATIGUE AND A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY. THE COPLT, A 4 YR VETERAN, WAS FLYING. HE PERFORMED NORMALLY PRIOR TO THE EVENT. THE WX WAS IFR WITH A 500 FT CEILING, CALM WINDS AND 2 1/2 MI VISIBILITY ON THE ILS TO RWY 3 AT HLG. WE WERE VECTORED ONTO FINAL ABOUT 2 MI OUTSIDE OF THE MARKER. HE HAD APCH FLAPS AND 150 KTS. HE LOWERED THE GEAR JUST BEFORE CAPTURING THE GS. FROM THAT POINT ON THE ESSENTIALLY SHUT DOWN. HE INITIALLY FAILED TO CAPTURE THE GS. RECOGNIZING THAT VIA MY PROMPTING THAT THE GS WAS BELOW US HE STARTED A 1000 FPM DSCNT TO RE-INTERCEPT. HE DID NOT REDUCE THE PWR AS REQUIRED BY THE ACCELERATED RATE OF DSCNT. IRONICALLY I SAID 'YOU'VE GOT TO SLOW DOWN, WE DON'T WANT TO GO OFF THE END OF THE RWY.' HE RESPONDED. 'I WOULD NEVER DO THAT TO YOU.' I AGAIN INFORMED HIM THAT WE WERE FAST, AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED. WE BROKE OUT AT 500 FT WITH THE GEAR DOWN AND APCH FLAPS BUT WITH 140 KTS STILL. I AGAIN TOLD HIM WE WERE FAST AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED. AT 200 FT WE WERE STILL TOO FAST FOR FULL FLAPS (130 KT LIMIT) SO I TOLD HIM TO 'JUST PULL THEM TO IDLE.' AGAIN HE ACKNOWLEDGED BUT THERE WAS LITTLE PHYSICAL MOVEMENT. WE TOUCHED DOWN AT 2000 FT WITH 3000 FT REMAINING AT APPROX 120 KTS WITH APCH FLAPS. I HAD A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY FROM THE KING AIR'S NORMAL STOPPING PERFORMANCE COUPLED WITH THE FO'S NORMAL PERFORMANCE. THE PROB WAS THAT HE HAD PHYSICALLY SHUT DOWN AND DID NOT GO INTO REVERSE EVEN THOUGH HIS HAND WAS IN POS TO DO SO. AT 2000 FT REMAINING AND 100 KTS, HE APPLIED TOE BRAKING WITH LITTLE EFFECT. I WAS RELUCTANT TO ABORT THE LNDG AT THIS POINT BECAUSE THE BRAKES WERE BECOMING EFFECTIVE AND WE WERE CLOSING IN ON LESS THAN 1500 FT REMAINING. I HELPED APPLY MAX BRAKING AT 1000 FT REMAINING FAVORING THE L RUDDER TO ENSURE WE WOULD MISS THE LIGHTS AT THE END. THIS ACTION LOCKED THE L TIRE AND CAUSED IT TO FAIL. WE WENT OFF INTO THE GRASS WHICH WAS VERY WET AND SLIPPERY DUE TO CONDENSATION AND INTERMITTENT GND FOG. THE ACFT SKIDDED TO A STOP WITH NO DAMAGE.

Synopsis

KINGAIR 90 FLT CREW HAS A RWY EXCURSION AT HLG.

Time / Day

Date: 200606 Day: Fri

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport: MSY.Airport

State Reference : LA

Altitude. AGL. Single Value: 1000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC Weather Elements.Other

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: MSY.Tower Operator.Common Carrier: Air Taxi

Make Model Name: Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C, 210D

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach Route In Use.Approach: Visual

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Taxi Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial Qualification.Pilot : Instrument Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 300

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 1550 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 300

ASRS Report: 699031

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence : Clearance Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerB: 2

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE ON THE 12TH HR OF A 14 HR DUTY DAY, PART 135 SINGLE PLT IFR, WAS ON A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 1 AT MSY. WHEN SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ, ASKED TO SWITCH TO RWY 28. CLRED THE VISUAL AND CLRED TO LAND. WHILE CONFIGURING THE ACFT TO LAND, INSTEAD OF JOINING A LEFT DOWNWIND TO RWY 28, JOINED A R BASE TO RWY 10. FATIGUE PLAYED A BIG PART IN LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. QUERIED BY ATC AS TO WHICH RWY WAS GOING TO, TOLD THE RWY 10 WHEN REALIZED THAT IS WHERE I WAS DSNDING TO. ATC THEN CLRED ME TO LAND RWY 10. AT NO POINT DID I CROSS THE EXTENDED RWY CTRLINE UNTIL I WAS CLRED TO LAND. I THINK THAT A 14 HR DUTY DAY IS THE MAJOR FACTOR OF THE SIT. MORE REST FOR PART 135 WOULD SOLVE THE PROB.

