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Final Report of the Independent Counsel In Re: Bruce Edward Babbitt

Carol Elder Bruce, Independent Counsel, August 22, 2000

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TITLE Page
COVER Cover
FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL IN RE: BRUCE EDWARD BABBITT Title Page
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ORDER FILED AUGUST 22, 2000 Order
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS i
TABLE OF CONTENTS xi
PREFACE 1
A.  The Mandate 1
B.  Structure of the Investigation 2
C.  Purpose and Approach of the Report to the Special Division 5
I.  SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE APPOINTMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL 7
II.  REVIEW OF EVIDENCE 13
A.  Origins of the Hudson Casino Proposal 13
1.  Indian Gaming in Minnesota and Wisconsin Is a Lucrative Industry in Which Established Participants Have the Ability to Protect Their Financial Interests 14
2.  The City of Hudson Is an Attractive Site for Gaming Because of Its Proximity to the Twin Cities 19
3.  The Hudson Dog Track Owners First Attempted to Establish An Indian Casino by Seeking a Partnership with the St. Croix Tribe in 1992 22
4.  Minnesota Indian Gaming Association Opposition to the Initial Hudson Proposal 23
5.  The Hudson Dog Track Owners Form the Four Feathers Partnership with Three Wisconsin Indian Tribes in a Second Effort to Establish An Indian Casino at the Dog Track 26
B.  The BIA Area Office Consideration of the Hudson Casino Proposal 29
1.  Legal Framework and Procedures Governing Land to Trust Acquisitions for Off-Reservation Gaming 29
a.  The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 29
b.  The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 32
2.  DOI Experience and Procedures for Reviewing Gaming Applications 39
3.  Consultation Process and Review of the Hudson Application 49
a.  Responses by Local Governments 50
b.  Responses by Local Residents and Activists 51
c.  Responses by Wisconsin and Minnesota Tribal Governments and Associations 54
1)  Tribal Opposition to the Hudson Application Was Led by the Minnesota Indian Gaming Association 54
2)  MIGA and Its Members Contact the BIA in Washington 55
3)  MIGA and Its Members Contact the Minneapolis Area Office of BIA 58
4.  The BIA Issues a Draft Finding of No Significant Impact 63
5.  Minneapolis Area Office Recommends Approval Under IGRA 66 66
C.  Coordinated Opposition Efforts By Minnesota and Wisconsin Tribes 71
1.  Opponents Mobilize Congressional Support 72
2.  MIGA Considers Political Contributions 75
3.  The Coordinated Opposition Lobbying Effort Focuses Its Political Arguments and Agenda 77
a.  The Tribal Opponents Identify Their Arguments, and Their Audience 77
b.  O'Connor & Hannan Joins the Opposition 82
c.  The Opponents Secure a Feb. 8 Meeting with Secretary Babbitt's Counselor, John Duffy 86
D.  Events Occurring During Early Analysis of the Hudson Application by DOI's Indian Gaming Management Staff (December 1994 - May 1, 1995) 89
1.  IGMS's Initial Analysis Identifies Concerns With the Best Interests Analysis, But Finds That The Casino Would Not Be Detrimental to The Surrounding Community 89
2.  The Feb. 8, 1995 Meeting of Opponent Tribal Representatives and DOI Officials at Congressman Oberstar's Office 93
a.  The "Strategy" Meeting 94
b.  The Meeting with John Duffy and George Skibine 95
3.  Opponent Representatives Meet with DOI Chief of Staff Thomas Collier on March 15, 1995 100
4.  DOI Sets April 30, 1995, Deadline For Additional Comments 103
5.  The Secretary and Senior DOI Officials Meet with Wisconsin Tribes on April 8, 1995 105
6.  Additional Comments Submitted to DOI on the Hudson Proposal 107
