# **ASRS Database Report Set**

# **Cabin Attendant Reports**

Report Set Description	.A sampling of reports from cabin crew members.
Update Number	13.0
Date of Update	.February 6, 2008
Number of Records in Report Set	50
Number of New Records in Report Set	6
Гуре of Records in Report Set	.For each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

### **MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data**

### **SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports**

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the reporting of a specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de- identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.

Linda J. Connell, Director

Aviation Safety Reporting System

Lenda J Connell

#### CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area "A" than area "B" simply because the airmen who operate in area "A" are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

One thing that can be known from ASRS statistics is that they represent the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 1999 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 1999. Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS lies in the **report narratives**. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. The values of these narrative reports lie in their qualitative nature. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.



ACN: 763303 (1 of 50)

# **Synopsis**

A FLT ATTENDANT REPORTS THE ACR FORCED THE FLT ATTENDANT CREW TO DEPART ONE FLT ATTENDANT SHORT OF THE REQUIRED NUMBER ON A LONG DUTY TIME FLT.

ACN: 763302 (2 of 50)

### Synopsis

FLT ATTENDANTS QUESTION AN ACR'S INFLT REST POLICY REQUIRING 3 SHORT BREAKS VS 2 LONGER BREAKS ON LONG FLTS. THE CREW FEELS MORE RESTED AND SAFE WITH 2 BREAKS.

ACN: 763300 (3 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

A FLT ATTENDANT REPORTS A SCHEDULE CHANGE AFTER ARRIVAL AT THEIR RON DESTINATION REQUIRED AN IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE AND A TOTAL DUTY DAY OF 13+22 HOURS WITH NO BREAK.

ACN: 757670 (4 of 50)

# **Synopsis**

AN MD80 ACFT FLYING SEVERAL DAYS WITH ONLY ONE PACK OPERATING, EXPERIENCED RAPID DECOMPRESSION AND THE OXYGEN MASKS FAILED TO DEPLOY.

ACN: 757178 (5 of 50)

#### **Synopsis**

A B777 FLT ATTENDANT REPORTS ELECTRICAL SMOKE AND FUMES FROM A CABIN VIDEO/POWER PORT. AN EMER WAS DECLARED WITH A DIVERSION TO A NEARBY ARPT FOR MAINT.

ACN: 750706 (6 of 50)

#### Synopsis

AN ACR FA NOT IN UNIFORM BUT BADGED FOR THIS ARPT ENTERED THE RAMP TO CHECK ON PERSONAL BAGS LOADED ON THE ACFT. A SECURITY VIOLATION WAS FILED.

ACN: 750699 (7 of 50)

AN AIRBUS A320 HAD AN AFT GALLEY WATER LEAK. ABOUT 1 INCH OF WATER POOLED IN THE AFT GALLEY, FLOWED INTO THE CABIN, AND LEAKED INTO THE AFT CARGO PIT.

ACN: 741212 (8 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

CATERING OPENED CABIN DOOR OF B737-700 PRIOR TO DOOR BEING FULLY DISARMED. FA WAS ABLE TO DETACH GIRT BAR BEFORE ESCAPE SLIDE DEPLOYED.

ACN: 741133 (9 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

FLT ATTENDANT ABOARD B737-800 RESORTED TO USING ACFT PWR TO RECHARGE PAX OXYGEN APPARATUS, THEREBY PREVENTING DIVERSION FOR LACK OF PAX OXYGEN BOTTLES.

ACN: 736552 (10 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

B767 SLIDE INADVERTENTLY DEPLOYS WHILE ATTEMPTING TO DISARM 1R DOOR AT GATE ARRIVAL.

ACN: 736550 (11 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANT FAILS TO DISARM DOOR OF B767 BEFORE OPENING AND THE SLIDE DEPLOYS.

ACN: 736544 (12 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

B737 CABIN ATTENDANT ACCEPTS OFFER FROM DEADHEADING CABIN ATTENDANT TO ARM/DISARM CABIN DOOR PRIOR TO DEP/ARR. WORKING ATTENDANT FAILS TO INSPECT THE DOOR AND THE SLIDE ALMOST DEPLOYS WHEN THE CATERERS ATTEMPT TO SERVICE THE GALLEY.

ACN: 736541 (13 of 50)

#### Synopsis

2 FLT ATTENDANTS INJURED DURING ARR AT PHL DURING AN ENCOUNTER WITH WAKE TURB.

ACN: 736520 (14 of 50)

BESET WITH FATIGUE DUE TO LONG DUTY DAYS AND FIVE CONSECUTIVE DAYS OF FLYING, CABIN ATTENDANT FAILS TO DISCONNECT SLIDE GIRT BAR ON B737-300 PRIOR TO CRACKING DOOR TO SIGNIFY IT WAS SAFE TO BE OPENED.

ACN: 736317 (15 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANTS AND PAX INJURED DURING TURBULENCE ENCOUNTER DESCENDING INTO SAEZ.

ACN: 734610 (16 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

B757 CABIN ATTENDANT RPTS STRONG ELECTRICAL ODOR ON INITIAL CLB RESULTS IN A RETURN TO THE TKOF ARPT.

ACN: 734261 (17 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

À FLT ATTENDANT DESCRIBES CREW MEMBERS SHOWING FATIGUE DURING ROUND TRIP ASSIGNMENTS TO THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

ACN: 732940 (18 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

A B747-400 FLT ATTENDANT REPORTS DISCOVERING DISARMED MAIN CABIN DOORS IN FLT AND ORDERED NOT TO FILE SAFETY REPORTS EXPOSING THE TRANSGRESSIONS.

ACN: 731948 (19 of 50)

#### Synopsis

ACR FLT ATTENDANT RPTS ACR HAS MOVED EMER EQUIP TO GALLEY LOCKER WHICH COULD MAKE THE EQUIP DIFFICULT TO ACCESS IN A GALLEY FIRE.

ACN: 731580 (20 of 50)

#### **Synopsis**

B737 CABIN CREW REPORTS PASSENGER WHO HAS BEEN SICK IN THE LAV AND STATES THAT HE HAS HEPATITIS C.

ACN: 729962 (21 of 50)

A FLT ATTENDANT RPTS DEPARTING THE GATE WITH CABIN INTERPHONE AND AFT CABIN HANDSETS INOP. WHEN THE EVAC SYS WAS FOUND INOP, ACFT RETURNED TO THE GATE.

ACN: 729630 (22 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANT RPTS STRONG BURNING PLASTIC SMELL RIGHT AFTER TAKEOFF. FLT RETURNS TO DEP ARPT.

ACN: 729270 (23 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

MD80 EXPERIENCED INFLT SMOKE FROM AC SYSTEM. DIVERTS FOR EMER LNDG.

ACN: 728809 (24 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

MD80 FLIGHT ATTENDANT REPORTS THE ACTIVATION OF A LAV SMOKE DETECTOR WHICH RESULTS IN A DIVERSION.

ACN: 728270 (25 of 50)

# **Synopsis**

AN MD80 EXPERIENCES SMOKE AND FUMES AFTER TKOF. AN EMER WAS DECLARED WITH A RETURN TO LAND.

ACN: 727293 (26 of 50)

#### **Synopsis**

B757-200 CABIN CREW ALERTS CAPT OF SMOKE/FUMES AFTER DEP. RETURNS TO DEP ARPT.

ACN: 727103 (27 of 50)

#### **Synopsis**

B777 CABIN CREW DETECTS SMOKE/FUMES IN CABIN. LANDS AT NEAREST ARPT.

ACN: 726679 (28 of 50)

#### Synopsis

B737-300 CABIN CREW HAS AN UNARMED DOOR WHILE INFLT.

ACN: 726607 (29 of 50)

FLIGHT ATTENDANT REPORTS DEBILITATING FATIGUE EXPERIENCED DURING ALL NIGHT FLIGHT TO ZZZ1 AND RETURN TO ZZZ.

ACN: 726547 (30 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

AIRLINE CATERING CREW ATTEMPTS TO OPEN A B737-300 CABIN DOOR FOR SERVICING AFTER DOORS HAVE BEEN ARMED FOR DEPARTURE.

ACN: 725731 (31 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

B767-300 CABIN CREW IS NOTIFIED OF EMER DUE TO HYD MALFUNCTION.

ACN: 725535 (32 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

MD80 RETURNS TO DEP ARPT AFTER CABIN FILLS WITH SMOKE SHORTLY AFTER TKOF.

ACN: 724973 (33 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

B757 FLT ATTENDANT RPTS FUEL SMELL IN THE AFT GALLEY DURING FLT.

ACN: 723986 (34 of 50)

#### **Synopsis**

B757 FLT ATTENDANT RPTS RAPID DSCNT TO LOWER ALT. DSCNT WAS PRECIPITATED BY THE LOSS OF THE REMAINING AIR CONDITIONING PACK.

ACN: 723772 (35 of 50)

#### **Synopsis**

AN A320 CABIN ATTENDANT RPTS MAINT MEL'ING THE ACFT WITH THE ENTIRE EMER EXIT ROW OF SEATS NOT BOLTED TO THE FLOOR.

ACN: 722658 (36 of 50)

#### **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANT ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT CATERERS FROM OPENING A CABIN DOOR WHILE IT IS ARMED RESULTING IN PARTIAL SLIDE DEPLOYMENT.

ACN: 722535 (37 of 50)

B757 CABIN ATTENDANT CONCERNED WITH LENGTH OF FLT AND FATIGUE ISSUES.

# ACN: 721203 (38 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

A B737-400 FLT ATTENDANT NOTICED A SMOKE AND FUMES IN THE CABIN AFTER LNDG. MECHANICS WERE ONBOARD IN ANTICIPATION OF THE PROB, SINCE IT HAD BEEN WRITTEN UP PREVIOUSLY.

### ACN: 720533 (39 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

B767 CABIN CREW DETECTS STRONG ODORS IN CABIN DURING TRANSATLANTIC FLT.

# ACN: 720346 (40 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANT RPTS FAILURE TO ARM DOORS PRIOR TO TKOF. CITES FATIGUE STEMMING FROM LONG DUTY DAYS AND THE REDUCTION AND ELIMINATION OF ON DUTY RESTRS AND EXTRA WORK NECESSARY TO MAKE UP FOR PAY CUTS BY THE AIRLINE.

# ACN: 720333 (41 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

AFTER EXTENDED EXPOSURE, CABIN ATTENDANT RPTS FUMES FROM LARGE FUEL SPILL DURING FUELING OF HER A320 WHICH RESULTED IN NAUSEA AND ILLNESS. AS A RESULT, RPTR IS UNABLE TO FLY THE TRIP AND CALLS IN SICK.

### ACN: 720328 (42 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANT ON FIRST FLT ABOARD AN A319 MISTAKENLY DEPLOYS SLIDE UPON ARR AT DEST.

### ACN: 720324 (43 of 50)

# **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANT REFUSES BOARDING TO PAX WHO STATES LAP CHILD WITH WHOM SHE IS TRAVELING HAS CHICKEN POX. PAX AGENT REMOVES BOTH BUT ALLOWS THEM TO BOARD AND FLY THE NEXT FLT WITH A DIFFERENT STORY ABOUT THE REASON FOR THE CHILD'S RASH.

### ACN: 720317 (44 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

AN A319 FLT ATTENDANT CREW RPTS REFUSING TO FLY AN UNSCHEDULED TRANSCONTINENTAL RETURN FLT BECAUSE OF FATIGUE.

# ACN: 720304 (45 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANT INJURED WHEN THE B757-200 ENCOUNTERS SEVERE TURB AND EXTENDED HOLDING ON ARR TO ZZZ. DIVERT TO ZZZ1 WHERE THEY ARE UNABLE TO PARK AND FLT CREW, CABIN CREW, AND PAX REMAIN ON BOARD UNTIL FUELED AT A REMOTE LOCATION FOR THE RETURN FLT TO ZZZ.

# ACN: 720289 (46 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

B747-400 CABIN CREW RPT STRONG ODORS AND SYMPTOMS OF CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING DURING PREFLT.

# ACN: 720272 (47 of 50)

### **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANT FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THAT PAX OPERATED PORTABLE OXYGEN CONCENTRATOR FAILED TO COMPLY WITH COMPANY REGS FOR CARRY-ON BAGGAGE.

# ACN: 720271 (48 of 50)

#### **Synopsis**

A B737-300 CABIN ATTENDANT COMMENTS THAT A MECH VERIFIED HER ACT'S 1L SLIDE WAS ARMED BY VIEWING THE GIRT BAR FROM OUTSIDE BENEATH THE DOOR.

### ACN: 719772 (49 of 50)


#### **Synopsis**

MD80 FLT ATTENDANT IS SCALDED BY EXPLODING COFFEE PACK WHILE RETRIEVING COFFEE POT.

### ACN: 719135 (50 of 50)

#### Synopsis

FLT ATTENDANTS, MD'S, AND AN EMT WORK TO TRY TO SAVE AN ELDERLY PAX SUFFERING FROM AN ULTIMATELY FATAL AIRBORNE MEDICAL INCIDENT.



### Time / Day

Date: 200711

### **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

### Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B757-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Ground: Preflight

#### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant: Currently Qualified

ASRS Report: 763303

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Company Policies

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Company

#### **Situations**

#### **Narrative**

AUGMENTED STAFFING FOR ENTIRE TRIP REQUIRED 6 FLT ATTENDANTS DUE TO LONG DUTY TIME. PURSER ON THE FLT ADVISED CREW SCHEDULER THAT ONLY 5 FLT ATTENDANTS WERE ON BOARD FOR THE TRIP AND THAT WE WERE NOT LEGALLY STAFFED ACCORDING TO THE FLT MANUAL. AFTER A LENGTHY DISCUSSION WITH THE PURSER OTHER FLT ATTENDANTS AND SCHEDULER, WE WERE ADVISED BY THE SCHEDULER THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO WORK THE FLT WITH 5 FLT ATTENDANTS. THE SCHEDULER WAS ASKED IF SHE WAS GIVING US A DIRECT ORDER. SHE SAID YES AND SO WE ADVISED HER THAT WE WOULD WORK UNDER PROTEST AND THAT WE WERE UNDERSTAFFED ACCORDING TO THE FLT MANUAL. WE DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO A COMPUTER AT THE TIME BUT UPON RETURN FROM THE TRIP I PULLED UP REQUIREMENTS AND THE PRINT UP UNDER COMMENTS STATED 'AUGMENTED STAFFING REQUIRED: FLT XX NEEDS: 6 FLT ATTENDANTS.'

A FLT ATTENDANT REPORTS THE ACR FORCED THE FLT ATTENDANT CREW TO DEPART ONE FLT ATTENDANT SHORT OF THE REQUIRED NUMBER ON A LONG DUTY TIME FLT.

# Time / Day

Date: 200711

### **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZZ. Airport

State Reference: FO

### Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B747-400 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground: Parked

#### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant: Currently Qualified

ASRS Report: 763302

### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification. Flight Attendant: Currently Qualified

ASRS Report: 763298

### Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant: Currently Qualified

ASRS Report: 763327

#### **Events**

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Company

# **Situations**

#### **Narrative**

I WAS THE PURSER AND AFTER REACHING THE GATE I ANNOUNCED FOR THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO DISARM THEIR DOORS AND SIMULTANEOUSLY TURNED ON THE CABIN LIGHTS. I STARED AT MY DOOR. I THINK I LOOKED AT IT 3 TIMES AND JUST AS CUSTOMER SVC APCHED TO KNOCK ON THE WINDOW, I REALIZED THE DOOR WAS STILL ARMED! I QUICKLY DISARMED IT AND STOOD THERE SHAKING

AS I REALIZED WHAT COULD HAVE HAPPENED! I HAD TAKEN FIRST BREAK, WHICH I NORMALLY DON'T DO. BY THE END OF THIRD BREAK I DIDN'T FEEL VERY ALERT AT ALL. IN FACT I COULD BARELY KEEP MY EYES OPEN. THIS AMOUNT OF FATIGUE IS SCARY AND THIS WAS A REAL EYE OPENER. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 763298: ACR'S DIRECTIVE OF REQUIRING 3 CREW REST BREAKS ON AN ALL NIGHT NON STOP FLT OF SUCH LONG DURATION IS CREATING AN UNSAFE WORK ENVIRONMENT FOR BOTH WORKING CREWS AND OUR PAX. OUR ENTIRE CREW WAS EXHAUSTED ON ARR IN ZZZZ AND IN THE EVENT OF AN EMER I DARE SAY WOULD NOT AND COULD NOT HAVE RESPONDED AS QUICKLY AS WE HAVE BEEN TRAINED TO DO DUE TO EXTREME FATIGUE. I PERSONALLY WAS SO OVERTIRED DUE TO A SHORT CREW REST BREAK AND HAVING BEEN IN FIRST BREAK THAT I FELT DIZZY AND ALMOST DELIRIOUS. I HAD TO CHK, DOUBLE CHK, AND TRIPLE CHK THAT MY DOOR WAS DISARMED AND THAT MY FLYING PARTNER'S DOOR WAS DISARMED. TWO OF US HAD TO PERFORM POST FLT SAFETY TO BE CERTAIN ALL DOORS WERE DISARMED, LAVS UNOCCUPIED AND OPENED AND THAT ALL PAX WERE OFF THE ACFT. UPON ARR AT THE HOTEL I WAS ALSO SO OVERTIRED I WAS UNABLE TO SLEEP, EVEN THOUGH THAT'S ALL I WANTED AND NEEDED TO DO. I HAVE FLOWN THIS TRIP FOR YEARS AND I HAVE NEVER FELT THIS PHYSICALLY EXHAUSTED. I HAD NAPPED DURING THE DAY OF THE TRIP AND FELT FINE AT BRIEFING. FURTHERMORE, IN OUR FAOM THE PARAGRAPH FOLLOWING THE BREAK DIRECTIVE IS A FLT ATTENDANT COVERAGE RATIO. DOING TWO BREAKS FROM ZZZ TO ZZZZ EXCEEDS THAT COVERAGE RATIO. WE DO OUR BEST TO MAKE OUR PAX HAVE AN ENJOYABLE FLT BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY WE NEED TO ENSURE A SAFE FLT STAFFED BY ALERT AND READY FOR ANY SITUATION FLT ATTENDANTS. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR JOBS, THESE DAYS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PARTS OF OUR JOBS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 763327: PAX REPORTED TO FLT ATTENDANTS UPON DEPLANING THAT A FEMALE PAX HAD FALLEN AND NEEDED ASSISTANCE. FLT ATTENDANTS QUICKLY PROVIDED OXYGEN, EMOTIONAL SUPPORT AND A READY AED. GND STAFF CALLED FOR EMER MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS FROM THE FRONT DOOR AS THE COCKPIT CREW HAD ALREADY LEFT THE COCKPIT. MY QUESTION IS: SHOULD ACR DISCIPLINE FLT ATTENDANTS FOR TAKING TWO REST BREAKS INSTEAD OF THREE REST BREAKS GIVEN THAT WE ARE FIRST RESPONDERS FOR ALL MEDICAL EMERS WHILE ON DUTY? FLT TIME IS 14.5 HOURS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR 763298 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THAT THE CURRENT ACR REST POLICY BEING ENFORCED IS 3 3.25 HOURS BREAKS. THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE SCHEDULING THEIR OWN BREAKS AT A 2 4.5 HOUR BREAK ROTATION BUT THE ACR IS DEMANDING THE THREE SHORTER BREAKS FOR PASSENGER SVC REASONS. THE FLT IS ESSENTIALLY ALL NIGHT SO MANY PEOPLE ARE ASLEEP ANYWAY. FIFTEEN FLT ATTENDANTS ARE NOW A NORMAL CREW COMPLEMENT FOR A 17.5 HOUR DUTY DAY THAT STARTS AT NIGHT AND ENDS AT NIGHT. THE CUMULATIVE FATIGUE LEAVES ALL CREW MEMBERS FEELING INEFFECTUAL AT THE FLT'S TERMINATION. ADDING A PROBLEM TO THE MIX. SUCH AS A PAX MEDICAL EMER IN THIS CASE, MAKES THE SITUATION EVEN WORSE.

