

ASRS Database Report Set

Air Carrier (FAR 121) Flight Crew Fatigue Reports

Report Set Description	A sampling of reports referencing air carrier (FAR 121) flight crew fatigue issues and duty periods.
Update Number	9.0
Date of Update.....	January 31, 2008
Number of Records in Report Set	50
Number of New Records in Report Set.....	50
Type of Records in Report Set	For each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

TH: 262-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the reporting of a specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de- identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.



Linda J. Connell, Director
Aviation Safety Reporting System

CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

One thing that can be known from ASRS statistics is that they represent the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 1999 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 1999. Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS lies in the **report narratives**. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. The values of these narrative reports lie in their qualitative nature. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

Report Synopses

ACN: 751955 (1 of 50)

Synopsis

A B737 CHECK AIRMAN REPORTS A PILOT ON DAY 2 OF IOE EXECUTED A GAR ON AN UNSTABILIZED APCH AND FOLLOWED WITH A FIRM TOUCHDOWN. FATIGUE A FACTOR.

ACN: 749531 (2 of 50)

Synopsis

B737-800 DESCENDS BELOW CORRECT ALTITUDE FOR STAR WHEN GIVEN A RWY CHANGE FROM A STRAIGHT-IN SOUTH TO A NORTH RWY.

ACN: 748887 (3 of 50)

Synopsis

B767 FLT CREW ON VISUAL APCH TO RWY 28R AT SFO IS SWITCHED TO RWY 28L AND GOES BELOW GS ATTEMPTING TO GET FLT DIRECTOR TO DISPLAY RWY 28L INFORMATION.

ACN: 748483 (4 of 50)

Synopsis

AN ACR PLT APCHING LAX RPTS FLYING ABOVE THE PROFILE TO AVOID WAKE VORTEX BUT EXCEEDING 250 KTS BELOW 10000 FT WHILE SLOWING ON PROFILE.

ACN: 745881 (5 of 50)

Synopsis

CL65 EXCEEDS 250 KTS BELOW 10000 FT. FLT CREW CITES FATIGUE AND DELAYED TOP OF DESCENT.

ACN: 741673 (6 of 50)

Synopsis

A B737-700 FLT CREW QUESTIONS LEGALITY OF OCEANIC FLT ASSIGNMENT FOLLOWING A RETURN TO DEP STATION FOR FMC MAINTENANCE.

ACN: 741638 (7 of 50)

Synopsis

DO328 FLT CREW MAKES ERRORS ENTERING COMPANY AND ATC ISSUED CHANGES TO THEIR ROUTE INTO THE FMC. FLT CREW GOES OFF COURSE AFTER CRL AND IS QUERIED BY ZOB CTLR.

ACN: 740750 (8 of 50)

Synopsis

AN EARLY MORNING ARR TO RIC BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT WHEN A RWY CHANGE CAME LATE IN THE ARR.

ACN: 740731 *(9 of 50)***Synopsis**

ATIS MISINTERPRETATION BY A TIRED CREW LEADS TO A LOC OVERSHOOT WHEN AN APCH IS PLANNED TO A CLOSED PARALLEL RWY.

ACN: 740461 *(10 of 50)***Synopsis**

CL60 FAILS TO COMPLY WITH ALT RESTRICTIONS ON THE TEB SID FROM TEB.

ACN: 740231 *(11 of 50)***Synopsis**

B757-200ER EXPERIENCED TRACK DEV DEPARTING EYSA DUE TO TRANSPOSITION OF MINS OF LAT DURING FMS PROGRAMMING.

ACN: 740191 *(12 of 50)***Synopsis**

A320 FLT CREW CAME TO THE REALIZATION THAT FATIGUE HAD BEEN THE CAUSE OF THEIR MINOR, BUT VARIED OVERSIGHTS THROUGHOUT THE REPORTED FLT.

ACN: 738761 *(13 of 50)***Synopsis**

SF340 FLT CREW HEARS WHAT THEY EXPECT TO HEAR WHEN RECEIVING RWY ASSIGNMENT FOR LANDING ON DTW RWY 22R. DURING THE LOC INTERCEPT THE CONTROLLER ADVISES THAT THEY SHOULD BE INTERCEPTING 22L LOC AND ISSUES A HEADING.

ACN: 738306 *(14 of 50)***Synopsis**

B757 FLT CREW BOTH FALL ASLEEP DURING ALL-NIGHT FLIGHT. THEY AWAKEN BEFORE ANY PROBLEM OCCURS.

ACN: 737862 *(15 of 50)***Synopsis**

AN A320 FLT CREW, DISPATCHED WITH ONE PACK INOP, LOSES THE SECOND PACK IN CRUISE. THEY DECLARED AN EMERGENCY AND RETURNED TO DEP ARPT.

ACN: 737555 (16 of 50)

Synopsis

B757 CREW ACCEPTS ILS RWY 13 APCH TO CYQX AFTER PLANNING LOC (BC) TO RWY 31. DUE TO RWY CHANGE, TAIL WIND, AND REQUIREMENT FOR ENGINE ANTI-ICE, CREW FLIES AN UNSTABILIZED APCH AND LANDS.

ACN: 737423 (17 of 50)

Synopsis

B747 RELIEF PILOT LAMENTS THE LACK OF PROPER REST BEFORE AND AFTER HIS TRIP. FLT IS RESCHEDULED DUE TO A MAINTENANCE ISSUE.

ACN: 737301 (18 of 50)

Synopsis

B757 FLT CREW ALIGNS WITH WRONG RWY ON NIGHT VISUAL APCH. REALIZING THEIR MISTAKE, GO-AROUND IS EXECUTED.

ACN: 736764 (19 of 50)

Synopsis

FATIGUED AS A RESULT OF LONG DUTY DAYS AND EARLY GET UPS, S340 CAPTAIN TURNS WRONG WAY AND NEARLY INCURS ON RWY 11/29 AT LFT.

ACN: 736544 (20 of 50)

Synopsis

B737 CABIN ATTENDANT ACCEPTS OFFER FROM DEADHEADING CABIN ATTENDANT TO ARM/DISARM CABIN DOOR PRIOR TO DEP/ARR. WORKING ATTENDANT FAILS TO INSPECT THE DOOR AND THE SLIDE ALMOST DEPLOYS WHEN THE CATERERS ATTEMPT TO SERVICE THE GALLEY.

ACN: 736520 (21 of 50)

Synopsis

BESET WITH FATIGUE DUE TO LONG DUTY DAYS AND FIVE CONSECUTIVE DAYS OF FLYING, CABIN ATTENDANT FAILS TO DISCONNECT SLIDE GIRT BAR ON B737-300 PRIOR TO CRACKING DOOR TO SIGNIFY IT WAS SAFE TO BE OPENED.

ACN: 736015 (22 of 50)

Synopsis

A B747-400 PLT RPTS OBSERVING AN UNSTABLE APCH FROM THE JUMPSEAT RESULTING IN A FAST, LONG LNDG. RPTR FAILED TO REQUEST A GAR.

ACN: 735929 (23 of 50)

Synopsis

B737 CREW FAILS TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 7L AS INSTRUCTED AFTER LNDG RWY 7R AT ANC.

ACN: 735580 (24 of 50)

Synopsis

B767 CAPTAIN LAMENTS THE LACK OF QUALITY SLEEP THAT IS AVAILABLE ON A TRIP TO SLRU THAT DEADHEADS DOWN AND LIVE BACK AFTER A 12 HOUR LAYOVER.

ACN: 734261 (25 of 50)

Synopsis

A FLT ATTENDANT DESCRIBES CREW MEMBERS SHOWING FATIGUE DURING ROUND TRIP ASSIGNMENTS TO THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

ACN: 733976 (26 of 50)

Synopsis

THE CREW OF A HEAVY MD11 REPORTS A STALL INDICATION DURING CLB AFTER A HIGH ALT SLAT RETRACT AS THEY ATTEMPTED TO MAKE SID ALT CONSTRAINTS.

ACN: 733743 (27 of 50)

Synopsis

CL600 CREW REPORTS NOT BEING AWARE OF TAXIWAY CLOSURE WHEN TOWER IS NOT OPERATING.

ACN: 733500 (28 of 50)

Synopsis

B757-200 CREW RECEIVES TCAS RA JUST OUTSIDE JETSA ON THE ILS 24R AT LAX AND GOES AROUND FOLLOWING TCAS GUIDANCE.

ACN: 732519 (29 of 50)

Synopsis

B767 FLT CREW SELECTS FLAPS 30 PRIOR TO THE LANDING GEAR REACHING FULL EXTENSION WHICH CAUSES A WARNING HORN TO SOUND. THE FLAP LEVER IS THEN MOVED TO 25 THEN BACK TO 30 WHEN THE HORN STOPS, RESULTING IN TRAILING FLAPS STUCK AT 25.

ACN: 732207 (30 of 50)

Synopsis

CL65 CREW DOES NOT USE BEFORE START CHECKLIST AND ATTEMPTS TO TAXI WITH THE HYDRAULIC PUMPS OFF. STEERING AND BRAKES ARE INOPERATIVE AND THE ACFT GOES OFF THE TAXIWAY.

ACN: 731456 (31 of 50)

Synopsis

A B737 FLT CREW NOTICED LNDG GEAR POSITION LIGHTS WERE RED AND GREEN AFTER GEAR EXTENSION. THE PROCEDURES HANDBOOK INDICATED THE GEAR WAS DOWN AND LOCKED, AND THEY LANDED NORMALLY.

ACN: 731124 (32 of 50)

Synopsis

AN MD88 WITH AN INOP AUTO-BRAKE AND AN ANTI-SKID MALFUNCTION ANNUNCIATED HAS A BRAKE LOCK AND THE TIRE FAIL ON LANDING.

ACN: 729889 (33 of 50)

Synopsis

A320 CREW MISSES CROSSING RESTRICTION AT CIVET AFTER TWO RWY CHANGES DURING THE CIVET 5 ARR TO LAX.

ACN: 729148 (34 of 50)

Synopsis

LGT CREW MAKES ERRORS CONVERTING METERS TO FEET AND DESCENDS BELOW ASSIGNED ALTITUDE DURING APPROACH TO MOSCOW'S SHEREMETYEVO AIRPORT.

ACN: 729097 (35 of 50)

Synopsis

AFTER CHANGING ACTIVE RWYS FROM RWY 9R TO RWY 27R, PHL TWR CHANGED THE ILS FREQ FROM RWY 9R TO RWY 9L, CAUSING REVERSE SENSING AND AN A330 TO GO AROUND.

ACN: 727239 (36 of 50)

Synopsis

A B757 CAPT REPORTS HAVING VERTIGO DURING A RAPID POST TKOF TURNING CLB WITH A LOW ALT LEVEL OFF. POOR CRM CITED ON AN EARLY MORNING FATIGUED FLT.

ACN: 726850 (37 of 50)

Synopsis

A B777-200 HAD THE AFT CARGO LATCH/HOOK PWR DRIVE UNIT REPLACED PER THE MAINT MANUAL. LATER DISCOVERED UNIT IS A REQUIRED INSPECTION ITEM.

ACN: 726607 (38 of 50)

Synopsis

FLIGHT ATTENDANT REPORTS DEBILITATING FATIGUE EXPERIENCED DURING ALL NIGHT FLIGHT TO ZZZ1 AND RETURN TO ZZZ.

ACN: 725862 (39 of 50)

Synopsis

B757 FLT CREW HAS LOST COM DUE TO EXCESSIVE NOISE IN COCKPIT.

ACN: 725413 (40 of 50)

Synopsis

A B737-800 WAS DISPATCHED WITH THE INCORRECT BRAKE ASSEMBLY INSTALLED IN #2 POS. BRAKE INSTALLED WAS A B737-700 BRAKE ASSEMBLY.

ACN: 724682 (41 of 50)

Synopsis

AUTOFLT SYSTEM ANOMALIES RESULTS IN MD80 COCKPIT CONFUSION AND GAR DURING CAT III APCH.

ACN: 724521 (42 of 50)

Synopsis

FLT CREW OF DHC8 FAIL TO PERFORM CREW OXYGEN MASK TEST. LATER DISCOVER MASKS WERE NOT CONNECTED TO THE OXYGEN BOTTLE. FATIGUE AND SCHEDULE PRESSURE WERE CITED AS CONTRIBUTING FACTORS.

ACN: 724475 (43 of 50)

Synopsis

THE FLT STATION TEMP APCHED 120 DEGS FAHRENHEIT FOLLOWING AN ACFT MALFUNCTION WITH 1 OPERATING PACK. THE PLTS OPENED THE FLT STATION DOOR TO PROVIDE COOLING AIR.

ACN: 724468 (44 of 50)

Synopsis

AN A330 EXPERIENCED AN UNCANCELABLE TOGA LOCK THRUST CONDITION FOLLOWING A PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR GO AROUND.

ACN: 724441 (45 of 50)

Synopsis

A B747-200 CREW ACCEPTED AN 18 HR DUTY DAY AFTER AN ATLANTIC CROSSING WITH AN INTERMEDIATE STOP. THE CREW BECAME FATIGUED ON THE SECOND LEG WITH DETERIORATING WX AND AN IOE FO.

ACN: 723886 (46 of 50)

Synopsis

A320 CAPT RPTS AN EXTREMELY FATIGUING TRIP PAIRING.

ACN: 723544 (47 of 50)

Synopsis

AN A320 CREW TURNED AN OVERHEATED BLUE HYD ELECTRIC PUMP ON PREMATURELY BEFORE LNDG BECAUSE OF CHKLIST AMBIGUITY AND CONFUSION.

ACN: 723131 (48 of 50)

Synopsis

A321 FLT CREW IS CONCERNED WITH FATIGUE AND REST ISSUES DURING FLT.

ACN: 722952 (49 of 50)

Synopsis

B737 FLT CREW HAS ALTDEV DURING APCH TO DCA.

ACN: 722878 (50 of 50)

Synopsis

A320 FLT CREW LINES UP ON WRONG RWY AT BWI.

Report Narratives

ACN: 751955

Time / Day

Date : 200708
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : RDU.Airport
State Reference : NC

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : RDU.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Landing : Go Around

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Observation : Company Check Pilot
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 126
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 8000
ASRS Report : 751955

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Unstabilized Approach
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE HAD JUST COME TO THE END OF A LONG FLT. THE FO WAS ON HIS SECOND DAY, AND HAD ALREADY FLOWN 2 LEGS. THIS WAS HIS THIRD FOR THE DAY. WE

WERE IN A -700 AND GOT HIGH BECAUSE OF HIS INEXPERIENCE. (WE HAD DISCUSSED CONFIGS, TECHNIQUES AND COMPUTATIONS SEVERAL TIMES AND HE JUST SIMPLY GOT BEHIND.) A GAR WAS INITIATED AS DIRECTED BY THE PLT MONITORING. ON THE GAR WE WERE VECTORED INITIALLY TO RWY 5L, AND THEN CHANGED TO RWY 5R. WE DID NOT GET THE LOC COURSE SET IN PROPERLY AND INADVERTENTLY INTERCEPTED FINAL FOR RWY 5L, THEN CORRECTED TO RWY 5R. WE WERE WITHIN PARAMETERS FOR THE STABILIZED APCH WITH 1 SPD CALLOUT FOR LOW SPD (SLIGHTLY BELOW REF -- CORRECTING). THE RWY HAS A SLOPE, AND A 'FIRM' LNDG WAS MADE, BUT CERTAINLY WITHIN THE 'NORM' FOR COMPANY FLTS. THE FO IS TRULY DOING A GOOD JOB AND JUST GOT TO THE END WITH A NOT SO PLEASANT COMPLETION TO HIS FLYING FOR THE DAY. PAY MORE ATTN TO THE 'FATIGUE' FACTOR FOR A NEW FO.

Synopsis

A B737 CHECK AIRMAN REPORTS A PILOT ON DAY 2 OF IOE EXECUTED A GAR ON AN UNSTABILIZED APCH AND FOLLOWED WITH A FIRM TOUCHDOWN. FATIGUE A FACTOR.

ACN: 749531

Time / Day

Date : 200708
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SEA.Airport
State Reference : WA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 13500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Dawn

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : S46.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-800
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : JAWBN

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 8500
ASRS Report : 749531

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING DESCENT ON JAWBN NINE ARRIVAL TO RWY 16C, THE FO WHO HAD LIMITED TIME ON THE AIRCRAFT, APPROXIMATELY 75 HOURS, SET LOWER LIMIT OF ALTITUDE RESTRICTIONS 12000 FT VS THE INDIVIDUAL STEP-DOWN ALTITUDES. CAPT VERIFIED THE ALTITUDE, AND SINCE AIRCRAFT WAS IN VNAV PROFILE WITH FMC ALTITUDE PROTECTION DECIDED NOT TO 'INSTRUCT' THE FO. BOTH CREWMEMBERS WERE TIRED, BUT HAD WORKED WELL FOR THE FLIGHT BOTH UP AND BACK. FAIRLY CLOSE TO JAWBN INTERSECTION, SEA APPROACH ADVISED THEY WERE SWITCHING RUNWAYS AND CAPT WENT HEADS DOWN TO REPROGRAM FMC FOR THE NEW ILS AND ARRIVAL. WHEN I CAME UP FROM HEADS DOWN, THE AIRCRAFT WAS ALREADY CONSIDERABLY BELOW THE 16000 FT RESTRICTION FOR JAWBN INTERSECTION. NOTIFIED ATC AND HE SAID NO CONFLICT AND THAT HE SHOULD HAVE WAITED TILL PASSING JAWBN TO GIVE THE AMENDED CLEARANCE, HE THEN CLEARED US TO 10000 FT. AT THAT TIME I NOTICED THE AIRCRAFT WAS IN CWS P INSTEAD OF VNAV. I HAVE NO IDEA HOW IT GOT THERE OR WHEN, SINCE I HAD BEEN HEADS DOWN, BUT SINCE THE ALERTER WAS SET TO 12000 FT. THE AIRCRAFT SIMPLY CONTINUED DESCEND. IN THE FUTURE, SIMPLY NOT ALLOW MYSELF TO ACCEPT AN 'UNUSUAL' USAGE OF THE AUTOMATION. THERE IS A STRONG DESIRE NOT TO CONTINUALLY 'INSTRUCT' THE COPILOT, BUT WITH NEW PERSONNEL NOT FAMILIAR WITH NORMAL TECHNIQUES HERE, IT MAY BE NECESSARY MORE THAN USUAL. THERE IS NO 'FORMAL' PROCEDURE I AM AWARE OF, BUT THE TECHNIQUE OF SETTING EACH CROSSING ALTITUDE UNLESS USING VNAV/RNP APPROACH PROCEDURES WILL GUARANTEE PROTECTION FOR JUST THIS KIND OF EVENT.

Synopsis

B737-800 DESCENDS BELOW CORRECT ALTITUDE FOR STAR WHEN GIVEN A RWY CHANGE FROM A STRAIGHT-IN SOUTH TO A NORTH RWY.

ACN: 748887

Time / Day

Date : 200707

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SFO.Airport

State Reference : CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Weather Elements.Other

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : NCT.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer Only : 28L

Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

ASRS Report : 748887

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Unstabilized Approach

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON FINAL DURING VISUAL APCH 28R IN SFO, GOT CHANGED TO RWY 28L. I WAS TIRED AND GOT DISTRACTED WITH MAKING SURE RWY 28L ILS WAS DIALED IN CORRECTLY (COULDN'T GET FLT DIRECTOR TO DISPLAY -- YES, I DISCONNECTED AND RECONNECTED) AND GOT LOW ON APCH. CORRECTED AND LANDED SAFELY.

Synopsis

B767 FLT CREW ON VISUAL APCH TO RWY 28R AT SFO IS SWITCHED TO RWY 28L AND GOES BELOW GS ATTEMPTING TO GET FLT DIRECTOR TO DISPLAY RWY 28L INFORMATION.

ACN: 748483

Time / Day

Date : 200707
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LAX.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 9800
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 12000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements : Turbulence
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SCT.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 748483

Events

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Wake Turbulence
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Speed Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Original Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

FLT TO LAX WAS DELAYED SO AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT IT WAS XA:15 AM EST AND WE HAD 1 LEG BEFORE THE LAX FLT, BOTH OF US WERE FATIGUED. WHILE IN VNAV ON AN IDLE DESCENT APPROX 4 MILES PRIOR TO MINZA WE HAD SEEN ON TCAS AN ACFT 8 MILES IN FRONT OF US. AT THAT TIME WE ENCOUNTERED MODERATE WAKE TURBULENCE AT APPROX 12000 FT, WE WERE NOT NOTIFIED

THAT A HEAVY ACFT WAS IN FRONT OF US. AT THAT TIME I SWITCHED THE AUTOPILOT TO VERTICAL SPEED 500 FT MIN TO AVOID FURTHER UPSETS THEN INCREASED OUR DSCNT ABOVE THE PRECEDING ACFT FLT PATH. AS WE CONTINUED THE DSCNT AND APCHING THE RESTR AT DECOR THE PNF INFORMED ME THAT I WAS NOT GOING TO MAKE THE RESTR SO I INCREASED MY DSCNT RATE TO MEET THE RESTR AND THUS I WAS ABOVE 250 KTS BELOW 10000 FT. ONCE REALIZED I SLOWED THE ACFT TO 250 KTS AND CONTINUED THE FLT UNEVENTFULLY. WE WERE DESCENDING FOR A LNDG TO RWY 24R AT LAX. I WAS TRYING TO MAKE THE CROSSING RESTR AT DECOR WHICH IS TO CROSS BETWEEN 9800 FT AND 9000 FT. AT 9700 FT I WAS AT APPROX 280 KTS. I THEN SLOWED THE ACFT TO 250 KTS BUT WAS STILL IN A VERY SHALLOW DSCNT. AFTER SUCCESSFULLY MEETING THE CROSSING RESTR I SAW THE SPEED DEVIATION AND CORRECTED. ONCE IDENTIFIED I REDUCED PITCH, REMAINED AT IDLE POWER AND EXTENDED THE FLT SPOILERS TO REDUCE SPEED. WHEN ENCOUNTERING WAKE TURB WITH CROSSING RESTRS BETWEEN YOU AND THE RWY ASK ATC IF YOU CAN DEVIATE FROM THOSE CROSSING RESTRS FOR WAKE TURB. THAT WOULD OF SOLVED OUR PROBLEM THAT MORNING.

Synopsis

AN ACR PLT APCHING LAX RPTS FLYING ABOVE THE PROFILE TO AVOID WAKE VORTEX BUT EXCEEDING 250 KTS BELOW 10000 FT WHILE SLOWING ON PROFILE.