Synopsis

C210 PLT APCHS WRONG RWY AT MSY.

Time / Day

Date: 200606 Day: Fri

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZBW.ARTCC

State Reference: NH

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 16000

Environment

Flight Conditions: Mixed Weather Elements: Fog Weather Elements: Rain

Weather Elements: Thunderstorm

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZBW.ARTCC Operator.General Aviation: Corporate

Make Model Name: Learjet 60 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial

Route In Use. Enroute. Airway: V489. Airway

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Pressurization Control System

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 90 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 13800 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1800

ASRS Report: 699025

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Events

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector. Aircraft Equipment. Other Aircraft Equipment: Cabin Press

Warning

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE CABIN AIR SWITCH WAS NOT TURNED ON PRIOR TO TKOF. THIS OMISSION WASN'T CAUGHT UNTIL THE 'PRESSURIZATION SYS' CAUTION ILLUMINATED AT 8000 CA. AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT TO 10000 FT WAS REQUESTED WHILE THE CREW RE-PRESSURIZED THE CABIN. LUCKILY ENOUGH THIS WAS A LOW ALT TRIP AND THE CABIN NEVER CLBED ABOUT 9500 CA. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) POOR DESIGN ON LEARJET PRESSURIZATION SYS. THE CABIN AIR SWITCH MUST BE TURNED ON PRIOR TO DEP UNLIKE MOST OTHER ACFT TYPES. FORGETTING THIS SWITCH IS A COMMON MISTAKE (ESPECIALLY IF DISTR) EVEN WITH EXPERIENCED LEAR CREWS. 2) DISTRS: WX, TRIP RTE CHANGES, RADIO CALLS, AND TFC. 3) TIRED CREW.

Synopsis

LEAR 60 FLT CREW NEGLECTS TO TURN CABIN AIR SWITCH ON PRIOR TO DEP.

Time / Day

Date: 200604 Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference. Navaid: LLC. VORTAC

State Reference: NV

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 32000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZOA.ARTCC Operator. General Aviation: Corporate Make Model Name: Citation II S2/Bravo Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91 Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot: ATP Qualification.Pilot: CFI

Qualification.Pilot: Commercial Qualification.Pilot: Instrument Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience. Flight Time. Last 90 Days: 110

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 6200 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 100