# Synopsis

FLT ATTENDANTS QUESTION AN ACR'S INFLT REST POLICY REQUIRING 3 SHORT BREAKS VS 2 LONGER BREAKS ON LONG FLTS. THE CREW FEELS MORE RESTED AND SAFE WITH 2 BREAKS.

# Time / Day

Date: 200711

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

#### **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

### Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B757-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Ground: Preflight

### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant: Currently Qualified

ASRS Report: 763300

### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant: Currently Qualified

ASRS Report: 763301

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Cabin Event.Other

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Company

#### **Situations**

#### **Narrative**

WE WERE SCHEDULED TO WORK FLT XX FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1 THEN LAYOVER FOR OVER 28 HOURS. WE WERE DRAFTED TO WORK FLT XY DIRECTLY BACK FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2 AS SOON AS WE WERE ABLE TO DEPLANE OUR PAX. WE HAD ABSOLUTELY NO REST BREAK AT ANY TIME DURING THE 11 HOURS 12 MINUTES OF ACTUAL FLT TIME OR THE 13 HOURS 22 MINUTES OF DUTY TIME AS WE IMMEDIATELY BEGAN BOARDING THE NEW FLT. OUR TOTAL FLT TIME FOR THAT DUTY DAY WENT FROM SCHEDULED 606 TO 1112. ALL THREE OF US WERE UNPREPARED TO WORK SO LONG. WE HAD NOT TAKEN NAPS OR SLEPT IN LATE. IF WE HAD AN EMER SITUATION WE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AT OUT BEST. I

BELIEVE IT WAS AN UNSAFE SITUATION AND ONE THAT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 763301: NOT HAVING PLANNED FOR THIS KIND OF 'TURN' (GETTING PROPER REST BEFORE A TRIP AND ALSO EXPECTING TO GO ON A LAYOVER) RESULTED IN EXHAUSTION AND NOT FEELING THAT I WOULD BE ABLE TO EXECUTE MY SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES CLEAR HEADED IF NECESSARY. WITH THE HOURS INVOLVED HERE AND OVER 11 HOURS OF FLT TIME WITHOUT A MOMENT'S REST SEEMED TO SURPASS SAFETY AT ALL COSTS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 763300 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER STATED THAT THE SECOND FLT TO WHICH SHE WAS ASSIGNED HAD DIVERTED EARLIER AND WHEN IT FINALLY REACHED ITS DESTINATION 3 OF THE 5 FLT ATTENDANTS WERE ILLEGAL TO PROCEED ON THE RETURN FLT. SINCE THE REPORTER'S CREW WAS LEGAL THE ACR ORDERED 3 OF THEM TO JOIN THE OTHER CREW ON ITS TRIP. THE REPORTER WAS NOT PREPARED FOR SUCH A LONG DUTY DAY: DID NOT REST PRIOR TO CHECK IN, WAS NOT GIVEN A REST PERIOD ON THE FIRST FLT, AND WOULD NOT BE GIVEN A REST ON THE NEXT FLT. BOTH ACFT IN THIS EVENT WERE FULL B757-200'S.

# **Synopsis**

A FLT ATTENDANT REPORTS A SCHEDULE CHANGE AFTER ARRIVAL AT THEIR RON DESTINATION REQUIRED AN IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE AND A TOTAL DUTY DAY OF 13+22 HOURS WITH NO BREAK.

# Time / Day

Date: 200709

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

#### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

#### **Environment**

Light : Daylight

#### Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

### Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Oxygen System/Pax

#### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant : Currently Qualified Qualification.Flight Attendant.Aircraft Qualified On : 5 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Airline Total : 8

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Total: 8
Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Type: 60

ASRS Report: 757670

### **Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical

Anomaly. Other Anomaly Consequence. Other

Consequence.Other: Physical Injury

### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Company

#### **Situations**

Publication: MEL Not Adequate

### **Narrative**

O2 DECOMPRESSION DUE TO AIR CONDITIONING BEING DEFERRED FOR SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO INCIDENT FOR AIR PACKS. ONLY WENT WITH 1 GOOD AIR PACK. CONDENSATION WAS HORRIBLE WHICH LED TO GREY SMOKE IN VENTS PRIOR TO LOSING ONLY AIR PACK. THIS PLANE HAD MULTIPLE PROBLEMS, NOT INCLUDING AIR MASK DID NOT DROP DURING RAPID DECOMPRESSION. SHOULD NOT HAVE TRAVELED THIS FAR AND BACK WITH ONLY 1 AIR PACK.

# **Synopsis**

AN MD80 ACFT FLYING SEVERAL DAYS WITH ONLY ONE PACK OPERATING, EXPERIENCED RAPID DECOMPRESSION AND THE OXYGEN MASKS FAILED TO DEPLOY.

# Time / Day

Date: 200709

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

#### **Place**

Locale Reference. Navaid: ZZZ. BCSTN

State Reference: US

#### **Environment**

Light: Night

### Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

### Component: 1

Aircraft Component : Cabin Entertainment

#### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 757178

### **Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe

Anomaly. Other Anomaly

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Consequence.Other

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Aircraft

#### **Narrative**

ELECTRICAL SMELL NOTED WHILE DELIVERING MEALS. FLT ATTENDANT #2 STARTED LOOKING FOR SOURCE AND REQUESTED ALL COMPUTERS BE TURNED OFF. I STARTED LOOKING ON LH SIDE FOR SOURCE OF SMELL WHEN BIG GREY PUFF OF SMOKE CAME UP BETWEEN SEATS. MOTHER GRABBED CHILD SITTING THERE AND JUMPED UP SHOUTING 'FIRE.' FLT ATTENDANT #2 RAN FOR EXTINGUISHER. I CALLED COCKPIT IMMEDIATELY. FLT ATTENDANT #10 GOT ON HANDS AND KNEES SEARCHING FOR FIRE AND FEELING FLOOR AREA WHERE SMOKE CAME FROM. THERE WAS A LOUD POP AND VIDEO UNITS SHUT

THEMSELVES OFF THEN WENT BACK ON. I CALLED PURSER TO TURN OFF POWER TO POWER PORTS. FO CAME BACK AND DETERMINED THERE WAS NO FIRE SO WE CONTINUED ON TO DIVERT ARPT. FIRE DEPT MET AIRCRAFT. MAINT CUT POWER TO THAT SECTION AND WE CONTINUED ON TO DEST. NO EMER EQUIPMENT WAS USED. FLT ATTENDANT #10 COMPLAINED OF SORE THROAT FROM BEING EXPOSED TO SMOKE.

# **Synopsis**

A B777 FLT ATTENDANT REPORTS ELECTRICAL SMOKE AND FUMES FROM A CABIN VIDEO/POWER PORT. AN EMER WAS DECLARED WITH A DIVERSION TO A NEARBY ARPT FOR MAINT.

# Time / Day

Date: 200708

### **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

### Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier
Make Model Name: Regional Jet 200 ER&LR

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121 Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

#### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: Off Duty Function.Observation: Passenger

ASRS Report: 750706

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Company Policies

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other: Company Review Consequence.Other: Emotional Trauma

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Company

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

#### **Narrative**

MY FATHER AND I WERE BOTH FLYING STANDBY FOR PLEASURE. WE WERE TOLD, BY THE CUSTOMER SVC AGENT CHKING US IN, TO MAKE SURE THE AGENT AT THE GATE INFORMED RAMP TO BOARD OUR BAGS WHEN GIVEN SEATS, AS OUR BAGS WOULD NOT BE BOARDED UNLESS WE WERE. AFTER BEING GIVEN SEATS FOR THIS FLT MY FATHER SAID HE NOTICED ONLY HIS LARGE FISHING ROD CASE HAD BEEN BOARDED. I THEN APPROACHED THE AGENT AND ASKED IF HE COULD FIND OUT WHETHER OUR 3 BAGS HAD BEEN BOARDED. THE AGENT TOLD ME THEY PROBABLY HADN'T SCANNED THE BAGS YET AND THERE WOULD BE NO WAY OF KNOWING. I THEN ASKED IF I COULD GO OUT AND CHECK THE PIT TO SEE IF ALL OUR BAGS WERE THERE, AS WE WERE VACATIONING TO A VERY REMOTE FISHING LODGE AND WE WOULD BE HELPLESS WITHOUT OUR BAGS. I SHOWED HIM MY FA

BADGE AS WELL AS MY ARPT BADGE. HE SAID I COULD GO OUT AND GAVE ME THE CODE FOR THE JETWAY. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE JETWAY IS NO MORE THAN 10 FT FROM THE PIT WHERE A RAMP AGENT WAS STANDING. THE RAMP AGENT SAW ME AS I CAME FROM THE JETWAY, BADGE IN FULL VIEW AROUND MY NECK. I APPROACHED HIM, SHOWED HIM MY BADGES, AND ASKED IF IT WOULD BE OK TO CHECK THE PIT TO SEE IF ALL OUR BAGS HAD BEEN BOARDED. HE SAID YES AND WALKED WITH ME AROUND THE CONVEYOR TO THE PIT DOOR. WE BOTH LOOKED IN AND SPOKE WITH ANOTHER AGENT WHO WAS SITTING IN THE PIT. WE COULD ONLY LOCATE TWO BAGS AND THE FISHING ROD CASE. I THEN ASKED IF IT WOULD BE OK TO CHECK IN THE PIT AS I WAS VERY UNSETTLED ABOUT LOSING THE THIRD BAG. THE AGENT SAID OK AND I CLIMBED IN THE PIT. BOTH THE AGENT IN THE PIT AND I LOOKED FOR THE BAG. WE FINALLY FOUND IT. I SAID THANK YOU AND PROCEEDED TO EXIT THE PIT AND WALK THE 10 FT BACK TO THE JETWAY. AS I APPROACHED THE JETWAY I NOTICED A PLT WALKING INSIDE THE JETWAY TOWARD THE ACFT. HE LOOKED PUZZLED. I HELD UP MY BADGE AND WAVED. I THEN OPENED THE JETWAY DOOR AND THE PLT HAD SINCE BOARDED THE ACFT. I WALKED OUT INTO THE WAITING AREA THANKING THE CUST SVC AGENT AND LETTING HIM KNOW ALL OUR BAGS HAD BEEN BOARDED. ABOUT 8 MINS LATER THE SAME PLT APPROACHED ME IN THE WAITING AREA AND ASKED IF HE COULD SPEAK TO ME. I SAID SURE, AND FOLLOWED HIM TO THE PODIUM. HE THEN ASKED WHAT I WAS DOING OUT THERE. I SAID I WANTED TO MAKE SURE OUR BAGS HAD BEEN BOARDED AS WE WERE FLYING STANDBY. HE THEN TOLD ME I WAS NOT ALLOWED OUT THERE. I SHOWED HIM MY ARPT BADGE AND SAID I WAS UNAWARE THAT I HAD VIOLATED ANY POLICY AS I HAD PERMISSION FROM BOTH THE GATE AGENT AND THE RAMP AGENT TO CHECK THE BAGS. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS ON THE RAMP IN VIEW AND WITH THE RAMP AGENTS AT ALL TIMES. HE APPEARED VERY UNNERVED AND ASKED FOR MY NAME AND FILE NUMBER. HE TOLD ME THAT I HAD BREACHED SECURITY AND THAT ALL BAGS WOULD HAVE TO BE UNLOADED AND THE FLT DELAYED. I APOLOGIZED AND SAID ONCE AGAIN THAT I HAD NO IDEA THAT I HAD BREACHED SECURITY. FOR THE NEXT 20 MINS OR SO I SAT WITH MY FATHER IN THE GATE AREA NOTICING MANY SUPERVISOR, OR SO IT SEEMED, BECAUSE OF THEIR RADIOS AND DISCUSSIONS TAKING PLACE. IT WAS AFTER THE PLANE HAD BOARDED THAT I WAS TOLD BY A SUPERVISOR, ALTHOUGH HE NEVER SAID HIS NAME NOR IDENTIFIED HIMSELF, THAT MY SUPERVISOR HAD BEEN CALLED AND WOULD BE HERE SHORTLY AND THAT I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO FLY COMPANY FOR THE REST OF THE DAY. AT THAT POINT I BECAME VERY EMOTIONAL AS I HAD NEVER INTENDED TO BREAK ANY RULES AND WAS ONLY TRYING TO REASSURE MY FATHER THAT ALL THE BAGS WERE ON. I EXPLAINED THAT I WAS NEVER OUT OF VIEW OF THE RAMP AGENTS AND COULDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY THE PLT WAS SO FURIOUS WITH ME. I APOLOGIZED ONCE AGAIN FOR THE SITUATION AND EXPLAINED THAT I WOULD HAVE NEVER EVEN ASKED IF I THOUGHT THAT I WAS DOING SOMETHING WRONG. I WAS COMPLETELY UNAWARE THAT THIS WAS A VIOLATION AS TOLD BY THE PLT AND THE OTHER GENTLEMAN AT ACR. SUPVR THEN ASKED IF ANYONE ELSE SPOKE WITH ME AT ACR. I SAID NO, OTHER THAN THE MAN WHO CONFERENCED WITH MR. X. HE NEVER INTRODUCED HIMSELF NOR IDENTIFIED HIS POSITION. I THEN JOINED MY FATHER AT BAGGAGE CLAIM AND WENT HOME.

### **Synopsis**

AN ACR FA NOT IN UNIFORM BUT BADGED FOR THIS ARPT ENTERED THE RAMP TO CHECK ON PERSONAL BAGS LOADED ON THE ACFT. A SECURITY VIOLATION WAS FILED.

# Time / Day

Date: 200708

### **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

### Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A320

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Ground: Preflight

# Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Indicating and Warning - Landing Gear

#### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant: Currently Qualified

ASRS Report: 750699

#### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Controller: Supervisor

### **Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical

Anomaly.Cabin Event.Other

Anomaly. Maintenance Problem: Improper Maintenance

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Other Consequence.Other

### **Maintenance Factors**

Maintenance Contributing Factor: Briefing

Maintenance.Contributing Factor: Schedule Pressure Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Fault Isolation Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Inspection

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Repair

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Aircraft Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas: Maintenance Human Performance

#### Situations

#### **Narrative**

WE GOT ON AND DID OUR SAFETY CHKS. THE CREW SET UP THE GALLEY AND CAME FORWARD TO TALK WHILE WE WAITED UNTIL BOARDING TIME. APPROX 2 MINS PRIOR TO BOARDING WE WENT TO GET INTO POSITION AND THIS IS THE FIRST TIME WE NOTICED WATER ON THE FLOOR IN THE REAR OF THE ACFT. WE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED THE CAPT THAT ABOUT 1 INCH OF WATER WAS POOLED IN THE GALLEY AND CREEPING INTO THE CABIN. BY THE TIME THE PROB WAS FIGURED OUT THE WATER WAS UP TO ROW 20. THIS ARPT APPARENTLY DOESN'T OWN A SHOP VAC TO REMOVE THE WATER AND THE COMPANY THAT OUR COMPANY CONTRACTS WITH WAS UNAVAILABLE. THE WATER REMAINED IN THE CABIN FOR 2 HOURS BEFORE A SHOP VAC WAS LOCATED AND IT WAS VACUUMED OUT. THE FLOORS WERE STILL SOPPING WET AND THE GALLEY WAS SLIPPERY. WE USED MOST OF THE BLANKETS TO HELP SOAK UP THE WATER BUT TO NO AVAIL. THE MECHANIC ASSURED US (FLT ATTENDANTS) THAT THERE WASN'T ANY ELECTRICAL WIRES THAT WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THE WATER. A MAN CAME UP FROM THE BAGGAGE LOADING SECTION AND COMPLAINED ABOUT ALL THE WATER POURING FROM THE PIT. THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE DISTINCTLY UPSET AND UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT TAKING THIS AIRPLANE, BUT WERE ASSURED BY ALL THAT IT WAS PERFECTLY SAFE. THE FIRST PAX ON BOARD PROMPTLY SLIPPED IN THE GALLEY TRYING TO USE THE BATHROOM. ALL THE PAX SITTING IN ROWS 20 THRU 26 HAD WET BAGS AND FEET. THEY ASKED FOR SOME TYPE OF COMPENSATION AND ZZZ1 TOLD THEM THAT ZZZ2 WOULD TAKE CARE OF THEM. WHEN WE ARRIVED ZZZ2 SAID THAT THESE PEOPLE'S NEXT DEST WOULD TAKE CARE OF IT, PASSING THE BUCK IT WOULD SEEM! THE WATER CONTINUED TO DRIP THROUGHOUT THE FLT. THE NEXT DAY WE GOT ON BOARD AND DID OUR SAFETY CHKS. THE CABIN CREW SET UP THE GALLEY AND HAD COME FORWARD TO CHAT. I WAS TESTING THE SAFETY VIDEO AND NOTICED THAT WE STILL HAD JULY'S MOVIES. THAT'S WHEN IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE SAME PLANE AS BEFORE. I CHKED THE RECORDS AND SURE ENOUGH, IT WAS THE SAME PLANE NUMBER. I INFORMED THAT CAPT OF OUR PREVIOUS PROBLEM AND HE SEEMED INCREDULOUS ABOUT THE WHOLE THING. THEN RIGHT BEFORE BOARDING, THE WATER STARTED TO POUR IN AGAIN. WE INFORMED THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY AND HE GOT TO SEE WITH HIS OWN EYES WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO US THE PREVIOUS DAY. HE MADE THE DECISION TO REFUSE THE PLANE BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE PLANE HAD NEVER BEEN FULLY INSPECTED AFTER THE FIRST INCIDENT. HE WANTED THE PANELS PULLED OUT TO MAKE SURE THERE WASN'T ANY DAMAGE FROM ALL THE STANDING WATER. I'M SURE HE HAD OTHER REASONS ONLY PLTS KNOW ABOUT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT CLEAR WATER, NOT BLUE WATER, WAS LEAKING FROM THE LH AFT-FWD LAV, WHICH IS JUST FWD OF THE LH AFT ENTRY DOOR. THE WATER WAS ALSO POOLING AND SATURATING THE CABIN FLOOR. IT WAS NOTED BY THE FLT ATTENDANT THAT WHENEVER THE APU WAS STARTED AND RUNNING, THE WATER STARTED FLOWING OUT FROM UNDER THE TOILET. AFTER THE SECOND INCIDENT OF WATER LEAKING AND NO FIX FOR THE CAUSE THE CAPTAIN REFUSED THE ACFT. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE ACFT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE FERRIED TO A LARGER MAINT STATION, BUT ENDED UP DIVERTING TO ANOTHER ARPT, DUE TO LOUD THUMPING AND BUMPING NOISES

IN THE FWD PIT. THE ALTERNATE ENROUTE STATION FOUND THAT THE CONTAINER HOLDING THE TOILET, FROM THE LEAKING LAV, WAS NOT SECURED IN THE FWD PIT AND WAS BOUNCING AROUND. THE RPTR STATED THE ISSUE OF CONTRACT MAINT NOT EVEN INVESTIGATING THE POSSIBLE LOCATION(S) OF THE WATER LEAK PRIOR TO FURTHER REVENUE FLIGHTS WAS UPSETTING TO THE CABIN AND COCKPIT CREW.