ACN: 745881

Time / Day

Date : 200707
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ATL.Airport
State Reference : GA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 12000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : A80.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : HONIE

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 225
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 800
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 325
ASRS Report : 745881

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Speed Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

THIS EVENT OCCURRED DURING DESCENT ON THE HONIE 3 STAR INTO ATL. THE CAPTAIN WAS THE PF AND I, THE FIRST OFFICER, WAS THE PNF. AS WE APPROACHED ATL, ATC GAVE US A CROSSING RESTRICTION TO CROSS THE TIROE INTERSECTION AT 14000 FT AND 250 KTS. I READ THE CROSSING RESTRICTION BACK TO ATC, SET 14000 FT IN THE ALTITUDE ALERTER, AND THEN PLUGGED IN 250/14000 INTO THE FMS SO THAT VNAV WOULD SHOW US WHEN TO START DOWN. THE CAPTAIN, FOR REASONS I DO NOT KNOW, WAITED TO DESCEND UNTIL THE VNAV INDICATED APPROXIMATELY A 4 DEGREE DESCENT. AS WE DESCENDED, WE MAINTAINED SOMEWHERE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 300 PLUS KTS AND DESCENDED QUITE RAPIDLY. WHILE ON DESCENT WE WERE FIRST TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 28. AFTER SETTING UP AND BRIEFING THAT APPROACH, WE WERE THEN TOLD TO DEPART TIROE ON A 300 DEGREE HEADING AND TO NOW EXPECT RWY 26R. AS WE DESCENDED, I GAVE COM1 TO THE CAPTAIN AND PROCEEDED TO MAKE AN IN RANGE CALL TO COMPANY ON COM2. WHEN I CAME BACK TO COM1, THE CAPTAIN BRIEFED THE APPROACH TO RWY 26R. PRIOR TO REACHING TIROE, ATC INSTRUCTED US TO CROSS TIROE AT OR BELOW 14000 FT AND TO DESCEND AND MAINTAIN 12000 FT. WE CROSSED TIROE, TURNED TO A 300 DEGREE HEADING AND CONTINUED OUR DESCENT TO 12000 FT. SHORTLY AFTER LEVELING OFF AT 12000 FT, APPROACH CONTROL ASKED US TO INDICATE OUR SPEED. BUSY DOING SOMETHING ELSE, I LOOKED UP AT THE SPEED TAPE AS THE CAPTAIN BLURTED OUT '250' OVER THE INTERCOM. KNOWING THAT WE WERE PAST TIROE AND SHOULD BE AT 250 KTS, I BLURTED OUT '250.' AS I FINISHED MY REPLY, I REALIZED THAT WE WERE ACTUALLY AT 290 KTS AND THAT WE HAD BUSTED AN AIRSPEED RESTRICTION. I IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED MYSELF AND SHEEPISHLY INFORMED ATC THAT WE WERE ACTUALLY AT 290 KTS. ATC QUERIED IF THAT WAS THE SPEED THAT WE WERE ASSIGNED AND I REPLIED 'NEGATIVE.' THE CAPTAIN BLINKED IN DISBELIEF AS HE TOO REALIZED THAT WE WERE AT 290 KTS INSTEAD OF AT THE ASSIGNED 250 KTS. IMMEDIATELY HE BEGAN TO SLOW TO 250 KTS AND THAT WAS THE LAST WE HEARD ABOUT IT FROM THE CONTROLLER. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS AIRSPEED VIOLATION. FIRST, AND I BELIEVE MOST IMPORTANTLY, BOTH OF US WERE QUITE TIRED, AS THIS WAS THE RETURN LEG OF A LONG SHIFT. THIS WAS THE CAPTAIN'S THIRD LONG SHIFT IN A ROW. FURTHERMORE, THE LEG OUT HAD BEEN DELAYED 4 HOURS DUE TO A LATE INBOUND AIRCRAFT. THEREFORE, WE EACH ENDED UP WITH ONLY TWO HOURS OF REST BEFORE GETTING UP FOR THE LEG BACK. I, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS NOT ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR A LONG SHIFT, BUT INSTEAD, SHOWED UP FOR WORK FULLY EXPECTING TO WORK A TWO DAY TRIP WITH ONLY A SHORT 1 HOUR LEG FOR A 9 HOUR AND 45 MINUTE OVERNIGHT. WHEN I CHECKED IN FOR WORK, I HAD A MESSAGE INDICATING THAT MY SCHEDULE HAD BEEN CHANGED AND THAT I WAS NOW SCHEDULED TO WORK THIS LONG SHIFT INSTEAD. THEREFORE, WHEN THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED, I, THROUGH NO FAULT OF MY

OWN, HAD BEEN UP FOR ALMOST 24 HOURS STRAIGHT. HAD SOMEONE NOTIFIED ME THAT I WAS RESCHEDULED TO WORK THIS LONG SHIFT, I WOULD HAVE TAKEN TIME TO REST THE PRIOR AFTERNOON SO THAT I WOULD HAVE AT LEAST BEEN A LITTLE MORE RESTED PRIOR TO WORKING ALL NIGHT. A SECOND CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE CAPTAIN'S DECISION TO WAIT TO DESCEND UNTIL WE WERE ON A 4 DEGREE DESCENT PATH. WE WERE DESCENDING QUITE RAPIDLY AND WOULD ONLY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SLOW TO 250 KTS BY USING FLIGHT SPOILERS AND CAREFULLY MONITORING OUR VERTICAL DESCENT RATE. AS WE WERE BOTH QUITE BUSY BRIEFING THE APPROACH AND COMPLETING OUR OTHER BEFORE LANDING DUTIES, THE ADDED RESPONSIBILITY OF HAVING TO CLOSELY MONITOR A STEEP DESCENT PROFILE WAS, PERHAPS, TOO MUCH OF A WORKLOAD FOR US, CONSIDERING OUR TIRED STATE.

Synopsis

CL65 EXCEEDS 250 KTS BELOW 10000 FT. FLT CREW CITES FATIGUE AND DELAYED TOP OF DESCENT.

ACN: 741673

Time / Day

Date : 200706
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : HNL.Airport
State Reference : HI
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
ASRS Report : 741673

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : FAA
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

THE 'RULES' CITED BY THE COMPANY WERE IN CONFLICT WITH CREW UNDERSTANDING AND PHYSICAL CONDITION. AFTER RETURNING TO HNL AT XA47

GMT WITH AN FMC PROBLEM, I CALLED SCHEDULING TO DISCUSS DUTY TIME ISSUES FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE DAY. I WAS CONCERNED THAT I WOULD LAND IN ZZZ1 OR ZZZ2 WITH MORE THAN 8.0 HOURS OF FLIGHT TIME AND WOULD EXCEED DUTY TIME LIMITATIONS. I WAS REASSURED BY THE SCHEDULING MANAGER THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. I WAS TOLD THAT BECAUSE THE FMC PROBLEM WAS AN ISSUE BEYOND THE CONTROL OF THE COMPANY I COULD BE SCHEDULED TO FLY LONGER THAN 8.0 HOURS. I SAID I ALSO THOUGHT THAT FATIGUE WOULD BE A FACTOR EVEN IF IT WAS LEGAL. I WAS TOLD TO GO LOOK AT THE FOM AND REGULATIONS. I WENT BACK TO THE AIRCRAFT AND THE MAINTENANCE COMPUTER PERSON WANTED TO DISCUSS THE IN-FLIGHT INDICATIONS AND PROBLEMS. BOTH THE FIRST OFFICER AND I SPENT TIME WITH THE MECHANIC TRYING TO MAKE SENSE OUT OF THE FMC PROBLEM. THE PAX REMAINED ON THE AIRCRAFT WHILE MAINTENANCE CHECKED OUT THE COMPUTER BECAUSE THE AGENTS DID NOT WANT TO HAVE THEM GO THROUGH THE AGRICULTURE INSPECTION AGAIN. THEY WERE NOT HAPPY. THE FLIGHT ATTENDANTS WORKED HARD THE ENTIRE TIME WE WERE ON THE GROUND TO GET THE PLANE RESERVICED AND TO ACCOMMODATE THE PAX. ANOTHER VERY DISTRACTING PROBLEM WAS THE APU BLEED AIR WAS NOT WORKING SO AN AIR CART WAS REQUIRED AT THE GATE. THE SOUND OF THE AIR CART WAS VERY LOUD THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE GROUND TIME. I TRIED TO CALL SOMEONE IN FLIGHT OPERATIONS TO CLARIFY THE DUTY TIME ISSUE. NO ONE WAS IN THE OFFICE. I TRIED TO CALL THE MANAGER OF SCHEDULING BACK TWICE AND SHE WAS ON THE PHONE. WE WERE TOLD BY MAINTENANCE THE AIRCRAFT WAS READY TO GO. THE FIRST OFFICER AND FLIGHT ATTENDANT CREW AGREED TO DEPART FOR ZZZ AND DISCUSS THE DUTY TIME PROBLEM ENROUTE. WE DEPARTED HONOLULU. WE TOOK OFF OVER 3 HOURS LATE AND HAD NO FURTHER PROBLEM WITH THE FMC. ENROUTE THE FIRST OFFICER AND I READ THROUGH THE FOM AND FOUND REFERENCES TO DUTY TIME ISSUES: 1. THE FOM SAYS ETOPS WILL BE CONDUCTED UNDER EITHER FLAG OR SUPPLEMENTAL AIR CARRIER RULES WITH A NOTE THAT SAYS NON-ETOPS SEGMENTS OF ETOPS FLIGHT ARE GOVERNED BY DOMESTIC AIR CARRIER RULES. ANOTHER SECTION DIRECTLY ADDRESSES THE ISSUE OF RETURNING TO HNL AND THEN FLYING TO THE MAINLAND WITH A STOP THEN ON TO ZZZ2 AND EXCEEDING 8.0 HOURS OF FLIGHT TIME (AS A RESULT OF 'CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND THE CONTROL OF THE COMPANY' SUCH AS A MAINTENANCE DELAY). AFTER READING THE ABOVE INFORMATION AND COMPARING IT TO FARs 121.471 AND 121.481 (B) (C) WE WERE NOT CLEAR WHAT WE WERE LEGAL TO DO. I ASKED FOR A PATCH THROUGH COMMERCIAL RADIO TO TALK TO DISPATCH ABOUT THE ISSUE. THE DISPATCHER ON DUTY CLARIFIED THAT WE WOULD NOT EXCEED 8.0 HOURS OF FLIGHT TIME UPON LANDING AT ZZZ AND SAID WE WERE LEGAL TO CONTINUE ONTO ZZZ2. I SAID I STILL WAS NOT CLEAR BUT THAT WE WOULD TAKE THE FLIGHT FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ2. WE WERE NOT EXCEEDING OUR CONTRACT DUTY TIME LIMITS AND HAD RECEIVED CONFIRMATION FROM THREE SOURCES FROM THE COMPANY (FOM, SCHEDULING, AND DISPATCH) ABOUT THE INTERPRETATION OF REGULATIONS. WE LANDED IN ZZZ2 AT XK02 GMT. I WAS EXHAUSTED. EVEN IF THE REGULATIONS WERE NOT EXCEEDED, I WAS NOT THINKING CLEARLY. I HAD BEEN AWAKE FOR 23 HOURS. THE 2.0 HOURS IN FLIGHT WITH THE FMC PROBLEM WAS DRAINING. IT WAS A COMPLEX, AMBIGUOUS PROBLEM NOT FITTING INTO ANY CHECKLIST OR PREVIOUSLY TRAINED SCENARIO. I WAS ON THE GROUND FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF AND TALKED WITH MECHANICS, PAX, AND SCHEDULING TRYING TO WORK OUT PROBLEMS BEFORE WE DEPARTED AGAIN FOR ZZZ. THE FLIGHT BACK TO HONOLULU FROM ZZZ2 AND ZZZ WAS UNEVENTFUL BUT A BLUR. EVEN THOUGH THE FLIGHTS WERE UNEVENTFUL, THE

LEVEL OF SAFETY DUE TO SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, DECISION MAKING ABILITY, COMMUNICATIONS AND WORKLOAD MANAGEMENT WAS COMPROMISED. I FOUND MYSELF LAPSING INTO A DAZE. FORTUNATELY WE HAD A PILOT JUMPSEATER FOR THE TRIP FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ2 WHO CONTRIBUTED TO KEEPING THE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AT A HIGHER LEVEL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER HAD LITTLE INFORMATION BEYOND THAT INCLUDED IN THE NARRATIVE. THE COMPANY CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE ASSIGNMENT WAS LEGAL AND THAT POSITION HAS BEEN UPHELD BY THEIR POI. THERE HAS BEEN NO ATTEMPT TO MAKE THE LANGUAGE BY WHICH THE DECISION WAS MADE MORE USER FRIENDLY AS SUGGESTED BY THE REPORTER.

Synopsis

A B737-700 FLT CREW QUESTIONS LEGALITY OF OCEANIC FLT ASSIGNMENT FOLLOWING A RETURN TO DEP STATION FOR FMC MAINTENANCE.

ACN: 741638

Time / Day

Date : 200703
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZOB.ARTCC
State Reference : OH
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 28000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZOB.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Do 328 TJ (Turbojet)
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other.VORTAC
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 741638

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THERE ARE TWO RELATED FACTORS IN THIS EVENT. ONE IS THE NEW ROUTING AND THE AMENDED VERSION OF SUCH, IN WHICH WE CONFUSED PARTS OF THE NEW AND OLD ROUTES. I ATTRIBUTE THIS ALMOST SOLELY TO FATIGUE AND OVER SCHEDULING. I KNEW I WAS RUN DOWN FROM MY RECENT SCHEDULE, BUT WHILE MAINTAINING AWARENESS OF THE BIG PICTURE ITEMS, I GLOSSED OVER THE FLIGHT PLAN, WHICH I HAD SEEN MANY TIMES BEFORE. THE NEW ROUTING AFTER CARLETON WAS SO CLOSE TO THE OLD ONE THAT I JUST DIDN'T PICK UP ON IT. I WAS ON DAY 6 OF FLYING, DOING BACK-TO-BACK THREE DAY TRIPS. THEY WERE AM TRIPS, AND I NEVER GET MORE THAN 6-7 HOURS OF SLEEP DURING EARLY AM SHOWS. ADD TO THAT THE FACT THAT I FLEW 29:54 IN ONLY 6 DAYS, AND I WAS FATIGUED. I FINISHED THE DAY DRINKING COFFEE AND SODA TO KEEP SHARP, BUT I HOPE THIS SITUATION DOESN'T HAPPEN ON A REGULAR BASIS, BECAUSE I BELIEVE I HAVE FOUND OUT WHAT MY PERSONAL LIMITS ARE FOR BEING AN EFFECTIVE CREWMEMBER. OVER SCHEDULING LIKE THIS IS A PROBLEM THAT WILL ONLY GET WORSE. WE WERE GIVEN THE NEW ROUTING OUT OF PIT ON OUR RELEASE. PIT CLRNC DELIVERY MODIFIED THE CLRNC, CHANGING THE FIRST HALF OF THE ROUTING UP TO THE CARLETON (CRL) VOR. WE MODIFIED THE CLRNC IN THE FMS AND STARTED THE FLIGHT. LATER, CHICAGO CENTER ASKED US IF WE HAD MADE THE 'TURN' TO MKE EARLY. WE HAD IN FACT FLOWN THE 'OLD' CLRNC, CRL/314/75 MILES INSTEAD OF THE 'NEW' ROUTING, CRL/319/92 MILES. WE DISCUSSED WITH CENTER WHAT PART OF THE CLRNC PITTSBURGH HAD CHANGED ON US, AND TRIED TO DETERMINE IF WE WERE SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN FLYING THE NEW OR OLD ROUTING. THE CONFUSION CAME FROM US BEING REISSUED THE FIRST HALF OF THE ROUTING, WHICH RETURNED US TO THE 'OLD' FLIGHT PLAN, WHILE THE SECOND HALF OF OUR ROUTING (THE 'NEW' ROUTE AFTER CRL VOR) WAS NOT CHANGED. WE HAD IN FACT ALSO CHANGED THE SECOND HALF OF OUR FLIGHT PLAN BACK TO THE OLD ROUTING AS WELL IN THE CONFUSION. CLEVELAND CTR ASKED ABOUT OUR CLRNC AFTER WE HAD GONE A WHILE ON THE CRI/314 RADIAL. THEY DID NOT ASK US TO CHANGE OUR RTE OF FLT. I ASKED FOR A PHONE NUMBER LATER, AND CALLED CHICAGO CENTER ONCE ON THE GROUND, AS THEY HAD BEEN ASKED BY CLEVELAND WHY THEY HAD CHANGED OUR ROUTINGS INTO THE MKE AREA. AT FIRST, I BLAMED PIT'S AMENDED CLRNC, BUT AFTER THE FO AND I TALKED ABOUT IT, WE FIGURED WE HAD MIXED UP THE CLRNCs. I CALLED CHICAGO CENTER AND THE WATCH DESK TO EXPLAIN THE SITUATION FURTHER, AS I DIDN'T WANT PITTSBURGH TO GET BLAMED FOR THIS OR TO HAVE IT APPEAR THAT WE WERE TRYING TO PASS THE BUCK AND SHIFT THE BLAME. CHICAGO SAID IT HADN'T TRIGGERED ANY ALERTS. WE DISCUSSED THE NEW ROUTING AND I PROMISED TO KEEP A CLOSER EYE ON OUR NEW FLIGHT PLANS. MAKING SURE THE FLIGHT PLANS IN THE FMS ARE EXACTLY AS ISSUED, ESPECIALLY WHEN WE ARE DEALING WITH NEW ROUTES. IT SEEMS LIKE MANY OF OUR FMS FLIGHT PLAN LISTS HAVE BEEN DELETED, AND I SUSPECT IT WAS SO WE WOULD PROGRAM IN NEW FLIGHT PLANS. IF THAT'S THE CASE, IT'S A GOOD IDEA. NEXT IS SCHEDULING. OUR PILOTS ARE OVERWORKED AND ARE BECOMING LESS PERCEPTIVE ABOUT LITTLE ITEMS. FATIGUE AND DULLED SENSES FROM WORKING ALL THE TIME WILL LEAD TO MORE AND MORE SMALL ERRORS. WE NEED TO PROPERLY STAFF THIS AIRLINE THROUGH AN AGGRESSIVE HIRING PUSH IF WE ARE EVER TO ALLEVIATE THE POTENTIALLY SERIOUS OVERWORKING OF OUR PILOTS AND FLIGHT ATTENDANTS.

Synopsis

DO328 FLT CREW MAKES ERRORS ENTERING COMPANY AND ATC ISSUED
CHANGES TO THEIR ROUTE INTO THE FMC. FLT CREW GOES OFF COURSE AFTER
CRL AND IS QUERIED BY ZOB CTLR.

ACN: 740750

Time / Day

Date : 200706
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : RIC.Airport
State Reference : VA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2100

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : PCT.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A300
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 130
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 11000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 300
ASRS Report : 740750

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Narrative

SO THERE WE WERE, DSNDRG BASED ON THE ATIS FOR WHAT LOOKED TO BE AN ENTRY TO A LEFT DOWNWIND TO RWY 34. AS WE NEARED THE ARPT APCH ISSUED A HEADING AND SAID TO SET UP FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 16 (CAN YOU SEE IT COMING?), WHICH MEANT WE WERE NOW ON EXTENDED BASE LEG. THAT WAS MORE CONVENIENTLY ALIGNED, BUT REQUIRED MORE ENTHUSIASTIC DSCNT, SO I DID THAT. THE FO LOADED THE ILS RWY 16 AND TURNED THE AIRPLANE INSTRUMENTS AROUND. THIS STRIP OF PAVEMENT USES THE SAME ILS FREQUENCY FOR APCHES TO BOTH ENDS. MEANWHILE APCH ALLOWED ME TO WIDEN OUT A BIT TO GET DOWN. THIS SORT OF COMMOTION IS ALWAYS LOTS O' FUN AT THE END OF AN OVERNIGHT WORK PERIOD, WHERE THE BODY CLOCK IS UPSIDE DOWN AND WHEN FATIGUE IS ALWAYS LURKING AROUND US AND THE ATC CTLRS. THE APCH CTLR ASKED US TO RPT THE FIELD IN SIGHT, WHICH WE EVENTUALLY DID. AS IS NORMALLY DONE, WE HAD THE ILS RWY 16 TUNED UP AND WERE ATTEMPTING TO USE IT IN ADDITION TO THE VISUAL REFERENCES. BUT THE SCREEN DISPLAY WAS NOT MATCHING UP WITH THE BIG DISPLAY OUT THE WINDOW. AFTER WE BOTH REMARKED THAT SCREENS AND WINDOWS DIDN'T HAVE MUCH CORRELATION -- WE DIDN'T USE THOSE WORDS -- I MANUALLY FLEW THE VISUAL APPROACH TO RWY 16. ON THE GROUND, THE FO ASKED THE TWR CTLR WHICH ILS WAS UP AND HE ANSWERED THAT IT WAS RWY 34. THIS IS BY NO MEANS THE FIRST TIME THIS HAS HAPPENED, WHERE APCH ISSUES AN OPPOSITE-DIRECTION APCH TO WHAT IS BEING ANNOUNCED ON AN ARPT'S ATIS. IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA FOR APCH CTLRS TO HAVE TWR CTLRS TURN ON THE ILS FOR THE DIRECTION AIRPLANES ARE ACTUALLY BEING CLRED TO LAND OR, IF UNABLE, TELL THE ARRIVING FLT THAT THE ILS IS STILL SET UP FOR THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION.

Synopsis

AN EARLY MORNING ARR TO RIC BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT WHEN A RWY CHANGE CAME LATE IN THE ARR.

ACN: 740731

Time / Day

Date : 200706

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : IND.Airport

State Reference : IN

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC

Weather Elements : Thunderstorm

Weather Elements : Turbulence

Weather Elements.Other

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : IND.TRACON

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Do 328 TP (Turboprop)

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer Only : 23L

Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Precision

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC

Qualification.Pilot : ATP

ASRS Report : 740731

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA

Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3

Resolutive Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Original Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE EVENT OCCURRED FOR A COUPLE OF REASONS. FIRST AND FOREMOST WAS THAT THE ATIS INFORMATION WAS INCORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD AND WRITTEN DOWN. INSTEAD OF NOTING FROM THE ATIS THAT RWY 23L WAS CLOSED, THE ILS RWY 23L WAS TRANSCRIBED AS THE APCH IN USE. ALL PLANNING THEN BECAME FOCUSED FOR THE ILS TO RWY 23L. SECONDLY, SINCE NO OTHER APCH OTHER THAN ILS RWY 23R WAS IN USE, INDIANAPOLIS APCH DID NOT TELL US ON INITIAL CONTACT WHAT APCH TO EXPECT. WE BELIEVED THAT WE WERE BEING VECTORED TO ILS RWY 23L. FINALLY, I BELIEVE THAT FATIGUE PLAYED A ROLE, GIVEN OUR APPROX TEN HOUR LAYOVER AND EARLY SHOWTIME. WHILE BEING VECTORED BY INDIANAPOLIS APCH IN THE INDIANAPOLIS TERMINAL AREA IN IMC CONDITIONS, THE FO AND I WERE TOLD TO INTERCEPT THE ILS RWY 23R LOC. BECAUSE WE HAD BRIEFED, SET UP OUR NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT, AND PROGRAMMED THE FMS FOR THE ILS RWY 23L, CONFUSION OCCURRED. WE IMMEDIATELY ATTEMPTED TO GET CLARIFICATION BY ATC, BUT DUE TO FREQUENCY CONGESTION, WE ENDED UP FLYING THROUGH THE RWY 23R LOC. AFTER FINALLY GETTING THROUGH TO ATC, WE WERE VECTORED BACK AND EXECUTED THE ILS RWY 23R. AFTER QUESTIONING ATC ABOUT OUR FINAL APCH CLRNC AND BEING TOLD THAT RWY 23L WAS CLOSED, WE REALIZED AN OVERSIGHT HAD OCCURRED. WE LISTENED TO THE SAME ATIS AS WE TAXIED TO THE GATE AND FOUND THAT THE ERROR HAD BEEN ON OUR PART. WE IMMEDIATELY SET UP FOR ILS RWY 23R AND FOLLOWED ATC INSTRUCTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT IF WORKLOAD CONDITIONS PERMIT, BOTH PILOTS SHOULD LISTEN TO THE ATIS TRANSMISSION AND DISCUSS ANY POSSIBLE QUESTIONS REGARDING ITS CONTENT. ALSO, I BELIEVE THAT IRREGARDLESS OF WHETHER ONLY ONE APCH IS BEING USED AT AN ARPT, APCH CTL SHOULD ALWAYS TELL YOU WHAT APCH YOU ARE BEING VECTORED FOR WHEN VECTORING IS STARTED.

Synopsis

ATIS MISINTERPRETATION BY A TIRED CREW LEADS TO A LOC OVERSHOOT WHEN AN APCH IS PLANNED TO A CLOSED PARALLEL RWY.