a.  New Materials Indicating Changes In Support by Local Governments and Other Officials 107
b.  Additional Materials, Including Economic Impact Studies, Submitted by Opposition Tribes and Tribal Associations 111
E.  Tribal Opponents' Continuing Lobbying Efforts (Feb. 9, 1995 - June 8, 1995) 114
1.  Opposition Lobbying on Capitol Hill 117
a.  Opponent Representatives Continue to Lobby Individual Congressmen 117
b.  Hudson Opponents Lobby Sen. McCain With False Information Regarding the Ownership of the Hudson Dog Track 124
2.  Tribal Opponents Seek and Obtain the Assistance of the Democratic National Committee 128
a.  Emergence Of A Strategy For DNC Involvement 128
b.  DNC's Fund-Raising Strategies in Anticipation of the 1996 Presidential Election 131
c.  DNC Native American Fund-Raising Prior to Spring 1995 135
d.  Patrick O'Connor and Larry Kitto Meet with DNC Chairman Fowler on March 15, 1995 139
e.  Discussions Among the Tribal Opponents in Anticipation of the April 28, 1995 Meeting 142
f.  Tribal Opponents Meet with Fowler on April 28, 1995 147
g.  The DNC Contacts DOI and the White House About Hudson 158
1)  DNC Contact with the White House 158
2)  DNC Contact with the Department of the Interior 160
h.  DNC Policies and Practices Concerning the Intersection of Fund-raising and Contacts with Administration Officials 161
1)  DNC Finance Policies on Administration Contacts 162
2)  Evidence of DNC Conduct in Other Matters Involving Both Contributions and Issues Pending Before the Administration 165
3.  Tribal Opponents Seek Assistance of Clinton/Gore Campaign 172
4.  Tribal Opponents Contact the White House, and the White House Contacts Interior 177
a.  Patrick O'Connor's First Attempts to Involve the White House 177
b.  O'Connor Speaks to President Clinton and Bruce Lindsey 178
c.  O'Connor's May 8, 1995, Letter to Harold Ickes 185
d.  Thomas Schneider's Contacts With Ickes 187
e.  Ickes's Office Contacts the Interior Department 191
1)  Jennifer O'Connor's May 18, 1995, Memo 193
2)  Heather Sibbison's June 6, 1995, Conversation with the White House 197
3)  Department of the Interior Assistance in Responding to the June 12, 1995, Congressional Letter to Ickes 199
f.  White House Policy Regarding Contacts With Agencies 201
g.  O'Connor & Hannan Curtails Its Lobbying of the White House Prior to the Decision on July 14, 1995 206
5.  Other Tribal Opponents Continue Lobbying 207
F.  Events Occurring During On-Going Analysis of Application by DOI in Washington, D.C. (May 1, 1995-June 8, 1995) 209
1.  Collier, Duffy and Skibine Meet with Congressman Oberstar on May 2, 1995 209
2.  The Four Feathers Partnership Enlists Lobbyists 211
3.  Four Feathers Partners Meet with Duffy and IGMS Staff on May 17, 1995 213
4.  White House Contacts with Interior During Consideration of the Hudson Application 216
5.  Tribal Opponents Meet with Michael Anderson and IGMS Staff on May 23, 1995 218
6.  Four Feathers Representatives Meet with IGMS Staff on May 31, 1995 220
7.  Further Contact Between IGMS Staff and Applicant Representatives 222
8.  IGMS Concludes that the Hudson Casino Proposal Would Not Be Detrimental to the Surrounding Community 224
G.  The Department of the Interior Decides to Deny the Hudson Application 229
1.  Internal Debates Over the Basis of Denial: IGRA Section 20 or IRA and Part 151 Regulations 229
2.  Skibine Drafts a Decision Letter Denying the Hudson Application Based Only Upon the Secretary's Discretion Under IRA and Part 151 Regulations 233
3.  Duffy Directs that Denial Be Based Upon Section 20 of IGRA, As Well As Section 465 of IRA and its Part 151 Regulations 237
4.  Recusal of Assistant Secretary Ada Deer 241
5.  The Issuance of the Decision Letter 242