# **Synopsis**

AN AIRBUS A320 HAD AN AFT GALLEY WATER LEAK. ABOUT 1 INCH OF WATER POOLED IN THE AFT GALLEY, FLOWED INTO THE CABIN, AND LEAKED INTO THE AFT CARGO PIT.

# Time / Day

Date: 200706

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

#### **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

#### Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-700 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground: Parked Flight Phase.Ground: Preflight

### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 741212

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Cabin Event.Other

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Insufficient Time

Consequence.Other: Physical Injury

#### Assessments

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Company

#### **Narrative**

BOARDING COMPLETED, AGENT READY TO CLOSE DOOR, I ANNOUNCED OVER THE PA 'FLT ATTENDANT READY CABIN FOR DOOR CLOSURE,' WENT AND ARMED R1. I WAS JUST GETTING READY TO CLOSE L1, AND IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT I HAD NOT BEEN CATERED YET. I RAN OVER TO DISARM R1. I WAS ABLE TO REMOVE THE GIRT BAR FROM THE FLOOR, BUT AS I WAS TRYING TO SECURE THE GIRT BAR INTO THE DOOR, THE CATERER OPENED THE DOOR. HE DID NOT KNOCK AND THE RED STRAP WAS ACROSS THE WINDOW. I YELLED THROUGH THE CRACKED DOOR FOR THE CATERER TO STOP AS THE DOOR WAS NOT DISARMED YET AND I NEEDED TO FINISH SECURING THE GIRT BAR TO THE DOOR. MY R WRIST AND FOREARM WERE INJURED AS I WAS TRYING TO SECURE WHILE HE WAS OPENING THE DOOR. THE CATERER WAS MOVING IN 'HYPER MODE' WAY TOO QUICKLY. WE MENTIONED TO HIM TO SLOW DOWN A BIT. A QUICK NOTE, JUST PRIOR TO THIS BOARDING, ENRTE TO ZZZ WE WERE EXPERIENCING A SCARY MEDICAL AND WERE ALL STILL SHAKEN FROM THE EXPERIENCE. MY NERVES DID NOT SETTLE

DOWN UNTIL 1/2 WAY TO ZZZ. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE SLIDE NEVER DEPLOYED, BUT I WAS NEVER ABLE TO PROPERLY SECURE THE GIRT BAR PRIOR TO R1 BEING OPENED.

# **Synopsis**

CATERING OPENED CABIN DOOR OF B737-700 PRIOR TO DOOR BEING FULLY DISARMED. FA WAS ABLE TO DETACH GIRT BAR BEFORE ESCAPE SLIDE DEPLOYED.

# Time / Day

Date: 200705

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

#### **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC

State Reference: US

### Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-800 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

#### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Function.Oversight: Flight Attendant In Charge Qualification.Flight Attendant: Currently Qualified

ASRS Report: 741133

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Cabin Event.Other Resolutory Action.Other

#### Assessments

Problem Areas: Passenger Human Performance

#### **Narrative**

CUST SVC AGENT ADVISED CREW PRIOR TO DOOR CLOSURE THAT CUSTOMER IN XD (MR X) HAD HIS OWN OXYGEN CONCENTRATOR (INDOGEN?...VERIFIED AS ONE THAT IS ALLOWED) AND THAT THE BATTERY PWR MAY NOT LAST FOR THE ENTIRE FLT. I CHKED WITH MR AND MRS X TO SEE JUST HOW MUCH BATTERY PWR WAS LEFT, AND THE CHARGER SHOWED THERE TO BE 82% BATTERY PWR REMAINING. I THEN ASKED THEM HOW LONG THE BATTERY NORMALLY LASTS AND WAS TOLD 5 HRS. WITH A FLT TIME OF 5+35, I LET THE CAPT AND OTHER CREW KNOW ABOUT THE SITUATION. WE DECIDED TO TAKE THE CUSTOMERS. KNOWING THAT WE WOULD EVENTUALLY NEED TO USE THE PORTABLE OXYGEN BOTTLES ON BOARD. AFTER ABOUT 2 HRS INTO THE FLT, MRS X RANG HER CALL LIGHT AND ADVISED THE 'BATTERY LOW' LIGHT WAS FLASHING ON THE CONCENTRATOR. A BOTTLE OF THERAPEUTIC OXYGEN WAS RETRIEVED AND MR X BEGAN USING THE BOTTLE WITH HIS OWN CANULA WITH THE VALVE ONLY OPENED ABOUT HALF WAY (WHEN OPENED FULLY, MR X COMPLAINED THAT THE FLOW WAS TOO MUCH). I ADVISED THE FLT DECK AND WAS ASKED BY THE CAPT IF MEDICAL SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. I TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS MY OPINION THAT

MR X WAS FINE SO LONG AS HE WAS ON THE OXYGEN, AND THAT UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, THERE WAS NO NEED TO NOTIFY MEDICAL. WITH A LITTLE OVER 3 HRS OF FLT TIME REMAINING, WE CONTINUED TO SWITCH FROM ONE POB TO ANOTHER AS EACH ONE REACHED THEIR RESPECTIVE MINIMUM LEVELS (I DID LET THE THERAPEUTIC BOTTLE GO BELOW 250 PSI, AS I WAS DISTR FOR A BIT BY A CUSTOMER IN THE MAIN CABIN WHO WANTED TO SPEAK TO THE FLT ATTENDANT IN CHARGE REGARDING A COMPLAINT), BUT THE DECOMPRESSION BOTTLES WERE TAKEN DOWN TO 1500 PSI. AND THE FLT ATTENDANT MOBILITY BOTTLES WERE TAKEN DOWN TO 1000 PSI EACH. CAPT WAS NOTIFIED WITH EACH BOTTLE SWITCH, AND ADVISED THAT IF WE SHOULD RUN THROUGH THE LAST 2 POBS, THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO DROP ALT TO 25000 FT AND THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO MAKE IT TO DEST. AT THIS POINT, WE WERE RUNNING THROUGH THE OXYGEN BOTTLES FAIRLY RAPIDLY. I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE THOUGHT IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR US TO USE THE ELECTRICAL OUTLETS IN THE GALLEY TO RECHARGE THE BATTERY OF THE CUSTOMER'S OXYGEN CONCENTRATOR. THE CAPT ADVISED THAT IT WAS OKAY TO USE THE OUTLET, AND I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD BEEN ADVISED NEVER TO USE THESE AS THEY MAY DAMAGE THE DEVICES CONNECTED TO THEM. HE ADVISED THAT IT SHOULD BE FINE, AND UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS THE BEST CHOICE. WE ASKED THE COUPLE IF THIS WOULD BE OKAY WITH THEM, AND THEY WERE VERY COOPERATIVE. WE BROUGHT THE CONCENTRATOR TO THE GALLEY AND CHARGED THE BATTERY BACK UP TO AROUND 80%, WHICH WAS MORE THAN ENOUGH PWR BY THIS TIME TO SUPPLY MR X WITH OXYGEN UNTIL WE LANDED. ALL USED OXYGEN BOTTLES WERE WRITTEN UP (5 TOTAL) ON A DISCREPANCY FORM AND GIVEN TO THE CAPT. MR AND MRS X, WHILE NEVER FULLY AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL OF DIVERSION, WERE VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE HELP.

# **Synopsis**

FLT ATTENDANT ABOARD B737-800 RESORTED TO USING ACFT PWR TO RECHARGE PAX OXYGEN APPARATUS, THEREBY PREVENTING DIVERSION FOR LACK OF PAX OXYGEN BOTTLES.

# Time / Day

Date: 200704

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

#### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

#### Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase. Ground: Parked

#### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 736552

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe

Anomaly.Cabin Event.Other

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Company Policies

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Consequence.Other: Company Review Consequence.Other: Physical Injury

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

#### **Narrative**

AT THE COMMAND OF THE PURSER'S 'FLT ATTENDANTS DISARM DOORS FOR ARR' CALL, I WENT TO DOOR 1R TO DISARM. I LIFTED THE PLASTIC COVER OF THE ARM AND DISARM LEVER AND PUSHED IN THE BUTTON, WHICH WAS WHITE BECAUSE THE COLORED PAINT HAD CHIPPED OFF. WHILE ATTEMPTING TO PULL DOWN ON THE ARM WITH MY R HAND. THE BUTTON FELT AS THOUGH IT WAS ALREADY DEPRESSED AND STUCK, AND THE DISARMING LEVER WOULD NOT COMPLETELY DISARM AS IT WAS STUCK WHILE PULLING DOWN. I APPLIED FORCE TO THE LEVER AND IT WOULD NOT GO FULLY INTO THE DISARM POS. I TURNED MY HEAD BACK TO COMMENT TO THE PURSER THAT 'THE DOOR IS STUCK' AND THEN THE LARGE HANDLE FLEW UP INTO MY L WRIST. I HEARD AND SAW THE DOOR OPEN AND STEPPED BACK TO AVOID THE DOOR HITTING ME. THE SLIDE THEN BEGAN TO DEPLOY AND I SHOUTED OUT THE DOOR, 'LOOK OUT' TO THOSE DOWN BELOW AND STOOD ASIDE. I THEN SAW SEVERAL PEOPLE BELOW AND

ASKED IF EVERYONE ON THE GND WAS OK AND RECEIVED A CONFIRMING HEAD NOD. I GAVE A THUMBS UP SIGNAL AND A MAN ON THE GND GAVE THUMBS UP BACK THAT EVERYTHING WAS OK. MY L WRIST IS SORE AND THERE IS A PIECE OF MY WATCH CHIPPED OFF THAT I WORE ON MY L WRIST. I WAS ENCOURAGED TO CONTACT A SUPVR.

# **Synopsis**

B767 SLIDE INADVERTENTLY DEPLOYS WHILE ATTEMPTING TO DISARM 1R DOOR AT GATE ARRIVAL.

# Time / Day

Date: 200704

### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: LAX.Airport

State Reference: CA

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

### Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase. Ground: Parked

### Component: 1

Aircraft Component : Escape Slide

#### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Non Adherence : Company Policies Anomaly. Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Unable

Consequence.Other

### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

#### **Narrative**

UPON ARR, WE WERE TOWED IN AND ONCE PLANE HAD STOPPED, ANNOUNCEMENT TO DISARM DOORS WAS MADE. I WENT TO DOOR AND IN A SPLIT SECOND OF NOT THINKING, PUSHED THE BUTTON ON SIDE AND PULLED LEVER. DOOR STARTED TO RISE AND SLIDE BLEW OUT WITHIN SECONDS. I ACTUALLY WENT OVER TO THE DOOR AND PERFORMED THE PROC FOR ARMING THE DOOR AND BEFORE I HAD TIME TO DO ANYTHING ELSE, THE DOOR HAD RISEN AND SLIDE DEPLOYED AS ALREADY STATED. I JUST WANT TO SAY HOW REALLY SORRY I AM THAT THIS HAPPENED AND I CAN'T APOLOGIZE TO THE COMPANY ENOUGH AS I AM FULLY AWARE OF HOW MUCH THESE SORT OF INCIDENTS COST THE COMPANY.

### **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANT FAILS TO DISARM DOOR OF B767 BEFORE OPENING AND THE SLIDE DEPLOYS.

# Time / Day

Date: 200704

### **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: SEA. Airport

State Reference : WA Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

### Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase. Ground: Parked

### Component: 1

Aircraft Component : Escape Slide

#### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 736544

#### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: Off Duty

#### Person: 3

Affiliation.Other: Contracted Service Function.Other Personnel.Other

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe Anomaly. Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

#### Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Environmental Factor

#### **Narrative**

I HAD A JUMPSEATER ON MY FLT WHO HELPED ME ARM DOOR 1R AT DEP. ALL WENT WELL. HOWEVER, AT ARR, I HAD ASSUMED THAT SHE HAD DISARMED 1R. SHE EVEN ASKED ME IF I WANTED HER TO CRACK 1R AS WE ARE SUPPOSED TO DO TO ADVISE GND PERSONNEL THAT DOOR IS DISARMED. HOWEVER, I SAID NO BECAUSE MOST OF THE TIME THE DOOR ON THAT SIDE CAVES IN. IF SHE WOULD

HAVE CRACKED THE DOOR IT WOULD HAVE BLOWN THE SLIDE. SHE DID NOT DISARM THE DOOR! I DID NOT KNOW THIS. I WAS DEADHEADING ON THE SAME ACFT. THE CREW ADVISED ME THAT THE DOOR WAS NOT DISARMED AND THE SLIDE HAD ALMOST DEPLOYED ON THE CATERER. I WAS HORRIFIED. I CAN'T DECIDE WHO I'M MORE UPSET WITH -- THE JUMPSEATER OR MYSELF. SHE HAD JUST CAME OFF A TRIP AND WAS PROBABLY VERY TIRED. SO THE MORAL OF THIS IS: NEVER ALLOW A JUMPSEATER TO ARM OR DISARM MY DOOR.

### **Synopsis**

B737 CABIN ATTENDANT ACCEPTS OFFER FROM DEADHEADING CABIN ATTENDANT TO ARM/DISARM CABIN DOOR PRIOR TO DEP/ARR. WORKING ATTENDANT FAILS TO INSPECT THE DOOR AND THE SLIDE ALMOST DEPLOYS WHEN THE CATERERS ATTEMPT TO SERVICE THE GALLEY.

## Time / Day

Date: 200704

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: PHL.Airport

State Reference : PA

#### **Environment**

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Airline Total: 18.5

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Total: 18.5 Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Type: 90

ASRS Report: 736541

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Wake Turbulence

Consequence.Other: Physical Injury

## Assessments

Problem Areas: Environmental Factor

#### **Narrative**

APPROX 25-30 MINS PRIOR TO LNDG IN PHL, FLT ATTENDANT #2 AND I WERE IN THE AFT GALLEY WHEN WE WERE FIRST SUSPENDED IN THE AIR AND THEN THROWN TO THE GALLEY FLOOR DUE TO WHAT THE CAPT LATER TOLD US HAD BEEN THE WAKE FROM ANOTHER ACFT. FLT ATTENDANT #2 BRUISED HER BACK FROM ABOVE HER HIP TO HER SHOULDER BLADE ON THE CORNER OF #4 JUMPSEAT AS SHE WAS FORCED DOWN BY THE G-FORCES. I HAD BEEN STANDING NEXT TO FLT ATTENDANT #2 IN THE GALLEY, BUT WAS CLOSER TO THE DOOR WHEN I WAS FORCED DOWN BY THE G-FORCES. I ONLY HAD A GALLEY WALL BEHIND ME -- NOTHING PROTRUDING, SO I DID NOT BRUISE MY BACK. FLT ATTENDANT #2 CALLED THE COCKPIT TO INFORM THEM OF HER INJURY AND TO INQUIRE AS TO WHAT CAUSED THE TURB. THE CAPT TOLD HER THAT IT HAD BEEN WAKE FROM ANOTHER ACFT. FLT ATTENDANT #2 TOLD THE CAPT THAT SHE WAS BRUISED, BUT DID NOT NEED ANY IMMEDIATE MEDICAL ATTN.

## Synopsis

 $2\ \text{FLT}$  ATTENDANTS INJURED DURING ARR AT PHL DURING AN ENCOUNTER WITH WAKE TURB.

# Time / Day

Date: 200703

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: DEN.Airport

State Reference : CO Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-300 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Ground: Parked

## Component: 1

Aircraft Component : Escape Slide

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 736520

#### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier

#### Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Maintenance: Technician Function.Other Personnel.Other

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Non Adherence : Company Policies Anomaly. Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem

Consequence. Other

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

#### **Narrative**

WE WERE SCHEDULED FOR AN XA50 PICK-UP GIVING US LESS THAN 8 HRS AT THE HOTEL. I DID NOT GET SUFFICIENT SLEEP AFTER WORKING ALL NIGHT AND WAS VERY TIRED AS WERE MY FLYING PARTNERS AND THIS WAS MY 5TH CONSECUTIVE DAY OF FLYING. AT XA45 THE CREW DESK CALLED TO NOTIFY US OF A 50 MIN DELAY BUT I WAS ALREADY IN UNIFORM AND COULD NOT GO BACK TO SLEEP. WE WORKED THE FLT TO DEN AND UPON ARR AT THE GATE I LOOKED

OUT OF THE WINDOW AND SAW THE AGENT BRINGING THE JETBRIDGE TO DOOR 1L. I MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO DISARM DOORS, THEN I DISARMED DOOR 1L AND CRACKED IT. I THEN WENT TO DOOR 1R AND DISARMED AND CRACKED THAT DOOR. WHEN I TURNED BACK TO DOOR 1L THE AGENT WAS OPENING IT. HE OPENED IT A FEW INCHES AND STOPPED BECAUSE THE SLIDE PACK WAS COMING OUT OF THE DOOR CASING AND THE GIRT BAR WAS ENGAGED. THE AGENT BACKED AWAY FROM THE DOOR AND I QUICKLY DISENGAGED IT AND NOTIFIED THE PLTS. A MECH CAME AND REMOVED THE SLIDE PACK AND OPENED THE DOOR. EVERYTHING HAPPENED VERY FAST.

# **Synopsis**

BESET WITH FATIGUE DUE TO LONG DUTY DAYS AND FIVE CONSECUTIVE DAYS OF FLYING, CABIN ATTENDANT FAILS TO DISCONNECT SLIDE GIRT BAR ON B737-300 PRIOR TO CRACKING DOOR TO SIGNIFY IT WAS SAFE TO BE OPENED.