ACN: 740461

Time / Day

Date : 200706
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 1500
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter
Make Model Name : Challenger CL601
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB5

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 17600
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 520
ASRS Report : 740461

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

TEB5 DEP. I READ (MEMORIZED) THE DEP PROC AT LEAST 4 TIMES. CLBED ON RWY HDG TO 1500 FT. TURNED 280 DEGS AND CONTINUED TO 2000 FT BEFORE 4.5 NM. COMPLETELY BLEW THE DEP. NO TFC CONFLICT. FATIGUE AND HOUR OF THE DAY LIKELY CAUSE OF MY ERROR.

Synopsis

CL60 FAILS TO COMPLY WITH ALT RESTRICTIONS ON THE TEB SID FROM TEB.

ACN: 740231

Time / Day

Date : 200705
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : EYSA.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 20000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : EYSA.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure : On Vectors

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 92
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3300
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 495
ASRS Report : 740231

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : Foreign
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Intended or Assigned Course

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THIS WAS A REPOSITIONING FLT FROM SIAULIAI LITHUANIA AND I WAS THE PIC FOR THIS SEGMENT. WE ANTICIPATED A QUICK TURN WITH AN EARLY DEP AND IMMEDIATELY LOADED THE FMC AND PERFORMED THE FLT DECK SETUP IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMPANY OPERATING PROCS. DUE TO CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND OUR CTL, THE ANTICIPATED EARLY DEP TURNED INTO A TWO HOUR DELAY. THIS PARTICULAR ARPT WAS NOT CONTAINED IN OUR FMC DATABASE AND DURING OUR ARR I OVERHEARD ATC TELL ANOTHER ACFT THEY WERE OFF COURSE BY EIGHT MILES. DUE TO THIS RPT AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THE ACFT HAD BEEN ON THE GND, I ELECTED TO PERFORM A QUICK ALIGN AND RE-INPUT THE COORDINATES INTO THE FMC. I LOADED THE PRESENT POSITION FROM THE COMMERCIAL CHART AND GAVE CHART TO THE OTHER PLT, WHERE HE INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED IT. AFTER HE CONFIRMED OUR POSITION I LINE SELECTED THE POSITION INTO THE FMC. OUR CLRNC ON DEP WAS TO FLY DIRECT TO MIRMA AND THEN FLT PLAN RTE. ENROUTE TO MIRMA, ATC CALLED AND RPTED OUR POSITION SEVEN MILES S OF COURSE. VOR BEARING DISTANCE INFO WAS CROSS CHECKED, WHICH CONFIRMED THE DEV. WE INFORMED ATC OF OUR SITUATION AND THEY RE-CLEARED US DIRECT TO KOLJA AND GAVE US AN INITIAL HEADING TO FLY. WITH RADIO UPDATE RESELECTED, THE FMC POSITION UP-DATED AND OUR BEARING DISTANCE INFO CROSS CHECKED. AT THIS TIME, OUR POSITION SHOWED US ON COURSE AND NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY WAS OBSERVED OR RPTED. AT NO TIME DID ATC GIVE US PRIORITY SERVICE OR REQUEST US TO CALL ANYONE UPON ARR. THE FLT CONTINUED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. IT WAS MY INITIAL IMPRESSION THAT WE HAD SOME SORT OF MALFUNCTION ASSOCIATED WITH THE SIAULIAI NAVIGATION FACILITY. I BELIEVED THIS TO BE THE CASE DUE TO THE RPT OF THE OTHER ACFT BEING OFF COURSE EIGHT MILES. THE VOR AT SIAULIAI WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR DME UPDATES AND GIVEN THE EXCHANGE BETWEEN ATC, THE OTHER ACFT AND OUR CURRENT SITUATION, I WAS CONFIDENT THE PROB WAS WITH THEIR NAVIGATION SYSTEM. SUBSEQUENT EXAMINATION OF OUR THREE IRU'S AFTER UPDATE REVEALED THAT OUR LATITUDE WAS OFF BY NINE-MINUTES. IT APPEARS THAT DURING THE QUICK ALIGN I TRANSPOSED TWO NUMBERS, WHICH GAVE ME A NINE MILE ERROR. THE LOADED POSITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN: N5554.5 E02323.2. I LOADED: N5545.5 E02323.2, THIS WOULD ACCOUNT FOR THE NINE MILE ERROR IN LATITUDE. AT NO TIME DID I OR THE OTHER PLT CIRCUMVENT OUR VERIFICATION PROCEDURES. THE POSITION WAS LOADED AND INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED BY EACH PLT. OBVIOUSLY THE PROBABILITY OF TWO PEOPLE TRANSPOSING THE SAME NUMBERS, ON THE SAME DAY IS EXTREMELY REMOTE, BUT HERE IT IS IN BLACK AND WHITE. PROVING THE FLT PLAN ONCE AGAIN, AFTER DOING A QUICK ALIGN MAY HAVE PREVENTED THIS ERROR, MAYBE. THIS ARPT WAS NOT CONTAINED IN THE FMC DATABASE AND THEREFORE A LAT/LONG WAS MANUALLY LOADED INTO THE RTE PAGE INTO POSITION ONE. IF

WE HAD CHECKED THE BEARING DISTANCE INFO WE MAY HAVE FOUND OUR ERROR. BUT THE DISCREPANCY WOULD ONLY HAVE BEEN APPARENT FOR THE FIRST WAYPOINT AND IT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO ALERT US TO THIS INSIDIOUS PROBLEM. BECAUSE THIS FIELD WAS NOT IN THE DATABASE, THE RWY WAS NOT DISPLAYED ON THE MAP PAGE TO INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY OUR LOCATION, ONCE WE WERE IN POSITION FOR DEP. THERE WERE FOUR SEPARATE BUT IMPORTANT FACTORS IN THIS CHAIN AND REMOVING ANY ONE OF THEM COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS FROM OCCURRING. 1) WORKING FATIGUED. 2) ARPT NOT CONTAINED IN FMC DATABASE. 3) NAVIGATION AID OUT OF SERVICE. 4) PROVING THE FLT PLAN AFTER PERFORMING THE QUICK ALIGN.

Synopsis

B757-200ER EXPERIENCED TRACK DEV DEPARTING EYSA DUE TO TRANSPOSITION OF MINS OF LAT DURING FMS PROGRAMMING.

ACN: 740191

Time / Day

Date : 200705
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Takeoff Roll
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 12500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1700
ASRS Report : 740191

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1981
ASRS Report : 740190

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL ENG START AND TAXI OUT WE WERE GIVEN POS AND HOLD ON RWY XX IN ZZZ. THE CTLR ISSUED US A TKOF CLRNC ALONG WITH A WIND RPT. AFTER PWR APPLICATION AND DURING THE TKOF ROLL I REALIZED THAT THE WIND RPT CONSTITUTED A TAILWIND. I ASKED THE FO IF WE HAD ACCOUNTED FOR THAT AND SHE REPLIED 'YES.' THE TKOF WAS UNEVENTFUL AND AS I WAS STILL PREOCCUPIED WITH NOT NOTICING THE TAILWIND, I FORGOT TO CALL FOR FLAP RETRACTION UNTIL PROMPTED BY THE FO. ONCE IN CRUISE, WE DISCUSSED WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND UPON FURTHER INVESTIGATION, REALIZED WE HAD NOT COMPENSATED CORRECTLY FOR THE TAILWIND. A TKOF WITH A BENIGN 5 KT TAILWIND ON A LONG RWY IS NOT REALLY THE ISSUE HERE. ISOLATED SIMPLE MISTAKES ARE COMMON AND TYPICALLY CAUGHT BY THE OTHER CREW MEMBERS OR CHKLISTS. THE FO AND I HAVE HAD AN EXCELLENT WORKING RELATIONSHIP AND I CONSIDER BOTH OF US TO BE VERY THOROUGH, COMPETENT AND PROFESSIONAL. DURING OUR 3 HR SIT IN ZZZ, BEFORE THIS LEG WE DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT WE WERE BOTH FEELING FATIGUED. WE WERE BOTH AT THE END OF ANOTHER 95 HR MONTH AND THIS PARTICULAR TRIP WAS COMPOSED OF DUTY DAYS LASTING 8, 9, 11 AND 11 HRS. WE BOTH AGREED THAT IF ANYTHING IRREGULAR OCCURRED OR IF OUR FLT WAS DELAYED ANY FURTHER WE WOULD PULL OURSELVES OFF OF THE TRIP. DURING CRUISE, WE DISCUSSED THE EVENTS AND AGREED THAT WE WERE NOT PRONE TO MAKING THESE MISTAKES AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE WERE NOT FEELING THAT SHARP. AS I BRIEFED THE APCH INTO A HIGH TERRAIN AND SHORT RWY ENVIRONMENT, I REITERATED THE NEED FOR VIGILANCE AS WE WERE BOTH CLRLY NOT AT THE TOP OF OUR GAME. AFTER GEAR EXTENSION I NOTICED AN UNUSUALLY HIGH DSCNT RATE AND REALIZED I HAD LEFT THE SPD BRAKES OUT. I AM AWARE OF THE FACT THAT MOST AVIATION ACCIDENTS ARE THE RESULT OF SEVERAL SEQUENTIAL ERRORS OR LAPSES IN JUDGEMENT. IN RETROSPECT, WE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN FLYING THAT FLT. WE ALSO SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PUT IN THAT POS BY THE NUMEROUS FATIGUE CAUSING FACTORS BROUGHT ON BY OUR SCHEDULES. I ALWAYS ASSUMED FLYING TIRED AND FATIGUED WERE THE SAME THING. THAT IS CLRLY NOT THE CASE. I HAD A GOOD NIGHT'S SLEEP, I AM IN EXCELLENT PHYSICAL SHAPE AND DID NOT CONSUME ALCOHOL AT ANY TIME DURING THIS TRIP. I DON'T BELIEVE OUR CURRENT SCHEDULING AND THE LEVEL OF SAFETY THAT IS EXPECTED OF US CAN COEXIST.

Synopsis

A320 FLT CREW CAME TO THE REALIZATION THAT FATIGUE HAD BEEN THE CAUSE OF THEIR MINOR, BUT VARIED OVERSIGHTS THROUGHOUT THE REPORTED FLT.

ACN: 738761

Time / Day

Date : 200705
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DTW.Airport
State Reference : MI
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : D21.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : SF 340B
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope : 22L
Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Precision

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 738761

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
ASRS Report : 738592

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolutive Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Intended or Assigned Course

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE CLOSURE OF RWY 21L IN DTW HAS CHANGED THE 'NORMAL' ARR SEQUENCE INTO DTW. RWY 22L IS ALMOST ALWAYS USED FOR TKOF AND SELDOM USED FOR LNDG. THIS I BELIEVE SET US UP TO BELIEVE WE WOULD 'DO WHAT WE ALWAYS DO' THAT IS USE THE RWY 22R APCH AND LAND ON THAT RWY. ALSO THIS OCCURRED AT THE END OF A VERY TIRING PATTERN. MY SCHEDULE HAD BEEN CHANGED BECAUSE I WAS GOING TO BE OVER 30/7. THE CHANGE WAS ABOUT 15 MINS SO I WAS STILL SCHEDULED AT THE MAX ALLOWABLE TIME. THIS WAS THE LAST DAY OF THIS PATTERN. AT THIS TIME I AM STILL NOT SURE THAT IT WAS NOT ATC THAT ISSUED US THE WRONG APCH AS WE (THE FO AND I) BOTH BELIEVE WE ACCEPTED AND READ BACK A CLRNC FOR RWY 22R. WE WERE ON APCH TO RWY 22R WHEN ATC ASKED IF WE WERE CORRECTING FOR THE ILS TO RWY 22L. AT THIS TIME WE WERE APPROX 10-12 MI FROM THE ARPT AND JUST JOINING THE RWY 22R LOC. WE TOLD ATC WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR RWY 22R AND ATC SAID NO WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR RWY 22L AND TO STOP DSCNT AND FLY HDG 180 DEGS TO JOIN THE RWY 22L LOC. ATC THEN ISSUED CLRNC FOR RWY 22L AND WE JOINED THAT LOC AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. ATC QUESTIONED IF WE WERE CORRECTING FOR LOC RWY 22L WE REPLIED WE WERE CLRED FOR RWY 22R. ATC THEN GAVE US A HDG TO JOIN RWY 22L. WE STOPPED OUR DSCNT AND TURNED TO THE HDG ATC HAD GIVEN US. SINCE WE WERE STILL 10-12 MI FROM THE ARPT WE HAD TIME TO SET UP FOR THE RWY 22L APCH. WE TUNED AND IDENTED THE CORRECT FREQ AND THE APCH AND LNDG WERE UNEVENTFUL. CLR COM IN TERMINAL AREA IS VERY IMPORTANT. DTW LIKE MOST LARGE ARPTS CAN BE VERY BUSY DURING AN ARR PHASE. FREQ JAMMING IS UNFORTUNATELY A COMMON OCCURRENCE. WE BOTH BELIEVE WE HEARD AN APCH CLRNC GIVEN THAT THE CTRLR OBVIOUSLY BELIEVES THEY DID NOT GIVE. IT IS IMPERATIVE WE AND ATC ARE ON THE SAME PAGE EVEN IF IT REQUIRES AN EXTRA RADIO CALL. I BELIEVE THAT FATIGUE PLAYED A PART AS THIS IS A VERY BUSY AND TIRING PATTERN. IT IS 4 DAYS OF ALMOST NONSTOP FLYING WITH FEW BREAKS. THE WELL KNOWN HUMAN FACTORS OF REST ARE ALMOST COMPLETELY IGNORED WITH THIS TYPE OF SCHEDULE.

Synopsis

SF340 FLT CREW HEARS WHAT THEY EXPECT TO HEAR WHEN RECEIVING RWY ASSIGNMENT FOR LANDING ON DTW RWY 22R. DURING THE LOC INTERCEPT THE CONTROLLER ADVISES THAT THEY SHOULD BE INTERCEPTING 22L LOC AND ISSUES A HEADING.

ACN: 738306

Time / Day

Date : 200705
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 37000

Environment

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 210
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 24000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4000
ASRS Report : 738306

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I DOZED OFF INFLT. WHEN I WOKE, I LOOKED OVER AND ALSO SAW THAT THE FO HAD DOZED OFF. WE WERE BOTH ASLEEP AT THE SAME TIME. THE TRIP STARTS WITH AN ALL-NIGHTER DEPARTING AT XA25. WHEN I RPTED TO WORK, I FOUND OUT THAT OUR FLT WAS DELAYED 1.5 HRS. NO ONE HAD CALLED US TO INFORM US OF THE DELAY. THE FLT ATTENDANTS HAD ALL BEEN NOTIFIED AND THE

INBOUND FLT CREW WAS NOTIFIED AT THEIR HOTEL ABOUT 7 HRS EARLIER. TODAY THE SAME THING HAPPENED. WE RPTED TO WORK 1 HR BEFORE DEP. THE FLT HAD BEEN DELAYED 1.5 HRS. WE WERE NOT NOTIFIED, BUT AGAIN THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE CALLED 4 HRS PRIOR. AFTER BLOCKING IN, WE ARRIVED AT THE HOTEL 30 MINS LATER. THAT GAVE US ONLY 9 HRS AND 40 MINS AT THE HOTEL. WE NEED TO BE NOTIFIED OF ANY AND ALL DELAYS OF OVER 30 MINS. THAT PART IS MY OPINION. IF THE FIRST SITUATION OF NOT BEING CALLED BEFORE AN ALL-NIGHTER HAPPENS TO ME AGAIN, I WILL CALL IN FATIGUED! I WAS UNSAFE TO FLY THE LAST HR AND A HALF OF MY FLT. THE SECOND SITUATION, SAME SOLUTION, THE CREW DESK NEEDS TO CALL US. IF THEY ARE CONCERNED OF WAKING US, THEY CAN LEAVE A MESSAGE AND WE WILL GET IT WHEN WE WAKE. OR WE CAN HAVE ALL PLTS CALL THE CREW DESK BEFORE THE START OF EVERY DAY.

Synopsis

B757 FLT CREW BOTH FALL ASLEEP DURING ALL-NIGHT FLIGHT. THEY AWAKEN BEFORE ANY PROBLEM OCCURS.

ACN: 737862

Time / Day

Date : 200705
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 31000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 270
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 11000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4000
ASRS Report : 737862

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 270
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 16000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 5800
ASRS Report : 737863

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : ECAM
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment
Resolatory Action.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative

DISPATCHED WITH #1 PACK INOP. AT CRUISE ALT, LOST #2 PACK. ECAM MESSAGE PACK #1 AND #2 FAILURE. EMER DSCNT TO 10000 FT, DONNED MASKS, NOTIFIED ATC, ADVISED FLT ATTENDANTS. EMER DSCNT TO 10000 FT CABIN ALT MAX AT 13500 FT. NO MASKS IN BACK DEPLOYED. OVERWT LNDG IN ZZZ1 (RETURNED TO ZZZ1) CFR TRUCKS TO MEET ACFT, LANDED LONGEST RWY. LANDED 7600 LBS OVERWT UNEVENTFUL LNDG. THIS WAS THE SECOND EMER DECLARED IN 3 DAYS. LOST HYDS OUT OF ZZZ2 2 DAYS PRIOR AND DIVERTED TO ZZZ3 WITH OVERWT LNDG. FO AND MYSELF FRAZZLED ON ARR BACK TO ZZZ1. COULD NOT BELIEVE 2 EMERS DECLARED IN 3 DAYS. UPON DISCUSSION WITH FO, WE THOUGHT IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY WE SHOULD NOT CONTINUE ON TO ZZZ4, IN A NEW ACFT, WHERE WE WOULD BE LNDG AT XA00 OR XB00 IN THE MORNING. BOTH OF US WERE UP IN ZZZ3 ON OUR LAYOVER AT XA00 AM AND KNEW BY THE TIME WE WOULD LAND IN ZZZ4 WE WOULD BE EXHAUSTED, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE PRECEDING EVENTS. TALKED TO FLT DUTY MGR WHO ADVISED US THAT A SYS CTLR WAS VERY UPSET WE WERE NOT CONTINUING ON TO ZZZ4. I WAS SHOCKED WE WERE NOT GETTING A 'JOB WELL DONE' BUT BEING CHASTISED FOR LEAVING THE PAX IN ZZZ1. SPOKE TO ASSIST CHIEF PLT IN ZZZ1 WHO WAS EXTREMELY SUPPORTIVE AS WELL AS THE ZZZ4 CHIEF PLT WHO WAS EXTREMELY SUPPORTIVE. CALLED SYS SCHEDULER IN ZZZ1 TO EXPLAIN SAFETY OF MY CREW AND PAX IS MY #1 PRIORITY AND I WAS SORRY FOR THE SITUATION BUT ONCE AGAIN I WAS EXHAUSTED AND IN NO FRAME OF MIND TO CONTINUE ON TO ZZZ4.

Synopsis

AN A320 FLT CREW, DISPATCHED WITH ONE PACK INOP, LOSES THE SECOND PACK IN CRUISE. THEY DECLARED AN EMERGENCY AND RETURNED TO DEP ARPT.

ACN: 737555

Time / Day

Date : 200705
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : CYQX.Airport
State Reference : NF
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2200

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements : Rain
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : CYQX.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope : 13
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 176
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15368
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3100
ASRS Report : 737555

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : Foreign
Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Unstabilized Approach

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

AS CAPT THIS WAS MY 3RD EUROPEAN TRIP IN 9 DAYS AND I FELT TIRED STARTING THE TRIP. THE CO-PILOT WAS STARTING HIS FIRST TRIP OF THE MONTH AND WAS 'FRESH' AND RESTED. THE CO-PILOT FLEW THE FIRST LEG TO GANDER AND I EXPLAINED TO HIM MY PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES AND HOW FUEL CONSERVATION WAS IMPORTANT. A FUEL EFFICIENT FLT REQUIRES PROPERLY PLANNED APPROACHES AND LANDINGS SO AS TO AVOID PROLONGED LEVEL FLT PRIOR TO DSCNT AND LNDG. THE FLT INBOUND TO CYQX WAS UNEVENTFUL UNTIL WITHIN 30 MILES OF THE ARPT. I HAD LISTENED TO THE ATIS AND DETERMINED THAT THE APCH IN USE WAS THE BACK COURSE FOR RWY 31 AND THE WINDS WERE OUT OF THE WEST. WE HAD SET UP FOR THE BACK COURSE FOR RWY 31 BUT DURING OUR INITIAL APCH TO THE ARPT WAS CONTACTED BY THE CTL TOWER TO INFORM US THAT THE ILS FOR RWY 13 WAS ALSO AVAILABLE AND WOULD WE LIKE THAT APCH. I ASKED THE CO-PILOT IF HE THOUGHT IT WAS OK AND THE REPLY WAS YES AND I REPLIED TO THE CTLR WITH AFFIRMATIVE REGARDING THE ILS TO RWY 13. THIS FLT WAS THEN CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 13 AND CALL THE TOWER. THE ACFT WAS QUICKLY CONFIGURED AND DESCENDED TOWARD THE FINAL APCH FIX. SEVERAL IMPORTANT FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED BY MYSELF INCLUDING THE FACT THAT THE FINAL APCH FIX IS ONLY 3.6 MILES FROM THE END OF THE RWY AND AN ON GLIDESLOPE SIGNAL AT THE FINAL APCH FIX IS 1580 FT MSL AND 1092 FT ABOVE THE ARPT. WHILE NOT PART OF THE INSTRUMENTS USED FOR THIS TYPE OF APCH I WAS DISTRACTED BY THE RADIO ALTIMETER AUDIO ANNOUNCEMENTS (OVER UNEVEN TERRAIN) AT 1000 FT WHEN ACTUALLY THE ACFT WAS SIGNIFICANTLY CLOSER TO THE ARPT ELEVATION AND LED ME TO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY THINKING THAT THE ACFT WAS 'NEARLY CONFIGURED' AT THAT POINT. THE WIND WHILE ONLY A 5 KNOT TAIL WIND AT THE SURFACE WAS NEARLY A 20 KNOT TAIL WIND AT THE FINAL APCH FIX INCREASING THE GND SPEED AND DSCNT RATE TO STAY ON THE GLIDE PATH. THE WX AT THE TIME WAS LIGHT RAIN AND SURFACE TEMPERATURES AROUND 3C REQUIRING THAT THE ENGINE HEAT BE ON DURING THE APCH. THE COMBINATION OF TAIL WIND, AND ENGINE ANTI ICE ON, PREVENTED THE ACFT FROM BEING STABILIZED ON APCH UNTIL MUCH LOWER THAN THE 1,000 FOOT FIGURE REQUIRING A GAR IF NOT STABLE. THE ACFT WAS LANDED BY THE CO-PILOT OUT OF THIS APCH IN THE LNDG ZONE AND STOPPED WITHIN THE NORMAL STOPPING AREA ON THE 8900 FOOT LONG RWY.

Synopsis

B757 CREW ACCEPTS ILS RWY 13 APCH TO CYQX AFTER PLANNING LOC (BC) TO RWY 31. DUE TO RWY CHANGE, TAIL WIND, AND REQUIREMENT FOR ENGINE ANTI-ICE, CREW FLIES AN UNSTABILIZED APCH AND LANDS.