ASRS Report: 694046

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Radar

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3
Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Advisory
Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Original Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ACFT HAD A VERY UNUSUAL EFIS SYS THAT I NEVER KNEW EXISTED. BUT CRUISING AT FL320 AND EVERYTHING WAS FINE. HAD QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EFIS, STC'S AND 1 ITEM ON A CHKLIST THAT DISAGREED WITH ANOTHER CHKLIST IN THE PLANE SO I GRABBED THE AFM TO LOOK IT UP. COPLT WAS LOOKING OUTSIDE SO I BURIED MY ATTN IN THE BOOK. AFTER ABOUT 5-10 MINS I LOOKED UP AND IT LOOKED LIKE THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR WAS SHOWING A LITTLE 3-4 DEG BANK TO THE L. FIGURED I WAS JUST TIRED AND SEEING THINGS, LOOKED ELSEWHERE AND EVERYTHING WAS FINE SO IT WAS BACK INTO THE BOOK. AFTER AN UNDETERMINED TIME, PROBABLY AROUND 1 MIN, ATC CALLED AND ASKED US IF WE WERE DIRECT TO MCC (OUR DEST). I LOOKED UP AND FIGURED OUT WHAT WAS GOING WRONG, CONFESSED TO ATC AND BEGAN CORRECTING USING THE HDG MODE. WE WERE ALMOST 45 DEGS OFF OUR COURSE (ABOUT 240 DEGS) AND HEADED FOR THE MIL AIRSPACE E OF RENO. THE CTLR THEN MENTIONED THIS AND GAVE US A HDG OF 270 DEGS TO KEEP US OUT. THE COPLT SET THE HDG BUG AND WE WERE ON OUR WAY. THE CTLR ASKED US FOR OUR BEST TURN RATE, SO I USED THE TURN KNOB ON THE AUTOPLT CTL HEAD, BUT THIS DID NOT GIVE MORE THAN ABOUT A 17 DEG BANK ANGLE, SO I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND SET UP A 30 DEG TURN. SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO DEST. THE NAV MODE WAS COUPLED TO THE GNS/XLS AND HAD DISENGAGED WITHOUT OUR KNOWLEDGE. WHEN I GRABBED THE AUTOPLT TURN KNOB IT WAS CTRED AS I RECALL. SO HOW DID WE LOSE OUR NAV COUPLING? HOW DID THE PLANE GET INTO THAT BANK IF THE TURN KNOB WASN'T MOVED? NORMALLY WHEN THE NAV COUPLING IS LOST, THE PLANE WILL JUST FLY WINGS LEVEL. I DID NOTICE THAT THE EFIS, FMS AND AUTOPLT WERE FROM 3 DIFFERENT VENDORS AND DID NOT ALWAYS DO A GOOD JOB OF ACQUIRING A GPS TRACK TOGETHER AND REQUIRED SOME EXTRA ATTN WHEN COMMANDING A 'DIRECT TO.' ONCE ACQUIRED THINGS SEEMED TO GO WELL THOUGH.

Synopsis

CE550 FLT CREW HAS A TRACK HDG DEV AT FL320.

Time / Day

Date: 200601 Day: Mon

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: RLG.VORTAC

State Reference : CO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 13000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC Weather Elements : Ice

Weather Elements: Turbulence

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZDV.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation: Corporate
Make Model Name: HS 125 Series
Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC
Navigation In Use.Other.VORTAC
Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Qualification.Pilot : ATP Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 50 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 6500 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1500

ASRS Report: 685667

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Qualification.Pilot: Instrument
Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine
Qualification.Technician: Airframe
Qualification.Technician: Powerplant
Experience.Flight Time.Total: 60

Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1700

ASRS Report: 685574

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Overshoot Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerB: 3
Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Advisory

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Assigned Altitude

Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas: Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Weather

Narrative

TRIP DEST WAS ASE. APCHING DBL, WE DETERMINED ASE WAS BELOW MINIMUMS AND RIL, OUR FIRST ALTERNATE, WAS ALSO BELOW MINIMUMS. WE CHOSE EGE AS OUR NEW DEST BECAUSE OF ITS GOOD WX. WE TOOK DELAYING VECTORS TO LOAD THE APCH. BOTH PLTS EXPRESSED CONFUSION AT WHAT APCHS THE FMS DATABASE WAS OFFERING, OUR APCH WAS NOT LISTED (DUE TO BEING A CIRCLE TO LAND APCH). FOR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REASONS WE DECIDED TO BUILD THE APCH IN THE FMS AND NAV USING RAW DATA. AT THIS POINT THE CTLR BEGAN TURNING US BACK TOWARDS THE IAF AND WE BEGAN TO REVIEW WHAT HAD BEEN ENTERED. LOOKING BACK. IT IS AT THIS POINT THAT WE SHOULD HAVE DISCONTINUED OUR APCH DUE TO FEELING RUSHED. IN OUR HASTE WE BOTH FAILED TO REALIZE THAT THE ALTS WERE ENTERED AT THE WRONG FIXES ON OUR 'BUILT' APCH. XING THE IAF, I CALLED FOR THE NEXT ALT AS INDICATED BY THE FMS AND DSNDED. REACHING THE NEW ALT THE CTLR QUERIED OUR ALT, WHICH WE INDICATED WAS 13000 FT. HE INFORMED US WE SHOULD BE AT 14000 FT FOR THAT SEGMENT OF THE APCH. WE IMMEDIATELY CLBED BACK TO 14000 FT AND FINISHED THE APCH WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENT. THE CTLR DID US AN OUTSTANDING SVC. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS DEV: 1) I HAD LESS THAN 5 HRS SLEEP AND AN 0300 WAKE-UP. THIS WAS THE 4TH LEG OF THE DAY AFTER 12 HRS OF BEING AWAKE. FATIGUE WAS AN ISSUE, ESPECIALLY IN REGARDS TO OUR CONFUSION WITH THE FMS. 2) WE DID NOT KNOW OUR ULTIMATE DEST UNTIL THE LAST MIN WHICH CAUSED US TO RUSH AND FEEL RUSHED. 3) WE ALLOWED THE CTLR TO TURN US ONTO THE APCH BEFORE WE WERE READY. AGAIN, WE ALLOWED OURSELVES TO BE RUSHED EVEN THOUGH WE HAD PLENTY OF FUEL AND OPTIONS. HAD WE SIMPLY SLOWED DOWN, ENTERED A HOLD AND REVIEWED THE APCH AS WE NORMALLY WOULD THIS EVENT WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED.