# Time / Day

Date: 200702

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

## Place

Locale Reference. Airport: SAEZ. Airport

State Reference: FO

## **Environment**

Weather Elements: Rain

Weather Elements: Thunderstorm Weather Elements: Turbulence

Light: Daylight

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B777-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Descent: Intermediate Altitude

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant: Currently Qualified Qualification.Flight Attendant.Aircraft Qualified On: 7 Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Airline Total: 15

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Total: 30

ASRS Report: 736317

## Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

#### Person: 3

Function. Observation: Passenger

## **Events**

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Turbulence Anomaly. Inflight Encounter: Weather

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other: Physical Injury

#### Assessments

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Environmental Factor

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Weather

## **Narrative**

FLT ATTENDANTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN UP IN CABIN AT ALL. WE WERE THROWN 5 FT IN THE AIR, DOWN A FOOT, THEN UP AGAIN, THEN SLAMMED TO THE GROUND FROM 5 FT. SEVERE (WHAT I CALL AS I WAS SUSPENDED 4-5 FT MIDAIR) TURB, HARD RAIN, SOUNDED LIKE HAIL. I LANDED STRAIGHT DOWN ON MY R WRIST AND R HIP, STAYED ON FLOOR UNTIL I CRAWLED TO R1 JUMPSEAT. CAPT ADVISED OF TURB IN 10 MINS. THIS HAPPENED IN 3 MINS FROM HIS PHONE CALL. PA'S WERE MADE TO PAX TO REMAIN SEATED AND BUCKLED IN QUITE A FEW TIMES, BUT FLT ATTENDANTS WERE PUTTING THINGS AWAY. FLT ATTENDANTS SHOULD BE IN JUMPSEATS IF THEY FEEL IT'S UNSAFE AND NOT SERVING (ON AN INTL FLT OF 4 OR MORE HRS) 40 MINS BEFORE LNDG EVERYTHING SHOULD BE PICKED UP. 2 PAX IN MAIN CABIN WERE INJURED AND ALSO ALL FLT ATTENDANTS.

# **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANTS AND PAX INJURED DURING TURBULENCE ENCOUNTER DESCENDING INTO SAEZ.

# Time / Day

Date: 200704

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light: Night

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant: Currently Qualified Qualification.Flight Attendant.Aircraft Qualified On: 6 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Airline Total: 7

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Total: 11 Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Type: 80

ASRS Report: 734610

#### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

## **Events**

Anomaly. Other Anomaly: Fumes

Resolutory Action.Other Consequence.Other

#### Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

#### **Narrative**

AFTER TKOF, A STRONG SMELL OF HOT WIRES BECAME APPARENT. THE CAPT WAS NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY. WE, THE CREW, MADE A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE CABIN. THE FLT RETURNED TO AND LANDED IN ORD WITH NO INCIDENT. THE FLT WAS CANCELED.

# Synopsis

B757 CABIN ATTENDANT RPTS STRONG ELECTRICAL ODOR ON INITIAL CLB RESULTS IN A RETURN TO THE TKOF ARPT.

# Time / Day

Date: 200702

Local Time Of Day: 0001 To 0600

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

#### **Environment**

Light: Night

## Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B757-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant : Currently Qualified Qualification.Flight Attendant.Aircraft Qualified On : 6 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Airline Total : 12

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Total: 16 Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Type: 50

ASRS Report: 734261

## **Events**

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Company Problem Areas : FAA

## **Narrative**

COMPANY IS SCHEDULING ITS CABIN CREW MEMBERS TO WORK ALL NIGHT TURNS TO THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS FROM MID-AFTERNOON TO EARLY AM PST/PDT FOLLOWING DAY. THESE TRIPS GO AGAINST A FLT ATTENDANT'S BODY RHYTHMS AND IN MY OPINION PUSH THE BOUNDARIES OF A BUILT-IN SAFETY CUSHION. UPON THE RETURN FLT TWO OF MY COLLEAGUES DISPLAYED VISIBLE SIGNS OF FATIGUE AS THEIR EYES WERE SEVERELY BLOOD-SHOT. ADDITIONALLY, APPROX 1.5 HRS PRIOR TO OUR ARR IN ZZZ I BEGAN TO SEE WAVY LINES (BLURRED VISION) AS I WAS ATTEMPTING TO KEEP MY EYES OPEN. COMPANY PROVIDES NO

CREW REST ON THESE ALL NIGHT HAWAII TURNS. THE COCKPIT CREW, DUE TO FAA DUTY-TIME STANDARDS, DO NOT HAVE TO ENDURE FLYING AN ISLAND TURN. BECAUSE OF SAFETY OF FLT CONCERNS THEY (THE COCKPIT CREW) WORK ONE LEG (FLT SEGMENT) TO THE ISLANDS AND REQUIRES A LAYOVER. MY PERSONAL FEELING, FROM MY EXPERIENCE, IS THAT THE SCHEDULING OF ALL NIGHT HAWAII TURNS FROM THE WEST-COAST PUSH THE PARAMETERS OF AN ADEQUATE SAFETY CUSHION. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IS GREATLY DIMINISHED BECAUSE OF CABIN CREW MEMBER FATIGUE AND I BELIEVE THAT REACTION TIME IS SIGNIFICANTLY COMPROMISED ON THE PART OF WORKING FLT ATTENDANTS SHOULD AN INFLT MEDICAL EMER OCCUR OR EVENTS THAT WOULD NECESSITATE AN EVAC OR PREPARATION FOR A WATER DITCHING.

# **Synopsis**

A FLT ATTENDANT DESCRIBES CREW MEMBERS SHOWING FATIGUE DURING ROUND TRIP ASSIGNMENTS TO THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

# Time / Day

Date: 200703

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZZ. Airport

State Reference: FO

## Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B747-400 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise : Level Route In Use.Enroute : Pacific

## Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 732940

#### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Function.Oversight: Flight Attendant In Charge

#### Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Cabin Event.Other

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Company Policies

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

## **Narrative**

DURING THE CHANGE-OVER FROM FIRST BREAK TO SECOND BREAK, 2 OF THE SECOND BREAK FLT ATTENDANTS WAITING TO GO UP INTO THE CREW BUNKS

NOTICED THAT DOOR 5R WAS NOT IN THE ARMED POS. THEY DISCREETLY ARMED THE DOOR. THEN THEY NOTICED THAT DOOR 5L WAS NOT ARMED AS WELL, AND ATTEMPTED TO ARM IT BUT COULD NOT BECAUSE IT WAS FROZEN AND SNAPPED IMMEDIATELY BACK TO DISARMED WHEN THE ARMING LEVER WAS MOVED. THEY CONTACTED THE PURSER AND THE CAPT. THE CAPT INFORMED THE PURSER THAT WE WOULD TRY TO ARM THE DOOR AFTER DSNDING BELOW FL180 ON OUR APCH INTO ZZZ. FOLLOWING MY BREAK (SECOND BREAK) I ASKED THE PURSER WHAT THE FINAL OUTCOME WAS REGARDING ARMING THE DOOR AND WHAT WE WOULD DO AS FAR AS POSSIBLY TREATING THE DOOR AS 'INOP' AND MOVING PAX TO SEATS FAR ENOUGH AWAY FROM 5L AS WE WERE ONLY ABOUT 3/4 FULL IN ECONOMY. SHE TOLD ME THAT THE CAPT HAD TOLD HER WHAT I STATED EARLIER ABOUT ARMING THE DOOR AFTER FL180. I ALSO ASKED HER IF I NEEDED TO FILL OUT A SAFETY RPT OR IF SHE WOULD. SHE SAID THAT THE CAPT TOLD HER THAT 'NO RPTS WERE NECESSARY SINCE THERE WAS A VERY GOOD CHANCE THAT THE DOOR WOULD BE ABLE TO BE ARMED BELOW FL180. SHE SAID THAT WE DID NOT NEED TO MOVE PAX AND WE WOULD CONTINUE AS NORMAL. I WENT BACK TO THE ECONOMY GALLEY AND DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE AFT PURSER AND THE OTHER 2 FLT ATTENDANTS, THAT WERE WORKING WITH US. WE ALL AGREED THAT THIS WAS NOT SOMETHING WE WERE COMFORTABLE WITH, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE 4 OF US HAD ENCOUNTERED MANY PROBS ON THE FLT OUT WITH THE 2 FLT ATTENDANTS THAT WERE ASSIGNED TO 5L AND 5R. THE AFT PURSER HAD SPOKEN TO THE 2 FLT ATTENDANTS SEVERAL TIMES ABOUT THE PROBS WE HAD DURING THE SVC ON THE PREVIOUS SEGMENT AS WELL AS THIS CURRENT FLT. THE 2 FLT ATTENDANTS BECAME VERY HOSTILE TOWARDS THE AFT PURSER AND MYSELF AND REMAINED THAT WAY ON THE FLT HOME. THIS INFO WILL BE RELEVANT SHORTLY. SHORTLY AFTER OUR DISCUSSION THE FLT BECAME TURBULENT AND THE FLT DECK TOLD US TO BE SEATED. THE FLT ATTENDANT THAT NORMALLY SITS NEXT TO ME AT 4R (HE WAS INBOARD) SAT AT 4L BECAUSE HE WAS CLOSER TO THAT JUMPSEAT. HE NOTICED THAT 4L WAS NOW NOT ARMED. HE IMMEDIATELY ARMED THE DOOR. THIS SHOCKED ME BECAUSE THIS DOOR IS THE ONE THAT I XCHKED AT DEP BECAUSE IT IS MY SECONDARY EXIT AND I AM 110% POSITIVE THAT IT WAS ARMED AT DEP. THE AFT PURSER AND I DECIDED TO ASK THE PAX AT 4L IF THEY HAD NOTICED ANYONE APPROACH THE DOOR OTHER THAN HER OR THE FLT ATTENDANT THAT RE-ARMED IT. 2 OF THE PAX AT 4L WERE ACTUALLY PLTS FOR OTHER CARRIERS AND THEY STATED THAT THEY COULDN'T BE SURE IF ANYONE ELSE APPROACHED THE DOOR BECAUSE THEY HAD DOZED OFF PERIODICALLY DURING THE FLT. WE CHOSE NOT TO DISCUSS THIS INFO WITH ANYONE ELSE FOR FEAR THAT THE DOOR 5 FLT ATTENDANTS MIGHT CREATE AN EVEN WORSE SITUATION KNOWING THAT WE DISCOVERED THAT THE DOOR (4L) HAD BEEN DISARMED. I WENT TO SPEAK TO THE PURSER AGAIN TO ASK HER IF SHE AT LEAST TOLD THE 2 DOOR 5 FLT ATTENDANTS THAT THEY HAD TO FILE A SAFETY RPT AND THEN SAID THAT SHE GAVE EACH OF THEM THE PHONE NUMBER AND THE WEB SITE INFO TO FILE THE RPT. I AM FILING THIS NOW BECAUSE I AM CONVINCED THAT THE 2 FLT ATTENDANTS SITTING AT DOOR 5L AND 5R DID NOT FILE A SAFETY RPT. I AM FILING THIS NOW BECAUSE I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT A CAPT RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL OF OUR LIVES WOULD TELL US NOT TO FILE ANY RPTS WHEN THIS IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF SAFETY PROTOCOLS, NOT TO MENTION THE INFERENCE THAT ONE OF THE 2 FLT ATTENDANTS AT DOOR 5 WOULD DISARM 4L IN ORDER TO BE VENGEFUL TO THE AFT PURSER. I AM DISAPPOINTED IN THE CAPT AND THE PURSER FOR PLACING ME AND THE REST OF THE CREW IN A POS WHERE WE WOULD QUESTION OUR ACTIONS WITH REGARDS TO FILING SAFETY RPTS. THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT THE RPTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN

FILED. THE RPTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF THE FLT.

# **Synopsis**

A B747-400 FLT ATTENDANT REPORTS DISCOVERING DISARMED MAIN CABIN DOORS IN FLT AND ORDERED NOT TO FILE SAFETY REPORTS EXPOSING THE TRANSGRESSIONS.

# Time / Day

Date: 200703

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A320

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121 Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Airline Total: 20

Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Total: 20 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Type: 15

ASRS Report: 731948

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Other Anomaly. Other

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Company

#### **Situations**

## **Narrative**

MY ACR HAS BEEN IN THE PROCESS OF RECONFIGURING THE A320 AIRCRAFT. IN THE PROCESS OF REMOVING THE FORWARD COAT CLOSET THAT HOUSED THE EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT, THE AIRLINE FIRST RELOCATED THE EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT TO THE FORWARD OVERHEAD COMPARTMENTS. CREW MEMBERS HAVE NOT BEEN HAPPY ABOUT THE MOVE SINCE IT HAS CREATED CONGESTION IN THE FIRST CLASS CABIN. IT HAS ONLY BECOME A REAL ISSUE FOR THE AIRLINE WHEN THE FIRST CLASS CUSTOMERS COMPLAINED. THE AIRLINE FOUND IT NEEDED TO CHANGE EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AGAIN. NOW WITH NO REGARD FOR SAFETY, EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN RELOCATED TO THE FORWARD GALLEY. SPECIFICALLY THE FIRST AID KIT AND PBE HAVE BEEN MOVED JUST ABOVE AND TO THE LEFT OF THE OVENS. ANY REASONABLE PERSON COULD SEE IF THERE WAS A FIRE IN THE OVEN, GETTING TO THIS ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE. CLEARLY THE AIRLINE'S INTEREST IN SAFETY IS LACKING IN PLACE OF REVENUE. THE NEED TO INCREASE THE AIRCRAFT SEATING CAPACITY

RESULTING IN THE REMOVAL OF AN ESSENTIAL STORAGE COMPARTMENT. NOW THE AIRLINE IS BACK-PEDALING BECAUSE OF THEIR APPARENT ERROR THEY DECIDED TO JUST PLACE EQUIPMENT ANYWHERE IN THE CABIN. WITH THE PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE AIRLINE'S POOR DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO INTEGRATING THE AIRLINES I LOOK TO THE FAA TO ENSURE THE AIRLINE DOESN'T MAKE IMPROPER DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE SAFETY OF THE AIRCRAFT. PLACEMENT OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE FAA AND AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS. AS A CERTIFIED FLIGHT ATTENDANT TRAINED ON A SPECIFIC MODEL OF AIRCRAFT I SHOULD BE ABLE TO FIND THE SAME EQUIPMENT IN THE SAME LOCATION REGARDLESS OF AIRLINE. IF I'M ON BOARD ANOTHER AIRLINE'S AIRCRAFT I SHOULD BE ABLE TO LOCATE EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT.

## **Synopsis**

ACR FLT ATTENDANT RPTS ACR HAS MOVED EMER EQUIP TO GALLEY LOCKER WHICH COULD MAKE THE EQUIP DIFFICULT TO ACCESS IN A GALLEY FIRE.

# Time / Day

Date: 200703

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZSE.ARTCC

State Reference: WA

## Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZSE.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-400 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 731580

## Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier

Function.Oversight: Flight Attendant In Charge

#### Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

## **Events**

Anomaly.Cabin Event: Passenger Illness

Anomaly.Non Adherence: FAR

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Passenger Human Performance

## **Narrative**

PAX WAS IN LAVATORY FOR LNDG. CIRCUMSTANCES: DURING THE FIRST BEVERAGE SVC, WE HEARD REPEATED CALL BUTTON CHIMES. SINCE WE DIDN'T SEE A BLUE LIGHT AT THE ANNUNCIATOR PANEL, WE FIGURED IT WAS A MISTAKE. HOWEVER, WE STILL HEARD REPEATED CALL BUTTON CHIMES. WE FIGURED OUT THAT IT WAS THE LAVATORY CALL LIGHT, AFT LAVATORY ACFT R. I WENT TO RESPOND TO IT. THERE WAS A PAX IN THE LAVATORY, AND STATED THAT HE WAS SICK, POSSIBLE FOOD POISONING AT DEPARTING ARPT, AND NEEDED SOME ASSISTANCE, SPECIFICALLY SOME TOWELS TO CLEAN HIMSELF

AND THE LAVATORY UP. MY RESPONSE WAS TO TAKE CARE OF THE PAX'S NEEDS. HOWEVER, HE SEEMED MORE CONCERNED ABOUT GETTING HIMSELF AND THE LAVATORY CLEAN, SO I OBLIGED HIM. LATER, HE ASKED ME IF WE HAD ANY DISINFECTANT TO CLEAN THE LAVATORY. I ASKED 'A' FLT ATTENDANT TO BRING UP THE LAVATORY SPRAY SANITIZER FROM THE WIND SCREEN AND I GAVE IT TO THE PAX. AGAIN, HE WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT MAKING SURE THAT THE LAVATORY WAS CLEAN AND DISINFECTED. FINALLY, HE ASKED ME IF WE HAD ANYTHING ON BOARD THE ACFT TO CLEAN BLOOD. I PROCEEDED TO TELL HIM WHAT WE NORMALLY DO WITH BODILY FLUIDS ON BOARD THE ACFT. WE CLEAN BODILY FLUIDS WITH TOWELS AND DISPOSE OF THEM IN A BIOHAZARD BAG. HE WASN'T SATISFIED WITH MY ANSWER AND WANTED TO SPEAK WITH THE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT. THIS IS WHERE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT TOOK OVER. AFTER 'A' FLT ATTENDANT DEALT WITH THE PAX. HE INFORMED ME THAT THE PAX HAD HEPATITIS C AND WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE LAVATORY BEING DISINFECTED BEFORE ANYONE CAN USE IT. UNFORTUNATELY, WE DID NOT HAVE ANYTHING ON BOARD THE ACFT TO ADEQUATELY DISINFECT THE LAVATORY TO THE LIKING OF THE PAX. ACTION: 'A' FLT ATTENDANT DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH THE FLT DECK. THEY DECIDED TO LOCK OFF THE LAVATORY AND HAVE THE LAVATORY DISINFECTED IN SEA. THE LAVATORY WOULD BE FOR THE SPECIFIC USE OF THAT PARTICULAR PAX AND DID NOT ALLOW ANYONE ELSE TO USE IT. JUST PRIOR TO 10000 FT, THE PAX WAS IN THE LAVATORY AND REMAINED IN THERE UNTIL OUR LNDG IN SEA. THE PAX FELT IT WOULD BE SAFER FOR HIM TO REMAIN IN THE LAVATORY IN CASE HE WOULD FEEL SICK FOR THE REST OF THE FLT. THE CAPT WAS IN AGREEMENT, FOR HIS SAFETY AS WELL AS THE SAFETY OF THE OTHER PAX ON BOARD.

## **Synopsis**

B737 CABIN CREW REPORTS PASSENGER WHO HAS BEEN SICK IN THE LAV AND STATES THAT HE HAS HEPATITIS C.