ACN: 737423

Time / Day

Date : 200704

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 35000

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B747-400

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 208

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14018

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 9018

ASRS Report : 737423

Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

FATIGUE: CREW FATIGUE DURING FLT FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2 INDUCED BY ILLEGAL TRIP, BUILT BY CREW DESK WHICH RESULTED IN LESS THAN ADEQUATE LAYOVER TIME BEFORE A FLT OVER 12 HRS. CREW FATIGUE WAS FURTHER INCREASED FOR THE RETURN FLT BECAUSE THE LAYOVER WAS TOO SHORT TO ALLOW THE CREW TO GET ADEQUATE REST FOLLOWING THE PREVIOUS 2 DAYS OF FLYING. CREW MADE NUMEROUS ERRORS ON BOTH LEGS DUE TO FATIGUE AND SEVERAL CREW MEMBERS FELL ASLEEP ON DUTY. WE HAD A MECHANICAL ISSUE THAT COULD NOT BE FIXED AND COULD NOT BE DEFERRED. BECAUSE OF NUMEROUS PROBS ENCOUNTERED AT ZZZ1 WITH MAINT ISSUES, LACK OF MANPOWER TO HELP US WITH OUR RETURN TO THE GATE, IT WAS VERY STRESSFUL AND EMOTIONALLY DRAINING. WHEN OUR CREW DUTY DAY WAS RUNNING OUT, THE FLT WAS RESCHEDULED FOR THE NEXT DAY. SINCE THERE WERE NO RESERVES

AVAILABLE, WE WERE TOLD WE WOULD HAVE TO FLY THE TRIP THE NEXT DAY. WE WERE GIVEN A LCL HOTEL BUT WE WERE ONLY GIVEN 12 HRS 5 MINS FREE OF DUTY BEFORE A 13 HR SCHEDULED FLT. WE USED SEVERAL OF THOSE HRS GETTING TO THE HOTEL, GETTING DINNER BEFORE TRYING TO SLEEP AND BREAKFAST BEFORE AN XA30 SHOW. DURING THE FLT TO ZZZZ2 ALL OF THE PLTS WERE TIRED AND WE KEPT MAKING MISTAKES. WHEN WE GOT TO ZZZZ2 OUR TIME AT THE HOTEL WAS CUT TO 18 HRS 30 MINS IN ORDER TO KEEP THE RETURN FLT ON SCHEDULE. BECAUSE I WAS TIRED FROM THE PREVIOUS 2 DAYS, I WENT TO BED AFTER GETTING SOMETHING TO EAT AND WOKE UP EARLY IN THE MORNING AND COULDN'T GET BACK TO SLEEP BEFORE PICK-UP. DURING THE RETURN FLT TO ZZZ1 I WAS VERY TIRED AND KEPT MAKING MISTAKES. IN FACT, THE CREW ALL SAID THEY WERE TIRED. EVEN WITH FIRST BREAK, MY SLEEP WAS INTERRUPTED SEVERAL TIMES BY TURB AND I HAD TO GO ON DUTY VERY TIRED. IT WAS NIGHTTIME, OVERWATER, AND IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT BODY-TIME. I KEPT DRINKING COFFEE/TEA TRYING TO STAY AWAKE. UNFORTUNATELY, I FELL ASLEEP SEVERAL TIMES AT THE CTLS. LESSONS LEARNED: I WILL NOT LET THE ACR'S LACK OF AIRPLANES AND PLTS PUT ME IN THIS POS AGAIN. I WILL REFUSE TO FLY A 12+ HR TRIP WITHOUT BEING PROVIDED ADEQUATE CREW REST BEFOREHAND. IN ADDITION I WILL ASK FOR ADDITIONAL TIME AT THE LAYOVER HOTEL IF I WAS FATIGUED ON THE INBOUND LEG.

Synopsis

B747 RELIEF PILOT LAMENTS THE LACK OF PROPER REST BEFORE AND AFTER HIS TRIP. FLT IS RESCHEDULED DUE TO A MAINTENANCE ISSUE.

ACN: 737301

Time / Day

Date : 200705
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DFW.Airport
State Reference : TX
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1100

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : DFW.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : Pilotage
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 737301

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

CREW FATIGUE, PF LACK OF USE OF AUTOMATION/RAW DATA AND BOTH PLTS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE LAYOUT OF THE E SIDE OF DFW (NOT SEEING RWY 17L WAY OFF IN THE DISTANCE AND TO THE FAR L OF RWYS 17C/17R DOES NOT GIVE YOU A CLR MENTAL/VISUAL PICTURE OF THE E SIDE DFW ARPT LAYOUT). ALREADY A VERY LONG DAY WITH EARLIER DFW WX CAUSING A DIVERSION TO OUR ALTERNATE ELP. RETURNING TO DFW FROM ELP, WE WERE GIVEN A SLAM DUNK VISUAL APCH TO RWY 17C. FO WAS FLYING AND WAS READY (STABLE) AND CONFIGURED FOR THIS. EXTREME RADIO TFC CAUSED THE APCH CTRLR TO HAND

US OFF LATE TO THE TWR JUST AS WE WERE TURNING A 4 MI FINAL. I FIRST SELECTED/HEARD THE WRONG TWR FREQ WHICH CAUSE MORE LACK OF AWARENESS FROM ME AND I EVENTUALLY GOT THE CORRECT TWR FREQ. AGAIN, THE TWR WAS EXTREMELY BUSY AND WE RECEIVED A CLRNC TO LAND ON RWY 17C ON ABOUT A 2 MI FINAL. DURING THAT TIME I HAD NOT NOTICED THE FO (PF) HAD TURNED OFF ALL HIS AUTOMATION INCLUDING HIS FLT DIRECTOR AND HE HAD ALIGNED UP WITH RWY 17R MISTAKENLY. MY FLT DIRECTOR/LOC SHOWED WE WERE R OF COURSE. WITH MYSELF BACK IN THE LOOP, WE ARE NOW ON A 1-2 MI FINAL, I QUESTIONED THE FO 'CLRED FOR THE VISUAL/LNDG 17C CORRECT?' HE STATED, 'YES IT'S THE ONE WE ARE ALIGNED UP WITH.' I NOTICED AN ACFT IN POS ON RWY 17R. I STATED 'THIS DOES NOT LOOK RIGHT' AND I SAID 'GO AROUND.' NORMAL GAR AND LNDG FROM THERE. FO LATER STATED AT THE GATE, THAT THE ACFT IN POS ON RWY 17R APPEARED TO HIM TO BE THE ONE WE WERE TO FOLLOW TO RWY 17C AND HE USED ONLY VISUAL CUES NOT HIS LOC/GS PROVIDING RAW DATA. AFTER THE NORMAL GAR, I CONFIRMED WE HAD THE CORRECT ILS TUNED AND RECONFIRMED THE LAYOUT OF THE E SIDE OF THE ARPT. I ADVISED ATC THAT WE BELIEVE WE ALIGNED UP WITH THE WRONG RWY (17R). NORMAL GAR AND LNDG. WHEN YOU HAVE A LONG DAY, YOU'RE TIRED. I BELIEVE AUTOMATION IS YOUR BEST FRIEND. USE IT TO YOUR ADVANTAGE. CONFIRM VISUAL CUES WITH RAW DATA (LOC/GS). TRY TO KEEP BOTH CREW MEMBERS IN THE LOOP OF YOUR USE OF AUTOMATION. DON'T LET MINOR THINGS DISTRACT THE PLT MONITORING.

Synopsis

B757 FLT CREW ALIGNS WITH WRONG RWY ON NIGHT VISUAL APCH. REALIZING THEIR MISTAKE, GO-AROUND IS EXECUTED.

ACN: 736764

Time / Day

Date : 200704

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LFT.Airport
State Reference : LA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : LFT.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : SF 340B
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 736764

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Ground

Events

Anomaly.Incursion : Taxiway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2
Resolutive Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

CAPT WAS FATIGUED DUE TO 5 DAYS OF WORK WITH LONG DUTY DAYS 12-14 HRS LONG WITH VERY EARLY SHOW TIMES (XC00 AM WAKE-UP AT XA30 AM). GND CTL CLRED OUR ACFT TO TAXI TO RWY 22L VIA TXWY B, CROSS RWY 22R, THEN TXWY J. INSTEAD OF TURNING L ON TXWY J, I TURNED R AND ALMOST CROSSED RWY 11/29. A VERY ALERT FO ALERTED ME THAT WE SHOULD HAVE TURNED L. WE THEN RECEIVED CLRNC TO TAXI ONTO RWY 11/29 TO MAKE A 180 DEG TURN AND GO IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

Synopsis

FATIGUED AS A RESULT OF LONG DUTY DAYS AND EARLY GET UPS, S340 CAPTAIN TURNS WRONG WAY AND NEARLY INCURS ON RWY 11/29 AT LFT.

ACN: 736544

Time / Day

Date : 200704

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SEA.Airport
State Reference : WA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Escape Slide

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant : On Duty
ASRS Report : 736544

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant : Off Duty

Person : 3

Affiliation.Other : Contracted Service
Function.Other Personnel.Other

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Narrative

I HAD A JUMPSEATER ON MY FLT WHO HELPED ME ARM DOOR 1R AT DEP. ALL WENT WELL. HOWEVER, AT ARR, I HAD ASSUMED THAT SHE HAD DISARMED 1R. SHE EVEN ASKED ME IF I WANTED HER TO CRACK 1R AS WE ARE SUPPOSED TO DO TO ADVISE GND PERSONNEL THAT DOOR IS DISARMED. HOWEVER, I SAID NO BECAUSE MOST OF THE TIME THE DOOR ON THAT SIDE CAVES IN. IF SHE WOULD

HAVE CRACKED THE DOOR IT WOULD HAVE BLOWN THE SLIDE. SHE DID NOT DISARM THE DOOR! I DID NOT KNOW THIS. I WAS DEADHEADING ON THE SAME ACFT. THE CREW ADVISED ME THAT THE DOOR WAS NOT DISARMED AND THE SLIDE HAD ALMOST DEPLOYED ON THE CATERER. I WAS HORRIFIED. I CAN'T DECIDE WHO I'M MORE UPSET WITH -- THE JUMPSEATER OR MYSELF. SHE HAD JUST CAME OFF A TRIP AND WAS PROBABLY VERY TIRED. SO THE MORAL OF THIS IS: NEVER ALLOW A JUMPSEATER TO ARM OR DISARM MY DOOR.

Synopsis

B737 CABIN ATTENDANT ACCEPTS OFFER FROM DEADHEADING CABIN ATTENDANT TO ARM/DISARM CABIN DOOR PRIOR TO DEP/ARR. WORKING ATTENDANT FAILS TO INSPECT THE DOOR AND THE SLIDE ALMOST DEPLOYS WHEN THE CATERERS ATTEMPT TO SERVICE THE GALLEY.

ACN: 736520

Time / Day

Date : 200703

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DEN.Airport
State Reference : CO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-300
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Escape Slide

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant : On Duty
ASRS Report : 736520

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
Function.Other Personnel.Other

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE SCHEDULED FOR AN XA50 PICK-UP GIVING US LESS THAN 8 HRS AT THE HOTEL. I DID NOT GET SUFFICIENT SLEEP AFTER WORKING ALL NIGHT AND WAS VERY TIRED AS WERE MY FLYING PARTNERS AND THIS WAS MY 5TH CONSECUTIVE DAY OF FLYING. AT XA45 THE CREW DESK CALLED TO NOTIFY US OF A 50 MIN DELAY BUT I WAS ALREADY IN UNIFORM AND COULD NOT GO BACK TO SLEEP. WE WORKED THE FLT TO DEN AND UPON ARR AT THE GATE I LOOKED

OUT OF THE WINDOW AND SAW THE AGENT BRINGING THE JETBRIDGE TO DOOR 1L. I MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO DISARM DOORS, THEN I DISARMED DOOR 1L AND CRACKED IT. I THEN WENT TO DOOR 1R AND DISARMED AND CRACKED THAT DOOR. WHEN I TURNED BACK TO DOOR 1L THE AGENT WAS OPENING IT. HE OPENED IT A FEW INCHES AND STOPPED BECAUSE THE SLIDE PACK WAS COMING OUT OF THE DOOR CASING AND THE GIRT BAR WAS ENGAGED. THE AGENT BACKED AWAY FROM THE DOOR AND I QUICKLY DISENGAGED IT AND NOTIFIED THE PLTS. A MECH CAME AND REMOVED THE SLIDE PACK AND OPENED THE DOOR. EVERYTHING HAPPENED VERY FAST.

Synopsis

BESET WITH FATIGUE DUE TO LONG DUTY DAYS AND FIVE CONSECUTIVE DAYS OF FLYING, CABIN ATTENDANT FAILS TO DISCONNECT SLIDE GIRT BAR ON B737-300 PRIOR TO CRACKING DOOR TO SIGNIFY IT WAS SAFE TO BE OPENED.

ACN: 736015

Time / Day

Date : 200704
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZ.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B747-400
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 210
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14900
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2830
ASRS Report : 736015

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Unstabilized Approach
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON A 12 HR PLUS INTERNATIONAL FLT WITH 2 CAPTS AND 2 FOS, I WAS THE FO WHO FLEW THE FIRST HALF OF THE FLT. AFTER MY PORTION OF THE FLT AND MY BREAK I WAS SITTING IN THE JUMP SEAT OBSERVING THE RELIEF CREW FLYING THE DSCNT AND APCH. WE WERE ORIGINALLY GIVEN THE ILS APCH TO RWY 22R. THIS WAS THE APCH LOADED IN THE FMC. WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED FOR THE VISUAL TO RWY 22L. THE RELIEF FO WAS FLYING THE APCH. I DON'T KNOW IF APCH CTL HELD THE ACFT AT AN UNUSUALLY HIGH ALT, BUT THE PF WAS HAVING A HARD TIME DSNDRG AND SLOWING AFTER THE RWY CHANGE. THE FACT RWY 22R ILS WAS LOADED IN THE FMC CAUSED THE GPWS TO ISSUE A FALSE 'TOO LOW TERRAIN' WARNING, WHICH ADDED TO THE HIGH WORKLOAD. IN AN EFFORT TO SLOW DOWN THE FLYING CREW SELECTED 25 DEG AND THEN 30 DEG FLAPS ABOVE THE MAXIMUM 25 DEG TO 30 DEG FLAP SPEEDS, WHICH RESULTED IN A FLAP RELIEF EICAS MSG. THE RESULTANT TOUCHDOWN WAS OUTSIDE THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE AND WELL ABOVE VREF SPD. THE ACFT WAS STOPPED WELL WITHIN THE REMAINING RWY, AND MAINT WAS ALERTED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF HOT BRAKES, WHICH DID NOT OCCUR. IT IS COMPANY POLICY TO BE ON A STABILIZED APCH BELOW 1000 FT AGL ON APCH SPEED IN THE LNDG CONFIGURATION WHICH DID NOT OCCUR ON THIS APCH. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT TO HIS ETERNAL SHAME HE DID NOT REQUEST A GAR WHEN HE DECIDED THAT THE APCH WAS UNSTABLE. A FACTOR IN THIS EVENT WAS FATIGUE CAUSED BY A LONG OVERNIGHT FLT. ON APCH, THE ACFT WAS LOW, THEN GOT FAST AND LANDED LONG ON THE RWY PROMPTING A COMMENT FROM THE CTLR ABOUT THE ACFT DEVELOPING HOT BRAKES.

Synopsis

A B747-400 PLT RPTS OBSERVING AN UNSTABLE APCH FROM THE JUMPSEAT RESULTING IN A FAST, LONG LNDG. RPTR FAILED TO REQUEST A GAR.

ACN: 735929

Time / Day

Date : 200704
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ANC.Airport
State Reference : AK
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ANC.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4000
ASRS Report : 735929

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot

Person : 4

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Incursion : Runway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

LANDED RWY 7R ANC. TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 7L WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGE. TXWY G HAS NO HOLD SHORT BARS. STOPPED LONG WITH NOSE ON OVER RWY HOLD SHORT LINE. HAD BEEN ON DUTY 18 HRS WITH 13 HRS OF BLOCK TIME. NEW EFB ARPT DIAGRAMS. YOU HAVE A TENDENCY TO HAVE YOUR HEAD DOWN PLUS FO HAS TO SELECT THE ARPT DIAGRAM WHEN CLRING THE RWY. WE HAD THREE MEMBERS IN THE COCKPIT. VERY LONG DUTY DAY. ZZZZ TO ANC, LOTS OF TIME CHANGES. MAIN FACTORS ARE FATIGUE AND POOR LIGHTING AT NIGHT DEFINING THE RWY EDGE.

Synopsis

B737 CREW FAILS TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 7L AS INSTRUCTED AFTER LNDG RWY 7R AT ANC.

ACN: 735580

Time / Day

Date : 200704
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
ASRS Report : 735580

Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THERE IS NO SVC MONDAY-TUESDAY FOR THE SECOND FLT. THEREFORE, A DEADHEAD IS REQUIRED ON TUESDAY NIGHT TO 'POS' THE CREW. THAT IS THE ONCE A WK SEQUENCE THAT I'M TALKING ABOUT. THERE IS NO WAY TO GET FULL NIGHT'S SLEEP ANYWHERE IN A MORE THAN 2-DAY PERIOD. THIS SEQUENCE IS 'SCHEDULED' TO DEADHEAD DOWN AT XA15. IT IS 'SCHEDULED' TO ARRIVE AT APPROX XJ10 IN SLRU AFTER A STOP IN XXXZ (ELEVATION 13300 FT). THE DEADHEAD FLT IS ALMOST ALWAYS LATE AND IS ALMOST ALWAYS FULL. AFTER DEADHEADING UNDER THESE ONEROUS CONDITIONS OUR PLTS ARE EXPECTED TO FLY AS A 2-MAN CREW THROUGHOUT THE NEXT NIGHT OVER SOME OF THE MOST DEMANDING CONDITIONS ON EARTH. ALTHOUGH THE HOTEL IS EXCELLENT, IT IS A CENTER OF LCL BUSINESS AND SOCIAL ACTIVITY AND NOT CONDUCIVE TO SLEEPING DURING THE DAY. ALSO THE LAYOVER IS DANGEROUSLY SHORT. SO WHAT WE HAVE IS A DEADHEAD WITH 4-6 FLT ATTENDANTS (WHO CONSISTENTLY GET THE BEST SEATS FOR SLEEPING) ON AN ALL-NIGHTER THAT IS CHRONICALLY LATE, HAS A STOP IN A HORRIBLE

ENVIRONMENT, AND GOES TO A SHORT LAYOVER IN AN ENVIRONMENT NOT CONDUCTIVE TO DAYTIME SLEEPING, AND THEN ONE IS EXPECTED TO FLY AN ALL-NIGHTER OVER THE AMAZON JUNGLE. IT IS UNSAFE! I HAVE HAD THIS SEQUENCE. I EXPRESSED MY RESERVATIONS ABOUT THIS SEQUENCE TO THE FLT OFFICE. WHILE OUR FLT OFFICE WAS SUPPORTIVE (CHIEF PLTS), CREW SCHEDULE WAS NOT. IT WAS MADE CLR TO ME THAT THE FLT DEPT IS SUBORDINATE TO CREW SCHEDULE AND EVERY OTHER DEPT, EVEN WHEN SAFETY IS CONCERNED. (A SERIOUS SAFETY PROB WITHIN ITSELF, BUT THAT'S A BIGGER ISSUE FOR ANOTHER DAY.) THE ONLY THING THAT THEY COULD SUGGEST WAS CALLING IN FATIGUED IF I HAD A PROB ON THE OTHER END. FAIR ENOUGH, BUT IT WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER JUST TO MAKE IT RIGHT IN THE BEGINNING OF THE TRIP AND NOT CAUSE A PROB ON THE END. I TOOK THE TRIP AS PUBLISHED. OUR DEADHEAD FLT LEFT ON TIME (A VERY RARE EVENT). ALL OF US ALSO GOT BUSINESS CLASS (ALSO VERY RARE). BOTH OF THESE THINGS WERE IN OUR FAVOR AND VERY RARE. WHILE SOME OF THE CREW MEMBERS SLEPT WELL, I SLEPT A TOTAL OF 25 MINS THAT NIGHT. I HAD EXPRESSED MY CONCERN TO THE COMPANY BEFORE ABOUT THIS AS I'VE NEVER BEEN ABLE TO SLEEP ON AIRPLANES. THEY COULDN'T HAVE CARED LESS. WE ARRIVED IN SLRU AND I SLEPT A SOLID 2 HRS. I WENT TO LUNCH AND DID MY NORMAL ROUTINE. BEING THAT I KNOW MANY PEOPLE THERE, SEVERAL WERE ASKING ME IF I WOULD LIKE TO DO THIS AND THAT DURING THE DAY AND NIGHT. I EXPLAINED TO THEM THAT I COULDN'T AS I ONLY HAD A SHORT TIME THERE AND HAD TO GET SOME MORE SLEEP. THAT AFTERNOON I WENT BACK TO BED. TRUTH IS, I SLEPT VERY LITTLE, IF ANY. I GOT UP, SHOWERED AND WENT TO DINNER. AT THIS TIME I HAD TO MAKE AN HONEST EVALUATION. I KNEW THAT I HADN'T SLEPT MUCH, BUT I DID FEEL FINE. IN NO WAY WAS I FATIGUED. THEREFORE, I COULD NOT HONESTLY CALL IN FATIGUED. I ACCEPTED THE FLT WITH ALL CONFIDENCE IN MY ABILITY AND MENTAL STATE. WE DEPARTED ON TIME AND THE TRIP WAS UNEVENTFUL. LATER IN THE FLT IT HIT ME. THE LAST FEW HRS WERE A STRUGGLE TO STAY AWAKE. I USED EVERY TECHNIQUE THAT I HAD BEEN TAUGHT TO STAY ALERT. CAFFEINE, GUM, CONVERSATION, ETC. THESE TECHNIQUES WORKED AND WE ARRIVED UNEVENTFULLY. IN THE END, I WAS ABLE TO DO THIS FLT TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY. BUT I AM ONE OF THE YOUNGER CAPTS THAT WORKS OUT SEVERAL HRS EVERY DAY AND HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN SLEEP DEPRIVATION TECHNIQUES. WHAT ABOUT SOME OF OUR OLDER PLTS WHO ARE NOT IN SHAPE? GRANTED SLEEP PATTERNS ARE DIFFERENT FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL. AND SOME CAN SLEEP FINE ON AIRPLANES AND DURING ALL TIMES OF THE DAY, BUT SOME (LIKE ME) CANNOT. AND WHAT WOULD OUR PAX THINK IF THEY KNEW THAT THEIR PLTS SPENT THE PREVIOUS NIGHT IN CHAIR! (AND IN OUR CASE, BUSINESS CLASS. WHAT ABOUT THE UNLUCKY PLTS THAT HAVE TO SPEND THE NIGHT IN A CTR SEAT IN COACH?) THEREFORE, THIS SEQUENCE NEEDS TO CHANGE. ABOUT THE ONLY SUGGESTIONS THAT I CAN COME UP WITH IS THAT (AT LEAST) THE PLTS SHOULD DEADHEAD DOWN 2 NIGHTS BEFORE (MONDAY) OR SIMPLY MAKE THIS A LONG LAYOVER FROM SUNDAY UNTIL SVC RESUMES ON WEDNESDAY. YES, I KNOW THAT THIS WOULD BE MORE EXPENSIVE, BUT PROBABLY LESS EXPENSIVE 'WHEN' OUR NEXT ACCIDENT HAPPENS! IN MY CASE, I VOLUNTEERED TO GO EARLY IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY AND WAS IMMEDIATELY SHOT DOWN. THAT'S IT.

Synopsis

B767 CAPTAIN LAMENTS THE LACK OF QUALITY SLEEP THAT IS AVAILABLE ON A TRIP TO SLRU THAT DEADHEADS DOWN AND LIVE BACK AFTER A 12 HOUR LAYOVER.