Synopsis

 $\mbox{HS-125}$ FLT CREW ON A NON PRECISION APCH TO EGE, THEIR SECOND ALTERNATE, HAS AN ALTDEV.

Time / Day

Date: 200601 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: P80.TRACON

State Reference: OR

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 8000

Environment

Flight Conditions: IMC

Light: Night

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: P80.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Taxi

Make Model Name: PA-31 Navajo Chieftan/Mojave/Navajo T1020

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 135

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Taxi Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot Qualification.Pilot: Commercial Qualification.Pilot: Instrument Qualification.Pilot: Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 200

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 2000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 600

ASRS Report: 684203

Person: 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly. Non Adherence : Clearance Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1
Resolutory Action.Controller: Provided Flight Assist
Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Became Reoriented

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Returned To Original Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS FLYING AN PIPER PA31-350. I WAS ENRTE FROM BFI TO PDX, ON AN IFR FLT PLAN. THE CONDITIONS WERE IMC, AT NIGHT, CRUISING AT 8000 FT MSL, BUT THESE CONDITIONS DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE INCIDENT. I WAS ESTABLISHED ON V23, WHICH USES THE SEA VOR UNTIL 61 DME, WHEN THE PLT IS SUPPOSED TO SWITCH TO THE BTG VOR AND TUNE THE CDI TO 149 TO. PRIOR TO THIS LEG, I WAS STARTING TO EXPERIENCE A LITTLE FATIGUE ENRTE TO THE FIRST DEST ON THIS FLT. BECAUSE I WAS 45 MINS EARLY, I TOOK A NAP IN THE PLT LOUNGE FOR AT LEAST 30 MINS. FEELING RESTED AT XB00, I MET THE CARRIER AND DEPARTED AT XCOO, AND DID NOT EXPERIENCE ANY FATIGUE UNTIL AROUND XD00, ENRTE TO PDX. TIME WAS ALSO NOT A FACTOR IN THIS RPT, SINCE I WAS ALREADY BEHIND SCHEDULE. AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, I STARTED TO FEEL FATIGUED AGAIN AROUND XD00. THE LAST TIME I REMEMBER TALKING WITH ZSE WAS AROUND XEOO. I DON'T RECALL ACTUALLY CLOSING MY EYES, BUT I HAD DEFINITELY 'ZONED OUT,' AND HAD MISSED SEVERAL RADIO XMISSIONS FROM CTR TRYING TO HAND ME OFF TO PORTLAND RAPCON. IN ADDITION TO MISSING THE RADIO CALLS, I HAD ALSO MISSED THE CHANGE OF COURSE, SO I WAS WELL OFF OF V23. CRUISING AT 8000 FT MSL, AND STILL NOT ON FREQ WITH PORTLAND APCH, I HAD UNDERSTANDABLY GIVEN APCH A DEFINITE SCARE. UNABLE TO CONTACT ME, PORTLAND APCH CALLED THE PDX MGR, WHO CALLED ME ON MY STANDBY RADIO. I HEARD THIS XMISSION LOUD AND CLR, AND I IMMEDIATELY CALLED PORTLAND APCH. BECAUSE I WAS SO HIGH. THE APCH CTLR HAD TO VECTOR ME AROUND TO AVOID THE ARR CORRIDOR. I LANDED AROUND XFOO, AND WAS TOLD TO CALL ZSE AND GIVE THEM AN EXPLANATION. CLRLY, THE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THIS INCIDENT WITH ATC WAS FATIGUE. I DID NOT GET ENOUGH SLEEP THE PREVIOUS 2 NIGHTS AND DID NOT IDENT THIS PROB UNTIL I WAS ON THE FLT. I SHOULD HAVE CALLED IN SICK, SINCE THERE WAS A RESERVE PLT. BUT, EVEN ENRTE TO PDX, I COULD HAVE REDUCED THE EFFECTS OF FATIGUE BY TURNING OFF THE HEATER, OPENING THE STORM WINDOW, AND TURNING OFF THE AUTOPLT. THESE ALL COULD HAVE HELPED ME STAY MORE ALERT, ENOUGH TO HEAR THE ATC XMISSIONS, AND TO HELP ME STAY ON THE ASSIGNED COURSE. AS A SINGLE PLT FLYING AT NIGHT, IT IS IMPERATIVE FOR ME TO GET ENOUGH REST TO REDUCE THE OCCURRENCE OF FATIGUE, OR TO AVOID FLYING IF THIS PROB PERSISTS.