6.  Interior Department Witnesses Deny Both Being Influenced by Political Party Affiliations and Being Aware of the Hudson Opponents' Efforts to Obtain Assistance from the DNC 245
7.  The Policy Reason Given for the Hudson Decision Was Neither a Long-Standing, Nor a Consistently Applied, Interior Policy 247
8.  Secretary Babbitt's Involvement in Consideration of the Hudson Application 253
a.  Babbitt's Participation in Indian Gaming Matters Generally 253
b.  Babbitt's Role in the Hudson Decision-Making Process and Early Contacts with Interested Parties 256
c.  Secretary Babbitt's Contact with Paul Eckstein 265
d.  Eckstein and Babbitt's May 17 Meeting 272
e.  Additional Approaches to Babbitt by Applicant Representatives 274
H.  Events of July 14, 1995 277
1.  Eckstein Arranges a Meeting with Duffy 277
2.  Eckstein and Moody Meet with Duffy on July 14, 1995 278
3.  Eckstein's July 14, 1995, Meeting with Secretary Babbitt 282
4.  Further Efforts By the Applicant Representatives to Delay the Decision 290
I.  Efforts to Reverse the Hudson Denial 293
1.  The Applicants and Havenick Seek Reconsideration of the Denial 293
2.  Eckstein Provides an Affidavit Regarding Contact with Secretary Babbitt in Litigation Challenging DOI's Denial of the Hudson Application 306
3.  Applicant Tribes Meet with IGMS Director Skibine and Staff Members on Dec. 3, 1996 308
J.  The Opponent Tribes Contribute Heavily to Democrats in the 1996 Election Cycle 311
1.  1995 Contribution Activity Prior to the Hudson Decision 312
2.  DNC Contacts with the Tribal Opponents in the Aftermath of the Hudson Decision 313
3.  Other DNC Native American Fund-Raising Efforts in 1995 317
4.  The DNC's Parallel Indian Fund-Raising Efforts Collide in August 1995 321
5.  DNC Indian Solicitations and Contributions by the Hudson Opponent Tribes in Late Summer and Fall 1995 327
6.  Summary and Evaluation of Tribal Opponents' National Democratic Contributions in 1995-96 333
K.  Secretary Babbitt's Various Statements and Testimony 352
1.  The Wall Street Journal July 12, 1996, Article 352
a.  Ickes's Office Examines the Hudson Matter Internally in Anticipation of the Wall Street Journal Article Alleging Potential Impropriety in the Hudson Decision 354
b.  Sen. McCain Writes Letters to Secretary Babbitt, President Clinton and Deputy Chief of Staff Ickes 356
c.  The White House Responds to Sen. McCain's Letters to the President and the Deputy Chief of Staff 359
d.  Babbitt Responds to McCain's July 1996 Correspondence 364
e.  McCain's Reaction to the Responses 368
2.  Secretary Babbitt's Oct. 10, 1997, Letter to Sen. Thompson 370
3.  Secretary Babbitt's Telephone Conversation with Sen. McCain Regarding Babbitt's Aug. 30, 1996, Letter 377
4.  Secretary Babbitt's Testimony Before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee 379
5.  Secretary Babbitt's Testimony Before the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee 394
6.  Secretary Babbitt's Interviews During the DOJ Preliminary Investigation 398
7.  Secretary Babbitt's Grand Jury Testimony 401
III.  LEGAL ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE 415
A.  There Is Insufficient Evidence to Warrant Criminal Prosecution of Any Conduct Related to the Hudson Casino Proposal, Including Secretary Babbitt's Congressional Testimony 415
1.  Babbitt's Testimony and Other Evidence Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Raised Questions About Whether the Hudson Casino Decision Had Been Criminally Corrupted by Campaign Contributions 415
2.  These Well-Founded Concerns About the Secretary's Testimony and the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Casino Decision Led to the Appointment of an Independent Counsel 417
3.  After a Thorough Investigation and Analysis of the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Alleged Corruption and Perjury, the OIC Has Concluded that No Prosecution Is Justified 418