ACN: 734261

Time / Day

Date : 200702
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant : On Duty
Qualification.Flight Attendant : Currently Qualified
Qualification.Flight Attendant.Aircraft Qualified On : 6
Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Airline Total : 12
Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Total : 16
Experience.Flight Attendant Time.Type : 50
ASRS Report : 734261

Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : FAA

Narrative

COMPANY IS SCHEDULING ITS CABIN CREW MEMBERS TO WORK ALL NIGHT TURNS TO THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS FROM MID-AFTERNOON TO EARLY AM PST/PDT FOLLOWING DAY. THESE TRIPS GO AGAINST A FLT ATTENDANT'S BODY RHYTHMS AND IN MY OPINION PUSH THE BOUNDARIES OF A BUILT-IN SAFETY CUSHION. UPON THE RETURN FLT TWO OF MY COLLEAGUES DISPLAYED VISIBLE SIGNS OF FATIGUE AS THEIR EYES WERE SEVERELY BLOOD-SHOT. ADDITIONALLY, APPROX 1.5 HRS PRIOR TO OUR ARR IN ZZZ I BEGAN TO SEE WAVY LINES (BLURRED VISION) AS I WAS ATTEMPTING TO KEEP MY EYES OPEN. COMPANY PROVIDES NO

CREW REST ON THESE ALL NIGHT HAWAII TURNS. THE COCKPIT CREW, DUE TO FAA DUTY-TIME STANDARDS, DO NOT HAVE TO ENDURE FLYING AN ISLAND TURN. BECAUSE OF SAFETY OF FLT CONCERNS THEY (THE COCKPIT CREW) WORK ONE LEG (FLT SEGMENT) TO THE ISLANDS AND REQUIRES A LAYOVER. MY PERSONAL FEELING, FROM MY EXPERIENCE, IS THAT THE SCHEDULING OF ALL NIGHT HAWAII TURNS FROM THE WEST-COAST PUSH THE PARAMETERS OF AN ADEQUATE SAFETY CUSHION. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IS GREATLY DIMINISHED BECAUSE OF CABIN CREW MEMBER FATIGUE AND I BELIEVE THAT REACTION TIME IS SIGNIFICANTLY COMPROMISED ON THE PART OF WORKING FLT ATTENDANTS SHOULD AN INFLT MEDICAL EMER OCCUR OR EVENTS THAT WOULD NECESSITATE AN EVAC OR PREPARATION FOR A WATER DITCHING.

Synopsis

A FLT ATTENDANT DESCRIBES CREW MEMBERS SHOWING FATIGUE DURING ROUND TRIP ASSIGNMENTS TO THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

ACN: 733976

Time / Day

Date : 200704
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 15500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : MD-11
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude
Route In Use.Departure.SID : ZZZZ

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
ASRS Report : 733976

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 40
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 400
ASRS Report : 734091

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 110
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7623
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1300
ASRS Report : 733965

Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING CLBOUT FROM ZZZZ PASSING APPROX 15500 FT THE STICK SHAKER ACTIVATED. PARAMETERS: AUTOPLT #2 ENGAGED. SLATS HAD JUST BEEN RETRACTED AND AIRSPD WAS THOUGHT TO BE INCREASING. WE WERE ON THE SID. IN ORDER TO MAKE THE REQUIRED CLB GRADIENT AND SID ALT RESTRS, 15000 FT, WE CLBED OUT WITH SLATS EXTENDED AND AIRSPD AT 230 KTS. WE HAD CHANGED THE CLB SPD A COUPLE OF TIMES AS WE APCHED THE 15000 FT RESTR. I WAS STARTING TO LET THE ACFT ACCELERATE AND THE CAPT SAID 'BE CAREFUL WE DON'T WANT TO ACCELERATE TOO MUCH YET, WE'LL MISS IT?' AFTER THAT INPUT I ROLLED THE SPD BACK TO 230 KTS AGAIN. AFTER MAKING THE RESTR, I LOWERED THE NOSE TO START ACCELERATING, I CALLED FOR SLAT RETRACTION AT THE SR BUG AND THE CAPT MOVED THE FLAP/SLAT HANDLE. I SELECTED FMS SPD AND THE ACFT CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE IN A SHALLOW CLB. THE CAPT WAS RUNNING OR HAD JUST FINISHED THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST WHEN THE STICK SHAKER BEGAN. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT. I WAS CONFUSED. HOW COULD WE BE GETTING A STALL INDICATION? I WAS SURE THE SLATS HAD BEEN RETRACTED AND THAT WE WERE ACCELERATING. I NOTED THAT THE YELLOW FOOT WAS UP FROM THE BOTTOM AND THE YELLOW 'DO NOT EXCEED' FOOT WAS DOWN FROM THE TOP. I COULD NOT RECTIFY THOSE 2 INDICATIONS IN MY MIND. I LOOKED AT THE AIRSPD AND WE WERE ACCELERATING AND THE STICK SHAKER HAD STOPPED. IN RETROSPECT, I SUSPECT AUTO-SLAT-EXTENSION WAS TRYING TO PREVENT A STALL AND HAD EXTENDED THE SLATS WITHOUT MY NOTICING. THE STICK SHAKER HAD STOPPED AND THE NOSE WAS LOW. IT IS UNKNOWN TO ME IF THERE WAS AN LSAS (LOW SPD AUTOSLAT) INPUT. THE ACFT QUICKLY ACCELERATED TO THE DO NOT EXCEED FOOT AND THE AURAL STARTED SAYING 'SLATS OVERSPD.' I BEGAN TO RAISE THE NOSE TO STOP THE ACCELERATION AND REDUCE THE AIRSPD. WHILE THAT WAS GOING ON THE CAPT PUT THE SLAT FLAP LEVER OUT THEN UP AND THE SLATS RETRACTED AND THE AURALS CEASED. WE ACCELERATED AND CLBED. WE ENGAGED AUTOPLT #1 AND THE ACFT FLEW NORMALLY THEREAFTER. THERE IS ANOTHER RESTR ON THE SID I REMEMBER LOOKING AT THAT AND THINKING ABOUT WHETHER WE WOULD MAKE THAT RESTR. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE CLB REQUIREMENT AND LOOKING AT THE SID WHEN THE STICK SHAKER STARTED. I WONDER IF I INADVERTENTLY SELECTED A SPD MODE AFTER SELECTING FMS SPD, ACCELERATING AND RETRACTING THE SLATS. I DO NOT KNOW THAT I DID THAT BUT I MAY HAVE. THIS INCIDENT WAS VERY CONFUSING AND HAPPENED VERY QUICKLY. WE HAD A STICK SHAKER AND WITHIN A FEW SECONDS WERE GETTING AN OVERSPD WARNING. I WAS VERY CONFUSED. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THIS EVENT. A VERY HVY ACFT (630000 LBS AT TKOF), A STEEP CLB IN AN ODD CLBOUT CONFIGN AND A VERY CONTENTIOUS PRE-DEP ENVIRONMENT CONTRIBUTED TO THE STRESS LEVEL IN THE COCKPIT. THE COCKPIT DISCUSSION WAS ALL FLT RELATED BUT NOT ALL ABOUT THIS FLT. MY ABILITY TO COMPARTMENTALIZE THE

OTHER STRESSES, SO THAT CONCENTRATION ON THE TASKS AT HAND COULD BE MAINTAINED, MAY HAVE BEEN COMPROMISED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 734091: I WAS THE PM (CAPT) DURING CLBOUT. AUTOPLT #2 WAS ENGAGED. THE ACFT WAS ACCELERATING AFTER MEETING A STEEP DEP GRADIENT. PASSING APPROX 15500 FT THE STICK SHAKER ACTIVATED. I WAS ALERTED TO THE ALMOST MUFFLED SOUND OF WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN THE STICK SHAKER AND THE FO MENTIONED SOMETHING OF THE SAME. I MOVED MY ATTENTIONS FROM PAPER-SORTING AND NAVING DETAILS TO FIRST MONITORING THE ENGS WITH AN EQUALLY QUICK GLANCE TOWARD THE AIRSPD INDICATOR/ADI/AND STANDBY INST. I ONLY RECALL SEEING WHAT APPEARED AS A BAND OF YELLOW EXTENDING FROM THE TOP AND ANOTHER FROM THE BOTTOM. WHAT I THOUGHT I WAS SEEING WAS AN INDICATION OF BEING TOO FAST AND TOO SLOW ALL AT THE SAME TIME. 'A COFFIN CORNER AT 15000 PLUS FT.' I TRIED TO REASON. DID WE HAVE FALSE AIRSPD INDICATIONS? THEN THE ACFT RAPIDLY ACCELERATED TO THE DO NOT EXCEED FOOT AND THE AURAL WAS ACTUALLY SAYING 'SLATS OVERSPD' OR WAS IT 'OVERSPD SLATS.' I AM STILL UNSURE OF THE EXACT ORDER OF VERBIAGE USED AND MY FIRST THOUGHTS WERE CTRED AROUND A STALL CONDITION BASED ON THE VIBRATION OF THE COLUMN AND THE FO'S COMMENTS, YET THE AIRSPD INDICATIONS WERE SOON TO VISUALLY CUE ME TO AN OVER-SPD CONDITION. AS THE FO DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT TO EASE THE NOSE OF THE ACFT A BIT UP FROM A NOW LOWER THAN DESIRED ATTITUDE, THE YELLOW BANDS BEGAN TO SEPARATE AND I RECALL HEARING 'OVERSPD' AND SEEMINGLY LATER THE CALL 'SLATS' FROM THE WARNING SYS. DURING THIS TIME I AM TRYING TO PROCESS THE INFO IN THE ORDER RECEIVED. SOMEHOW WE WERE TOO SLOW AND TOO FAST AT THE SAME TIME, A SHALLOW DSCNT WAS NOW BEING ARRESTED BY CLICKING OFF THE AUTOPLT, YELLOW AIRSPD BANDS NEARLY TOUCHED IN THE CTR OF THE AIRSPD TAPE, AND A QUICK FLASH OF RED LETTERS IN THE LOWER L OF THE ADI (AN AREA OFTEN HIDDEN BY THE YOKE). IN BTWN ALL OF THE ABOVE EVENTS, I REACHED FOR THE SLAT HANDLE AND TUGGED IT AFT IN AN ATTEMPT TO VERIFY ITS POS AND IF NECESSARY TO EXTEND SLATS. I AGAIN GLANCED AT THE STANDBY AIRSPD IN MY ATTEMPT TO QUICKLY UNDERSTAND WHAT THE TRENDS WERE BY COMPARISONS OF ALL DISPLAYED AIRSPDS. I FINALLY REACHED A CONFIRMATION OF OUR AIRSPD (NOW 300 KTS AND INCREASING). THE WARNINGS CEASED, AND I VERIFIED THE SLATS WERE STOWED. WE ACCELERATED AND CLBED NORMALLY THEREAFTER AND AUTOPLT #1 WAS ENGAGED. I MADE A LOGBOOK ENTRY AT THE END OF THE EXHAUSTING DUTY DAY IN AN ATTEMPT TO ACCURATELY RELAY WHAT COULD BE RECALLED TO ALERT THOSE IN CHARGE OF WHAT WE PERCEIVED TO HAVE HAPPENED. NOW, AFTER SOME REST, I SUSPECT AUTO-SLAT-EXTENSION WAS TRYING TO PREVENT A STALL AND HAD EXTENDED THE SLATS. PERHAPS I SIMPLY RETRACTED THE SLATS ON COMMAND WITHOUT FIRST VERIFYING THE AIRSPD? OR PERHAPS THIS OCCURRED AFTER A PLT COMMANDED (SPD INTERVENTION) AIRSPD DECREASE. (THE PF HAD INTERVENED WITH SEVERAL CHANGES EARLIER, AND I DID NOT NOTE SUCH ACTION AT THE TIME OF THE EVENTS. IT IS ONLY SPECULATION ON MY PART.) THE ACFT SYS SEEMED TO HAVE PERFORMED AS DESIGNED. THE STICK SHAKER STOPPED, THE NOSE WAS LOW, AND THE AIRSPD WAS INCREASING. THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED WITHOUT NOTICE AND I WAS 'OUT OF THE FLYING LOOP' AND WELL INTO THE SECRETARIAL DUTIES OF THE FLT (15000 FT, CLBING RAPIDLY). IT WAS VERY CONFUSING, LARGELY TO THE SHORT DURATION OF EACH SEPARATE WARNING/EVENT. WE HAD STICK SHAKER AND WITHIN A FEW SECONDS WERE GETTING AN OVERSPD WARNING. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS EVENT: THE ENTIRE DUTY PERIOD WAS 'MORE THAN STRESSFUL' WITH OVER 3 HRS OF MY TIME USUALLY SPENT ON 'NORMAL' PREFLT

AND INFLT DUTIES HAVING BEEN DERAILED AND HOPELESSLY 'LOST' BY HAVING TO DEAL WITH OPERATIONAL AND FAR CONFLICTS CREATED BY A 'SURPRISE' (TO US) AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE, AN UNREVEALED AOM MAINT REQUIRED BULLETIN, AND RESULTANT OPERATIONAL PROC. THIS WAS VERY MENTALLY FATIGUING. A HVY ACFT (MAX GROSS TKOF), A STEEP CLB GRADIENT REQUIREMENT (6.5%) TO A VERY HIGH ALT, AT A NEW (TO ME) ARPT AND TRIP PAIRING, WERE ALSO POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTORS. ONE NOTE: AN OBSERVATION THAT I SHOULD HAVE FORWARDED UPON THE FIRST INSTALLATION OF THESE STANDBY AIRSPD INDICATORS (ON ANOTHER FLEET) IS THAT THE AIRSPD INDICATION 'WHEEL' MOVES ENTIRELY CONTRARY TO WHAT THE MIND PERCEIVES AS 'NORMAL.' THAT IS, THE WHEEL SPINS THE WRONG WAY. THE INSTALLED WHEEL SPINS TO DISPLAY INCREASING AIRSPDS FURTHER AND FURTHER L. EVERY OTHER INST OF MEASUREMENT THAT I HAVE EVER ENCOUNTERED (THERMOMETERS, PRESSURE GAUGES, SPEEDOMETERS, ETC) WORK OPPOSITE TO SHOW INCREASING VALUES, INCREASING VALUES ARE SHOWN TO THE R. THIS EVENT PROVES TO ME THAT I WAS CORRECT IN MY LONG-HELD ASSUMPTION THAT WHEN MOST NEEDED, INTERP OF THIS INSTRUMENT'S INDICATIONS WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT AND TIME CONSUMING.

Synopsis

THE CREW OF A HEAVY MD11 REPORTS A STALL INDICATION DURING CLB AFTER A HIGH ALT SLAT RETRACT AS THEY ATTEMPTED TO MAKE SID ALT CONSTRAINTS.

ACN: 733743

Time / Day

Date : 200704
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SAV.Airport
State Reference : GA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Dawn

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : CRJ 900 (all) Canadair Regional Jet 900
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
ASRS Report : 733743

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 1600
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 650
ASRS Report : 733742

Events

Anomaly.Incursion : Taxiway
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS THE CAPT. WE HAD A REDUCED REST OVERNIGHT IN SAV WITH AN XA05 RPT TIME AND AN XA50 DEP. THE TWR IN SAV DID NOT OPEN UNTIL XB00. WE RECEIVED OUR CLRNC FROM ZJX AND ELECTED TO DEPART RWY 9. I BEGAN TAXIING OUT TXWY E AND CAME TO A RED ROW OF LIGHTS ACROSS THE TXWY. I WAS CONFUSED BECAUSE I KNEW THAT WAS NOT THE END OF THE RWY. I ASSUMED THAT IT WAS THE ILS HOLD SHORT LINE AND SINCE THE WX WAS VMC, I COULD CONTINUE TO TAXI TO THE END OF THE RWY. IT WAS JUST BEFORE SUNRISE AND VERY DARK SO I DIDN'T SEE THE SIGN BY THE ILS HOLD LINE AT E1 UNTIL I HAD TURNED BACK ONTO TXWY E THAT THE TXWY WAS CLOSED UNTIL THE TWR OPENED AT XB00. THE TWR CTLR MUST HAVE OBSERVED MY DILEMMA AND TURNED OFF THE ILS HOLD LINE AND TURNED ON THE TXWY LIGHTS W OF E1 SO WE COULD CONTINUE OUR TAXI. WE TOOK OFF AT XA59 JUST PRIOR TO THE TWR OPENING. IT WAS MY FIRST TIME DEPARTING SAV PRIOR TO THE TWR BEING OPEN AND MY FIRST EXPERIENCE WITH AN ILS HOLD LINE WITH A CLOSED TXWY DURING THE HRS WHERE THE TWR WAS NOT IN OP. ONCE I REALIZED I HAD MADE AN ERROR, I IMMEDIATELY STOPPED, AND CONTINUED ONLY AFTER THE TXWY LIGHTS HAD TURNED ON. I CONTRIBUTE MY ERROR TO FATIGUE AND LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE NON-TWR OP. AFTER LATER REVIEW OF THE ARPT DIAGRAM, I SAW THE NOTE IN REGARD TO THE TXWY. I BELIEVE I OVERLOOKED THE NOTE DUE TO THE FINE PRINT AND POOR LIGHTING, FACTORING IN THE FATIGUE CAUSED BY THE BREVITY OF THE OVERNIGHT. ALTHOUGH THE REST WAS LEGAL, I DON'T THINK IT WAS SUFFICIENT CONSIDERING THE LENGTH OF DUTY DAYS PREVIOUSLY FOR SAFETY.

Synopsis

CL600 CREW REPORTS NOT BEING AWARE OF TAXIWAY CLOSURE WHEN TOWER IS NOT OPERATING.

ACN: 733500

Time / Day

Date : 200704
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LAX.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : Marginal

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SCT.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope : 24R
Flight Phase.Landing : Go Around
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : N/S

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 240
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 8700
ASRS Report : 733500

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : TCAS
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative

WE WERE LEVEL AT 2200 FT MSL OUTSIDE OF JETSA WHEN WE GOT A 'TFC, TFC' AUDIO/YELLOW POP-UP ON THE HSI. WE THEN GOT A RED RA/AUDIO 'CLB, CLB' WARNING. MY EXCELLENT FO BEGAN TO FOLLOW THE RA GUIDANCE BARS AND I SAW THAT THE RA ALT WAS 1900 FT MSL AND WE WERE 2000 FT MSL. MY FO CLBED FASTER AND THE RA SYMBOL STAYED WITH US AT 100 FT BELOW OUR ALT. I TOLD LAX TWR THAT WE HAD AN RA ALERT AND WE WERE CLBING/GOING AROUND. LAX TWR TOLD US TO CLB TO 3000 FT AND TO FOLLOW THE LOC. I ASKED IF WE COULD FLY RWY HDG INSTEAD. HE SAID OK. THE RA DISAPPEARED AT 2900 FT MSL. I DO NOT REMEMBER HEARING THE TCAS CLR OF CONFLICT AUDIO ANNOUNCEMENT. AT THIS POINT WE GOT THE LOW FUEL EICAS MESSAGE ALONG WITH THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHTS AND THE BEEPER. I GOT OUT THE HANDBOOK AND FOLLOWED THE SOP BY OPENING THE XFEED VALVE AND TURNING ON THE CTR FUEL PUMPS. WE TURNED DOWNWIND NORTH AND TOLD SOCIAL THAT WE HAD LOW FUEL AND 5500 LBS OF FUEL REMAINING. WE TURNED BASE 3 MI E OF JETSA AND HAD NO FURTHER INCIDENT. WE LANDED WITH 5100 LBS OF FUEL. ON THE GND OUR CTLR TOLD US THAT THERE WAS NO TFC IN OUR IMMEDIATE AREA AND THAT A HELI WAS 3 MI BEHIND US AND OFFSET AT LOW ALT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE WARNING WAS A FALSE INDICATION. HOWEVER, WE FOLLOWED SOP. HUMAN FACTORS AT HAND WERE: WE WERE VERY TIRED AS OUR FLT THE NIGHT PRIOR WAS LATE AND TURNED INTO A LATE NIGHT FLT WHICH ARRIVED IN THE EARLY MORNING. OUR FLT OUTBOUND WAS DELAYED DUE TO UNKNOWN REASONS AND WE ARRIVED INTO LAX AT XA55 WHICH WAS EXACTLY 2 HRS LATE. THE RA WARNING OCCURRED AT A CRITICAL TIME, RIGHT AT GS INTERCEPT AND THINGS GOT VERY BUSY. SINCE WE WERE CLBING QUICKLY WE NEVER REALLY ACCELERATED MUCH ABOVE THE BUG. WE PERFORMED A GAR TO CLEAN CONFIG AND RETURNED TO LAND ON RWY 24R. ATC SAID THAT NO FURTHER INFO WAS REQUIRED AND TO HAVE A GOOD NIGHT. I CALLED DISPATCH AND ADVISED OF THE SITUATION. MY FO WROTE UP THE TCAS AND CALLED MAINT.

Synopsis

B757-200 CREW RECEIVES TCAS RA JUST OUTSIDE JETSA ON THE ILS 24R AT LAX AND GOES AROUND FOLLOWING TCAS GUIDANCE.

ACN: 732519

Time / Day

Date : 200703
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : PHL.Airport
State Reference : PA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1200

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements.Other
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : PHL.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B767-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Trailing Edge Flap

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 732519

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

COMBINATION OF FATIGUE AND FLAPS 20 DEGS CONFIG WITH GEAR UP FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD OF TIME, FOLLOWED BY A STANDARD CALLOUT OF FLAPS 30 DEGS. PLT MONITORING LOWERING FLAPS TO 30 DEGS WHILE GEAR WAS IN TRANSIT, THEN RAISING HANDLE BACK TOWARDS 20 DEGS, TO SILENCE THE GEAR HORN, AGAINST THE COMMANDED MOVEMENT OF THE FLAPS. ON APCH, TRAILING EDGE FLAPS SHUT DOWN WHEN FLAP HANDLE MOVED TO 30 DEGS. CONDITIONS WERE GOOD AT PHL. RELIEF PLT CHKED QRH AND WE CONTINUED WITH A FLAPS 25 DEG LNDG UNEVENTFULLY. AT THE GATE, EICAS STATUS MESSAGE 'TRAILING EDGE FLAPS SHUT DOWN.' TAXIED IN WITH FLAPS AT 25 DEGS. SUBSEQUENT ACTION BY MAINT WAS TO RESET FLAP POS WITH ALTERNATE FLAPS. NO FURTHER MALFUNCTION INDICATIONS OR MAINT REQUIRED. NO COMPUTER RESETS OR MESSAGES INDICATED. ACFT WAS ON SPD AND APCH STABILIZED AT 1200 FT. WE WERE PUT IN HOLDING PATTERN AT VCN AND WHEN EXITING HOLDING, ATC REQUESTED SPD OF 170 KIAS, BELOW FLAPS 5 DEG MANEUVER. PF CALLED FOR FLAPS 20 DEGS WITH GEAR UP DUE TO EXTENSIVE VECTORING AND DISTANCE FROM ARPT. WE HAD 2 SEPARATE APCH SECTORS TO TRAVEL THROUGH. AFTER BEING CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH, TFC TO FOLLOW WAS HARD TO VISUALIZE. THE FO WAS VERY GOOD AT HIS PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE DURING THE ENTIRE TRIP. WITH FLAPS AT 20 DEGS, AND AFTER ACQUIRING THE TFC, HE CALLED FOR FLAPS 30 DEGS AT 1800 FT TO BE STABILIZED BY THE OM. I POINTED OUT THE GEAR WAS STILL UP. HE THEN CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN, SO I COMPLIED WITH THE GEAR DOWN AND THEN WENT TO FLAPS 30 DEGS ON THE GEAR HANDLE PRIOR TO THE GEAR BEING DOWN AND LOCKED. WHEN THE WARNING HORN SOUNDED, I REALIZED MY ERROR AND REVERSED THE HANDLE TO 25 DEGS, ABOUT THE TIME THE GEAR LOCKED DOWN. WHEN I SUBSEQUENTLY WENT TO FLAPS 30 DEGS, WE GOT THE EICAS WITH THE TRAILING EDGE DISAGREEMENT MESSAGE, AND THE FLAPS STUCK AT 25 DEGS. THE INDICATED AIRSPEED WAS 150 KIAS WHEN I ORIGINALLY COMMANDED 30 DEGS, SO NO ACFT LIMITATION EXCEEDANCES WERE INVOLVED. THERE IS NO PROC IN THE PLT HANDBOOK TO OPERATE AT FLAPS 15 DEGS OR 20 DEGS WITHOUT THE GEAR DOWN, THOUGH THIS IS CLEARLY PRUDENT DURING EXTENSIVE VECTORS AT A LONG DISTANCE FROM THE ARPT. WE CONTINUED THE APCH AT FLAPS 25 DEGS AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. 25 DEGS IS ALSO A NORMAL LNDG CONFIG. ACFT TURNED OVER TO MAINT AT THE GATE. QRH WAS HANDLED BY RELIEF PLT AS WE WERE APCHING 1000 FT AGL. ADVISE ATC ABOUT REQUESTING EXCESSIVELY SLOW SPDS FROM HVY ACFT DUE TO CONFIG REQUIREMENTS IN HOLDING OR COMING OUT OF HOLDING. FATIGUE IS ALSO A FACTOR. AFTER A LONG FLT, WE BECAME BUSY AT DEST WITH HOLDING, EXTENSIVE VECTORS, AND THEN A VISUAL APCH IN HAZY CONDITIONS, TRYING TO IDENT THE RJ WE WERE FOLLOWING. I WAS AWARE THE GEAR WAS STILL UP, BUT WAITED UNTIL THE FO CALLED FOR FLAPS 30 DEGS BEFORE I MENTIONED IT. THE FO WAS VERY COMPLIANT AND CAPABLE AND IT ISN'T UNUSUAL TO HAVE A GEAR DOWN CALL AT 1800 FT ON A VISUAL APCH. I DIDN'T KNOW HE WOULD CALL FLAPS 30 DEGS AS HIS CONFIG WAS 20 DEGS AND THAT IS THE NEXT PROCEDURAL CALLOUT.