Synopsis

SINGLE PLT IN NIGHT IMC OPS APPEARED TO FALL ASLEEP DURING CRUISE FLT.
ATC CTLR EVENTUALLY CONTACTS THE PLT AND VECTORS THE ACFT TO ITS DEST.

Time / Day

Date : 200511 Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid: LAS.VORTAC

State Reference: NV

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 6600 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 7000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: L30.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Charter

Make Model Name: Brasilia EMB-120 All Series

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135 Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Aircraft: 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: L30.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation: Personal Make Model Name: Golden Eagle 421 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Climbout: Intermediate Altitude

Person: 1

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Departure Qualification.Controller: Radar Experience.Controller.Radar: 5

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position2: 13

ASRS Report: 676984

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Charter Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 3

Affiliation.Other: Personal

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Critical

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : Conflict Alert

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1 Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Alert

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Consequence.FAA: Investigated Miss Distance.Vertical: 400

Assessments

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Narrative

IFR C421 CLBING S. I RADAR IDENTED HIM AND CLBED HIM TO 7000 FT AND SHIPPED HIM TO DAG. DAG DID NOT CLB ACFT. I HAD A TWIN VFR OFF HND. I IDENTED HIM AND CLRED HIM THROUGH CLASS B AIRSPACE, TOLD HIM TO MAINTAIN AT OR BELOW 7000 FT. I DID NOT REALIZE C421 HAD NOT BEEN ISSUED A CLB. THE CONFLICT ALERT WENT OFF AND I WAS NOT RECEIVING MODE C FROM THE TWIN. I ASKED THE TWIN HIS ALT. HE SAID 6600 FT. I TOLD HIM TO MAINTAIN THAT AND THERE WILL BE AN E120 PASSING OVERHEAD. PRIOR TO THIS INSTANCE, I WAS EXTREMELY BUSY ON THIS POS AND WAS GOING ON MY FIFTH HR ON POS FOR THE DAY. FOR THE AMOUNT OF TFC WORKED THAT DAY (ON SUNDAYS) THAT IS A LONG TIME TO BE ON POS AND HAD I NOT HAD THAT ERROR, I WOULD HAVE WORKED 6 HRS. I BELIEVE FATIGUE PLAYED A FACTOR IN THIS ERROR. TOO MUCH TFC, BAD PROCS AT THE FACILITY, AND GROSS UNDERSTAFFING WILL CONTINUE TO LEAD TO ERRORS AT L30.

Synopsis

L30 CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 7000 FT IN CLASS B AIRSPACE WITH IFR DEP AND VFR ACFT AFTER FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT ADJACENT CTLR DID NOT CLB IFR ACFT.

