Thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing. As you know, this Committee has a lengthy history in examining the shortfalls associated with security at many of the Department of Energy's (DOE) nuclear weapons sites. As I can quickly garner from today's prepared testimony, the old adage about "the more things change, the more they stay the same," rings true for this subject. Indeed, many of the security problems we worked so hard to correct in the 1980s and 1990s are still plaguing this Department today: site security at some locations remains inadequate; force-on force exercises at some facilities still require improvement; the handling of sensitive materials and documents still remains a complex-wide concern, and Wackenhut is still at the center of another controversy.

Mr. Chairman, I compliment you for taking the initiative to begin looking closely at these problems with today's hearing. I must warn you, however, that this area of inquiry can be a very frustrating full-time undertaking. For example, today we have a panel of people from the Y-12 weapons site. In June of 2003, there was a force-on-force exercise that was compromised because Wackenhut allowed some of their protective force personnel to see the computer simulations of these exercises in advance. Not surprisingly, the guard force passed the exercises with flying colors. In fact, they were so good that DOE's Y-12 site manager could not believe it and asked for an investigation by the Inspector General (IG).

During that investigation, the IG took testimony indicating that this and similar kinds of cheating had been going on for decades. It included disabling gear that determines when a responder has received a fatal gunshot wound, but new gear that could have avoided this has not been implemented. Numerous other actions were taken by the protective force over the years to obtain an advantage when the exercise actually occurred. In addition, Wackenhut personnel also participated in the detailed planning and development of the tests, another practice the IG found questionable. But not a single Y-12 witness today -- including the site manager -- even acknowledges the IG's findings or tells us what actions they took in response.

Other topics before the Subcommittee today also demonstrate the intractability of the difficulties. The key problems at Lawrence Livermore Lab and the loss of classified removable electronic media at Los Alamos occurred long after the Wen Ho Lee incident, after the classified disk was found behind a Los Alamos copier, and after the University of California promised to tighten its procedures.

And just today, it was reported that DOE gave a no-bid contract for security work at the Idaho Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and Argonne-West Laboratory to a native Alaskan corporation that has no experience guarding federal nuclear sites. It will have to partner with Wackenhut to get the job done. Absent constant and consistent Congressional inquiry, this kind of curious behavior will continue unabated.

To do oversight in this area properly will require significant staff and member hours, and considerable field work. But it is a duty that has taken on more importance than ever, and I am confident that all Members of the Committee support you in this undertaking.