Synopsis

B767 FLT CREW SELECTS FLAPS 30 PRIOR TO THE LANDING GEAR REACHING FULL EXTENSION WHICH CAUSES A WARNING HORN TO SOUND. THE FLAP LEVER IS THEN MOVED TO 25 THEN BACK TO 30 WHEN THE HORN STOPS, RESULTING IN TRAILING FLAPS STUCK AT 25.

ACN: 732207

Time / Day

Date : 200703
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : HPN.Airport
State Reference : NY
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : HPN.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 60
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9800
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 300
ASRS Report : 732207

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Excursion : Taxiway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Insufficient Time

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

CREW WAS REPOSITIONING ACFT FROM A REMOTE PARKING LOCATION TO THE TERMINAL AREA. DUE TO A BREAKDOWN IN CRM THE CAPT (ME) ALLOWED THE STANDARD PROCS, IE, CHKLIST COMPLETION (BEFORE START CHKLIST) TO BE

BYPASSED. WHILE BEGINNING TAXI PHASE TO REPOSITION ACFT I ATTEMPTED TO STEER ACFT WITH TILLER AND NOSEWHEEL STEERING WAS NOT RESPONSIVE. I APPLIED BRAKES AND CALLED FOR FO TO DO SO AS WELL. JUST AS THE ACFT ROLLED OFF OF TXWY ONTO SOFT GRASSY AREA I NOTICED THAT THE HYD PUMPS WERE NOT IN THE REQUIRED POS OF 'AUTO/ON.' CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE CREW FATIGUE (EARLY SHOW TIME, LAST DAY OF 4-DAY TRIP), CRM BREAKDOWN (IE, CAPT ALLOWED EXTERNAL ATC RADIO CALLS TO INTERFERE WITH COCKPIT DUTIES), TRYING TO RUSH TO MOVE ACFT TO BOARD PAX AT THE TERMINAL TO MAKE AN UPDATED 'ETDC' WINDOW. NOTE: ONLY FLT CREW PLUS 1 FLT ATTENDANT ON BOARD. NO PAX. NO INJURIES, NO DAMAGE TO ACFT WHATSOEVER.

Synopsis

CL65 CREW DOES NOT USE BEFORE START CHECKLIST AND ATTEMPTS TO TAXI WITH THE HYDRAULIC PUMPS OFF. STEERING AND BRAKES ARE INOPERATIVE AND THE ACFT GOES OFF THE TAXIWAY.

ACN: 731456

Time / Day

Date : 200703
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ORL.Airport
State Reference : FL
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 2400

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ORL.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-800
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer Only : 18R
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Flight Phase.Landing : Go Around

Aircraft : 2

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Landing Gear Indicating System

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 140
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 7000
ASRS Report : 731456

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : Lndg Gear
Warning Lites
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Narrative

ON THE ILS RWY 18R APCH INTO MCO IN VISUAL CONDITIONS WE SELECTED THE GEAR DOWN AT 8 MI FROM THE RWY AT 2400 FT AGL. ON THE LNDG CHKLST THE GEAR RESPONSE WAS CALLED FOR BY ME AND THE FO NOTED THAT THE GEAR INDICATED 3 GREEN AND 3 RED ON THE MAIN PANEL, BUT 3 GREEN ON THE OVERHEAD ALTERNATE GEAR INDICATION. WE NOTIFIED TWR THAT WE WERE GOING AROUND TO TROUBLESHOOT. OUR EMER CHKLST OR QRH DOES NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC GEAR INDICATOR SECTION IN TAB 14 FOR THIS PROB. THE ONLY REF IS 'GEAR FAILS TO EXTEND' CHKLST. THE NOTE #2 STATES THAT IF THE OVERHEAD ALTERNATE PANEL SHOWS 3 GREEN THEN THE GEAR IS CONSIDERED SAFE AND DOWN. SO WE COMPLETED THE CHKLST AND SET UP FOR THE SECOND APCH. ON THE FIRST GAR TWR AND THE ARPT GND OPS PEOPLE SAID THAT ALL 3 GEAR APPEARED DOWN. WE NOTIFIED THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND THE PAX OF THE ISSUE, AND THAT WE HAD AN ALTERNATE SYS GIVING US A SAFE GEAR INDICATION. WE SET UP FOR A SECOND APCH FOR LNDG AND ON SHORT FINAL WE GOT THE GPWS 'TOO LOW GEAR WARNING.' THIS MADE US UNCOMFORTABLE AND THEN WENT AROUND AGAIN TO RE-TROUBLESHOOT. AGAIN, THE CHKLST DID NOT HAVE US TURN OFF THE GEAR WARNING INHIBIT SWITCH, SO WE LEFT THE SWITCH IN THE NORMAL POS. BOTH THE FO AND MYSELF CONCLUDED THAT THE GEAR INDICATION SYS HAD MALFUNCTIONED AND THAT THE OVERHEAD ALTERNATE INDICATORS WERE ACCURATE ALONG WITH THE DRAG FELT IN THE ACFT AND THE TWR GEAR DOWN CONFIRMATION. I EVEN WENT AS FAR AS TO CHK THAT THE GEAR HANDLE WAS SEATED PROPERLY WITHOUT RAISING IT. WE HAD THE TWR ROLL THE EMER TRUCKS AS A PRECAUTION AND I WATCHED THE HUD TO SEE THE 0 FT AGL AT TOUCHDOWN POINT SO THAT IF WE DID NOT FEEL A TOUCHDOWN WE WOULD GO AROUND AGAIN. ON THE THIRD APCH WITH THE TOO LOW GEAR VERBAL TALKING TO US WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE 3 RED LIGHTS ON THE MAIN PANEL WENT OUT ON ROLLOUT. TAXIED TO THE GATE WITHOUT INCIDENT. I PUT THE WRITE-UP IN THE BOOK, NOTIFIED DISPATCH, MAINT CTL AND OPS. I ALSO CALLED OUR FODO AND OUR B737 FLEET MGR ABOUT THE ISSUE. BY THIS TIME WE WERE TIRED AFTER ALL THE EVENTS AND THE LONG DAY WE HAD HAD. THERE NEEDS TO BE A GEAR DISAGREEMENT INDICATION CHKLST IN OUR QRH. ESPECIALLY AN ACTION THAT TELLS US TO TURN ON THE GEAR WARNING INHIBIT SWITCH SO WE DON'T HAVE TO LISTEN TO THE BOGUS WARNING. THE GPWS OBVIOUSLY ONLY LOOKS AT THE MAIN PANEL INDICATIONS OF UNSAFE GEAR, NOT THE 3 GREEN INDICATIONS ON THE OVERHEAD. IN HINDSIGHT WE PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE TURNED OFF THAT SWITCH ANYWAY. BUT, OUR TRAINING CONSTANTLY EMPHASIZES NOT TO MOVE ANY SWITCHES UNLESS A CHKLST CALLS FOR IT. IN THIS CASE THERE WAS NO REAL CHKLST FOR THIS MALFUNCTION.

Synopsis

A B737 FLT CREW NOTICED LNDG GEAR POSITION LIGHTS WERE RED AND GREEN AFTER GEAR EXTENSION. THE PROCEDURES HANDBOOK INDICATED THE GEAR WAS DOWN AND LOCKED, AND THEY LANDED NORMALLY.

ACN: 731124

Time / Day

Date : 200703
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : MD-88
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Landing : Roll
Route In Use.Approach : Contact

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Antiskid System

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 600
ASRS Report : 731124

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 63
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3063
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 63
ASRS Report : 731796

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

WE PUSHED BACK ON TIME AT ZZZ AND STARTED BOTH ENGS SINCE IT WAS FIRST FLT. ALL WAS NORMAL. I SALUTED THE GND CREW, THEY DISCONNECTED AND LEFT. MY FO THEN RAN THROUGH THE REMAINDER OF THE AFTER START CHK. WHEN SHE GOT TO THE AUTOBRAKES SHE WAS UNABLE TO ARM THEM. SHE TRIED SEVERAL TIMES AND EACH TIME WE GOT THE AUTO BRAKE FAIL MESSAGE ON THE OAP AND THE SWITCH RETURNED TO THE OFF POS. I DISTINCTLY REMEMBER LOOKING AT THE OAP EACH TIME SHE TRIED TO ARM THE SYS AND SEEING ONLY 3 MESSAGES. APU GENERATOR OFF BUS, PARKING BRAKES AND AUTOBRAKE FAIL. THERE WERE NO OTHER MESSAGES. I ASKED HER TO CHK THE MEL TO SEE IF WE COULD PLACARD THE SYS. WE COULD NOT SO I RETURNED TO THE GATE. AT THE GATE WITH THE DOOR OPEN, I LEFT THE ACFT AND WENT UP THE JETBRIDGE TO CALL DISPATCH AND LET HIM KNOW WHAT WAS HAPPENING. I RETURNED AROUND 10 MINS LATER AND STOPPED ON THE JETBRIDGE TO TALK WITH THE MECH ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE ACFT. HE TOLD ME THEY WERE PUTTING THE AUTOBRAKE SYS ON MEL. HE HAD A COPY OF THE MEL IN HIS HAND SO I ASKED TO SPECIFICALLY LOOK THROUGH THE 'COPY' FOR ANY 'O' PROCS UNIQUE TO THE MEL. ON THE LAST LINE OF THE LAST PAGE I SAW THAT THE AUTOSPOILER SYS ALSO WOULD BE INOP DUE TO THIS MEL AND WE WERE NOT TO ARM IT FOR TKOF OR LNDG. I THANKED HIM FOR HIS EFFORTS AND WENT BACK INTO THE COCKPIT TO WAIT FOR THE NEW RELEASE AND LOGBOOK. I TOLD MY FO ABOUT THE AUTOSPOILER SYS ALSO BEING INOP DUE TO THIS MEL. WE RE-ACCOMPLISHED THE ENTIRE BEFORE START CHK SINCE WE'D LEFT THE AIRPLANE. SO HERE WE WERE ALMOST 1 HR LATE AND MY FRUSTRATION LEVEL HAD REALLY BEGUN TO CLB. HERE'S WHAT I WAS DEALING WITH OVER THE 4 DAY TRIP AND IN PARTICULAR THE LAST DAY. 1) OPS IN ZZZ MAKING A LOT OF EXTRA WORK FOR ME DUE TO CLERICAL ERRORS. 2) MAINT PROBS WITH THE JET. 3) PRESSURE FROM THE PAX VIA THE FLT ATTENDANTS ABOUT WHY WE'RE STILL AT THE GATE, WHY AREN'T WE LEAVING, ETC. 4) A VERY NEW (ONLY A MONTH ON THE LINE AFTER A 4 1/2 YR FURLOUGH) FO WHO I REALLY HAD TO WATCH CLOSELY AND 'COACH' THROUGH EVERY ONE OF HER LNDGS. 5) A REAL PROB WITH STRESS/FATIGUE DUE TO LESS THAN OPTIMAL SLEEP AT THE HOTEL. EVIDENTLY, THE HOTEL WAS HOSTING A NATIONAL DANCE COMPETITION AND A YOUTH HOCKEY TOURNAMENT FOR BOYS AND GIRLS AGES 8-13. THEY WERE RUNNING UP AND DOWN THE HALLS UNTIL WELL AFTER XA00 SCREAMING AND PLAYING. WE ALSO HAD THE TIME CHANGE. 6) MY OWN OVERRIDING DESIRE TO GET THE JOB DONE AND GET THE PAX SAFELY TO THE DEST. FINALLY, ALL THE PIECES OF THE PUZZLE ARRIVED AND WE PUSHED OFF THE GATE A SECOND

TIME, DISCONNECTED AND STARTED NORMALLY. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, WE NOTICED 4 NEW MESSAGES ON THE OAP THAT WERE NOT THERE THE FIRST TIME WE PUSHED AND STARTED. WE HAD THE ANTISKID INOP MESSAGES. MY FO AND I DISCUSSED THIS AT GREAT LENGTH AND FINALLY REACHED A CONSENSUS THAT THIS INDICATION MUST BE AS A RESULT OF THE MEL SINCE NEITHER ONE OF US HAD PHYSICALLY TURNED OFF THE ANTISKID SWITCH AND THOSE MESSAGES HAD NOT BEEN THERE PREVIOUSLY. FOR WHATEVER REASON, I DON'T KNOW WHY -- MAYBE EXPECTATION OR JUST THE OVERALL HUMAN DYNAMIC THAT HAD BEEN CREATED THIS MORNING, IT NEVER OCCURRED TO ME TO CALL MAINT. MY FO AND I DISCUSSED AS WELL THAT WE'D BOTH FLOWN MANY YRS IN THE AIR FORCE IN AIRPLANES NOT EQUIPPED WITH ANTISKID AND THAT THIS SHOULDN'T BE A PROB. WX WAS NICE IN ZZZ1 AND WE'D JUST BE OVERLY CAUTIOUS ON THE LNDG ROLL WITH THE BRAKES. WE THOROUGHLY BRIEFED THE DEP AND TOOK OFF AND FLEW TO ZZZ1. ALL WAS WELL (IN OUR MINDS) UNTIL THE POINT WHERE WE TOUCHED DOWN ON THE RWY IN ZZZ1. I WAS FLYING THE ACFT AND TOUCHED DOWN IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE SMOOTHLY AND ON SPD. AFTER LOWERING THE NOSE TO THE RWY, I REACHED FOR THE SPOILER HANDLE AND PULLED IT FULL AFT. IT SPRUNG OUT OF THE GATE TO THE RETRACTED POS. I DID IT AGAIN AND AGAIN IT SPRUNG OUT OF DEPLOYED. I QUICKLY TOLD THE FO TO GRAB IT AND HOLD IT FULLY DEPLOYED. SHE DID. I THEN DEPLOYED THE THRUST REVERSERS. IT WAS DURING THE ITERATIONS OF TRYING TO GET THE SPOILERS OUT THAT I HEARD ON THE RADIO A CALL FROM AN X AIRPLANE THAT WE HAD A TIRE SMOKING. I HADN'T EVEN TOUCHED THE BRAKES YET. MY HEELS WERE STILL ON THE FLOOR. AS SOON AS I PUT OUT THE THRUST REVERSERS, I RAISED MY FEET TO THE BRAKE PEDALS AND CAUTIOUSLY APPLIED BRAKE PRESSURE. AT NO TIME DID I EVER FEEL/SEE/SENSE ANY SORT OF DIRECTIONAL CTL PROB WITH THE ACFT AND IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE RADIO CALL I WOULD NOT HAVE KNOWN WE'D HAD A PROB. I SLOWED THE JET AND EXITED THE RWY AT THE SECOND HIGH SPD. TWR ASKED ME WHAT I WANTED TO DO AND I SAID, 'WELL, PLEASE TELL ME WHAT YOU SEE.' HE PUT THE BINOCULARS ON ME AND SAID HE SAW NO SMOKE. THE AIRPLANE BEHIND ME SAID IT APPEARED I HAD A FLAT TIRE. I SAID STAND BY AND HAD THE FO CALL MAINT TO SEE IF I WOULD BE OK TO TAXI ON ONE MAIN TIRE. THEY SAID YES. WE TAXIED BACK AND PARKED AT THE GATE. AGAIN, IT FELT LIKE A NORMAL MD88 TAXIING AND WE NOTICED NOTHING ABNORMAL ON THE WAY IN.

Synopsis

AN MD88 WITH AN INOP AUTO-BRAKE AND AN ANTI-SKID MALFUNCTION ANNUNCIATED HAS A BRAKE LOCK AND THE TIRE FAIL ON LANDING.

ACN: 729889

Time / Day

Date : 200703
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LAX.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 13000
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 14000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SCT.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : CIVET5

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 240
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 11200
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1200
ASRS Report : 729889

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Original Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING OUR ARR INTO LAX, ZLA GAVE US A RESTRICTION TO CROSS GRAMM INTXN AT FL180 AND 280 KIAS. JUST PRIOR TO GRAMM, WE WERE TOLD TO CONTACT SOCAL APCH. SOCAL TOLD US TO DSND VIA THE CIVET 5 ARR FOR RWY 25R. THIS WAS NOT THE RWY THAT WAS PROGRAMMED INTO THE PLANE SO I, AS THE PNF, BEGAN TO CHANGE THIS AS THE PF ENTERED AND WE BOTH CONFIRMED 7000 FT IN THE FCU. THE CTLR THEN WITHIN 20 SECONDS CAME BACK AND SAID TO MAINTAIN 16000 FT AND EXPECT RWY 24R PROMPTING ANOTHER CHANGE IN THE AIRPLANE. THE PF SET 16000 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW OF THE FCU AND WE BOTH CONFIRMED. THE CTLR THEN SAID FOR US TO DSND VIA THE CIVET 5 FOR RWY 24R. AT THIS POINT, WE WERE GOING TO BE TOO HIGH TO MAKE OUT NEXT RESTRICTION, WE THOUGHT SO THE PF SELECTED OPEN DSCNT WITH FULL SPOILERS. THE CTLR NEXT GAVE US WINDS FROM THE NEW ATIS AS 060 AT 10 GUST 19. AT THIS POINT I HAD TO CHK OUR MANUALS TO SEE IF THIS WAS TO EXCEED OUR LIMITATIONS FOR THE AIRPLANE. I LOOKED UP FROM THE MANUAL TO SEE US BELOW 14000 FT AND NOT YET AT CIVET. THE PF QUICKLY DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT TO ARREST OUR SINK RATE AND CLB BACK UP. AT THE LOWEST POINT WE MAY HAVE BEEN LESS THAN 12000 FT BUT THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN AFTER PASSING CIVET. I THINK WE CROSSED CIVET AT 13000 FT. ONCE BACK ON THE DSCNT PROFILE WE REENGAGED THE AUTOPLT. THE CTLR THEN SAID THE WINDS WERE 360 AT 10 GUSTING TO 19. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED: 1) FATIGUE. BOTH THE FO AND MYSELF HAD COME IN ON A RED EYE FLT AND EACH GOTTEN ABOUT 4 HOURS SLEEP IN A 24 HOUR PERIOD. THIS ALSO PROBABLY CAUSED THE ACCIDENTAL PULLING OF THE ALT KNOB FOR AN OPEN DSCNT RATHER THAN PUSHING FOR MANAGED DSCNT. 2) COMMUNICATION. ATC'S ISSUANCE OF MULTIPLE CHANGES OF RWY, ALT AND ERRONEOUS WX FOR THE ARPT WITHIN A VERY SHORT DISTANCE OF APPROX 8 MILES. THIS CAUSING ONE PERSON TO BE INSIDE THE ACFT AT ALL TIMES AND NOT BACKING UP THE OTHER PLT. AND LAST OF ALL, COMPLACENCY IN THE ACFT'S AUTOMATION. THE AIRPLANE DOES NOT MAKE MISTAKES, WE AS PLTS DO, AND WE HAVE TO WATCH THIS CLOSER.

Synopsis

A320 CREW MISSES CROSSING RESTRICTION AT CIVET AFTER TWO RWY CHANGES DURING THE CIVET 5 ARR TO LAX.

ACN: 729148

Time / Day

Date : 200702
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : UUEE.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : UUEE.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Large Transport
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : UM25B

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 110
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 600
ASRS Report : 729148

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot

Person : 4

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WITH THE FO FLYING THE ACFT, WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC TO DSND TO 600 METERS MSL WHILE ON THE UM25B ARR TO MOSCOW (SHEREMETYEVO). BOTH THE RELIEF PLT AND MYSELF (CAPT) CONFIRMED A 2600 FT MSL ALT CONVERSION. AFTER INTERCEPTING FINAL TO RWY 25R, THE CTLR REQUESTED THAT WE 'STOP DSCNT.' I NOTICED THAT WE WERE LEVEL AT 2000 FT MSL. AFTER ARR AT THE GATE, I ASKED THE FO ABOUT THE DISCREPANCY, AND DISCOVERED THAT HE HAD BEEN USING AN EXPIRED ALT CONVERSION CHART WITH QFE ALTS BELOW THE TRANSITION LEVEL, INSTEAD OF QNH ALTS AS USED ON THE NEW CONVERSION CHART, HENCE THE 600 FT ALTDEV. I FEEL THE PRIMARY CAUSES OF THIS DEV WERE THE FAILURE OF THE FO FLYING THE ACFT TO USE A CURRENT ALT CONVERSION CHART, AND THE FAILURE OF THE CAPT AND RELIEF PLT TO CONFIRM THE PROPER ALT HAD BEEN SET ON THE MCP. IN ADDITION, CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: 1) FATIGUE. 2) VERY POOR ENGLISH USED BY THE ATC CTLR RESULTING IN NUMEROUS REPEATS, AND 3) METERS TO FEET ALT CONVERSION PROCS USED ONLY IN RUSSIA. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CREW WAS VERY TIRED AND COMBINED WITH THE LANGUAGE BARRIER MAY HAVE PRODUCED A MISUNDERSTANDING AS TO WHETHER QFE OR QNH WAS BEING USED FOR THE ALTIMETER SETTING.

Synopsis

LGT CREW MAKES ERRORS CONVERTING METERS TO FEET AND DESCENDS BELOW ASSIGNED ALTITUDE DURING APPROACH TO MOSCOW'S SHEREMETYEVO AIRPORT.

ACN: 729097

Time / Day

Date : 200702
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : PHL.Airport
State Reference : PA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2700

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : PHL.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope : 27R
Flight Phase.Landing : Go Around
Route In Use.Arrival : On Vectors

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 23000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000
ASRS Report : 729097

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot

Person : 4

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

PHL HAD A RWY/APCH CHANGE FROM ILS RWY 9R TO ILS RWY 27R. THEY INADVERTENTLY SWITCHED THE ILS TO RWY 9L. WE WERE THE FIRST ACFT ON THE SWITCHED APCH. AS WE WERE VECTORED TO ILS RWY 27R WE OBSERVED THE CORRECT ILS FREQ (RWY 27R AND RWY 9L ARE THE SAME FREQ), BUT EVENTUALLY NOTICED REVERSE LOC SENSING AND WRONG ILS ID. WE EXECUTED A GAR. WE WERE THEN VECTORED FOR ANOTHER APCH, WHICH WAS NOW CORRECT -- RWY 27R AND AN UNEVENTFUL APCH AND LNDG. NO EXPLANATION, COMMENTS, OR APOLOGIZES FROM ATC. MY FLT WAS RUNNING 5 PLUS HOURS LATE, SO FATIGUE WAS ALSO A FACTOR.