Time / Day

Date: 200508 Day: Thu

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SHR.Airport

State Reference : WY Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZLC.ARTCC Operator.General Aviation: Corporate Operating Under FAR Part: Part 91

Flight Phase.Landing: Roll

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Function.Oversight: PIC Qualification.Pilot: ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 114

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 7500 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1600

ASRS Report: 669354

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 110 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 11000 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1465

ASRS Report: 669058

Events

Anomaly.Conflict: Ground Critical Anomaly.Ground Encounters.Other Anomaly.Incursion: Runway

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2

Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted Consequence.FAA: Assigned Or Threatened Penalties

Assessments

Problem Areas: Airport

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

XA15 ARRIVED AT ACFT. CHKED WX, ORDERED FUEL, AND FIGURED ACFT PERFORMANCE FOR APA-SLC-SHR. REVIEWED ARPT DIAGRAMS OF ALL 3 ARPTS. FOUND SOME ITEMS NEEDING MAINT ATTN. XD45 BLOCKED IN SLC. I COMPLETED THE SHUTDOWN CHKLIST, CHKED ATIS (WAS SAME AS INBOUND), COPIED CLRNC, AND ENTERED IT INTO FMS. I COMPLETED 'TOLD' CARD, VERIFIED WT AND BAL MANIFEST, WENT IN FBO TO SETTLE CHARGES AND RETRIEVE FAXES, COMPLETED FINAL PREDEP WALKAROUND, CONFIRMED IDENT CHK AND DELIVERY OF SAFETY BRIEFING BY COPLT, BRIEFED HIM ON SALT LAKE 9 DEP, STARTED ENGS, AND COMPLETED BEFORE TAXI CHK AND BRIEFED OUR TAXI OUT. XD58 BLOCKED OUT FOR SLC-SHR TRIP. XE43 RECEIVED WX SHR: WIND 340 DEGS AT 6 KTS, 10 MI VISIBILITY, TEMP 12 DEGS, DEWPOINT 12 DEGS, ALTIMETER 30.01 INCHES, DENSITY ALT 5000 FT. CTR WAS BUSY AND ASKED US TO SLOW FOR THE TFC HE NEEDED TO GET INTO AND OUT OF SHR. CTR CLRED US FOR HOLDING ON SHR VOR 335 DEG RADIAL 13000 FT. WE WERE IN ICING CONDITIONS AND WERE PICKING UP SOME ICE ON LEADING EDGES. I RAN ALL ANTI/DEICE EQUIP AND BRIEFED COPLT ON OUR CONFIGN FOR HOLDING TO ACCOUNT FOR ICE. AFTER PASSING SHR VOR AND 30 SECONDS INTO OUR TEARDROP ENTRY, CTR INSTRUCTED US TO TURN AND JOIN THE OUTBOUND SEGMENT OF THE APCH, AND CLRED US FOR THE APCH. COPLT WAS ANNOUNCING OUR POS ON CTAF AND THERE WERE NO RESPONSES. THERE WAS NO RESPONSE TO TA REQUEST. BROKE OUT UNDER OVCST JUST AFTER PASSING SHR VOR. COPLT CALLED ARPT AT 12:30 O'CLOCK POS, I CONFIRMED MY SIGHT OF THE RWY AND TRANSITIONED TO VISUAL FLT. ANTI/DEICE OFF. CTR HAD BEEN PROMPTING FOR OUR EARLIEST POSSIBLE CANCELLATION OF IFR. I SAW WE WERE ON FINAL WITH RWY 14 MADE WITH NO TFC AND AT THAT TIME SAW NO REASON WE WOULD NOT LAND ON RWY 14. I AUTH OUR CANCELLATION AND COPLT RELAYED AND RECEIVED OUR CANCELLATION. JUST BEFORE 200 FT AGL, COPLT COMPLETED BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST, I SAW THE CONES AND ASKED COPLT, 'ARE THOSE CONES?' I ADDED PWR AND LEVELED OFF AND MAINTAINED SPD. COPLT RESPONDED 'YEAH.' AFTER MAKING DECISION NOT TO GO AROUND, ANNOUNCED TO COPLT 'I'M GOING TO LAND, DO YOU SEE ANYTHING ELSE DOWN THE RWY?' I THEN CLOSED THROTTLES TO REGAIN SLOPE TO RWY AFTER CONES. COPLT, 'AH, NO.' AFTER THE LNDG, I PULLED OFF AND STOPPED ON THE TXWY, PICKED UP MY SHEET AND SAW THERE WAS A NOTAM OR THAT RWY BEING CLOSED. SOMEWHERE DURING THIS CHAOTIC MORNING, I PUT US IN THE POS OF MISTAKING SHR'S NOTAM FOR RWY 14/32 CLOSURE WITH SLC'S NOTAM ALSO FOR RWY 14/32 CLOSURE. I ARRIVED TO SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 14 AT SHR NOT KNOWING OF ITS CLOSURE. SEEING THE CONES LOCATED ABOUT 1/4 WAY DOWN RWY 14, I KNEW THERE WAS SOMETHING GOING ON WITH RWY 14 THAT I DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT. EITHER A NOTAM WAS MISSING, OR I HAD MISSED OR OVERLOOKED A NOTAM THAT WE HAD BRIEFED. SCANNING THE REST OF THE RWY TO SEE WHAT ELSE THERE MIGHT BE, AND NOT SEEING AN 'X,' I BELIEVED THE REST OF THE RWY WAS OPEN. OUR TOUCHDOWN POINT HAVING ORIGINALLY BEEN BEFORE THE CONES, I ADDED SOME PWR BUT LEVELED OFF. MY DECISION NOT TO GO AROUND