# Time / Day

Date: 200702

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: IAD. Airport

State Reference : DC Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: IAD.Tower Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A320

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground: Taxi

## Component: 1

Aircraft Component : Seatbelt

## Component: 2

Aircraft Component : Headset Aircraft Component : Headset

#### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 729962

## Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical Anomaly. Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Resolutory Action.Other Consequence.Other

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

## **Narrative**

OUR PREFLT STATED THE FOLLOWING WRITE-UPS: CABIN INTERPHONE INOP AND AFT FLT ATTENDANT HANDSET INOP. I WAS THE PURSER ON THIS FLT. DURING PREFLT SAFETY CHKS. THE AFT FLT ATTENDANTS REALIZED THAT THE AFT PA WAS ALSO INOP. WE WERE CONCERNED BECAUSE WE HAD NO MEANS OF COM BTWN EACH OTHER. THE AFT FLT ATTENDANTS HAD NO WAY TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE COCKPIT. I ASKED THE CAPT TO CHK WITH MAINT. THE CAPT ASKED ME TO CHK THE FOM. WE FOUND THE FOM TO BE UNCLR ON WHICH COM SYS NEEDED TO BE OPERABLE. PAX WERE BOARDED AND THE ACFT DOOR WAS CLOSED. CAPT APOLOGIZED TO ME THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO GET MAINT ITEMS FIXED. I WAS SURPRISED THAT THE ACFT WAS OK TO GO, BUT ASSUMED THAT MAINT HAD CLRED THE ACFT TO GO. DURING TAXI OUT, ONE OF THE AFT FLT ATTENDANTS CAME UP FRONT AND ADVISED ME THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO OPERATE THE LIGHT SWITCHES AT THE PANEL AT DOOR X. THEY WERE NOW CONCERNED THAT THE EVAC SYS MIGHT NOT BE OPERABLE AND URGED ME TO CALL THE COCKPIT. THE CAPT WAS IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED AND SAID THAT HE WOULD PULL OVER AND CALL MAINT. WE EVENTUALLY TESTED THE EVAC SYS AT DOOR X, THE LIGHTS WORKED BUT THE EVAC HORN OR SOUND DID NOT. THE CAPT THEN HAD ME TEST THE EVAC COMMAND AT DOOR Y AND IT WAS OPERABLE. WE THEN RETURNED TO THE GATE. WHEN THE MECHS BOARDED THE ACFT, THEY WERE VERY ANGRY, THEY TOLD US THAT THEY HAD NOT CLRED THE ACFT TO DEPART, THAT THE CAPT HAD CLRED THE ACFT. THEY ALSO ASKED WHY WE DID NOT TEST THE EVAC SYS BEFORE WE LEFT THE GATE. WE TOLD THEM THAT THIS WAS NOT PART OF OUR PREFLT SAFETY CHK. WE NOW FEEL THAT IT SHOULD BE. HAD WE NEEDED TO EVAC THE AIRPLANE, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE COULD HAVE BEEN SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES, IN THAT THE COCKPIT WOULD NOT HAVE KNOWN TO STOP THE ACFT. WE ALSO WONDER WHETHER IT WAS SAFE TO DISPATCH THE AIRPLANE WITHOUT COVERT COM POSSIBILITIES BTWN THE CREW MEMBERS IN THIS DAY AND AGE OF LEVEL 3 AND 4 SAFETY THREATS, ALSO, I WOULD LIKE TO ONCE AGAIN STATE THAT THE FOM WAS VERY UNCLR TO ALL OF US. WE REALLY FEEL AFTER THIS INCIDENT THAT THE EVAC SYS SHOULD BE TESTED DURING PREFLT CHKS.

## Synopsis

A FLT ATTENDANT RPTS DEPARTING THE GATE WITH CABIN INTERPHONE AND AFT CABIN HANDSETS INOP. WHEN THE EVAC SYS WAS FOUND INOP, ACFT RETURNED TO THE GATE.

# Time / Day

Date: 200702

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

#### **Environment**

## Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: ZZZ. Tower Operator. Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Climbout: Takeoff

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant: Currently Qualified Qualification.Flight Attendant.Aircraft Qualified On: 5 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Airline Total: 19

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Total: 25 Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Type: 85

ASRS Report: 729630

#### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

## Person: 4

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Observation: Passenger

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Other Anomaly: Fumes

Anomaly. Other Anomaly Resolutory Action. Other

Consequence.Other: Physical Injury

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Aircraft

## **Narrative**

RIGHT AFTER TAKEOFF I SMELLED A HORRIBLE PLASTIC BURNING SMELL AND NUMEROUS PAX RANG THEIR CALL LIGHTS. I MADE MY WAY UP THE AISLE, TO ANSWER QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SMELL. I CALLED CAPT AND HE WAS ALREADY SPEAKING WITH FLT ATTENDANT #1 WHO TOLD HIM THAT NO OVENS WERE IN USE. I TOLD HIM THAT PAX HAD CONCERNS AND HE SAID WE WERE RETURNING TO DEP ARPT. THE FUMES WERE VERY OVER POWERING. I HAD A BAD HEADACHE AT THIS POINT AND FELT A BURNING IN MY THROAT. I NOTICED AN INCREASE IN FUMES RIGHT BEFORE LNDG AS WELL AS A DIRTY SMOGGY SMELL. CAPT CALLED US RIGHT AFTER LNDG AND TOLD US TO KEEP HIM APPRISED OF SITUATION IN CASE WE WOULD NEED TO EVACUATE. WE MADE IT TO THE GATE. DEPLANED WITHOUT INCIDENT. ALTHOUGH I DID HEAR 6 PAX WERE SENT TO THE HOSPITAL FOR FUME INHALATION.

## **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANT RPTS STRONG BURNING PLASTIC SMELL RIGHT AFTER TAKEOFF. FLT RETURNS TO DEP ARPT.

# Time / Day

Date: 200702

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

## **Environment**

Light: Night

## Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

## Aircraft: 2

## Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant: Currently Qualified Qualification.Flight Attendant.Aircraft Qualified On: 4 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Airline Total: 22

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Total: 22 Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Type: 90

ASRS Report: 729270

#### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Observation: Passenger Function.Other Personnel.Other

# Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

## Person: 4

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person: 5

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Observation: Passenger

#### **Events**

Anomaly, Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical

Anomaly. Other Anomaly: Fumes

Anomaly. Other Anomaly

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Consequence. Other

Consequence.Other: Physical Injury

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance Problem Areas : Passenger Human Performance

#### **Narrative**

AT APPROX XA50 A DEAD HEADING CAPT MOTIONED TO ME TO ASK ME IF I SMELLED THE ODOR THAT WAS IN THE CABIN. HE DESCRIBED IT AS SMELLING LIKE CHLORINE. I THOUGHT IT SMELLED MORE LIKE AN ELECTRICAL SMELL. I SAID YES AND INSTRUCTED HIM TO CONTACT THE COCKPIT, IDENTIFY HIMSELF, AND EXPLAIN TO THEM WHAT WAS HAPPENING. I ALSO WAS EXPERIENCING A BURNING SENSATION IN MY EYES. PRACTICALLY SIMULTANEOUSLY, SEVERAL PAX RANG THEIR CALL LIGHTS TO RPT THE ODOR, AND BY THIS TIME, WE HAD WHITE SMOKE IN THE CABIN. THE CABIN LIGHTS WERE OFF AT THE TIME AND SMOKE APPEARED TO BE COMING OUT IN STREAMS FROM THE AIR VENTS ABOVE THE PAX SEATS. WHEN THE DEAD HEADING CAPT CONTACTED THE COCKPIT, THEY RESPONDED FIRST BY TURNING OFF THE AC PACKS, ONE AT A TIME. I THEN CHKED THE AFT LAVS FOR ANY SIGNS OF SMOKE OR FIRE AND FOUND NONE. I ALSO WALKED FORWARD FEELING FOR HEAT, BUT FOUND NONE. I PROCEEDED TO THE FWD ENTRY AREA AND TURNED OFF THE POWER PORTS. DEAD HEADING CAPT ALSO CAME FORWARD AND PULLED ALL THE GALLEY CB IN THE FIRST CLASS GALLEY. MANY PAX AT THIS TIME RPTED THE ODOR, SMOKE AND A BURNING SENSATION IN THEIR EYES. WE TOLD THEM THAT WE WERE AWARE OF THE PROB AND HAD ALREADY RPTED IT TO THE PLTS. NO ONE THAT I WAS AWARE OF AT THIS TIME COMPLAINED OF DIFFICULTY BREATHING. THE SMOKE STARTED TO SUBSIDE ONCE BOTH PACKS WERE TURNED OFF, BUT THE ODOR, FUMES, AND SMOKE STILL LINGERED. IT WAS DECIDED THAT WE WOULD MAKE AN EMER LNDG IN ZZZ1 AND WOULD BE MET BY EMER PERSONNEL. WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND TAXIED TO A GATE WHERE EMT, AND FIRE AND RESCUE TEAMS AWAITED OUR ARR. I WAS THE #2 AND WAS THE LAST PERSON BESIDES THE COCKPIT TO DEPLANE, AND WHEN I ENTERED THE CONCOURSE, THERE WERE SEVERAL PAX ON OXYGEN. A FEW HAD BEEN SEEN FOR IRRITATED EYES, AND ONE PAX HAD A SEVERE DIABETIC REACTION LATER ON. IT WAS DECIDED THAT WE WOULD OVERNIGHT AND THE PLANE WAS TAKEN OTS.

## Synopsis

MD80 EXPERIENCED INFLT SMOKE FROM AC SYSTEM. DIVERTS FOR EMER LNDG.

# Time / Day

Date: 200612

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

## **Environment**

Light: Daylight

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant: Currently Qualified Qualification.Flight Attendant.Aircraft Qualified On: 5 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Airline Total: 7

Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Total: 8
Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Type: 70

ASRS Report: 728809

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe

Anomaly. Other Anomaly: Fumes

Anomaly. Other Anomaly

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed As Precaution

Consequence.Other

#### Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

## **Narrative**

DURING THE BOARDING PROCESS THE (LAVATORY ON ACFT L AFT) SMOKE ALARM CHIMES STARTED GOING OFF. NO ONE WAS IN THAT LAVATORY. AFTER A FEW MINS (NO MORE THAN 2) IT CEASED. THERE DIDN'T SEEM TO BE ANY ODOR AT THAT TIME AND NO SMOKE WAS VISIBLE. I THOUGHT MAYBE IT WAS SET OFF BY A BLACKBERRY CELL PHONE'S RADIO SIGNALING BUT NO ONE IN THE REAR OF THE ACFT OWNED UP TO HAVING A BLACKBERRY DEVICE. DURING THE DEMO: A FEW MINS LATER, THE CHIMING OF THAT LAVATORY SMOKE DETECTOR STARTED

AGAIN, LASTED ABOUT A TOTAL OF 5 MINS -- IT WOULD STOP THEN START UP AGAIN FOR A BRIEF FEW SECONDS THEN STOP. I BELIEVE, CAN'T REMEMBER FOR SURE, THAT THE CAPT CALLED US ABOUT THE ALARM, BUT SINCE THERE WAS NO ODOR AND NO VISIBLE SIGNS OF SMOKE, WE ALL THOUGHT IT WAS MALFUNCTIONING. I CAN'T RECALL HOW MANY TIMES THIS INTERMITTENT 'CHIMING' OCCURRED, BUT BY THE TIME WE WERE STARTING OUR BEVERAGE SVC IT BEGAN AGAIN -- THIS TIME CONTINUOUSLY. THE #4 AND I LOOKED FOR THE SWITCH TO TURN OFF THE ALARM, BUT COULD NOT FIND ONE. THIS PARTICULAR ACFT APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN 'REVAMPED' OR RECONFIGURED AND THE ORIGINAL SHUTOFF TO THE ALARM HAD BEEN DISENGAGED. AFTER LOOKING THE LOCATION UP IN OUR MANUAL WE WERE STILL NOT ABLE TO FIND A SHUTOFF. I THEN DECIDED TO CHK WITH THE CAPT TO SEE IF THEY KNEW AND HE SAID THEY DIDN'T HAVE THAT INFO OR SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT BUT DID VERIFY WITH US THAT THERE WAS NO SMOKE DETECTED BY VISUAL OR SMELL. ABOUT THAT TIME, A FURLOUGHED OR MAYBE A 'CALLED BACK TO DUTY' FORMER PLT OF OURS WHO WAS TRAVELING WITH HIS FAMILY IDENTED HIMSELF AS ONE OF OUR PLTS OFFERED TO SEE IF HE COULD LOCATE THE SHUTOFF AND AT LEAST KEEP AN EYE ON THE LAVATORY SO WE COULD CONTINUE WITH THE SVC. BY THIS TIME WE HAD ALREADY BLOCKED OFF THE LAVATORY. WITHIN A FEW MINS HE DETECTED WHAT SEEMED TO BE AN ELECTRICAL BURNING ODOR SO HE TURNED THE AIR VENT OFF IN THE LAVATORY. WHEN I RPTED TO THE CAPT THAT THIS PLT SMELLED THE ODOR I WENT BACK IN TO CHK IT MYSELF. NOT KNOWING HE HAD TURNED THE AIR VENT OFF, I TURNED IT BACK ON AND THEN IMMEDIATELY SAW A FAINT PUFF-LIKE CLOUD WHICH QUICKLY DISSIPATED. WE INFORMED THE CAPT ABOUT THE STRENGTHENING ELECTRICAL BURNING ODOR AND SMOKE-LIKE BRIEF 'PUFF' AND HE MADE THE DECISION TO DIVERT FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ON THE GND. THE FINAL CONSENSUS ON THE GND WAS THAT THE OXYGEN MASK IN THE LAVATORY WAS DISENGAGED/ACTIVATED WHICH EMITTED THE ODOR AND VAPOR. WE CONTINUED ON TO ZZZZ.

# **Synopsis**

MD80 FLIGHT ATTENDANT REPORTS THE ACTIVATION OF A LAV SMOKE DETECTOR WHICH RESULTS IN A DIVERSION.

# Time / Day

Date: 200702

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

## **Environment**

Light: Daylight

## Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: ZZZ. Tower Operator. Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Climbout: Initial

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant.Aircraft Qualified On: 6 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Airline Total: 8 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Total: 12 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Type: 90

ASRS Report: 728270

#### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Airline Total: 27

Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Total: 27 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Type: 100

ASRS Report: 727291

#### Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

## Person: 4

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

## **Events**

Anomaly. Other Anomaly: Fumes

Anomaly. Other Anomaly

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Resolutory Action.Other Consequence.Other Consequence.Other

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Aircraft

#### **Narrative**

SHORTLY AFTER TKOF, WHITISH SMOKE BEGAN TO FILL THE CABIN, MAINLY UP NEAR THE FIRST CLASS AND MAIN CABIN DIVIDER. PAX RANG THE CALL LIGHT AS I LOOKED UP AND SAW THE SMOKE. THE #1 AND #4 FLT ATTENDANTS ALSO SMELLED/SAW IT AT THE SAME TIME. WE IMMEDIATELY CALLED THE CAPT, SHE RESPONDED THAT THEY COULD SMELL IT AND HAD ALREADY CLRED FOR AN EMER LNDG. WE REASSURED THE PAX, CAPT ANNOUNCED WE WERE LNDG IMMEDIATELY. UPON DESCENT, THE SMOKE DISSIPATED AND WAS GONE BY THE TIME OF LNDG. PULLED TO THE GATE WITHOUT INCIDENT AND THE PLANE WAS TAKEN OTS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 727291: SMOKE FILLED THE CABIN 1 AND A HALF SECONDS AFTER TKOF, A BLUE/GREY SMOKE, VERY INTENSE FWD OF THE WINGS AND INTO FIRST CLASS.

# **Synopsis**

AN MD80 EXPERIENCES SMOKE AND FUMES AFTER TKOF. AN EMER WAS DECLARED WITH A RETURN TO LAND.

# Time / Day

Date: 200702

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

## **Environment**

Weather Elements.Other

Light : Daylight

## Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: ZZZ.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B757-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Climbout: Intermediate Altitude

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant.Aircraft Qualified On: 4 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Airline Total: 22

Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Total: 22 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Type: 40

ASRS Report: 727293

## Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

#### Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

## **Events**

Anomaly. Other Anomaly: Fumes

Anomaly. Other Anomaly

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed As Precaution

#### Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

#### **Narrative**

OUR FLT WAS LATE TO LEAVE DUE TO A MECHANICAL. AFTER ABOUT 3 TO 5 MINS FROM TKOF I SMELLED SOMETHING ELECTRICAL AND COMMUNICATED THIS TO FLT ATTENDANT #4. I CALLED THE COCKPIT AND EXPLAINED THE SMELL, AND TOLD THE CAPT THAT I WOULD CALL HIM BACK IN SECONDS IF IT GOT WORSE. AT THAT TIME, I LOOKED BACK IN THE CABIN AND PAX WERE COMPLAINING OF A BAD ODOR. I WALKED INTO THE CABIN AND THE SMELL WAS STRONGER, LIKE ELECTRICAL OR PLASTIC. I ALSO NOTICED A SMOKE OR HAZE SLOWLY FILLING UP, IN NO PARTICULAR AREA. I IMMEDIATELY CALLED BACK TO THE COCKPIT AND UPDATED THE PROGRESS AND TOLD HIM I WAS GOING TO LOCATE THE HAZE. WHEN I WAS AT MY INTERPHONE I NOTICED THAT THE FLOOR BY MY JUMPSEAT WAS GETTING VERY WARM AND AT THE SAME TIME THE SMOKE ALARM IN THE LAVS STARTED RINGING. I IMMEDIATELY WENT TO GRAB THE HALON, AND FELT THE WALLS AND CEILINGS IN BOTH LAVS. THEY FELT NORMAL. THEN ONLY THE R LAV ALARMED CONTINUED TO CHIME. THE L LAV CHIMES STOPPED. I THEN CALLED UP TO THE FRONT AND ASKED THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO BRING BACK MORE HALONS. I STARTED TO FEEL THE CEILINGS IN THE AISLES. BY THIS TIME, THE SMOKE/HAZE HAD DISSIPATED. THE CAPT INFORMED THE PAX WE WOULD BE LNDG IN 10 MINS. I THEN WENT UP THE WINDOW EXITS TO BRIEF THE PAX IF AND WHEN THEY NEEDED TO OPEN THE WINDOW. WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. I FELT SLIGHT PRESSURE IN MY EAR. I CALLED THE COCKPIT AND THEY CONFIRMED THEY WERE DEPRESSURIZING THE CABIN. WE WERE FINALLY TOWED TO THE GATE. I ASKED FLT ATTENDANT #4 IN FWD CABIN FOR ADDITIONAL HALONS. FLT ATTENDANT #1 CAME BACK WITH HALON AND MADE A PA TO PAX TO REMAIN CALM AND FOLLOW DIRECTIONS OF FLT CREW. SHE THEN WENT BACK TO FWD CABIN. HUMAN PERF CONSIDERATION: THE OTHER FLT ATTENDANTS WERE PASSIVE IN LOCATING HALONS AND SMOKE AND FOLLOWING PROCS. NO ONE DID AN EMER CHKLIST AND FLT ATTENDANTS DID NOT RE-BRIEF PAX AT WINDOW EXIT BUT I DID BEFORE LNDG.

## **Synopsis**

B757-200 CABIN CREW ALERTS CAPT OF SMOKE/FUMES AFTER DEP. RETURNS TO DEP ARPT.

# Time / Day

Date: 200702

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZZ.ARTCC

State Reference: FO

#### **Environment**

Light : Night

## Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant : Currently Qualified Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Airline Total : 22

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Total: 22 Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Type: 75

ASRS Report: 727103

#### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Other Anomaly: Fumes

Anomaly. Other Anomaly

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed As Precaution

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Aircraft

#### **Narrative**

DURING FLT FUMES AND SMOKE DEVELOPED IN FIRST CLASS. SMELL WAS NOTICED IN BACK CABIN ALSO. WE WERE TOLD WE WERE GOING BACK TO ZZZZ TO LAND. WE LANDED HEAVY WITH FIRE CREWS WAITING. CREWS CAME

ONBOARD AND CHKED THINGS OUT. AFTER HOURS ON PLANE THE LIGHTS AND EMER LIGHTS WENT OUT. WE USED FLT ATTENDANT FLASHLIGHTS SO PAX COULD AT LEAST SEE SOMETHING. PROBABLY AN HOUR LATER THEY DECIDE TO USE RAMP STANDS TO DEPLANE PEOPLE.