Synopsis

AFTER CHANGING ACTIVE RWYS FROM RWY 9R TO RWY 27R, PHL TWR CHANGED THE ILS FREQ FROM RWY 9R TO RWY 9L, CAUSING REVERSE SENSING AND AN A330 TO GO AROUND.

ACN: 727239

Time / Day

Date : 200702
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : FLL.Airport
State Reference : FL
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 3000
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 4800

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : MIA.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude
Route In Use.Departure : On Vectors

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 67
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7700
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4521
ASRS Report : 727239

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

I ALLOWED COMPLACENCY TO ENTER THE COCKPIT, THUS ALLOWING 5 OR 6 BENIGN EVENTS TO COMBINE AND ESCALATE INTO AN OPPORTUNITY FOR MYSELF TO GET BEHIND THE ACFT AND POSSIBLY GET VIOLATED. IT WAS THE LAST LEG OF A 3 LEGGED NIGHT. I DIDN'T FEEL OVERLY TIRED (THOUGH I HAD BEEN UP ABOUT 20 HRS) AND IT WAS JUST A 20 MIN FLT FROM PT A TO PT B. MY FO IS EXPERIENCED ON THE ACFT AND THE NIGHT HAD GONE SMOOTH. THE AIRPLANE WAS EMPTY. WE WERE BASICALLY A FERRY FLT. I WAS COMPLACENT IN MY TKOF BRIEF AND FORGOT TO BRIEF THE FO FOR A POSSIBLE LOW ALT CAPTURE. CLRNC WAS RWY HDG WITH A 3000 FT LEVELOFF. WE TOOK OFF ON RWY 9 AND AT ABOUT 800 FT WENT IMC. THOUGH IT WASN'T ANYTHING CONVECTIVE, THE CLOUDS WERE OF THE KIND THAT CAUSE QUITE A BIT OF CHOP. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A COURSE REVERSAL TO TURN TO A HDG OF 270 DEGS. AND THEN I GOT THAT LOW ALT CAPTURE...AT ABOUT 1400-1500 FT. I WAS LATE WITH THE VNAV CALL BECAUSE OF ALL THE THINGS GOING ON IN THE COCKPIT (ATC CALLS, MODERATE CHOP AND THE TURN), COUPLED WITH THE LIGHT ACFT. I DIDN'T THINK IT WAS A BIG DEAL AND CALLED FOR THE FO TO BUG ME CLEAN MANEUVERING. BUT I DIDN'T CALL FOR 'SPD' FIRST AND HE DIDN'T SELECT IT. I KEPT CALLING FOR SPD AND HE KEPT DIALING THE SPD KNOB UP. HE THEN REALIZED THAT WHAT I WANTED AND SELECTED 'SPD.' UNFORTUNATELY FOR ME, BECAUSE WE WERE LIGHT, I WAS IN A BIG TURN, IMC AND GETTING BOUNCED AROUND, I GOT A LITTLE VERTIGO. COUPLE ALL THAT WITH THE BIG ACCELERATION FROM THE AUTOTHROTTLERS ADVANCING AND MY INNER EAR AND BODY MADE IT FEEL LIKE THE PLANE WAS DSNDING AND FAST. AND THOUGH I COULD SEE THE VSI CLBING, THE ALTIMETER CLBING AND THE FLT DIRECTOR COMMANDING ME TO PUSH THE NOSE OVER, I COULDN'T SHAKE THE SENSATION OF A RAPID DSCNT. AND SO I WASN'T BEING VERY AGGRESSIVE IN HOLDING THE NOSE OF THE ACFT DOWN. AT THIS POINT I COULD SEE THAT WE WERE RAPIDLY CLBING THROUGH 3000 FT AND STILL CLBING. I ASK MY FO TO SELECT AUTOPLT, WHICH HE DID, BUT THE AUTOPLT WOULDN'T CONNECT AND TO ADD INSULT TO INJURY, THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECT WARNING HORN AND LIGHT STARTED GOING OFF. ANOTHER ADDED STRESSOR. I ASKED THE FO TO CALL ATC AND REQUEST A 4000 FT LEVELOFF WHICH HE DID AND THEY GRANTED. I STILL HAD THE VERTIGO AND SENSATION OF DSNDING. I FINALLY DECIDED TO ROLL WINGS LEVEL WHILE CLICKING OFF THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECT WARNING HORN. AT ABOUT THIS TIME, THE AIRPLANE IS REACHING 250 KTS, SO THE AUTOTHROTTLERS BEGIN TO RETARD ALSO HELPING DECREASE MY VERTIGO SENSATION. MY BODY BEGINS TO BELIEVE WHAT MY EYES HAVE BEEN TELLING IT ALL ALONG, THAT YES WE ARE CLBING AND EVERYTHING IS GOING TO BE OK. WE FINALLY GET THE AUTOPLT ON AND GET THE AIRPLANE UNDER CTL. UNFORTUNATELY, BY THIS TIME I'M AT 4700-4800 FT. FOR SOME REASON THOUGH, ATC COULDN'T READ OUR MODE C AND THE XPONDER WAS ON. I DSNDDED BACK TO 4000 FT AND LEVELED OFF, RECYCLED THE XPONDER AND HAD THE FO RPT LEVEL. ATC SAID THEY WERE NOW RECEIVING THE MODE C AND NOTHING ELSE WAS SAID. I WILL NOW ALWAYS GIVE A THOROUGH BRIEF. I WON'T ASSUME MY FO HAS THE SAME KNOWLEDGE AS I DO. BETTER TO BRIEF IT AND ENSURE THAT HE/SHE KNOWS WHAT TO EXPECT. NONE OF THESE EVENTS BY THEMSELVES WAS A PROB. EVEN A COMBINATION OF THEM WE HANDLE ALL THE TIME. BUT THE TOTAL COMBINED,

ALONG WITH THE TIMING PLACED ME IN A VERY PRECARIOUS SITUATION ALL CAUSED BY NOT BRIEFING LOW ALT CAPTURE.

Synopsis

A B757 CAPT REPORTS HAVING VERTIGO DURING A RAPID POST TKOF TURNING CLB WITH A LOW ALT LEVEL OFF. POOR CRM CITED ON AN EARLY MORNING FATIGUED FLT.

ACN: 726850

Time / Day

Date : 200702

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B777-200

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Cargo Door

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

Experience.Maintenance.Technician : 30

ASRS Report : 726850

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Oversight : Coordinator

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Manuals

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Schedule Pressure

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Logbook Entry

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Situations

Publication : Maintenance Manual

Narrative

ON ACFT X I WAS REPLACING THE AFT CARGO LATCH/HOOK PWR DRIVE UNIT AS PER MAINT MANUAL WHICH WAS DEFERRED INBOUND INOP. AFTER TESTING THE DOOR I SIGNED OFF THE ITEM. THE NEXT NIGHT AT WORK I WAS THINKING IT WAS AN RII ITEM AND RECHK THE MAINT MANUAL AND FOUND NO NOTES TO SAY IT WAS AN RII ITEM. I CHKED THE RII LIST AND IT WAS. I THEN CALLED LINE MAINT AND RPTED THE PROB AND THEY HAD THE DOOR LATCH INSPECTED BEFORE FURTHER FLT. I THINK IT WAS MY MONDAY ON THIS SHIFT AND ANYONE WHO HAS WORKED THIS SHIFT KNOWS YOU'RE TIRED. PLUS I THINK THE MAINT MANUALS SHOULD BE REVISED TO SHOW THE JOB REQUIRES AN RII TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING.

Synopsis

A B777-200 HAD THE AFT CARGO LATCH/HOOK PWR DRIVE UNIT REPLACED PER THE MAINT MANUAL. LATER DISCOVERED UNIT IS A REQUIRED INSPECTION ITEM.

ACN: 726607

Time / Day

Date : 200702

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground.Other

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant : On Duty
ASRS Report : 726607

Events

Anomaly.Cabin Event.Other
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : FAA
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHAT HAPPENED: GOING FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1 AND THEN BACK ON THE ALL-NIGHTER IS NOT SAFE. AS I SAT IN MY JUMPSEAT UPON LNDG, I HAD A VERY HARD TIME KEEPING MY EYES OPEN. AFTER LNDG AND DISEMBARKING THE PLANE, I COULD NOT EVEN REMEMBER IF I DISARMED MY DOOR. I WENT BACK TO DO A DOUBLECHK AND IT WAS DISARMED. THANK GOODNESS I DID NOT HAVE TO DRIVE WHEN WE LANDED. I PROBABLY WOULD HAVE FALLEN ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL. I AM GLAD THERE WAS NOT A MEDICAL EMER. I DON'T FEEL I WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO HANDLE IT AT 100%. WHY: DUE TO FATIGUE. WHAT ACTION WAS TAKEN: I WROTE THIS RPT. WHAT WAS THE OUTCOME: HOPEFULLY THIS TYPE OF TRIP WILL BECOME ILLEGAL. IT REALLY IS NOT SAFE. IT WOULD NOT BE SO BAD, BUT THE 2 HR SIT WHILE IN ZZZ1 IS THE KILLER. ALSO IF YOU ARE ON RESERVE AND CANNOT PLAN ACCORDINGLY FOR THIS TYPE OF TRIP IT IS EVEN MORE UNSAFE.

Synopsis

FLIGHT ATTENDANT REPORTS DEBILITATING FATIGUE EXPERIENCED DURING ALL NIGHT FLIGHT TO ZZZ1 AND RETURN TO ZZZ.

ACN: 725862

Time / Day

Date : 200702
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : JFK.Airport
State Reference : NY
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 17000

Environment

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Aircraft Cooling System

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 255
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 5000
ASRS Report : 725862

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Aircraft : Equipment Problem Dissipated

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE EXCESSIVE COCKPIT AIRFLOW NOISE WAS A MAJOR CAUSE IN OUR BEING OUT OF CONTACT WITH NEW YORK DEP CTL FOR APPROX 20 MI JUST AFTER TKOF. AFTER TKOF WE CONTACTED DEP CTL AND THEY TURNED US NW AND CLBED US TO EITHER 13000 FT OR 17000 FT (CAN'T REMEMBER), THEN GAVE US ANOTHER FREQ. I SWITCHED TO THE NEW FREQ, MADE THE CALL AND WHILE WAITING FOR THE RESPONSE NOTED THAT IT WAS SO LOUD IN THE COCKPIT I WAS HAVING TROUBLE HEARING MYSELF THINK. THE COPLT TRIED TURNING OFF THE R RECIRCULATION FAN WHICH DIDN'T HELP MUCH, THEN THE R PACK WHICH DIDN'T HELP MUCH EITHER. WE THEN TURNED OFF THE L PACK AND R RECIRCULATION FAN WHICH GOT THE AIRFLOW NOISE DOWN TO A NORMAL LEVEL. DURING THIS I FORGOT TO FOLLOW UP WITH A SECOND CHK-IN ATTEMPT, AND AFTER A WHILE WE REALIZED WE WERE ON A DEAD FREQ. WE RETURNED TO THE ORIGINAL DEP FREQ AND GOT STRAIGHTENED OUT WITH A BIG L TURN FROM ATC. LUCKILY IT WAS PRETTY LATE AT NIGHT, LIGHT TFC AND NO AIRPLANES HEARD US DURING THE EVENT. IT TURNS OUT THAT I HEARD THE FREQ CHANGE WRONG, THE CTLR DIDN'T CATCH MY WRONG READBACK. I HAVE NO EXCUSE FOR MY FORGETTING TO CONTINUE MY CHK-IN WITH ATTEMPTS WITH ATC OTHER THAN TO SAY I WAS TIRED FROM THE ALL-NIGHTER AND HAVE BASICALLY BECOME FED UP WITH NOISY COCKPITS AND THE COMPANY NOT FIXING THEM. I JUST WANTED THE NOISE TO STOP. AFTER GETTING SQUARED AWAY WITH ATC, WE WROTE UP THE AIRPLANE. WE ALSO TURNED THE L PACK BACK ON SOMETIME DURING THE CLB, AND TRANSITIONED TO SPEAKERS AND EARPLUGS. DURING DSCNT THROUGH 13000 FT WE AGAIN TURNED OFF THE L PACK SO WE COULD TALK IN NORMAL CONVERSATION FOR THE APCH. I DIDN'T WANT TO GET YELLED AT BY ATC TWICE IN ONE NIGHT.

Synopsis

B757 FLT CREW HAS LOST COM DUE TO EXCESSIVE NOISE IN COCKPIT.

ACN: 725413

Time / Day

Date : 200701

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737-800

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Brake System

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

Experience.Maintenance.Technician : 20

ASRS Report : 725413

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Other Personnel.Other

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Lighting
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Logbook Entry
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

WORKING 5 HRS INTO MY SHIFT, I INSTALLED A 700 SERIES BRAKE ONTO AN 800 SERIES ACFT. THE BRAKES I HAD PICKED UP WERE NEXT TO THE 800/900 SERIES, SO I PICKED IT UP. I WAS TIRED AND DIDN'T PAY ATTN TO THE PART NUMBER AND SO THE WRONG PART WAS INSTALLED. I DON'T NORMALLY WORK ON B737'S.

Synopsis

A B737-800 WAS DISPATCHED WITH THE INCORRECT BRAKE ASSEMBLY INSTALLED IN #2 POS. BRAKE INSTALLED WAS A B737-700 BRAKE ASSEMBLY.

ACN: 724682

Time / Day

Date : 200701

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ATL.Airport

State Reference : GA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1500

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC

Weather Elements : Fog

Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ATL.Tower

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Flight Phase.Landing : Go Around

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Autoflight System

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC

ASRS Report : 724682

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

ASRS Report : 724687

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA

Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : MSAW

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : GPWS

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

WE WERE TIRED, IT WAS LATE AND THE WX WAS DETERIORATING. WE WERE RETURNING BACK TO ATLANTA AND IT WAS NOW ABOUT 1 HR LATER THAN SCHEDULED, BECAUSE OF ALL THE ICE BLOWING OVER THE SOUTHERN UNITED STATES. IT WAS ONLY OUR SECOND LEG OF THE DAY BUT WE WERE BOTH MAKING LITTLE TRIVIAL MISTAKES -- YAWNING, RUBBING THE EYES, AND WISHING FOR BED. THE LATEST ATIS FROM ATL DIDN'T MAKE ME FEEL ANY BETTER: FOG, DRIZZLE AND LOWERING VISIBILITY. IT WAS THEN THAT I MADE MY FIRST BIG MISTAKE. WHEN YOU'RE EXHAUSTED AND TRYING NOT TO ACT THAT WAY YOU CAN TALK YOURSELF INTO ANYTHING. I SAID 'LET'S FLY A CAT III TO AUTOLAND BECAUSE WE'RE TIRED AND I DON'T WANT TO GO AROUND!' THAT ATTITUDE SET OURSELVES UP FOR OUR NEXT PROB. COMING IN ON THE APCH, EVERYTHING LOOKED GOOD ON MY SIDE. I REVIEWED THE NOTES -- I HAD THE PLANE CONFIGURED AND WE WERE ABOUT TO INTERCEPT THE GLIDE PATH WITH MY FMA IN AUTOLAND MODE. I BELIEVED THAT BTWN THE BOTH OF US WE COULD MUSTER ENOUGH MENTAL ENERGY TO FLY AN AUTOLAND. IT WAS ABOUT THEN THAT MY FO ASKED ME IF I WAS GOING TO ARM THE AUTOLAND. I SAID I DID AND XCHKING HIS FMA NOTED THAT HIS WAS ONLY SHOWING ILS MODE. CONFUSED, I STARTED DOUBLECHKING THE FREQS AND COURSE SETTINGS. THEY WERE CORRECT. HOW ABOUT THE CONFIGN? AGAIN CORRECT. SO I PUSHED THE AUTOLAND BUTTON AGAIN -- NOTHING. SO OFF COMES THE FLT DIRECTORS, AUTOPLT AND THROTTLES, ALL WHILE WE WERE HEADING DOWNHILL TOWARD RWY 8L. THE FO WAS TRYING TO KEEP UP WITH MY FLURRY OF ACTIVITY, BUT I WAS FAST AND DETERMINED BECAUSE I'M A MAN OF MY WORD AND I'M NOT GOING AROUND! FORTUNATELY, WE WEREN'T ALONE. ATL TWR QUERIED US ABOUT OUR POS ON THE GLIDE PATH. MY FO SAID 'LET'S GET OUT OF HERE,' AND IT WAS THEN THAT I FINALLY CAME TO MY SENSES. WHAT THE HECK WAS I DOING? I LOST ALL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS BECAUSE I WAS FIXATED ON THE AUTOPLT. THIS WAS ALL WRONG AND I SAID 'LET'S GO AROUND!' IT WASN'T LONG AFTER THAT THAT TWR ORDERED US TO DO THE SAME. WE PULLED UP, MADE A L TURN, AND CLBED OUT AND WE RETURNED TO FLY A CAT I TO JUST ABOVE MINIMUMS AND LANDED. NOW, IN RETROSPECT, I CAN SEE HOW MENTAL EXHAUSTION CAN MAKE A SIMPLE PROC LIKE GOING AROUND SEEM LIKE A MAJOR INCONVENIENCE. I GOT INFECTED BY A MAJOR CASE OF 'GET HOMEITIS' AND IT ALMOST LED TO DISASTER. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 724687: THE TWR CTLR ISSUED A LOW ALT ALERT ALONG WITH THE CORRECT ALTIMETER SETTING. I ADVISED THE TWR WE WERE 'ON THE GO' AND THEY CLRED US TO FLY HDG 360 DEGS AND MAINTAIN 4000 FT. AS WE ROLLED OUT ON THE HDG OF 360 DEGS, WE RECEIVED 1 EGPWS 'TERRAIN, PULL UP.' THE CAPT PULLED.

Synopsis

AUTOFLT SYSTEM ANOMALIES RESULTS IN MD80 COCKPIT CONFUSION AND GAR
DURING CAT III APCH.

ACN: 724521

Time / Day

Date : 200701

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC

Weather Elements : Ice

Weather Elements : Snow

Weather Elements : Turbulence

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Oxygen System/Crew

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Function.Oversight : PIC

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial

Qualification.Pilot : Instrument

Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 240

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5200

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4000

ASRS Report : 724521

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolutive Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

DURING OUR PREFLT, IN A RUSH TO TRY TO MAINTAIN SOME SORT OF SCHEDULE INTEGRITY, SINCE OUR ACFT WAS OPERATING WELL BEHIND SCHEDULE DUE TO WX AFFECTING ARRS INTO ZZZ, WE FORGOT TO PUT ON THE FIXED OXYGEN MASK AND ACTUALLY TRY TO BREATHE USING THE MASK. LATER DISCOVERED THE OXYGEN WAS NOT HOOKED UP. THE PRESSURE-QUANTITY WAS FINE, BUT THE TANK WAS NOT CONNECTED. WE FLEW THE ACFT FROM ZZZ-ZZZ1. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS WERE: 1) HASTE, RUSHING TO TRY AND MAKE THE SCHEDULE. 2) FATIGUE -- DUE TO EXTREMELY EARLY MORNING SCHEDULE AFTER FINISHING LATE THE PREVIOUS 2 DAYS, 3) FAMILY -- TRYING TO COMMUTE HOME SINCE OUR BASE WAS CLOSED EARLIER IN THE YR, SO WE HAVE SOME SORT OF FAMILY LIFE. 4) OTHER -- JUST TRYING TO GET THE TRIP WE WERE ON OVER. 5) GET HOME IT IS.

Synopsis

FLT CREW OF DHC8 FAIL TO PERFORM CREW OXYGEN MASK TEST. LATER DISCOVER MASKS WERE NOT CONNECTED TO THE OXYGEN BOTTLE. FATIGUE AND SCHEDULE PRESSURE WERE CITED AS CONTRIBUTING FACTORS.

ACN: 724475

Time / Day

Date : 200701

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : OMA.Airport
State Reference : NE
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 34000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZAU.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 17200
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 6700
ASRS Report : 724475

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2500
ASRS Report : 724764

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative

WE WERE DISPATCHED WITH 1 PACK INOP. THE OPERATING PACK WAS PUTTING OUT EXTREMELY HOT AIR INTO THE COCKPIT. WE TRIED ADJUSTING EVERY COMPONENT OF THE PNEUMATIC SYS WITHOUT SUCCESS. WE CONTACTED DISPATCH AND MAINT AND DISCUSSED OPTIONS. THE HEAT WAS UNBEARABLE. THE EQUIP COOLING LIGHT BEGAN TO FLICKER AS A RESULT OF THE HEAT. I ELECTED TO LEAVE THE COCKPIT DOOR OPEN AND RAISE THE CABIN BARRIER. I POSTED A FLT ATTENDANT AT THE BARRIER AND HAD OUR JUMPSEATER GUARD THE OPEN DOOR. ANOTHER FLT ATTENDANT SUPPLIED US WITH WATER AND WET TOWELS TO FOOL OFF. PRIOR TO LNDG I CLOSED THE COCKPIT DOOR AND HAD THE FLT ATTENDANTS RETRACT THE BARRIER. ONCE UNPRESSURIZED, WE TURNED THE PACK OFF. THE COCKPIT TEMP WAS PROBABLY AROUND 120 DEGS FAHRENHEIT. THE LNDG WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. DUE TO FATIGUE FROM THE EXTREME TEMP, THIS CREW ELECTED TO GO TO THE HOTEL AND PICK UP THE BAL OF OUR TRIP THE NEXT DAY.

Synopsis

THE FLT STATION TEMP APCHED 120 DEGS FAHRENHEIT FOLLOWING AN ACFT MALFUNCTION WITH 1 OPERATING PACK. THE PLTS OPENED THE FLT STATION DOOR TO PROVIDE COOLING AIR.