INVOLVED SEEING RISING TERRAIN BEYOND THE RWY, AND BELIEVING THERE WOULD LIKELY BE SOMETHING LESS THAN 2200 FT FROM IT TO THE CEILING. I HAD NOT ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO GO BEYOND THE ARPT AND RETURN TO RWY 5 OR RWY 23. ALTHOUGH THAT WAS A DOABLE OPTION, I FELT THAT THE REMAINING RWY BEYOND THE CONES PRESENTED THE SAFEST OPTION FOR THE CONCLUSION OF THE FLT. THE ACFT NEEDED ONLY 1/2 OF THE PUBLISHED 8300 FT AND THERE WAS 3/4 OF IT IN FRONT OF US. I DECIDED TO LAND THE AIRPLANE SAFELY AND THEN FIGURE OUT IF I HAD MISSED SOMETHING. AT NO TIME WAS THE ACFT, CREW, PAX, GND PERSONNEL, OR GND EQUIP EVER IN ANY DANGER. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) WAS AWAKENED BY DISPATCH SHORTLY AFTER 10 HRS REST COMPLETED, AND GIVEN A COMPLETELY NEW ITINERARY THAT WAS A 14 HR DUTY DAY. 2) BEFORE THE REST PERIOD, I WAS GRANTED MY REQUEST FOR 2 HRS OF PREFLT TIME WITH THE AIRPLANE BEFORE OUR SCHEDULED TKOF TIME. ALL THE HAWKER 800'S WE FLY ARE EARLY SERIAL NUMBERS ORIGINALLY SOLD TO INDIVIDUAL OWNERS WITH INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES. THEY ARE ALL OUTFITTED DIFFERENTLY INSIDE. 3) ARRIVED AT THE ACFT TO FIND: OXYGEN LEVEL LESS THAN 1/4, TKS TANK NEEDED FILLING, ONE D-CELL TYPE FLASHLIGHT MISSING, INTERNAL LAVATORY NEEDED CHANGING, 'MAX WT' PLACARD FOR BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT WAS MISSING, ENG COMPUTER LIGHT WAS FLASHING IN THE MASTER WARNING PANEL, OUR PRINTER FURNISHED TO PRINT OUR BACKUP APCH PLATES WAS NOT WORKING. 4) DISPATCH HAD INTERRUPTED US CREW) NUMEROUS OCCASIONS ASKING WHY WE WERE LATE AND WHEN WOULD/COULD WE DEPART, WHILE WE WERE BRIEFING THE FIRST 2 TRIPS: APA-SLC-SHR. I FIGURED WE WOULD BRIEF THOSE 2 LEGS TOGETHER TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF TIME WE WOULD NEED ON THE GND IN SLC KNOWING THE LATE PAX WOULD BE UPSET. SOMEWHERE AT THIS TIME, WE MISTOOK SHR'S RWY 14/32 CLOSURE FOR SLC'S NOTAM, ALSO FOR ITS RWY 14/32 BEING CLOSED. IT IS MY PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REQUIREMENT TO KNOW ALL THINGS PERTINENT TO A PROPOSED FLT. I DO HAVE CTL OF TAKING THE TIME I NEED, AND THOUGHT I HAD DONE SO THIS DAY. WHAT I CANNOT CTL IS THE EXISTENCE OF THOSE PRESSURES. THE PAX HAS PAID MILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO RIDE ON OUR JET AND THE SMALLEST DISSERVICE HAS TO BE ANSWERED FOR. I HAVE ANSWERED FOR MANY DISSERVICES, ALL DUE TO SCHEDULING, MAINT, OR WX/ATC. THE FOLKS WHO SCHEDULE US TO BE LATE DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PLACE BLAME FOR A DISSERVICE ELSEWHERE, PREDOMINATELY ON FLT CREWS. 5) THE REST OF THE MORNING INCLUDED A BUSY 2 FLTS TO SLC THEN SHR AND NOT RE-EXAMINING THE NOTAMS AT SHR. 6) WE LANDED AND TOOK OFF ON A RWY AT SLC THAT HAD CONES NEARLY 2000 FT FROM ONE END (RWY 17/35). THEREFORE, THE FIRST SIGHT OF CONES THE SAME DISTANCE FROM THE RWY IN SHR DID NOT IMMEDIATELY TRIGGER US TO THINK THE RWY WAS CLOSED. 7) NEITHER I NOR THE COPLT SAW AN 'X' ON THE RWY. 8) WE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE ON CTAF REGARDING ANY TFC OR RWY IN USE. ALL OUR POS RPTS INBOUND WERE, THEREFORE, IN THE BLIND.