# **Synopsis**

B777 CABIN CREW DETECTS SMOKE/FUMES IN CABIN. LANDS AT NEAREST ARPT.

## Time / Day

Date: 200702

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ORD.Airport

State Reference: IL

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-300 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Ground: Preflight

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 726679

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Company Policies Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Independent Detector Aircraft Equipment. Other Aircraft Equipment: poor indicator

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 1

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

#### Assessments

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

## **Narrative**

LAST NIGHT ON MY FLT I NOTICED MIDWAY THROUGH THE FLT THAT DOOR 1L WAS DISARMED. I WAS POS #4 AND WAS IN MID-CABIN WHEN THE ARM DOORS WAS ANNOUNCED AND I WALKED UP TO MY DOOR AND WENT THROUGH THE MOTIONS OF MY ARMING PROC ONLY I DIDN'T REALIZE THAT THE PURSER MUST HAVE ALREADY ARMED IT WITHOUT TELLING ME AND THEN GOING THROUGH THE ROUTINE I DISARMED IT INSTEAD OF NOTICING IT WAS ALREADY ARMED. IT IS FUZZY TO ME AS I SWEAR I ARMED THE DOOR BUT OBVIOUSLY I DID NOT. I IMMEDIATELY ARMED MY DOOR. OBVIOUSLY A LACK OF COM BTWN THE PURSER AND I AND MY FAULT FOR NOT ENSURING MY DOOR WAS ARMED WAS THE PROB.

## **Synopsis**

B737-300 CABIN CREW HAS AN UNARMED DOOR WHILE INFLT.

# Time / Day

Date: 200702

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier Make Model Name: Commercial Fixed Wing

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase. Ground. Other

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 726607

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Cabin Event. Other

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Company Problem Areas : FAA

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

## **Narrative**

WHAT HAPPENED: GOING FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1 AND THEN BACK ON THE ALL-NIGHTER IS NOT SAFE. AS I SAT IN MY JUMPSEAT UPON LNDG, I HAD A VERY HARD TIME KEEPING MY EYES OPEN. AFTER LNDG AND DISEMBARKING THE PLANE, I COULD NOT EVEN REMEMBER IF I DISARMED MY DOOR. I WENT BACK TO DO A DOUBLECHK AND IT WAS DISARMED. THANK GOODNESS I DID NOT HAVE TO DRIVE WHEN WE LANDED. I PROBABLY WOULD HAVE FALLEN ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL. I AM GLAD THERE WAS NOT A MEDICAL EMER. I DON'T FEEL I WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO HANDLE IT AT 100%. WHY: DUE TO FATIGUE. WHAT ACTION WAS TAKEN: I WROTE THIS RPT. WHAT WAS THE OUTCOME: HOPEFULLY THIS TYPE OF TRIP WILL BECOME ILLEGAL. IT REALLY IS NOT SAFE. IT WOULD NOT BE SO BAD, BUT THE 2 HR SIT WHILE IN ZZZ1 IS THE KILLER. ALSO IF YOU ARE ON RESERVE AND CANNOT PLAN ACCORDINGLY FOR THIS TYPE OF TRIP IT IS EVEN MORE UNSAFE.

# **Synopsis**

FLIGHT ATTENDANT REPORTS DEBILITATING FATIGUE EXPERIENCED DURING ALL NIGHT FLIGHT TO ZZZ1 AND RETURN TO ZZZ.

# Time / Day

Date: 200701

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: PDX. Airport

State Reference : OR Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-300 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Ground: Parked

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 726547

## Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 726550

#### Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Other Personnel.Other

## **Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Company Policies Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

#### Assessments

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Company

## **Narrative**

WE BOARDED THE PLANE IN PORTLAND, AND IT MUST HAVE BEEN THERE FOR A LITTLE WHILE BECAUSE IT WAS EMPTY WHEN WE GOT ON, AND THE CLEANERS HAD JUST LEFT. THE FIRST CLASS GALLEY WAS BOARDED A SHORT TIME BEFORE DEP, BUT BECAUSE OF THE ACTIVITY DURING BOARDING, I WAS NOT AWARE OF WHETHER THEY HAD LOADED THE AFT GALLEY YET. AT DEP TIME, THE AGENT CHKED WITH THE COCKPIT AND PURSER, AND CLOSED THE DOOR. I MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT 'ARM DOORS FOR DEP,' AND ARMED BOTH FORWARD DOORS. AS FLT ATTENDANT #2 CAME UP TO HER DEMO POS, WE HEARD SCREAMING FROM

THE BACK OF THE AIRPLANE. FLT ATTENDANT #2 WENT BACK, AND THEN INDICATED TO ME THAT THE CATERERS WERE TRYING TO OPEN THE DOOR FROM THE OUTSIDE, THEN ASSISTED FLT ATTENDANT #3 IN HOLDING THE DOOR CLOSED. I CALLED THE COCKPIT TO LET THEM KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON, ALTHOUGH IT APPEARED THAT THE SCREAMING HAD HELPED TO PREVENT THE SLIDE DEPLOYMENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 726550: THE PURSER MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT TO ARM DOORS FOR DEP, SO WE ARMED BOTH AFT DOORS. I WAS GETTING MY DEMO EQUIP OUT OF THE COMPARTMENT ABOVE THE GALLEY AND I NOTICED THE DOOR HANDLE MOVING AND LOOK OUT AND SAW A GALLEY GUY THROUGH THE PORT HOLE WINDOW AND SCREAMED 'NO NO STOP STOP' WHILE I WAS TRYING TO DISARM THE DOOR. IT WAS SO LOUD THAT MY FLYING PARTNER CAME RUNNING FROM THE FRONT OF FIRST CLASS. THE DOOR WAS OPENED ABOUT A QUARTER OF THE WAY BUT IT DID NOT DEPLOY AND I WAS ABLE TO DISARM IT AND THEN THE GALLEY PEOPLE CAME IN AND CHANGED THE GALLEY BUT WE REALLY DID NOTHING AS WE DID NOT NEED ANYTHING.

## **Synopsis**

AIRLINE CATERING CREW ATTEMPTS TO OPEN A B737-300 CABIN DOOR FOR SERVICING AFTER DOORS HAVE BEEN ARMED FOR DEPARTURE.

# Time / Day

Date: 200701

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

## **Environment**

Light: Night

## Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier Make Model Name: B767-300 and 300 ER Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

## Aircraft: 2

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

## Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Hydraulic System

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Airline Total: 19

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Total: 19 Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Type: 80

ASRS Report: 725731

#### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

## Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical Independent Detector. Other. Flight Crew A: 2

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed As Precaution

# **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

# Narrative

LOSS OF CENTRAL HYD FLUID. PREPARED FOR PLANNED EMER WITH OUR CHKLIST. LANDED AFTER 2 HRS 10 MINS. LNDG WAS FINE.

# **Synopsis**

B767-300 CABIN CREW IS NOTIFIED OF EMER DUE TO HYD MALFUNCTION.

# Time / Day

Date: 200701

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

### **Environment**

Light: Daylight

### Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: ZZZ. Tower Operator. Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Climbout: Intermediate Altitude

### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant.Aircraft Qualified On: 4 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Airline Total: 5

Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Total: 7
Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Type: 75

ASRS Report: 725535

#### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

# Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

### **Events**

Anomaly. Other Anomaly: Fumes

Anomaly. Other Anomaly

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

Resolutory Action. Other

#### Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

# **Narrative**

AS SOON AS WE TOOK OFF THE CABIN WAS FILLED WITH SMOKE AND ODOR. WE INFORMED THE CAPT AND THE CAPT DECLARED AN EMER AND LANDED THE PLANE BACK AT ZZZ.

# **Synopsis**

MD80 RETURNS TO DEP ARPT AFTER CABIN FILLS WITH SMOKE SHORTLY AFTER TKOF.

# Time / Day

Date: 200701

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

### **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC

State Reference: US

### **Environment**

Light: Daylight

### Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant: Currently Qualified Qualification.Flight Attendant.Aircraft Qualified On: 6 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Airline Total: 15

Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Total: 15

ASRS Report: 724973

#### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

# Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

### **Events**

Anomaly. Other Anomaly: Fumes

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport

Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Landed As Precaution

Consequence.Other

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Aircraft

# **Narrative**

THERE WAS A STRONG SMELL OF WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN FUEL FROM PUSH BACK. IT CONTINUED INTO THE FLT FOR THE DURATION OF THE FLT. THE ODOR WAS IN THE AFT GALLEY. A NON-REV PILOT WENT TO THE AFT GALLEY AND HE ALSO SAID HE SMELLED THE ODOR. THIS WAS RELATED TO THE CAPT AND THEY THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE A FUEL LEAK THAT WAS POOLING AND COULD CAUSE A FIRE. THE CAPT DECIDED TO LAND IN ZZZ. I BELIEVE HE SHUT ONE OF THE FUEL LINES. THE ODOR DISSIPATED. THE MECHANICS CAME ABOARD AND CHKED ALL POSSIBILITIES. NO LEAK WAS FOUND AND AFTER ABOUT 3 HOURS WHEN THE MECHS WERE SATISFIED -- WE CONTINUED ON. I WAS WORKING THE FIRST CLASS CABIN BUT DID GO TO THE BACK GALLEY DURING THE FLT AND THE ODOR WAS STRONG.

# **Synopsis**

B757 FLT ATTENDANT RPTS FUEL SMELL IN THE AFT GALLEY DURING FLT.

# Time / Day

Date: 200612

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

### **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZZ. Airport

State Reference: FO

# **Environment**

Light: Daylight

### Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

# Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

#### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Airline Total: 31

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Total: 31 Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Type: 50

ASRS Report: 723986

### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

### **Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical Independent Detector. Other. Flight Crew A: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed As Precaution

Consequence.Other

#### Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas: Maintenance Human Performance

# **Narrative**

APPROX 1 HR OUT OF ZZZZ, THE ACFT WAS PUT INTO A SHARP, RAPID DSCNT TO BELOW 10000 FT OF ALT. (CAPT WAS TRYING TO PREVENT OXYGEN MASK DEPLOYMENT.) NO MASKS DROPPED. CAPT'S ANNOUNCEMENT INFORMED US OF THE LOSS OF OUR ONE REMAINING 'AIR PACK' (WE WERE FLYING WITH ONLY ONE IN OP) AND THAT WE WOULD BE DIVERTING TO ZZZZ1 FOR REPAIRS OR REPLACEMENT. WE LANDED WITHOUT EVACING. PAX AND CREW CLRED CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION IN ZZZZ1. MAINT IN ZZZZ1 REPLACED AND TESTED THE AIR PACK.

# **Synopsis**

B757 FLT ATTENDANT RPTS RAPID DSCNT TO LOWER ALT. DSCNT WAS PRECIPITATED BY THE LOSS OF THE REMAINING AIR CONDITIONING PACK.

# Time / Day

Date: 200701

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

### **Environment**

Light: Daylight

### Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A320

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Ground: Preflight

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant.Aircraft Qualified On: 4 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Airline Total: 20

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Total: 20 Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Type: 90

ASRS Report: 723772

#### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

### Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Maintenance: Technician

### **Events**

Anomaly. Maintenance Problem: Improper Maintenance Anomaly. Maintenance Problem: Non Compliance With MEL

Anomaly.Non Adherence: FAR

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Unable

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Aircraft Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

#### **Narrative**

DURING BOARDING PAX CALL BUTTON AT ROW 10DEF. PAX ADVISED ME THAT ENTIRE ROW OF SEATS WAS LOOSE. THE PAX THEN DEMONSTRATED BY ROCKING THE ROW WITH THEIR BODY WT WHILE SITTING DOWN. I OBSERVED THE ENTIRE ROW ROCKING OFF THE FLOOR, BOTH FRONT AND BACK FLOOR MOUNTS. I IMMEDIATELY RPTED THIS TO THE CAPT. MAINT IMMEDIATELY CAME TO THE ACFT. WE WERE AT DEP TIME AND THE DECISION WAS MADE BY DISPATCH TO MEL THE SEATS AND DEPART ON TIME. THE PAX WERE RESEATED TO ROW 11DEF. THIS IS DIRECTLY BEHIND THE MEL ROW OF 10 DEF. HOW COULD THIS BE ALLOWABLE? THE COMPANY PLACED PAX IN A ROW AFT OF THE MEL ROW AND THERE WERE PAX SITTING IN THE ROW FORWARD OF THE MEL ROW 9DEF! AS A FLT ATTENDANT, I AM SHOCKED THAT AN EXIT ROW OF SEATS, NOT BOLTED TO THE FLOOR, COULD BE SAFE, IT WOULD SEEM THAT IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT/EVAC THE STRESS LIMITS WOULD NOT BE MET AND THE ROW WOULD SHIFT AND BLOCK EGRESS. THE ACTIONS OF PAX EGRESSING WOULD ALSO SHIFT THE ROW OF SEATS TO BECOME A SAFETY HAZARD. THE ACFT WAS DISPATCHED WITH THE ABOVE DESCRIBED CONDITION. IT WAS ALSO DISPATCHED FROM zzz WITH THE SAME MEL.

# **Synopsis**

AN A320 CABIN ATTENDANT RPTS MAINT MEL'ING THE ACFT WITH THE ENTIRE EMER EXIT ROW OF SEATS NOT BOLTED TO THE FLOOR.

# Time / Day

Date: 200612

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A319

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase. Ground: Parked

# Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door

### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 722658

#### Person: 2

Affiliation.Other: Contracted Service Function.Other Personnel.Other

### **Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Company

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

### **Narrative**

UPON ARR, WE WAITED AN EXTENDED AMOUNT OF TIME FOR THE JETBRIDGE. SO THE 'DISARM DOORS FOR ARR' ANNOUNCEMENT HAD NOT BEEN MADE. HOWEVER, CATERING ARRIVED SHORTLY THEREAFTER. MY FLYING PARTNER AND I WERE STANDING UP WAITING FOR ARR AND DEPLANING PROCS WHEN I NOTICED CATERING OUTSIDE OF DOOR 2R. I LOOKED TO THE WINDOW SHAKING MY HEAD AND MOTIONING NO WITH MY HANDS. THEN I SAW THE DOOR HANDLE MOVING UPWARD. I RAN TO THE DOOR AS MY FLYING PARTNER YELLED, 'DISARM, DISARM.' I WAS IN A PANIC THINKING QUICKLY TO MOVE THE DISARM LEVER UPWARD, BUT I WAS STARING AT THE DOOR HANDLE, WHICH I THEN MOVED UP INSTEAD. THE DOOR SWUNG OPEN AND THE SLIDE INFLATED. IT DID NOT FULLY

INFLATE. THERE WERE NO INJURIES. SINCE THE INCIDENT, I HAVE COME TO REALIZE THAT THE DOOR HANDLE ON THE AIRBUS IS IDENTICAL TO THE HANDLE ON THE EMBRAER 145, WHICH I PREVIOUSLY WORKED ON. I WAS TRAINED TO MOVE THE HANDLE UPWARD WHEN PEOPLE WERE AN ARM'S LENGTH FROM THE DOOR TO AVOID INJURY.

# **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANT ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT CATERERS FROM OPENING A CABIN DOOR WHILE IT IS ARMED RESULTING IN PARTIAL SLIDE DEPLOYMENT.

# Time / Day

Date: 200612

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: HNL. Airport

State Reference: HI

Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 722535

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Cabin Event. Other

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Company

### **Situations**

#### **Narrative**

THE 2 DAY/ALL NIGHTER HAWAII TURNS ARE COMPLETELY UNSAFE. I WAS GIVEN THIS TRIP ON RESERVE, AND WAS BEYOND EXHAUSTED. AS IF THE DAY HAWAII TURNS WERE BAD ENOUGH, THIS ADDS ADDITIONAL INSULT TO A DUTY PERIOD. ON THE RETURN FLT I WAS FALLING ASLEEP, MAKING CARELESS ACTIONS (SUCH AS DIFFICULTY IN CLOSING THE B757 COCKPIT BARRIER -- A TASK WHICH IS EASY WHEN FULLY RESTED, MY HANDS WERE TREMBLING WHEN HOLDING A COFFEE CUP/SAUCER, I NEARLY FORGOT TO DISARM MY DOOR, I COULD BARELY THINK STRAIGHT WHEN MAKING PREPARATION FOR LNDG AND WELCOME ANNOUNCEMENTS). THESE ARE ALL SIMPLE ACTIONS WHICH UNDER NORMAL WELL RESTED CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD NEVER BE COMPROMISED. THE DUTY DAY IS THAT OF AN INTL TRIP, HOWEVER WITHOUT A REST BREAK. IT IS SIMPLY NOT HUMAN TO WORK THESE HRS DURING THE NIGHT, AND THE FATIGUE WE ARE SUBMITTED TO IS AN ENORMOUS RISK TO THE CREW AND PAX'S SAFETY. IN ADDITION TO FEELING UNSAFE IN THE WORKPLACE, IT WAS COMPLETELY UNSAFE DRIVING HOME. I WAS NODDING OFF BEHIND THE WHEEL, AND EXPERIENCING GREAT DIFFICULTY KEEPING MY EYES OPEN. MY VISION WAS BLURRY, AND I WAS FRIGHTENED FOR MY SAFETY. ACR IS PUTTING US AT GREAT RISK ON MANY LEVELS. THESE HAWAII ALL NIGHTER TURNS (AS WELL AS DAY TURNS) NEED TO BE REEVALUATED. THEY MAY 'LOOK GOOD ON PAPER,' BUT THE SAFETY AND FATIGUE RELATED RISKS ARE TOO GREAT. PLTS CANNOT FLY THEM -- SO WHY SHOULD WE?

# **Synopsis**

B757 CABIN ATTENDANT CONCERNED WITH LENGTH OF FLT AND FATIGUE ISSUES.