ACN: 724468

Time / Day

Date : 200701
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Weather Elements : Rain
Weather Elements : Turbulence
Weather Elements : Windshear
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A330
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope : 26L
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Landing : Go Around
Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Precision

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Autothrottle/Speed Control

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 20
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 13500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2500
ASRS Report : 724468

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 17000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1500
ASRS Report : 724464

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Turbulence
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Speed Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 3
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control
Consequence.Other : Company Review
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

ILS APCH, RWY 26L, ZZZZ, JAN 2007. VERY WINDY (230/20G35). TOPS 5000 FT MSL. IMC CONDITIONS THROUGHOUT VECTORS, APCH AND GO AROUND. MODERATE TO SEVERE TURB THROUGHOUT. AT ABOUT 1000 FT AGL RECEIVED PWS (PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR) WARNING. EXECUTED REQUIRED GO AROUND. STILL IMC. FOLLOWED MAP PROC, PROCEEDED STRAIGHT AHEAD, LEVELED OFF AT 3000 FT MSL. CAPT (PF) CALLED, 'FLAPS 3, POSITIVE RATE, GEAR UP,' AT START OF GO AROUND BUT FO DID NOT COMPLY DUE TO CONFUSION OVER WHETHER THIS WAS A WINDSHEAR PROC (GEAR AND FLAPS TO REMAIN AS THEY WERE) OR A STANDARD GO AROUND (GEAR/FLAPS UP). HOWEVER, ACFT PERFORMANCE UPON GO AROUND INITIATION WAS VERY POSITIVE AND IMMEDIATE. DURING END OF VERY RAPID CLB FROM 1000 FT MSL TO 3000 FT MSL, FLAPS BEGAN TO OVERSPD. RELIEF CAPT IN EXTRA CREW SEAT REITERATED CALL FOR FLAP RETRACTION AND FO RESPONDED WITH RAPID SUCCESSION FLAP RETRACTION TO FULL UP. APCHING LEVEL OFF AT 3000 FT MSL PF REDUCED THRUST AND GOT NO RESPONSE. ENGS WERE AT MAX TOGA THRUST. PF'S ATTENTION BEGAN TO BE FOCUSED EXCLUSIVELY BETWEEN FLYING AIRPLANE, LEVELING OFF, RAPIDLY INCREASING AIRSPD AND LACK OF ENG RESPONSE TO THRUST LEVER POSITIONS TO REDUCE THRUST. DURING THIS TIME ATC CALLED FOR LEFT TURN -- FO VERBALLY RESPONDED BUT PF DID NOT DUE TO TASK

SATURATION CAUSED BY ENG THRUST PROB AND RAPIDLY BUILDING AIRSPD. SECOND ATC CALL FOR LEFT TURN NOT RESPONDED TO FOR SAME REASON. THIRD CALL BY ATC FOR LEFT TURN RESPONDED TO AND COMPLIED WITH. BY THIS TIME, ACFT SPD HAD BUILT UP TO THE POINT OF 'AUTO SYSTEM SPD PROTECTION FEATURE ACTIVATION' CAUSING ACFT TO CLB ON ITS OWN (AGAINST PLT INPUTS TO REMAIN LEVEL) IN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT ACFT OVERSPD. BY 3700 FT MSL, ENGS BEGAN TO RESPOND -- CLB STOPPED AT 4000 FT MSL. ATC OBSERVED THE CLB AND RECLEARED US TO MAINTAIN CURRENT ALT OF 4000 FT MSL. PF TRIED MULTIPLE TIMES TO REGAIN THRUST CTL THROUGH THROTTLE REDUCTIONS AS FAR BACK AS IDLE AND MULTIPLE USE OF AUTO-THRUST DISCONNECT BUTTONS TO NO AVAIL. UPON ANNOUNCING THRUST PROB TO THE OTHER PLTS, RELIEF CAPT ALSO TRIED SAME THINGS MULTIPLE TIMES. FINALLY, ENG RESPONSE RETURNED. QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE AFFECTED BY A) FATIGUE INDUCED BY OVERNIGHT FLT FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1 (8 HOURS FLT). B) MODERATE TO SEVERE TURB THROUGH APCH, GO AROUND AND POST GO AROUND INCIDENT. C) CONFUSION ON PART OF FO REGARDING COMMANDS FOR CONFIGURATION CHANGE AFTER WINDSHEAR-INSTIGATED GO AROUND. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 724464: OBSERVED WINDS OF 245/70 AT 4000 FT, 245/65 AT 3000 FT, 245/45 AT 1500 FT. MODERATE TURB BELOW 5000 FT. MOMENTARY AIRSPD FLUCTUATIONS OF +/- 10 KTS OBSERVED, ONCE WE WERE DSNDING ON THE GLIDESCOPE. NO WINDSHEAR WAS RPTED ON ZZZZ TWR FREQ. SHORTLY AFTER PASSING 4.0 DME ON FINAL, A PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR WARNING WAS RECEIVED, WITH AN AREA (STRIPED ICON) OF WINDSHEAR AHEAD ON FINAL APCH DISPLAYED ON THE ND'S. THE PF (CAPT) IMMEDIATELY ANNOUNCED HIS DECISION TO INITIATE A GO AROUND, ADVANCED THRUST LEVERS TO TOGA POSITION AND CALLED FOR 'FLAPS 3,' FOLLOWED SHORTLY THEREAFTER BY 'GEAR UP.' I MOMENTARILY THOUGHT THAT THE PRESENT CONFIGURATION (GEAR DOWN, FLAPS FULL) SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AS IN A WINDSHEAR RECOVERY MANEUVER, HOWEVER A CHK OF THE FO'S FLT INSTRUMENT SHOWED THAT THE ACFT WAS ACCELERATING AND CLBING. THE FO DID NOT SELECT FLAPS 3 OR THE RETRACT THE LNDG GEAR, IN RESPONSE TO THE CAPT'S COMMANDS TO DO SO. I STATED THAT THE FLAPS WERE STILL IN THE FULL POSITION. THE FLAP LOAD SYSTEM RELIEF WAS ACTIVATED, AND THE FLAPS WERE RETRACTED AUTOMATICALLY FROM THE FULL POSITION. I STATED AGAIN THAT WE NEEDED TO RETRACT THE FLAPS, AND EVENTUALLY THE FO MOVED THE FLAP HANDLE TO THE FLAPS 3 POSITION. I THEN STATED THAT WE NEEDED TO CLEAN THE ACFT UP, AND THAT THE FLAPS AND GEAR WERE EXTENDED, AND THAT THE FLAPS WERE BEING OVERSPEEDED. THE ACFT WAS RAPIDLY ACCELERATING AS IT CLBED, AND THE FLAP LOAD RELIEF SYSTEM KEPT RETRACTING THE FLAPS FROM THE SELECTED POSITIONS OF THE FLAP HANDLE. EVENTUALLY, THE FLAP HANDLE WAS MOVED TO THE CLEAN POSITION, HOWEVER THE LNDG GEAR WAS STILL EXTENDED. I STATED THAT THE LNDG GEAR WAS EXTENDED, AND THAT WE WERE OVERSPEEDING THE GEAR AS THE AIRSPD INCREASED ABOVE 250 KTS. WE WERE LEVEL AT 3000 FT. THE ACFT WAS IN CODE 4 TURB, AND THERE WAS HIGH LEVEL OF NOISE IN THE COCKPIT FROM THE AIR NOISE OF THE EXTENDED LNDG GEAR ALONG WITH THE ASSOCIATED BUFFETING. THE AIRSPD WAS INCREASING RAPIDLY, AND THE PF STATED THAT HE COULD NOT GET THE THRUST TO COME BACK FROM TOGA. I LOOKED AT THE THRUST LEVERS AND THEY WERE IN THE IDLE POSITION. I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD PUSHED THE AUTO-THRUST DISCONNECT BUTTONS ON THE THRUST LEVERS, AND HE STATED THAT HE HAD PUSHED THE BUTTONS MULTIPLE TIMES. THE AIRSPD WAS OVER 300 KTS AND INCREASING. I WAS VERY CONCERNED BY THE HIGH AIRSPD AND CONTINUED ACCELERATION OF THE ACFT. I GLANCED AT THE

ENG INSTRUMENTS AND THE ENGS APPEARED TO BE AT HIGH THRUST LEVEL. I STATED THAT THE AUTO-THRUST SYSTEM MIGHT BE IN TOGA LOCK. I ASKED THE PF IF HE HAD PUSHED THE AUTO-THRUST PUSH BUTTONS WITH THE THRUST LEVERS IN THE TOGA POSITION, AND HE STATED THAT HE HAD. I SAID, 'LET ME TRY PUSHING THEM UP,' AND I DID SO QUICKLY. THE PUSH BUTTONS WERE PUSHED WITH THE THRUST LEVERS IN THE TOGA POSITION AND IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO THE IDLE POSITION. THE HIGHEST INDICATED AIRSPD OBSERVED WAS 360 KTS. EVENTUALLY, THE THRUST DECREASED AND THE AIRSPD WAS DECREASING. HIGH SPD PROTECTION HAD APPARENTLY BEEN ACTIVATED AND THAT CAUSED THE ACFT TO CLB FROM 3000 FT. WE WERE RECLEARED BY ATC TO MAINTAIN 4000 FT, WHICH WE DID. THE LNDG GEAR WAS RETRACTED, BUT I AM UNSURE AT WHAT AIRSPD. DURING THE INITIAL CLB TO 3000 FT, WE WERE CLRED TO TURN LEFT, HOWEVER THE TURN WAS DELAYED DUE TO THE RAPID SEQUENCE OF EVENTS MENTIONED ABOVE. AFTER THE ACFT WAS LEVEL AT 4000 FT, AND THE SPD WAS STABILIZED, WE WERE VECTORED FOR A SECOND ILS APCH THAT RESULTED IN A SUCCESSFUL LNDG. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR 724468 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE REASON FOR THIS CONDITION HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED, ADDING A MAINT INVESTIGATION DID NOT UNCOVER THE CAUSE. THE RPTR STATED THAT THIS ENTIRE CREW IS GOING INTO A SIMULATOR AND WILL ATTEMPT TO REPRODUCE THE MALFUNCTION UNDER SIMILAR WIND/TURB CONDITIONS.

Synopsis

AN A330 EXPERIENCED AN UNCANCELABLE TOGA LOCK THRUST CONDITION FOLLOWING A PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR GO AROUND.

ACN: 724441

Time / Day

Date : 200701
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 2200
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 2700

Environment

Flight Conditions : Mixed
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZ.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B747-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope : 09R
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 11000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 5000
ASRS Report : 724441

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Unstabilized Approach
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

HAD WX AND MAINT PROBS AT ZZZ1 WHICH DELAYED US FOR 4 HRS. THIS WOULD PUT US OVER A 16 HR DAY WHEN WE REACHED ZZZ. POLLED CREW AND WE ALL AGREED THAT WE WERE WELL RESTED AND WOULD TAKE A 2 HR EXTENSION. IT WAS GRANTED. WE DEPARTED JUST IN TIME TO COMPLETE THE DAY IN 18 HRS. UNEVENTFUL FLT TO ZZZ. VECTORS TO APCH WERE GOING NORMALLY ON DOWNWIND AND BASE. ATC REQUESTED THAT WE KEEP 210 KTS. ON BASE, ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED CLRNC TO SLOW DOWN. THE FO (AN OE STUDENT) WAS FLYING AT THIS TIME WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED. WE WERE PUT ON AN INTERCEPT HDG AND TOLD TO INTERCEPT THE LOC TO RWY 9R. WHEN COURSE WAS ALIVE, WE WERE STILL AT 190 KTS. AT THIS SPD, THE AUTOPLT WOULD OVERSHOOT THE LOC. APCHS WERE IN PROGRESS ON THE PARALLEL RWY. TO PREVENT THE OVERSHOOT, I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT. I AGGRESSIVELY INTERCEPTED THE LOC. INTERCEPTION WENT WELL. WE WERE TOLD TO DSND TO 2700 FT AND CLRED THE ILS. I REENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND STARTED A DSCNT. THE GS WAS COMING INTO VIEW AND THEN DISAPPEARED WITH A FLAG. I RESET THE NAV MODE SELECTOR AND THE NAV RADIO. THE FLAG DISAPPEARED. WE WERE BELOW GS BUT THAT WAS WHAT I EXPECTED UNTIL WE REACHED 2700 FT AND THE GS INTERCEPTION POINT. HOWEVER, I HAD MISREAD MY ALTIMETER AND I WAS ACTUALLY HEADING FOR 1700 FT. THE CREW CALLED ALT AND THEN I REALIZED MY ERROR. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND CLBED BACK TO 2700 FT. THE LOWEST ALT WE REACHED WAS 2200 FT. APCH CALLED AND SAID THEY HAD GOTTEN A LOW ALT WARNING AND REMINDED US WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE AT 2700 FT. I TOLD THEM WE HAD INDEED GOTTEN LOW BUT WERE NOW LEVEL AT 2700 FT. THE REST OF THE APCH WAS RUSHED BUT THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. SEVERAL FACTORS CAME INTO PLAY HERE. THE CREW DUTY DAY EXTENSION WAS BASED ON WX BEING NO LOWER THAN 600/3 AT THE TIME OF OUR ARR. SHORTLY PRIOR TO DEP FROM ZZZ1 WE RECEIVED WORD THAT THE WX MAY GO DOWN TO 1/2 MI. THE ACTUAL WX TURNED OUT TO BE 300 FT OVCST WITH 9 MI VISIBILITY UNDER THE CLOUDS. IT WAS CLR ABOVE 500 FT. WE DID NOT SEE THE RWY UNTIL 300 FT. THE CHANGE IN CONDITIONS WE RECEIVED AT ZZZ1 SHOULD HAVE PROMPTED US TO REEVALUATE OUR DECISION FOR THE EXTENSION. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS FLYING WITH AN INEXPERIENCED OPERATING EXPERIENCE STUDENT. TRAINING ALWAYS REQUIRES MORE VIGILANCE THAN NORMAL LINE FLYING. ANOTHER UNEXPECTED FACTOR WAS THE TFC AT ZZZ. IT WAS MUCH HEAVIER THAN I EXPECTED. COMBINE THE BAD WX, TRAINING, AND HVY TFC LOAD THE DECISION TO EXTEND THE CREW DUTY DAY WAS PROBABLY A POOR ONE. THE REAL INSIDIOUS NATURE OF THIS INCIDENT WAS THAT I FELT THAT I WAS VERY ALERT THROUGHOUT THE APCH, BUT LOOKING BACK I CAN SEE THAT MY REACTIONS WERE SLOWED AND MY JUDGEMENT DID SUFFER. IT WASN'T UNTIL WE WERE IN THE BLOCKS THAT I REALIZED JUST HOW TIRED I WAS.

Synopsis

A B747-200 CREW ACCEPTED AN 18 HR DUTY DAY AFTER AN ATLANTIC CROSSING WITH AN INTERMEDIATE STOP. THE CREW BECAME FATIGUED ON THE SECOND LEG WITH DETERIORATING WX AND AN IOE FO.

ACN: 723886

Time / Day

Date : 200701

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 723886

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

THIS PAIRING IS A LEGALLY SCHEDULED, 4-DAY PAIRING, THAT STRETCHES THE MARGIN OF SAFETY TO ABSOLUTE BARE MINIMUMS. DURING THE COURSE OF THIS FLT, AS WELL AS THE NEXT NIGHT'S FLT NUMEROUS ATYPICAL ERRORS OCCURRED DUE TO FATIGUE AND OPERATING 'ON THE BACK SIDE OF THE CLOCK.' FOR EXAMPLE, THE ERRORS INCLUDED INITIALLY SETTING AN INCORRECT TRIM SETTING AND DIFFICULTY DETECTING OBSTACLES DURING TAXI. MOST ERRORS WERE TRAPPED BY THE CHKLIST, BUT WE WERE RELYING TOO HEAVILY ON THIS BARRIER. I BELIEVE SEVERAL FACTORS ARE INVOLVED THAT MAKE THIS PAIRING UNACCEPTABLE. FIRST, ON DUTY PERIOD 1, WE ARRIVED AT ABOUT XA00 BODY-TIME, AFTER 2 LONG LEGS, WITH A 2 HR LAYOVER AND ACFT CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE. SECOND, ON DUTY PERIOD 2, WE

FLEW UNTIL XT00 WITH A NEAR-MINIMUM OVERNIGHT OF 9 HRS 15 MINS. SO AFTER VERY POOR REST THE FIRST NIGHT, WE HAD TOO-SHORT OF REST (LESS THAN 8 HRS OF SLEEP) THE SECOND NIGHT. I BELIEVE THE FIRST DUTY PERIOD IS WORSE THAN A TRANSATLANTIC FLT, IN THAT THE TRANSATLANTIC FLT STARTS 2 HRS LATER, ARRIVES EARLIER, AND USUALLY HAS A RELIEF PLT. THE BEST SOLUTION TO CORRECT THIS PROB IS TO HAVE A FRESH CREW (EITHER JUST OUT OF AN OVERNIGHT, OR JUST STARTING THE TRIP), FLY THE FLT. AS AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, ELIMINATE THE ACFT CHANGE SO THE CREW CAN GET A LITTLE REST PRIOR TO THE NEXT FLT. ALSO AFTER DUTY PERIOD 2, LENGTHEN THE OVERNIGHT, SO WE DON'T HAVE 2 CONSECUTIVE NIGHTS OF POOR REST. IN SUM, I BELIEVE THIS IS THE SINGLE GREATEST SAFETY RISK IN OVER 30 YRS OF FLYING. IT IS AN 'ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN.'

Synopsis

A320 CAPT RPTS AN EXTREMELY FATIGUING TRIP PAIRING.

ACN: 723544

Time / Day

Date : 200701
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 32000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Hydraulic System Pump

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 70
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 20000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4500
ASRS Report : 723544

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Other Personnel : Dispatcher

Person : 4

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Aircraft : Equipment Problem Dissipated
Resolatory Action.Other
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

WE SAT FOR ABOUT 1 HR WAITING FOR THE WX AT ZZZ TO IMPROVE. DISPATCH DID NOT WANT US TO TAKE OFF BECAUSE THEY HAD SNOW AND ICE PELLETS MIXED. HE WAS AFRAID WE WOULD GET STUCK THERE. FINALLY, IT CHANGED TO SNOW SO OFF WE WENT. THIS WAS AFTER SITTING AROUND FOR OVER 1 HR WAITING FOR OUR ACFT TO COME IN (IT WAS LATE). I BELIEVE WE WERE AT OUR CRUISE ALT WHEN WE RECEIVED A HYD BLUE PUMP OVERHEAT MESSAGE. WE FOLLOWED THE ECAM AND TURNED THE PUMP OFF WHICH OF COURSE MADE OUR BLUE SYS PRESSURE GO TO ZERO. WE GOT THE BOOK OUT AND READ THE FLT MANUAL CHKLIST AS WELL. BOTH OF US LOOKED AT IT AND FELT WE HAD DONE EVERYTHING. WE THEN HAD DISPATCH CALL US AND HE WANTED US TO RETURN TO ZZZ1 BECAUSE OF THE PROB AND THE WX AT ZZZ HAD GONE BACK TO SNOW AND ICE PELLETS. I HAD ALREADY FIGURED THAT I WASN'T GOING TO ZZZ. I QUESTIONED HIM WHEN HE DIDN'T SEEM TO WANT TO CALL MAINT IN ON THIS ONE AND HE GOT THEM TO COME ON THE LINE. COM WAS DIFFICULT AND I THOUGHT POOR. WE REALLY DIDN'T LEARN ANYTHING NEW. MAINT DID NOT TALK WITH US BUT JUST THE DISPATCHER. AS IT TURNED OUT, MAINT DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT REALLY WAS WRONG WITH THE AIRPLANE. I TALKED WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND JUST ISSUED A WEAK CABIN ADVISORY (I WAS TEMPTED TO NOT EVEN DO THAT). THE REASON IS THAT I KNEW IF WE HAD FURTHER PROBS WE COULD ALWAYS DEPLOY THE RAT AND GET THE BLUE SYS BACK. DISPATCH EXITED BEFORE I WAS REALLY DONE TALKING WITH HIM SO I ACARS'ED HIM TO MAKE SURE HE DID NOT HAVE EMER TRUCKS CALLED. AGAIN AT THIS POINT IT DID NOT SEEM NECESSARY. I, OF COURSE, ALSO TOLD THE PEOPLE WHAT WAS GOING ON. ONCE WE GOT EVERYTHING DONE I WENT BACK TO THE BOOK AGAIN TO MAKE SURE WE DID NOT MISS ANYTHING. AS I LOOKED AT IT AGAIN IT SAYS 'IF BLUE OVERHEAT OUT' TO PUT IT BACK IN THE AUTO POS. THE LIGHT HAD BEEN OUT FOR SOME TIME SO WE BOTH AGREED THAT WE COULD PUT IT BACK ON AND RECOVERED THE BLUE SYS. WE DID AND DID NOT HAVE ANOTHER OVERHEAT. ON THE GND WITH ALL THE PRESSURE OFF, I LOOKED AT IT AGAIN AND FOUND THE BOOK PROC CONFUSING. IT HAS 2 CHKLISTS ON THE SAME PAGE. THE PART ABOUT TURNING THE PUMP BACK ON IS UNDER APCH PROC HYD LOW PRESSURE. WE NEVER GOT THIS ECAM MESSAGE (OF COURSE WE DID TURN IT ON BEFORE THE APCH PHASE AND DON'T KNOW IF IT WOULD HAVE COME UP THEN OR NOT). I THINK THIS CHKLIST NEEDS TO BE MADE MORE CLR. OTHERWISE THE FO DID A GREAT JOB AS WELL AS THE FLT ATTENDANTS. FATIGUE WAS AN ISSUE IN THAT SITTING AROUND FOR THAT LONG AND THE FACT THAT WE WERE ON DAY #4 OF A LONG 4-DAY TRIP (THE DAY BEFORE WE DEADHEADED TO ZZZ2 AND FLEW BACK) MEANT WE WERE TIRED IN OUR DECISION MAKING. THOUGH I WOULD SAY I DON'T THINK I WOULD HAVE DONE ANYTHING DIFFERENTLY.

Synopsis

AN A320 CREW TURNED AN OVERHEATED BLUE HYD ELECTRIC PUMP ON
PREMATURELY BEFORE LNDG BECAUSE OF CHKLIST AMBIGUITY AND CONFUSION.

ACN: 723131

Time / Day

Date : 200701
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : GVE.VOR
State Reference : VA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 35000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZDC.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A321
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 125
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 21000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4000
ASRS Report : 723131

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DUE TO LONG DUTY DAYS AND SHORT OVERNIGHTS YOU CANNOT STAY ALERT AND IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO STAY AWAKE AT TIMES. THIS WAS ONE OF THOSE TIMES. THE FO AND MYSELF WERE TIRED. IT WAS DAY 3 OF 4. THE FO WAS FLYING. I JUST NODDED OFF! I HAD BEEN FIGHTING IT AND IT FINALLY WON! I WAS ONLY OUT FOR 4 OR 5 MINS BUT WHEN I WOKE UP THE FO HAD FALLEN ASLEEP TOO! THE LITTLE TIME FOR GENUINE REST. THIS 'IT'S LEGAL' METHOD OF SCHEDULING FLT CREWS HAS TO STOP!

Synopsis

A321 FLT CREW IS CONCERNED WITH FATIGUE AND REST ISSUES DURING FLT.

ACN: 722952

Time / Day

Date : 200701
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DCA.Airport
State Reference : DC
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 1000
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 1600

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : DCA.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 240
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 30000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 7000
ASRS Report : 722952

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 8000
ASRS Report : 723434

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

MISREAD STEP-DOWN FIX WHILE ON THE VOR DME APCH TO RWY 19 AT DCA DURING TRANSITION TO VISUAL CONDITIONS TO LAND. THIS LED TO AN EARLY LETDOWN FROM 1600 FT TO 1000 FT. CREW FATIGUED. NIGHT APCH IN WX AND CREW COM HAMPERED BY ABSURDLY NOISY WINDSHIELD WIPERS IN B737.

Synopsis

B737 FLT CREW HAS ALTDEV DURING APCH TO DCA.

ACN: 722878

Time / Day

Date : 200701
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : BWI.Airport
State Reference : MD
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : BWI.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1500
ASRS Report : 722878

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

NOT ABLE TO GET NAP PRIOR TO ALL-NIGHTER TO BWI. ENRTE HAD SOME NAV OFFSET ISSUES WITH CAPT NAV DISPLAY, BUT RESOLVED THEMSELVES. ON DOWNWIND TO RWY 33L, ASKED IF RWY WAS IN SIGHT. ARPT WAS ON R SIDE, FO ACKNOWLEDGED RWY WAS IN SIGHT AND I TURNED FOR THE FINAL APCH IN NIGHT VISUAL CONDITIONS. TURNED BASE TO FINAL AND SAW HIGH INTENSITY APCH LIGHTS ON 330 DEG HDG, TURNED TO INTERCEPT. INTERCEPTED, NOTED SLIGHT OFFSET ON NAV, BUT DUE TO PRIOR EXPERIENCE EARLIER IN FLT, PRESSED ON TOWARDS HIGH INTENSITY RWY LIGHTS AT MY 12 O'CLOCK POS. BELOW 1000 FT TWR RPTS WE ARE LINED UP FOR RWY 33R, WHICH IS ONLY 5000 FT LONG AND ASKS IF WE CAN STILL SIDESTEP TO RWY 33L. WE SIDESTEP WITHOUT ISSUE. HOWEVER, WITHOUT TWR CALL, I AM ALMOST CERTAIN NEITHER OF THE PLTS WOULD HAVE NOTICED WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO LAND ON SHORT SIDE. BOTH CREW MEMBERS WERE VERY TIRED DUE TO BODY CLOCK ISSUES AND INABILITY TO GET DECENT NAP PRIOR TO FLT. FLT WAS FURTHER DELAYED BY MAINT ISSUE.

Synopsis

A320 FLT CREW LINES UP ON WRONG RWY AT BWI.