Synopsis

AN HS800 PLT LANDED ON A CLOSED SHR RWY 14 AFTER MISTAKING SLC RWY 14-32 CLOSURE NOTAM WITH SHR. LANDED DESPITE SEEING CONES BUT NO RWY X BECAUSE OF TERRAIN AND IFR CANCELLATION.

Time / Day

Date: 200504 Day: Thu

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference. Airport: MSP. Airport

State Reference : MN

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 4500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Weather Elements: Turbulence

Light: Daylight

Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: M98.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation : Corporate

Make Model Name : Learjet 45 Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope: 12L

Navigation In Use.Other: FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

Route In Use. Approach: Instrument Precision

Route In Use.Arrival: On Vectors Route In Use.Arrival.STAR: EAU 7

Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Laptop Computer (performance, planning, etc.)

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 75 Experience.Flight Time.Total: 12500 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 225

ASRS Report: 654927

Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Corporate Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 3

Affiliation.Government: FAA Function.Controller: Approach

Events

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Turbulence Anomaly.Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3

Resolutory Action.Controller: Provided Flight Assist

Assessments

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

BEING VECTORED FOR ILS RWY 12L AT MSP. FIRST SIGN OF TROUBLE WAS THE FMS TURNED ACFT 5 MI PRIOR TO ZASKY INTXN (AT ZASKY 300 DEG HDG) PER EAU 7 ARR. COPLT WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH FMS FAULT. CTLR THEN INFORMED US TO PLAN ON THE RWY 12L ILS (VFR CONDITIONS AT TIME). COPLT WAS RUSHED WITH FMS. SELECTED APCH PLATES ON OUR TABLET PC AND APPEARED HE SELECTED RWY 12R APCH ON OUR TABLET. HE THEN BRIEFED FOR RWY 12L APCH WITHOUT REALIZING HE SELECTED RWY 12R. HE TUNED WRONG LOC FREQ (RWY 12R). CTLR CAUGHT IT AND VECTORED US BACK TO INTERCEPT RWY 12L. HOWEVER, OUR TABLET PC WENT INTO SLEEP MODE AND THERE WAS A DELAY ON OUR PART TO BRING PC ON LINE AND SELECT RWY 12L APCH PLATE. WE ARE NEW TO THE PAPERLESS COCKPIT'S TABLET PC. WE LEARNED TODAY: 1) WHEN TURB, BE CAREFUL SELECTING APCH PLATE ON OUR TABLET PC (VERY EASY TO SELECT WRONG PLATE WHEN BEING BOUNCED AROUND). 2) REPROGRAM TABLET PC TO STAY ON OR ACTIVE FOR AT LEAST 30 MINS BEFORE GOING INTO SLEEP MODE. WE BELIEVE THE TURB WAS THE MAIN EVENT CAUSING US TO SELECT WRONG APCH PLATE FOR PARALLEL RWY APCHS.

Synopsis

LR45 PLTS SELECT THE INCORRECT PARALLEL RWY ILS APCH ON A LAPTOP COMPUTER IN TURB AND ARE VECTORED BY APCH CTL.