# Time / Day

Date: 200612

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

### **Environment**

Light: Daylight

### Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-400 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground: Parked Flight Phase.Ground: Taxi

### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 721203

### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

# Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Maintenance: Technician

### **Events**

Anomaly. Other Anomaly: Fumes

Anomaly. Other Anomaly

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas: Environmental Factor

### **Narrative**

AFTER LNDG IN ZZZ, I NOTICED ENTIRE CABIN FULL OF SMOKE. I CALLED THE FLT DECK AND ADVISED THEM OF THE CABIN CONDITION. THE CAPT ASKED ME

WHERE SMOKE WAS COMING FROM. I TOLD HIM IT WAS EVERYWHERE IN THE CABIN. HE STOPPED THE PLANE, SO I CALLED THE FLT ATTENDANTS IN THE BACK TO STAY ON THE INTERCOM AND KEEP LISTENING TO OUR CONVERSATION WITH THE FLT DECK, IN CASE WE MIGHT EVACUATE THE PLANE. I TURNED THE LIGHTS ON DIM AND WAS ASKED TO OPEN THE FLT DECK DOOR. BY THAT TIME THE PAX IN FC WERE COUGHING. I FELT BURNING AND STINGING SENSATION IN MY THROAT AND CHEST. I ALSO STARTED TO COUGH. WE HAD TWO OF OUR MECHANICS IN FC. ONE OF THEM WENT TO THE BACK OF THE ACFT TO SEE WHERE THE SMOKE WAS COMING FROM AND THE OTHER MECHANIC CAME UP TO THE FLT DECK AND TOLD THE CAPT NOT TO EVACUATE BECAUSE THEY WERE ONBOARD FOR THIS EXACT REASON. THAT THE SAME THING HAPPENED TO THE FLT BEFORE OURS. AT THAT TIME THE SMOKE BEGAN TO DISSIPATE BUT THE BURNING STINGING FEELING WAS STILL STRONG. AT THAT POINT THE CAPT ASKED IF WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO THE GATE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THAT FAR. FLT ATTENDANTS FROM THE BACK AGREED TO CONTINUE TO THE GATE. AFTER WE GOT TO THE GATE, THE MECHANIC CRACKED OPEN DOOR R1 AND I DID THE SAME TO DOOR L1 TO GET SOME FRESH AIR IN THE CABIN. WE DEPLANED THE PAX AND I NOTICED THAT MANY WERE COUGHING AS WELL AS THE MECHANIC AND MYSELF. THE MECHANIC ASKED THE CAPT NOT TO WRITE UP THE PROB IN THE LOG BOOK, BECAUSE IF THEY DID THAT, THE PLANE WOULD HAVE TO STAY THE NIGHT IN ZZZ OR UNTIL THEY FIXED THE PLANE THEY GOT CALLED OUT FOR. THE SMELL TO ME WAS LIKE A LIQUID OR CHEMICAL BURN SMELL (ACID SMELL). AS WE WERE WAITING FOR OUR VAN TO THE HOTEL TWO PAX ASKED ME IF WE KNEW WHY THAT HAPPENED. I DID NOT COMMENT ON IT. THAT NIGHT AND NEXT DAY I STILL FELT THE BURNING IN MY THROAT. AS PER CAPT REPORT '...FLT CREW NOTED THAT ATIS RPTED THAT UREA HAD BEEN APPLIED TO RWY SURFACE.'

# **Synopsis**

A B737-400 FLT ATTENDANT NOTICED A SMOKE AND FUMES IN THE CABIN AFTER LNDG. MECHANICS WERE ONBOARD IN ANTICIPATION OF THE PROB, SINCE IT HAD BEEN WRITTEN UP PREVIOUSLY.

# Time / Day

Date: 200611

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

### **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: CZQX.ARTCC

State Reference: FO

### **Environment**

Light : Night

## Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: CZQX.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier Make Model Name: B767-300 and 300 ER Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

# Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Galley Furnishing

#### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant.Aircraft Qualified On: 3 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Airline Total: 37

Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Total: 37 Experience. Flight Attendant Time. Type: 75

ASRS Report: 720533

# Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

#### Person: 4

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Relief Pilot

### **Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe

Anomaly. Other Anomaly: Fumes

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Consequence.Other

# **Maintenance Factors**

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Scheduled Maintenance

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency: Testing

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Aircraft Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas: Maintenance Human Performance

#### **Narrative**

APPROX 4 HOURS INTO THE FLT I STARTED TO NOTICE AN ODOR OF BURNING. I THOUGHT IT WAS COMING FROM THE AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM. IMMEDIATELY, I TURNED OFF THE POWER PORT BUTTONS ON THE FWD JUMPSEAT PANEL (ANOTHER FLT ATTENDANT TURNED OFF THE CHILLER SYSTEM IN THE MID GALLEY). I WENT TO THE CAPT WHO WAS ON REST BREAK. HE BEGAN THE PROCESS OF TROUBLESHOOTING. THE ODOR SEEMED TO BEGIN MID ACFT AND FLOATED TO THE FWD CABIN. IT STAYED PRETTY MUCH THE ENTIRE FLT, VERY STRONG IN THE BEGINNING AND THEN LESSENED ONLY TO INTENSIFY ON LNDG. PAX WERE VERY MUCH ALARMED, THE FLT ATTENDANTS DID AS MUCH AS THEY COULD TO ASSURE THEM THAT THE CAPT WAS AWARE OF THE SITUATION AND WORKING TO CLR THE AIR. ONE OF MY PAX WAS VERY UPSET, AND ON LNDG, ONE OF THE COACH PAX YELLED AS SHE WAS LEAVING THAT WE HAD JEOPARDIZED HER LIFE. FLT ATTENDANTS COMPLAINED OF HEADACHES AND AFFECTED SINUSES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR FLEW SEVERAL TRIPS WITH THE SAME CREW AFTER THIS INCIDENT AND STATES THAT THE CAPT GAVE HER A COPY OF THE RPT THAT HE FILED WITH THE COMPANY. THE RPT INDICATES THAT THE CREW CONSULTED WITH MAINT AND CONTINUED THE FLT AFTER TURNING OFF THE AFFECTED OVEN, SECURING THE LEFT PACK, AND THE TRIM AIR SYSTEM. THE ACFT APPARENTLY HAD A HISTORY OF PROBS WITH THIS OVEN, AND HAD JUST COME OUT OF SCHEDULED MAINT WITHOUT AN INTERVENING FLT.

# **Synopsis**

B767 CABIN CREW DETECTS STRONG ODORS IN CABIN DURING TRANSATLANTIC FLT.

# Time / Day

Date: 200612

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference: US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B757-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground: Parked Flight Phase.Ground: Takeoff Roll

## Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Emergency Exit

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 720346

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical Anomaly. Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Company

Problem Areas: Environmental Factor

### **Narrative**

DUE TO FATIGUE, I FAILED TO ARM DOORS 1L AND 1R PRIOR TO TKOF. I REALIZED ONCE WE WERE IN THE AIR THAT THEY WEREN'T ARMED. MY ACTION WAS OF COURSE TO IMMEDIATELY ARM THE DOORS. THIS IS THE SECOND TIME DUE TO FATIGUE I'VE HAD A DOOR INCIDENT. I WROTE A RPT A FEW MONTHS AGO AFTER DOING A ZZZ1 TURN WHERE I NEARLY OPENED AN ARMED DOOR. HOW ARE THE ZZZ1 TURNS LEGAL, WITHOUT A CREW REST BREAK? ANYWAY, SINCE LAST MONTH WAS MY VACATION MONTH AND WE ARE NOW PAID SO LITTLE FOR VACATION, I WAS FORCED TO FLY 115 HRS IN NOVEMBER TO MAKE UP FOR IT. WE ARE BEING PUSHED BEYOND OUR LIMITS! IN MY ENTIRE CAREER, PRIOR TO ACR'S GOUGING OF SAFETY REGS AND PAY, POST 911, I NEVER CAME CLOSE TO AN INCIDENT. I FEEL THAT WITH THE WAY THE TRIPS/DUTY DAYS AND

MINIMUM RESTS ARE IT'S ONLY A MATTER OF TIME. I ALSO WOULD LIKE TO SAY, THAT FOR EVERY RPTED INCIDENT, THERE ARE AT LEAST 2 OR 3 THAT GO UNRPTED! I HOPE THAT THERE IS SOMEONE WHO READS THIS WHO ACTUALLY CARES, BECAUSE THE SUPPOSED LEADERS AT OUR COMPANY DO NOT GIVE THAT IMPRESSION.

# **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANT RPTS FAILURE TO ARM DOORS PRIOR TO TKOF. CITES FATIGUE STEMMING FROM LONG DUTY DAYS AND THE REDUCTION AND ELIMINATION OF ON DUTY RESTRS AND EXTRA WORK NECESSARY TO MAKE UP FOR PAY CUTS BY THE AIRLINE.

# Time / Day

Date: 200612

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: LAX. Airport

State Reference : CA Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A320

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121 Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight Flight Phase.Ground.Other

## Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Fuel Storage System

### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 720333

#### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Other Personnel.Other

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe

Anomaly.Cabin Event.Other Anomaly.Other Anomaly: Fumes

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Unable

Consequence.Other

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Company

# **Narrative**

WHILE SETTING UP GALLEY FOR FLT, CAPT TOLD US TO STOP, WE WERE DOING A PLANE CHANGE DUE TO A MECHANICAL. WHILE SETTING UP NEW GALLEY, CLEANING CREW EXCITEDLY PULLED ME OUTSIDE TO SEE MASSIVE QUANTITIES OF LIQUID POURING OUT OF LEFT WING. I RAN FORWARD YELLING, 'CAPT LOOK AT THE LEFT WING...' NO PAX ONBOARD. CAPT BEGAN YELLING EVERYONE GET OFF THE PLANE, GET OFF (JETBRIDGE STILL INTACT). WE STOOD FOR SOME TIME WATCHING JET FUEL GUSH FROM L WING. HAZMAT WAS CALLED OUT TO CLEAN UP AND MECHANICS DETERMINED PROB. AS CLEANUP WAS GOING ON. I HAD TO GO BACK INTO THE AIRPLANE TO GET MY JACKET AS IT WAS VERY COLD IN THE TERMINAL. SMELL WAS AWFUL. AFTER MORE TIME PASSED I HAD TO GO BACK ONTO AIRPLANE TO GET WALLET SO I COULD GET SOME FOOD FROM MACHINE FOR MYSELF AND ANOTHER FLT ATTENDANT. ODOR STILL VERY BAD. MECHANICS FOUND TWO OTHER PROBS WITH THE ACFT, NOW GOING ON A 3 HOUR DELAY. AT SOME POINT CAPT ASKED US IF WE WANTED TO CALL FATIGUE AND CANCEL FLT. WE ALL DISCUSSED IT AND ALL FELT FINE AND REALLY WANTED TO GET THESE PEOPLE TO THEIR DEST. I COULD NOT STAY ON PLANE DUE TO SMELL. I WAS IN GATE AREA MOST OF TIME HELPING AGENTS GO FROM PLANE TO PLANE LOOKING FOR BLANKETS FOR THE PEOPLE, EVENTUALLY, I HIT THE WALL AND FELT ILL. I HAD A SORE THROAT AND NAUSEOUS STOMACH. CALLED CREW DESK TO TELL THEM. THEY ASKED IF I WAS CALLING FATIGUE. I SAID, 'I DON'T KNOW WHAT TO TELL YOU.' (I DID NOT REALLY UNDERSTAND WHAT FATIGUE WAS). I TOLD THEM I WAS SICK AND HAD TO GO TO A HOTEL OR HOME IF I COULD GET THERE. THEY SAID IF I WAS CALLING FATIGUE I HAD TO GO TO HOSPITAL NOW. I SAID I HAD TO GET TO BED ASAP AND WOULD GO TO THE HOSPITAL THE NEXT DAY. I MADE IT HOME, SLEPT FOR 7 OR 8 HOURS THEN WENT TO URGENT CARE, GOT A SHOT OF VITAMIN B. DR SAID I HAD THE BEGINNINGS OF SOMETHING BUT SHOULD BE OK IF I WENT BACK HOME TO REST.

# **Synopsis**

AFTER EXTENDED EXPOSURE, CABIN ATTENDANT RPTS FUMES FROM LARGE FUEL SPILL DURING FUELING OF HER A320 WHICH RESULTED IN NAUSEA AND ILLNESS. AS A RESULT, RPTR IS UNABLE TO FLY THE TRIP AND CALLS IN SICK.

# Time / Day

Date: 200611

### **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport : DEN. Airport

State Reference: CO Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A319

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground: Parked

# Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Emergency Exit

### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant: Currently Qualified

ASRS Report: 720328

#### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

## **Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Unable

#### Assessments

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

#### **Narrative**

THIS WAS MY VERY 1ST TIME EVER ON OR FLYING THIS ACFT. I DID A FULL REVIEW OF MY A319 USING EARLY THIS MORNING AT THE HOTEL AND A VERY THOROUGH SAFETY CHK AND REVIEW ONBOARD. UPON ARR AT THE GATE THE PURSER IMMEDIATELY MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT TWICE TO 'DISARM DOORS, DISARM DOORS.' I LEFT MY JUMPSEAT IMMEDIATELY AND HEADED TO DOOR 2R AS MY FLYING PARTNER TURNED TO HER DOOR 2L. I LIFTED THE HANDLE RIGHT IN FRONT OF ME WHICH WAS THE WRONG HANDLE. I SAID TO MYSELF AS I DO EVERY TIME I DISARM A DOOR, 'DOOR IS ARMED' LIFT HANDLE, 'DOOR IS

DISARMED' AT WHICH TIME I HEARD THE DOOR PRESSURE RELEASE, DOOR CRACK AND THEN BEGIN TO OPEN. I INSTANTLY GRABBED FOR ALL HANDLES AS I ATTEMPTED TO HOLD THE DOOR FROM OPENING AUTOMATICALLY. I KNEW I COULD HOLD IT MOMENTARILY WHILE I CALLED FOR MY FLYING PARTNER TO ASSESS AND MAKE SURE THE AREA OUTSIDE THE DOOR WAS CLR. AFTER ENSURING THE AREA WAS CLR I LET THE DOOR SLOWLY OPEN. THE SLIDE DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY DEPLOY AT THAT TIME. MY FLYING PARTNER AND I VERY QUICKLY AND BRIEFLY DISCUSSED WHETHER THE DOOR COULD BE DISARMED OR CLOSED AT THIS TIME. WE AGREED IT MIGHT BE BEST TO LIFT THE ARMING LEVER IN HOPES OF SAVING THE SLIDE FROM DEPLOYING AT A LATER TIME WHEN IT MIGHT BE UNATTENDED AND OR COULD POTENTIALLY INJURE SOMEONE ON THE GND. I THEN HELD ON TO THE INTERIOR ASSIST HANDLE AS I REACHED OUT TO LIFT THE ARMING LEVER. AS I DID THE DOOR BEGAN TO MOVE FURTHER OUTWARD AND OPENED TO ITS FULL OPENED POS. AT THAT TIME THE SLIDE THEN DEPLOYED AND INFLATED. PERSONNEL ON THE GND WERE AWARE OF THE SIT AND STAYED COMPLETELY CLR OF THE SLIDE AREA BECAUSE WE HAD PREVIOUSLY WARNED THEM THE DOOR WAS OPENING. ONCE THE SLIDE HAD DEPLOYED THE GND CREW ASKED IF WE WERE EVACING. WE SAID, 'NO, IT WAS AN ACCIDENTAL DEPLOYMENT.' MY FLYING PARTNER IMMEDIATELY BRIEFED WITH ME AND SAID SHE FELT VERY RESPONSIBLE KNOWING I HAD NEVER FLOWN ANY OF THE A319'S OR A320'S BEFORE. I THANKED HER FOR HER CONCERN AND CARING, BUT I TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCIDENT. MY CREW WERE VERY SUPPORTIVE AND EXPLAINED TO ME THE A319 AND A320 ACFT HAVE THE MOST ACCIDENTALLY DEPLOYED SLIDES. I AM GRATEFUL FOR THEIR SUPPORT BUT I AM MOST THANKFUL NO ONE WAS INJURED MAINLY DUE TO THE FACT MY FLYING PARTNER AND I WERE ABLE TO REACT QUICKLY AND WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THE AREA OUTSIDE WAS CLR.

# **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANT ON FIRST FLT ABOARD AN A319 MISTAKENLY DEPLOYS SLIDE UPON ARR AT DEST.

# Time / Day

Date: 200611

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-300 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground: Parked

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 720324

# Person: 2

Function. Observation: Passenger

#### Person: 3

Function. Observation: Passenger

#### Person: 4

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Other Personnel: Gate

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Cabin Event: Passenger Illness Anomaly. Non Adherence: Company Policies

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Resolutory Action. Other

### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Company

Problem Areas: Environmental Factor

Problem Areas: Passenger Human Performance

#### **Narrative**

A PAX CAME ON WITH A LAP CHILD WITH 7 MINS TO GO BEFORE DEP AND SAID TO ME, 'I HOPE THIS FLT IS NOT FULL AND NO ONE IS SITTING NEXT TO ME BECAUSE MY BABY HAS THE CHICKEN POX' AND THAT POINT I SAID TO HER THAT

SHE CANNOT FLY BUT SHE IGNORED ME AND WENT BACK TO HER SEAT. I INFORMED AN INFLT SUPVR ON THE JETWAY AND THEN TOLD THE CAPT. HE SAID THAT WE NEEDED TO GET PAX AGENT UP TO THE PLANE AND A SUPVR. THE SUPVR CAME UP AND SAID 'WELL SHE IS ALREADY ON THE PLANE AND HAS INFECTED EVERYONE SO WHAT IS THE PROB?' I SAID THE PROB WAS THAT I WOULD NOT TAKE THIS WOMAN. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION WITH THE WOMAN, SHE WAS TAKEN OFF OF THE AIRPLANE. I JUST RECENTLY FOUND OUT THAT THE SUPVR PUT THE WOMAN ON THE NEXT FLT TO SFO. THE REASONING FOR THIS WAS THAT THEY SAID THAT THE CHILD DIDN'T HAVE CHICKEN POX IT WAS HIVES AND THAT THE WOMAN LIED TO ME. WELL IF SHE LIED TO ME WHAT IS TO SAY THAT SHE DID NOT LIE TO THEM AS WELL JUST TO GET HERSELF ON THE FLT. I SAW THE CHILD AND IT WAS THE CHICKEN POX. SO I BELIEVE THIS SUPVR PUT PEOPLE AT RISK TO A SERIOUS HEALTH PROB. MY FLT HAD ABOUT 20 CHILDREN AND INFANTS AND 2 PREGNANT WOMEN. WHO KNOWS WHO WAS ON THE NEXT FLT.

# **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANT REFUSES BOARDING TO PAX WHO STATES LAP CHILD WITH WHOM SHE IS TRAVELING HAS CHICKEN POX. PAX AGENT REMOVES BOTH BUT ALLOWS THEM TO BOARD AND FLY THE NEXT FLT WITH A DIFFERENT STORY ABOUT THE REASON FOR THE CHILD'S RASH.