B.  There is Insufficient Evidence to Prove that the Hudson Casino Decision Was Criminally Corrupted 425
1.  A Campaign Contribution Can Form the Basis of a Federal Bribery Charge Only If an Official and a Contributor Specifically and Corruptly Agree that a Contribution Is Being Given and Received in Exchange for an Official Act 425
2.  There Is Insufficient Evidence to Prove that the Hudson Matter Was the Subject of a Corrupt Quid Pro Quo 430
3.  There Is Insufficient Evidence to Support a Finding that Any Other Federal Criminal Corruption Statutes Were Violated in the Hudson Matter 442
C.  There Is Insufficient Evidence to Prove that Secretary Babbitt Perjured Himself Before Congress 445
1.  There Is Insufficient Evidence to Prove that Babbitt Perjured Himself in Testifying About What He Said to Paul Eckstein About Harold Ickes's Involvement in the Hudson Casino Proposal 447
a.  Evidence Relating to Whether Babbitt's Testimony About His Conversation with Eckstein Was True or False 452
1)  Eckstein Repeated Key Parts of the Babbitt-Eckstein Conversation Shortly After the Meeting to at Least Four People, Each of Whom Has Corroborated Eckstein's Version of the Conversation 453
2)  Babbitt's Asserted Purpose for Invoking Ickes's Name Undermines His Subsequent Insistence that He Did Not Tell Eckstein the Decision Had to Be Issued "That Day" 455
3)  Babbitt's Testimony About the Eckstein Conversation Was Internally Inconsistent 456
4)  Babbitt Fully Understood the Meaning of the Senators' Questions 457
5)  The "Two-Witness Rule" Is Satisfied 459
b.  Babbitt's Testimony about His Conversation with Eckstein Was Material to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 462
c.  There Is Insufficient Evidence to Prove that Babbitt Possessed the Requisite Intent to Provide False Testimony 464
2.  There Is Insufficient Evidence to Prove that Babbitt Perjured Himself in Testifying About Whether He Intended to Mislead Sen. McCain with His Aug. 30, 1996 Letter 466
a.  Evidence Relating to Whether Babbitt's Testimony That He Did Not Intend to Mislead McCain Was True or False 469
1)  The Text of Babbitt's Letter to McCain Shows He Misled McCain 470
2)  Babbitt's Letter to McCain Was Drafted as a Flat Denial that Babbitt Invoked Ickes's Name 475
3)  Babbitt's Subsequent Conduct Is Probative of Whether He Intended to Mislead McCain 477
(a)  Babbitt Wrote a Letter to Thompson in October 1997, Admitting That He Invoked Ickes's Name to Eckstein 477
(b)  Babbitt Telephoned McCain and Apologized for Misleading Him 478
4)  Babbitt Had a Motive to Mislead McCain 479
b.  Babbitt's Testimony About His Letter to McCain Was Material to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 480
c.  There is Insufficient Evidence to Prove that Babbitt Possessed the Requisite Intent to Provide False Testimony with Respect to the McCain Letter 482
APPENDIX App. 1
Responses Filed
March 20, 2000, Michael Brozek App. 2
April 20, 2000, JoAnn Jones App. 5
May 12, 2000, Gerald E. Sikorski App. 9
May 30, 2000, Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, Stanley R. Crooks, Glynn A. Crooks, Susan Totenhagen, Paul Kempf, Kurt V. BlueDog, and William J. Hardacker App. 14
June 2, 2000, The Honorable Bruce Edward Babbitt App. 24
June 2, 2000, Patrick J. O'Connor App. 40
June 5, 2000, Thomas Collier App. 46
June 5, 2000, Cheryl D. Mills App. 52
June 5, 2000, David Mercer App. 56
June 5, 2000, Scott Dacey App. 62
June 5, 2000, Donald L. Fowler App. 76
June 5, 2000, The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr. App. 82
June 5, 2000, Chris McNeil, Jr. App. 86
June 7, 2000, Elena Kagan App. 90
MAP - Principal Tribal Locations and Cities App. 97