# Time / Day

Date: 200611

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ZZZ. Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: A319

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground: Parked

# Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 720317

### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 720318

# Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 720319

### Person: 4

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Function.Oversight: PIC

### **Events**

Anomaly.Cabin Event.Other Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other Resolutory Action.Other

# **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Company

### **Narrative**

DURING OUR FLT TO ZZZ THE PLTS RECEIVED AN ACARS STATING THAT, 1) FLT ATTENDANTS SHOULD CONTACT SCHEDULING WHEN WE ARRIVE AND, 2) THAT

FLT ATTENDANTS WILL NOW WORK OUTBOUND FLT ABCD BACK TO ZZZ2. THIS WOULD MAKE OUR ORIGINAL 3-DAY TRIP INTO AN OVERNIGHT TURN. THE ENTIRE CREW WAS EXHAUSTED AND IF WE TOOK THE FLT BACK TO ZZZ2 WE WOULD HAVE BEEN UP FOR OVER 24 HRS. THIS IS A SAFETY ISSUE. I CONTACTED SCHEDULING. HE NOTIFIED ME THAT WE WERE NOW BEING SENT BACK TO ZZZ2 BECAUSE THE CREW WAS ARRIVING LATE TO ZZZ. I ADVISED HIM OF OUR SITUATION AND THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO WORK THAT FLT. THAT WE WILL BE DOING FATIGUE. SCHEDULING STATED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO REPORT TO THE HOSPITAL IF WE INTEND ON DOING FATIGUE. I RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A PROB. SCHEDULING SAID THAT HE WOULD SET IT UP AND CALL ME BACK. IN THE MEANTIME, THE OUTGOING PLTS TO ZZZ2 ARRIVED AND HEARD WHAT WAS GOING ON. CAPT STATED THAT HE WOULD NOT FLY THE PLANE BACK TO ZZZ2 IF WE WERE WORKING IT. SHORT TIME LATER, ARPT PARAMEDICS AND POLICE ARRIVED TO THE AIRPLANE. PARAMEDICS WANTED TO KNOW THE SITUATION. WE EXPLAINED WHAT WAS HAPPENING. THE LEAD PARAMEDIC STATED THAT HE COULD NOT TREAT US UNLESS WE WERE ILL. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS NOTHING HE COULD DO FOR US EXCEPT GIVE US A PILLOW AND TELL US TO GO TO BED. HE CLRLY STATED THAT THEY DO NOT GET INVOLVED IN EMPLOYEE RELATION ISSUES. SCHEDULING SAID THAT THE PARAMEDICS WOULD TAKE US TO THE HOSPITAL. THE LEAD PARAMEDIC SAID HE WAS NOT A TAXI SVC. I CONTACTED AGAIN AND HE SAID THAT HE COULD GO TO PLAN B AND CALL ME BACK. ONCE AGAIN, HE CALLED ME BACK AND SAID THAT A VAN SVC WOULD NOW TAKE US TO THE HOSPITAL. WE WERE SENT TO THE HOSPITAL. WE WERE ADMITTED TO THE EMER ROOM, AFTER RECEIVING FUNNY LOOKS FROM THE ER STAFF. AFTER FALLING ASLEEP IN OUR HOSPITAL BEDS, THE DOCTOR ARRIVED. HE ASKED WHAT WAS WRONG. I EXPLAINED THE SITUATION TO THE DOCTOR. HE RESPONDED 'SO YOU ARE NOT SICK?' I SAID NO, JUST TIRED AND FATIGUED. HE THEN RESPONDED, 'THIS IS IDIOTIC THAT YOUR COMPANY SENT YOU TO THE ER AND WASTED MY TIME WHEN I COULD BE SEEING PATIENTS THAT REALLY NEED MY ATTN.' WE WERE RELEASED FROM THE HOSPITAL TO GET REST IN OUR HOTEL ROOM. WE CONTINUED TO THE HOTEL. WE FINALLY CHKED INTO THE HOTEL. WE DEADHEADED BACK TO ZZZ2 ON OUR ORIGINAL FLT THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO WORK.

# Synopsis

AN A319 FLT ATTENDANT CREW RPTS REFUSING TO FLY AN UNSCHEDULED TRANSCONTINENTAL RETURN FLT BECAUSE OF FATIGUE.

# Time / Day

Date: 200611

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.TRACON

State Reference: US

# Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: C90.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B757-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Descent: Approach Flight Phase.Descent: Holding

# Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 720304

# Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

### Person: 4

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

#### Person: 5

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Other Personnel.Other

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Cabin Event: Passenger Illness

Anomaly.Cabin Event.Other

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Turbulence Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Weather

Anomaly.Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 1 Cabin Att Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Exited Adverse Environment

Consequence.Other: Company Review Consequence.Other: Physical Injury

### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Company

Problem Areas: Environmental Factor

Problem Areas: Weather

### **Narrative**

UPON APCH INTO ZZZ ABOUT '10' BEFORE PREPARATION FOR LNDG I WAS PICKING UP TRASH FOR THE ECONOMY CABIN AND WAS NEARING THE FIRST AFT LAVATORY WITH THE BAGS AND PAPERS IN HAND WHEN SEVERE TURB HIT. I WAS ABLE TO THROW THE TRASH IN THE LAVATORY (DIRECTLY BEHIND THE LAST ROW OF SEATS ABC) BUT WAS THROWN VIOLENTLY AGAINST THE WALL OPPOSITE THE LAVATORY THEN BACK TO THE FLOOR AND SUBSEQUENTLY BACK. AND FORTH AGAINST THE ARMRESTS BEFORE I COULD PROPERLY GRAB HOLD OF SEAT 35C. I WAS IN A FETAL POS AND HOLDING TIGHTLY AS I COULD AS THE PLANE PITCHED BACK AND FORTH, UP AND DOWN. AS THE PLANE PITCHED AND DROPPED THE LOWER HALF OF MY BODY (TWISTING MY SPINE) FLOPPED UP AND DOWN. I TRIED IN VAIN TO SEARCH FOR AN EMPTY SEAT/SEATBELT AND SINCE THE BACK JUMPSEATS WERE TAKEN, I TOOK A REAL BEATING FROM THE ACFT. A FLT ATTENDANT WAS ABLE TO TURN THE CORNER TO ASK MY CONDITION AND I WAS ABLE TO TELL HER THAT I WAS JUST ABLE TO HANG ON. ONCE THERE WAS A BRIEF INTERMISSION FROM THE SEVERE TURB I WAS ABLE TO RUN TOWARD THE MID JUMPSEAT (DOOR 2) TO SECURE MYSELF. WE THEN HAD TO HOLD APPROX 1 HR BEFORE FINDING OUT THAT WE HAD NO MORE FUEL TO LAND IN ZZZ AND PROCEEDED TO ZZZ1. WE LANDED AND TAXIED TO A REMOTE PART OF THE ARPT NEAR A CARGO HANGAR AND HELD WITH NO AIR WHATSOEVER FOR ABOUT 3 1/2 HRS. WE FINALLY GOT AN 'AIR START' AFTER WAITING FOR FUELERS TO BE ABLE TO ACCESS US DUE TO LIGHTNING THEN TAXIED TO FINALLY PRODUCE AIR. SEVERAL OF THE PAX AS WELL AS A FLT ATTENDANT HAD TO TAKE OXYGEN DUE TO LIGHTHEADEDNESS. I ALSO FELT THIS BUT WAS ABLE TO HAVE THE COCKPIT OPEN THE WINDOWS FOR VENTILATION. WE FINALLY WERE CLRED TO GO TO ZZZ AFTER THE GND STOP AND BEING ON THE SAME ACFT FOR 8 HRS 10 MINS ACCORDING TO OURS (AS WELL AS THE PAX CALCULATIONS) THEY SEEMED TO GIVE US '1 MIN' LAYOVER IN ZZZ1 AND TRIED TO MAKE US CONTINUE ON TO ZZZ2 TWO HRS LATER. FORTUNATELY, WE WERE ABLE TO CONVINCE A SCHEDULER OF OUR LEGALITY BUT WITH DEFINITE RESISTANCE. WHY IS OUR COMPANY GIVING US A '1 MIN' LAYOVER TO MAKE US LEGAL FOR THE NEXT FLT? TO GO ILLEGAL IN THE AIR?' THE CREW SCHEDULERS NEED TO THINK ABOUT THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE PAX IN THESE IRREGULAR SITUATIONS AND NOT ABOUT HOW MUCH 'WORK' THEY WILL HAVE TO DO IN ORDER TO RE-CREW THE FLT. NOT TO MENTION I AM EXTREMELY HURT AND TOLD THEM OF MY INJURIES.

# Synopsis

CABIN ATTENDANT INJURED WHEN THE B757-200 ENCOUNTERS SEVERE TURB AND EXTENDED HOLDING ON ARR TO ZZZ. DIVERT TO ZZZ1 WHERE THEY ARE UNABLE TO PARK AND FLT CREW, CABIN CREW, AND PAX REMAIN ON BOARD UNTIL FUELED AT A REMOTE LOCATION FOR THE RETURN FLT TO ZZZ.

# Time / Day

Date: 200610

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: SFO. Airport

State Reference : CA

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B747-400 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Ground: Preflight Flight Phase.Ground.Other

## Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 720289

### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 720285

### Person: 3

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 720286

# Person: 4

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 720287

# Person: 5

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 720288

#### Person: 6

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

# **Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe

Anomaly. Other Anomaly: Fumes

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Resolutory Action.Other

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Aircraft

#### **Narrative**

DURING CREW BOARDING I CAN SMELL A VERY STRONG UNPLEASANT ODOR BOTH IN THE JETWAY AND THE ACFT. FLT ATTENDANT X THOUGHT THE ACFT MUST HAVE BEEN SPRAYED. I PERFORM MY PREFLT DUTIES AS USUAL AND VERY SOON START FEELING A SHORTNESS OF BREATH AND NAUSEA. I TOLD FLT ATTENDANT Y THAT I CAN FEEL AN ASTHMA ATTACK COMING. I USED MY INHALER AND TOOK AN ALLERGY TABLET. MEANWHILE FLT ATTENDANTS IN CABIN START DEVELOPING SYMPTOMS SUCH AS IRRITATION IN THE EYES, ITCHINESS ON THE LIMBS AND HEADACHE. I HAVE THE SAME SYMPTOMS PLUS SKIN RASHES ON MY NECK, CHEST AND LIMBS. PURSER X CAME TO CHK ON THE CREW AND DECIDED TO REPORT TO CREW CTL AND WHEN IGNORED REQUESTED A SUPVR COME ONBOARD. WE WERE BRIEFED BY THE CAPT THAT THERE WAS A FUEL LEAK FROM THE APU AND HE SUSPECTED OUR SYMPTOMS TO BE CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING. HE DECIDED TO HAVE ALL THE CREWS VACATE THE ACFT FOR 20 MINS AND CRACK THE DOORS TO AIR OUT THE AIRPLANE. WE WENT TO THE BOARDING AREA FOR SOME FRESH AIR. MEANWHILE CAPT DECIDED TO CHANGE EQUIP AND THE FLT WAS DELAYED. I WORKED THE FLT BUT STILL EXPERIENCED SORE THROAT, HEADACHE, RESPIRATORY AND SKIN ALLERGIES THROUGHOUT THE FLT. I HAVE TO TAKE MAXIMUM DOSAGE OF ALLERGY MEDICATION. AFTER THE FLT MY SORE THROAT AND SKIN RASHES PERSIST UNTIL TODAY.

# **Synopsis**

B747-400 CABIN CREW RPT STRONG ODORS AND SYMPTOMS OF CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING DURING PREFLT.

# Time / Day

Date: 200610

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZZZ.ARTCC

State Reference: US

# Aircraft: 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZZZ.ARTCC Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-300 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

# Aircraft: 2

### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 720272

## Person: 2

Function. Observation: Passenger

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Cabin Event: Passenger Contraband Anomaly. Non Adherence: Company Policies

Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance Problem Areas : Passenger Human Performance

### **Narrative**

I WAS WALKING FROM FIRST CLASS THROUGH ECONOMY AND NOTICED A PAX WAS USING A NASAL CANNULA. I INQUIRED WHAT HE WAS USING AND HE SHOWED ME HIS PORTABLE OXYGEN CONCENTRATOR (POC) AT HIS FEET. HE SHOWED ME THE STICKER STATING THAT IT WAS 'APPROVED BY THE FAA FOR ONBOARD USE.' THIS WAS MY FIRST EXPERIENCE OF HAVING A POC ONBOARD. I ACCEPTED THE STICKER AT 'FACE VALUE' AND DISCUSSED THE ADVANCEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY WITH THE PAX SENSITIVE TO HIS NEEDS FOR THERAPEUTIC OXYGEN. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE FACT THAT HE TURNED OFF THE POC FOR TKOF AND LNDG BECAUSE IT OPERATED BY BATTERY PWR. I MADE THE INADVERTENT SAFETY VIOLATION BY NOT REFERRING TO MY MANUAL TO CHK

FOR INFLT USE. THIS IS PERMITTED AS CARRY-ON BAGGAGE BUT NOT CURRENTLY ALLOWED FOR ONBOARD USE. I WAS WRONG TO SURMISE THE FIRST LINES OF DEFENSE, TSA SCREENING AND OBSERVATIONS MADE WHILE BOARDING BY CUSTOMER SVC PERSONNEL WOULD 'WEED OUT' UNACCEPTABLE CARRY-ONS.

# **Synopsis**

CABIN ATTENDANT FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THAT PAX OPERATED PORTABLE OXYGEN CONCENTRATOR FAILED TO COMPLY WITH COMPANY REGS FOR CARRY-ON BAGGAGE.

# Time / Day

Date: 200610

## **Place**

Locale Reference. Airport: ABQ. Airport

State Reference : NM Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B737-300 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121 Flight Phase.Ground: Parked

### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Function.Oversight: Flight Attendant In Charge

ASRS Report: 720271

## Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Maintenance: Technician

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

#### **Narrative**

I WAS FLYING PURSER. ON THE 2ND LEG OF THE TRIP UPON COMPLETION OF MY SAFETY CHKS, I WAS MET BY A MECH WHO INFORMED ME UPON ENTERING THE ACFT THAT MORNING TO OPEN THE DOOR 1L FROM THE NIGHT BEFORE, HE HAD GONE DOWN BELOW THE ACFT TO VERIFY THAT DOOR 1L WAS DISARMED BY LOOKING DIRECTLY UP FROM BELOW. UPON DOING THIS SAFETY CHK HE NOTICED DOOR 1L GIRT BAR WAS ENGAGED ON ONE SIDE. HE ENTERED THROUGH THE BACK ENTRANCE AND IN FACT IT WAS ARMED. HE DISARMED THE DOOR 1L FROM THE INSIDE OF THE CABIN. UPON QUESTIONING THE MECH HE STATED THE ACFT HAD COME IN FROM THE NIGHT BEFORE FROM ZZZ. HE ALSO STATED HIS TRAINER HAD ALWAYS TAUGHT HIM TO VERIFY THE B737 DOOR 1L DISARMED BY GOING UNDERNEATH THE ACFT. I FEEL THIS SAFETY CHK WAS VITAL IN NOT HAVING A BLOWN SLIDE. PERHAPS WHEN THE DOOR WAS SHUT

AFTER THE CREW DEPLANED THE NIGHT BEFORE BY THE CUSTOMER SVC AGENT THE DOOR MIGHT HAVE FALLEN OUT OF THE SAFETY BRACKETS AND REARMED IT ON THE ONE SIDE.

# **Synopsis**

A B737-300 CABIN ATTENDANT COMMENTS THAT A MECH VERIFIED HER ACT'S 1L SLIDE WAS ARMED BY VIEWING THE GIRT BAR FROM OUTSIDE BENEATH THE DOOR.

# Time / Day

Date: 200612

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

### **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

Light : Daylight

## Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

# Component: 1

Aircraft Component: Galley Furnishing

#### Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Qualification.Flight Attendant : Currently Qualified Qualification.Flight Attendant.Aircraft Qualified On : 6 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Airline Total : 29.5

Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Total: 29.5 Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Type: 90

ASRS Report: 719772

### Person: 2

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

### **Events**

Anomaly. Cabin Event. Other

Resolutory Action.None Taken: Unable Consequence.Other: Physical Injury

#### **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance

### **Narrative**

COFFEE PACK EXPLODED UPON COMPLETION OF BREW CYCLE AND ATTEMPTED RETRIEVAL OF POT. R WRIST SCALDED AND BURNS OF SECOND DEGREE NATURE ON WRIST AND R ARM. UPON EXAM OF COFFEE PACK, TEAR WAS APPARENT DOWN THE ENTIRE SEAM ON THE BOTTOM OF PACK. THIS TEAR WAS EITHER CAUSED BY A DEFECT IN THE ACTUAL PACK, OR BY ABNORMAL PRESSURE BY HOT WATER IN COFFEE MAKER. PARAMEDICS MET FLT AND AFTER TREATING WITH COLD COMPRESSES ADVISED ME TO SEEK MEDICAL ATTN.

# **Synopsis**

MD80 FLT ATTENDANT IS SCALDED BY EXPLODING COFFEE PACK WHILE RETRIEVING COFFEE POT.

# Time / Day

Date: 200611

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: ZZZ.Airport

State Reference: US

### **Environment**

Light: Daylight

### Aircraft: 1

Operator.Common Carrier: Air Carrier

Make Model Name: B757-200 Operating Under FAR Part: Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise: Level

# Person: 1

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

ASRS Report: 719135

### Person: 2

Function.Flight Attendant: On Duty

Person: 3

Function. Observation: Passenger

Person: 4

Function.Other Personnel.Other

Person: 5

Affiliation.Company: Air Carrier Function.Flight Crew: Captain Function.Oversight: PIC

### **Events**

Anomaly.Cabin Event: Passenger Illness

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport

Resolutory Action.Other

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas: Passenger Human Performance

#### **Narrative**

FLT ATTENDANT AND I WERE IN THE AFT GALLEY WHEN WE HEARD A COMMOTION BY THE REAR LAVATORIES. WE SAW AN ELDERLY GENTLEMAN BENT OVER WITH HIS HEAD IN HIS SON'S ARMS. WE HAD THE GENTLEMEN SIT ON THE FLT ATTENDANT JUMPSEAT. I ASKED THE PAX'S SON IF HIS FATHER WAS ON MEDICATION OR IF HE HAD MEDICAL PROBS. HE SAID YES. WE GOT AN OXYGEN BOTTLE AND I GAVE IT TO HIM. I THEN CALLED THE FRONT CABIN TO LET THEM KNOW WE HAD A MEDICAL EMER THAT WE WERE ASSESSING. WE PUT HIM ON THE GALLEY FLOOR AND HE WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY BREATHING. I PAGED AN 'MD' OR 'DO.' 2 MD'S AND 1 EMT CAME TO THE GALLEY. I THEN RETRIEVED THE MEDICAL KIT AND AED. AFTER GIVING THESE TO THE MD AND EMT, THEY HOOKED THE PAX UP TO AN IV AND THEN BEGAN CPR WITH A CABIN ATTENDANT DOING THE COMPRESSIONS AND THE MD DOING THE BREATHING. THE MD WANTED TO KNOW WHAT MEDICATION THE PAX WAS ON. SO I GOT THIS AND THEN CALLED OUT TO THE DOCTOR WHAT WAS IN HIS MEDICATION BAG. THE MD AND EMT SAID WE NEEDED TO LAND AND I RELAYED THIS TO THE PLTS. THEY GOT BACK TO ME IMMEDIATELY TO SAY WE WERE LNDG IN ZZZ ASAP. I TOOK OVER COMPRESSIONS DURING LNDG UNTIL THE PARAMEDICS TOLD ME TO STOP. WE NEEDED MORE SURGICAL GLOVES THAN WERE PROVIDED ON THIS ACFT. OUR PAX HAD A PACEMAKER AND, THEREFORE, THE AED WOULD NOT SIGNAL TO SHOCK OUR PAX. I BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE INFO PROVIDED ABOUT WHAT TO DO WHEN YOU KNOW A PAX HAS NO PULSE, IS NOT BREATHING, HAS A PACEMAKER AND THE AED SAYS NOT TO SHOCK YOUR PAX. THE DOCTOR, EMT, AND FLT ATTENDANT DID A FABULOUS JOB TRYING TO REVIVE OUR PAX. HE WAS FINALLY PRONOUNCED DOA AT A HOSPITAL IN ZZZ.

# **Synopsis**

FLT ATTENDANTS, MD'S, AND AN EMT WORK TO TRY TO SAVE AN ELDERLY PAX SUFFERING FROM AN ULTIMATELY FATAL AIRBORNE MEDICAL INCIDENT.